INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN 1965

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100160001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 20, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

N? 336
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
prxRn unism
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN 1965
iu
CIA/SRS-11
20 July 1959
ARCHIVAL; RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
AC=;1CY PIi 'I: B , BLDG. A-18
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research staff on International Communism
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN 1965
CIA/ SRS- 11
This is a speculative study which
has been discussed with US Gov-
ernment intelligence officers but
has not been formally coordinated.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword
I Introduction
II Discussion
A. In what areas of the world is Com-
munism likely to have achieved the
greatest success?
B. Will the control of International
Communism still be centralized
in the CPSU? If not, where will
the control be?
C. What is likely to be the nature and
degree of control of International
Communism over national or
regional Communist Parties? lZ
D. In what areas will revisionism
have made greatest progress? 14
Page
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E. What is likely to be the relative
importance of Fronts, economic
operations, political action, and
insurrection in the promotion of
International Communism? The
estimates are in terms of areas
with particular attention to the
underdeveloped regions.
Western Europe
Latin America
The Middle East
South Asia and the Far East
Africa
F. What changes are developments in
mass communications and trans-
portation likely to have made in
the organization of International
Communism and communist
parties and in the degree and
nature of their control over
individuals and groups?
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This paper was originally prepared as a contribution
to a long-range planning study on measures to counter Interna-
tional Communism. Hence its organization as the discussion
of a number of questions concerning the character and control
of the movement in 1965. Because these questions deal with
matters of general interest in the consideration of the future
development of International Communism, the paper is being
disseminated beyond the primary recipient.
It is recognized that many statements of the paper
are debatable, both interpretations of evidence and predictions
offered. Moreover, in a world of rapid change, speculation
about a global movement as vigorously propagated and as stren-
uously opposed as International Communism runs the risk of
being falsified by all sorts of fortuitous circumstances and by
trends and changes of dynamics whose importance cannot cur
rently be evaluated. In awareness of these limitations, this
essay is offered as a best "guess" on the questions discussed,
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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN 1965
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The condition of the International Communist
Movement in 1965 will depend upon the progress which the
Bloc countries have made in achieving their economic goals
and in extending their political and cultural influence. If the
world escapes a major war before that date, it is probable
that the USSR, Communist China, and their satellites will
have registered significant economic advances, both absolute-
ly and relatively to the Free World. The increased strength
of the Bloc will certainly enhance the importance of the two
principal Communist states in world affairs; it will probably
enlarge their influence in the countries of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America.
Z. International Communism will be a beneficiary
of the growth of the Bloc in power and prestige. Many nation-
al parties in the Free World will be stronger in numbers and
influence, becoming in some countries the principal opposi-
tion to the party or coalition in power. A number of outlawed
Communist parties will probably have improved their subver-
sive potential by taking advantage of the presence and aid of
Bloc missions and the deterioration of effective repression.
Trimmers, neutralists, and unwary nationalists will be trapped
into a collaboration of benefit to the local Communist Party.
3. The Communist fronts will have their ups and
downs during the period from 1959 to 1965, but in the latter
year a good many can be expected to be in a flourishing condi-
k
tion. The advances of military technology, the probable lac
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of any important progress in arms limitation, and the expan-
sion of the nuclear weapons "club" will give an urgency to
peace movements that the Communist-directed societies will
exploit to the full. Friendship committees will be active,
aided by the growing power of the Bloc countries and their
well-financed efforts at cultural penetration. The present
array of organizations - global and regional - for doctors,
lawyers, journalists, writers, scientists, and other profes-
sional categories will be espousing the Communist line in con-
ferences and publications. Youth organizations will probably
be generously supported with a view to capitalizing on the vision
of a new society being constructed in the USSR, Communist
China, and the other countries of the Bloc. The Afro-Asian
committees and societies will either have been brought firm-
ly under Communist control or have been split into warring
organizations. In brief, it is believed that all the present
tools and methods of International Communism, overt and
clandestine, will be in active use in 1965 and that, in general,
their potency and efficacy will have been increased by the
material progress of the Bloc countries.
4. There is the possibility, of course, that between
now and 1965 the movement will experience troubles which would
seriously impair its expansionist capabilities. For example,
it remains to be seen whether the Peking communists have exor-
cised from China the age-old scourge of flood and famine. Some
calamitous occurrence in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe
might serve to dampen the Kremlin's militancy. Khrushchev's
death, sudden or lingering, might cause a temporary wavering
of power and direction in the headquarters of International Com-
munism. Even success brings its problems. As the communist
powers get involved more and more in the affairs of the under-
developed countries they may find that issues become increas-
ingly complicated and that the price of winning one client may
be two enemies. Unpredictable developments such as these
punctuate human history, and one or more conceivably could
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interrupt the course of communist expansion. They may give
the non-communist world opportunities which are not evident
in a speculation based on recent trends and the current situa-
tion.
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Ii. DISCUSSION
A. In what areas of the world is Communism likely
to have achieved the greatest success?
