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December 30, 1972
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STATINTL Approved For. Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80- DES MOINES, IOWA, REGISTER 0 E 3 O 137a M - 250,261 S - 515,710 New Man for CIA Only a few insiders have much basis for judging the work of the United S t a t e s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and they raroly talk. But there are a few hints along the way about the meaning of President Nixon's decision to name James R. Schlesinger CIA di- rector and make the present director. Richard Helms, ambassador to Iran. President Nixon has not been satisfied with the performance of the U.S. "in- telligence community." In late 19139 he cut CIA personnel abroad by 10 to 12 per cent. He ordered a study of the CIA and intelligence generally by James V Schlesinger, then a military and inter- national specialist in the White House Office of Management and Budget. and b7v K. W. Smith, a National Security Council aide. Their report. came out in May, 1971. it recommended puiling intelligence to- gether either by riving CIA Director Helms more authority over the five oth- er U.S. agencies beside the CIA that gather intelligence, or by setting up a now cabinet-level Department of In- telligence. In November, 1971. the White ` House ordered a reorgani-r.ation of intelligence activities to give Helms more leadership over the rival intelligence agencies in the State and Defense Departments, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Now the President pulls helms out and puts in one of the authors of the report - Schlesinger. One complaint that the President is said to have against the CIA under helms is that the CIA often has been realistic about Vietnam. hoc example, the CL\ didn't think bombing North Vietnam would be effective, or that it was effective after it started. Ousting Helms for being right is wrong. On the other hand, Senator J. William F.ulbright's Foreign Relations Com- mittee has been hassling the CIA for its private wars in Laos and Cambodia, which either violate U.S. law or come close to it. Ousting Helms for making war against the will of Congress would be proper - but it is clear Helms was only carrying out Nixon's policy there. James Schlesinger is an economist who spent 12 years in the RAND Corpo- ration. an Air Force think tank, then three years as a Nixon appointee in the ,Bureau of the Budget and the White House Office of Management and Bud-- et, then a year as Nixon's choice as chairman of the Atomic Energy Com- mission. His record in government is good, but he is a weapons man and a hardliner. ` Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 ti'iSHIiGiOI POST Chahneiftyro.90&F . Release 2000/09/& 6IAZI DP80-0 Helms, the Shah and the CIA THERE IS A CERTAIN irony in the fact that Richard klclns will go to Iran as the American ambassador 20 years after the agency he now heads organ- ized and directed the overthrow of the regime then in power in Teheran. The tale is worth recounting if only be- cause of the changes in two decades which have affected the Central Intel- ligence Agency as well as American foreign policy. Helms first went to work at the CIA Ili- 1947 and he came up to his present post as directorthrouoh what is gener- ally called the "department of dirty tricks." However, there is nothing on the public record to slow that lie per- sonally had a hand in the overthrow of the Communist backed and/or ori- ented regime of Premier Moh;:ni red Mossadegli in 1933. an action that re- turned the Shall to his throne. (';',c can only guess at the wry smile ti ,t must have come to the Shah's face when he first heard that President - i::on was proposing to solid the CIA's top man to be the American envoy. The Iranian affair, and a similar CIA action in Guatemala the following year, are looked upon by old hands at 1953: Teheran rioting iijat over. threw the (goccrnmen.t left the Unit. ed Stotes Point Pour office with gaping holes for tr:ndowcs and doors. the agency as high points of a sort in the Cold War years. David Wise and Thomas 13. Ross have toil the Iranian story in their hook, "The Invisible.Gov- Verni ent," and the CIA bo. s at the time, Allen