COMMENTS ON KHRUSHCEV'S ARTICLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060008-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 18, 1998
Sequence Number:
8
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 15, 1959
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060008-3.pdf | 232.98 KB |
Body:
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15 September 1959
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Comments on Khrushchev's Article in Foreign Affairs
1. In response to your request for comments on Khrush-
chev's article, I am submitting two papers prepared by members of
SRS:
a. Comments on the article itself by
25X1A9a
b. Notes on the back round and significance of "peaceful
coexistence" by 25X1A9a
I believe that these cover the principal points suggested to this Staff by
this challenging piece.
2. My only additional comment would be that Khrushchev, by
entirely ignoring the world conquering objectives and the incessant
subversive activities of International Communism as a movement, has
provided an almost classic example of the "double track" approach:
the dialectic of "peaceful" state-to-state relations and of immutably
hostile Communist Party penetration. I do not believe that Free World
and especially American consciousness has fully absorbed the implica-
tions of the basic Communist theorem: "Peaceful coexistence between
nations and states is the matrix of implacable ideological political and
economic struggle. " The rigor of this proposition is not concealed in
Khrushchev's article, but it is glossed over with sophistry, which, as
25X1A9 points out, may not be perceived by many wishfully oriented
readers in socialist and neutralist circles abroad. For this reason, I
25X1A9aagree with that this is a dangerous piece which deserves a
direct and authoritative response in the same medium. I would raise
the question whether the President, himself, should not make the reply.
If this were deemed undesirable, possibly President Hoover or Pres-
ident Truman might appropriately do so. SRS would be glad to make
further suggestions in connection with this proposal.
25X1A9a
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Chief, SRS/DDI ::r, N,CL4S . I
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
"On Peaceful Coexistence" by Nikita S. Khrushchev
Khrushchev has utilized his opportunity to place before a
selected audience a forceful exposition of several main facets of
Soviet foreign policy. Writing with seeming candor and avoiding
the repetitive logomachy characteristic of the usual Moscow utter-
ances, he restates well-known positions and attitudes.
The article is simple in outline. First, Khrushchev propounds
a number of familiar Soviet tenets - the danger of war, the possibility
of coexistence between states with different social systems, the
inherently peaceful nature of "socialist" society, the necessity of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of other states, the intention to
''outstrip" the United States in economic competition, the unity of
people, party and government in the USSR, and the growing strength
of the "peace" forces in the world. Secondly, he discusses the specific
issues of disarmament, Germany, and West Berlin. On disarmament,
he 'blames the lack of progress on the West's refusal "to meet us half-
way, " but he writes hopefully of an agreement to ban nuclear tests.
On Germany and West Berlin, Khrushchev claims that the Soviet posi-
tions are realistic and reasonable; agreement would be possible except
for Western concessions" to Chancellor Adenauer, who is pursuing a
military policy, the policy of the German revanchi.sts. " Khrushchev
concludes his article with. a statement of the conditions for peaceful
coexistence. They are basically the Western, acceptance of "the ir-
revocable fact that the historic process is irreversible" and the recog-
nition that "extensive and absolutely unrestricted international trade"
must be practiced.
Omitted from the discussion are a number of subjects which
affect "peaceful coexistence" - Far Eastern and Middle Eastern. issues,
the United Nations, propaganda warfare, and the activities of Kremlin-
directed Communist parties and front organizations. Communist China
is referred to only in Khrushchev's vague statement that the. respective
friends of the USSR and the US should also have amiable relations with
the two super powers.
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It could be expected that Khrushchev would respond to the
opportunity offered by Foreign Affairs by presenting a strong defense
of established Soviet policies and attitudes. He was unlikely to suggest
in advance of the coming high-level talks that Moscow's positions on
disarmament and German problems were anything less than reason-
able. He undoubtedly wished to reassure any skeptical elements in the
Kremlin and the leaders of other states of the Bloc that no change in
policy was contemplated.
One may conclude from the article that Khrushchev believes
that continued tension between the power groups is dangerous :but that
he is unprepared or unable to concede any points that might improve
relations. He emphasizes the gravity of the,German problem, but he
offers no solution except the Western acceptance of the Soviet formula.
It is plain that Western refusal to accept Soviet hegemony over Eastern
Europe as a permanent, de jure condition is very irritating to the
Communist leader and that a change in Washington's attitude on this
subject is a sine qua non to better relations. One may also deduce
that controls on trade: with the Bloc countries are an annoyance., but
it is improbable that Khrushchev thinks greatly expanded commerce
is as important to relieving tensions as he makes out. Finally, there
is no suggestion that he wishes to reinsure with the West against a
future menace in the form of an aggressive Communist China. On the
contrary, he breathes confidence that if the Western powers do not
accept peaceful coexistence, Soviet-style, the USSR can maintain Its
position until the rising strength of the "socialist camp" transforms
the balance of world forces.
Although the speciousness of much of Khrushchev's argument
will. be apparent to a large proportion of Free World leaders and to
the more sophisticated students of international affairs, the article
will. undoubtedly impress a certain number of people with influence
on public opinion in foreign countries. The author almost certainly
had in mind that he was writing as much for neutralists, some social-
ists, anti-American nationalists, pacifists, and other susceptible
elements as for readers in the United States. Khrushchev, the man
of peace, will be quoted as endorsing many of their views. The dis-
tortion of Western positions and the ignoring of Communist responsi-
bility for international tensions will be skipped over or rationalized
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away. This use of Khrushchev?s authoritative pronouncement
indicates the necessity for clear, forceful restatements of West-
ern policy. The meaning and implications of "peaceful coexistence"
must constantly be exposed to view.
25X1A9a
SRS/ DDI
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