5. While it is probable that by 1965 Communism
will be a stronger force in almost all the underdeveloped areas
of the world, three of them appear to be particularly vulner-
able to serious inroads. These are South Asia, the Middle
East, and Latin America.
6. The key to the South Asian situation is India. In
1965 the third five-year plan of industrialization and general
development will be conning to a close, and by that time it should
be apparent whether the state-directed but essentially mixed
economy of India is still in the race with Communist China.
Both countries are seeking to construct a heavy-industry base
and to raise agricultural production in order to feed a rapidly
expanding population. :[f Communist China has made what
seems to many literate Indians to be significantly greater pro-
gress, the methods and. practices of Communism will be highly
attractive. I The Indians will not indulge in scientific compari-
sons and then come to rational decisions; they will be moved by
some real facts and by many impressions, shaped in large part
by ignorance and propaganda. In despair and desperation, the
impoverished masses may be led to try Communism. 2
1
It is possible that the Indian and general Asian sense of out-
rage over Communist China's repression of the Tibetan revolt
will have yielded to the passage of time, especially if the effort
to eliminate "reactionary serfdom" and to bring Tibet into the
20th century has been successful.
2The magnitude of the problem is indicated by the conclusion
of a recent Ford Foundation study that "India is heading for
disaster unless she can increase her food output by 57 percent
during the next seven years. " It was the opinion of the study
team of American agricultural specialists that: "If elementary
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7. The:lIndian political situation could also have an
important influence upon the progress of Communism in that
country. The current crisis in the state of Kerala may prove
to be merely a passing event, or it may have decisive long-
range consequences. There is a good chance that the Congress
Party, at present exhibiting the weaknesses of its disparate
character, will break up after Nehru passes from the scene.
If the result should be two major parties around which other
democratic movements and factions could coalesce, Indian
politics might be revitalized. If, however, the Congress Party
dissolved into a number of groups, it is not inconceivable that
the Communist Party would emerge as the largest, best organ-
ized, and most purposeful force in India. Whether or not India
has "gone" Communist by 1965, the CPI will very probably be
a bigger and more influential party than it is today, controlling
much of the organized labor movement, penetrating the mili-
tary and civil services, and directing a chorus of fronts and
supporting organizations.
8. The course of affairs in India will greatly affect
Communist prospects in other parts of South Asia. An India
still essentially democratic and making some progress in im-
proving living standards would help to hold its neighbors within
the ambit of the Free World. A Communist India would add
such~a weight to that being exerted now by China and the USSR
that the whole area of South and Southeast Asia would almost
certainly succumb to Communism.
9. Recent trends in the Middle East indicate that
a basic contest is developing in the area between communism
and Arab nationalism. Having joined hands to expel Western
"imperialism, " the protagonists of the two movements are
squaring off to battle for dominance. The Communists have
wants such as food and clothing are not satisfied, other free-
doms may be sacrificed for the promise of food enough. "
(New York Times, 21 April 1959).
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a number of advantages. They have a well-developed ideology
to oppose to the vague principles of Arab nationalism. They
have popular slogans to excite the poor and oppressed. They
have organizational methods and trained cadres for use in
countries where soundly constructed political parties have
never existed. Finally, they have the backing of the Commu-
nist Bloc which can support the local parties in a number of
effective ways.
10. ' The Arab nationalists have some assets on their
side. They lead a movement, with deep historical roots and
wide appeal to all classes of people in the Arab countries.
They have a genuine desire to be independent. They are skill-
ful in the region's time-honored methods of conspiracy, brib-
ery, and assassination. They can enlist the forces of Islam
against a godless ideology.
11. It would be rash to predict how the struggle
between Arab nationalism and communism will eventuate.
The qualities of the two movements are just being put to the
test. For example, the peasants and tribesmen of the Arab
lands can undoubtedly be aroused to oppose communism as a
threat to their Islamic religion, but it is questionable if the
city-dwellers can be similarly stimulated by religious appeals.
Many of the latter seem to view Mohammedanism as outmoded
and irrelevant to the modernization of their countries, and
even if they are attached to their faith, they are often prepared
to accept Soviet and Chinese claims that Moslem minorities in
the Bloc suffer no molestation on religious grounds. It appears
unlikely, therefore, that Islam will prove to be an unbreakable
barrier to the spread of communism in the Middle East. With
contending forces of such great but uncertain potency, the con-
test between Arab nationalism and communism may well be un-
decided in 1965. The struggle will almost certainly have been
characterized by revolts, coups d'etat, the union and fractur-
ing of countries, and other manifestations of violent change.
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~++TmT ^ T.
There will be grave risk that one of these occurrences will
bring the great powers into open conflict, a risk that will in-
crease as more and more communist interests and prestige
are committed in the area. Should such warfare develop, the
struggle of Arab nationalism versus communism will be sub-
merged in a much larger conflict.
