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STATINTL FOREIGN POLICY Approved For Release 2001/03/0 , -l 80-01601 RO ARE BUREAUCRACIES IMPORTA.Nrr (OALL ISON WONDERLAND) article on? this subject. With the publication of his book this approach to foreign- policy now receives its definitive statement.' The bureaucratic interpretation of foreign policy has become the conventional wisdom. My argument here is that this vision is misleading, dangerous, and compelling: mis- leading' because it obscures the power of the President; dangerous because it undermines the assumptions of. democratic politics by Who and wl at shapes foreign policy? In relieving. high officials of responsibility; and recent years, analyses have increasingly em- compelling because it offers leaders an phasized not rational calculations of the excuse for their failures and scholars an national interest or the political goals of opportunity for innumerable reinterpreta- national leaders but rather bureaucratic pro- Lions and publications. cedures and bureaucratic politics. Starting The coritention that the Chief Executive with. Richard Neustadt's Presidential Power, a is trammelled by the permanent government ? ? judicious study of leadership published in has disturbing implications for any effort to 1960, this approach has come to portray the impute responsibility to public officials. A American: President as trapped by a perma- democratic political philosophy assumes that nent government more enemy than ally. responsibility for the acts of governments can Bureaucratic theorists imply that it is exceed-. be attributed to elected officials. The charges irigly difficult if not impossible for political of these men are embodied in legal statutes. leaders to control the organizational web The electorate punishes an erring official by' which surrounds them. Important decisions rejecting him at the polls. Punishment is result from numerous smaller actions taken senseless unless high officials are responsible by individuals at' different leveis in the for the acts. of government. -Elections have ... bureaucracy who, have partially incompatible some impact?only if government, that most national, bureaucratic, political, and personal cottiplex of ' modern organizations, can be objectives. They are not necessarily a reflec- controlled. If the bureaucratic machine' tion-of.the aims and values of high officials. escapes manipulation and direction even by Presidential Power -was well received'by'John the highest officials, then punishment is Kennedy, who read it with interest, recom- illogical. Elections are a farce not because the mended it to his associates, :and commis- People suffer from false consciousness, but sioned Neustadt to do a private study of the because public officials are impotent, en-? 1962 Skybolt incident. The approach has meshed in a bureaucracy so large that the been developed and used by a 'number of actions of government are not responsive to scholars-Roger Hilsman, Morton Halperin, their will. What sense to vote a man out of Arthur Schlesinger, Richard Barnet; a1 -4 office when his successor, regardless. of his Graham Allison-some of whom held"sub- values, will be trapped in the same. web of Cabinet positions during the 1960's. It was only incrementally mutable standard . operat- the subject of a special conference at the RAND ing procedures? . Corporation, a main theme of a course at the The Rational Actor Model Woodrow Wilson School at - Princeton and the subject of'a faculty seminar at Harvard. Conventional analyses that focus on the It is the intellectual paradigm which guides values and objectives of foreign policy, what the new'public policy program in the John F. Allison calls the Rational Actor Model, are Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. perfectly coincident with the ethical as- Analyses of bureaucratic politics have been sumptions of democratic politics. The state used to explain alliance behaviour during the is viewed as a rational unified actor. The 1956 Suez crisis and the Skybolt incident, behaviour of states is the outcome of a r Truman's relations with MacArthur, ' Amer- rational decision-making process. This proc- ican policy in Vietnam, and now most ess has three steps. The options for a given thoroughly' the Cuban missile crisis in situation are spelled out. The consequences f h ' ' STATINTL on' Ex la' o eac option are ro ected A o Graham Alh n s Essence o Dec~ ~s?Z i?i ~ 300010004-7 ing the Cubar A Le unsis, p2 l c (Little Brown & Company). Allison's volume makers. The analyst knows what the state .c _i: _ __a did. His ohiective is tr, i-Yini h? by Stephen D. Krasner NE Y.Ultli :Unto 19 APR 1972 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA~RDP80-O16 Intelligent Use of Intelligence By ADAM YARMOLINSKY WASHINGTON-One of the least at- error, or that what haci been seen was tractive postures for a Government a SAM air defense missile, not an official in public debate is " only MRBM or an IRBM. But the agency knew what I know...." It has always could not prove there were no offen- seemed to me that Government per- sive missiles in Cuba. And the general formance should be able to stand the availability of these reports to the Con- scrutiny of public examination and gress might tempt some individuals to judgment based on no more than a issue inflammatory statements. careful reading of the daily news- It is not only immediately current papers, and that it is no proper defense intelligence that can be misused by to take refuge in what you cannot tell irresponsible recipients. If this legisla- your critics. tion is enacted, a special responsibility Nevertheless, there are several kinds will attach to the recipient commit- of materials produced by the Central tees to police the dissemination of the Intelligence Agency that can be exv materials received. tremely useful, particularly in making Careful control is essential for two -or evaluating-detailed decisions on reasons: in order to avoid the foreign the development of weapons, the de- policy consequences of public dis- . ployment of forces, and the provision closure, and in order to protect sources. of military assistance. The issue of protection of sources is To take these materials in descend- one on which I have no special exper- ing order of importance, the most valu- tise to offer the committee, except to able first, I would begin with order-of- point out that there are matters on battle information, which can be and which one nation is willing to have is quite precise and informative, par- another nation gather information ticularly' when it covers