CHINESE COMMUNISM AND LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100180001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 26, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
CHINESE COMMUNISM AND LATIN AMERICA
CIA/SRS-1 3
26 February 1960
State Dept. declassification instructions on file
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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Senior Research Staff on International Communism
CHINESE COMMUNISM AND LATIN AMERICA
CIA/SRS- 13
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For several years the Chinese communists have been
devoting much attention to Latin America. They regularly
link the peoples of the area with those of Asia and Africa as
similar victims of imperialist exploitation and oppression.
In their concern with Latin American affairs, the Chinese
communists are chiefly motivated by a wish to frustrate the
policies and weaken the position of the United States in an area
of prime security importance. Lately Cuba and Panama have
particularly aroused their solicitude. Another motive is a
desire for diplomatic recognition in the one region of the world
where no success has been registered. Communist zeal is also
involved, since political and social conditions in a number of
Latin American countries appear favorable to advancing the
movement. Hope of increasing the small volume'; of trade with
the area is probably a minor motive.
The Chinese communists are showing their interest in
Latin America by a variety of means. They beam 21 hours of
Spanish-language broadcasts to the area weekly. The flow of
propaganda publications has risen rapidly. Latin American
visitors to mainland China numbered more than 350 in 1959,
with 135 of them attending the 10th Anniversary celebrations
in Peking as expense-free guests of the Chinese Peoples
Republic. A considerable proportion of the invited travelers
have been non-communists prominent in politics and the pro-
fessions. Return visitors have been fewer; a touring acro-
batic troupe, a journalistic group, and a labor delegation
have accounted for most of them. The Communist parties of
Latin America are receiving doctrinal instruction and tactical
advice in meetings with Chinese leaders, through the supply
of the written works of Mao Tse-tung and his lieutenants, and
by the training of cadres.
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The Chinese communists are probably well-satisfied with
the Latin American response to their approaches. The leaders
of the Latin American Communist parties have found their
Chinese comrades to be sympathetic counselors and the CCP's
advice relevant to their "semi-colonial" conditions. From
non-communists have come compliments on the "progress" of
the CPR and support for diplomatic recognition and increased
trade and cultural relations.
Chinese communist interest in Latin America is being
exhibited along with rising Soviet attention to the area. There
is no evidence of rivalry in party relations or governmental
policy on the part of the two communist powers; rather they
have a common interest in weakening United States influence
in Latin America. Although a rupture of the Sino-Soviet alli-
ance would trouble the Latin American Communist parties,
they would almost certainly remain loyal to their long-estab-
lished ties with the Kremlin.
The likelihood is strong that Communist China, both as
a state and as a source of influence in the international move-
ment, will be increasingly a more prominent factor in Latin
American affairs. The CPR will not impede the rising Soviet
influence in the area but will supplement the communist threat
to the security of the Latin American republics.
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CHINESE COMMUNISM AND LATIN AMERICA
INTRODUCTION
1. Seeking to project their influence to all quarters
of the globe, the Chinese communists have devoted a great deal
of attention during the past several years to Latin America, a
region with which China has had few historic connections, cul-
tural affinities, or trade relations. They regularly link Latin
America with Asia and Africa in expressions of solicitude for
peoples suffering from imperialist oppression. Thus, Liu
Shao-chi declared in the political report to the VIII Party
Congress in September 1956 that Peking's foreign policy was
"to oppose colonialism and help all struggle against colonial-
ism and in defense of national sovereignty in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. " This objective has been repeated daily in
the propaganda emissions. from Communist China. Kuo Mo-jo,
chairman of the China Peace Committee, during his speech at
a mass rally held in Peking on 25 November 1959 "to support
the Congo people and all the African people in their struggle
for national independence, and in opposition to imperialism and
colonialism, " digressed from his main topic to include a few
standard paragraphs about Latin America. "Let us, at this
mass rally, " he exhorted, "pay our sincere respects to the
Latin American people who are fighting courageously in de-
fense of their national independence, for democracy and free-
dom, and against the American aggression and plunder. "l
2. Peking's interest in Latin America is reflected
in the space given to the region in the domestic Chinese press.
