Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 12, 2000
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 26, 1970
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP80-01601R000500070001-2.pdf5.74 MB
STATINTL Approved For Relea 00n1/03/04: CIA- !ltly, to build n.uclea r bomb Sh ict rs, to fen r t:c illy, i`?eMttlii I*! i.; ,s:iT ]'ta.tLllt Of the V1CtC0: U. Cot ( Gi 1 r 1i11`~il`C g1L , 11111 1* t, per' I rC I i its ^ ]l COi7grCS CIC b It i l),. They NA,TVIL 11--? "ring the he ne of stlc(r 1 to 1 -' ve that in h )0 .ible ob si +i rit:a or n la!ssil the 1Ct.lClie East C1731 S, Pi E':! ,,~_nt Nixon 10Ctit CS could be att8!Jl C':I 111 Southeast }IpVC Ia12C'i8 LIS ? llillC a Rl! Icn 1x11 1- 1'elied for 111foriilatlon? exchi'.SEV0!y On Acid with military force. 1,110reover, tary threat. to \ ' es Cril kurop0 in the PICSIC!Ctats misinformCcl about past sad a ballistic Ill1.^>S!le dCieliSC his 1nt 111gence b 'eaucracy. SIC did not 1^atch tclC\'1Slon and no InoI'e than 11014' tha Vi'illalll war was "pI'o;;l?css- crisis in the fl!turc. 1latelligcnco esti- scanned the 1:10: rung ne1VSIi. 1)CI's. His ins." There is a classic hesitancy Of ]Hates have come tt7 control our lives iiafOril?ai`);1 Came fl'Gna i}' ii1tC11igenc into 1= ence 111e11 to bring tl eir lca(i:'rs by dominating tai i:110catiGI1 of FI 11'" est' l)h`} rnent. bad news. ',then bad new S is some- tional resources I,i? ? 1~. ~t n1 t ,16 must SiISI' e' H tItit }ccause America's highest ~ovc n- hI78a b Ca!l 1)C t1i :ISOi.C' titirCS l'Cp3(i, 0' Of the I'1tC11}; 11 C.: COnln1UI1it;f aid that intelligence officials may be pal'.`'Uing nlent.o`ficials do not ad irately ]atoll! n= G'ir ' r--lions the intelligence G it can so;?lctimcs ]:ad him disastrously astray is illustrate" by the Cs mbodi?anl intervention lest spring. The President announced to the world that ]!i1; pri:a- cipal purp !se was to destroy the "cen- tral headquarters" of the C_onimunists in the area invaded by American forces. No such headquarters were found. One must 0 su!ile that his intel- Iigenca was in part erroneous. Texlbcohs or. Anericall ,overnment. fail to infcull e. that for foreign and .d case sCC1t intelligence is far more pov.,crful then Congress and lilV NO-. the Department of State. It can be intelligence S',? tcli? costs more tllai' COlitr0!, decision ma l:mg. 11115 Dllil3s .more. influential than the C111--f Exec"- $5 billion a year to operate. The aanc:tl g? riously into question the survival of tncIr .: I } i l . C'Iit:C 14:1"c7:;!!Ci-3 Cy' l'XCl'- 1 ? ! co ta7 0'1 7111}'.tCl'V IIatc l i Ci7CC . l r l . : : ti:e C:?'.-2 c ! a t l ic'c'al of real) ni ibl:), CISCs }1'.ot-1 roie ill poli^}' matlililz hes been d'. closedt aS RI-01111d $3 r! accou table (,;DV mn;iicnt. What can be but k. rcit N`ic'ctively rliriNe to lion, \:'itla 1110:1: tin n I3`1,000 CI't1pleye.. CIA ii a? 1'Cs1)Glt not 1 0 rir1 1 ot iOClU Ii tc. of tlol.1s Il1S V;G1-% Sel'lOUS alter.}IOII must be giVCn h P1O;;dit b: ;in c^in' ends h;s day inn for C.I.A. end Ctter cret 1 Os ira}' bj a. i'rCSidCiltla] COmrIall S1o;1, A hi 1a 0 Ici-ninent Oriicizal Iec o f i F ~'ie;ring a picture of tale of tc t.a NVO-ld g to prL t n?s o, ]ntellic policy, pain.P' ( i!ttCCi th t no 1!1\'c!n,el ' C' i d Of olguih} 'thoil c-n 1 Control. Total ex- by secrot ilite}li~en So the toal i:itell:"Cnc 1'CSoire, s. So no 0110 pond ures on in Clligcnce. could b;; cut President is its }iotentia.i prisoner. If to is iin;`?nsitI c to !s dan kn0ws the cxacttotal COStS. in half, after roorpalli%fitlon of the nY Patr~skluiit 7ili t?'ger, tal e' r. One than tI o deci'.c s : ~0 it 1',as political cti ! eln. Covert p' on and ion co,t](I cccolne its 1 }'s! tilled that the \ '~hr, \T,'Orld must sespionage, now directed front C.I.A.'s l't try to brills tl:e ient._..:1 e r cc.y .. was Tipp e d 1 for mi leading President'John F. K needy in the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1511. There the similarity ends. The Bay of Pigs Operation was envis!fIned and conducted by' Cuban refugees- ~l ith CIA help-in an effort to win back STATINTL V the island nation from Fidel Castro's Communist re-ginie. Last lceeke.nd's escapade in North Vietnam, was plaln-ne.I by Americans, executed by Americans, and intended to benefit :1mericans. The dliglaect chiming of congre_sional cloves over the discomfiture of the President and W w Secretary Melvin Laird is unseemly tinder the circumstances. Pubt'c acknol.lodgement o f the raid-ai.d its disappointing resulis--by Laird will put the Communists On guard a ainst Sp::ce hero Fri.nk Bolllli n. future rescue efforts. = nOty a special representative Laird had little choice, of o f president Nixon . nn cn, t?s Administration fees Ii r i sr, tt e r s of oar, told soon would have got Wad of : health." Forth Vietuant and over a' The former astronaut, wh(i Y(rt Vietnatne- threat to 1 P Ax x Once Cnnerr`s that m'lr'i;", i are the 1'a;Cl and `'exposed" the beaten , dragged tucuyh `'invasion. Wages. tortured. They are Now would be a good time f~'l a die' bare),, suff lent to for membel?s ? of Congress. WPM his AledWol care is including those concerned, "d.yod to barely- avert over the bomb damage to death ratixr' than to promote Cuounun Siron"holds in recently completed a fact- Do' cute t le n _ ? p - finding trip to Southeast Asia, . conference, to recall Boa said, 1 isle after time, as we man's lv gads. , daalt ,vitil the governments around the world, I heard the Pcrma l pleaded that they: t th^ '()rill " remetnber the people the h a eomnieri?. t V i e t n a m e s e consider our U is., ner;citizens, wit not ate prisoners there a trump card I1' in tl'gotiations." forsake your countrymen who The prisoners of war, have given so much for you. in The Borman concluded, are - Americans are fact., political concluded, being murdered or allo',cecl to 'plus, tie motives of the die in Conununist 1'GW camps ntu fi Unite`i States are clear. Itt nausi he first cnl?e2rn. addition to being a humane The raid i( it accOlltp'_ished .h action, the slrrply eaeculed moili ng else, as again heliccptcr landing in enemy focused world opinion and' r ,,id world awareness . on the l r . 1? territory, if succe: ,.u ? al l. .t,R, r t decenc Approved Sat F or(TS ~ l i 3/ 4?;;c`.tiAn 80404e01 R000500070001-2 00 ?t V1;M"nn . I displ ,ycd by \ot c 1 .. n arrogance. STATINTL pproved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80- BRISTCL, CIA I-IERt:Lr)-COURIER 24 - 23,619 S -. 30,172 4 `` e Vii; J t+ ~:.1 1; Tow would be a g cod time for members of Congrtes }, including those concerned over the becc b d, mage to Communist stronah.j'ds Foes of the war in Vietnam Vietnf :nese col,iider our plisoilers already Pave labeled the abortive there a trump card in attempt to free American prisoners r~ Cn he t prisooers of war Borman of wa"? n ar , Hanoi the Nj ol's , ' admin'i't c tiu'n's "Bay of PIOS.e, CC,.~ !! t., 2Te, in fact, political in hoo.,t ages. But the C ^.riil mission, even. in Thus its futility, may not have besets a , the motives of the United total loss. states are In addition to Thee is no s ee" ,n to d:7u'I th 't btArIg ?, lllTrii ile ?coon t'},e Sl' Es'p'y the .r_ .,t +' cte ext cued h-lic:o 1. la.~..hug in revL,e u~tL_ l>f~ eor..=.~.-.,~ eiinult.aneo,, ;iy with t~h reitaliatory with bombing raids in North Vietnam, was initiated on the basis of competent intelligence advice, pinpointing t e.locetlon of the POW camp. It is also apparent that the report v; +s sa:ly out of date. The prisortcrs reportedly had been % Missed away two weeks prior to the raid. If strcce,:~ftil, the r .i,iss: ~.7,on would ' have been hailed as a dramatic response to Hanoi's refusal to abide by the Geneva convention or to negotiate for the release and treatment of T'Or'Js. As sooaace hero Frank Dorman repo tees to Con;ress just two, w(uld. Have jolte the Communist prc.)t ? and~a forces from their ari ogc~nce. But it 1W..4J no su essf tl and intelligence sources are beia - blamed as the 'Central In tellig c. cc ?y was rapped for nii l sd be "c?cry The 11 a w i s h appiUprlatio,ilr''Cl ilt day h'arhlo,. of ii17 Ili1Cc^.i' )rised'' if the U111ted Siat_~;! SUi I cc snbEee]ieniit a octal. so - ati ;n iBCt 01 II1tClflb'IlC/ 11 f01'i11...t1 t. did not have airy intcllioellc:E1, C e 1'?led tl':0 y ars a 0 aLt0illjfr0nl Southeast Asia 11ad br'ain a,Cnts ill'N0t'th Vietilan . 4vliat it ?'Ei."ti'a ci as' a strii',g c. ,,,aiting mialt;si ill di'::l'selS at I i I f l, le CO . t . .f Oil tll.. other side o .l int..ltt~..mce ci A...,ter - tlOC tulle o! the let (ii,._nsr\. ell attach Or, U.S. ilrtcllir- he recalled the Central lntclii - ?+ n -~r..... ~" 1,00 ii)1% I INI' V ante 1' epo r t that Viciciatl?r C ence sltln r 1,UiEr}? tin., Jilt I, o- I o far as 1 }a1o;v, front the Con;aiil.mists had infiltrated rear capture O~ u1n Pc blo and 7 'i ?t Of'111-T`r'-i't Lll)^rl}l, hliCl)l0 anCl 1Ci O:fCll- l" ro than 3n, !iln 2-ants into the the V i'vat COrlt'Q recalhd Rep. Jamie L.. South ViCtilanicsc governmont. Sent 'its 01`:11 i"vC5ti :-tOiS i11! .T' tli~ p:nta~On'S dct ils. 1!Ilell11 ~1'httlcit, 1)~i15S all0tll^i SUb Thit study, 2000i'iilZ to ptlb. ee? `~ Ctliilil',Iitco !1',^i1ih i, "1'~a (lid. not 1 i s h a d relial'ts, aCICl oiled,ycd, ence Oil -&S. 1 Stlila' rrlln 1$Ck of lllf0rillall:lrl' 1i01vCVe1' that the United Sta!e.S 1C d i _%) - s.. ts 10 UII4CPSCOri 1;rC cuff red fi'o:n so much infer- f' e Puld tconcE_rn ti1C SL's r lY+littF.f. and South V ichl%',*Me had IlOll] nla t101i aild there were so 111at1' ! 1 = s~tllgremote.lyco;:ipi::ra.l.Eal- furi11Cl" too ll, t e liil i us, stC') Ot waa`:s to ,et it out tilt it heveI' r rna'?:in lr..-~ily 0; its fitl~linr`s and ihaugh it did nor cltenct that b ?Ot where. it :' s nC^d_'CI ii' flue thre ulliteil Siatcs Hard 110 aoCntSl criticism Pcolic instead of c'l ins- , z 2 . to uo au}' go'i .' n ih Nnrih LfiCtli!atll. t: harsh wol?ds and toms III testifying 1 fore t11c Senat.c fro:li tll_ testinlo;ly. I'orei n ' Felc.lions Committee this weeli, Laird denied ?lhei'e i fo:e leavir Congress to -, l e.o any intellige'c_. failure in - n1? c crel, 13, of cc Ci1S , I'rlc.l' tIIC .l escu ittclil%t. tid Chan'' Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP8O-01601 ROOO5OOO7OOO1-2' STATINTL t rl"i, E U. Fits _'RD Approved For Release 1C~-DP80-01 CGS ;.? 1101110 To the editor: Portland State University fa- cilities are being used for re- cruitment to the Central In- telligence Agency. This is an _example of how the university is used to further the government's attempts to crush popular revolu- tions and to deny self-determina- tion to various peoples of the world by interfering. In their af- fairs. An agency whicii denies; this basic night of s:lf-determi nation cannot. ba alloyed to de- fend its recruiting.*, activitiesunder the guise of "free s; eech." Nor should an agency which produces instruments To crush self - expres- sion be allowed in an institution ,of "education." The role of the CIA Is well known throughout the world for its intervention in all areas. Per- haps it is best known for training ex-Cubans for the invasion of Cuba. Or perhaps people are more familiar with the complicated his- tory'of the.CIA's involvement In the Dominican Republic. This agency Is also known for its aid In coups and kin;-making in the Middle East, notably in Iraq and Iran. Some of us can remember the summer of 1965 when the Prime Minister of Singapore pro- duced evidence of the CIA's hav- ing attempted to bribe him with $3.3 million. The list of coun- tries In which the CIA is in= volvcd continues on and onthrough Latin America, Asia, Africa - in- deed one suspects that no country is left untouched. We demand an end to any co- operation between the institutions of learning and the Central Intel-; ligence Agency. We .are also interested in the Vanguard's position on this mat- ter. The Student Mobilization Committee to End the War In Vietnam (Ed. note: Richard Rankin, r,s- sociate placement dircetor, says that the relationship between thcl CIA and the placement service is no more cordial than "normal employer-placement servicerela- tions." Rankin says that a CIA repre- sentative will not be to the place- ment service to recruit. However, he does say that the placement service acts as' a "point of con- tact and referral" for PSU stu- dents interested in joining the CIA. Students must walk down- town to see the CIA recruiter. The Vanguard believes that any PSU student should have the richt to h3 an imperalist if he desires to b~_- one. The Vanguard also believes that rather than ouestionirg the moral righteousness of each recruiter.', students should examine the role of the placement service on c,- .in-pus.} Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 STATINTL Approved For Relelig-fd1`~~'.~CIA-RDP80r0 23 i ov 19 3.{ ?~3ttiE~fir'.Ca t-z ius ~# 'ei :'a's "; a.;s?cs% `}_~yss E,`i iOV f r C LI. ? ~m:v ti Et': I'i'. c}.SiG)Si?C' to g n i%~ ~~: i. ?iIr'e ~~ :'a t-~. ~'~ f11E SIIO\~ i`S[ALJ,1'S'l'_ RT~LiKE'I'IIIS:'I?here's i Ehissuper-agent type. see, and he's playing a recording. From it conies an impersonal voice explaining the need to "zonk" someone in sonie faraway part of the world. The job is going to he difficult, the voice warns coldly, and if ant01._ is Caught, t~.` 1`: hi de Cory will he denied. Then -whoosh!;-the recording disintegrates in a puff of instant .air pollution. and a hatlery of secret agents is off on another hour of derring-do. Exciting? Suspenseful? A real spy swashbuckler? Mission Tntpossitile may he all of' these, but it's also fiction, pwe fic- tion.'Any resetnhlance to real people or places or govern- ment institutions. living or dead, is. as they say. coinci- dental. Some discrepancies between fiction and fact: Fiction: Spies are superhuman men and women who -frequently- hide behind rubber masks, false mustaches, and similar disguises. . Fort: Most intelligence workers are fair!- ordinary- men and women sclio!;u language specialists. and other \yell- trained people. They usually live very ordinary lives- V.ithout benefit of disgui es. Fiction: 'fie main job of most spies is to handle difficult . and delicate assignments .%hich take them on exciting jour- neys to mysterious places. Poet: The mom' job of most intelligence specialists in- volves a day-by-day sifting through printed material-- newspapers, tn;tgazines, government documents, tran- scripts of radio hruaileasts. This is done in an effort to spot social, political, and military trends and movenrents in foreign countries. This jot) is difficult and sometimes deli- cate, but it usually takes workers no farther than a nearby office. Still, the agenApp:mved 1F-9r Relaas)ee20011 /' in common with their real-life counterparts. Both CIO much of their work in secret. The reason for the secrecy is obvious: information that reaches the public also reaches, potential enemies. Most American secret agents work for the Central In- telligence Agency (CIA). That's the agenev.char ed with gathering information about possible enemies abroad. Few outsiders know what goes on within the plain-looking eight .story building that houses the CIA's headquarters in Langley. Va. For that matter,. few know what goes on in CIA offices anyvhere in the world. a resident Dwight Eisenhower once summed up the se- cret nature of CIA work: "Its successes cannot be ad- vertised. Its failures cannot be explained. Its heroes aKf! undecorated and un sting, often even among their own fraternity." 'What does the CIA actually do? One explanation of its scope and purpose is to be found in a pamphlet put out by the agency itself: "In international affairs, intelligence is knnowledge and forcknowledge-fact and estimate. In peace, it is that knowledge of the world about us thatis- es>een,tiall /~to the preservation of pence. In. Nvar, ~AL 'lt:i.O]A..R i~iIRSO-O.IW,Iki~OGOrI~AE)7,Vli01t`iAd.C're is November N3, p3?~$ved Fo~Oilj'~I S t,0 ~C3A Qi~ 111-169j TABLE 24.-PRETEST AIiD CAIN SCORES- FOR ALL ADVAti1ACED CHILDREi1 (BY QUARTILES) W"M Qr N-16 61-zi- mum Pretest Gain Pretest Gain possible score Mean * SD Mean SD 'lean SD 1. oars 203 95.44 23.90 Body pads total ___----?_____________------ 32 24.13 dy parts-------------------------- 5 4.13 Pointing to b'di- Fleming lady pits----------------------------- 15 11.06 Function of body pails (point)__________8 5.94 Function of body parts (verbal) 4 3.00 ) ----------------- 58 15.19 Recognizing letters--------------'-------------- 8 2.25 gaming capital letters ----------------- _------ 16 1.75 Naming Inner case letters----------------------- 8 .56 4 3.56 matching letters in words________________________ 4 1.44 Recognizing letters in words______________4 .63 Initial sounds---------------------------------- Reading words--------------------------------- 6 0 formstotal ---------------------------------------- 24 12.44 Recognizing forms ------------------------- ____ Naming forms ---------------------------------- -4 21.31 Numbers total------------------------- ------ --- 6 2.13 Rccognizing numbers___________________________ -6 2.08 Naming numbers------------------------ ------- Nomerosity------------------------------------ 6 3.56 6 3.56 Counting ------------------------------------- Additional and subtraction_______________________ 7 1.94 Matching subtest----- ------------------------------ 11 9.31 RelatiCnal terms totat_______________________________ 17 10.63 Amount relationships_-_____- ------ 9 4.75 Size re!ationships-------------------------------- 2 1.75 Position relationships--------------------------- .56 3.50 Sorting total--------------------------------------- 26 2.75 Ctassifcation total__________________________________ 24 11.50 Classification by size---------------------------- 2 1.00 Classi cation by form ------------ 6 2.26 -------------- C!assitication by r.umber ------------------------6 2. 119 Ct3ssifital!ar by tusction----- _------------------ 9 5.56 Puzzlestotal --------------------------------------- 5 2.75 Peabody fair score (pretestorly)------------------- 80 42.31 Peahody mentalae(marlls)___________________________ 51. ES 1lidden trio ,es total (posttest)______________________ 10 4.38 Wciclr comes fast Iola ------------------------------ 12 6. CO 5.71 1.15 2.65. 2.11 1.26 8.79 2.08 3.77 2.00 .81 1.21 96 0 3.48 1.36 1.01 10.37 2.C9 4.25 1.75 2.88 1.61 1.45. 2.53 1.39 .58 1.46 1.34 3.12 .73 1.41 1.05 1.35 1.13 9.43 11.97 1.20 2.83 Pretest Gain SD Mean SD 40.46 18.83 110.83 25.63 45.25 22.87 2.35 4.28 25.71 4.79 3.14 4.50 .30 .98 4.49 77 .02 1.03 .89 2.66 11.38 3.13 1.32 3.15 .79 1.59 6.40 1.63 1.23 1.63 .37 1.11 3.43 1.07 .49 1.09 17.09 9.99' 18.62 8.86 19.63 11.46 2.01 2.10 3.34 2.05 2.78 2.51 7.65 5.24 3.69 4.26 8.72 4.80' 3.37 2.51 .78 1.24 3.66 2.68 .37 .95 3.26 1.08 .53 1.27 1.09 1.26 1.42 1.21 1.20 1.50 .39 1.35 .77 .80 .89 1.06 .30 .65 .03 .17 .35 .69 3.83 3.59 12.31 3.15 4.62 3.39 .54 1.76 2.54 1.25 1.03 1.41 1.10 1.23 1.68 1.00 1.46 1.20 12.16 8.17 27.50 10.83 12.40 7.68 2.05 2.14 2.98 1.80 1.85 1.93 5.91 4.15 4.18 4.50 5.71 4.33 .37 '.94 4.85 1.31 .48 1.20 .84 1.49 6.46 2.39 1.18 2.11 .82 1.30 2.55 1.70 .74 1.53 .65 1.11 9.32 1.60 1.05 1.74 1.19 2.19 11.71 2.57 1.38 2.64 .40 1.72 5.52 1.52 ...80 1.61 .11 .41 1.89 .31 .05 .37 .60 1.33 3.58 1.09 .48 1.38 1.65 1.83 2.86 1.41 1.75 1.54 4.58 4.95 15.11 4.23 4.55 4.27 .66 .26 .78 1.54 1.74 3.26 1.43 1.37 1.59 1.14 2.17 2.91 1.49 1.12 1.76 1:49 1.73 6.74 1.73 1.68 1.78 .79 1.59 3.15 1.21 .48 1.60 -------------- 48.12 9.39 ----- --------- -------------- 60.29 15.51 -------------- -------------- 4.45 1.31 ...-?--------- -------------- 8.40 2.83 ----??-------- 26.69 16.03 102.13 21.65 38.65 17.02 112.77 24.36 19 3 97 4 2534 4 4.31 2 26.37 5.64 . .25 . .93 .75 .29 .86 4.30 1.10 1.25 3.02 11.39 2.75 .87 2.51 11.86 3.20 1.13 2.22 6.71 1.44 .81 1.54 6.77 1.66 .56 .95 3.29 1.01 .55 .99 3.44 1.07 S. GS 9.26 16.81 7.03 12.43 10.10 19.25 10.21 1.19 2.14 2.48 1.69 2.52 2.57 3.07 2.10 3.75 4.39 2.55 3.91 5.87 4.59 3.71 4.92 1.13 1.54 .81 1.97_ 2.23 1.02 1.55 .31 .87 3.45 .72 3.47 .87 .38 1.20 1.35 .95 .55 1.18. 