a period of about itself, by covert or clandestine several. years. Without getting into means, so long as there- need be no highly classified matters, it is safe to official recognition that the veil of of- say that advanced technology has con- ficial secrecy has been pierced. The. siderably increased the accuracy and point is one that in its nature makes completeness of this data over the last examples inappropriate. decade. The greatest danger is that Congres- nce ma- lli i ge nte Next in Importance I would put the sional overexposure of detailed accounts of the political and terials might lead the executive to cur- economic' situations in particular coun- tail the flow of information to itself tries or regions. These accounts pro- as well as to the Congress, or to at- vide a degree of contemporary detail tempt to tamper with the impartiality that is simply not available in the open of intelligence reporting. nhatsug ulu literature. be major tragedy. The third, and perhaps least im- the possibility as an argument against portant kind of information is the flow the proposed legislation, but rather as of news bulletins that are, many of pointing to even greater need for an them, the grist of the daily press and effective system of self policy. the broadcast media. This material is, or was when Adam YarntoIinshy is professor of law I last knew it, published At Harvard. These remarks were made .in daily compilations, edited at several at Ha the These Foreign were ade degrees of security classification. Cbefore ommittee. There are a number of problems that arise .in. trying to make effective use of intelligence materials - including some dangerous temptations. To begin with there is the problem created by the sheer volume of available material. The signals are there, but they cannot be heard above the background noise, or distinguished from it. J The problem of volume, or noise, is further complicated by the difficulties of proving a negative. During the pe- riod after the Cuba missile crisis of I 1962 there were (understandably) a number of reports of suspicious cylin- drical objects observed in Cuba. Each of these was painstakingly checked out by the agency until the analysts were satisfied that the report was in Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300010004-7 Approved For Releasi- fOO/04' CI 1' DP80-01601 R000 17-APR 1972 Chile blast at By VIRGINIA PREWETT AS expected, Chile blasted the U.S. at the current Organ- Ization of American States as- sembly. It took the news play, to the virpual exclusion of ev- U: not news erytning else Sulu, urn it no more than a repetition of charges of U.S. intervention and general mistreatment pre- L. viously made by Chile and r thus was, strictly speaking, now news. The impression left with the U.S. reading public, and on Capitol Hill, was: "There they go 'again, those Latin Americans, whacking the U.S. even tho we've poured out billions of tax-payers' money to help them." Our 'neighbors know that U.S. economic cooperation in recent years has been mostly loans tied to the purchase of U.S. goods. But this never comes thru to our public. Many things were said as the OAS Assembly opened that are of substantive interest and concern to our public. Tho you would never guess It from the coverage, other countries got lambasted there as well as our own. Guatemala raked Great Britain over the coals in their current dispute over British Hon- duras (Belize), in which Britain sent naval units Into the Caribbean. And Fidel Castro, whose cause was pushed by Peru, was both directly and indirectly lam- basted by a number of nations' representa- tives. HITS AT CASTRO Venezuela's statement very clearly hit at Castro, without naming him, in condeming the- kind of "interventionism" he practices. Costa Rica condemned "the acts of intervention aimed at creating violence and terrorism as the path to power thru the destruction of politi- cal liberties" -- a clear shot at Fidel. Para- guay named Cuba as "the only vassal state in the hemisphere - the vassal of Russia." Col- ombia charged Cuba with "permanent inter- vention" in aiding subversive groups thruout the hemisphere. Argentine, in an indirect reference, deplored the "use of violence,- whether from the left or the right, to get politi- cal power.'.' Quite apart from Chile's plaints, our country was criticized for failing to live up to promises of economic cooperation. Trinidad-Tobago brought up the imposition of the 10 per cent tariff surcharge, which tho rescinded, still ran- kles. And Mexico gave what was clearly an im- portant warning in saying that the issue of U.S.-Latin American economic cooperation is the issue of peace in the continent. APPROVED BY MANY Colombia suggested that Latin American Countries restrict expenditures on armaments, and this was approved by many speakers. This can be a historic step forward in the hemi- sphere and deserved notice. It was not judged newsworthy in face of Chile's blast. If the news play reflected things said at the Assembly one-sidedly, the Assembly itself poorly reflected realities In Latin America. For example, even as it deliberated, the Tu- pemaros in Uruguay began what is called "virtual civil war." The Tupemaros are Castro-type urban guer- rillas whom Fidel Castro encouraged openly from Santiago, Chile, during his long visit there. Responsible U.S.. newsmen have it from CIA and other top-level sources that Fidel Cas- tro's Chilean embassy is helping the Yupema- ros, as well as guerrillas in Bolivia. Yet Chile escaped all mention in the matter. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300010004-7 Approved For Release 266TMN1t-016 -14 APR 1972 JACK ANDERSON The Kremlin has asked Cuban dictator Fidel Castro "to try to regain control over Latin American revolutionary movements" and has promised "to pay all the costs involved." This is the secret finding of the Central In- telligence Agency (CIA), which has put together the jigsaw pieces from its agents in Europe and South America. In an earlier column, we reported that Cas- tro had moved his Latin American liberation center from his embassy in Paris to his em- bassy in Santiago, Chile. His ambition, ac- cording to the CIA, is to stir up "revolution everywhere in Latin America." This clandestine operation, says the CIA, Will be financed by the Soviets. CITING INFORMATION that came indi- rectly from Cuban intelligence officer Enrique 73enavides Santos in -Paris, the CIA reports: "Benavides said that through Cuba, the So- viets will support armed revolution or political struggle, whichever was deemed appropriate in given countries throughout