Latin American affairs are regularly discussed on the "foreign
1
FBIS Far Eastern Daily Report, 27 November 1959, p. AAAS
(OUO).
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page" of the People's Daily, with the Cuban situation being a
particularly popular topic. The Santiago conference of foreign
ministers in August 1959 was considered worth about a third
of all space devoted to non-B Loc events by the People's Daily,
and for several issues the theme of Latin American indignation
over the "trap" being laid by Secretary Herter was prominent-
ly played.
25X1 C8b CHINESE COMMUNIST MOTIVES
3. Undoubtedly the chief motive behind the attention
bestowed on Latin America is Peking's desire to frustrate the
policies and weaken the position of the United States. The
Chinese communists have seen in Latin America opportunities
to carry the propaganda and subversive offensive into the back-
yard of their principal enemy. Here is a region of vital secur-
ity importance to the United States, of heavy economic invest-
ment and extensive trade relations, and of traditionally close
political alignment. It is also a region affected by the strong
nationalistic currents in the world, beset by many social and
economic problems, and containing influential groups who are
jealous and resentful of United States power and influence.
Aware of these factors, the Chinese communists have logical-
ly pointed a good share of their campaign of hostility to the
United States in the direction of Latin America.
4. A second motive is to win international recogni-
tion. The Western Hemisphere is the only major region in
which the Peking regime has failed to gain acceptance by some
25X1 C8b
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countries as the de jure government of China. Its prestige
suffers to that extent, while the claim of the Republic of China
on Taiwan to be the legitimate repository of Chinese sovereign-
ty is strengthened. Removal of the present outcast status in
the Western Hemisphere by obtaining diplomatic recognition
from a number of Latin American states would represent a
major victory for the Chinese Peoples Republic. It would al-
most certainly lead to admission to the United Nations and the
prospect of the transfer of the Security Council seat from the
Taiwan to the Peking regime. The Chinese communists believe
that by cultivating influential groups they can' encourage the
strong neutralist sentiments in several Latin American countries
and reduce the bloc of adverse votes in the UN Assembly. Cuba's
abstention on the 1959 vote and the restiveness displayed by other
governments on the admission issue indicate that this belief is
well founded.
5. An additional motive for attention to Latin America
is the desire to hasten the spread of Communism. Mao Tse-
tung and his followers have the missionary zeal of communists
in a virulent form. As they see the situation, there are Com-
munist parties in nearly all the Latin American countries that
deserve to be helped. The times are propitious for such aid.
Latin American revolutions, traditionally the deposing of one
oligarchic clique by another, are more frequently taking on the
character of deep social convulsions. The prospects for com-
munist advances are thus improved, and to this favorable situa-
tion the centers of the movement cannot be indifferent.
6. Postulating the establishment of communist re-
gimes in Latin America, some long-range planners in Peking
may envisage a Chinese orbit spanning the Pacific. Should
migration become one necessary solution to China's population
problem, the comparatively open spaces of South America offer
possibilities more favorable than either the densely populated
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or the arid regions of Asia. Such geopolitical ideas, if enter-
tained in Peking, would provide a subsidiary motive for the
support of Latin American communism.
7. Finally, as a minor motivating force, there is
Peking's interest in increasing its foreign trade. The pros-
pects in this regard are not great. As two generally under-
developed areas and exporters of raw materials for the most
part, Communist China and Latin America do not have much
to exchange. An average annual trade of about $7 million can
probably be increased by Chinese purchases of sugar, copper,
wool, and certain other products, but the vistas held out by
communist propaganda are certainly illusory. To the Latin
Americans' misfortune, coffee-drinking is not as yet a popular
habit in the Far East.
THE MEANS OF CHINESE INFLUENCE
8. The Chinese Communists direct twenty-one hours
of Spanish language broadcasts to Latin America each week.
