NOTES ON GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000200060016-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: NOTES

NOTES ON Gl1ANY
Approved'For Rese 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01A000200060016-3
by
Henry A. Kissinger,
Harvard University..
I.. L3a k round
The importance of Germany in Europe hardly requires re,:tatemeht It
is tr-i most hihly industrialized country on the Continent; its disciplined
labor forces and its deposits of raw iiiateria15 make it in many respects
the lceyotone of kaerican efforts in Europe. It was hoped that the si_: ning-
of the Peace `i caty would transform Germany into a awillin partner of the
Atlantic eoa:rniunity; its contribution all the snore me aninr ful bocaurI,e freely
given. It was assumed tho.t a feeling, of satisfaction would greet the
achievement of quasi.-sovereignty only seven years after unconditional cur-
render culminatim a rerm rkable i:ecovory inconceivable as late as 1945.
Such has not been the ca see however. This writer npon:nt ?:ieveral weeks
in Germany at a period coinci.din" with the signing of the Peace Treaty.
During this time he was in a position to visit various sections of Germany
and to talk to a wide ran;-;e o:" irdivic'uals. German rea ction to the Peace
Trot'ty inc' to U.S. policy in general can best be oaznmed. up as "hysterical".
1.1hether e: Jressec1 as the refu^,al by the Laender of Adenauorts recuost that
the Pao.ce Treaty be celebratod, by school holidays and by the etcl.7ibition of
flags on public bui.ldinr;s; whether revoa1ec. in newr3pape ^ ectitorials or in
conversations o. loLendin" over all sections of the population anJ threatening
to ruin the whole, C';crrnan ;policy of the U.S.?
II. Specific German?Cr ticisms
German criticism of the U.S. focuses on the Peace Treaty, on rearmament
and on t ho problem of Gorman unity. ' Specific criticisms tend to vary with
1,he i_ntf rr.;sts of the group concernedp but it is fair to Late that they are
:enei'al and are reduCiblo to one vnderlyin ; cause: A pervasive distrust
of t le U.S.
The criticism of the P-'nace Contract takes many form..,, most of it dir-
ected a^,ainst the U.S. The decartelization c1: u;:,o is considered by many
an it frin ement of the very overeignty the Treaty attempts to restore. The
industr.'ial:isto naturally deplore the clause for obvious reasons. But it is
opposed al o; t as violently by the SPD as another e camplo of U.S. encourage-
ment of 'treactionary free enterprise capitalism". Tno provision reC cxding;
the r. evicw of sentences. of war criminals has ar. ou.,ed the violent opposition
of veterans t groups. Many individuals who really have a vested interet.t in
rearmament balk because of this alle ed slur on the honor o the German army.
The former of Staff of the Gorman High Cornand. ex-pret.,sed a C;enoral
attitude to the writer when he stated: "If I tun r;oin to Do asked about the
s taffin? of the G.-rmanO ficers t Corp, I shall i ecommend that its, personnel
'Je c yawn from the ranks o ' the latiryersy so tha-G they will knaI llow to be1L:~.ve
after the war. 11
Security Information
COIFID'?;: TI.&L
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200060016-3
 ApprQ,b 6-3
loos, effective had Soviet propaganda not succeeded in stimulating a two-
fold fear: a) that the Peace Treaty perpetuates (or in the' words of a
leading 1PDP politician "eternizes") the division of Germanyp and b) that
o. .:++ m xnc nt will make war inevitable. Soviet propaganda has succeeded in
shifting the onus for the division of Germany on the U.S). The apparent ro-
jecti.on of the Soviet proposal for a four-power conference has made ratifi-
c:.tion of the Peace Troaty by the Bundostag o:ctromoly difficult. The pros-
Su re- for unification is powerful and cannot be assuaged by ,a' Lriori asser-
tions of Soviet bad faith. A loading inombor of Adenauorts party told this
Saritor that the bad faith of the Soviet Union could not have boon better ox-
posed than through a four-power conference; that in his opinion a peace
treaty should have boon aatv..rtisod as a last resort not as the beginning of
a avow era in ;Eur opcan pol.icios. This is undoubtedly the anotiviation behind
the recent advocacy of a four-power conference by Jacob Kaiser, Adonauorts
Minister for All-Gorman Affairs, who is certainly an ardent anti-Camrnunist.