Dulles, conceded in public after he left the goternn)ent that the United Stales had had a hand in what occurred. and the country was thrown into crisis. JIossade_;h "connived," as Wise and Ross put it, with Turich, Iran's Com- munist party, to bolster his hand. The British and Americans decided he had to go and picked Gen. hazo11 h Zanedi to replace him. The man who stage- managed the job on the spot was Ker- mit "Kim" Roosevelt (who also had a hand in some fancy goingrs-on in Egypt), grandson of T.R. and seventh cousin of F.D.R., and now a Washing- tonian in private business. Roosevelt managed to get to Teheran and set tit) underground headquarters. A chief aide was Brig. Gen. II. Norman Schwarzkopf, who, as head of the \"ew Jersey state police, had become famous during the Lindbergh baby kidnaping case. Schwarzkopf had reorganized the Shah's police force and he and Roose- velt joined in the 1953 operation. The Shah dismissed llossade,;h and named Zaheldi as Premier but Mossade;,h ar- rested the officer who hr.;ught the bad news. The Teheran streets filled with rioters and a scared Shall fled first to Baghdad and then to Lome. Dulles flew to Rome to confer with him. Roo- sevelt ordered the Shah's backers into the streets, the leftists were arrested by the army and the Shah returned in triumph. Mossade,h went to jail. In time a new international oil consor- tium took over Anglo-Irnian which operates to this day,thouh the Shall has squeezed more and more revenue from the Westerners. tivity, there were plenty of other suc- ces:-ful enterprises that fell short of changing government regimes. Today the CIA. humiliated by the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco it planned and ran, has withdrawn from such large scale af- fairs as tran, save for its continuing major role in the no longer ''secret war in Laos." The climate of today would not permit the United States to repeat the Iranian operation, or so one resident Nixon (who was Vice Presi- prise The climate of 1953, however, was very different and must he taken into account in any judgment. Moscow then was fishing in a great many troublctd waters and among them was Iran. It was probably true, as Allen Dulles said on that 1965 TV show, that "at no time has the CIA engaged in any political activity or any intelli- gence that was not approved at the highest level." It was all part of a deadly "game of nations." Richard Bis- sell, who ran the U-2 program and the Bay of Pigs, was asked on that TV show about the morality of CIA activi- ties. "I think," he replied, that "the morality of . . . shall we call it for short, cold war . , . is so infinitely eas- ier than the morality of almost any kind of hot war that I never encoun- tered this as a serious problem." PERHAPS the' philosophy of the Cold War years and the CIA role were best put by Dulles in a letter that he wrote me in 1961. Excerpts from his then forthcoming book had appeared o him it) Ilarper's and I had sueeested t book, "The Cof Intel- ]ligennh his " 1963 53 book, further revelations lie mint in- Dulles wrote i. published vv' after Craft lie a in both left t CIA Iran , elude in the hook. He wrote about ad- Dulles lie was making: "This includes and Guatemala it "became clear" that more on Iran and Guatemala and the a.Communist state was in the makin:. problems of policy in action when "support from outside was given to there begins to be evidence that a loyal anti-Communist elements." Ina country is slipping and Communist 1965 television documentary on take-over is threatened. We can't wait "The Science of Spyitn " Dulles said: for an engraved invitation to come and "Tile government of lIossadceli, if you give aid." recall history, was overthrown by the There is a story, too, that Winston action of the Shah. Now, that we en- Churchill was so pleased by the opera- couraged the Shah to take that action tion in Iran that he profcrred the I will not deny." Miles Copeland, an George Cross to Kim Roosevelt. But ex-CIA operative in Inc Middle Last, the CIA wouldn't let him accept the wrote in his book. "The Game of decoration. So Churchill commented to Nations." that the Iranian derrin-do Roosevelt: "I would be proud to have was called "Operation Ajax." lie cred- served tinder you" in such an opera- ited Roosevelt with "almost single- Lion. 