Besides extolling the achievements of the CPR, the burden of
these broadcasts is the iniquitous behavior of United States
"imperialism" and its "exploitation" of Latin America. A
common feature of the programs is a recorded interview with
a Latin American visitor? These follow a pattern: enthusiastic
reports of visits to factories, schools, and communes; praise
for the happy, friendly Chinese people; denunciations of Yankee
imperialism; calls for diplomatic recognition and UN member-
ship; predictions of the benefits to be reaped by increased trade
and cultural relations. Almost standard is a comment about the
transformation of the "Shanghai of bandits and prostitutes, which
the imperialists had attempted to represent as a symbol of a de-
praved and humiliated China . . . "l A good deal of Latin
1
Recorded address of Luiz Carlos Prestes, secretary-general
of the Brazilian Communist Party, 1 December 1959. FBIS
Far Eastern Daily Report, 1 December 1959, p. AAA 22 (OUO).
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American "news" with a strong anti-United States flavor broad-
cast by Peking apparently derives from a working arrangement
between the New China News Agency (NCNA) and the recently
organized and.Cuban sponsored press service, Prensa Latina.
9. Considerable quantities of printed material are
sent to Latin American countries. Some items are Spanish
translations of the works of leading Chinese Communists, such
as Como Ser un Buen Communists (How to be a Good. Commu-
nist) by Liu Shao-chi. Others are books and pamphlets de-
signed to impress non-communists as well as party members.
On 1 January 1960 the Chinese Communists began publishing
a Spanish-language edition of their propaganda magazine,
China Reconstructs. Subscriptions will be accepted, accord-
ing to the Peking radio, by distributors in Brazil, Colombia,
Chil.ea, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Advertise-
ments calling attention to the availability of Chir}ese commu-
nist publications are appearing in newspapers throughout the
region.
10. Besides the broadcast and printed word the
Chinese. Communists have sought influence through exchang-
ing visits. From January to November, 1959, 355 Latin Amer-
icans had traveled to the Chinese Peoples Republic, a consider-
able increase over the 115 in each of the two previous years.
Approximately 1.35 of the 1959 visitors attended the 10th Anni-
versary celebrations in Peking.
11. The Latin American visitors to Communist China
fall into three general categories. First, there are the active
members of Communist parties. They are invited to be present
at congresses of the CCP or to visit China after attending meet-
Department of State Intelligence Information Brief No. 226,
25 November 1959.
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ings in other Bloc countries. Some spend several months
attending Chinese Communist Party schools. The second
category consists of fellow-travelers - politicians, journal-
ists, lawyers, union leaders, and authors. A good proportion
of these visitors are active in communist front organizations,
such as the World Peace Council and the International Union
of Students. The third group is composed of non-Communists,
including politicians, businessmen, and journalists.
12. The Chinese communists have been generous in
paying the expenses of their Latin American visitors. The
transportation of most, if not all, of the delegates invited to
the 10th Anniversary celebrations in Peking was paid by the
CPR, and they were guests of the government during their
stay in China. The money to pay the fares of the Chilean del-
egation was reportedly transmitted to the Communist Party of
Chile, which made the selection of persons invited. The Chi-
nese declined to provide tickets for the wives of male delegates
but offered them expense-free visits after arrival if they paid
their own way. A group of members of the Colombian Congress
who traveled in the Bloc last summer journeyed on to Peking
where they had an interview with Mao Tse-tung; their expenses
were reportedly paid from Paris and return by the countries
they visited.
13. So far the exchange of visitors has been heavily
in one direction. Late in 1958 and early in 1959 a Chinese
acrobatic troupe toured South America, performing in all
countries willing to grant visas. Several were not. The
director of the touring party, Chou Erh-fu, utilized his pres-
ence in Latin America to establish contacts with local commu-
nist leaders. Six non-performers reportedly visited La Paz,
Bolivia, after the troupe was refused visas. A group of four
Chinese newsmen opened an office of the New China News
Agency (NCNA) in Havana in June and visited other Latin
American capitals seeking to employ correspondents for their
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service. They succeeded in hiring several, according to
reliable reports. In late November 1959, three fraternal
delegates and an interpreter arrived in Santiago, Chile, to
attend the Second National Congress of the Chilean trade
unions, the Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile (CUTCh),
meeting from 5 to 8 December. This Chinese group appeared
in Caracas on 23 December as guests of toe Venezuelan Labor
Confederation (CTV). The delegation said the purpose of the
visit was to get "to know Venezuela and to establish closer
relations with the Venezuelan labor movement" as a means
of "contributing to world peace. " The Chinese were received
by leading labor leaders at the Confederation headquarters and
entertained by the organizing committee of the Association of
the Friends of China. The United States Embassy commented:
"In the absence of countervailing ievidence, CTV invitation and
sponsorship of the Chinese Communist delegation must be ad-
judged as a significant achievement of Venezuelan Communists
in the labor movement. "
14. Communist Chinese cultural associations have
been established during 1959 in Bogota, La Paz, Caracas, and
Montevideo, adding to those already existing in cities of Chi~e,
Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. The one in Bogota was utilized
to extend invitations to three prominent non-communist Colom-
bians to attend the 10th Anniversary celebrations.