1.42 1.18 19 1.33 68 '.70 .52 1.18 .95 .87 . 06 .25 D 0 .10 .04 .26 00 3 4.23 11.35 3.20 4.32 .2.74 12.37 3.05 . .25 1.69 2.10 1.19 .94 1.44 2.47 1.10 .83 1.82 1.32 1.14 1.29 1.22 1.81 1.17 8.69 5.35 24.13 8.65 12.06 6.79 28.07 9.60 .63 1.50 2.23 1.75 2.16 1.64 2.18 1.98 94 2 3.00 2.77 3.82, 4.81 4.10 4.09 4.43 . 1.50 1.55 4.58 1.46 .63 1.17 4.89 1.16 1.55 1.90 6.23 1.94 1.19 1.42 6.86 1.85 .50 1.51 2.06 1.59 1.37 1 2.51 1.30 .81 1.17 9.90 1.01 .33 1.20 9.67 1.09 1.55 2.85 10.48 2.34 2.10 2.63 11.58 1.96 1.13 1.15 4.68 1.54 1.52 1.67 5.61 1.46 .25 .58 1.90 .10 .30 1.84 .41 13 1.82 3. 19 1.25 .48 1.29 3.47 1.10 . 50 1.41 2.81 1.22 1.52 1.29 2.98 1.41 . 3 69 5.33 14.03 3.56 4.97 4,01 15.19 4.21 . 50 1.10 1.45 .68 .29 .64 1.41 . .`?3 2.22 3.06 1.35 1.39 1.50 3. 16 1.52 1 06 1.61 2.55 1.18 1.16 2.02 ' 3.C5 1.51 . C5 1 1.43 6.32 1.50 2.06 1.86 6.89 1.47 . .13 .96 2.23 1. 15 1.23 1.41 2.93 1.42 -------------- 49.45 8.18 -------------- 49.19 9.93 -------------- 62.03 13.34 62.49 15.55 -------------- 4.71 1.13 -------------- 4.33 1.46 -------------- 7.06 2.93 -------------- 7.79 2.49 ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF AN AMENDMENT AMENDMENT NO. 1041 TO H.R. 19590 At the request of the Senator from Wisconsin (Mir. PROx3nRS), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. TIDINGS) was added as a cosponsor of amendment No. 10'1 to H.R. 19500, the Department of Defense Appropriations bill. NOTICE' CONCERNING NOMINATION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the following nomination has been referred to and is now pending before the Com inittee on the Judiciary:' Robert C. &'ardian, of California, to be an Assistant. Attorney General, vice J. Walter Yeagley, to which office he was appointed during the last recess of the Senate. On behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all persons interested in this nomination to Me with the committee, in writing, on or before Monday, November 30, 1970, any reprzsentatiors or objections they may wish to present concerning the. above nomination, with a further statement whether it is their intention to appear at any hearing which may be scheduled. fr- ADDITIONAL STATE NM -0,1'TTS OF SENATORS WE SHOULD RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WLT`HI CUBA Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, in November, 1053 I was elected U.S. Sen- ator. Ohio voters generously gave me a majority of approximately 153,000 over Senator "Honest John" Bricker, who had never been defeated for office in my State. Senator Bricker had served as at- torney general of Ohio and for three terms as Governor of Ohio. In 1944 he was the Republican nominee for Vice President of the United States. So feeling very good I dissolved my law firm, took the sign off the door, and de- cided to go to Florida and possibly to Cuba. Shortly before Christmas Day In ISM, I was vacationing in Florida, in celebration of my election victory which very few persons except myself had an- ticipated. In the cocktail room of the Yankee Clipper where I was staying while gossip- ing with the bartender and others, I was told that the guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra mountains were overcoming the corrupt dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, a former sergeant of the Cuban Army, whom the United States had been sup- porting. I was informed that our Central Intelligence Agency had been keeping Batista in power in Cuba despite the fact that he was a corrupt dictator and was despised by millions of poverty-stricken Cubans. Then also at a party at the Trade Winds I was told that Fidel Cas- tro's guerrillas were winning the revolt there and the tyrant Batista, who had taken over by force, was abandoned by -his followers and would be out before the New Year. Yet, the CIA and our Gov- ernment officials in Washington seemed to have no Intimation tuitil suddenly Batista fled from Havana to rendezvous with his unlisted bank accounts In Swtzerland. He then commenced the life of affluence and ease in gorgeous exile on the' sunswept, fashionable beaches of Spain along )vith other ex-dictators, kings and emperors. It was startling news to the CIA, offi- cials in the White House, and the Amer- ican public when bearded Castro and his tattered followers triumphantly paraded in Havana and took over the govern- ment of this island of nearly 3 million people 90 miles from Key West. His re- gime has lasted and thrived from" late December 1939. to this good hour. The fact ' Is that the Central Intelli- gence Agency from its Director right down the line to CIA operatives on the staff of our embassy in Havana were supporting the corrupt dictator, Batista, and were surprised and humiliated when suddenly Batista took off from Havana with his personal entourage. The late great President John F. Ken- nedy directly following the Bay of Pigs debacle said: That CIA, I would teiir it into bits and (throw it to the four winds. This was a CIA operation from the outset, including training in Guatemala for invasion of Cuba and overthrowing the Castro regime with our air support. Mr. President, the time is long past for the United States to resume diplo- matic and trade relations with Cuba. The fact is that today 50 nations, in- eluding our neighbors, Canada and Mexico, recognize the Castro regime and enjoy a thriving international trade with the Republic of Cuba. J -We might as well face the fact that the Castro regime is firmly entrenched. To our knowledge, no rebellion or guer- Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 Approved For Release 200 STATINTL - "If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome: if you believe the , e , what the equipment did and now it did it. He touched and patted the machine as he s oke p , pointing to the huge treads and kicking them, and then looking at the gun and smiling, patting the armor plate. There was no trouble with this vehicle, Sergeant Rosario said.. It is the best vehicle he has 'had in twenty years in the Army. We looked at it, dark green . against the sandy earth, squat and lethal, permanent as the sphinx or.. some other rough beast. The ser- =geant opened a flap at the front end and extracted a canvas cover, then unhooked other flaps to show how the canvas could be deployed so that the machine could float, could move. through the water like a fish. But it was not really meant for water warfare, because. the guns did not work well in water. It was designed to act in support of the 'cavalry scouts, the armored personnel carriers; the cav was the spearhead,* the reconnaissance element -'of an-, armored rroia~~e~~t~tgbs~03t~d sc~e~~b'lf Pdi4490~~'t~ie in is `.-safe -Lord Salisbury theologians, nothing is innocent: if you believe the soldiers noth a There were deep ruts in 'the stony earth, and the land fell away and then came. up steeply in a rise two miles distant. This was Fort Hood in East Texas. and +. :rte - i r` V :j v _ he machine stood on a vacant knoll, its foreshortened gun pointed north i ne. sergeant was brisk. He was explaining the machine how it work d t__ _ __((~~ {{ STATINTL 11la4-?..L AIM.. v.l 17 ~.11~1 - Approved For Release 2(0o/B; JCIA-RD WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP ad F,[,?~angdqw By FRANK GETLEIN You can always count on the ness: It would have been all the field and determined to l h t t in his grip forever. But the CIA devised the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban people rose, as predicted, to welcome the counter-insurgents, and Cuba has been peacefully democratic and pro-American ever since, as is well known. Earlier still, the intelligence community and the military community were shaken by the possibility of peace break- ing out at a meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev. Again, the CIA rushed in, dis- patched a U-2 spy plane over Russia, lied to the President so that he would, in effect, lie to Khrushchev about it, and in no time at all the dread threat of peace was laid to rest for the remainder of the Eisenhow- er years. Now the spooks have done it again and just in the nick. For some months now, those same communities have been -worried about Richard Nixon. The ancient anti-Communist warrior, the man who exposed Alger Hiss and thus saved China from going Red,, the man who exposed Helen Gaha- gan Douglas and thus saved Hollywood from going Red, ,that 1 iself to be going soft on he commies. troops began coming home, with loose talk about.another 40,000 out by Christmas and the whole crowd, perhaps, out by next year sometime. If that happens, there goes the war. Spooks can't be expected to fight it themselves; they need troops. ' At just that dark hour, the CIA composed a report for the President, and it may well be the thing that will turn the tide. The South Vietnamese government - our guys - said the CIA, has been infil- trated by 30,000 enemy agents. The newcomers are mostly Cong rather than Northerners; they are all over the police and the army; and they are so efficient that none of them above the rank of lance- corporal has been apprehend- ed. That last note is particularly important. It anticipates and rejects the understandable de- sire of the President or the press to have a look at some .of the 30,000. If one could not be produced, the untrustIag might have concluded that was because they don't exist. Now everyone knows in ad- vance it's because the 30,000 Cong infiltrators are smarter than the Thieu-Ky democratic He was talking about peace than the CIA itself, which can In Vietnam and about letting count the infiltrators but can't the South Vietnamese govern- lay hand on them. ment do its own fighting with The report, filed last May its own troops. He was sound- but leaked to the press only Ing like a regular Fulbright or last week, contends that the even an Aiken; he was just Cong made a strategic shift as lucky Vice President Agnew a result of American and didn't hear about his new soft- South Vietnamese victories in tration w a ey CIA to come to the rescue up with Nixon, a natural nat- win by infi when things look glum. tering nabob, if ever there was could not by arms. Clearly, Back in the Kennedy admin-. one. the report concludes, once the Istration, it looked as if the Month by dreary month, the Americans are entirely out of i~ South .Vietnam, the country it goner for the cause of free- dom so well served by the two military men now in charge. The real conclusion is that - Vietnamization will have to be abandoned, for every acre of ground we turn over to our gallant democratic allies we ,are, for all we know, really turning over to the Cong infil- ators. Therefore, back to the boon- docks, you Yankee fighting lanimous palaver about pulling out, you puerile presslords and pussyfootin professors. Having charted this mass move of the enemy from the field to the bureaux, the CIA will surely be able to reverse the alarm should that become necessary. If we keep our troops in Vietnam now in or- der to protect the South Viet- namese. government from the South Vietnamese g o v e r n- ment, eventually, no doubt, the CIA will learn to catch the infiltrators they now can only count. Once more, the Ameri- cans will begin to hope for peace in our time, or perhaps our children's time, or at any rate some time. And once more, the CIA will file a report: Discouraged by the cleansing of the govern- ment - or purges - conduct- ed by Thieu and Ky, the Viet Cong will pull its infiltrators back to the combat zones and the Americans will have to stick around to fight them. With proper adjustment, there is no reason in the world the war can't last forever. .Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-61601 R000500070001-2 . WALL STREET JOURNAL Approved For Release? .V: CIA-RDP8O-0 REVIEW and OUTLOOK The New Regime in Chile The cold war era has had the dis- and Kennedy agreed to leave Castro comforting effect of shaking up many: alone. In retrospect, it looks as if the Ken- long established assumptions.of inter- nedy experience may have indicated a national relations. The leftward turn new direction for the politics of hemi- in Chile-where, despite yesterday's spheric security. In a polarized, nu- violence, a Marxist with Communist clear armed world, it no longer was Party support is expected to be named practical to judge a Latin government president-leads to some thoughts on as a threat in itself because of its ties how our assumptions have changed in to hostile powers. Like it or not, the hemispheric politics. U.S. would have to tolerate it so long For years, the old Monroe Doctrine as it posed no specific threat to the seemed a bedrock element in thinking hemisphere. Only when it did pose about inter-American relations. Under such a threat could the new risks in- it, the U.S. maintained that there is a volved in a U.S. reaction be considered historic "special relationship" be- acceptable. tween the U.S. and the independent re- This shift in some ways reflects the publics of Latin America. And so for fact that other Latin governments do partly strategic and partly moral rea- not view communism in itself as seri- sons, the extension of influence by a ously as Washington does, perhaps be- non-hemispheric power over other cause, as Mr. Anderson suggests in a hemispheric nations would be consid- book review on this page, they some- ered a threat to the security of the times tend to view a turn to commu- U.S., and resisted as such. nism as an act of disillusionment with As a concept, the Monroe Doctrine the U.S. rather than an immediate em- has of the Soviets. At the same time, has proved surpx'isingly durable, the Latin nations still retain a consid- though its force has often varied with arable interest in the 'protection d- power realities and the preoccupation forded by alliance with U.S. power. of Washington with other foreign or in- usi naatitioons s have e often about U.S. n- ternal problems. It sometimes became Thus Latin Ue pretext, rightly or wrongly, for cern over Castro. But Latin support for the intervention Latin affairs, Kennedy during the missile crisis was the theory that t otherwise outsiders unanimous. Cuban-based missiles would intervene or take advantage of a the U.S., after Latin country's instability. Monroe which h icereaten n other Latin ter Doctrine thinking emerged most re- alll, too. a threat e oulld na. cently when Lyndon Johnson sent It is against this background that troops to intervene in the Dominican the emergence of a Marxist Chile Republic's uprising of 1965. should be regarded; it means that, By that time, however, it was begin- however nerve-racking, the Nixon Ad- ning to grow clear that the'days of the ministration's choice of a wait and see Monroe Doctrine were numbered, at policy is the only practical course. least in the absolute form it had taken To be sure, the strategic dangers for so many years. This had been well Dr. Allende's election in Chile poses demonstrated by the previous Kennedy should not be underestimated nor Administration's dealings with Cuba. should its sobering implications for At the Bay of Pigs, John Kennedy the future of the hemisphere. Despite' balked at the prospect of committing his assertions that his coalition govern- ? the U.S. to overt support of an armed ment will not succumb to either local effort to unseat a Castro who had Communist Party domination or Soviet fallen in with the Soviet Union. In the control, other developments leave' cold'war context, the risk of an open room for doubt. For example, it's re- confrontation with the Russians ported that Soviet technicians and ad- seemed too great. visers have been flooding into Chile But when the. Russians then pro- ever since Dr. Allende's victory began_ ceeded to establish offensive missile to look secure. bases in Cuba, the threat seemed far But at the same time, the realities have more serious and immediate. Kennedy of hemispheric security politics took a resolute public stand-focused changed, for reasons the U.S. never more on the Soviet missiles, it must be could have controlled. And failure to noted, than the Cuban government. recognize such a fact of international The Russians removed the missiles life can only lead to worse trouble. STAT.INTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 Approved For Re1ease(f2;l'91M- 14'OCT 1570 American blacks, on the 1967 to the present, dUr- H C) 17 C t N I Ii S. RAD 1 CAL S' other hand, got hard-core ing which he has been tak- guerrilla and intelligence ing an active, deadly 'se- training in Castro's milita- rious hand in promoting a -z, ry camp,. The Cubans revolution in America Casros interest in l e J '" ra ' f ii :1 o ~, " J v looked upo:r the blacks as + ' Ili1 more dependable revolu- American minority groups si a K~, 11..tionaries and less suscep- at first was largely ideal- .S "f i~`?1 f',~;,':1 e, '?.. ??. ., ?? ,?,It ~:~!?;~I,!"j? .y19fi :.f; T NOCtOt1 R B ' ? d?~/ 4.: i. .ti. oy y . ?I~IS:ItIT, y, ?: ?r=~w i'i ~ir~ ?I~'~: \?rr/f'~~ l' l~VI/}' T?1 w'll~~; R''' M ? ?~i+'?,r ? t'''it ~!/.?~?~1i ~~',~ ~t ?:1~','t,? ~' ~, r.r \' ? I ?' ? ??,,t? ?? ~,.?.?, /1;., ~YK r' ~?'??' ? ~l. r ,.~i:, {! 4Y: :!?r If i,?a.??.rf.`1,?,,+; Y1 .,1 .1.? A pps vW ~ el as p O 031b4'? #3P 6- 1'6 '4F ' 4 '1 R , 2 G` 41.R. :.. O 60070001-2 30 0 SAGA ; 1; ;; +'. ? f ; ? ?~ ? , Aoatiaued Approved For Release BIRN04 : CIA-RDP80-0 22-MAY 1970 By Lionel Martin Guardian staff correspondent Second of two articles From founder Jorge hlasetti to present director Manuel Yepe, the orientation within Prensa Latina, the Cuban news agency, has been to avoid political "ad- jectivization" and propagandistic phrase- ology prevalent in the news agency releases of some socialist countries. Prensa Latina considers that its partiality is in accord with a truthful representation of 'reality. To be partial means to present news and analysis that highlights the stnfggle of peoples and nations for na- .tional liberation and a better life. This must be done objectively in strict accord communism" and a "propaganda agency again it was the victim of calumnies,', of the Cuban government." economic pressures and legal maneuvers.:.,. It survived each test. Prensa Latina has also been victimized. Gun in one hand; pen in the other by the United States government in a, direct A few days after Jorge Masetti arrived way: four years, _ in. the Sierra Macstra in 1957 he witness` During its first Pren Latina operated a st a bureau u in New Yorsa k. ed an air-raid by the 'Batista air force A , . he stared at a dead child, he related later, About two weeks before the second a i a f nn vers ry o the Bay of rigs invasion, a he asked himself, "What am I doin g,hcre policeman appeared at the office and with a pencil in my hand when I should announced that he had been sent to warn, be pulling the tri er of a hi " gg mac ne-gun PL th .at a "visit" by Cuban exiles was The implication was clear: Masetti felt imminent Aft fi f er rst re using its protec- .that his job, was to take up arms in the tion, the New'York Police Department fight. t ; . 