In an atmosphere which is becoming increasingly infler,-ibl_a because
of the pressures of both the ,SPD and orctrorne right-win; groups the govern-
ment coalition finds its position alrriost untonatble if it constantly is forced
to defend itself againF t charges of being an instrument of the Allies (see
Schtursacharts description of Adonauor as Chancellor of the Allies). Much cf
the; anti-Amen can bitterness of particularly the FDP is duo to their belief
that American policy puts them before inipossihle alternatives: Either to
leave the ggovornrnont coalition or to vote for unpopular nn asuros an! cor nit
political suicide. On the day of the ratification of the Peace Treaty this
writer dined with the head ef the Forei,n Policy CmTmis lion of the FOP. He
was greeted by his host with the words, "Why did you do this to us?"
The psychological affect of the Peace Troaty is further reduced by
the fact that it was tied to a Defense Pact. Evan more than in Jbpan, this
is construed as a form of blackmail, Cs granting shvcrci,gnty to achiovo
essentially American ends in the U.S. strategy against I us, i.a. But rearraa-
rxea t is opposed for other reasons as wall. The younger gore ration is cyni-
c:: and bitter. Having witnessed the collapse of Germany after fighting
a .1opoloss war for several years: they era disillusioned and "neutralist".
In conversations with university youth a pacifist strain with religious
overtones appears, not easily overcome by a leader. ship with as little
prestige a's the present West German government. Others oppose rearmament
on tl-~.c basis of military considerations. Thoy emphasize the indefensibility
of the F,lbo, Allied troop dispositions which point to a stand at the Rhine
1.11d to the f utility of fighting a roar-? card action which will again l.a ave
Germany dcvasted and many hostages in Soviet hands.
III. Prc'~olo ray
The above remarks are perhaps one-sided. The s cepathies of many, if
not most, Germans arc with the West. But they are not vocal.. Their feel-
ing;s ero not organized and however opposed to tho Soviet Union? they are
often as distrustful of the U.S., though not as afraid. Zia real dilonria
of the U.S. position in Corr.i ny does not derive from the specific complaints
advanced, but from {gore cal lack of confidence in the U.S. which prevents
te creation of a psychological climate for the e,accution of integrated,
long--rc.nga policies and which prevents the Germans from soeii g; such meas-
ures as -h;lze Atlantic Pact in ter?-is of their own intoro st.
It is, of course, unfortunate that it should have been the P(..,,,,, co Con-
tract which became the focal point of the f ez stra tion and resentments
of the past fifteen yoars. Perhaps it would have been wiser to sign a Peace
Contract only after the failure of a four--power conforonce9 to keep the
Peace Contract very short and to leave such details as docartelization and
the: disposition of war criminals for negotiation ,,aitl, a sovoroir n West
Germany as an implementing instrument of the Peace Contract, Rearr:aziont,
too$ would bo psychologically much ~.ioro meaningful woro it negotiated by a
government airoady sovorci n,r rather than by om seemingly accepting it as
the price of sovereignty.
Sonurit =C, foe: mation
Approved For Release 2000/08/kI'diP.-I [ 80-01065A000200060016-3
 qq vea~'reye ~rud~i~t~r~~:i~e~t~t~r~tc~cr~ d4_
P a`i crccelat as syr:.ptoris of a more func.,cziontal resentment. Inclcod an at-
ter1pt to r.icot specific criticisms by ad hoc noasuros woulC probably worsen
rather than improve the situation in two ways: a) they would be token as
::.i~o .lrer syymotori of Americ~,.n weakness and encourage the notion that intransi-
go mco is the best bargaining weapon in coaling with the U.S. This seeri-
in,,; woaknoss would make the Gcrri::rzs all the .:.ore rorvcus since it wou3.d be
interpreted as the reverse side of Soviet strength. b) Any concessions,
c:lclz, a::h they would remove specific criticisr:rs, w: ulc'. probably raise others
as has proved to be the o,%sc through the past four ye::rs. They would$ if
anything, increase the ox i.stin ? b1tt'rne ss by intensifying the prevalent
self-righteousness and frustration. They would be taken as one more indi-
cation that -;,he U.S. novor unc'crst' nc s what really moves the German people;
tha,.?t:, it is talking about legal instruments while the Germans describe an
historical e.crionce.