12. The conditions which are likely to prevail in
much of Latin America during the next few years offer good
prospects for the growth of communism. Old social patte .is
are cracking under the impact of industrialization, rapid com-
munications, and expanding populations. Urbanization is cre-
ating concentrated masses subject to more effective political
organization and manipulation. The strains of economic de-
velopment are opening opportunities for all sorts of radical
appeals to people still largely illiterate. Strong nationalistic
sentiments are easily turned into resentful attacks on Amer-
ican and European capitalism.
13. Communism has been growing in this soil, and
it is likely to continue to do so. It has allied itself with nation-
alist causes and in some countries has won a measure of res-
pectability. The disciplined strength of local parties tempts
noncommunist politicians to court them. In several countries
even the outlawed parties are factors in the political equation.
Although it is unlikely that any Latin American country will be
taken over by communists by 1965 - or that the United States
or the OAS would stand idly by under such circumstances -
it is probable that the movement will be more of a threat
then than it is now. The communist cause will be aided by
vigorous economic and cultural offensives on the part of the
Bloc countries.
14. The African continent will certainly be a region
of growing interest to the communist states. Unless by 1965
there has occurred a major shift in world power alignments
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or the Middle East has succumbed to communism, it is un-
likely that the movement will have made serious gains in the
North African region, except those of more extensive diplo-
matic representation and trade relations. South of the Sahara:
communist efforts at penetration will probably not be spectac-
ularly successful. There will be several more independent
states, internally weak, neutralist in attitude, and jealous of
their independence. They will probably establish diplomatic
relations with the Bloc countries and accept offers of econom-
ic assistance, and they will tolerate a good many activities by
communist front organizations. Communism will be one of
several competing forces in an area which probably will be
characterized by highly disordered international relations.
Again, unless there has occurred a major shift in the align-
ment of world power, communism is not likely to have gained
permanent control over any significant area of Africa below
the Sahara.
B. Will the control of International Communism
still be centralized in the CPSU? If not,
where will the control be?
15. It can be predicted with considerable confi-
dence that the control of International Communism will still
be centralized in the CPSU. The other possibilities with
respect to the movement seem unlikely.
16. One would be the development of a sort of dual
control by the CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party. There
have been a good many indications that Peking is taking con-
siderable interest in nurturing and advising foreign communist
movements, not only those in Asia but also in Africa and Latin
America. For instance, the connections between the CCP and
the Communist Party of Australia have become markedly clos-
er in the past few years. More than sixty Australian commu-
nists have received training for several months in China, and
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the doctrinal works of Mao and his associates are prescribed
texts in study courses at home. Through front organizations
and trade unions the CPA has promoted a number of visits to
and from China by students, workers and "cultural" groups.
As another example, leaders of the Latin American parties
who visited Communist China after the XXI CPSU Congress
received counsel from Mao Tse-tung on important matters
and were instructed to report back to him. Whether relations
like these have the Kremlin's unqualified approval cannot be
determined at this time. It may be presumed that the CPSU,
recognizing the interest attaching to Mao as a senior ideologue
of the movement, does not object to Chinese initiatives that
advance the cause but would frown on liaisons of which it was
not fully informed. In the case of the Australian party, con-
sistently an orthodox organization, Moscow is probably con-
fident of its loyalty to "proletarian internationalism" as under-
stood by the CPSU, and looks upon the relations with the CCP
as not only suitable because of geographical proximity but also
valuable for the reciprocal influence exerted in strengthening
the movement. During the period under consideration, we do
not believe that the Chinese Communists are likely to chal-
lenge the Kremlin's commanding position in the direction of
International Communism. The solidity of the Bloc will still
be highly important to them, and furthermore few communists
in Free. World countries would want to connive at relations be-
hind Moscow's back. Should Communist China achieve a "leap
forward" of really startling dimensions, the Chinese model
might attain such prestige that Peking would receive a de facto
recognition as the directing center of communism in the Far
East. Even this sharing of directing power is unlikely, how-
ever, since by 1965 Communist China's development can
scarcely outshine the progress, economic and military, being
registered by the USSR.
17. Another possibility might be a kind of regional
decentralization of the movement with the CPSU assuming
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control in, say, Eastern Europe and the Middle East and
Africa; the CCP in the Far East and South Asia; the French
or the Italian party in Western Europe, and the Argentine
party in Latin America. This seems a highly improbable
line of development. Except for the CCP, none of the other
non-Soviet parties is likely to wield sufficient power or pres-
tige to control the movement in a major geographical area.
There will no doubt exist the kind of subordination of SOME,
parties that is believed to have been practiced from time to
time, as for example, the supervision of some parties in the
Arab world by the Communist party of Italy. However, any
real or permanent decentralization on a regional basis is im-
probable.
18. A third possibility might be the establishment
of a new international organization, a Comintern in whose
management and direction the non-Soviet parties would have
representation according to their strengths. In another study, 1
SRS has analyzed this possibility, and concluded that in the
field of inter-party relations, the CPSU is likely to proceed
cautiously in re-establishing any institution which bears the
visible imprint of central control in the tradition of Stalin.