'I?hat remark, Roosevelt is said to liandedly" calling the "pro-Shah forces! have. replied, was hotter than the deco Oil to the streets of Teheran" and so- ration. perv;sinO 'their riots so as to oust" Ilclms doubtless would be the last to T'OD.AY THE IRAN to which Ifelnts Will go alter he ieaves tiie CiA is a sta- ble, well armed avid well oil-finances., recirite under the S hali's coniinand IRAN IS NEX-l' DOUR to the Soviet which has mended its tencc?s With Mos- Union. In 1951 1Iosrade;;h, who con- Cow without hurling its close relation- fused V,'estertters w;th his habits of ship with w'a>a;in^lon. The t-iiah has Weeping in public' and running govern- taken full aciv:uua.:e of the changes in silent business from his bed, national- East-West relation : front the Cold % at- say so out loud but I can imagine his reflecting that. if it hadn't been for what 1.)ullcs. Kim I,ooseveit and the others did in I953, he would not have the chance to present his credentials to a Shah still on the peacock throne in 1973. . STATINTL I ed t h e eJ,)IitApp the raved;Fo iReleasea2,000~a5 iStl,.CIA.RDP80- cry. The west boycotted Iranian oil High prints of covert CIA Culd 1ti'ar ac- 113 Approved For Release 20001,ff/t11 CPA-RDP80-0 I r" . " > o Z e By TAMMY ARBUCKLE Star-News Special Correspondent 'VIENTIANE - Some Amer- icans killed in Indochina com- bat do rot appear in the U.S. Indochina death toll which stands at latest count at 45,915. These unacknowledged com- bat deaths are of American civilians performing military duties normally carried out by U.S. Air Force or Army per- sonnel. As they are civilians the U.S. military does not include them in the death tall when they are killed in action. For example, U.S. officials this weekend announced two t1 ~i L ' P kl C t \, engaged were hit by Commu- nist fire but none crashed. A third American adviser to the irregulars was killed during an operation which failed to retake the Plain of Jars in North Laos in September. Air America officials say about twenty of their Arleri- can crew members have been killed in Laos since March 1970. Air America is a private contractor to the Central Intel- ligence Agency and other U.S. government agencies and as air crew personnel are civil- ians. They are not carried on the military death toll. American military deaths: Air America engages in re- They said U.S. Air Force Capt. supply drops to irregulars of- -v , . r Osborne, Kan., was killed Sat- ~aireraft fire and in infiltration urday when his light observa- and exfiltration of irregular in- tion plane was shot clown by tellis;ence and c o in m a n d o small arms over the embattled tcaris behind enemy lines. An- .South Laos town of Saravane. ether company, Continental U.S. officials said a second Airlines, has lost some Ameri- American was lost over the can personnel in similar oper- plain of Jars area but were ations in Laos. unable to incientifv him u:itil American o f f i c i a 1 s say next of kin were notified. roughly 800 Americans were On Friday, Dec. 15, how- killed or aremissing in Laos at a town on the Sot th since 'Mn 1964 when the Unit- ever, ed . States first t shouldered a Laos' Bolovens Plateau called greater burden of the Laos .Paksong another kind of war. This figure includes all death occurred. John Kearns categories and is mostly mili- of Alvaredo, Tex., was listed tary. ? as killed by North Vietnamese The unheralded paramili- mortar shells which hit the tary deaths in Laos indicate a command post of the Lao ir- trend which may start to show regular unit lie was advising, in South Vietnam as American Killed at Saravane military wind down the war An embassy spokesman de- there and various private American civilian companies scribed Kearns as "American are poised to move in to take icpntract personnel attached to over paramilitary chores. n irregular Lao unit." Irregu- lar Lao units are handled by Deaths Unreported the Central Intelligence agen- . Increasing use of disguised - T'--_ : h rd was the mil American adviser to irre-m- paraitary organizations will jars kill--,d in action since Sep- allow the U.S. military to put tember. out figures of zero American Another A m e r i. can was casualties on the