LUNCHEON CONVERSATION WITH (Classified)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100070030-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: November 5, 1956
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Re ea a 1999/09/08: CIA-RDP80-01446R0
MEMO FOR RECORD -
SUBJECT: Luncheon conversation with
5 November 1956
1. In a rambling discussion of the world situation, the following
points see%56Aorth noting:
a. said that in his discussion with the Director two
weeks ago he had raised the idea of a UN police force or military inspec-
tion team fngary to consist of troops from India, Finland and Ireland.
25X1C5a
b. had a lengthy conversation with the PolishM $ tor,
_ This had been arranged througl?5Xsl ~one on the hill".
was most impressed with the caliber of~ especially considering his
youth, and felt that he had a most unusu ht into the history and back-
ground W olish Communist party. raised the question
whether could write a book on the origins an development of de- 25X1C5a
Staliniza.tion illustrated through the history of the Polish CP. He implied
that he would be interested in undertaking to write such a book with
but wondered whether they could find a popular publisher. I suggested that
a book written on a middle level - partly popular and partly scholarly -
might enjoy5~lc)nsiderable sale if written promptly.
c. was greatly interested in the news that Nehru had
finally come out in sharp criticism of Soviet action in Hungary. He feels
that the potential for a leading role by Nehru at this moment is greater
than ever, particularly in view of his reported willingness to act jointly
with the US.
d. We both agreed that changes in the Moscow set-up should be
closely followed. He was more inclined to place any change in the Krem-
lin leadership some distance off, one or two years, but he did feel that a
leadership2gi1 g is definitely in existence.
e. had some second thoughts on the desirability of
attempting to meet and interview Tito, a project which he had discussed
last week with the SE Divisioi. He recognizes that Tito's position has
considerably changed as a result of the Hungarian developments. My
own thought was that Tito had lost considerable initiative as a result of
ORIGINAL CL BY GLASS.
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 Approved For Relee 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000070030-7
being forced to come out against the Hungarian rebels and in favor of
the Soviet armed action. I felt that Tito's example in the field of
"independence" was considerably tarnished and that he emerged in his
true colors as a protagonist of world Communism, which coul(Z,%] 6be
achieved in some form of understanding under Russian aegis. -
suggested that Tito might attempt to rebuild his bridges with Nehru and
with some of the Left Wing European Socialists, especially Nenni and
Bevan. It was doubtful how success ul he might be in this attempt.
f. Finally I suggested to _ that this might be a good more nt
for him to try his hand at a broad-brush speculative article on the pros-
pects for the Kremlin leadership.
Chief, SRS/DDI
Approved For Release 1999/0000100070030-7