11 acceded but only f - f d T or ew a ys he the B of Pi aygs alter guards were withdrawn, six counter when unnecessary editorialization and invasion, 'Masotti left Cuba and went to revolutionary Cubans armed with i ls p sto propagandistic wordiness have crept into visit the battl@lines of the National entered the PL office, tore the place up PL releases However this is recognized as Lib ti F h fi era on ront t en ghting the Frenchd ijudfh ., annre one o te employees ,who ~a . failing and more 'and more Algeria. He stayed with the FLN for-was sitting at the desk of the absent Latina meets the standards it has set 'for several months and witnessed the victo bhif -ureau ce. -itself. :rious conclusion of their struggle. When perpetual harassment When it became clear that Prensa he returned to Cuba he began writing a The constant threats and absence .of Latina would not fold of its own accord,lbook on Al eria Thej book was never g protection decided Prensa Latina to move . as many pundits had predicted, thelfinished. Other activities attracted Maset-its bureau within the confines of the opposition press controlled by Latin;ti. He asked himself: "What is left now United Nations where greater security American oligarchs and U.S. elitist inter- but the sacred obligation to practice what existed."' Shortly afterwards, the Federal ests, unleashed an all-out offensive against I have learned?!' In the'final months of Reserve rloatd told Prensa Latina that its .the agency. 1961 Masotti disappeared from 'sight. expentc's would be curtailed to S5000 a 1960. Prensa Latina was accused the ,world press about- the - - -~ rcli ' g presence of agency"s" activities. Prchsa Latina had ad of being an official 'spokesman for guerrillas operating in the province of 1 l ' f t 000 ' 510 h g r y "'"I spen up to , a mont "Cast ro-Cominunism." One Venezuelan Salta in Argentina near the Bolivian for he 'New York operation. The U.S.?. columnist f eel lint:ed PL s nel ith y r per on w frontier Salta was the domain of enorlt it .,- govertrt also restricted PL's activities ,the Soviet Union and called the agency moos land holdings l''ke that of Tabacaloutside'the walls of the United Nations. "Kuban?TASS." John O'Rourke, belonging to the "patron" Costa: It is also Prcnsa" Latina was told by Washington' . editor News sent i um of the a region r r e ch in petroleum, l ber, sugar out that' il' could only. use its teletype at the ors Metter to fellow P l d ha a cane and catt e an even s steel millsNih o U foe te transmissionf news concern', over the world warning against the use of like that of Zapla and Jujuy ' , ing that organization . Prensa Latina material. Shortly after- The guerrilla band never had a'chance in ' Nirvana both UPI and AP 'had' wards, the Gdatemalan government, on to consolidate itself. lit was wiped out by ac rc+~itgd correspondents who operated whose territory the CIA was to prepare Argentine forces in 'March' and April wi hout any financial limitations of the Bay of Pigs invaders, closed down the 1964. "Comandante 4e;undo,' the leader travei grestrictionsAn 1969 the Cuban Prensa Latina office. A' month later, a of the group was never he0d from again., ' k ., gover r e t asked the AP correspondent' 'false story circulated in the Mexican Press Comandante 'Segundo ?~wasl the Aom deto le v cause of; hews reports 'it that Prensa Latina was u9ing a clandestine gyc of Jorge Maseta iii consl c~ false and, which tended 'to radio transmitter in Mexico City. In da a e 1slions betwceh Cuba and a October, Jules Dubois, chairman 'of the ' ~. l ?{f,, , hbor, n.. , l , l ? , I:. ' w 1 frietttt - ni ."freedom of the presstomafi-ue." of the j t g ,'' Mexico. UPI - also coase~,t(Pi4rptionsin'll'`vt' Approved For Release ,2001 /03/A!4 : ,ClA-R?~P00- . 64 000009670001-2 'P 'A P bourgeois Inter-American Press 'Associa: Masetti's legacy . ' tion, declared Prensa should be consider- Masetti left behind an agency that was ed as an "instrument of international already a "going concern." Again and Havana 1. L Ire I. ?191r iuii.1.,, 1 ~1.,. ;1 oontinuea Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP8 &PUT.9m BUR 15 MAY 1970 1,1,14ICHAEL HARRINGTON Cambodia BrinOut'the Old Nixon Some years ago I talked to a But now the President and possible to shoot a population ! the ublic t over this into s. Where the '}irominent conservative before notion. Warn and particularly sources of a ubmissionwar are both na- debating him and he told me , wars of the Vietnamese and tionalist and social, as in the ? of how the Right felt that' Cambodian type, are too im- case of Vietnam, there is a Richard Nixon had betrayed portent to be left to the goner- profound limitation upon what it. When he came to Washing-' als. guns can do. But the factors' ton, he said, Nixon was looked Consider the evidence. The that must thus mitigate, and. military men encouraged Ken- even overrule, the military upon as. a potential leader of nedy to move into Vietnam judgment are the ones which the Taft wing of the Republi= when a much wiser civilian, the Pentagon is least able to caYt t party, but he quickly sold namKenneth bassador ato Ind a, t told understand. Butour now the old Richard. ou Eastern establishment in 1952.1 Chiefs and the CIA proved%J' is step of his administration. But when the phone finally themselves ludicrously igno- As usual, he has depicted him- rang in the middle of the night rant of conditions. in Cuba self as a brave, idealistic lead- with the Cambodia crisis, the when they advised support of er who has refused the cheap President who answered it an invasion which was not and easy solution and who has was none other than the old only immoral, but stupid as recognized the terrible com= , Richard Nixon. The intemper- I well. In 1965 and 1966, it was plexities of our plight. ate, patriotically simplistic the optimistic report of the, That, I submit, is nonsense. and military-oriented leader, Nixon has accepted the pa- Pentagon on the early end to who responded to the events in the. war in Vietnam that tfiotic simplifications of those Southeast Asia was everything- caused Lyndon Johnson to un-1 same generals who have his old rightist friends might balance his budget by $10 bil-; caused so much tragedy, both' have wished him to be. national and international, : in I am, of course, appalled lion and start our current in-,I their q for Operatia-ltat, th i tl M e caaaapa ore aecen yr gn~! j~.,..,,; ;,.,t+-:il+t~awwt~b lul~rul ,1 the nation down that same slippery slope which all but of 1958 revealed that the man - . who had been entrusted fnr was 4 peace of the society alon ?awith ao =ghosuen. t of reach pow powerful th e r`-" - - ?""? ning mate he was, suddenly But I am particularly ly con- 1' seemed almost moderate. ect of ith one as d h p ere w corne In saying these things, I the problem: The difficulties, have no intention of demean- ; and dancers, confronting a ci- ... Yl After the {. ca Bay of Pigs fiasco, s fi a. of the military, but only their of ' ability to me decisins in Presi- wars which are increasingly how ~v hard it Kennedy was for a talked political in nature. .dent to reject the unanimous P The generals and the admi.' advice In of they, the Chiefs ', rals believe, of course, in force Staff. and admirals theory, the know h more generals ethan and violence. But, as the o r the chief executive about war. bombing of North Vietnam un- 'An Eisenhower could veto t Jam!! P 1 s im' ' their advice, as be did in~` then Vice President Nixon wanted to intervene with of -the ill`cehich in' Indoebina,'t but on because be ware Sw Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RD.P80=01601R000500070001-2 ' Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01681 RIYOS00070001-2. JFCzSON, MISs. NEWS E - 46,751 MAY 1 1970 'Castro Crows Fidel Castro is making a big .thing of what appears to be a Fminor infiltration of Cuban exiles from the United States. The Cuban dictator gave the funeral oration to undertake at this time anythingi, 1 for five of his soldiers said to have like the Bay of Pigs attack that] ..been killed in a battle with the gave President. Kennedy so bad a l j, invaders, in which two of the latter time. reportedly were killed and three It seems strange for Castro to f.captured. The funeral was held on make so much of what cannot be a, j.?the ninth anniversary of the Bay of -serious threat to his rule. The ex-{ .Pigs fiasco.. planation may lie in his reference] ,, _Tying President Nixon, the CI to reports that invaders would land and the Pentagon t6' -the recen to sabotage the sugar harvest. He*; A"invasion," Castro sought to build has called for the harvest of 10 ,it up to Bay of Pigs proportions. million tons of sugar this year to ,The latest intruders, he said, will give Cuba a record return in for-; ,Ieceive a defeat more humiliating eign exchange. But recent radio nd crushing than that of the Bay reports have indicated the goal of Pigs group. may not be reached. Stirring the Perhaps the CIA is involved to people up with charges of Yankee ,.?ome degree in the harassment. wickedness may get them out in lfiom time to time of Castro's reg-. the fields to . it the rest of the l t cane B u . ti. ime by exiles from Florida. As Coverup '` certainly President Nixon and the Pentagon have more than 'enough, problems in Southeast Asia, the. Middle East and elsewhere. It. would be against all logic for them Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0.1601 R000500070001-2 STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP asi~zt~W i $ 4 8 MAY 1970 Exiles Report Landing,on . Cuban Coast MIAMI (UPI)-The Miami- based Christi a n Nationalist Movement, a Cuban exile orga- nization, announced last night it had staged another landing of commandos on Cuba. There was no indication of how many, men participated in the raid. 'The group said the landing party was able to go inland in Cuba "without' niaking contact with the enemy." It also was disclosed that there was an attack on the Uru- guay-Cuban Cultural Institute in Montivedeo, but there were no details. The report came three weeks after another landing party from a Miami-based group, Alpha 66, went ashore on the eastern tip of Cuba on April 17, the ninth anni- versary of the Bay of Pigs inva- sion. The Castro regime reported 'there were only 13 men in that guerrilla force and that 4 were killed and" the other 9 captured. Alpha 66 has disputed the Castro claim Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 T4crr Tc~-IN L 'v2'S Approved For Release 20 3104: CIA-RDP80'-0160 A A/AV 4t I 'fine Years Later UO lv By PAUL BETHEL execution of terror- On April 17, nine years ago, 1,347 T da Cuba hosts hundreds of Amer- he would threaten - members of Cuban Assault Brigade 2506 y, landed at the Ba of Pis. But as ican radical youths and trains and ex fists under custody whose release is de- y Pigs. an estimated 10,000 Latin guerrillas manded in exchange for the life of a try they on saw the h eh horidimzon, outlines , the e ing trcdiircnis for r yearly. The return of U.S. youths is foreign diplomat. Most obscrvcrsofthe a .success had been withdrawn. Because attended by bombings, arson, campus Latin American scene (including a sur- Castro's air .force was not destroyed in disturbances, the unfolding of urban prising number of U.S. foreign service advance, they were subjected to vicious, guerrilla warfare in its many guises.; officers) believe that should this threat crippling air attacks. Nevertheless, In March, Abbic Hoffman, convicted be carried out just once-that would Brigade members fought well and in the "Chicago 7" trial, journeyed tof end the kidnappings. achieved most of their objectives, in- Puerto Rico while under bond and there' The Cuban-based African, Asian, Latin eluding the capture of Giron air strip' led a Castroite mob against the Uni-' American Solidarity Organization took on which Central American-based fighters versity of Puerto Rico-one girl shot,' a giant step forward in coordinating were to have been based. 553,000 damages, the ROTC facilities,, subversive activities for a continent-wide They fought well despite the fact? destroyed, school shut down. Push on April 7. The AALAPSO, as it that two of their transports had been i American and Western diplomats are is known, published what it calls a sunk by an air force which was supposed' kidnapped and murdered by Castroite. "Minimanual for the Urban Guerrilla." to have been destroyed on the ground. terrorists in Latin America. Castroite pamphlet's 20,006 words, written These transports carried radio equip- gangs held up 40 banks last year in The pamp by Carlos h et Brazilian C tten ment to alert the Cuban people and Brazil, getting away with $1.5 million be recently Marighcl cut da, a in a shoas ro- solicit recognition of the outside world. to finance their subversive activities, with police, carry the blueprint of future :The ships also contained rifles for de- Several apparently coordinated events. Communist-inspired guerrilla activities. ' fectors. which took place the first week of April The manual teaches how to pull off The World War II B-26s of the Free- demonstrate the growing strength of a successful kidnapping, proposes the dom Fighters were no match for Castro _Russian-Cuban subversion: + "physical liquidation" ? of government' ~.. jets, British Sea Furies and the more ? Count Karl von Sprcti, German . leaders and "attacks on imperialist enter- heavily armed B-26s. Stripped of tail' ambassador to Guatemala, was kid- prises" and holds up the cold-blooded guns to accommodate auxiliary gas tanks napped, then murdered by CastrosRevo- murder of U.S. Army Capt. Charles, needed for the flight from Central Amer- lutionary Armed Forces. ,Chandler as an example of the perfectly ica, the planes of the Freedom Fighters ? Castroite'Tupamaros" in Uruguay executed Castroite crime. were sitting ducks once Castro's planes pulled off the most audacious robbery, got on their tails. Their vulnerability in the history of that country, hitting:. The "Minimanual" is illustrated was another reason why Castro's air the Horacio Mailhos tobacco firm and": by pictures of how to make Molotov - force was to have been knocked out on fleeing with $250,000. (The same group ;. , cocktails, how to use guns, explo- ' the ground. kidnapped a banker and held him for i ?.; sives and the like to best advantage. '' . ransom.) 'The urban guerrilla's reason for Yet, of 48 sorties ofCast to existence, the basic, condition in carry out the e destruction n of Castro's An American vice consul ran his car over would-be abductors in Porto which he acts and subsists, is to .sir 0r ProciApnt Kennedy 'ner- .. .~ .. I ah-^t 99 4 daAaroc_ ~~~s PQOQQ ff ? A Venezuelan army patrol was am- A version of Marighcla's terrorist phil- Among the last messages sent out bushed and four soldiers killed. . osophy also appears in a recent issue by Brigade 2506 was this one: ? A Castroite guerrilla band in Co- of "Leviathan," a publication of the "To Base. Do you people realize lombia captured a village, executed its "Weatherman" faction of the Students, how desperate the situation is? Do you police chief and made oft with the for a Democratic Society, put out in back us, or quit? All we want is low entire police arsenal. San Francisco. jet cover and jet close support. Enemy Argentina intends to take extreme That same first week of April, a high- has this support. I need it badly or measures to stop the kidnapping ofdiplo- level functionary in Bolivia's Ministry' cannot survive. Please don't desert us. mats. Gen. Julio Alsogaray had this.. of Interior confirmed reports that leaders Out of bazooka and tank ammunition. will hit me at dawn." to say about the Von Spreti murder: of Castroite terrorist organizations from Tanks That self-inflicted defeat in 1961 rc-. "If there is a revolutionary. war' under 12 countries met in La Paz "to unfold mains an open wound for the United' way,.and it is,apparcnt from everything a continent-wide liberation movement." ~? States, and the Soviet lodgement in Cuba coming out of Havana that there is,: The countries marked for attack are: / remains one of our most serious foreign; then we must adop counterrevolutionary Argentina, Brazil. Bolivia, Colombia, policy ptoblcms. measures." - if the general has his way, Chile,. Guatemala, Ecuador, Mexico, Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 ao:, :nued STATINTL Approved For Rel1se?ll~' d'? GIA-RDP8 MAY 197n ,'The Secret Team and the Games 'he -Play was strikingly illustrated not 1 by L. Fletcher Prouty. the refusal of the Central lntelligencel Agency top"tovide witnesses for the- "The hill costumes of the Meo tribes- court-martial that was to try eight Green men contrasted with the civilian clothes Beret officers for murdering a suspected : of United States military men riding in North Vietnamese spy, thus forcing the open jeeps and carrying M-16 rifles and ,Army to drop the charges. pistols. These young Americans are The Secret Team consists of security- , mostly ex-Green Berets, hired on CIA cleared individuals in and out of govern- ment who receive secret intelligence data ' contract to advise and train Laotian troops." Those matter-of-fact, almost gathered Security Agency anCIA and the d the and who react ltotthose weary sentences, written late in, Feb- - ruary by T.D. Allman of The Washington data when it seems appropriate to them. Post after he and two other enterprising with paramilitary plans and activities,! correspondents left a guided tour and e.g., training and advising -a not ex-' walked 12 miles over some hills in Laos actly impenetrable euphemism for "lead-! ing into battle -Laotian troops. Mem-' to a secret base at Long Cheng, describe bersliip in the Team, granted on a "need a situation that today may seem com- to know" basis, varies with the nature monplace to anyone familiar with pr bl ti h d l f t o ems t an oca on o a the { the American operations overseas, but that come to its attention. At the heart of the b more than 10 years ago would have Team,of course, are a handful of top ex ex- be been unthinkable. kable. ecutives of the CIA and of the National To take a detachment of regular Security Council, most notably the chief troops, put its members into disguise, H d i f i li Whit v e ouse a ser on ore gn po cy. -,smuggle them out of the country so that neither the public nor the Congress Around them revolves a sort of inner knows they have left, and assign them to ring of Presidential staff members, State l clandestine duties on foreign soil under Department officials, civilians and mili- the command of a non-military agency lacy men from the Pentagon, and career -it is doubtful that anyone would have professionals in the intelligence services. dared to suggest taking such liberties And out beyond them is an extensive' and intricate network of government of- with the armed forces and 'foreign rela- lions of the United States, not to say ficials with responsibility for or expertise with the Constitution, to any President in some specific field that touches on, national security: think-tank analysts, up to and especially including Dwight D.. businessmen Eisenhower. Indeed, the most remark- who travel a lot or whose; businesses (e.g., import-export or operat-' able development in the management of,.ing a cargo airline) are useful, academic; Americas relations with other countries during the nine years since Mr. Eisen-' experts in this or that technical subject hower left office has been the assump-~ior geographic region, and, quite impor-I tantly, alumni of the intelligence . ser li f d on o more an more control over mili vice tary and diplomatic operations abroad -a service from which there are no unconditional resignations . by men whose activities are secret,. whose very iden-;' Thus the Secret Team is not a clan-; whose budget is secret , tities as often as not are secret-in short destine super-planning board or super- a Secret Team whose actions only those general staff but, even ,nre damaging to; the coherent conduct of foreign affairs, a implicated in them are in a position to monitor. How determinedly this secrecy bewildering collection of temporarily ! is preserved, even when preserving i; assembled action committees that' means denying the United States Armya respond pretty much ad hoc to specific ersonnel troubles in various parts of the world, the right to disci line its own p p -s?meamcs In Ways nal auprm[ethe . . -not to say the opportunity to do justice. -11 7 Approved For Release, 2001 /03/04 CIA-RDP80.01601 Rr000500070001-2 S_ TAT ITI NeM~(oric Review of BooXA _ Approved For Release 2O0?