15. The Peking regime has additionally shown its
interest in Latin America by undertaking to advise visiting
communists and train party members. From the time the
Chinese Communists consolidated their political power in 1949
there has been a growing amount of ideological and tactical in-
struction communicated by the CCP. In general, the CCP has
1
American Embassy Caracas, Joint Weeka No. 51, 31 Decem-
ber 1959 (CONFIDENTIAL).
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25X1X6
25X1X6
emphasized to the Latin American communists the alleged
similarity between many conditions in their "semi-colonial"
and "semi-feudal" countries and those in pre- 1949 China, the
relevance of Chinese methods in developing "socialism, " and
the importance of the "national independence movement" in
liberating states from imperialist oppression.
16. Since late 1957 three major events in the Com.-
munist Bloc have provided occasions for the assembling of
party leaders from all over the world, and Latin America has
been well represented at each. After the first, the 40th Anni-
versary celebration in Moscow and the concurrent meeting of
the Communist and Workers Parties, a number of Latin Amer-
ican leaders traveled to Peking where they sought the counsel
of Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues. The XXI Congress of the
CPSU was another occasion for a glathering of the communist
elite, and again some Latin Americans visited Peking on their
homeward journey. The third occasion, the 10th Anniversary
celebrations of the Chinese Peoples Republic, provided an
opportunity for numerous intimate contacts between leading
Latin American communists and their CCP comrades. 1 On
5 October 1959, the Latin American rou met with Mao Tse-
tung, Liu Shao-chi, and Chou En-lai. 25X1X6
Mao "emphasized the importance of Latin
America, and especially the Cuban revolution. "2 On 25 Octo-
ber the Brazilian Communist Party delegation, led by its
secretary-general, Luiz Carlos Prestes, had a private ses-
sion with Mao and other CCP officials.
1
The attendance of delegates from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela was
announced by Radio Peking. Representatives from El Salvador,
Honduras, and Panama reportedly were present also. -
25X1X6
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17. Small numbers of Latin American communists
have been traveling to China for training since at least 1952.
Rafael Echeverria Flores, a leading theoretician and officer
of the Ecuadoran party, received training in both the Soviet
Union and Communist China in 1958 and was recently report-
ed to be directing a "special political-military orientation
course to be given to twenty select Party leaders, as a first
step toward the formation of Communist revolutionary cadres
in Ecuador."' Blas Roca, Cuban communist leader, was
said to have been a "classmate" of Echeverria during instruc-
tion given by P'eng Teh-huai, Chinese commander during the
Korean War. Several members of the Costa Rican Partido
Vanguardia Popular (PVP) attended a CCP school in 1958, and
the party was offered -six places for a course to begin in April
1960. The Panamanian party was offered two places in this
course and reportedly given $1, 400 by the CPR Ministry of
Foreign Relations (sic) to cover travel expenses. The Latin
American training candidates were advised to allow two months
for the course, one month for more specialized instruction,
and two months for travel, presumably in Communist China.
THE LATIN AMERICAN RESPONSE TO COMMUNIST
CHINESE INTEREST
18. The Latin American communists have apparently
responded eagerly to the overtures of their Chinese comrades.
Every party seems to have sent delegates to the 10th Anniver-
sary celebrations and, in the case of the larger countries, to
have cooperated in insuring the attendance of non-communists.