Latin America. !'According to Benavides, the Soviets have told Cuba they will 'pay for everything' in helping all revolutionary groups, even Catholic radical groups. "Benavides strongly emphasized that Cuba has not changed its line but still favors armed revolution everywhere in Latin America." THE NEW liberation center in Santiago, says the CIA, "will receive Soviet funds via Cuba and play a large role in the new Soviet- Cuban strategy for Latin America. "Representatives of Latin American revolutionary groups now. in Chile," the CIA adds, "arc currently preparing a campaign of increased revolutionary activity with the sup- port of Cuba." At least one revolutionary group, according to another CIA report, is receiving funds directly from the Soviet Union. A source inside the Guatemalan Communist movement told the CIA that "the Soviets were giving $100,000 per year to the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT)." From a member of the Cuban delegation at the United Nations, meanwhile, the CIA learn- ed that at least some Cuban leaders "are doing some rethinking on basic revolutionary tactics. "There is some theoretical opposition to the 'Che Guevara' theory, which favors supporting native insurrectionists and anarchists in poor countries," reports the CIA. "Instead,. support is growing for the Chilean formula, which maintains that traditional democratic procedures are the best means of socialist power in weak, backward countries. "It is in countries like Brazil," the CIA quoted the Cuban delegate as saying, "that stronger active measures should be taken." WHEN A self-styled consumers group in New York City tried to keep Sen. Frank Moss, D-Utah, from talking about "no-fault" insurance at their inaugural meeting, Moss angrily cancelled the speech. The "consumers group" is made up of wives of members of the American Trial Lawyers Association. The Association is busily lobbying against "no-fault" because it will reduce lawyers' fees by an estimated $1 billion (b). But the wives have agreed to back product safety bills which don't cut into their fur coats and their husbands' Cadillacs. So they wanted Moss to speak. Footnote: "No-fault" is scheduled for secret hearings in a few days before the Senate Com- merce Committee. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601.R000300010004-7 Kremlm t 0, n P "ayfor,Rev,olufion's' The Washington Merry.Go-found Approved For Release 2001 /6"P M- O80-0160 14 APR 1972 STATINTL Kremlin, Fv inancin"'., L'atin By . Jack Anderson changed its line but still fav- ors armed revolution every- The Kremlin has asked Cu- where in Latin America." ban dictator Fidel Castro "to try to regain control over Latin American revolutionary movements and has promised "to pay all the cost involved." J This Is the secret finding of the C e n t r a 1 Intelligence (Agency, which has put togeth- er the jigsaw pieces from its agents in Europe and South America. In an earlier column, we re- ported that Castro had moved a campaign of increased re- his Latin American Libera- tion center from his embassy In Paris to his embassy in Santiago, Chile. His ambition, according to the CIA, is to stir up "revolution everywhere In Latin America." This clandestine operation, Soviet?Cubaii Strategy The new liberation center in Santiago, says the CIA, "will receive Soviet funds via Cuba and play a large role in the new Soviet-Cuban strategy for Latin America. "Representatives of Latin A in e r i c a n revolutionary groups now in Chile," the CIA adds, "are currently preparing volutionary activity with the support of Cuba." At least one revolutionary group, according to another CIA report is receiving funds directly f r o in the' Soviet Union. A source inside the Guatemalan communist move- says the CIA, will be financed i ment told the CIA that "the' by the Soviets. (Soviets were giving $100,000 Citing information t h a tiper year to the Guatemalan Caine directly from Cuban Communist Party (PGT)." intelligence officer Enrique From a member of the Cu- Benavicles Santos in Paris, thelban delegation at the United CIA reports: Nations, meanwhile, the CIA "B e n a v. i d e s said that, learned that ? at least some through Cuba, the Soviets will Cuban leaders "are doing support armed revolution orisome re-thinking on basic re- political struggle, whichever, revolutionary tactics. was -deemed appropriate in) "There is some theoretical given countries . throughout; opposition to the 'Che Gue- Latin America. vara' theory, which favors "According to Benavides,,supporting native insurrec- 'the Soviets have told Cuba'tionists and anarchists in poor they will 'pay. for everything' countries." in helping all revolutionary "Instead, support is growing groups, even Catholic radical for the Chilean formula, groups. which maintains that tradi- "Benavides strongly empha- tional democratic procedures Sized' that Cuba has not are the best means of social ist power in weak, backward countries. "It Is In countries like Bra- zil," the CIA quoted the Cu- ban delegate as saying, "that stronger a c t i v e measures should be taken." ' - ~I IVTL~~~~ Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300010004-7 rt.a'_?IAG~Ci1 DAILY ?E:;a' 12 APR 1972 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP8O-01601 ROOO Chile prepares for attack By VIRGINIA PREWETT BATTLE lines of a sort are already drawn for the Organi- zation of American States As- sembly, which began a ten- 1' day session here yesterday. Chile has told the U n i t e -d S t a t e s it "cannot ignore" ing in 1970 to prevent the elec- tion of Dr. Salvador Allende to meeting down to work in committees and may do this again at the Assembly, where such meetings are closed. Our Secretary of State, William Rogers, ob- viously does not want to become involved. Af- ter entertaining the visiting delegation heads at a luncheon today he will leave for a visit to Canada tomorrow. LOUD, CLEAR SIGNALS The si nals l d b h g y the a e its presidency, as tenuously Chile on the Assembly eve have been'loud and revealed in the Anderson-11"I' '. -., ~. ~as-,~ .. clear. They tell Santiago that Washington has scandal. detailed proof that President Allende is har- boring a Cuban embassy now trying to upset The U.S. delegation to the OAS Assembly is governments in both Bolivia and Uruguay. prepared to assume a ' "statesman-like, digni- fied attitude," but if attacked hard will "reply On Friday, April 7, the Nev York Times' in kind. roving columnist on foreign affairs published leaked information aimed at both Castro and The Nixon Administration, from the highest Allende. It revealed that Bolivian exiles in