/03/O4': CIA-RDP80- Theatre of Delusion' The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks cessively revised ? to make it more plan for presentation to the UN con- (SALT) now reopening in Vienna may "practical" politically. In the process it tamed neither liberals, idealists, not best be seen as the latest in a series of also grew less magnanimous. It ended scientists. it was the earliest official fumbling attempts by mankind to pick. up looking-from Moscow's point of postwar collection of cold warriors: s up the pieces in the wake of Hiro- view-like a plan for domination of the John Hancock of Lehman Brothers; shima. A month after that first atomic world and the economy of the Soviet Ferdinand . Fberstadt, another Wall bomb dropped, Einstein said what is' ,Union by the United States, as Ache-'Street banker with strong military ties; still the last word of wisdom on the son now admits' in a section of his 'Fred Searls of Newmont Mining, 'a subject, though we are as far as ever newly published mejnoirs which has -concern of imperial dimensions and from applying it. To a UPI reporter escaped attention. world-wide cartel connections; and who tracked him down in a forest . Dean Acheson, then Under Secretary ;Herbert Bayard Swope, the journalist cabin near Lake Saranac, Einstein said of State, was chairman of a committee who had become Baruch's personal "the only salvation for civilization and !,{appointed by President Truman after public relations man. the human race" now lay in "the' the war to draw up?a plan for the 'The Baruch plan, as it became creation of a world government.' As international control 6f atomic energy. known when it was submitted to the long as sovereign states continue to 'This committee in turn' set up a UN, must have seemed to Moscow the - have separate - armaments and arms- 'consultative group oiscientists and big blueprint for a world capitalist super- ment secrets," he warned, "new world 'business executives under David E. state in which the US would retain its i wars will be inevitable."' Lilienthal and including J. Robert atomic monopoly behind the facade of 11 This idea, like so much-else in the Oppenheimer. The original sketch for a an international organization under US repetitive and frustrating history of the control. In Present at the Creation, struggle against the arms race in the world authority to take over all Acheson discloses publicly for the first ; last hundred years, was not new. It sources of uranium and to control all time that he felt the plan as trans. appeared at least as early as 1913, in a nuclear production facilities camp from 'formed by Baruch contained provisions novel by H. G. Wells, The World Set the Lilienthal group.. "almost certain to wreck any possibiil- Free. Wells predicted the splitting of This was at least twice revised before ity. ? of Russian acceptance" because.; the atom-by some stroke of luck or ? publication by. the Acheson committee. Moscow would see them "as an at- were intuitive genius placing the event in The others on his committee tempt to turn the United Nations into 1933, when it actually occurred. He General Leslie R. Groves, who headed an alliance to support a US threat of also. forecast, the use of nuclear energy the Manhattan Project which built the ..war against the USSR unless it ceased ?' in a world war so catastrophic it shook bomb; Dr. Vannevar Bush, who organ-- its efforts" to develop an atom bomb, Domed habits and led them to forma Dr. James B. Conant, then president of Even the earlier pre-Baruch version world government as their oply assur ` Harvard; and John J. McCloy, Assistant would have been hard to sell a ruler of ance henceforth of survival .2 Secretary of War under Henry 1: Stalin's ferocious suspicions and primi- ' For a fleeting moment since forgot- Stimson; Stimson recognized very early tive Marxist 'views. The Baruch plan ten, the dropping of the first bomb did. that the secret of the bomb would was enough to have frightened off even push the American government in the, soon vanish and had best be shared a gentle Menshevik. It would have, direction of world government. The?? while it might still be used to build a .eliminated the veto in the UN Security horjors of Hiroshima and then Naga= , more stable world.. - Council to assure, in Baruch's' words, saki, the realization of who[ a third. The main drawback in the original "swift and certain punishment" of any and nuclear world war would do- to' violator. It would have thrown the mankind, shocked American political Acheson-Lilienthal plan was that it war-torn and terribly weakened Soviet leaders and scientists into a project. asked the Soviet Union and all other Union open to Western inspection, and whose novelty and magnitude began to countries to hand over control of their at the tnercy of a US-led majority in be commensurate with the peril they uranium deposits and open themselves the Security Council. Baruch was no foresaw. But the Baruch-Lilienthal- ; to geological survey at once in return fool and he knew the Russians well. Acheson plan for the international for a promise at some unspecified His rhetoric in presenting the plan control of atomic energy they then future date to cease our own produc-matched the occasion. The choice, he presented to the United Nations tion of bombs and hand over their the thUN, e is "world secret to an international authority-if told peace or world proved to be the first of four lost ? destruction." But his draftsmanship opportunities since the war to bring Congress did not change its mind when, ensured a Russian Nyet. So the first the time came, opportunity was lost. the nuclear monster under control; the' The hedges not only became more SALT. talks represent Another chance., , onerous but began to seem deliberate in and I fear it too will be lost. n retrospect the failure transcends pitfalls by the time the plan was the personalities who took part. Man. The Baruch plan, as put forward in revised again by Bernard Baruch, kind just was not ready. The US was 1946, would have set up a kind of whom Truman named in'March, 1946, as US representative on the United not generous enough. The Soviet world supe fate for tbf ~ucle a C. Unfortunat ~~q tteEr t~- 96ti~~ sa~4'it{e /QC i~ .a ' M"Irme-~f the passed through three stages, in which The group Baruch chose to work with ro es ha ?n reversed, it is hard to4oatlau the orieinal idealistic impulse was auc- him in revising the Acheson-Lilienthal believe . that the Russian regime. self. D Approved For Release 2Q04/03/04 CIA-RDP80=0160 DES MONF.S, IOTA REGIS W* 2 1 1970 V - 246,841 S - 514.496 Firy Spee~h by Blames U.S. for.lnvaston+ II A V A N A, CUBA (REU- TERS) - Prime Minister Fidel Castro accused President Nixon Monday night of ordering the Pentagon to organize mercenary forces for new attacks on Cuba. He made the charge as Cu- ban troops continued to hunt c o u n t e r-revolutionary forces last Friday. Castro, In an angry speech ' .L_ gi ...1 f live soldiers at fun o slain in clashes with the in- vaders, warned that the new ter worse defeats than the Ill- fated Bay of Pigs Invasion In 1961. "Nixon has now assigned the Pentagon, sadly known for its crimes in the world, the organi- l ' spoke at the funera Castro which was nationally televised. The slain Cubans included an Army lieutenant, a. private and three members of a mountain militia unit from a small vil- lage on the eastern tip of the island. The five were killed in a clash Saturday evening follow, The landing came nine years to the day after the abortive Bay of Pigs landing in 1961 by Cu- ban exiles backed and equipped by the United States. No Indicatioy pp Castro still. refused to git}e an Indication of- the size of the in- army AR?15, A - and AR-18 automatic rifles. Earlier Monday, Alpha 66, a, militant anti-Cuban exile brgan- ization j claimed responsibility for the Friday landing. Start War A spokesman for the Miami- based group, which hag report- edly been =nvolved In several past raids on the communist island, said invading forces landed on Cuban shores in aril, effort to start a guerrilla. war In the same area where ?Cas- tro's own revolution began dur; Ing the 1950s. The landing party consisted of the same group of men who vading force, and revealed no new details', of the operations against them. to But his silence appeared I were forced to find refuge In. indicate that there had been no, zation and recruitment of mer- cenaries for new aggressive plans against our country," the. It was Castro's most vicious attack on the United States since early 1968. He claimed Observers speculate the merce-i naries are still being hunted in the heavily-wooded Sierra Bill Purial mountain range. So far the Invaders are re ported to have had two of their party killed and three captured. speaking. openly on radio and He described the landings as part of "Imperialistic plans" against Cuba. 'Spread Crime' The new invaders were "mer- cenaries who come from the country which spread . crime throughout the world," Castro of criminals composing' the Pentagon and the CIA" have they received in Vietnam and Laos," they will learn in Cuba, "Here they (the U.S.) will' have defeat more sbameial,'. more ereshing than they rap, celved at the Bay N,? It 4NN steel-helmeted troops and ml- litamen, armed with auto- early Januar4 '' at the UA1 matic weapons and backed by ' Guantanamo naval base in' helicopters,' fanning out to surround the guerrilla band. Castro was pictured during the broadcast at the headquar- ters of Mai. Raul Menendez Pomasevich, commander of Cuba's eastern army. Pomasew ich is directing the 'search and rreee.'deecrlbed N ? U.S. Cuba after a planned mill-j tration was thwarted by rough seas, the Miami News reported. Cant. Vicente Mendez, 39, who had led the unanccessful invasion in January, was re- portedly heading the latest operation. Reports 'also': indicated 'the raiders had been trained at 'a secret camp in the Florida Ew erglades? , r Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 13000500070001 -2 STATIN Approved For Release 203/04 : CIA-RDP80-01 7 APR 1970 WE WERE SITTING-my wife and I and two Cuban friends-in the office of the earnest black director of the new "Rosafe Signet" provincial artificial. insemination center south of Havana. The center is named after a mighty Canadian bull who died of overwork two years after reporting for duty. Wo. had been visiting with his numerous progeny, ad.... miring the shiny new French lab equipment, and we. were sipping warm Russian champagne and listening to the director's vision of a Cuba one day self?su(li? cient in meat and dairy products-thanks to Rosafe Signet, his heirs and the Revolution. Enormous cigars were passed around, and I was handed an aluminum ashtray inscribed, "Made from a U.S. plane shot down over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." "Weil," said one of our companions with a diplomatic' smile, "at least America has contributed something ? to our revolution...." Later, we were sitting amid the abstract paint. ings in the Casa de las Americas with the poet and editor, Roberto Retamar, who once taught at Yale. "U.S. policy has been vital to the success of our Revo. AFTER ELEVEN YEARS, CASTRO'S REVOLUTION. STILL LURCHES ALONG ON FAITH, H.OPEAND BLUFF. A SURPRISING .EYEWITNESS REPORT'. .BY LOOK'S EDITOR IN-:CHIEF,::..:..' WI 1fdli~d~Po'rW69099'2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-?1601R00050007000. 'uea STATINTL STERN GANG documents to Pearson's legman, Jack Anderson. Then all six of his disloyal employees signed af- fidavits against Dodd for Pearson. Pearson carried on a six months' vicious smear campaign against Dodd, charging Dodd with secret payoffs from lobbyists. The liberal press orchestrated Pearson's charges and published thundering editorials demanding that Dodd be impeached b the Senate U bl t ' h d na h Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160 WASHINGTON OBSERVER NEWSL&Z'r 1 April 1970 A strong independent ticket in Con- necticut this year would upset the old-line political parties in that state and probably capture a few elective offices, according to competent political observers. Due to political divisiveness and turmoil, there are more announced and unannounced candidates in Connecticut than ever before. Inflation, high taxes, racial turbulence, Vietnam War and an industrial complex hard hit by a flood of cheap imports have finally come home to roost and created a back-wash against the controlling Democrat Party in this small but wealthy state and may set an election pattern for other New England states. Connecticut is known as a swing state due to Its large independent vote - 519,000 independent voters; the Democrats outnumber the Republicans by 475,000 to 400,000. Last year, the Democratic state administration "levied the largest tax increase in the state's his- tory - $539-million. The big tax boost created so much protest that the popular Democratic Cover- nor, John N. Dempsey, decided to not run for a third term. Added to the turmoil was the inability of the Democratic Mayors of Hartford and New Haven to cope with Negro riots and street crime. Lawyer-lobbyist John M. Bailey, long-time Democratic Connecticut machine boss, will manip- ulate the Senatorial and gubernatorial nominations 'at the Democratic state convention in June. Incum- bent Senator Thomas Dodd is an under-dog in a race for renomination, but he vows that if he gets the essential 20 per cent vote in the state conven. tion he will force the first senatorial primary in the state's history. Dodd, an ex-FBI agent and Federal prosecutor, as vice chairman of the State Internal Security Subcommittee, conducted a lengthly investigation of the State Department's role in helping Fidel Castro to come to power in Cuba and the setting up of a Communist bastion 90 miles offshore from Florida. Dodd, thereby incurred the everlasting wrath of the liberals, The State Department's security gumshoe men., purloined the Federal income tax returns of Sen.. ators Dodd and Eastland and the committee's chief counsel, Jay Sourwine and turned them over to the late Drew Pearson. Then Dodd's top aide, James Boyd became the recipient of emoluments e o w It l stan t e ? publicity pressure buildup, the reluctant Senators i censured Dodd in 1967. The Soviet garrison in the State Department ac- complished its mission. The Senate Internal Secur- ?ity Subcommittee is virtually immobilized. And the subversives in the State Department and CIA:' Capitol -Hill. - - ; Dodd's disloyal aide, Jim Boyd, awarded grants from the Stern family foundation, is busy concoct- ing new scandals against Conservative Members of Congress. Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario (D-Conn) who aspires to the Governor's chair r.or a seat in the U.S. Senate, will soon become the victim of a smear. Jack i Berson has written. four articles linking Daddario with the Mafia. Ile ` scandal will break When it will politically hurt, Daddario the most. The Shreveport Councilor says: "The Stern Family Fund was established by Edith Rosenwald Stern and her late husband, Edgar Stern. Edith is the daughter of old-line communist financier, Ju- lips Rosenwald, of Chicago. She is also a financial angel of Louisiana's highly controversial gover- t. nor, John McKeitheni. She is also a former sister- in-law of the communist spy, Alfred Stern, who fled behind the Iron Curtain after indictment in New York as a Soviet Spy. "The Stern Family Fund has managed to keep its tax exempt status despite its forays into po itics." Philip M. Stern was Deputy Assistant Secre- tory of State for Public Affairs at the time the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion debacle was planned, } and sat in on the planning conferences; his top ?1 aide was the Negro leftist, Carl T. Rowan, whom he later has appointed Director of the U.S. In- formation Agency. Philip Stern's uncle, Alfred Kaufman Stern, the indicted Soviet spy, who fled behind the Iron Curtain, has been in Cuba helping Castro train Negro revolutionist, espionage agents and saboteurs, according to intelligence reports." from the tax-exempt Stern Family Fund founda- tion. Boyd subverted five other Dodd employers to join him in a conspiracy to discredit their em-1 The tax-exempt Stern Can- with such cohorts plocr. They filched Dodd': office files at night as Jack Anderson and Jim Boyd, is now trying to Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 IBERTY LOW ID0WN STATINTL c `A April 1970 STATINTLI At Great Falls, a few miles above the Nation's capital, the Potomac is a nary shining ribbon of water twisting and winding between its palisades as seen from C` 20,000 feet. It is here that the great procession of mighty thundering jetliners begin their descent as they head toward National Airport. It is challenging to a pilot to keep in the narrow twisting corridor above the river, where he is require to remain because the thundering roar of his aircraft is unwelcome to the resident of the District of Columbia and Virginia on the land below. Apparently the resi- dents of Georgetown in the District of Columbia have more political influence, for as a result of their complaints pilots make sure that when they stray from over the _river, it is on- the Virginia side._ As the planes thunder over Langley, Va., pass- STATINTL engers look out upon'the roof of a.tremendous office complex, a massive white build- ing with two gigantic bean-shaped parking lot$,--the imposing headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.). Intelligence is generally thought of as a cloak and dagger hush-hush business, shrouded in mystery, and much is made of how secret the.C.I.A. operation is. But .the iceberg has a'big tip--the.. building in Langley, the recruiters on college cam- puses, and operations such as the U-2 overflights of Russia, and the Bay of Pigs V invasion of Cuba. ..Most people recognize the need of governments for'accurate intelligence, necessary for the protection of their nationals. Things that are really subject to question -by the layman are the concept of this operation being a world wide network, com- puterized, and mass-produced with a massive bureaucracy, and the quality and orien- tation of the personnel involved. Of course, the size of the budget to sustain all this should be a justifiable.. question for taxpayers. This is particularly import- ant as the budget of the C.I.A. is secret--even the Congressmen who vote the funds .are not supposed to know the amount of the agency's budget. The allotments are con- cealed in appropriations forother,agencies of government. If, however, the C.I.A. ..gets the reputed amount of $4 BILLION a year, and this amount can be hidden in the. budget, it would certainly cause taxpayers to wonder if the federal budget is not leakier than the New York City water system. One-thing is certain--anybody who recruits on college campuses should know what he -.:.....,.is-hiring---for the students who get honors these days are those. who please theirs Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 . STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03104: CIA-RD Approved For Release 2001/03/04'- ClA-RIP8d-01601 R000500070001 -2 Iu(~SiRATED Sy DAVID sTONE MAR~iN BY ANDREW 5ti. vwm%w& is still in doubt ?? . For seven years, our a.two invisible governments c! -;~?rGr`~ for control of the small, notion of Haiti. The outcome Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDPhThTh000500070001-2 GAINESVIt,LE, FLA. SUN E-21,nt38 S - 22,112 MAR 24 1910 Cuba and a a r Guatemala No two situations are ever quite alike, so the "lessons of history" are trick But th er 1966-68 (and several times. S earlier). y. e is But they-still exist as an urban it certain parallel between U.S. underground, strong- enough to actions in Guatemala and Cuba. kidnap the Guatemalan foreign .4 The United States tried to minister, the United States labor 'overthrow the Communist-led attache, and a p r o-m i n e n t. Guatemalan banker in the last:l governments in hn+1, "mans b y an invasion of exiles bankrolled 'by. the United States Central. In 1968 they killed two'S' .