A. NSC POLICIES (GENERAL)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020019-5
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 1, 2000
Sequence Number: 
19
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 3, 1952
Content Type: 
PAPER
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020019-5.pdf337.71 KB
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Approved For F lease 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP80-OW65A000100020019-5 Working Paper Policy Additions 3 October 1952 A. PNSC Policies (General) The U. S. is of making significant progress in the psycholo~:ical field toward its jjective of reduction and rf-traction of Soviet power as laid down in NSC 20/4. Further progress toward the development and im;:lementation of an agreed overall strategic concept for our national psychological program, an effort can take place only in con- junction with a corres ond' development of capabilities and resources and an ac companying adjustment of aszc na ion po icier an programs designed to have a deterrent effect on the Soviet Union. The distor- tion and exploitation by Communists of anti-American propaganda are occasio-ing resistance instrumentalism and charges of aggressiveness of our psychological effort. (Middle east) desp' e a stated cy of impartiali ,y. An edim nt to U. S pabil'ties in the e East ?,d in the isparit, of o titudes to and I and the Arab States (Eastern Europe) A U. S. policy on Czechoslovakia is desired. Policies on Czecho- slovakia are tenuous and not substantive. (SR) Policy clarification A required concerning U. S. position with respect to the future status of the peoples of Russia. Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020019-5 Approved For W ease 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP80-040MWgJ910R39P19-5 3 October 1952 e4' B. Inter-Departmental Policies (General) Headline publicity about U. S. atomic prowess is a very question- able line of policy. The most that seems to be required at this time is an occasional guarded but reassuring statement to the effect that U. S. national interest, with respect to atomic weapons, is being effectively safe-guarded. The Department of Defense raises two major points for resolutions (1) It requests clarification of the role and obligations of the military establishment in psychological operations, and (2) It states the opiaion that the nations military establishment can render more effective support to the national psychological program; if its war- time potentials are exploited to the maximum during the cold-war period. An appropriate authority is suggested for a reexamination of the entire question of inter-departmental coordination mechanisms for achieving national psychological objectives. (Far East) 25X1A CIA regards coordinating machinery between civilian and mili- tary authorities in the field of psychological as inadequate in certain respects. A coordinating mechanism was set up, for example, but failed to include the operations of USIE services in Korea. Close cooperation with the military exists in the field on intelligence and tactical psychological warfare measures. However, a completely effective coordination of two major strategical plans with respect to Korea has not been realized with respect to command and logistical support, but steps are being taken to remedy the situation. The U. S. Government should provide a firm and clear policy on s ecif~ c (General) The excessively aggressive and militaristic tone of some of the statements made by U. S. Government officials which play directly into the hands of the Soviet Peace offensive calls for the establish- ment of a strong policy on this matter. p issues relating to colonialism because of the exigencies of -/~ the European alliance system. (Eastern Europe) The State Department has indicated reluctance to countenance any activity which could be construed to support a separatist tendency. Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020019-5 25X1A "IOPC~-, k/,44t7 tr~ Ot W Z~F-O/~ ~~, ,~ - , j OV4--~ i a tquir - - within the Agency T?1 %M 4 for the deli* _It 'an with the psycholo- gical warfare aspects of the , with specific divi sion and assignment of responsibility for more effective utilization of 25X1 C M 4 w TOP SECRET D. International 5/1 8.28 Copy of 17 Copies Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020019-5 Approved For Ruse 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP80-015A000100020019-5 Policy Additions 3 October 1952 ., q Pat- Policy . coordinat' and delineation of responsibility4 USIE, MSA, and CIA ,, 4 - 01TTT1i QJ, -z- tat in@ p l @--e from overt U. S. information activities in MSA and State Department, aitd 44 corresponding development of covert propaganda activities in the gray fields. State and MSA feel that they can handle the gray field securely, and for that reason, CIA should not be involved in these activities. Policy guidance to deal with the exploitation of the racial issue in the U. S. by the Communists is needed. Policy guidance on tariff structure to expand international trade and expand the ability of foreign countries to export to this country. (General) Policy modification is requested on NSC 10/2 with respect to broadening its utilization in reference to attribution of our govern- ment with respect to certain aspects of CIA operations, so that during high-level operations, discreet reference may be made to indicate some measure of U. S. support. Tunisia The U overnment uld to e a fi specif' issues to colonial , ch as the Tunisian case. Southeast Asia 25X1 C Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020019-5 Approved For Rele 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP80-010000100020019-5 Policy Additions 3 October 1952 D. International Policies (General) Because of Burma's disapproval of Americas present policy of laying the foundation of effective guerrilla activities in the event that this country may be overrun by the Communists, some leaders in Burma are reluctant to cooperate with.the U. S. fully. CIA is governed by a policy limitation which precludes any action which would seriously prejudice U. S. relations with the government in Burma. Satisfactory progress has been impeded by the lack of overall national policy and by State Department policy toward personnel support of developmental projects which has precluded sufficient staffing for programs laying the ground work for future operations in Burma. Indochina CIA has been unable to lay the foundation for effective guerrilla activity because it has not received a policy authorization to do so and because the French have been unwilling to cooperate in this matter. Even though there are severe policy limitations, considerable progress has been made in s chological warfare activities and some progress in the 25X1 C Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020019-5 --Approved For Releakl" 2000/09/11 TRDP80-0106514400100020019-5 SECURITY INFORMAT104 FAR EAST General F/2-X1 C There is need fora a -e t statement of olicy,, and implementing directives as to the relocation and exploitation fore/5 purpose of refugees from the China Mainland. / FAR EAST There is. need for a qata -cut statement ofoverall and psychological Vbjectives with respect to and the Overseas Chinese, S o # I --r' S8 BET - SECURITY iNFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020019-5 AppAjossrBw Rt eAW%WMNtC P80-0 65 MIA: 11-01 For the Intraoffice Use of OSO and OPC Only-as a Cover Attachment to Form No. 38-13 ROOM NO. . ATTENTION.-Access to top secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate or assistant top secret ..control officer who receives and/or releases the attached top secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in columns provided. Each individual who sees this top secret document will enter date of handling and sign his full name in the proper columns. Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. full name before further routing. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should sign aro. 10-61704-1 PLEASE RETURN THIS xrRlr Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020019-5 Detaching Form No. 38-13 for the purpose of securing this form to top secret docu- ments is prohibited THIS FORM MUST BE DETACHED PRIOR TO TRANSMITTING TOP SECRET MATERIAL OUTSIDE OF OSO OR OPC TOP SECRET a". i.