Many Latin American communists have accepted invitations
to visit China following attendance at congresses or training
schools in the USSR and the East European satellites. Oppor-
tunities extended by the CCP for party schooling have been
gratefully accepted. The Communist press in Latin America
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devotes considerable space to Chinese affairs and the pronounce-
ments of the Peking regime; much of this material is popular
because of its strong anti-American tone, but it also caters to
a lively interest in developments in the CPR.
19. There is evidence that a good many Latin Amer-
ican communists have subscribed to the view that Chinese exper-
ience is highly relevant to their problems. Chinese programs
with respect to land reform, the expropriation and expulsion of
foreign business interests, and mass education are accepted as
apposite to the Latin American situation. The tactic of a "dem-
ocratic front" in which peasants, the small bourgeoisie, and
the nationalist intelligentsia are organized by the communists
seems a practical method for the Latin American parties. A
consideration in the receptivity of the Latin American commu-
nists to Chinese models and instructions is almost certainly
the prestige of the Peking leaders as genuine revolutionists,
men who only a few years ago were bearing the red flag in
battle.
20. Interest among Latin American communists in the
Chinese example was considerably increased by the line of the
XX CPSU Congress (1956) on different roads to socialism. Duti-
fully loyal to the Kremlin, Latin American communists saw in
this doctrinal statement an approval to study and apply Chinese
experience to their "distinctive" local conditions.
21. The Latin American communists who have been
in contact with their Chinese comrades seem to find them agree-
able in both personal and party relations. Some of the Latin
Americans contrast the gracious manners of the Chinese with
a hard and arrogant approach of Soviet communists. The Latin
temperament appears to find the Peking official atmosphere
more congenial than the Moscow, and the ready access to top
leaders pleases the visitors. The Brazilian party delegation
to the 10th Anniversary celebrations was obviously flattered
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by its reception, being treated, according to the account of
Prestes to some Central Committee members, as representa-
tives of one of the most important Communist parties outside
the Bloc.
22. The Chinese propagandists probably are well satis-
fied with the response to their blandishments in non-communist
circles of Latin America. They have elicited a considerable
volume of favorable comment about their regime and its policies
from the fellow-traveling and radical intelligentsia, and they
have obtained the endorsement of several well-known political
figures. For example, former President Lazaro Cardenas of
Mexico lauded the Peking government in a 10th Anniversary
celebration arranged by various communist and leftist organi-
zations in the Mexican capital. Invitations to visit China have
been accepted by persons influential in forming public opinion.
The Colombian delegation to the Peking celebration consisted
not only of several communists and sympathizers but also of
the sons of two former presidents of the republic, both.direc-
tors of newspapers. Another Colombian delegate was a prom-
inent businessman and rancher who writes extensively on agri-
cultural economics. The Argentine delegation included four
legislators, three national and one provincial. Among the
Chilean delegates was the president of the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee of the Chamber of Deputies. A Bolivian visitor was the
former president of the Chamber of Deputies, Dr. German
Quiroga-Ga1do. A number of the 10th Anniversary delegations
included one or more journalists.
23. There seem to be several explanations for the
response which the Chinese have achieved among non-commu-
nists. One is certainly the existence of great curiosity about
what is happening in the Far East, a . Latin American echo of
18th century Europe's vogue of chinoiserie. Expense-free
tours do nothing to diminish this curiosity. Journalistic enter-
prise accounts for the interest of a good many publishers,
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editors, and reporters who have traveled to Communist China
and have publicized its developments. The leftist inclinations
which are strong among journalists in some Latin American
countries sharpen their professional interest in things Chinese.
A wish to demonstrate their independence of Washington's atti-
tudes is also involved in the response of non-communist Latin
Americans. There is at least a slight element of bravado in
having associations frowned on by the United States.
THE QUESTION OF SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY
24. Peking's interest in Latin America has been dis-
played during a period of rising Soviet attention to the area..