~ Intelligence Agency. The effort military attaches in January and succeeded in Guatemala in 1954 the U.S. ambassador iii August,,,;; and it failed in Cuba in 1969.9 right in the capital. { Cuba is more Communist than In Cuba the United States has it was in 1961, heavily subsidized no diplomats, but in Communist by Russia and its Communist countries where i does have, the allies. It got away with con- worst that happens to them is fiscating a billion dollars' worth an occasional "spontaneous of private property of Americans. demonstration" with broken win- Yet already it has largely lost d?ws. elsewhere in Latin America. It Is the fragmented "world Com- :is no longer regarded as much munist movement" ahead by hay- of a danger, by Latin American ing a costly weak sister like governments or by Washington. Castro's Cuba? Is the fragmented "free world" ahead because the Guatemala has had a bumpy United States once "saved from history since 1454f- vOry little communism".- a backward weak economic or social , progress, sister like Guatemala? It's hard :recurring violence, free elections to tell, but a r e a soli a b i e I which do not secm ,to settle much. hypothesis is that Cuba is a net The Communist gverrillas were? -,drain on world communism and- fighting in the ' mountaind '14 to. the X1.5. ` ~'-.': r'}"j- \ Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 iew weeks. rte Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0 SUN HERALD 22 Xer 1970 ' u G~s %: ~ 7 of 6ry IlXG of tbo Z=rfrs veral years of wait, AFTER se ing in the shadows, Ameri-. ca's Central Intelligence Amencv, may be fully operational again. This w k's incredible coup in Cam- bojia. which will have such far-reaching con- scquences throes h the entire Asian theatre, had the stamp of the C.I.A. at its most pro- fessional. of course. there will he no oM- el.d .ct.til on the C.I.A. rule. but it t%.oultil he naive in today's world to a,',Ime that prince Norodom Siha- snuk's overthrow was just a luck) a.Y;I:ni far the'L'nited States. Way hack in 1966. the agency was accused by some watchdog American Sen?,iors of supporting Camiiodian rclwls who opposed the Prince - an accusation that was widely trumpeted ahout South-East A.ia. where the C.I.A. is credited with having spies in every town and ? in cocry Government. It probably does. While the super-spy agency has made :rotccgttc n1islakes over the past 11) scars, it has also scored / Some brilliant successes and, under / the enthusiastic support of Presi- dent Nixon. C.I.A. director Rich- ard Nelms and his world-wide net- work of spies arc doubtless more owerful than ever. p Charges that they had meddled far too much in Asian politics eae?ed the C.I.A. men to lie low -xite time but it was obvious even to a reporter on a brie( visit to South-East Asia this month that Ike C.I.A. was -911119-116" again. / Transport and ppasssnget plods of Air America Inc., which N ran as a C.I.A.s i i a - n sidiary. are to be seen land. Laos and South Vietnam, and it Is enma na knowledge Ihd these aircraft are used 1* ntseS assts and wes/MU for SSIM$ From PETER M1CHELMORE in New York Ooa Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : ' CJA-!RDP80-0.1601 R00.050 k O01-2 CIA-RDP80-0 Approved For Release '~?4 U 2 2 MAR and' Sprds A,.\ 'machete fights or feudrinduceo am- In 1961, for instance, the Somozas ' LUIS America Writer cr . MOT nation of fire-water consumption Puerto Caoeza available to the CIA Ad- : as the jumping off point for the Nicaragua--Gen ersonal affronts nd 11iANAGUA . a . . , p t/astasio Somoza Dobayle, president Somoza has two types of oppo- exile invaders of Cuba at the Bay of and proprietor of Nicaragua, has 'Went. The most dangerous to him Pigs. As one who hates everything become by any standard the biq- personally but not to the regime Castro stands for, Somoza probably gest wheeler-dealer in Latin Ameri- are what are called the Sandinistas, I would have joined the United States ca. ? a limited number of hot-headed and Guatemala in the Bay of Pigs At 44, Somoza seems to operate. Marxist youths operating as urban venture for nothing. by the rule that what is good for robbers and rural guerrillas. He may have gotten some pay-off him is good for Nicaragua. By and Somoza's 'tough and dedicated s and he was allowed to keep all the large, he is right. Guardia have held the Sandinistas small arms ammunition that was Nicaragua is virtually a private well in check, although the rebels assembled at Puerto Cabeza to . estate of the Somoza family but the occasionally explode a bomb or back up the defeated invasion incumbent chief is smart enough to stage a gun battle. They would love force. The last of the weapons were spread things around so that almost ' to kill Somoza but his security is, to quietly removed from Nicaragua everybody has a piece of the action. put it conservatively, excellent. by the United States within the past It would be difficult to say what His other opposition is more pout-? two years. the Somoza family does not own or ' ical. than violent. The leading fig- These days, Tachito is deeply in- ,run. run. There is a small merchant . ures are Dr. Francisco Aguero, 51, ; valved in the hostile confrontation fleet, a national airline, a meat- of the Conservative party, and a between El Salvador and Honduras. ; packing plant, a cement factory; dissident Conservative, newspaper Tachito spends a lot of time on the sugar cane fields and estates-and publisher Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. telephone with President Osvaldo a newspaper. . The most significant thing about Lopez of Honduras, President Fidel `,Tachito"-as Somoza is known Aguero and Chamorro is that they Sanchez of El Salvador, Trejos in -inherited all this from his father, are prone to spend more time ver- : Costa Rica and Gen. Omar Torrijos Gen. Anastasio Somoza, who was bally attacking each other than In Panama. He says he does not assassinated. Young Anastasio be- they are Somoza. The President know President Julio Cesar Mendez came head of the clan when his , . finds' this vastly amusing. Montenegro of Guatemala. 'older brother, Luis, d'.ed a few It is unusual that Chamorro Is Before, during and after the years ago. swerving off to identify with the June-July war between El Salvador Tachito was well trained for the small Social Christian party since and Honduras, Somoza seems to job. He graduated from West Point his family has been for generations have acted responsibly. His intelli- m 1944 and earned a reputation as a a' rival of the Somoza-Sacasa group gence service, which is the best in hard-working student. He was a far and similarly leaders in the Con-. Central America'# detected signs late playboy ?Ramfis Trujillo. Old The real issue for any party in Tacho gave his son an allowance of Nicaragua is Somoza - and when only S5 a week while he was at . the. opposition can't agree on its West Point. He emerged a compe- anti-Somoza stance, Tachito really tent officer and a good chemical has no problem except his own con- engineer. stitution. This prohibits a president. Somoza is also an excellent pout- , from succeeding himself and Tachi-. cal engineer. After the death of a to's elected term is up in 1972. ganization of American States figure-head president, Rene Schick, He will not say what his plans are would not let him remain on Hondu- he won election as the Liberal par- but it is known that he is trvine to -1 Tan snit (if the good Salvadoran The Somozas have ruled Nicara- tution changed so he can be elected gua since the middle thirties and again or whether to run a figure- there is no broad national dissatis- . head Liberal candidate. faction with their stewardship. The average Nicaraguan can re- call no other leadership and by lo- cal standards has no special moti- vation for rocking the boat. In pure- ly relative terms, Nicaraguans are well enough off, and Somoza is careful not to squeeze them. Violent People Yet it really doesn't matter -much. Since Tachito is chief of the armed forces, the name of the next president of Nicaragua has little bearing on control of the country. Barring a coup or a revolution, neither of 'which appears likely now, the Liberals will win, in 1972 and Tachito will be in charge, one way or another. This is not to say that there is not With his tenure as secure as any dissent in Nicaragua nor that So- ? dictator's can be, Tachito is free to mores does not have enemies. Nic- work at what might be called araguans are a violent people; the ! statesmanship in Central American t [ tb- di 1zdflUnn ' Ztct homicide--main } ` . ? ? ; dung andpowerpolihca. cry from another dictator's son, the .' servative party. ' that the Salvadorans were ready to second highest ~ Ncagua An-r6un attack Honduras. Somoza tried to stop the attack by personal persua- sion with Sanchez, and he passed on the information to other powers, including the United States, so they army was successful) and would punish El Salvador with rough eco- sanctions. nomic But his soundest advice was that +? an' advance across the border would prevent any hope of peaceful settlement for years to come. He even implied that if Salvador had tol attack, it would be wise to make one quick strike and then back off. When Honduras asked for arms, } Somoza refused. But he did let it be STATI NTL known in Central ' American capi- tals that if the Salvadoran army got, i within 10 miles of his northern fron. 1 tier he woukj,pitch in to aid Hondu- ras. He anticipated he would have IA~~ 07000 -ontlnued Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160 i'T.'I 3FAC:1, FLA. SUN E S S - 15,507 MAR 2 0 1970 VU !flD Ira s The developments in Cambodia must, by necessity, raise that ques- on. To wit: Did the Central Intel- V ligence Agency, which has plenty of men in the field, FORESEE what might happen or did it PRODUCE the happenings? Quite likely, it did the latter, hop- ing to give Mr. Nixon a hand in the struggle in Vietnam for which he promised a solution while campaign- V k~~ . /t.~.o 0 0 ing without ever fulfilling that prom. Ise. The idea may have been -- on the ! part of the CIA - to get another na- tion involved in the battle against . , the Vietcong. The only trouble is that the scheme. is more apt to misfire. In the manner in which. the CIA sponsored "invasion" of Cuba mis- Cambodia too. What a catastrophe) . Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 STATINTL Approved;, For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80- BOSTON ADrISTR" 15 Nor 1970 kja%0029 kPW1110 for CIA.', i I1m Ned of Some' P ?o coon By WILLIAM TL'EIS Chief. Sunaey Advertiser 1re3hinFton Dureou? Wl'ASI IiNGTON - Is t h e public debate over the Central Intelligence Agency's military role in Laos jeopardizing Its primary information-gathering assignment In this big - still bad - workl? Has the time been reached when Senate and other critics of the Laotian Involvement should more carefully define their terns and targets? Sloss" somebody, Per AaPa .1~ t:wi~535 even The President, help clear confusion in the public mind about CIA operations. without compromising its vital tasks? Tbe' feeling In the Senate to- day Is that the big intelligence agency, created after World War 1 1110 Inv this Import. r and large se of t ? nction carelessly, p e r,h ape Inadv tenily damagetl. CIA director Richard Velma, a career official, has made staunch friends on Capitol Ilill by his candor and coopera- tion. Most lawmakers recognize that some clandestine opera- tions are necessary and that such operations don't remain secret it talked about. Rut. remembering the CIA. run Bay of Pigs fiasco In Cuba, those most concerned a r e determined to make sure the agency Is not misused., Finally, there appears to be some feeling that formal or In- formal limits or guidelines should be adopted In the :CIA- Laos debate. Senate Democratic l e a d e r Mike Mansfield, an Asian ex- pert long concerned about U. S. Involvement In Laos, is one who thinks "some terms ought to be defined.". 'r. The Foreign Relations corn-1t iepor{td y! faew! dispaW+u', , ? :i whi e grett parent mli l i t a r yin ope ational 11 assignment in Laos. "I have great faith in Dick, Helms," Mansfield said. "Not to ? criticise clandestine operations as such. It is We bad they are being undertaken In Leos. They represent a counter-effort, against counter-forces w h 19 h have stayed In Laos regardless of the Geneva Agreement." Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.). Committee member, said he had found helms and the CIA "completely candid." In the Senate that the civilian agency has been performing essentially a military task on orders of the National Security Council. Hebnc briefed members ci' the Foreign Relations Commit- tee Friday In a closed session on CIA activities In Laos. Chair- man J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) told reporters that the use of CIA members In the U. S. foreign aid program In Laos was a long-standing policy established by the National Se- curity Council. Fulbrirht. speaking fog him- self, said the policy was laid down before Helms took office.: Sen. Jacob K. Javits (a-N.Y.)" said that Use Forelgn.Relations, committee has been "having trouble gcttting a e r t a I n In- formation." One thing that is "not acceptable," said the mar World' War It officer, Is Approved For, Release 20d'I'IMI C~0RDP80- Javils also said he felt that n~hre~. ground rules affecting CIA' activities sliould be disclosed except when the "paramount national Interest" Is involved. Mansfield points out that the North Vietnamese have long had forces In the northeastern areas of Laos, along the No Oil Minh trail, along which the Communists move troops and material into South Vietnam. And he notes. that because the U. S. has been bombing that area, both countries have In ef- fect been ignoring the 7+61 iiiiii Geneva Accord. What some senators do not, say, but what Is generally ac- cepted as fact, is that a small h o group of their colleagues w constitute a CIA "watchdog subcommittee have been in- formed all along about the agency's Laotian role. And the CIA's training ac- tivity _In the, struggle to -keep Approved For Relea~~~~1/ 3/041:: CIA-RDAWI '~?R000500070001-2 13 MAR 1970 fully sough >t probation _inga cams- originallyfro m- -dictatatshlp. Umeed to 'prison. the Central ?Intelligence\!' He now realizes, Comfr- C u ba ii Y Exile Sentenced ..iAgency. lot wrote the court, that he They said they learner] did his cause more harm the Information from Cor- than good, although he i Five L.A: B o i fi b 1119 S ??. nillot after his arrest and ompared his actions to said he also told them he ~, ~ was trained by the CIA t s those of American patriots A Cuban e x i l e who from Superior Judge Mai-.. use explosives when he :during the Revolutionary ' c l a i m e d to have been colm M. Lucas., was part of a military unit ? War. trained by the U.S. Cornillot did not explain ' preparing for the Bay of -:: The series of bombings government 'to combat' .,his statement, made In a ' Pigs Invasion. occurred during a 2-hour the Communist menace" letter to the court, that he ?. Denying that' he was a and 20-minute period July fanatical terrorist, Coi- JOGS, at the offices of was se tenced to prison was trained by the govern- "nillot said he participated :'.19, the Mexican National Tou- Thursdai for a term of ment. in the bombings only be-. rist Council, Shell Data one to five years. ' However, during t h e . cause he believed it to be Processing C e n t e r, Air Hector M. Cornillot, 31, County Grand Jury Inqui- his duty "to combat the ' France and Japan Air convicted for his part in enemies' of Cuba in "the Lines. five anti-Castro terrorist rY which led to his indict- United States." A codefendant, J u a n. bombings here in mid- ment, two FBI agents He said his basic crime:. 'Garcia-Cardenas, . 31, who 1963, said he thought he testified that the explo- was being overzealous In like Cornillot is from the was "striking a blow. for saves used, by Cornillot wanting to see his country .. M -i a m i area, previously. freedom.' He unsuccesa-? and others in the bomb ? free . from oppress on and was convicted and 'senw Approved For Release. 2001/0.3/04: CIA-RDP80-01801 R000500070001 .2 ,: CTA Z o provio Fqr Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RD ROCHFSTFR, N.Y. DEMOCRAT & CHRONICLE; U - 144,697 $ 221,661 . -MAR 13 1970 Cl Uris Some B'ui By 141ITE NAUER 1 that no one develops a defense t it fi ' The C e n t r a I Inteili-? ,U a country was able to de- Bence Agency and all of its so- veI an adquate defense tivities are absolutely essential against the nuclear bomb or ?S to the security and survival of missle, it would control the :4 the United States, says a for-, wm,M ? ' . 1 roar U. S. spy. The CIA has made its mis- I~ doomed it, overnight," Dan.,-: ,-: takes, Moore admitted, and . be doomed . said the Bay of Pigs debacle 1 J Tyler Moore, author, lecturer was the "classic." and former chief of the U.S.' counter-intelliegence service' Many of the reports the CIA in the Middle East, said yester- was receiving before the inva- day. ?, sion were negative, and the Moore was in Rochester yes- plan should have been 'terday to speak at an Ad Club .', scrapped, Moore said. "It was operation i luncheon in the Chamber of known never come off." Commerce. of these negative Moore said America's spy But many '?,, swept under the rmechanism' is far superior to reports wcre ?iay other nation's. "We are . rug by the ah gency,e said. t of the ' On the spy himself, Moore .~ res world in the spy ousu as, J"m - ~~- - - 1450 y~ can con- t ~ to as Ave are in industry and tech- . s ay t do your work. The spy o tto t l ! td to danger ges use. sn Asked sked if maybe the CIA .-.&- iii mine he never gets too powerful, and ante w ?F ...?- d to is the confusion of, lace shape foreign policy apart , from Congress and the White ??i'' leading a djobs ouble and having kto House, Moore said emphati- holding two tally, "No, absolutely not. ? : ? ? explain mysterious absences "The rigidly con.."? .and activities. "trolled t Ongress and the "The international spy is r' President. Congress knows , like a violent con man. The i what the CIA is doing, and can "?; : ?difference Is that the con man iL shut off the agency any time it }. never uses violence, while the I ? so wishes." I. spy uses it at the drop of a There is a distrust of the The co rater ease" a CIA because Americans not Hafy a ' know what it does, but n,ob- t' ? .,lds. ditty to d 7 the no i'- viously the secrecy is tutwsik.:. sary. It is hard to tell the U. S. `,~oM?` ~` ,' ','ia people what it Is doing without;. ? telling the rest of the world," boft is Ulu to wed .'Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDR80,01601 8000500070001-2 ..the world have intensified a i hundred fold since the advent of nuclear wep0? "Th? t "1 see no shortcomings in i'. our intelligence gathering sys- tem, but I do think some the publicity is disturbing the eration." he Said-OP"t a in setivites throughout -sm ", ,,..., -ess, tie added. -break in the pr IY such -as the _Gretn- ~. a story a V- when ?, ' see about the agency, rs . against The repte'only bear the neg- be continued., suit is that the Amer- STATINTL Approved For Releasj,g011LQ3J04 : CIA-RD DAILY hsi*b"3 1.1 MAR 1970 ? cept Cuba. Cables were rushed to a totally surprised Charles de Gaulle, the Queen of Eng- land and even Nikita S. Khrushchev, Mrs. Ken- nedy would accompany the President. The press corps left Washington In droves. Editorials thruout our country commented that, the Bay of Pigs fiasco having driven U.S. . ers three quar awful feeling to realize that there, exactly prestige so low, this was obviously the wrong down there- at this pinpoint place, the U. S. i moment for Mr. Kennedy to meet Khrushchev. debacle not only shattered our ancient Monroe They said all was sure to get worse as a re- Doctrine forever, it led directly to our combat suet, ands it did. But Include could they dream that horrors in Vietnam. -..A half .f-er the Aav of trapping the United States in Vietnam? Pigs, Russia had been so encouraged that she placed her troops and missiles in Cuba. This required President Kennedy to "confront" the U.S.S.R. He ordered the Cuban blockade, inex- plicably lifted it within less than 30 days and also inexplicably did not put the blockade back when the Soviet defaulted on the on-site in- spection he demanded. All over Latin America Castro's subversion rose like a black gas and within another year this was so damaging that President Kennedy was forced to make a trip and tell protesting leaders in the southern hemisphere that there was nothing he could do to help it. Six e l e c t e d Latin-American governments promptly fell, including Dr. Juan Bosch's Do- i minican Republic government, and the die was cast for the Dominican intervention require- meat President Johnson inherited. JAMES RESTON of the New York Times was, in Vienna. He states: "A few minutes after. President Kennedy left Khrushchev he told me that apparently Khrushchev had decided that .'anybody stupid enough to get involved in that situation (the Bay of Pigs) was immature, and .anybody who didn't see it thru was timid and, therefore, could be bullied!' Mr. Reston says President Kennedy then or- dered the first American combat troops (16,000) into Vietnam as a face-saving opera- tion to offset Khrushchev's opinion of him in his Bay of Pigs performance, even tho this violated all his repeated promises not to allow the United States to fight another Asian land war. All was quiet below the plane. The shore was; abandoned. There was only one small light,! very faint, at the far curve of the -Bahia de SUCH intimate' Kennedy'chroniclerd as Theo- Coehinos.? There were not: even hulks on the! 'dove C. Soren='. e that aftir'ehe Day of chain of shoals. But our great.Unlted States-or', ? a. l~e,tlyt stam!.:r~;~ f !debacl* Kssrmelgt. fW ' do tree world wW a>1W ap ?? ..u..a?r,r w?..n. w.a:,~c.r p.rv Ii+i..w:~wi.rW ~iMiivli ".. epw:?~,y(c.r?.a11wn?+w@ *wl n k Tay dr -/ Vietnam Ii I FLEW over the Bay of PIg something to distract our public's mind and recently in a flight across that the embarrassed President contrived for Cuba. There another of his- that purpose a glamorous trip abroad. tory's "if onlys" creeps 'in- The headlines would be about a glittering surely the most fateful, in- banquet at Versailles, a reception at Bucking- credibly fateful, "if only" in . ham Palace, a Vienna visit - everything ex- the history of the United States. Far below the plane waves were rolling onto th beach, carrying their bright mercury of the sea under a scudding It was an eerie and moon t Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03%04: CIA-RDP80 G== CITY 11L 4SSDAY 9 Mar 1970 rothrr/The U.S. started arming and train- d hi s U ' Matilyn Ikrgct' i was secrei:~ry of state an mg the Mco tribesmen as early as rl the (' the agency h..r1. IA ri l h 4 , d r e:u AUc:at ~c v a relatively free hand, and in Laos, it 1960. Yet it was the recent disclo.=.ure a) Di,l,nnalic Correspondent The popular image of the CIA epee- i did a lot mom thin gather intelligence that the U.S. was arming the Mens, alive usually tortes straight from the' and recruit local agents. tough tribesmen with a particular movies: a slightly soiled trench coat, a It was in 1957 that the agency grudge against the North Vietnamese, a in turned-up collar, sunglasses. But started exerting noticeable influence on . that helped trigger the current uproar Leos, at least, reality is apt n be the political affairs of that perennially,i against U.S. activities in Laos. Many . less James Bond and more aclea-cut unsettled country. In an effort to dis- i, of the 1,040 Americans admitted to be fellow in a es shirt. cl the apathy, dissension and lack of working in Laos scene reportedly are For years now, the Central Intell organization among the non- ,,with the tribal army. 0 nee Agency has played a covert role ` Communist Lao, the CIA apparently, The army is headed by Maj. Gen. in the twilight war of Laos. (Some call helped organize the Committee for the Vang Pao, a Laotian military come'. of National IntereastL `'hc . ?mander in northeastern Laos who' it a nonvrar in s a ndercovercover a roe: keeps his people in line by force o[ - t years the agency's under activity committee described itselt as a mass has been known, but its role has :patriotic organization, rather than a political party, which favored civil leadership and also by having one wile somewhat changed. service reforms and a "hard" liner for each of the four tribal areas. The In the more free-wheeling days, iagainst the Communist I' Lao. Meos have been successful in their there was the chance to set up strong- g . - battles beyond any expectation and . men. polarize political forces and even ; The C o m an u n i. s t s considered its have. become a significant .thorn in the. . fill up money bags to buy votes. But members "lackeys" to American inter side of Hanoi. It is believed that the' now, the CIA, through its agents in ests, and it appeared that the organiza-North Vietnamese have made elimina- . -their sport shirts, apparently is train-_~:tion's dependence on the CIA 'ulti- lion of Vang Pao and his tribesmen'. ing and equipping an army of 'Meo'..?mately lent some truth to that. ? one of the goals in their current Lao=it tribesmen. " The committee became the step Liar offensive. The fact that the asspies, or ladder for a future Laotian leader who , e CIA and how it grew in Laos is,. "tpy calal aledft in they arc lo, are are ,. was so closely tied to the CIA that he n ironic way, almost-a ttu r~' invol c governmeent nt linngo, was known to its agents as "our boy. , story which tuna from the error of tat mi in traixinc d or all a)e.'That leader was Phoumi Nosavan. trying to set up a western-type army that might bn expected to fat) then. . Phoumi was, by all reports, a patriot. with a military strong man in Phoumi . Pentagon, is not entirely sinister. . Ever.- ds who g Nosavan to the arming of a highly able since the signing of the Geneva accor i;: 1 country, but he was not above ) accept guerrilla warrior,. Vang Po. what is' in 106?, the U.S. has sought to main- ,'? in is Laos sow, one informed ?? rule the fiction that is a e gout? the'.?,.Phoumhuge sums from -a foreign i was so va able that theoCIA,'SO said,, s what. should have-been' ruler, and that means k keeppi ng , :. ~? is ,,; ,~.?a-L'iak . rigged the 1060 election in his favor.) In Vi! !~:.:~ , . _ ,-_. f P T our r h ithin t thi f c as ma ng o U.S. accuses Hanoi of being the first to' was some the American diplomatic community violate, could best tae restored i( ap- were observed... '. to Laos. The ambassador was never.. at least earances , p , Those within the government who; sure that -he was in charge of his own .. ' mission, and in many cases, was. sure i ew are ympathetic to that v are s dcenly concerned about the current;'.. that he was not. The CIA was forever congressional uproar over U.S. an ' ;-.......^ ___ ---- 4 .volvement in Laos. They say that con-i free-wheeled it, in the ,wordu of ono- ' gressional leaders, as well as tl?e informed source, ? And enginccrod a., members of {he Senate and House coup. And then another one six ith the CIAO months later i alin itt d I g w comm ees e . armed services and appropriations, Phoumi had be un to count o th g n e have known for years what was goings; CIA, which had chosen him over Sou . on in Laos. They say that the activity, vanna Phouma. But just when Phoumi was funneled through the CIA not to' really needed help, the CIA began feel- ., . / i.y i keep it secret from the" American; ing a clampdown ordered by President; ' people but rather to preserve the . Kennedy because of the Bay of Pigs ; necessary facade - for ' international; fiasco., In Laos, where Winthrop Brown diplomacy. ' ;was ambassador, the CIA was forced Of course, it was not -only for t}id to argue its cases through- channels.' sake of appearances that the CIA e- '.Qlficials say that .tlt reins have been` the job in the old days. In the Dullless `se.aU ore. whee om .John Foster.Dull"'. Approved For. Release 2001 /03/04: CIA-RD'P80-01.601 R000500070001-2 .!?:` v Approved For Release3/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601 March 1970 - ;rl ?' !- !~ r :~ t F ' hp{~I ' Ytt i^ 1 ~~ ~' r .y ~V V! R =.~ "' i ?:Yi'Z,'it:~ ,t. .. t,.k.~jK1i~~ ,1rIa~1"~t. ~~? + '.#~~-~ t '~yA1, "i1~1 ~3 ~} Y ' . "' :ti 6, c! `9) Cr t Blr n LfSV~c_ :yG '7i i" . d:, ./r~r~'1~ r~ ~~ r - u` x .* ~e"r-:i ' "' ?~ " + r ~ 1 ~1 a . . , ~ F .t - t. / - - . ..r l. em . .i" ..l_>.. tr M1`_:e~?~ir i~0'~/!sw'~w. R,~~b ~..r1.(i .' .~.. r.: s.: ~4..J 1,,?."Y~ i~+tf;1. ' .t,lv~_~7f:'.'~'Tr t.+r~i.. ?~"'++.~~C`~?.. wY y.. J i-..~' is .:.: bL V~ 1 -4:.~' 'V-+F~ ~~`+.N''y ~,.1`../- ~ .Nf1' N ~' N7 +~`Y ~~ ~ r M.~'9:~~-~,~i ":A-` Sy w ~.' ~-~~.....'2.?{.~~.:w~~7.1f;+'nT.i.-./.,'r..:r+w4....4hL~~.i1`?1~/,.*1~1r-x..T 4fs:fl'-._~.T.*"_~~:..~5 !_?rt '~-vL'n`~w^~~ Jl. ~./, - ~ .. 1`i~ ~. ~ .1;1T'''-''~`Z.-i yi:.~`'`'".. :'~ ~~~~~,,.-rr', ~~i'C~ "~r.+%s ? r .=,;,'' r~;~':-~ ",~?r"'i,v,,,'rr~..r'.'y~1?%:!~f""'w'~-...~C't'-... ?.?..yw~.-. ..: t ..~~~(l}"h tt2 at;.ti ~''n. 'e. rv ..n-- ~r ti`s,- _.._ A~ f+.?f?,?. w, r - ..~..~e.'.7.rro~ta.aeF~ti.~"fT. -~"T "'.', A ?i~ "~i "=+r .~.~.~ ...n'% ~C'c?r`'?~ ..r...~%- ?p (a.,,~ Y ?~. ~ lx. .1'\~?~'~ '~'r~w~~tf Sr." ' ~ em ~ ' ^ t ~ . n4 " "~C..... ~ l? ~ ~ f,;k^#~.w ...,..? R ? ?~.~~ ,!~ . "? `?U `: ? i:. _ d ?r?`/-?yC'?~S~ '`%`r-~ ..r .q.:~_ .a.~._.~:~.- `1. ?r ? -.a ,~ ~ M i MI's \r~?~. i /f." ? ~? /?'t? ~S"Y~J`-1~' A~- n Ltii i j+ wr 1A'?'.l` M'~ Pr f N...yi~~~.r~~ ~r?~ ~ b".'7.~ w~ ~l'' a."~`"`,~ -?C,?'It 7 ~Ti ".r* r..,.~~'s~, .?~v'rr W a a~.aV'S.."~"^-I?-~} {,? ~-wJ7.Y~.; ?\.,~ ,~1Fesyyy#~??.. .-v+Mt+rr/ .r.,~~"a{~`~'~`~+,~~"'~'~ ' +t~...t;.fr ~. ~ '.~ti~~ ?1'7'.5.-: 'M-y ? ,'j J'rU. pct y~:~~ {~i~,;{''?'?~ {~ .rf .,G,', - ~--? ; t r . i . ~. _....^..~ ..-.f ? ,I'!~ J... .. t~,k)G1 . L p r.'C R?~ '..?,,.{ i''~i J ;'`+fjs ' ' M ,Y.Y,, ?,~ 'R`?"' ' ~-.~~~ =y .1Z~ ~w~~.'v" i . < ~ ~..? 1 e~ ~ r r+w..:.- 4 "w"'~ ~ / V11. r?'-"kdin~'"~ - r C ? +..1. ...< t ?. .:~~ ?~~n~P'Y~.,'Sf~.ii?~s.I,rt kS ~t'rl '~'.,,n.^?~'?'A~~',~~ ~1 ._.~ J..---_r~/ i7/,~~!.~e ,'. ':~ triJ 4 ' ~..'"~ ~.C-i V..?! a,~ ~. ti'. Y-t+!sf'"?+? !..a j~ 9 .Y~y'~/, r'.!;'.f.`~r~i l ,~7t~ {~fri,,;h4.LGS- H.-: ~`C.~lawc~+L1 r'. "``.? . .~~"_.\ - 3o- "..i ' a . ~ w?I ^hi ti _, ~"i ~~~i ' ? .her !~r..:'r. "'' - ~ ;. ;/ ~%-. I ~t'l~`= + ?-i:,, - .,_ w~.r~'Mw, ?- ' = h gHIS IS THE "YEAR OF THE DECISIVE EFFORT" in Cuba. economically-as the effects of errors in planning, inadequate ~ , ,, . '4y+~~ti s F~ti p` f~ ~ - `",~"':'"'~.~ f'~ }-~``}~ ~!, ~ f .1~ ~ r''rA?=w..~~-,,~.^'jJ, i~',1v',~,?G(i.~ 'r."~+?Q,r.~ ~ ~"~~~`'?T.'.?J~CY rf""i h tl"^ ~e++sw.~'~ ~,, '" .,..^1/r~ `i f~4 ~a 4~ ~-.~ .~,~, .. s~_ '^'~."v`.ti7'`."i''.,V'i. .1 '?`7S~.. t ,/1... ~C'." r ? ~. _ ri+i?..?.r ~rRxi'..ftir'k?:`v t ?... '^;,? . ?- r. +,X' ' ' . 't "ti.- \_ ~ ~1-'i { ,~; , ~y~?+e~.~.? `~ r _ .C~~ ~'.~r fjca a-.ry~r r,n;ah~f~ ~1.,,.~ y"~ ten:. _~ y~ 1' -~+?~t5-~V ~+iTr.3~'~~.'-~". cG:~.l1."~'.rrL.~~.Yif~.~(AeM+^.ii3~l raY ~CV1"c. .~. .~~....~. h+~-_ ?~?~ '~ same discipline, with the same spirit of sacrifice" as ' economic embargo imposed by the United States had a cumu- the young men who attacked Fort Moncada in 1956 _ lative impact on production and consumption-the present to begin the rebellion against Batista. The country is mobilized, austerity, say government leaders, is planned. It is the result not for defense, but for the achievement of economic objectives, of the extraordinary and unprecedented rate of investment, 31 the most important'and immediate one being the ten million per cent of the Gross Material Product (GNP exclusive of ton sugar harvest in 1970 which Fidel has. called a "point of services), and of the use of scarce foreign exchange to buy the capability of the revolution." Manufacturing plants apparently have no serious shortage The island is austere. Rationing is tight and consumption of raw materials or spare parts or of technically trained restricted. Children receive one quart of milk a day, adults, ' ; personnel. This was the view of the administrators, technicians unless a medical diet requires it, none; a loaf of bread and one and production workers whom I interviewed in seven plants fourth to three-fourths of a pound each of rice and beans are (cement, textiles, agricultural equipment, paper, beer and honor for this revolution ... a yardstick by which to judge ;', capital goods rather than consumer goods. allotted to each adult per day. Meat, when available, is rationed , ? malt, copper mining and sugar) scattered over five of Cuba's to three-fourths of a pound per week, though seafood and provinces. (These were drawn from the sample of 21 plants . pizza, both new in the Cuban diet since the revolution, are where I had interviewed workers in 1962). All of the plants more easily obtained. Cucumbers and avocados, though not were working overtime and, their administrators claimed, at abundant, are apparently available in sufficient quantities to close to theoretical capacity. satisfy the Cuban diet. Other greens are rare, but Cubans, who In the Venezuela sugar production center, British technicians never ate them before, do not notice their absence now. were installing a new automated mill, bringing the number of Clothing is also rationed, and department stores display few mills there to four, and East Germans were putting in several items. Unlike the situation during my visit in 1962, however, new thermoelectric turbines of 3000 kilowatt capacity each, when the revolution was going through its worst period ? according to Agustin Hernandez, the center's young adntinis- by Maui( %Mfift 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R0QQAQ9A7Q14Qa; fit,,,, ,~ppr etl~ a01/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R0005006*0Ob~l'Y RAD10' TV V6 1 41 EAT 42110 BTROST. N6W YORK. N. Y. 10017. 607-5100 FOR MAN: Donny Melcher. M.N: Joel... MAN s Charles Culhane.':,. MAN t Raul Castores. MAN: Joe Steele. MANS Ronald Kuntz.. MN: John Strawberry. MAN: Anthony Palmieri.`' PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF February`;16,1970 9s00-10sQ0PM; ...O'Dell.. WOMAN: John Kettle. WOMAN: Harry Kenny. MAN: ...Russell. MAN: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) (EXPLOSIONS IN BACKGROUND) MAN: Ronald E. Robertson. son in Vietnam, the grief and the sadness, and the'feeling of being cheated would happen to anybody,; but there's no compensation, MAN: When somebody talks about justifying the death of a Approved For 2001/ OFPicao I @ NKW VOR 9 OE1 11011 ILO ANOKLMS 6 WOADMN OTON. n O. A FIfANO(ig NiM/ZIiQ~I~Q 7QIMOf-~~ Approved Fo REJ s~2D 01/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R0005000~Tu0011-- 970 ;Amin- -rV REPORT 11YC. 41 EAST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK. N.Y. 10017. 627-5100 PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF NET Journal STATINTL MAN: Donny Melchor.' MN: Joel... MAN: Charles Cuihane. MAN: `Raul Castores. MAN: Joe Steele. MAN: Ronald Kuntz.. MN: John Strawberry. MAN: Anthony Palmieri. MAN: ...Russell. Z N: ...O'Dell. WOMAN: John Kettle. WOMAN: Harry Kenny. MAN: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) (EXPLOSIONS IN BACKGROUND) MAN: Ronald E. Robertson. MAN: When somebody talks about justifying the death of a son in Vietnam, the grief and the sadness and the feeling of being cheated would happen to anybody,-but there's no compensation, F oFMCES Aooro ed 4 094DJ t&sA 4A'~~ 1~ ;, 1~ ~ ~-A~ '~~~oa J I A_1 1NllL_. Approved For Re1eas1ie20W#@30*V1C9T @0-01 12 February 1970 Conuni ssar o'f the Cold War tiluch that is,relevant has either been As is evident from his prose and his ' ' Present at the Creation: public behavior, Acheson is neither omitted or. summarily dismissed. invar- My Years in the State Department cold nor "unflappable. Beneath the, iably these are items that cast doubt by Dean Acheson. urbane elegance and 'the studied arro- on the wisdom of his judgment or the Norton, 798 pp., SI5.00 "gance there is an emotional man whose ineluctability of his decisions. "it temper has more than once got the could not have been otherwise" is the 'Ronald Steel better of him and who likes a good theme that runs through his account of 'Y hope that Mr. Acheson will write a fight even if he has to pick it himself.'. the far'ions White Paper on China, as book' explaining how he persuaded At several points he describes himself' well as of policies of such dubious himself to beliere that a gorernntent,.'.as a would-be schoolteacher, trying to; wisdom as the Truman Doctrine, the could be conducted without the sup- inform the ninnies in Congress and rearmament of Germany, the Japanese STATINTL ention in t h i d erv e n t .port of the people." elsewhere on the facts of political life; Peace treaty. an -Walter Lippmann But the more appropriate worst is Korea. That it could, perhaps should, Have been otherwise is apparently, politician. Acheson was never interest- ?The wish has now been granted. Seven- P a judgment that teen years after leaving the State ed in education. What he wanted was friromm~ these hese pages. . not of a have n t at Department. Dean Acheson has finally compliance, acceptance, surrender. Pro- '-unveiled his memoirs of those tumul-,Plc,,were stupid in so far as they the time. With customary modesty Acheson tuous.days.'He was wise to wait. The opposed him, and enlightened when- reminds us that he has a reputation for unhappy Truman Administration, em- ever they agreed. Like most other am- ..not suffering fools gladly." What he bellished by the passing of time and b> tious politicians, he gloried in the mean o tg ydoh not the-fading of memories, has taken on a n nipulation of men and institutions. stics, for he records few in- hitect or A young historical patina. The New Left is too to chief architect of American for- suffer oi iie a cons l Paper, the Berlin airlift, or the Korean son had a stormy tenure in the State temptuous of Congress for daring to War, and probably never even heard of 1)4artui. nt --owing, in no small part, what he d?nis executive hellig-' inf such as undeclared acts executive '.John Carter Vincent or Owen Latti- to hi. uw?n cnntenliousncs and infringe on w more. Cold War liberals hope that most crnr~?. Although .much abused . by prerogatives, war. He upbraids Senator Kenneth people have forgotten their role in the headline-hunting right=wing politicians Wherry for suggesting that perhaps Truman -Doctrine and the rearmament such as Nixon and Joseph McCarthy, Truman should have sought Congres- D Germany-two of the capstones of he also abused others and suffered;Trum authorization before sending 'Acher?'n's tenure as Secretary of. State.