level," has signaled-to Dr. Allende what weal)- Chile now marshaling to "communize Bolivia" ons it has. But it is also clear the White house are directed by a Cuban mission in Santiago. wants to avoid a knock-down-and-drag-out Dr. Allende is pointedly tied into the affair by fight at the OAS with Chile. Our side has had the revelation that the Cuban who heads the good success getting complaining Latinos, mission is a Castro intelligence officer named Luis Fernandez Ona, "married to Allende's ,favorite daughter, Beatrice." AID TO GUERRILLAS Earlier, an even more detailed leak of CIA Information to Jack Anderson on March 30 had "given chapter and verse on the way the Cu- bans in Castro's Santiago embassy and. the Allendista Chileans are working to help guer- rillas trying to overturn governments in Boliv-. Aa and Uruguay. - Latin American sources had long since re- vealed this to me and it comes as no surprise ,to the well-informed. But the timing of the leaks, especially the one to columnist Sulzber- .ger,. indicates the White House holds a strong hand and wishes it to be known. But this same White House, at the n'tpment, is in a bind on the issue, one it will not be free of until after President Nixon visits Moscow in May, if.then. The Nixon-Kissinger team wishes to keep its options wide, if possible. Depending on how Moscow is willing to deal, ' the team .might later want to make a 180 degree turn, ,specifically on Castro's Cuba. Other complaints against the United States -besides Chile's, will be heard at the OAS as- !sembly,' echoing those sure to be voiced at this rweeks' Santiago meeting of the United Nations 'Conference on Trade and Development (UNC- TAD). And these complaints may become deeply involved in our domestic, election-year politics. For none other than the longtime Nix- on critic, the Senate Foreign Relations Com- inittee Chairman, Sen. J. William Fulbright, is meeting with the Latinos on April 14.'. _. , . STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP8O-01601 RQ0030001 OOO4-7 ?? NATION Approved For Release 20x1 J P~ AMA-RM Qp 1L601 I T T VICTOR VIAltCIIETTI Mr. Marchetti was on the director's staff of the CIA when he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his novel The Rope-Dancer has been published by Grosset & Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis of the CIA. After the-.Bay of feel the sting of Pre; the agency had its because it failed in overthrow Castro. C the top of the agent committee, which ti, tration, the agency The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign af- tices. Throughout th fairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy tine operations again and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately the same time, and promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news agency deeply invol\ media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this ing regimes in Laos agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership, When the Nation, one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources the CIA in 1967, s and circumstances from which the agency draws its au- exposed the agency' thority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic labor and cultural aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country funding conduits, ne intend it to be-the clandestine mechanism whereby the tried to restrict the executive branch influences the internal affairs of other Senator Fulbright's a nations. In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its oper- ational plans accord with the aims of the'administration and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional lead- ers. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influen- tial individuals and institutions outside government is also sought.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware of the dangers they court, both personally and for the agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more care- ful than are administrators in other areas of the bureau- cracy to inform the White House of their activities and to seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly for an occasional operational blunder is a'small price to pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and the men who control the Congress. The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower- Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.- Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles of the administration, however, the shoot-down was shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system trol over the CIA h; was simply told by P and get on with its bi formed to look into Secretary of State, th of the CIA. Some c because they had be .longer thought worth continued under improvea cover. A few 01 the larger operations went on under almost open CIA sponsorship, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being examples. And all the while, the. CIA was conducting a $500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/ assassination programs in Vietnam. The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence commu- nity late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy. Most of the few changes are intended to improve the finan- cial management of the community, especially in the mili- tary intelligence services where growth and the technical costs of collecting information are almost out of control. Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of the community's product with national security planning and to provide the White House with greater control over operations policy. However, none of that implies a reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action. In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on advice provided by the CIA and that given by former agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Admin- the A-I I (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the istration, the Council had responded to a similar request launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to by recommending that in the future the CIA should con- espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft. centrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American, Af' AA The A-11 development program was completed, neverthe- scan an scan targets, using more foreign nationals as less, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and useful elsewhere. other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc- Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300010004-7 Approved For Release 2001 On the flip side Malraux can be as superficial as the next man : spotting a plough, he is THE LAST OF THE GIANTS instantly reminded of the Cincinnatus VI~Ys 'h0-01601 800 ay t,. L. 0UMuuI ,I. 067 g Weidenfold and Nicolson. 