This gives a tragic and almost noxtricablo quality to l :i^rican-Gorman
relations. The Germans have oq orioncod three upheavals in the past thirty
years: the collapse of the aipiro, of t h 1-lein r Republic, of Nazi Ger-
many. - The older gonoratioi is of a cynicism that knows only one impetus t
to be, by all moansp on the winning side ro~.t tins. The younger gczcration
is confused and gro1An. American invocations of a Communist peril soon to
them all too reminiscent of the propaganda of Goobbcis and all too shallow
in torus of their own oxporionco with the Soviet Union.
Germany, too, is just timerging' from the shock of. defeat and of donazi.
fi cation and donalitarization, a ic1 from ? he expulsion of millions of its
cities from Fast Germany and from economic chaos. Donazification has
created a sense of identification among many former party members and de-
nazification is ascribedp rightly or wrongly, to the U.S. A loading civil
servant tole? this writer that up to the lejorican Occupation and his own
imprisonment he had considered the SS sub-hurian, but that the internment comp
had taught him their qualities. The memory of a period when America was
specking; of "rooducation", of the villainy of German militarism and authori-
tarianism is still pervasive and is constantly invoked in conversations.
The sudden shift of American policy in 1950 is considered by most Germans
not as ma nanimity but as utter cynicisr1. Above all$ the Germans are weary
and almost neurotic and any exhortation is' apt to be rosented because CC
its very e.cistenco. The fear of a new ware now bombings, and now occupation
is pervasive.
A ericans attempt to deal with the-so frustrations with an open-minded
matter-of-factnoss. They examine the "objective" merit cf individual com-
plaints; more often than not they moot German objections. They speck of
the evils of Cor:miunism, but not in terms which mean anything to the Germans--
and., therefore,. they compound German bittern ss, German self-rightoousmss
and the feeling that Americans simply are incapable of understanding. The
editor of a leading German cultural and political review., a former inmate of
a concentration camp, a man of considerable influence in intellectual cir-
cles told this writer: "If an Anti. ican visits rq friends or myself. we al-
ways have a very pleasant conversation. But afterwards we fool like throw-
ing the nearest convenient object against a wail. We simply cannot stand
this t'Goddannod American good-willr any longer. We would like to talk about
things that movo us, whose solution. I assure you. is not to be achieved by
good will."
It is this feeling of impotent frustration with Americans that accounts
for the present stalemate in Germany. The ratification of the Peace Con-
tract will not remove it; on the contrary, it will intensify it and cause
the election next year to be fought on issues of narrow nationals:ra and
freedom from subservience to the U.S. One should not count much on the af'ten-
el , . r essed dislike of the Soviet Union. To bog ~ v r _ e ~ the USSR i c?i d..
and even hated, b t is also respoctccl andf red--and this nay suffice Ior
1e neutralization of Germany. It is significant ha't Romer, who in the U.S.
..gone called General Clay a petty criminal (11 lunke) has not used similar epi-
thets against Soviet cone,utndors--.even from the safety of the Uestern zone,,,.