Since the dissolution of the Cominform.-in1956 there has been
considerable speculation about the creation of a new Commu-
nist International. We may assume that the Soviet leaders,
including Khrushchev, would favor some form of organiza-
tion which would give unity and monolithic stability to the
movement. But it has become apparent that a number df
Communist parties - notably the Chinese, the Polish and
some in the Free World - would be opposed to such an insti-
tution. As a result, the steps which have been taken by the
Bloc leaders have been tentative and limited. The so-called
1The "Socialist Commonwealth of Nations ": Pattern for
Communist World Organization, CIA/SRS-10 (18 June 1959).
10- MAP=
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Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, which con-
vened in Moscow to celebrate the 40th Anniversary of the Bol-
shevik Revolution (November 1957) has been described as the
successor - through an unbroken lineage - of the Comintern. 1
A new theoretical Journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism,
has been established to aid in the coordination of the commu-
nist line throughout the world.
19. Whether or not a new Comintern is organized,
any diminution of the control of the CPSU over the interna-
tional movement is not probable. The "leading role" of the
Soviet party is so much a part of the character of Interna-
tional Communism that any "democratization" of the move-
ment would be revolutionary. To raise the question would
almost certainly bring down on a party or leader charges of
revisionism, the gravest threat to the movement by commu-
nist admission. The CCP is the only party in a position to
challenge a dominant Soviet voice in an international organi-
zation, and its Attitude toward the "leading role" principle
indicates that it would be unlikely to do so. The premium
which Peking places on Bloc unity, its scorn of Tito's pre-
tensions, and China's dependence on the USSR all point to
CCP agreement to continued Kremlin dominance in the move-
ment. 2
1
Cf. US Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administra-
tion of the Internal Security Act: "The Revival of the Com-
munist International and Its Significance for the United
States" (May 1959), passim.
2Inthe field of government or state, as opposed to Commu-
nist Party organization, it is possible if not probable that a
closer integration of the "world socialist system" in the form
of a "commonwealth" or sodruzhestvo will emerge by 1965.
This possibility is analyzed in. SRS-10.
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C. What is likely to be the nature and the degree
of control of International Communism over
national or regional Communist parties?
20. The control of International Communism over
national parties means fundamentally the control of the Krem-
lin. The rulers in Moscow may tolerate a measure of autono-
my for tactical reasons, but they are not disposed to permit
a serious challenge to their authority. The period from the
XX CPSU Congress in February 1956 to the 40th Anniversary
celebration in November 1957 is instructive on this point.
The Congress, the Polish disorders, and the Hungarian revolu-
tion shook all the Communist parties; there were defections
and calls by dissidents for "national roads to socialism. " The
Kremlin, with the willing aid of its loyal lieutenants in the na-
tional parties, embarked on a program of stabilization. By
the end of 1957 this had been so successful that a Communist
"summit" meeting could be held in Moscow to proclaim the
unity and cohesion of the international movement.
21. As to the nature of the Kremlin's control, it
will almost certainly be exercised by keeping the national
communist parties in the hands of thoroughly loyal adhe rents
of Moscow. Within the Bloc, this condition will be assured
by utilizing all the powerful levers of both party and state
power. A revisionist faction within a national communist
party will be given no opportunity to develop an influential
position; it will be isolated and rendered harmless by the
tactics at which communists are adept. The fading influence
of the "liberal" elements in the Polish party since the October
days of 1956 shows that in a communist state the advocates
of orthodoxy hold the winning cards. In the parties outside
the Bloc it is only the leaders and factions enjoying Moscow's
endorsement who have any survival prospects. After the ex-
posure of Stalin's crimes and the suppression of the Hungarian
rebellion, a number of these parties -for instance, in the
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United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark -
were seriously riven by dissension and defection, but Moscow
accepted losses in membership and in the parties' meager
political standing in order to keep control in loyal hands.
220 The degree of control will be that amount ade-
quate to guarantee subservience to the touchstone of Interna-
tional Communism, namely, recognition of the leading role
of the CPSU in the movement and endorsement of the current
line of the Kremlin on world issues. Beyond these the Krem-
lin will permit some tactical autonomy. In the case of the
CCP, the latitude will be considerable, for the CPSU undoubted-
ly recognizes that the problems of "building socialism" in China
are so vast and different from those in the USSR that what
amounts to a "national road" is necessary. This inevitable
latitude poses difficulties in the Sino-Soviet party relationship
which will probably move through varying degrees of warmth
and fraternal feeling. A reader of the CCP's major doctrinal
pronouncement of 28 December 1956, "More on the Historical
Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, " might de-
tect a slightly patronizing tone in the advice being offered by
the Chinese to their Soviet comrades, then troubled by condi-
tions in the satellites and in the Western parties. The first
ideological explanations accompanying the commune drive al-
most certainly annoyed the Kremlin. One would be safe in
predicting that there will be periodic rifts and misunderstand-,
ings between the two Communist giants, probably more than
foreign analysts detect from the scanty evidence of the party
relations. Nevertheless, it is believed that through 1965 the
means of Soviet power and the Chinese Communists' need for
Bloc solidarity will be quite adequate to insure Peking's co-
operation. This will be publicly registered from time to time
by Chinese acknowledgment of the "leading role" of the CPSU
and the primacy of Soviet experience in the building of social-
ism.