1,06-1 Of aullism in the next sentence Perhaps the clue to his character was not pages. E6. FALLEN OAKS ux l M . ra a By Andre Hamrsh Hamilton; 123 pages. f2. Conversations with the great tend to produce better anecdotes a year later than weighty reporting the next day. When the great are seriously selling a line they are invariably dull and unpersuasive; when they are not selling a line they much prefer to talk about the past or people of the past, and so say things that are glad and sad by turns but are not history, and are not immediately printable if the journalist wants to be asked back again. So Mr Sulzberger's anecdotes of everyone from de.Caulle and Churchill to forgotten diplomats and Africans' is declares Gaitskel?l is always away a highly readable and enjoyable flip when troubles comes." Macmillan side to his staid, responsible, ask-rrie-, admits on the common market in 1962 back' columns in the New York Times. that he has no alternative policy : " I To ?M. Malraux no cliche uttered in have always made it a rule in my life his presence, far less one by himself, to avoid fall-back positions. When you is devoid of philosophical importance. have a fall-back 'position, you always So he. is a trifle high-falutin'; but since fall back." Allen Dulles of the CIA not many people got to hear de Gaulle's boasts : " The Russians are too 'smart last table talk his recollections, too, are to put bases on Cuba." Dean Acheson ? entertaining : a sort of ?flip manda- muses on Dulles and Selwyn Lloyd : rinese. " They're a pair of slick lawyers trying ? Mr Sulzberger's Churchill is almost to outsmart each other." And in a half-world : Chartwell had a Randolph Churchill and Julian Amery visibly declining owner whereas the will not mention Eden in July, 1956, ' Boisserie never quite seemed to, even except as `.` the jerk." STATINTL J- Approve r Sulz- py4~~A~46: dWl4-RDP80-016018000300010004=7 with de Gaulle in his prime. M. at the end. Churchill in 1956 has three glasses of wine, two of port and two of brandy at lunch, reads his books Aloud, plays with his carp and defends Stalin (who never broke his word to me "). But although his lucidity no .longer has a dynamo to keep it going, he seems more at peace with destiny than Malraux's report of de . Gaulle, living with his cat, two television sets, his trees and the stars. The general is profoundly pessimistic, surviving con- sciously at the end of a civilisation," watching " the funeral procession of a world." Nixon is popular " because Asia still believes peace to be possible." But that is a Pandora's box : I don't believe the United States, in spite of its power, has a long-term policy. Its desire, and it will satisfy it one'day,is to desert Europe. You will see. That is the authentic voice of gaul lism all right, and it explains. the simply the impulse to- say "No," but that he was at ease' only when he said " No." So there is great contempt for the Pompidous of the world who believe things can be solved by getting people to lunch together. That, of course, would never do for journalists, Mr Sulzberger among them. Not much misses his eye or ear f Tito :pouring claret into his champagne (learned from King Paul of Greece), Prince Bernhard drinking only bourbon because the Germans had robbed him of his scotch, an ill Dulles saying " the hell with it" in Paris and ,taking two portions of lobster bisque. There are, naturally,- ? many unguarded remarks. George !frown NORFOLK, VA. STATINTL PILOT Iiy Don HM, The Virginian-Pilot Washington Bureau WASHINGTON. T H E CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE .AGENCY--The CIA, dreaded, accused, and. abused on seven continents-has joined the college PR lecture circuit. But unlike its fellow campus crawlers .among government agencies and spe- cial pleaders, the CIA wants its public relations program kept hush-hush. Secret publicity? This tricky exercise was attempted last month at Hollins .College, Roanoke, Va., at a weekend conference entitled-honest-"Freedom and Thought Control in America." A senior CIA official made a speech to more than 100 students, at least one newspaper reporter, and a girl with a .tape recorder. The handsome, gray-haired speaker -who had been identified in advance publicity only as "John Maury, federal employe"-was introduced to the open audience as a spokesman forth-, Cen - image. Lespite me criticism to which it i In his talk, Maury painted a glowing subjected, Maury said in his speech, th picture of CIA operations. CIA's activities are-directed and strut. The agency, he said, is "the eyes and nized by a number of federal organize ears of the policy makers and it is our tuns and the Congress. job to collect enough information so that they will not blunder into dangerous sit- How about the CIA's subsidizing o uations." /the National Student Association, an in L a t e r over cocktails, Nicholas Von ternational scandal when the stor, Hoffman, the Washington Post's impas- broke, Von Hoffman asked Maury ove sinned leftist columnist, who was a fel- drinks. 1 conference participant, t w i t t e d There was no other way to provid aury about that. the money for those students to get tl v'on .Koffman unkindly mentioned the international conferences, Maury said. :j?: 7 of Pigs, as "one of the agency's But, Von Hoffman asked innocently ;;;?113." hadn't congressional committees al agency, Maury responded, only information;. it doesn't make :'clicy. The sp~al:er had some titillating tid- 0,.'s for t. e au::'ence. It is little known, he said, but the s2rior Russian intelli- gence officer cn du'y the day Francis Gary Powers was :-:lot down, May 1y 1960, was working American intel- lige:;ce. The officer s later caught and executed. tral Intelligence Agency. Von Hoffman' apparently Maur actually didn't take Y is a high CIA official, time to note that some circles don t con- in charge among other duties of the sider the 1960 U2 incident an American agency's congressional liaison. intelligence triumph either. His remarks,' Maury told the mixed- The CIA, however, Maury said was bag group confidentially, s h o u I dbe able with accuracy to determine the ex- "kept in the family." tent of the Russian long-range missile The girl with the tape recorder said threat and this information h e 1 p e d afterwards. she planned to make trap President Kennedy triumph in the Cu- scriptions for anyone who wanted them. ,?