Overt manifestations of this attention have been proposals and
negotiations with several Latin American states for trade,
loans, and technical assistance; the establishment in Moscow
on 22 January 1959 of the USSR Association for Friendship and
Cultural Cooperation with the Countries of Latin America;
numerous invitations to visit the Soviet Union; offers of univer-
sity scholarships; tours by Russian athletic and musical groups,
and increases in radio broadcasting beamed to Latin America. I
The Soviet exhibition presented in New York in the spring of
1959 was transferred to Mexico City and opened there in Novem-
ber by Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan. In February 1960
it was presented in Havana along with a festival of Soviet films
and musical artists, and Mikoyan made another well publicized
trip to inaugurate the exhibition. In many of their contacts
Soviet officials suggest to Latin Americans that more fruitful
relations could be expected if diplomatic recognition were ex-
panded beyond the three missions presently established -
1
In October 1959 Radio Moscow doubled its Spanish-language
broadcasts to Mexico and Central America from 7 to 14 hours
weekly, and raised its Portuguese-language service to 14 hours
weekly. Its Spanish-language broadcasts to South America re-
mained unchanged at 21 hours weekly. The satellite radios
support the Soviet output by sending 43 hours to Latin America.
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Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico.
25. There is no reason to believe that Soviet attention
to Latin America has been increased in a competition for influ-
ence and popularity with the Chinese communists. On the con-
trary, the two communist powers appear to be conducting a
cooperative campaign, with the East European Satellites adding
their bit. 1 Such evidence as exists suggests that both in com-
munist party affairs and in governmental policies the Peking
and Moscow regimes are rendering each other support rather
than promoting rivalty.
26. The long-established Latin American parties have
always been faithful servants of the Kremlin. In spite of oc-
casional troubles with revisionists, deviationists, and Trotsky-
ists, orthodoxy has held the field. There were repercussions
in Latin America of the 1956 events that shook European com-
munism -- Khrushchev's. "secret" speech and the crises in
Poland and Hungary - but the parties regained their equilibrium
and suffered few defections. The Latin American parties re-
ceive regular guidance from Moscow which interprets the inter-
national situation, indicates propaganda lines, and prescribes
tactics in local situations. Major gatherings in the Soviet cap-
ital, such as. CPSU congresses, are the occasion for extensive
discussion between Kremlin officials and Latin American dele-
gates. This kind of instruction is supplemented by the frequent
visits of Latin American party leaders and officers of Commu-
nist front organizations to Moscow and the Satellite capitals.
1
The Satellites maintain diplomatic relations with the following
Latin American countries: Czechoslovakia - Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay; Hungary - Argentina; Bulgaria -
Argentina and Uruguay; Rumania - Argentina and Uruguay. A
Czechoslovak consul-general is located in Bogota, Colombia.
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Advice and directions are also conveyed by and through the
diplomatic missions of the Bloc countries.
27. Although over the past several years there is
discernible a moderately strong Chinese influence in the pro-
grams and tactics of the Latin American Communist parties,
this appears to be complementary to the Kremlin direction
and not contrary to it. It is believed, for example, that Mao
and his colleagues advised. several Latin American comrunrs~t
leaders, who visited Peking after the XXI Congress, that their
parties should establish illegal apparats, a recommendation
previously made to them in Moscow. At the time of the 10th
Anniversary celebrations Mao is reliably reported to have
warned the Brazilian party delegation against rightist as well
as leftist deviation, a caution repeated to the group when con-
sulting later with CPSU officials. Probably all such advice,
as well as briefings on international developments, is delivered
with a special Chinese flavor, but it generally conforms to the
line issuing from Moscow.
28. A good reason for Sino-Soviet collaboration in
directing and supporting the Communist parties of Latin Amer-
ica lies in the common interests of Peking and Moscow in the
area. Both Communist China and the USSR regard the United
States as the major enemy. Latin American communism is a
useful instrument in weakening the position of the United States
in a region of primary strategic importance to Washington.
The two communist powers can join wholeheartedly in measures
to combat "Yankee imperialism. " Their present satisfaction. in
the trend of the Cuban revolution indicates that this is a develop-
ment which they hope to see repeated in other Latin American
countries.
