PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNIST BW PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000500050002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 7, 1952
• Content Type: STUDY

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DOC. NO. RSB D4%
DATE A~ ?~ 19~ s.
COPY NO. 48
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington
STA " MUDY ?- PRELIMINARY' ANALYSIS OF TIC CO M'MUNISP BW
PROPAQANfA 0AMPAIGN1?W3t H RECO142NDATIONS
"THIS IS AN APPROVED PAPER)
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
bons 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelatv
hnited States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, Sec-
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the
=M' 1
approved For Relea$e 2000
80-O1065A000 00 50002-6
MUM
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Seur ormation COPY NQ.
PSB D-25 b
Au ust 7, 1952
' 25X1A
PSYCHOLCQICAL STRATEGY,BQAR3)
STAFF STUDY -- PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF TF COIvMUNIST BW
PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, WITH RECOMMffNDATIONS
NOTE BY WV, S RETARY
This staff study was approved by the Board at its
Fourteenth Meeting, August 7, 1952, with the provision that
approval of the study does not constitute specific approval
of the suggestions set forth, in paragraphs 20 through 23,
which are included as advisory recommendations.
25X1A'
Secretary to the Board
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Aug. 7, 1952
Memorandum of 2
July 1952
IZUI R MUM FURS The Honorable David K, F. Bruce,
t]uder Secretary of State
The Honorable William C. Foster,
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Genera, Walter Bedell Smith,
Director of Central Intelligence
BviTadier General Jesmond D. Balmer, USA,
Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plana Division
SUBJECT: Staff Study -'cliza.>n^,xy Analysis of the Corrnxaunist k3GF
Propaganda Campaign with Recommendation.-.
The attached revised staff study on the current Soviet germ warfare
campaign (PSIS D-25a) is submitted for information and for approval of
the reeonunendations (Paragraphs 19 through 24).
As indicated in the paragraphs referred to above, it is the view
of the PSB staff that the current Soviet FEW propaganda campaign, and
similar campaigns which may be ' launched in the future, are of suffi-
cient stra.teg4.e significance to justify close and continuous attention
on the part of TSB. At the same time it is recognized that the PSB
staff itself is not competent either to advise the Board on the day-
to-day operational aspects of the problem or to act as a watch com--
mittee with respect to new developments in regard to the Soviet
campa:gn and its implications. It is there"ore felt that the
proposals contained in Paragraph: 19 and 24 which have been suggestad
by the Department of State best meet the requirements of the problem
Preen an admini.strattvo point of view,
As the aim of the present study was merely to identify the problem
and to suggest machinery for dealing with it, no attempt has been made
at a dofinit.~ve analysis of the subject. Since the completion of this
study. new intelligence has been received indicating that the conclusions
could have boon strengthened, particularly along the following lines:
i.. The Soviet hate America campaigns are increasingly .focussed
upon inciting hatred of the U.S. armed forces. Apart from the possible
light this throws on Soviet intentions or expectations in the present
world situation, it is particularly prejudicial to the U.S. national
interest, as compared with less specific types of anti-American propaganda.
2. ThQ campaigns are conducted with as much intensity inside the
USSR as in satellite or non-comrmmnwst countries, and the Soviet govern-
ment has officially identified itself with even the more extravagant
anti-American propaganda to a marked degree.. This fact may be a further
clue to Soviet intentions, but perhaps its chief significance is that
the Soviet government cannot effectively disavow the campaign or equate
it with any privately sponsored anti-communist campaigns in the Western
press.
3. By their very nature the Soviet charges might acquire a kind of
retrospective credibility if circumstances ever made it necessary for
us to use .chemical warfare, BW, RW, etc. Even the more banal charges of
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Aug. 7, 1952
mistreatment of prisoners acquire an appearance of veracity in the eyes
of many people when accidents or Isolated acts of brutality occur as
they are statistically certain to occur when large numbers of prisoners
are being handled.
4. Regardless of the quantitative intensity of the Soviet campaign,
the substance of the Soviet charges against the United States armed forces
gives the present campaign a character that is almost without precedent
in time of peace. To the degree that the charges of U.S. atrocities
gain credence they risk poisoning the minds of future generations as well
as of the present one. Propaganda of this type is itself a horror-
weapon. It is an attack not only against the United States, but against
the very structure of human civilization.