ground as killed when Lao irregultlr they > do now in Laos, as it will units launched a helibornc at- twing tack on Sa rmv?ule on Oct. ]'1. be "civilians" who are He was aboard age of eight killed, not U.S. military per- U.S. Air Force helicopters sonnel. which carried Lao irrc;uiars As in Laos most of these .into the S~uravane airstrip un- - '1'? .''I k , f ? mm cy or other U.S. government. agencies. The U.S. failure to announce a list of paramilitary deaths in Laos, however, is one of the few faults which mar these operations. in Laos, instead of having thousands of Americans as the Xenta,,on has poured into Guth Vietnam, the war is run just as effective if not more so by 5'00 to 600 Americans. Small Group Functions While Hanoi fields four, and in the dry season, five weak divisions of some 40,000 com- bat troops in Laos, the United States has only between 30 and 40 men on the ground at the most in combat areas through- out the country. In the past eight years an estimated 31 of these Ameri- cans been killed. This figure i n c l u d e s some technicians caught flatfooted onthe ground in 1963 at Phou Pathi, a supersecret installation in North Laos which the North Vietnamese overran. About GO Air America crew- men of American nationality are believed to have been killed in the same time period. The small number of Ameri- cans with the irregulars are essential to insure good Lao leadership and lack of corrup- tion. Poor leadership and non-payment of troops severe- ly weakened Royal Lao regu- lar forces throughout the war. It has been suggested, how- ever, that U.S. Embassy offi- cials should admit it when such Americans are killed in action instead o: trying to pre- tend they are "American per- sonnel in mana ement" as happened initially in the Kearns' case and these An;eri- can deaths should he included in military cap:ualty fiiiiires re- leased weekly in Saigon. . STATINTL der intense a car . lms . a 0"N" ic,ltl V~, R A.foLrc Rekease QQ0_15 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 Amc 1 i the helicopter touched down. and similar units contracted to Six of the.U.S. helicopters the Central Intelligence Agen- 2 0 DEC ~,~ ,TATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15: t"! ~./ `Y t.1[ Lai ti?? ,xL t,.i ill By Ft c'_:M:ef P.. Ward Despite press speculation a peace agreement for Vietnam may soon be con- cluded, there is concrete evidence indicating the U.S. Ls planning to prolong the conflict -and will attempt to subvert any peace ac- cords. U.S. procrastination in Paris, intensified .bombing and the huge shipments of arms to Saigon, among other developments, are all indicators that the White liouse has no desire for true peace hard has not abandoned its neo-colonial designs in Indochina. An even more ominous proof of U.S. intentions of maintaining its puppet regimes in Indochina, was the apparent effort by presidential envoy Henry Kissinger to press Saigon's "demands" in Paris at the end of November, which would have virtually scrapped the agreement reached in October by Kissincer and in Due Tho of the DRV. "Even as the U.S. military is packing up for its expected exit ' from. Vietnam, American officials here are secretly plan- ning a major postwar presence of U.S. civilians in Vietnam, with many of them doing jobs formerly done by the military ," wrote Fox Butterfield in a report from Saigon in the Nov. 27 New York Times. -Without. alluding to the delay in Paris, Butterfield noted that the U.S. is in the process of au;nicntln_ its "civilian ad:iscry force in Vietnam, from 50 CO to 10,;;0, its peak level at the stage of maximum U.S. mihhtary presence in Vietnam. But it should be apparent that this "advisory" apparatus could not be assembled overnight, anymore than the enormous flow of U.S. arms co-,;Id be brought to Saigon in a day. S aigo n's air force was increased t;:o-fold, from prox?i:nat.ely 1030 to 20130 aircraft during the past two r:ontLs, to give only one item of U.S. supply effort. To place recent developments in their proper pcrrpe:ctive, it must be noted that t; ere has tbeen it major shift in U.S. strategy art in motion lest spring in the wake of t e Io- au t oied offensive by the Liberation Armed Forces in S011111 Vietnam. Despite adrniinistration efforts