29. While the interests of Peking and Moscow with
respect to the Western Hemisphere are currently parallel, it
is possible that some divergence might arise. Should the Sov-
iet leaders consider it, expedient to campaign for a further
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T"Mmmoft
moderation in the international climate, the cold blasts of the
Latin American parties might require some tempering. There
is some evidence that this is occurring. A few weeks before
President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to South America, the
secretary-general of the Communist Party of Brazil was relia-
bly reported to have instructed its members that, "given the
international situation as it exists today, " they should greet
the President with friendly demonstrations and seize the occa-
sion "to organize a gigantic campaign for peace. '"f The Chilean
party was said to be preparing banners welcoming the President
and advocating the prohibition of nuclear arms and testing. The
Chinese, while understanding the need and purpose of tactical
flexibility in advancing the communist cause, may regard the
Kremlin's "peace" line as likely to blur the image of a rapacious,
domineering United States which they have been drawing. That
this may be Peking's opinion is lent credence by the continued
virulent tone of Communist Chinese comment on,,Latin Amer-
ican events. For example, an NCNA report of the demonstra-
tions in Panama on 3 and 4 November 1959 spoke of "bloody
suppression" by "US occupation forces. " It was broadcast
twenty-eight times by Radio Peking to foreign audiences and
was followed on 11 November by a summary of a People's
Daily article discussing in scornful language the "unequal"
and "forcibly imposed" US-Panama treaty of 1903. Soviet
comment, in contrast, was relatively restrained. Both Mos-
cow and Peking have broadcast many charges of external plots
and counter-revolutionary activities directed against the Castro
regime in Cuba, but the Chinese have been much more explicit
in blaming the US Government. So far in the Communist
Chinese interpretation of Latin American affairs and Washing-
ton's relations with its hemispheric neighbors there has been
no moderation in the attacks on the United States.
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30. Although the contrast in the overt treatment of
Western Hemisphere developments in Chinese communist and
Soviet propaganda appears to be a genuine difference over
proper tactics, it may represent the mutual recognition of the
advantages of separate themes, with Peking playing the harsh
and Moscow the soft notes. This kind of duet is not unusual
in communist practice. A risk of confusing some party mem-
bers is involved, but the well-briefed communist leaders in
Latin America will almost certainly understand the tactic and
utilize it to exploit antipathy toward the United States while
advocating Soviet-style peaceful coexistence.
31. Real Sino-Soviet competition for direttion of Latin
American communism will arise when and if the two powers
divide over more profound issues. One can only speculate
about how the Latin American parties would react to a genuine
schism between Peking and Moscow. Certainly,,it would pro-
voke a grave crisis. Many Latin American communists would
be strongly attracted to the Chinese pole, particularly if in-
volved in the split was a difference over a detente with the
United States. To sacrifice the militant line o the Chinese
communists would be a hard choice. Moreover, to cut them-
selves off from Chinese "experience" would seem to many
Latin American communists to be depriving their parties of
the most recent and relevant guidance on revolutionary tactics
in a semi-colonial prea.
32. Nevertheless, despite their unhappiness over
being forced to choose, th-e great majority of Latin American
communists would, it is believed, remain loyal to the Kremlin.
Moscow's lines to the Latin American parties are long estab-
lished, and their strength is increased by the growth of Soviet
power, a reality as opposed to the Chinese promise. Further-
more, the likelihood that an east-west split of the Communist
Bloc would find the European parties adhering to the CPSU
would weigh heavily with the Latin Americans since the region's
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ties - political, economic, and cultural - are much stronger
with Europe than with the orient.
33. As previously suggested, a more probable prob-
lem for the Latin American parties is to adjust to varying
themes from the two principal centers of communist power.
This they should be able to do, since the leaders will be, aware
that basic strategy and covert tactics are agreed between Pe-
king and Moscow. Overt activities will be adapted to situations
as they arise, not too difficult a task in view of the slight im-
portance which communists attach to consistency.
34. There is every likelihood that Peking will devote
increasing attention to the Latin American area., Given the
expansive tendencies of the Chinese communists, their enmity
toward the United States, and the social ferment in a number
of Latin American countries, it is almost certain that Peking's
activities will take on greater importance in the region.
35. The propaganda offensive will probably continue
to mix the harsh and the bland. Denunciations of the United
States and gross misrepresentations of Washington's policies
will be regular themes for Latin American audiences. A
spreading net of press service correspondents will feed the
Communist Chinese propagandists with accounts of "Yanf.~.ce
exploitation. " Bracketed with attacks on the United. States
will be glowing reports of progress in the CPR.