For all the reasons indicated above, and particularly because of
the last one, it is nr considered view that we should treat the Soviet
hate-America campaigns in their current form as a special problem re-
quiring unusually thoughtful and intensive efforts not merely to counter-
act the effects of the propaanda but to indict the rulers of the USSR
before the bar of world opinion for one of the most serious crimes
against humanity they have yet committed. Surely, this is an opportunity
which should not be missed to array on our side the moral and cultural
leadQrs of the whole worlds including the very ones who have sometimes
been most easily duped by coinnnini.st peace-propaganda. This is our
chance to shoot down, once and for all., the Stockholm dove. It is also
an unusually good occasion to seek from friendly nations and from
international organizations more adequate recognition than the U.S.
has yet been given for its disinterested efforts to utilise our techno-
logical resources for the relief of human want and suffering throughout
the world.
TOP LET
Se c, ur i t.Y 'ormatio
In presenting the study to the Board I should like to acknowledge
the valuable assistance giventbe staff in preparing it by Colonel
Ken nneth K. Hansen of the Office, Chief of Psychological Warfare,, Depart-
ment of the Arm
25X1A
Acting Director
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"IF
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pSYCHOGxL STIR TEGY EoA V
Aug. 7, 1952
STAFF STUDY PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNIST
BW PROPAGAMA CAI 'AIGNt WITH RECOMMENDATIONS
I, PROBLEM
1. To analyze the implications of the Communist BW propaganda
campaign and to make recommendations for action in the light of the
conclusions reached.
II. DISCUSSION
HISTORY
2. A Soviet hate campaign against the United States is generally
considered to have started on January 21, 1951? On that date Pospelov,
in the presence of the full Politburo, delivered a speech on the theme
"The hands of the American imperialists are steeped. in the blood of the
Russian people." jimediately after the speech there appeared numerous
documents allegedly proving American atrocities. Photographs were
pu'. l i shed, showing Russians who were being mutilated, ki11 d, or
tortured, presumably at the hands of Americans. Every Russian news-
paper played, up this theme. As pointed out by Mose Harvey in a POC
briefing, this hate-America campaign is being carried on while the
Soviet Union is theoretically at peace with the United States. This
is without precedent even in Soviet history. Stories appear almost
-daily alleging further American atrocities. The "never forget and
never forgive" theme is hammered into the Russian consciousness in a
fashion which can hardly fail to have an effect. The charges usually
give alleged details with dates, corroborative evidence, etc. The
campaign is not limited to the'USSR, but is carried on In the European
satellite countries and in Asia. In Rumania, the Communist Party
issued a directive explaining exactly host the campaign should be pro-
secuted. A similar directive was issued in China.
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The hate campaign continued throughout 1951. In the spring of
1951 there were allegations, which were not followed up, from Chinese
Conraunist sources stating that the United States was engaged in germ
warfare and poison gas warfare.
On February 22, 1952, a nest campaign was launched by the North
Korean Foreign Minister who char;;ed that the United States was carrying
on EW in North Korea. On March 6, the Pei ing Peoples' Daily, an
official Communist organ, said that the United States had sent 448 planes
on"BW missions over Manchuria the preceding week.
On March 8, Chou En-lai charged that the . Terican use of germ
warfare was aimed at "wreck.ing the Armistice talks in Korea, prolonging
and expanding the aggressive war in Korea, and instigating new wars."
He stated that US pilots who used BW weapons would be treated as war
criminal s-.
A CIA Special Intelligence Estimate,
published March 25, out.
lines the preceding facts and points out that the accusations concerning
BW heave been directed exclusively at the U.S. The Estimate also notes
Malik's attwpt to bring the issue before the UN and refers to the
alleged evic' :rice published in the Chinese and Soviet press. This "evidence"
consisted of photographs of insects, germs, and germ bombs which American
forces presumbly dropped in North Korea.
6, The Chinese Communist Government rejected a proposal by the
International Ped Cross offering to investigate the charges. It refused
an offer from. India to assist in any investigation of the charges and
also rejected a proposal from the World Health Organization to send aid
into epidemic areas. The Chinese Communist Government claimed that an
investigation was already being carried on by the Chinese and friendly
governments and that ICRC and WHO were interested only in securing
military information for the U.S. High Command.