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T? K1 T'T A T
D. In what areas will revisionism have made
greatest progress?
23. Before the Russian revolution, a revisionist
was a communist who opposed the revolutionary principles of
Marxist doctrine and advocated evolutionary development:.
Since the establishment of the Soviet state, a revisionist has
been in practice a professing communist who dissents from
one or more tenets which the CPSU declares to be doctrinal-
ly orthodox. It happens that revisionists have historically
been advocates of a more "liberal" course and non-Russians;
champions of a harder line have had other epithets reserved
for them, and Soviet oppositionists have been charged with
anti-party activities, deviationism, intrigue, and even treason,
but never revisionism. Some cases of revisionism arise out
of true ideological divergences; others are so designated al-
though a conflict of power interests is the basic matter at
issue. Tito's quarrel with the Kremlin falls partly in the
latter category. Although branded a fascist when he first
rejected the position of satrap in Stalin's empire, the Yugo-
slav leader was later termed a revisionist, and his continued
insistence on national independence and his refusal to recog-
nize "the leading role of the CPSU" in the field of ideology
have thwarted Khrushchev's attempts to patch up the quarrel.
Some leaders of other parties have deviated on internal issues
from Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by Moscow, but they
have not challenged the authority of the CPSU to control the
international movement or to determine the communist line
on foreign affairs.
24. Revisionism, it is believed, will be a problem
for the communist world in 1965 as it is today. It will prob-
ably be most serious in Eastern Europe, because the conflicts
between Soviet and national interests constantly put a strain
on the unity of the satellite parties. These parties must seek
a measure of popular consent, yet to court this among people
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who are in large part anti-Russian admits the risk of straying
from the current Moscow orthodoxy. Because of indoctrination
and the realization that they have no future without Soviet sup-
port, the satellite leaders are willing servants of the Kremlin,
but they have the task of governing people who would overthrow
them if opportunity offered. This uneasy situation leads to
policy differences within the parties and, among other results,
to accusations of revisionism. Unless or until the populations
of the satellite countries accept their place in the communist
empire, revisionism will be endemic in the national parties.
It is unlikely, however, to assume proportions serious enough
to threaten Soviet control.
25. If in 1965 Yugoslavia is still an independent com-
munist state, it will be regarded by Moscow as a center of re-
visionism and the Belgrade regime will continue to be the tar-
get of attack by all communist parties. One can only speculate
about the situation which will arise with Tito's demise. His
successors, not enjoying his personal prestige, might find
the embrace of the Bloc more comfortable than. the independent
role he has essayed. If they made their peace with Moscow,
this center of revisionism would be removed, and the Soviet
leaders would probably be willing to tolerate a good deal of
Yugoslav individuality in "building socialism" to achieve such
a result. Gomulka's Poland is likely to stay within permissi-
ble boundaries of ideology and to escape charges of revision-
ism. Some of the practices of the Polish communists, in
agriculture for example, probably bother the ideologues in
the CPSU, but they can be tolerated for the time being be-
cause the Warsaw regime has been increasingly orthodox on
the essential tenets. Although tardily for a satellite leader,
Gomulka finally echoed the approved interpretation of the Hun-
garian revolution, spoke less equivocally about the leading
1Gomulka has recently shown signs of moving back cautiously
toward the goal of agricultural collectivization, sugaring the
pill and delaying its administration.
r"'!1'AT - TT'- AT rt+T A T
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position of the Soviet party, and found fewer friendly words
for the erring comrades in Yugoslavia.
26. In 1965 revisionism will almost certainly be a
problem in a number of the communist parties in Free World
countries. Some issue or personal rivalry will cause a leader
or a faction to criticize Moscow's dominance and advocate a
more nationalistic program for the local party. However, in
the absence of a crisis comparable to the Hungarian revolu-
tion, such schismatic movements are not likely to accomplish
much. The support of the international movement, and es-
pecially the endorsement of the CPSU, are so important that
orthodoxy is almost certain to triumph over revisionism.
Moreover, the way of the revisionist is usually hard. Unless
he is a person of exceptional talents, he will fade into obscurity,
rejected by former comrades and democratic socialists alike.
27. It is unlikely, therefore, that by 1965 revision-
ism will constitute a basic threat to Sino-Soviet Communism.
Revisionist factions will be an occasional problem for satel-
lite and Free World parties, but the cards are stacked against
their ability to present a serious challenge to what the CPSU
pronounces as the true doctrine.
E. What is likely to be the relative importance of
Fronts, economic operations, political action,
and insurrection in the promotion of Interna-
tional Communism? The estimates are in
terms of areas with particular attention to the
underdeveloped regions.