to play down the strength of the offensive, it is evident that once ag ain the whole. U.S. strategy for victory in Vietnam was smashed. Only. the most drastic U.S. measures of the war prevented the complete collapse of the Sadron regime and its armed forces: the blockade of the DRV, the greatest aerial escalation against the DR\' and liberated areas of South Vietnam (while heavy bombing of Laos and Cambodia was sustained), and unprecedented aerial tac- tical and logistics support for the Saigon' forces. The au mentation of the U.S. air logistics : support for S::i on s forces during the of h eses put There have been various hypot for ~'c^rd in the Western press concerning to give surged irori a montiFly aver 1e o; about flint. million pounds o. cargo tore Kissinger's seeming about-face on b?hnif of < Saigon, after proclaiming in October before the ohensrve U.S. o 60 million pounds in.May. the world that "peace is at hand." Nearly Augmented U"support" for Saigon after f - ever possible explanation has been the offensive be an, raised total U.S. ex proposed by the pundits except the most pen itures on the war by an anneal rate of plausible one. The U.S stal,is[g in Paris does approximately '410 billion or nearly double ~t:x rate prior to the offensive. t t d f it S i erence no represen any e to s a gon _ puppets, but rather it is for the purposes of ire Nixon administration co;:ccnicd this augmentation by requesting additional war U.S. policy and the Saigon repimc is merely F an instrument. U.S. expressions of "su-,nort" fund'alg only for the period ending Se t. ,0. for Saigon's policies, now as :n the past, to At about the same time the administration the extent they are not fictions for deceising presented Congress with a request for these American opinion, are fundamentally ex funds in June, Air America and Continental presaions of the aims and designs of the U.S. Ait Ser.ices, the CIA coat ractual "civilian" airlines, began stepping up recruitir among Gain time Air Force personnel in Indochina, according toil Dec. I report of Dispatch News Service, In essence, An:cri`anprocrastination in by Jc;:n iwrFCc S. Ile quoted from a con Paris has been an effortt to gain time for augmenting Saigon's war machine and f,d'cntml recruirecruiting brochure which, am ono setting tip a huee clandestine ., network ,~ of points, stated: , "Clvll:atl advisors" which will attempt to C['LlGi`-5t[r!c virrY' ptb'.ongthe stru;,3le in Vietnam, as well as is c`ri- the rest of IA k F l~ l E r~aVe~ ~ ~it e e~s Oki 1 1-09 W e rcciaents have been reacted. govcrn;llcut, that is government ag:nc}?s U,Lk~j3 l;.% such as USO:vt, USAID, USIS, etc. While these agencies may be under CIA direction, you don't know and you don't care. The government agencies direct the routin^s and schcdutings, your company provides the teei:inical know-hew and you fly the air- P'aC. --- n The brochure makes it clear that "civilian frying" is merely a cover for clandestine military activity: "Although flights mainly serve U.S. offiical personnel movement and n a:.tive officials and civilians, you sometimes en gage in the movement of friendly troops, or of enemy captives; or in the transport. of cargo more potent than rice and beans! T er e's a war going . on. Use your imagination!" In what Burgess describes as a "hastily"added postrcipt, the brochure states: "Foreign aid situation unclear pending outcome military situation is RVN (Pci,uh'-ic of Vietnam), but it looks as if we'll fl:ieb t e war (and peace terms favorable for our side); if so, it is expected than a boom among contract operators will result.... " In ether words, here we have the first .concrete indication that the White House was impacitiy admitting defeat of its "Vieth tnimtion" program and reverting; to a less costly program of clandestine warfare. The U.S. str al c Sy shift was probably cqu?s'ly dicta: ed by a desire to further diminish the political impact Of the war on American c; -.,inn a=1 finally by a desire to diminish tree dowry to U.S. prestige is t e event of i ' -1:2-c f:.. that is the cell?sc of the }a;? st roll a. i""a U.S. is clearly trying to stave off this devetorment as long as pcssitle, but it also wants to avoid the impression of being engaged in di: ect and