Security T:
Approved For Release 2000/08/k-" "G~-TA'Wbp80-01065A0002000600l6-3
 YY!~6 a: q at i.on S01000 b ~1 c+c' ,of pN~1.!4 ,~ R
as arbor-ant) brutal, inconsiderate, without sensibilities an:'. anirl`^t ci by
sl'allow cynicism. A recent survey by the Institute fur Social--porsch=[-
i;i illustrates this point. A soxaplo of Germans in the 1W7oste'.r'n
;o11r,S of Germany ware asked to compare the national characteristics c Gor
r~s, Ru?ci::ir , and lu.iericans on the points mentioned above. In every
i.mrtai..co tho Germans were predictably considered most favorably (least
ar:'o ;c;nt, least brutcaJ,,etc. ), but surprisin .:ly on every point the Anoricans
appeared as worse than the Russians. (More people thought Aslerlcans were
brutal or arro:..,:cntP than
.(nother e .:anplc, nay be permissib M. ~i leac~inu German intellectual
told the f ollowin? story to this writer. During the non-fratornizati-on
period C,a:rdina. I'anihabor mot the Comm ndin ; Gonora] of the U.S. troops
occupj'in;G 1?iunich and e:'tonc?ed 1.i s ha nC? as a W:r( et l.;;iC. The ,o: orican General
refused co accept it. At the soxio ti4:ie, the ?Jishop of Trier met a French
General. Ile, too, e:tended his hand hue the French General, obedient to
hi,s orders, refused to shake it. An -hour later, a French civilian v3 a `red
the lishop of Trier and denonotrativG'ly e:. tenc?ec his hand. It was the
French Goner,-.1. The story, this writer 1 s a cqua',inta-.nce points out, was apo-
crypho 1, '.)ut it was plausible. T.le Germans, he, added, wovld rn vor belle ve
it were an Ara:>:;'ican sub stii;uted for the Fr cnciu n.
T11C' e attitudes are the real source of U.S. dif. iculties in Germany, if
not in _duropo. They facilitate Soviet propa?^.nda, because they make oven the
most outra_:sous :i'abrication :,payc":101o'ically pl.'?.u3ible. The attacks on Gon-?
oral 1 .i.d; Gmr,-.y as Cenral Microbe nay not convince :"uropeans that the U.S.
is cn, aa.einti, in Berra warfare in Korea. They do aced to the picture CC an
ovC :.T)O.: rinr' U.S. bul yin`; small nations, The lack o:.confidence in the U.S.
rn.l>cs avon friendly r-ovcrnraoa,ts tentative in their defense d' measures they
i?1Zd-^2'dly rec to. No i..ncliy;enouo advocates arioo to defy end U. a. policies
with even a fraction of t1.E; fervor of their critics. This puts the burden
of c?o:.'ense snuaroly on or.,:ano officially identi.fiecl with the U.S.: the
Voice of _ 1:i SRI ' , '.i' 1' America Houses, anC? ~?]:?.c rC.C4117- sponsor d publications
such the hon:.t o.nC. Die IIouo Laituxi . And, in tlia.s runner, policies Much
as .re :armament and the P ace `1i eaty are ev n more clearly labeled s hi~cyicon,
not as Geriakin, policies and become oven more vuJ.ncr?ble.
The Ciorrvan situation is critical; not because Germany is apt to to Com--
munist-.-there is 1]rc.Ctiaally no ran or Ca tills. The real throat is tlla a
nationalist re..c'Lion foei on a c.o1,mi-tic anti .,.:ixic:ricanisri 'may urine to power
a tovornnont which will lean on the USSR to ac ]icvo its in. epenc?ence from
the Wost whatever its ider,,lotical differences. `1"l-iis reverse Titoism i `i by
no moons ir1;]osssi.l)le and may be encour,aGed by the violent debate the Peace
Contract and rearm menc are certain to evol,.e.
IV. As~r'ci?.r~1c);ic I?x:or;~"n~~___
The fundamental cau,,o of the of the U.S. position in Ger-
many can be summarized as follows: T ac U.S. has attempted to crop ' a :from ?-
worl. of le' al relati,onshins and 7, Lotted the p s. c''iolor;ica c imato which
w d r1?he the: e rel.a ti-Ain onship E f' o dive ? In at"l t:lo (:t0 6 o"
e ?