~ ~ MaurY A Sltb5?Cllei2tly l~.1c_ t''at ban missile crisis. prcie_-' There was some heckling from Mau- news reports of his foray wor '_c' require ry's audience, according to people who the, CIA to "review its e f o r t s" at were there. A woman told Maur oh 'd o ready decided not to appropriate fund; for'this purpose? Didn't the CIA thu, thwart the will of Congress? "You don't understand," Von Hoff man says Maury replied. It's not really a secret that the CL' long has attempted to maintain contdc ith college campuses. That, after all is where it must recruit the bright young minds that will don the cloaks and wield the daggers of the future. That also is where the scholarly studies and overt information gathering that are the basis for 90 per cent of intelligence are cen. tered. Maury had noted in his speech that the CIA reaps some of its criticism because it's a .facet of American morality "that we feel that anything done in secret must be a little naughty." Like secret publicity maybe? Maury also had said that intelligence workers "learn from mistakes and fail- ures." y g mamtain some sort of com- lived in Athens a year and was appalled 4 e munication with the academic commun- at -the CIA's role in supporting ppalled . There he n may e w s have p a p been e a r rep lreponorte er waI- ity." the mili_ . Thr was Lary "colonels coup" in that country. J finsdrawn to the Maury speech because of Maury ? shot back that he'd been in advance publicity sent out by the col- Queried for this report, he said last Greece for six years and had been Ath- lege. It said that a "federal government week, "Well, we wouldn't want to be ac- ens agent at the time of the coup. Some employe" would discuss intelligence ac- cused of going around propagandizbig of her' er statements were inaccurate, he tivities. CIA agents often describe them- on college campuses." told the woman. selves to acquaintances simply as "fed- It's hard to see what else the CIA was eral employes." "That just meant CIA doing. According to Dr. Henry Nash, to me," the reporter said. chairman of Hollins' department of po- After the speech s e s s i o n, Maury, " litical science, Maury told him the ~Iol- Von Hoffman and others retired to the I know, said Jane White, the stu- see visit r& R f3tt ~ b*'t `5 ~Qranged the confer- see wheth x! r1'd re"e`er v put it that way." can spea o stu- STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/ /8 rt QIr R&80-01601 R _1.9 AR 197Z By BURT HOFFMAN ? Star Staff Writer One of the curses of newspapermen today. is that too many of them too often take themselves too-seriously. And L. Matthews, in this often impetsonel and geii rally humorless memoir of his 45 years .'r the New York Times,_ takes himself more ?r-iously than most. Yet it. it. int, one newspaperman to 'fault ano'i.: , . o .s c: his work: "To be where history is i ' `.i o; to St : vive danger; to get off a whacl:ir.:: !aod, ;.r t bx?id story for one's newspaper and get it-off in time - this is what makes journalism a great and attrac- tive profession." Matthews, whose chief claim to fame now rests with the Interviews he had with Fidel Castro in his mountain hideaway in 1957, was an editorial writer for the 17 years preced- ing his retirement-in 1967. His other 28 years with The Times were spent in a variety of assignments, mostly overseas, including stints in Paris, Rome, Madrid, New Delhi and London. He covered the Abyssinian campaign of Mussolhil, the republican side of the Span- ish Civil War, tha Allied battle in Italy in World War If nod the amphibious landing on the French R-'tiiera. MS ACCOIJ,;T OF those years, particu- larly the years in Spain and his visits to -Cuba, is the ac'o int of a dedicated man who cares passioro;e;y about his profession, his newspaper, the rsents he saw and the stories he .wrote. It is t:'.i3 passion, and his admitted bias for "true." as he defined truth, that brought him into c)m'ict with many others at The Times as v. 1 .as with portions of the public,includi,i- s; officialdom. As a young i,~.i-rter%covering the Loyalist side of the war.i "pain from 1936 to 1939 he proved indefati ;a. am' courageous - Hem- ingway, who was with him much of the time,. described tithe.;s as "brave as a badger." Matt'rea.: 'as .!t or near the front lines of most ma; x :. tga:;oments and he has Justifiable pride in ;. ; ;t he. wrote. He does not, he-:: -er, have pride in what The Times printe.^. 'The truth suffered," says Matthews, ~,,u e editors handling his Times who was covering the forces of Franco suffered no such problems and was believed even though he wrote only what was handed to him at headquarters and rarely ventured forth to see what was going on. Much of the antagonism toward his dis- patches is attributed by Matthews to the Catholicism of the editors in The Times "bull- pen" who were responsible for the handling of his stories. These editors, he writes, op- posed the Republican government and the support it was getting from the Communists. Similarly, Matthews expresses much bit- terness at the antagonism toward him by some of his Times colleagues and the lack of understanding of Castro and Matthews' at- tempts to tell the true story. ' His initial interviews in the Sierra Maes- tra created the legend of Castro. They gave the impression that Castro, who at the time had something like 18 followers, was in fact winning his revolt against Batista. The effect was to raise Castro's morale by making him an international figure and to rally support- ers to his side. While' Matthews' stories exaggerated the extent of Castro's. support, they did provide an accurate Impression of his political Aims- aims which coui] be accepted by anyone who believes, as Matthews does, in justice and equality. Much dispute arose in later years over whether Castro at the time he met .Matthews was a Communist. Matthews' crit- ics contend that Castro deceived him and thus Matthews deceived the world. Matthews himself and others have pretty convincingly demonstrated that Castro's communism fol- lowed his ascendancy to power. AN INCIDENT IN October, 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, tells much about Matthews' relationship with The 'l'imes and with Castro. Matthews was in Mexico City with a visa to Cuba and a seat reserved on what turned out to be the last plane that left for Havana after President Kennedy's quar- myself, who has listened to the same sort of antine speech. His plan to visit Cuba had complaints Matthews levels against his edi- been the subject of a conversation between tors, I nevertheless tend to sympathize with Matthews and Kennedy at the White House Matthews. It is