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7. The campaign alleging LW activities by the United States con-
tinues. Various statements have been issued by Communist front organiza-
tions which have picked up the Conviunist charges. The World Peace.-
Council, will undoubtedly spearhead and coordinate a continued attack
directed against the United States.
8. Replies to a Department of State circular to mission; in
various parts of the world inquiring about the effectiveness of the
germ warfare campaign suggested that as of April 2 the campaign had
not been effective in most countries.
9. T'Iost of the missions felt that U.S. sponsored programs to
denounce the Communist charges would merely keep the cam aian alive.
10. The British Foreign Office, however, has suggested that if the
c8rnpaiun continued it "may in long run be effective because of (a) anti-
US feeiinG in certain areas (b) ignorance of realities of war (c) fear
of pla;ue (d) resentment of any Western warfare against Asiatics and
.(Q) pacifism and lassitude in Burma."
MOTIVATIONS
11. A number of explanations have been advanced for the present
Communist Germ warfare propaganda campaign. The "real" reason for the
germ warfare propaganda campaign against the U.S. is not certain. It
is clear, however, that the present phase of the "hate America" campaign
serves several purposes -- some of which may be peripheral to the as
yet unidentified main purpose. Some of the uses to which the BW propa-
ganda campaign is or can be put are listed below:
a. It discredits the U.S. in the eyes of Asiatics.
b. It provides an alibi for current (and future) epidemics.
t, It makes Communist troops more fearful of picking up UN
propaganda leaflets and less willing; to be captured.
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Security Informfition Aug. 7, 1952?
d. It creates a moral climate in which it might be difficult
for the U.S. to employ BW, CW, or Ali in the event of global
war. (The Stockholm Peace Petition of 1950 combined all
three in the category of weapons to be "outlawed.")
e. 'It provides a justification for possible Communist use of
f. It provides a ,justification and a psychological prepara-
Ition for, all out global war if the USSR decides such a
move is expedient.
12. The BW propaganda campaign has already provided the Soviet
Union with a means of harnessing the forces of nature to their propa-
ganda advantage. Any epidemics or any insect infestations any0hcre
provide an opportunity for charging the United States with employing
BW or testing; its BW capabilities.
For example, a Canadian communist newspaper quoted by TASS
noted the outbreak of the hoof and mouth disease in Canada and charged
that the U.S., Br i.tain, and Canada were conferring on the proc?,uction of
"germ warfare weapons ... for spreading hoof and mouth and other animal
diseases." Charges were also made that the U.S. was experimenting with
locusts in Saudi Arabia and other Near Pastern countries. These charges
coincided with the plaque of locusts throughout the Near East. Troubled
backward areas may be constantly invited to blame diseases and plagues
on U.S. iz:iperialist machinations. Even Atgerican efforts to help the
peoples of these areas may be used against the U.S. For example, U.S.
planes fihtilt locusts may be blamed for the plagues and U.S. doctors
fighting the disease may be accused of spreading it.
POSSIBZE FUTUR ,-CTION
13. The B14 propaganda campaign may be combined with a fas warfare
campaign. Nearly all references to the U.S. use of BW mentioned U.S.
failure to ratify the 1925 Geneva Convention on germ and gas warfare. The
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coznm.ittee of "democratic lawyers" who "investigated" the use of Find in
Korea have already referred to the American poison as bombs in their
findings. (The 1951 spring propaganda offensives from China, Korea,
and. Indo-China all claimed that the U.S. was employing poison gas
against North Korean and Chinese troops.)
211. CONCLUSIONS
Ji., The germ warfare campaign is clearly part of a continuing
Soviet hate-America campaign. By its scope and intensity it marks a
new be in the latter, however, suggesting that implementation of the
hate-. ,aerica theme will play a major -- and perhaps increasing -- role
in Sov.et psychological strategy.
15. The precise reason for choosiig germ warfare as the subject
of the present campaign is not known. However, it fits into one of
the main patterns of the general? campaign, which is to link the United
States, aria particularly the U.S. armed forces, in the public mind with
the perversion of science.