28. Judgments concerning the relative importance
of the various means for advancing communism depend heavi-
ly upon estimates of the future situation in various countries
and areas. The communists will be flexible in tactics, al-
though their doctrinal rigidity in appraising situations will,
on occasion, lead them to choose ineffective and even self-
defeating means.
-16-
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Z9. Western Europe. Assuming that in 1965 con-
ditions in this area are largely the same as at present, it is
probable that front organizations will be the chief tool in the
promotion of International Communism. Peace committees,
friendship societies, and labor, professional, youth, and
women's organizations will be promoted to advance the come
munist causes. Economic operations will probably be at-
tempted against any soft spots that develop in particular na-
tional economies, and a major effort may be made to frus-
trate the development of the Common Market. 1 Political
action, other than labor strikes of opportunity, and insurrec-
tion are not likely to be regarded by the Kremlin as profitable
methods.
30. Latin America. Since this area will be char-
acterized by the political and social strains associated with
efforts at rapid economic development, there will be oppor-
tunities for Moscow to employ all the weapons of the commu-
nist armory. Fronts of all kinds will be important. They
will endeavor to capitalize on the strong nationalistic trends
present in many of the Latin American countries and on the
frictions and dislocations attendant on rapid social change.
Attempts at economic penetration through trade and aid pro-
posals are certain to be made, and a number of deals will
probably be consummated. Nevertheless, communist cap-
abilities in this field are limited, and the Latin American
governments are likely to realize that their aspirations will
best be attained in cooperation with traditional trading part-
ners. There will probably be more opportunities for political
action and insurrection by 1965 than today. With increased
1
A sign pointing in this direction is the Soviet proposal, sub-
mitted to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,
for the creation of an all-European trade organization to
"counteract the trend toward the dividing of Europe into
closed economic groups. " (New York Times, 10 April 1959).
17
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political consciousness on the part of organized workers,
peasants, and students, Latin American revolutions will have
more elements of social upheaval and struggle than the tra-
ditional palace coups in which one ruling faction replaces a
similar one. Penetration of labor unions, the armed forces,
the police, political parties, and student;corganizations will
enable the Communist parties to exploit revolutionary situa-
tions to their advantage. The communists' prominence in
the Venezuelan and Cuban revolutions is probably an indica-
tion of their role in future troubles in the Latin American
area. Their success in dominating revolutionary movements
will be limited by the capabilities of the national parties, by
the area's remoteness from the centers of communist power,
and by counteractions of the United States and the OAS.
31. The Middle East. In 1965 this area will
probably still offer opportunities for the full range of commu-
nist operations. The contest between Arab nationalism and
communism may result in the communists' front efforts being
less productive than in. some other areas; issues of control
and direction are likely to split these organizations into groups
allied with one movement or the other. With a good start on
economic penetration, the Bloc will probably be utilizing this
tool on an expanded scale. It will be difficult for the Middle
Eastern countries which have developed extensive economic
relations with the communist states to disentangle their af-
fairs should they wish to do so. Having directed large parts
of their trade toward the Bloc, become involved in long-range
industrial and improvement projects, and replaced Western
technicians with communist personnel, they have created a
dependent relationship which cannot be easily broken. The
communists are not likely to be forbearing in exploiting this
relationship. Political action and armed insurrection must
be considered probable communist tactics in the Middle East.
The area, of course, is as accustomed today to the methods
of conspiracy and violence as in the days of the original
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Assassins, To the traditional means of promoting or ob-
structing a cause, the communists have merely added refine-
ments drawn from their long experience in clandestine oper-
ations. It is probable that by 1965 the recent history of the
area will be a record of coups, insurrections, and civil wars
between armed "resistance fighters. " In these, communist
parties and supporting organizations will be participants.
32. South Asia and the Far East. In the arc from
West Pakistan to Japan the communists are likely to rely
principally upon "peaceful" means for advancing the move-
ment. Front organizations will endeavor to capitalize on
widely-held sentiments - anti- colonialism, Western imper-
ialism, fear of nuclear war, and peaceful coexistence. Given
the neutralist feelings in the area, the fronts will probably
be able to carry on some successful campaigns and enlist a
good deal of support. Their activities will be complemented
by vigorous cultural programs by the communist states -
delegations, exhibitions, scholarships, publications, and
so forth. The economic operations of the communist coun-
tries are likely to follow the pattern of the past few years.
There will be offers of low-interest loans for major develop-
ment projects, trade agreements, and the supply of Bloc per-
sonnel as advisers and technical experts. By 1965, the export
by Communist China of cheap manufactures may be a serious
problem in the area. If this export is carried out in ways to
disrupt local economies and traditional trade relations, the
benefits of low cost merchandise may be lost. In the com-
munists' economic operations in the area the overseas Chi-
nese will probably be utilized in many ways. Political action
will be resorted to whenever conditions are favorable - and
they frequently will be. The communist influence in labor
unions, particularly in India, Singapore, and Indone sia, will
certainly be employed to advance political causes. The com-
munist parties in such parliamentary bodies as are function-
ing in 1965 will use their power to frustrate the will of the
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democratic majorities and generally to discredit constitution-
al processes. The penetration of all official strata, civil and
military, will be pushed by the party commands. Although the
communists are not likely to invite strong retaliatory measures,
insurrection must be expected under favorable circumstances.