questionable, however, whetir- the . previous July. Ken tedy had asked fvlat- er Matthews is fair in ascribing truth and the thews to report back to him after the visit. Purest of motives to himself while criticizing While awaiting the flight, Matthews also the abilities and the motives of many of his discussed his trip with Thomas E. Mann, then colleagues. U.S. ambassador to. Mexico, and arrange- Interestingly, perhaps, Matthews has ments were. made for him to talk to repre- praise for only one Times managing editor, sentatives of the Central Intelligence Agency., air Van Anda, who had left the scene by the to find out what the CIA wanted to learn in Lime Matthews arrived. Van Anda writes , Cuba. But the day before the plane left, John Matthews, was "the first and thus far only A WORLD IN REVOLUTION. A Newspaper- Oakes, editor of The Times editorial page, great managing editor that (The) Times has Man's Memoir. By Herbert L. Matthews. contacted Matthews "with orders from on had. . I did not work under Van Anda and Scribner's.? 462 pages. $12.50. ne high that I was not, under any circum- kw him only by reputation and office gos- tion of being trusted by the White House and the State Department, but not by my own newspaper," The moral of the Incident, writes Matthews, "is that journalism is some- times too important to be left to editors and publishers. I presume that there was some element of concern for my safety . . . but I suspect it was much more a case of the embarrassment that would have been felt - and the criticisms from obvious quarters - at the New York Times having an editor in Havana - and me, of all people - during such a crisis." In 1963, Matthews did return to Cuba as part of a trip he was taking for background information for his editorial writing. Barred from writing anything for the news depart- ment, Matthews attempted to write for The Times Sunday magazine. But, says Mat- thews,, "the pervading American emotional- ism about Castro . . . seemed to me to affect Lester Markel, the Sunday editor, more than anyone else on The Times.... Since lie knew nothing about Cuba, but felt very strongly about it, a barrier was raised that I could not surmount" and an article written for the magazinne was rejected. While Matthews condemns many of the editors at The Times as antagonistic toward him-and thus toward truth-his relationship with Times p u b I I s h e r s was more sanguine-at least until Arthur Ochs Sulzber- ger, the current publisher, took over. Basic to an understanding of the case Matthews presents against his editors is the historical enmity that exists between report- ers and editors on virtually all newsoa .ers. Few reporters ever believe an editor is capa- ble of sound judgment of any sort, and a similar attitude prevails among .many editors toward reporters. A reporter is, as he should be, intimately involved in his own story and his own problems. An editor is faced with the problems of many reporters compounded by 20 f03 O V? tmemb 76r es P9 ~On-0101 Rt7OQ Q t190Q+7bout one-fourth of in a hews wrote en "I was in the eto s 'Matthews' book is about Spain and Cuba. stories would not believe his ? reports and Matt peculiar Po mangled them or did not print them. Mat- Much of the rest is more a series of editorial . U'LWV, Ut11U DEACON JOURNAL, Approved For Release 2001 /03(94 4qb4-RDP80-016 S - 203,112 rJA N 2 8 1972 1 Or Just 1, 1 Data Men? By WILLIAM KEZZIAII What is the real Central In- telligence Agency (CIA) ? . Is It a super secret spy agency or a fact-gathering f agency which daily rives the President a briefing on the world situation of the past 24 hours? LYMiAN B. Iil1 PAT17ICK, former CIA director- comp-'troller, spoke of both roles ;Thursday at' Akron Universi- ty. however, Kirkpatrick re- vealed little of what goes on behind the walls of CIA head- quarters in Langley, Va. The CIA that Kirkpatrick portrayed has had its sue- : cesses and failures. ONE SUCCESS came dur- ing Presidential briefings aft- er the high flying U-2 plane photographed Cuban missile placements and set in motion what Kirkpatrick called the high point in the CIA. "The Cuban missile crisis proved what the CIA could do," he said. The failure? That was the Bay of Pigs invasion which Kirkpatrick characterized as mistaken and confused intelli- gence'work. KIRKPATRICK believes the most difficult aspect for any intelligence agency is analyz- ' .ing and. projecting the wide- ranging material it gets. ' Getting material is easy. "Most raw intelligence comes from sources open to the public-such as newspa- 1'pers and radio broadcasts. In fact, 80 pt. of the material gathered can be ? s e e n or heard by anyone and that includes thse in "closed" countries," he said. Approved For Release JQ4rae ro80-01601 R000300010004=7 t no American spies in the James Bond mold.. 2 2 JAN 1972 Approved For Release 2001,/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R w Rile l the ISIS Cu an w Light Oi By Chalmers M. Roberts THE CUBAN missile crisis of 1962 never ceases to intrigue those who lived -through it or had anything to do with it. And so two new works that add to the general knowl- ,edge are well worth reporting. One is a unique look at the crisis by a Communist .diplomat then in Washington. The other is an analytical study by an associate professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Janos Radvanyi was the Hungarian charge in Washington at the time (there was no am- bassador), an affable fellow with whom I had much contact. On May 17, 1967, he defected, turning up later at Stanford where he wrote J "Hungary and the Super Powers" to be pub- lished in May by the Hoover Institution, The book is largely about Hungarian-American relations. But one chapter on the missile cri- sis will, have far wider interest. What follows is from it . p ??' evo missiles but that "it is altogether possible IN SEPTEMBER and October, 1.962, Rad- that Dobrynin may not have been in vanyl reported home that the United States formed. was overreacting to reports of Soviet activity in Cuba. lie did so in part because Soviet dip- THE CRISIS became public with the Pres- the proposal. Dobrynin Ne t da h ' y x . s Oct. 22 speec lomats here had told him the uproar was ident G*y part of the American pre-election campaign. called the diplomats together again, explain. AT the meeting on the 26th Dobrynin said But one day he received a copy of a cable to ing that the purpose was ' to collect informa he still had no information on how Moscow Budapest from Hungarian Ambassador tion and to solicit opinions on the Cuban sit- Janos Beck In Havana. Beck "made it a nation." Dobrynin "characterized it as seri- would meet the quarantine. "I told hirn," point to discount information he had re- ous and offered two reasons for his concern. writes Radvanyi, "that according to my infor- ceived from the Chinese embassy in Havana First of all, he foresaw a possible American mation the American buildup for an inva- as being provocatively anti-Soviet," Radvanyi attack on Cuba that would almost surely re- sion of Cuba was nearly completed and that writes. But "the Chinese ambassador had ap- shit In the death of some Soviet military American missile bases had aimed all their parently told him that according to informa- personnel who. had been sent to handle the missiles toward targets on the island. Only a .tion he had received from private sources sophisticated new weapons. Thus by implica- go-ahead signal from the President was the Soviet Union was delivering surface-to- tion the Soviet ambassador was admitting needed. The Soviet ambassador concurred surface ballistic missiles to Cuba and that the presence in Cuba of Soviet medium with my analysis, adding that the Soviet Soviet military advisers had come to Cuba range missiles. Secondly, he feared that Union found itself in a difficult position in .not as instructors but as members of Soviet when Soviet ships reached the announced Cuba because its supply lines were too long ;special rocket' force units to operate these quarantine line a confrontation was inevita- and the American blockade could be very missiles." ble." Dobrynin "explained that any defensive effective. (Czechoslovak 'ambassador) Ruzek Radvanyi goes on: "Ambassador Beck re- weapon could be labeled offensive as well remarked grimly that if the Americans in- marked that his Chinese friends had com- and dismissed American concern ever a vaded, it would definitely trigger a nuclear plained of Soviet unwillingness to disclose threat from Cuba. The Pearl Harbor attack, war. At this point I lost self-control and any .details and had asked Beck whether he he suggested, might have been responsible asked whether it was not the same to die knew anything more about the whole affair, for this unwarranted paranoia. Everybody from an American missile attack as from a Beck argued that the story of the deploy- agreed that the situation was serious and Soviet one. Dobrynin attempted to assure ment of ground-to-ground missiles had been that the possibility of an American invasion me that the situation had not reached such launched by 'American warmongers' and ob- of Cuba could not be discounted." Asked proportions and that a solution would no served that neither the Soviet ambassador how Moscow intended to deal with the quay- doubt be found ... in Havana nor high-ranking Cuban officials antine, "Dobrynin was forced again to reply "At the close of the meeting, any last re- had mentioned anything to him about the that he simply had no Information ..:' maining ray of hope I may have had for a missile build-up." On Oct. 23 at the Soviet embassy's milt-.peaceful solution was abruptly shattered. This message apparently was sent In late tary' attache party Dobrynln told Radvanyi Dobrynin now announced that the soviet July or early August. Soviet arms shipments ,that the situation was even more confused embassy was this very moment burning its ,were arriving at that time, though the first and unstable ..." But, as Radvanyi notes, the archives. Shocked at this news I inquired of medium range missiles did not come until Soviet envoy did not disclose that before the Dobrynin whether he planned to evacuate Sept. $. On Aug. 22 CIA Director John Mc- party he had met with Attorney General the families of Soviet diplomatic personnel. Cone voiced to President Kennedy his suspi- Robert F. Kennedy in the third floor of the Dobrynin replied in the negative. cions that the Soviets were preparing to in- ;embassy. it was then that Robert Kennedy "Back once again at the Hungarian lega- troduce offensive missiles, perhaps on the told Dobrynin the President knew he had tion I rushed off to Budapest a long sum- basis of Information gathered in Cuba that been deceived by assurances from Dobrynin mary of my latest meeting with Dobrynin, month by French intelligence agent Philippe and others that no offensive missiles would and informed the foreign ministry that Do- De Vesjoli. 1-Iowever, on Sept. 19 the United be placed in Cuba, as detailed in Robert brynin had confirmed the information that the States Intelligence Board's estimate was Kennedy's. posthumously published "Thir- Americans were militarily prepared to in- that the Sod ~t pofffeenn- (`~/~~p~ n ,~~n,~ vadde/~CCuba.. I`emh~apsiizzed that tiless?a quick Rc&g slue missilAs' d / c CK.CC E 2 htl~ ? (d"l1tY~r1'Y-8'-!R8O 0 l~VlVlaR008 0024 n'ww 7ound within the next Reveals Some Intriguing Backgrouaz Former I ungarian Diplomat Here On Ocr. 18 Radvanyi attended the first of three meetings with Soviet Ambassador Anatolyl F. Dobrynin and the heads of all the Communist embassies in Washington. Dobrynin discussed the meeting the previous day between President Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. After dinner at the Czech embassy Dobrynin ".as- sured his audience that recent reports of So- viet ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba were completely without foundation." As to the Kennedy-Gromyko meeting, "nothing ex- traordinary had happened"; the German sit- uation had been discussed at length along with disarmament. At this point in his ac- count, Radvanyi states that "it seems highly unlikely to me" that Gromyko had not been " about the rivy to the Kremlin discussions " . "-STATINTL nist diplomats on Oct. 06, this time at the Soviet embassy, they discussed Walter Lippmann's column of, the previous day sug- gesting ciismantlin g of American missiles in Turkey 'along with the Soviet missiles in. Cuba.,. "The Soviet embassy." writes Bad- vanyi, "apparently considered the Lippmann article a trial balloon, launched by the U.S. administration to seek out a suitable solu- tion. Dobrynin sought their (Commu- nist diplomats') opinion as to whether they thought the Lippmann article should he re- garded as an indirect suggestion on the part of the White House." Only the Romanian ambassador indicated he had some reason to think that it was just that; Lippmann, as far as I know, has never said whether the idea was simply his own. According to RFK's ac- count, Adlai Stevenson on the 20th had sug- gested a swap involving withdrawal of American missiles ,from both Turkey and Italy and giving no the naval base at Guan- tanamo Bay in Cuba. The President rejected another story. - 1 14