16. W iiie all types of conununist hate-America propaganda are
potentially serious from the U.S. point of view, the atrocity type of
propa ;an.da is particularly sitnificant in its strFLtet;ic -implications,
sl.nco it is directed primarily against the U.S. armed forces.
17. It must be expected not only that the hate-America campaign
will continue, but that the Soviet communists will continue to emphasize
special campaigns of the science-atrocity type, either by prolonging
the current germ warfare campaign or by shifting emphasis to new subjects.
In particular there is a strong possibility that the Soviet communists
may soon launch an all-out propaganda campaign alleging that the U.S.
has been using; poison as in Korea, perhaps accompanying this theme
with charges of scientific extermination and torture methods in Korean
prison camps,
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18. Irrespective of the popular credence in any country given to
particular communist hate America campaigns, the cumulative effect of
these campaigns over a long period of time may be to seriously impair
the U.S. psychological position in certain areas, particularly with
relation to the possible use of scientific and unconventional weapons in
case of general war. On the other hand the shrill pitch of this type
of eoimminist propaganda and the crude fabrications used to support it
create a Soviet psychological vulnerability which we should be able
to exploit. A U.S. counter-propaganda campaign alone may not be suffi-
cient to cor.o with these effects. Rather, there may be required an
integrated program of governmental actions, in relation to which propa-
ganda will take its appropriate place.
IV. LPM4MIVB QNS
19. That POC inaugurate and coordinate operational planning,
additional to that now being done, to deal with the problems raised
That the following suggestions (paragraphs 20 thru 23) be
taken into oonsi(.1eration by POC in this planning:
20. Cautionary guidance on the explosive possibilities inherent
in the BW gror'agazida campai n, indicated above, and the necessity for
coordinating carefully all statements in conjunction with it.
Additional steps to secure due credit - not gratitude - to
the U.S. for its positive assistance in disease and pest control, in-
dicating that the responsibility for putting such efforts in the proper
perspective rests principally on the governments concerned. (Purpose -
to anticipate. Soviet attempts to make the U.S. the scapegoat for
epidemics and insect plagues.)
21. Consider measures to counter an anticipated early.increase
in atrocity charges. While BW has been the principal charge, it
becomes less and less in our interest to concentrate on one issue.
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The chharges should be attacked as a package. Following is one
suggestion for countering CW charges, which are as old as the BW
but which have not received such prominence:
Secret requests to the Secretary General of UN and to
neutral governments such as Sweden and India that a team of officers,
of their medical units now in Korea be immediately relieved of present
duties and detailed, on a secret basis, to an inspection team to tour
UN artillery and air units and satisfy themselves and their govern-.
dents that the UN forces are not using gas. These governments, plus
one of the' ,rab League and one of'the Latin American governments,
should be requested to relieve this medical team as soon as possible
by technically qualified officers, to remain on this assignment
until an armistice is concluded.
Coordinated statements by the UN and the above mentioned
governments testifying that such charges are untrue.
Appropriate technical advice and assistance to the in-
spection team by MNCUNC.
22. Investigate the possibilities of applying or extending
existing legal principles with a view to filing with the World Court
or the UN, or both, a complaint against the USSR based on the theory
of an international libel action, alleging particularly the more
extravagant types of communist atrocity-propaganda and stressing the
,long-range tlingering radiations effects of such propaganda upon
world security, as well as its threat to the mental health of young
persons.
.23. Arrange for the necessary intelligence support to appraise
the significance and impact of the Soviet BW propaganda campaign,
gas warfare allegations and "perversion of science" propaganda, in
their relationship to the total complex of Soviet cold war strategy,
and in order to assist the three objectives of planning, which are :
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a, To analyze and seek to identify the underlying strategy
and the probable evolution of the hate-America campaign, to in-
clude :
The Communist BW propaganda campaign.
2. Gas warfare allegations.
3. Potato bug, locust plague and similar "perversion
of science" propaganda.
b. To develop further measures to minimize the effects of
the present BW propaganda campaign and to undercut anticipated
future propaganda campaigns simils.r in nature or related thereto.
To develop new measures designed to seize and maintain
the initiative in the fields of propaganda and operations.
24. That the Chairman, POC, submit to the Director, Psychological
Strategy Board, appropriate progress reports on the project assigned by
paragraph 19.
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