.1as :i: rer uently acted as Y r r':.w?n "1~:.;n c c y]:.tion in the Western Defense C01,1-
raullity de` ended on its approbation of the U.3.- It has conscc uently attempted
to moot ,)pecisic corzl,laints. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has pur-
sued its minimum o.-,ject;ive, the neutralization of Germany by emphasizin'' the
Gelman interests involved# with little regard for approbation. Indeod, Ger-
man hatred of the Soviet union may be a Soviet ssC r it is bared on a
frti.r IT?C 1 p..rCl 1'Zf3_Cr all c~.C.;inn? ~, ~?C.vOCLl' nM~Gi'r?w.r1 u117..`Gy, by 1) ~IyZfTr
on German fears as rearmament, by emphasizing the deva tation of Korea, they
are c:ree.tin. the conditions of a neutralism which scorns achievable only by
opposition to the U.S.
The U.S. will not be able; to remedy its position until it empLlasizes the
psycl..olofic.l component of its political strategy. This is o1l the Y.-lore true
as the power to influence events directly is rapidly slipping out of the hands
of ?the U.S. It should be tla.e aim of any U.S. psychological effort to create
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200060016-3
Securit:1- Information
CONFIi)1 T~ TIA~T~
 r ?, u F~ es s h~oooi91e ?tizCl DiPj $?S?1MA000?O, 060011 S
pro;`;ram involves a technical and a substantive aspect: a cons iderat i on of
the conceptions underlyin U.S. psycholpgical strate y and a discussion cf
its f orra and content.
American propaganda in Germany has stressed a mass appeal and official
auspices: the Voice of America, officially sponsored publications, and
11terict Housos. But this inevitably compounds U.S. difficulties. Ttaelvo
years of Nazi rule and seven years of military occupation have left a resi-
c..ue of distrust of the printed word, particularly from official sources. In-
deed the more unofficial the source, the greater is credibility; the more
obscure a rumor, the stronlr;'or its impact. Officially-sponsored publications
moreover suffer from the very inhibitions they attempt to remove; they tend
to reach only those who are already convinced. This distrust of official
sources, in particular those identified with the Occupation, is bast re-
vealed by the difficulty faced by former staff members of the Tleue Zeitun; in
finding new employment. The Voice of. America ;Fain aims for a mass appeal.
Its impact on the opinion-forming segment of the population seems doubtful.
It is, however, precisely the op ..nion-r. akin ; element of the population
(loading intellectuals, political fig;uros?c, editors, etc.) who are the
source of U. S. difficulties in G-erraany. It is their distrust of U.S. inten-
tions which creates an atmosphere of rigidity for policy makers. This dis-
trust is all the more pervasive because this group on the whole knows ex-
trerelvp little about the U. S. Throughout his travels this writer met a sur-
prising number of influential Germans who had had almost no contact with
Americans. It is fair to say tr~at German reaction to U.S. official person-
nol, both HHICCG and lirr y, is extremely rai_xed. TJpic.:.l attitudes wore that
they raprosontecl "second-rates" or that they constituted a means to relieve
unemployment in the U.S. The writer is in no position to pass on the merit
of these complaints; on the other hand, their e.:istence is an objective fact
of considerable importance.
For these reasons neither official sources nor official personnel are in
a position to fundamont4,Oly adfo ct the asychologi cal climate. It is there-
fare important to create a basis of understanding on an unofficial basis on
all levels 'by sending a few, highly solo ctcd individuals to Germany, to
give them a "cover" which will permit them to travel widely and to establish
contacts. A university, lame foundation, newspaper and similar organizations
would scorn most suitable. Zany doubts could well be resolved in such a man-
ner and on an unofficial basis; many questions could be answered before they
become political issues. Above all, it is important to engage Germans and
, aericans on cooperative projects so that by workin, together a com.:unity of
interests might be created. This could take the form of study groups, cul-
tural congresses, exchange professorships and intern programs, wherever pos-
sible uricler non-governmental auspices.
Exchange programs are undoubtedly useful. On the other hand, the German
youth would be even more effectively reached through a number of young Amer-
icans strategically placed into key universities. Their selection as cf.' all
personnel for these programs should not be on the basis o2 paper qualifica-
tions but should stress understanding of German conditions, personality and
inward aliveness. It is, above all, crucial to find individuals who can
assist in removing the Gorman feeling that America never "understands," that
it is cynically sacrificing weaker nations to its overall purposes.