`front his inalnilityIto conceive that his to Korea, and cbe ores what he to And the Right, which once, bizarre as-might not t-- the ultimate wisdrini on troops kind o sulky it now seems. accused him of being. every issue. llis career in public life is,t troops ch"rheteried the last two poses of sympathetic to the .communists, has the story of a main who was too clever relations between the Senate Com- found new virtues in the, tart elder for himself, - whose intelligence was'' mitten on between Foreign Relations and the '. statesman who defends the Vietnam often self-destructive,' and whose arro? mittee Administration" other war and extols the misunderstood goose never allowed him to realize it, ? words, the Fulbrlght Committee's hear- governments of Rhodesia and '' South ings on the Vietnam war and the Africa. ? . This densely printed volume of near- 'hastily granted and isurely red the Acheson's apologia pro vita 'lira is a ly 1300 pages is a defense of those Tonkin Gulf Resolution. masterly defense of his roles as Assis- policies taken when Acheson, was a Among the numerous igdividuals toot Secretary of State from 1941-45, good deal more 'than merely resent who crossed his path and made his life Under Secretary from 1945.47. and at the creation of the post-war world. is curiously Secretary of State from 1949-53. lie The prose rolls on majestically and more a single troublesome. there to Richard M. does not in this book deal with the inexorably in a mighty tide of rccapit- not Nixon, who first showed his gift for -earlier years, covered with considerable ulations, explanations, character' phrase-making by referring to the then charm in his memoir Morning and sketches, put-downs of those who e of the "Oran of the Noon.' The son of an ' Episcopal disagreed or displeased, and self. . owar Secretary dly of CoSStattat of Communist the bishop, Acheson attended Groton, justifications. It is an impressive but Cinm dly"How egecurious that this t on- Yale, and Harvard Law School, and: not quite convincing achievement. otherwise seem s to retentive have ms slipped Achcson's. went to Washington in 1919 as law ' While' one does not expect the mem- sode clerk to Justice Brandeis. There he met ; oirs of public officials to be dispassion- t the mighty and the rich, joined the' ate, it is unfortunate that Acheson is Abroker in power. 'Acheson was influential law firm that is to day I not able to look back on that period fascinatee by its use. Like Truman, for known as'Covington and Burling, brief- with the objectivity gained from hind-' whom he expresses' so much admir- ly served as Under Secretary of the sight. Acheson not only knows what' anon', he exercised it with a pleasure !Treasury under Roosevelt.. established happened, but orchestrated the Cold. bordering on the obscene, He favored the contacts and polished the manner War empire during its formative years., the unconditional surrender of Japan that allowed him to circulate in the He is. singularly equipped to help putt decis- and never questioned Truman's t ' that dark pcnou into an oncs is ho-! ion to use the atomic bomb. When highest realms of finance and govern- ment. and returned to the Admirlistra-, ical perspective. But what he has Mosade nationalized the British- lion at the ou, t~rvr U,ft ?' ?~ ` 'Fall $ `16ioyE'oGlosblo?~@(I"J.211 at this point that his' present narrative, t mg css an The w o c't n begins. '''much false as it is selective a _ _ . ... COD S'ti]upd Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80 CH.. L0TTE, N.C. fEWS E - 65,014 FE B 9 1970 'Frotft` The Winston-Salem Journal POLICY BY POLL before the disastrous Bay of Pigs expedition`l into Cuba, he would have known no more than J be did before. 4 Those two big blunders in foreign policy did; not result from - a "communications gap" between the president and the people. More likely, they arose from the failure of presidents to consult the pick-and-shovel workers in the ', State and Defense Departments and Central ?~ Intelligence Agency. "A president," says the panel, "should be continuously aware of what the public thinks Poll-taking actually become a kind of and wants and worries about." A president American vice. Politicians in particular reach who Is so informed, the panel suggests, would for their polls the way a hypochondriac If there is one thing this country can do without it, it is another public opinion poll. And V there is' a second thing the country can do without, it is the kind of panel led by Arthur J. Goldberg that proposes a system of continuous national polling to. tell the President and his advisers what the people are thinking about .? foreign policy. stay "in tune" with the American people and ,avoid some of the mistakes our ? recent ;'presidents have made in foreign relations. reaches for his thermometer. Candidates forA public office read the polls before they dare I decide what they think. No wonder there is a Frankly, we doubt it. If President Johnson drought of leadership. 'had known what the American people were So we say, to ex-Ambassador Goldberg that thinking in 1964 at the time he was weighing his proposal is and by right ought to be a non his big gamble in Vietnam, It would have starter. And we will lend our support to any helped him not at all. And R President president who will give the order to ' rn the *eooedy- had taken every ,kind of poll In, 12U, pollcats cull" ,.?. .~.... --- .:_W ... ___.....a.u ~. -..,.+.e ?..i.,+' .,r../a.:r,~.rw4,.,?, r. r.1,+r?'7a`.,-L af? , Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 STATINTL Approved-F-or Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80- LA:+St ?, :!ICii. I JOURNAL E - FE EB, 6 38 1970 ~. S - s-1.576 Joint Chiefs of Staff Wrongly Blamed for `Bay of Pigs' Fiasco d-"? - were the older heads, the pro By BRIG. GEN. (RET.) S.L.A. Puerto Caliezas. On the Tours- r_-___,s a rou of reeariv-I g p e made scapegoats. They had "` " Military Affairs Analyst sion, Somoza brooded for hours tenure. They could take the about blocking it because he rap. So they were given direct Nine years ago this month I felt certain that the changes orders to keep t heir traps President John F. Kennedy ordered in the plan by Presi- - closed about the Bay of Pigs. launched a plan for the Inva- dent Kennedy doomed it to dis- sion and over- aster. He tried to call the Stories in the national jour- ,throw of Cas- White House and couldn't get , nals appeared stating flatly t r o 's Cuba. through. Then he decided not! what the JCS had advised, or e a--' aPnrOVed. or authorized. Per- What the vub- to Interfer? The ch n a g knows about IWA~ the moving forward of the air these writings with cleverly d the Bay of strikes. He figured this action ,dropped innuendos, hints an n:.... What nnbnrivy a paragraph lug to Castro. the JCS was not authorized tot has been writ- ., There is no reference to Sn- annrove or disapprove any. , is not false in Marshall ' 1 ings?onl the Bay of"Pigs ~Ac ; mend marginal changes. Most l fact or implication. Much in- tually, Somoza did not fear r of the time the JCS did not .formation which should have ' enough. There is no sound mill- know what was going on. The been disclosed has not. s the saddle and rid-i tart reason to believe that the *ardin . Maybe the JCS Onl n n e a y of log run. The j should be faulted for not buck-, cast is dead. 1 anyth ng in the m o s the ,Among those who survive, not whole scheme was abortive. It ing the system- As for a person .u in + facing ten years in Jail, that's] h ur tel recounted lacked sufficient str one as acc a y eng it. enough bomber power by more, :1 Somewhere there must exist' than half, the distance from 'the secret report by the four Puerto Cabezas being so far. distinguished gentlemen, of and not enough air crew by J whom two survive, purporting still greater discrepancy. Pi. to relate who was to blame and lots collapsed from sheer ex- in what degree. The report has haustion. never been made public. Were INSUFFICIENT SUPPORT it bared tomorrow, its contents would still mislead. The au- ; As for the brigade landing thors of the document worked force, Its strength might have under the premise that the survived to the point of a sensi- President's underlings may not ble withdrawal, with the aid of criticize him; the document is offshore bombardment a n d in effect a "Hamlet" without a c 1 o s e air support over the I melancholy Dane. beachhead, of which the ma- Having agreed to the inva- sion plan, the President would not retract his OK. Only he and one other could stop it, once it was in motion, and while his household guards might have talked him out of it, they were too spellbound to try. He was the President. The other man who could rooned invaders had neither. T he United States should have learned in its battle ` against North Korea that a lit- tle huffing and puffing doesn't bring anyone's house down, in particular that of a Communist military dictatorship in f u 11, swing. The expectation that') anti-Castro guerillas w o u 1 d spring to arms overnight and start marching was little short' have stopped it was President ' of lunatic. Luis Somoza of Nicaragua. He, ' The deciding councils were had the veto power right in his composed mainly of ndividu- mitt. No only the B-26 bombers , als inexperienced in warfare used in the air strikes but also and In amphibious operations, the brigade landing farce Was ; Yet the blame fell mainly on ka w hid, film ott kis'10o?. at, WN:4o10t 'Chiefs of; staff. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 :C'Ca4~ ' 'h rti COQ t. G~ r) r: n 0 0 is t -j ? :1 47 A r! -1 v^- ? ( rr 0 STAIN L a Richard Nixon Text of a telegram to Ripon's Seventh Anniversary Dinner Washington, D.C. ? . January 17, 1970 Approved For Release 200.1/03/04 CIA-RDP80- 1601 R000500070001-2 arguing its positions in a? vigorous and reasonable manner, the Rip- on Society has notably enriched our political dialogue. Its research on issues such as revenue sharing, welfare reform and the draft has made an important contribution to the evolution of national pol- ? t a time when man eo le fear tl many young p P t their ideas a cannot have an impact on American politics, the members of the Ripon Society have effectively proven otherwise. By thinking long and hard about public problems and by As you may. have noticed from time to time, your conclusions usually arouse opposition as well as support. But that is not a bad thing, for intellectual controversy is essential for social progress. Neither the Republican party -nor the American government can be effective in the 1970's unless they are vital and venturesome in- stitutions, always receptive to the new ways of looking at public problems. That is why the party and the government welcome Ripon's impatience with the tired approaches of the past and its readiness to explore ideas "whose time is coming." - I have followed with interest the impressive growth of the Ripon Society since I first met with a delegation of its members shortly after its founding. To all who gather tonight to hear my good friend, John Anderson, I extend my warm greetings. And I offer sincere congratulations and best wishes to the members of the Ripon Society as you celebrate your seventh anniversary. Approved For ReIes 1~' I, Kennedy Ridei' Hires IR ~ i~? Pins Leader. -- - _STATFNTL 9-R-RDP80-0 Z7 was quickly approved in #:n~'e no imparted area super n-'? , lE? chamber on tendents among their ,politically BERT a ALLEN 1 t t em R y p O an Motes almos . AND i Teddy's motion. aware constituents. 11 JOHN A. GOLDWITTH I It passed the House on the fol- Against this lobbying effort the WASHINGTON - One Of the! lowing day after Rep. Byron Ro- White House is mounting a fur- top leaders of the ill-fated Bay-of, g.^rs, Dl'PiCno., explsdned In Rep.' ions campaign of persuasion with;; -Pigs Invasion force has been put' Charles F. Wiggins, RUPICa1., thati respect to the veto. Newly return- O'dxt the , thanks of a S err Ric amc xhnent to tine bill w de? thednt GOP even House members report the mavericks, ussu y nc!ommitteeee thanks to some fast vise'! vto help the Senate with a ignored by the President's liaison, footwork by Sen. Edward .Ken ' l~ooldkc rirg" problcrr. team because they are knt-am to f'-n" ago and teak A job as .a! Ten days later President Nixon (?.,r?,,,,~?: ,,,,,.? s?av_ are being ooh :;1 ,A K clay, are aware of it, but Erneido Gently placed o n the Senate p a y - *a pr idea 0j" act of Con-1 roll t ..r0.L?~.prr~WW +aas~+~rY f: ^ b b Olv jo y ).gress? 1 Short-cuffing of this sort is not i ` 0'1%-, will work for 1h(unknown in the balls of Congress..) PSenate Judiciary subcommittee,During the routine Senate passage j r+otr Refugees and Escapees, which' of the hill Kennedy told acc'tit; 1 IV,,, Lad .a cantbraang Interest in GOP leader Robert P. Griffin, Abe nary emigres from Cdba who Mich., that the bill had been have settled in Miami and else- cleared by top Republicans on the Where in the United States. Teddy Judiciary Committee. Kennedy is the subcommittee; Sometimes such short-cutting chairman. has empleasant reverberations, R; Oliva was second In command. however. The very senior mom- of "Arigarle 2306," which trained i tiers of the Alw,nropti n'!kmns Ctrn? for the. 1961 Bay-of Pigs operation' "litter - Repnhlicnns and Dem? in Guatemala, 1k' was Inter one oc rii~-; - may ~xdt h ,mmr;cd, tot severnl co-authors, with news LORRIND D.AUITAKvRS ~- D man Haynes Johnson. of n 'book Lawmakers, returning from the '! - ahout the'msuccessful attfmlt to holidays at home - especially ' oust Fidel Castro. GOP House members - have been ;q 1 Ferdcral law prohibits the hir- thoroughly lobbied by home-ton, ing of allens by most federal ag- educators in preparation for the'. } encics including Congress. Over I. impending light over the $20 bit-. `. the years. general exceptions have, von appropriation bill for the Dep- (authorized most of then, to hire' artment of Health, Education and from many nationality groups,:; Welfare. t ]wt the Senate was barred from:,, That is the bill which contains t s'ring Oliva. a refugee from Can",", $1,1 billion in aid for schools and i'milnist Alba. .,colleges above and beyond Presi-..1 Last month, In the final days of" dent Nixon's buds:*. the last congressional session, it. i.Kennedy quietly asked the Senate Local lobbying for the uphill ,'appropriations Committee to put , fight to over-ride such a veto was a rider in one of Its final money.;' care1uly orchestrated here during burs to clear the way for Oliva. I the . congressional , recess. the' The committee refused, on chief coordinator was Charles Lee, (grounds that it should not further: a former Senate staff member, `complicate the situation by ieg? who heads the Emergency Conm- jislating for individuals mittee for Full Educational Fund- TEDDY UNDAUNTED - Un- ing deterred, Teddy executed a neat I", and his aides urged school., end run. In the early evening of superintendents, especially those Der. 19th, a few days before Con- who lvould get additional funds fill' gross quit for the holidays, Teddy heads of federally ' "impacted"'! -- in his capacity as Senate Lem- school systems,- to get together.;. Eorraiic ship - moved that the' .wit college presidents and meet, Senate approve a routine, last. Anintty. with their o'-n lawmakers'i minute bill "with an amendment.' during the holidays. The measure. cleared by the Jld?' over-riding a veto ? Is, as re-t 'scary Committee, designates this Gently noted by Senate Demo'ra- )month. Jan. 1970, as "National tic Leader Mike Mansfield, Mont..*. Blood Donor Month." "always difficult." The education The amendment, not explained lobby is quite a lobby, however. t In the routine Senate procedure, ; . bn aeted ' area meow how" p authorizes the payment of Oliva into most sdaol systems, and ' for, no more t o six rnan ,~ ?.dld???"#. Y~+6 ~ lea ' `I` 3 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 Inside Washington I'Al: , W. VA. WEST VIRGINIA*proved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016 E. 6,367 LPN231970 L One Man's Profil i e n Cou rage rHe' would have been a fit subject ger operation, Dr. for one of John F. Kennedy's "Pro- Donovan was author- tiles in Courage." ized by the Justice Department to 0r1 Dr. James B. Donovan who di to East Berlin to ex l d e the ore the posibil 4 s. other day in New York City took his ity of exchanging Dr. Abel for. Francis ;1 law career in his :hands when he agreed tr Gary Powers,. the U-2 pilot who had .i "as a public duty" to defend Col. Abel, been shot down. He was successful and.4 a Soviet spy.. . the exchange was made on a brid He was called " e . a Commi l" eover and It abused generally was also, Dr. Donovan who went, so that Chief Justice to Cuba and arranged the release fro an p Supreme Court-no man has under. , taken a more arduous and more ? self. itil Bay of Pigs invasion, of nearly- 11,000 .d sacrificing task." relatives of the survivors,. other. politi,;A c u~ a Pal 'Prisoners and of IRA A _ :___ _ m r amiliea detained on various: Donovan appealed Abel's conviction on Ychar ges i charge of conspiracy and the a' ' It 'efore the Supreme Court Ppesl Later on, he was elected president jt,'~ the board of education in 'New York importantly, when Abel had. been .'City ound guilty, Dr. Donovan asked, be. and was president of Pratt Inst-~~ ore sentence was tute at the time of his death at 53. passed, that possi? For his ility of future exchange of condemned work on the Abel-powers :l ,.exchange, he, w ..D . pies with the Soviet Union not be dis- tinguished as Intelligence awarded Medal' theby the warded by taking Abei'a life. He was anteneed to 30? years. cc..Agency, at the-.{ iMyeara.'later,;in a cloak` rection of President Kennedy. +., -._:and dag. In 'sum, quite a .man. s, STATINTL Approved For Release ?2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 AA-FfN1I for Releas;4b9QN37O4U ~CI 20 JAN 1,cj,7G' Dr. James Be Donovan, 53, Dies; Colonel Abel was found Ion Christmas Eve, 1962. of conspiracy in 1957, Between flying trips to Ha. uilt g y -and was sentenced to 30 years vana, the State Democratic rison and fined $3,000. But party nominated Dr. Donovan in p before sentence was passed. as its candidate for the Senate Dr. Donovan had asked that in 1962. To the despair of party President of Pratt lastitttfe the possibilities of future ex workers, Dr. Donovan cam 1j. change of condemned spieslpaigned like a man with more Soviet Union not be important things on his mind. 1 h th i e t EBdf Edtw x-oar oacaion by the taking of Senator Davits won by 975,000 votes . ~' l 51 phetic when, five years later,1flying trips through the spring Abel was returned to the Soviet; of 1963, holding all-night con- Dr. James Britt Donovan, the . Union in exchange for Mr.iversations with Premier Castro k ~"? that eventually brought the re- lawyer and educator who ar Powers. anged the trade of a Soviet When Dr. Donovan appasiledllease of a total of 9,700 Amer- e Colonel Abel's conviction be- !cans and Cubans from Cuban Colonel t Francis t r il 2 U h : o p - for t e Court in 1959 jails. Gary Powers and negotiated fore the Supreme the ransom of prisoners taken', > 3~r ` and lost, Chief Justice Earl Named Board President ~,, taw s a .Warren said: 1n December, 1963 the burly, by Cuba in the Bay of Pigs think I can say that in +.~ white-haired lawyer was elected invasion, died early yesterday. . my time on this court no man He was 53 years old. has undertaken a more arduous president of the Board of Edu- cation, He had been appointed E, more self-sacrificing task" In 1961 when a "reform" board who had been)) Dr. Donovan l Abe th : , e president of Pratt Institute The last chapter in was created by the State Legis- Dr since Jan. 1. 