For example, the communists in Singapore might resort to
violence in an effort to seize power or to provoke the British
to rescind the grant of self-government. In the main, how-
ever, the communists will probably rely upon the disillusion
created by weak governments, faltering economic systems,
and the passing of the bright promise of independence to bring
closer their day of victory.
33. Africa. The speed with which African nation-
alism is sweeping away political colonialism has probably
surprised the Kremlin as much as Western capitals, and un-
doubtedly the communists are busily engaged on schemes to
exploit the new situation. By 1965 native regimes of author-
itarian cast are likely to be in power in a good part of Africa
south of the Sahara. Their leaders will probably be pre-
occupied in holding power, maintaining internal order, and
maneuvering for influence in the confusing and conflicting
patterns of the new African scene. The Kremlin will be en-
gaged in trying to establish communist strength in countries
where the movement has been virtually unknown. It will
operate with certain advantages in this task. In the first
place, the communist states are accepted by many in the
African governing classes as disinterested friends, hostile
to colonialism and free of racial prejudice. This receptive
attitude will be reinforced by the Africans' desire to pursue
neutralist foreign policies. Secondly, expanded trade rela-
tions and aid programs of various kinds will bring representa-
tives of the Bloc countries into increasing contact with the
peoples of Black Africa? The work of these representatives
will be facilitated by the belief of many African leaders that
collectivist economies are best suited to their conditions. A
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third advantage will derive from the techniques of organiza-
tion, both overt and clandestine, which communist function-
aries can introduce into societies evolving from the primitive
to the outwardly civilized.
34. The communists will also face some obstacles.
Africa is remote from the centers of communist power, and
neither Soviet nor Chinese emissaries can exploit ethnic and
cultural bonds as they do in Asia. The economic relations of
Africa with the Western world will be less easy to sever than
the political ties. New and more positive policies by the
"colonial" powers to promote economic development and
'commonwealth" ties may gradually disarm "anti-imperialist"
hostility. Furthermore, the new African states will be jealous
of their independence and wary of exchanging a new imperial-
ism for an old.
35. In trying to expand in Africa from points of
penetration, International Communism will use a full range
of tactical weapons. Probably founding parties where they
do not presently exist will be given a high priority. The Krem-
lin will want to take advantage of the favorable climate in
several of the new African states to establish local CP's.
A party may have to go underground as the native regime
becomes more authoritarian or outlaws undemocratic organ-
izations, but even so a useful foothold will have been secured.
Front organizations will play a prominent part. The commu-
nists have already seen the benefits to be gained from draw-
ing Africans into their student, labor, and cultural organiza-
tions, and they will expand these efforts. They will employ
the flattery of office and of platform appearances, with prom-
inent communists and fellow-travellers, as well as travel
expenses; to attract promising African figures to participate
in the activities of national, regional, and worldwide front
organizations. The economic operations of the Bloc coun-
tries are likely to be of the publicity-gaining type already
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practiced in Asia and the Middle East. Trade delegations with
attractive wares will be busy on the African circuity and the
USSR will probably be making offers of loans and technical aid
for major development projects. Opportunities for political
action will be numerous by 1965. There is little evidence to
date of communist influence in the native-European troubles
of East and Central Africa, but Moscow is unlikely to ignore
the openings which these offer. In these areas communist-
trained organizers can be expected to try to give the social
and political unrest a revolutionary direction. The penetra-
tion of labor unions will lead to strike action for communist
political objectives and to a considerable sabotage capability.
It is not likely that by 1965 the communists will be able
independently to stage coups against established governments
or to carry on insurrections but they probably will be partici-,
pants in political action plotted and started by others. In
such situations the question of trained leadership becomes
important. The Kremlin may well be counting on supplying
the organizing and directing skill for millions of Africans
whose rapid propulsion into the modern world is almost bound
to be tempestuous.
36. To draw a conclusion, there is a good prospect
that in 1965 communism will be more of a factor in African
affairs than it is today and that, in addition, it may be on the
threshold of a period of rapid expansion. This latter condi-
tion could come about if the rather considerable numbers of
Africans being trained in the Bloc gain influence and control
in parties, unions, cooperatives, schools, and other organi--
zationsy for their communist indoctrination is apt to give
them advantages in the rather disorderly development that
will characterize Africa during the next few decades.
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F. What changes. are developments in mass com-
munications and transportation likely to have
made in the organization of International Com-
munism and communist parties and in the
degree and nature of their control over individu=-
als and groups?