'nacre exists in Germany a large undercurrent of hatred aE' the Soviet-
Union kept alive by expellees from Eastern Germ any, by former prisoners of
war in Russia and by Russian behavior in Eastern Germany. Nevertheless, this
feeling cannot gain expression because it is unorganized and lacks a focus.
It should be possible to encourage German structures to channel these feel-
ing;st associations of former war prisoners (probably existing clandestinely
in c.-.ny case) might provide excellent vehicles.
There exists also the problem of gaining some influence over veterans
groups. This all the more important because their power is constantly
growing. In this task the army in Germany might help by inviting German
Approved For Release 2000/088?b''?-'ibP80-01065A000200060016-3
S.-cu_Aty Irt 'oa.?mation
 measures may appear unpalatable. Nevo;rtheless the U.S. hardly has a
choice, If the U.S. does not use these Croups, they will be infiltrated
1 :y the Communists.
V. A, Psy_choloical Program - Possibly Propa;p,pda Measures
American propaganda in Germany has at various times employed the foi-
lowin" themes: a) The Soviet danger is exaggerated and German fears are
therefore unfounded. b) Soviet bad'faith is so self-evident that it need
hardly be discussed. c) The Peace Contract and rearmament are logical
concomitants of "containment," d) The Soviet Union is so etrong that the
defense of Europe will be impossible without German divisions and the U.S,
may be forced to abandon Germany without a German Defense contribution.
Almost none of these appeals has proved effective, because they tend
to intensify Cerman fears and leave unanswered the real German doubts.
The German fear of the Soviet Union,, born out of historical experience,
cannot be assuaged by propaganda an6 should be frankly faced. Up to now
it has had a paralyzing effect on G rmaxi public opinion because the alter-
natives have been in mrre ctl.y stetted : Either a German defense contribution
and. a U.S. defense of Europe or a "neutral. Germany" to be perhaps occupied
but not fought over. This has enabled the SPD, the ri{;ht wins: group and
Soviet propaganda to play on German tiredness of war, the constant reiter-
ation of which has '-become increasingly effective. It is clear that this
fear cannot 1:? overcome by mfri}mia3.,n,,,, ~, the Soviet danger; the Germans know
better--or think they know better, which in this case amounts to the same
thine. Nor can it be dealt with by constant exhortations and calling atten-
tion to the need for a German defense contribution. These exhortations
merely confirm German fears about the weakness of the U.S. and its aan
impotence vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R.
The alternative should be differently posedt Either a German contri-
bution -to the defense of Co many and therefore some voice in its destiny
or a defense of Germany, in any case, but as an impotent object of policy.
In his conversations with Germans this writer posed these alternatives in
somewhat the following; terms: The major problem for Germany is not to
avoid war, since that decision will depend on many factors outside Germany'
control, primarily on the Soviet Union's estimate of the existing total
power relationship. The Major problem for Germany is to gain some voice in
its destiny and in ca sae of war some power to affect ovonts. It was not
certain whether Germany could survive another war; but it was quite certain
that it could not survive a generation as impotent object of other policy.
This approach always proved ej_tremely effective.
Similarly, it is useless to defend the Peace Contract am! Rearmament
as easy, because "logical decisions. It would be much wiser to show
some compassion with the turmoil Germany is under going; internally. Ameri-
can officials and .1~merican propaganda should state that we are well aware
of German difficulties and hesitations; that the. Peace Contract and rearma-
ment are not easy measuros, but that policy cannot wait for the coincidence
of psychological receptivity and historical or political necessity; that Ger-
many's spiritual contribution to the t?kst at this sta,'e may well consist of
undergoin this spiritual turmoil and overeomin it, It is said in Germany
that American officials advocate ratification of the Peace Contract to keep
VSenator Taft and isolationism from the Presidency. This could hardly con-
stitute a reply to German fears.