36. The present trickle of Latin American visitors
to mainland China is likely to rise. A report that, starting
in the spring of 1960, a ship from Buenos Aires will provide
free passages for 500 tourists eight or nine times a year,
seems improbable, but the flow of both party members and
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non-communists will almost certainly increase. Admiring
statements about life in the CPR can be expected from many
of these visitors.
37. Representatives of Communist Chinese organiza-
tions will appear with increasing frequency in Latin American
countries. They will come as delegates or observers at Com-
munist Party congresses, at meeting of front organizations,
and at trade union and professional conventions. Theatrical
and athletic groups can be expected, too.
38. The CCP will almost certainly take an increas-
ing part in guiding the activities of Latin American communists.
This growing influence will. result partly from the visits of com-
munist leaders to Peking for discussion and advice, the training
of cadres at CCP schools, larger quantities of published mater-
ials on Maoism and Chinese experience in !'building socialism, "
and from the direct support of party organizations in Latin Amer-
ican countries. Concerning the last kind of influence, a recent
reliable report from Panama recounting the acceptance of a
Chinese offer to pay the salary and office expenses of an NCNA
correspondent who would double as a full-time party functionary
discloses a subsidizing formula which will probably be repeated
in other strategically important points in Latin America. I
39. Growing Chinese influence will also stem from the
receptivity of Latin American communists to approaches from
Peking. The revolutionary ardor of the CCP appeals to many
Latin American communists, and they profess to find much in
the Chinese "experience" of relevance to the problems of their
countries. The Chinese emphasis on land reform, an-important
issue in most Latin American countries, will continue to make
the CCP's advice and guidance attractive.
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40. Although Peking's influence will grow over the
next few years, it will not displace the dominant role of the
CPSU in Latin American communism. The historic ties of
the Latin American parties to the Kremlin are being strength-
ened by the rising attention of Moscow to the Western HemiF
sphere. The Soviet presence, growing through trade and tech-
nical missions and through cultural contacts, will almost cer-
tainly be more pronounced. Although here or there a Latin
American communist leader may anticipate a day when his
party's closest ties will be with Peking, the great majority
are thoroughly imbued with proletarian internationalism and
its recognition of the supremacy of the CPSU in the world move-
ment. These leaders will not promote any schismatic currents
in their area. They will be gratified by and will encourage a
larger role for the CCP, but their loyalty to Moscow will not
be diminished. In this loyalty they will almost certainly be
supported by the representatives of the Satellite parties with
whom they have contact at home and on their travels in the
Bloc and by the officials of the communist front organizations.
41. In addition to the growing influence of Chinese
communism through party relations, the Peking regime will
be a greater factor in Latin American affairs through the ac-
ceptance of the CPR as a state to be recognized and to be dealt
with. The speed with which diplomatic recognition and govern-
mental relations advance will be affected by the trend of world
affairs and the political developments in the separate Latin
American countries, but the signs point to the successful pen-
etration of a currently closed area. Cuba, if the Castro regime
survives and continues its present pro-communist policies, may
be the first Latin American state to switch its recognition from
Taipei to Peking. Once the ice is broken, other governments
will probably do likewise. Many of these governments do not
wish to incur the displeasure of Washington and fear the en-
couragement of domestic communism which may result from
the presence of more Bloc missions, but they are under strong
pressures from assorted groups of nationalists, liberals, and
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Yankee-phobes who see in diplomatic recognition of the CPR
a way of asserting their "independence" of United States
influence. Trade between Communist China and the Latin
American countries is unlikely to grow to any significant pro-
portions. It will be dangled, however, as a prize to be won
by closer relations.
42. For the foreseeable future Latin America is going
to be subject to communist currents from both east and west.
Hoping to capitalize on various circumstances favorable to com-
munism in the Western Hemisphere, the international movement
will endeavor to quicken the flow by a variety of pressures -
diplomatic, economic, cultural, ideological, propaganda, sub-
versive. The Soviet current will remain the stronger, but
from across the Pacific will come a steady and mounting tide
that will heighten the threat to the dikes of Latin American
security.
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