37. There are four developments in mass commu-
nications and transportation which bear upon the operations
.of International Communism. Each plays a part now in the
tactics of world communism; by 1965 it will be more im-
portant in the Kremlin is operational manuals. The first is
the availability of rapid air transportation. This contributes
to the methods by which Moscow coordinates, supervises,
and controls Bloc affairs and the world movement. Since the
dissolution of the Comintern, the Kremlin has relied increas-
ingly upon meetings of communist leaders to plan strategy
and tactics. Some of these are large, multi-party affairs;
others are bilateral. They total several score a year. This
method, a kind of conference system, of directing the affairs
of International Communism would scarcely be feasible with-
out fast transportation. It enables the Kremlin leaders to get
about their empire on frequent occasions. It also permits the
assembly, on fairly short notice, of a general conclave of
communist leaders, as was the case with the XXI CPSU Con-
gress. Besides the substantive value of the business trans-
acted at these meetings, the communists get a propaganda
increment from their dramatic comings and goings.
38. The second development is the use of radio
broadcasting to spread the communist message among the
illiterate masses of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Here
is a means of reaching primitive peoples who might other-
wise never hear of communism and the countries which pro-
fess the Marxian creed. While propaganda broadcasting is
no monopoly of the communists, it is a particularly useful
tool to them. Because their objectives are usually destructive
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of the existing social order, they can play irresponsibly on
all the fears, grievances, and aspirations of uneducated and
illiterate peoples who have no :points of reference for appraises
ing the accuracy of what they hear. It is most probable that
in 1965 the Bloc countries will be devoting increased resources
to this form of propaganda.
39. Another development to be expected is the exten-
sive use of motion pictures. The communists will employ this
medium to reach large numbers in the underdeveloped countries.
Its novelty for simple and illiterate people will insure receptive
audiences. As in the case of radio broadcasts, these people
will frequently have few standards by which to judge the ac-
curacy of the material presented.
40. As a fourth development, it is likely that the
major communist powers will be using their air transport cap-
ability to heighten the threat of intervention by "volunteers" in
crisis situations. The USSR employed the threat effectively at
the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 and will certainly try it again
when conditions are inviting. By 1965 the Chinese Communists
should have an air capability that would give verisimilitude to
their threats of intervention. The tactic of threatening inter-
vention by "volunteers" will help the position of communist
parties in countries around the periphery of the Bloc. In situa-
tions where civil war has broken out or impends, they will be
able to claim a supply of reinforcements sufficient to determine
the outcome. Like the Kremlin's rattling of nuclear weapons,
the vision of swiftly landed "volunteers" takes its place as a
tactic to paralyze foes and to give local communists the argu-
ment that they represent an avenging power which wicked im-
perialists and war-mongers may provoke into action.
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III. CONCLUSIONS
41. The discussion of the questions posed for this
paper does not pretend to offer a definitive or complete assess-
ment of International Communism in 1965. Nevertheless, it
does suggest some general conclusions about the future status
and prospects of the movement. They are:
a. The dynamics of Communism will remain
as strong as we assess them today. The non-Communist
world will still be in competition through the whole spec-
trum of human activity with an aggressive, ruthless move-
ment.
b. Moscow will continue to be the directing penter
of International Communism. Communist China will
probably be a more assertive partner, but in the major
issues dividing East and West the "leading role" of the
CPSU will be acknowledged throughout the Bloc. The
Communist parties in Free World countries will con-
tinue to be pliant tools of the Kremlin.
c. Communist parties will experience dissident
movements which the orthodox factions will denounce and
combat under the charge of revisionism. The East
European satellite parties - particularly those of Poland,
Hungary, and East Germany - will continue to be bothered
by schismatic tendencies, since the problems of how best
to rule largely hostile populations and reconcile national
and Soviet interests regularly generate factional differ-
ences. In Communist party divisions, leaders and groups
loyal to what the CPSU declares to be orthodox will almost
always possess superior advantages. Hence, the pros-
pect is not great that the International Communist Move-
ment will be seriously retarded by revisionism or "nation-
al" Communism, Tito's continued intransigence notwith-
standing.
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d. In seeking to weaken opposition and gain
objectives, Communism's methods will range, as in
the past, from the violent to the bland. There will be
the difference that the Soviet Union's growth in mili-
tary and industrial power, supplemented by a Commu-
nist China rising to great power status, will provide
a variety and potency of means considerably beyond
those employed today.
e. Communist pressure will have mounted
against the most vulnerable of the Free World's posi-
tions - the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. By 1965, political and economic
crisis plus Communist action will probably have brought
several of these countries, especially in Asia and the
Middle East, to the crucial decision whether to succumb
to alignment with the Sino-Soviet Bloc or continue to
seek the realization of their aspirations through means
acceptable to Western sources of aid and cooperation.
Many others, while still eschewing alliances or polit-
ical commitments, will be accepting development
assistance from both East and West. Even in the
areas farthest from the centers of Communist power,
the contest for influence will be more critical than it
is today.
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