1968, entev- story was undertaken by .lature. h fe' e ,Methodist Hospital in Brooklyn Donovan in secret,at t He became involved in con- - last week for treatment of in- .quest of the United States Gov- f troversy from the day he be- ' . He suffered a heart ernment. After Mr. Powers's came resident. Civil rig' its attack attack at 2 A.M. Monday. His U-2 plane was shot down in president. - Dr. Donovan groups said that u th g er s his fa home was at 35 Prospect Park the Soviet Union, ...........wW ~. was not committed to Integra- At the chan e h g . e ex NewWest in Brooklyn. The New York Times gested t lion. He said he was committed, :?. For 16 years after his admis- Dr. James B. Donovan same time, Abel's wife was first, to education. Sion to the New York Bar, Dr. -pleading with Dr. Donovan to When the school system an- Donovan's successful legal prac- : Took His Son to Cuba secure., clemency for her hus- nounced preliminary plans for , racial imbalance, the t him well out of the band correcting isits to e ke l t l p f e v as e De On one of his As a result, the Justic limelight. But in 1957, his ap-, April, 1963, Dr. Dono- . program was severely criticized ointment as defense counsel Cuba, in ear-old son, partment authorized Dr. Dono- f anDr. Donovan, as president and atapu to Abel,.van took his ostensibly for the van to go to East Berlin to for Col. Rudolf Ivanovich Soviet spy, catapulted him John, along, "explore the situation." of the board, drew most of skin diving. the fire. "arito the public eye. What I needed was some- Cited by the C.I.A. The controversy grew hotter Between the Abel case and ? the when nearly 45 per cent of n said The story leading up to the cif 's school children stayed s the president of thing to make j b d h i a jo I s nova :Pratt , Dr. Donovan: trust me," cold and cloudy February ay home in a concerted boycott, oNegotiated the exchange of adding, "I was a little worried, l?in 1962 when the prisoners were exchanged is told in Dr. demonstrators chanted, "Dono- .Colonel Abel for Mr. Powers. but ota was worth to Dr. Donovan Donovch book. The sequel van must go!" alternating with Frederick Pryor, an Amen' months later, when ,Jim crow must alternating l and can student; after the release of ,Mr. povrers, . came some By raid-March of 1964 civil SWrote a book about the ex- President Kennedy called Colonel Abel, knowing of his rights d- shad joined in a perience called "Strangers on character of the negotiations lawyer's extensive collection of groups had joined in an f . How-Dr. DonovarVs a Bridge" (New York: Athene- "unique" Fordham University, illuminated manuscripts, sent effort to fps in conferring an honorary rd him two 16th-century legal removal resignation. 1964); re in 1962, used the word volumes, "with gratitude." ever, he replied that he had ? qan prisons ethe 163 release 163 I' e P to describe . For his work on the Abel- no intention of leaving and Cuban of 1,163 survivors "s sty) of negotiating powers exchange, Dr. Donovan e ritually the campaign died of the Bay of Pigs invasion, his style of beyond ietl His re-electin pres- d the was awarded the Distinguishe let was considered a vote tives of the diplomacy l 0 ` a re ntere f nearly 500 o, e 'survivors and other political Dr Donanovan as an snoops- Intelligence Medal by the Cen confidence by his fellow prisoners, and of 35 Americans p foal Intelligence Agency, at the( of me members. `and their families detained on lar figure, the defender of the, direction of President Kennedy., At Pratt, DX. Donovan, like various charges; highest ranking Soviet Intelle Several months after his suc? CRan an unsuccessful race in genre agent ever tried in the' ces5 with semi-official negotia.. so many of his fellow educators 1962 as a Democrat for the United States. Although he ' tions in the Soviet Union. Dr: in recent years, had to face was appointed to the task by by campus disruptions over black Senate seat of Jacob K. Davits, Donovan was asked by the students' demands and antiwar New York Republican; a committee of the Brooklyn' Cuban Families Committee for protests. VServed on the Dowrd of Ed* liar Association,o Dr. abusive Donova trign- ; the Liberation of Prisoners of At first he threatened War to argue their case with ' to have ? ucatlon , to which ho was ap- was hone subjcallsected t and letters -ad- arrested and expelled any stu- presldein 1961, first as vice p Premier Castro. In this case, dents who committed vandal- Dr. . eat and Donovan 's then approach press- dressed he had accepted lover.". however, the negotiations were ism or denied others access to dent dent. roach to assignment "as a public duty,", entirely unofficial. classes or incited nonstudents, 'these se assignments was unortho- and donated his $10,000 de-1 For months, Dr. Donovan to action. After the 400-member dox and highly personal. He fense fee to the law schools of Hshuttled betwen avana whereene Nsaid, "Castro, ew York an i faculty went on nrikeli to pro- f "once compared his brand o Fordham, Columbia , I and I talked about' everything l modified it. unofficial diplomacy to playing yard Uinive lties.~1_ - , under the sun; I found him a In recent months Dr. Dona .-poker. "You have know .&.V rather fascinating feP.ow." van had encouraged student and be willing g to ri sk a11. The visits continued during membership on Pratt 's admin.' the missile crisis of September- istrative council and had begun October, 1962, and by December discussions designed to lead to. fculty senate1 d n Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : C -I pBb=`~ m`0 8`0070602 Lawyer Arranged Spy Exchange ;:arrtfnucid Approved For Relei3 3$/$3/04 : CIA-RDP80 l.nATLY IM, 8- .1 ^ N 1970 James B. Donovan, president of Pratt Institute, former president of the city Board of Education and a colorful and renowned figure in international law, died early yesterday in M e t h o d i s t Hospital. :_._.........__ ...................... _-- _ -_ ?. Brooklyn. Donovan, who was 53 and lived at 35 Prospect Park West, gained national fame in 1962 when he set / up the, exchange of Col. Robert I. Abel, a convicted Russian spy, for U-2 pilot Gary Powers, who had been shot-down and imprisoned in Russia. He also arranged the ransom of 1,113 prisoners taken by Com- munist Cuba in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, in addition to the ransom of thousands of their rela- tives and other political prisoners. The Cause of Death g as in NO. In 1943, he entered the Navy as an ensign, serving as general counsel to the cloak-and-dagger Office of Strategic Services. By 1945, he had risen to the rank of commander. Donovan died of a heart attack, according to a member of his family. He was born in the Bronx, the son of a wealthy surgeon from an old New York family. After graduation from All Hallows. - -Qg I Harvard Law School, he began End comes in Br ooklyn practicin 1 spoken, even when angry debate erupted at public meetings of the Board of Education, but he some- times showed emotion with a stony stare and a flushed face. IIe an d' gere opponents at times At the Nazi Trials with trenchant remarks, as when During the Nurnberg trials of he said, in opposition to busing Nazi war criminals, he was an elementary students long dis- associate prosecutor in charge of tances for i t +. go n W r 1 is x ed to e expense of overly over school integration defend Col. Abel, who was other children in the system." and Donovan was attacked by accused of the capital crime of both sides ir, the argument. being the head of Soviet es ion- Ile Leaves the Board P Donovan is survived by his 'age in the U.S. Donovan agreed ' During school boycotts by mili- wife, the former Mary E. to take the case as a public tart integrationists in 1964 and McKenna to whom he was mar service. 1965, he accused boycott leaders ried in 1941; three -daughters, The Jury trial ended with con- of "cynically exploiting" children Mrs. Edward Amorosi, Mary viction and a 30-yea;Jr.,,- pson by keeping them out of school. Ellen and Clare - one son,,ohn J., sentence for Abel, who He left the school board in 1965 and two grandchildren. A Requi== eraded as, an-artist In the city because. he said, of pressures em Mara will "be , offered ate e Iur l year& ~Invarfably `w*s 1 Aom his ]qvy practiice. a.m. Thursday in St.. Patrick's,. .:..::' .. ~.~?., u0#!41-an amp ;preai~,.f thedral. to r visual evidence. l, ra ion. e re running a school board, not. a Becomes Schools Chief After the war, he returned to transportation board." , In 1961, Donovan was a his law office as a specialist in Ile summed up his public edu- to the PPoier- International International and insurance cases. cation policy this way: "It is our Board of Education, serv- was a senior partner In the sacred duty to provide every dis- ing as eta vice president until firm of Watters, Donovan, Dor- advantaged child the best educa- December 1963, when he became sey, Burke & Griffin at 161 Wil- tion possible in a free society, president. His tenure on the liam St. but we don't have the right to board was marked by heated con- In 1957, Donovan was appoint- accom ilish th' t th t Pratt, a four-year college in'' Brooklyn, on Jan. 1, 19G8. Ile, took a strong stand against stu-: dent agitators who refused to ne-; gotiate, declaring: "Destruction ? of property, inciting to riot and threats of physical harm are, crimes and will be treated as such." Five years later, Donovan' se-; cretly arranged the exchange, on a bridge in East Berlin. of Abel for Powers and Frederick L., Pryor, another 'U.S. prisoner. in Russia. The Spy Exchange Donovan began negotiations to free the Bay of Pigs. prisoners in- w? 1962 after his name as suggested to the Cuban Refugee Committee by Robert F. 'Kennedy, then at- torney general. A ransom of drugs and baby foods was agreed upon after months of negotiations with Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. Months later, Donovan again bargained with Castro, this time winning the release of 27 Ameri- cans held in Cuba for four Cubans jailed in the U.S. Donovan was New York Demo. cratic nominee for the U. S. Sen- ate, In 1962, but, because of his negotiations with Castro, he had. little time to campaign and he was easily defeated by. GOP in. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01 AiA 6Ivb0070001-2 Y;t.3 i;IAGWz4 STAR 19 JAN 1970 NEW YORK (AP) -James development of the atomic the United States, masquerad- B. Donovan, 53, the lawyer bomb. ing as an artist. who set up the trade of a Sovi. Mr. Donovan also had a The court-appointed Dono- et spy for U2 pilot. Francis thriving private lawv career, van made the point during his Gary Powers and arranged was president of Pratt Insti- defense that executing Abel the ransom of prisoners taken / tute and ran unsuccessfully for exchange American spies held by Cuba in the Bay of Pigs/ the U.S. Senate as a Democrat invasion, died early today. in Russia. He was a resident of P: ?:ok- . against Sen. Jacob K. Javits in Abel was sentenced to 30 lyn and died in Methodist iios- 1962 . ~ years in prison, but , five years pital there. A spokesman at Pratt Insti- later Mr. Donovan s prophecy tute said lie died of heart fail- was borne out when Abel was The spy trade and prisoner release negotiations in the ear- ure? used to win Powers' freedom Donovan's most cele- Powers' piloted U-2 spy hts of a ~Mr hli hi w 960 l . g g ere s y 1 I career in which Mr. Donovan brated case probably was that plane was downed over the So- Workd - crimes hish he defe the l ---- ---- -- - as .S .~oa on so :? a trials in Nuernberg and serv- et master spy, Col. Rudolph gave Premier Nikita Khrush- chev the pretext for scrapping i d l d un ? save ice with the U.S. Office of Sci- Abel, in 1957 an lty. The a summit meeting with Presi h and Develop. from the death pe tR g esearc ::. - ~?-- @n JAd3ES B. DONOVAN ment1 which supervised the Russian had lived for years, in. dent Dwight D. Eisenhower. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2 Approved For Release 2QS$icta `b :s i A-R 19 JAN1970 .Cutbacks Curb Role By Murrey Marder WmsbOriton Rat Stet! Writer STATINTL Isenvaclement Minister Andrei A. Gro- myko. "Henry" is Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser; "Anatoliy" is the Soviet Am- bassador in Washington, An- l''Liberal Misgivings, olicy would invoke' forei n , g p . such camaraderie. Within the administration, T1TI N1 It is hardly - that. First there are misgivings among names.are used only on in liberal Republicans about 1 frequent 'occasions, if cir President Nixon's tendency, cumstances allow the men. at times of high domestic". Among four of the central figures in the high drama of American-Soviet relations, it is sometimes "Bill and An- drei" or "Henry and Anato- Iiy" "Bill" is Secretary of State William P. Rogers and "Andrei" is Soviet Foreign At the outset of the Nixon administratlMi'; probably no Republican 'Ideologue could have Imagined that Nixon ture in private meetings. That only indicates that the., two contesting superpowers find It mutually 'advanta-' human equation in an age of computerized armageddon. There was a similar practice in the Johnson administra- ;tion. for dealing in realities now. Both nations are being squeezed by the same ines- capable pressures: The strain of the nuclear Age on their resources. ;; More Modest Goal The Nixon administration hopes to do in the 1970s what no President has ac- complished since World War II: withdraw from the dream of an America preserving order throughout the world, and turn instead to the pressure, to reach hack to the narrow conservative po- the launching pad for the presidency. His appeal to "the silent1 majority," the use of Cold War phraseology in his Nov. 3 speech on Vietnam, and Vice President Spiro T. Ag- new's gibes at the Eastern Liberal Establishment all. 1 nourish internal concern about whether the adminis- tration can be deflected' from its declared course of a 4 less-engaged foreign policy., If there should be "a bad turn" in United States at- tempts to, disengage from;+ Vietnam, or an unexpected challenge in the Middle East or elsewhere to American pride or honor, these Repub- insiders wonder if the lican Nixon administration would ' swerve to the right, and the more modest goal of ? at- ' more combative course of tempting to do only, what, policy that "the old Nixon" d t s . American popular opinion,' , represen military power and m9ney Officials -claim that no can afford. doctrinal differences divide This would represent A. policy-makers in the Nixon profound shift In foreign y? administration, that each of; policy. the principals is a "pragma President Nixon Is.relying increasingly on the advice ,.` ' ideas have evolved, it now is The four most important: clear that it is facing { men advising the President of hl; lot~gtlme'trtend' Wi111am P1, Roge sibuf ,, squarely that unromantic on foreign policy are Kissin? V"- limitation on foreign,policy:, get, Secretary Rogers, De- i'?" money. II fense Secretary Melvin R. A higher potential exists Laird, and one who was not in this Republican adrninis. very visible at the outset, tratinn in this era. it is(' Attnrnev. General John N. who in his - - c lai ed to - .. , --- --- -" ----------.. , abilities to assault; this way may be the most influ- money problem-including ential of all. political resources. These are joined, on all President Nixon's support-, major Issues by Richard C. .,ers assert that he cannot be. i Helms, director of the Cen seriously outflanked on the tral Intelligence Agency, .?4 ?' right, thanks to his earlier, , and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler;--v career of fervent. anti-com chairman;of the Joint Chiefs munism. "No one," `sal a ; of Staff, high official,", Is going\to'41 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: I FtQ _8,0-Q160, 050007700(1-2 Illy XC ;C JIL Approved For Release 2001/0,/:1&-RDP80-01601 Foreign Affairs: The Key to All the Trouble By C. L. SULZBERGER PARIS-Perhaps the most sig- nificant American foreign pol- icy failure over the past decade came neither in Vietnam ti or at the Bay of Pigs but in Laos. Had U.S. diplomacy plugged the Laotian sewer already being exploited by Communist guer- rillas ten years ago, the sordid drama that subsequently tor- tured external and internal U.S. relationships might have been avoided. i Laos is a noncountry carved .out by French colonial adminis-' trators and not a nation state with homogenous population or natural borders. Yet it is excep- tionally important as the main military highway from North to South Vietnam. As long ago as Sept. 30, 1959, Sir Robert Scott, then British High Commissioner for South- east Asia and later head of the Imperial Defense College, pointed out that it was "mili- tarily impossible for the North Vietnamese to invade South Vietnam across the frontier fixed between the two states" by the Geneva partition agree- ment five years earlier. Traditional Invasion Route }Jowever, he added: "The' tra- ditional Invasion route is south- Mrlyd through Laos and if that country were to' fall Vietnam mum but Washington sabotaged nam's warriors are still mardl>i! would be finished and Thailand the arrangement. By October, ing. ,; would rethink its policy. Ap-, 1960 the first Russians 'in his. Like virtually every impor. parently the Communist bloc" tory set foot on Laotian soil tant American foreign policy, (this was before the Sino-So- mistake the fault was biparti. viet split) "is trying to probe and Moscow swiftly mounted san since the original trouble in Laos to see how far it can on behalf of the Pathet Lao the . came when the Eisenhower Ad% go without touching off major fastest and most efficient for- ministration tipped the applt: reaction." sign aid program it had ever cart in 1957 and failed to Scott warned that if Com- attempted. aright it by 1960. On the other, munist Pathet Lao partisans,' When President Kennedy met, stand, the Kennedy Administra. supported by Hanoi, were not Khrushchev a few months after tion was naive in seeking as halted, the developing guerrilla his election, a conference had the basis for a "settlement" war "would be bound to last already started in Geneva to precisely what its adversaries is a minimum estimate." He However, the United States was Price of Misjudgment saw Laos as the key to South- seeking to close the barn door - east Asia's future and urged on a horse that had fled. The vital strategic lmpor4r, that while SEATO should warn Its policy was to arrange ' tance of primitive little Laom of open invasion, "the essen- Laotian "neutrality" but it was was insufficiently appreciated.: tial thing is to get U.N. into ,too late. Dean Rusk told me at Even in 1961-1962 it was worthi the act." Geneva, May 14, 1961: "We?pre- .trying to arrange de jure parti:j U t l 't 'on at would have extended fer a neutral Laos to a parti- diagonally' from northwest to tinned Laos We 't . won sign He added that although "in something that is clearly only . southeast to keep the loweff: the long run there is only one designed to gloss over a phony. trail out of Communist hinds!; outlet for future Chinese ex- If 'there is an agreement that We have 'paid for the mss- pansion and that is Russia- makes Laos genuinely neutral judgment. During the last &62 some day the Chinese must we will take. it." ade U.S. aid to Laos has tntalccf push into the Soviet prairie possibly $1.75 billion while all lands of Mongolia and Tur- A Bad Deal kinds of American paramilitary kestan-there is no evidence But the deal ultimately ac- .operations have been mounted yet in this part of the world of cepted, under the guise of de there. Nor can any valid settle- any rivalry between Russia and jure neutrality among leaders ment of the Vietnamese was, China." in the so-called Laotian Gov- ' -ever come until, as President Until 1957 a chance remained ernment, actually accepted ? a ? Nixon said on May 1.4, 1969, to establish a genuinely neutral de facto partition of the worst. Hanoi withdraws its troops Laotian Government to balance - sort, leaving in Communist from Laos, the "traditional in- off Western and Communist in- hands the entire Ho Chi Minh,* vasion route"- down which they, .Nuances at an acceptable mini- Trail down. which Worth Viet ' march into the South. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000500070001-2