The above arguments are obviously desic;ned for the opinion-making see-
ment of the population. For the majority of the population simple themes
are necessary. The U.S. should not lase its appeal on the self-evidence cf
Soviet bad faith. Rather it should attempt to constantly reiterate it -
not in abstract terms of anti-Communist polemic but reinforced by concrete
issues and grievances; treatment of prisoners, expulsions, standard of liv-
in, etc. These should not be reserved for occasional U.N. sessions but be
constantly kept alive through posters, slogans, nucleus groups, etc. Above
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200060016-3
COJ FIDENTIA.L
 App`rovecrFor Ruse 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01 5A000200060016-3
all, the U.S. should attempt to wrest the initiative in the psychological
struf;"le from the U.S.S.R. All advantages in this effort are on the side
of title U.S. German unity should not be permitted to be preempted by the
"'o.;ri; t Union. If the U.S. appeared as its advocate, much wind =iould be
-;,,,ken out of the sails of the `)'PD, right-wing and Soviet propct anda.
German youth is still uncormitted. Its skepticism will make it dis-
trustftll of slogans,, but its latent idealism causes it to seek new val.uas
any. now commitments, European unity e::ercises a powerful appeal on the
Gc:crlan youth, though not in the form of economic and military inte-ration.
Here the spiritual unity of the West, advocated by individuals of high
calibre, would provide a valuable focus of psychological efforts; to be
complemented by organizational structures outlined ;above.
On another plane, the billeting procedures of the Army have provided
Lmaent of the
a cons tint source of irritation. It hits hardest the vary se,
population potentially most friendly to the U.S., the middle class. By
takin-; houses and barrin; the entry to their otiniers, the Army is creating
bad feeling totally out of proportion to the importance of bill,~ting. An
attempt should be made to have the Army construct its own billeting facili-
ties which could, after the Occupation, be turned over to the Germans.. In
this manner the presence of the Array coulc? be considered a boon, instead
of as at pre sent, a bli ;ht.
The above measures represent only an outline of possibilities. No for-
mal statement of a pro? rexa can guarantee success. This is all the more true
since our difficulties in Germany stem not from had policies, but from
bad ti mi.ng; and not from ill-conceived propaganda but from superficial ir., ple-
mentation. There is no easy recipe for rergaining confidence; there. is no
technical, pat solution to recapture the initiative in the war of ideas. It
is clear, however, t;.aat a new approach is needed in Germany lest the latent
anti-Americanism determines the shape of events. and le st Germany be swallowed
up by the Soviet orbit.
Henry A. Kissinger
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200060016-3
 TOP SECRET
C /
USE & OF 0300 C 6ONNLAODP80-010 etach i n9 Form No. 38-13 for the
A ~fH~ iN oFi3ICE
AS A COVER ATTACHMENT TO FORM NO. 38-13 purpose of securing this form to
Top Secret Documents is Prohibited.
RIIA L. TOP SECRET
MATERIAL IS WHOSE RELEASES DUTIES
THE ATTACHED TO TOP ESECRET MATERIAL WILL SIGN THIS FORM AND INDICATE PERIOD OF CUSTODY IN COLUMNS PROVIDED. EACH INDIVIDUAL WHO SEES THIS TOP
SECRET DOCUMENT WILL ENTER DATE OF HANDLING AND SIGN HIS FULL NAME IN THE PROPER COLUMNS. OFFICER DESIGNATIONS SHOULD
BE USED IN THE "TO" COLUMN. UNDER EACH COMMENT A LINE SHOULD BE DRAWN ACROSS SHEET AND EACH COMMENT NUMBERED TO COR-
RESPOND WITH THE NUMBER IN THE "TO" COLUMN. EACH OFFICER SHOULD SIGN FULL NAME BEFORE FURTHER ROUTING.
ROOM
NO. RECD.
OFFICER'S
FULL NAME
CONTROL NO. I? 1 ! 3
THIS FORM MUST BE DETACHED PRIOR T_RTjtAWjXTJNGSOP giCorT YIT~~ Qp~~7~j
FORM NO. 38- - _
TOP SECRET
PLEASE RETURN THIS
FORM TO REGISTRY