large-scale U.S. in- tcrvc:rtion at the time, which sooner or later Nixon and Kissinger must know is inevitable. Even if they cannot face this reality, they are now in deadly earnest about maintaining support for the puppet regimes, regardless of peace agreement. If the U.S. honestly any adhered to a peace agreement, Saigon's political collapse would quickly follow. That i why the U.S. is stepping up clandestine support for the Saigon regime, military aid disguised as civilian "contractual" aid, provided mainly by U.S, private military contractors. There is a relationship between the U.S. arrays build-up Indochina and the program fur secret contractual aid. Before the Oc- tober peace agreement, the U.S. made little effort to keep the program' secret. In tc timcny before ti:- Senate Appropriations (Cotr.nlittee on Se)t. 13,,Air Force 'laj. Gen. ?a;cpli it. I:eLuca explained in detail U.S. plans for contracting for personnel to train Saigon Air Force members. In the area of maintenance alone, the U.S. was planning to make contracts for a54 million of one to tar t}:erv:ords l' r ersonnel ac t p , TWASHINGTON' P ST STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/151 P80-01601 R00 Thailand Approves. U..: c uarters BANGKOK. Dec. 16 (UP])-I headquarters from Saigon to a Field Marshal Thanom Kitti- i remote base in Thailand only kachorn said today that lie has 60 miles from North Vietnam given the United States ap- when a cease-fire goes into ef- proval to move its military feet in Vietnam. Thanom confirmed the plan- ned move to isolated Nakorn Phanom Airbasc, 380 miles northeast of Bangkok. The base, which formerly -served as a major center for close air support of government and CIA-sponsored troops in Laos, was the jumping-off point for the unsuccessful commando (raid on North Vietnam's Son tay POW camp in 1970. It is the closest base to both Laos and North Vietnam, ly- in; about 60 miles from North, Vietnam at the closest point. Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 LOS L""-.L Approved For Release 20001P?/rk: q -RDP80-01601 R00ffPQ1i(.01-5 eds Shell C.I 's HQ at ..Long.Deng- The headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agen- cy in Laos at Long Cheng has come under Commu- 'nist artillery fire for the first.time since early Sep- tember, American officials said, Thursday.. The North Vietnamese shelling took place Tues- day night, the officials 'said. They said about 30 rounds , of long-range 130- ,mn). 'artillery and 10 r oup d s of shorter-range 85-mm.;_ artillery hit the western end of the airstrip and damaged several hous- es at the mountain base. , No casualties were re- .ported. Lopg Cheng, -about SO miles north of Vientiane, is headquarters. for the CIA:- sponsored t s e c r e t army" led by the Meo hill tribesmen's Maj. Gen. Vang- Pao. In addition to Vang Pao and his soldiers, at number of CIA advisers stay overnight at the base. Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 NJ\ STATINTL WASHINGTON 'STAR Approved For Release 2000/05/0:19 WftP80-01 By JOHN BURGESS Special to The Star-News BANGKOK - "The flying is non-mi]itary; in other words, `civilian flying. You are flying .for the U.S. government, that .is government agencies such as USOM, USAID, USIS, etc. ? While these agencies may be 'under CIA direction, you don't know and you don't care. The government agencies direct the routings and schedulings, your company provides the technical know-how and you fly the airplane." , Thus an unnamed American pilot describes "civilian flying" in Southeast Asia for Air America and the lesser known Continental Air Serv- ices -both private companies on contract to the U.S. govern- ?'ment. The pilot's comments are part of a confidential, 16-page brochure available at certain Air Force personnel of- fices. It is shown to Air Force ,.pilots interested in flying for one of the companies upon -completing their military serv- lee. The brochure lists no author ,or publisher, but it offers 'an : lltlminating view into the in- sternal operations of Air. Amer- .Ica, which lias played a cru- 'cial role in the Indochina war theater since the 1930s. Air ,.America, along with the other "companies, has airlifted troops, refugees, CIA agents, American politicians, war ma- terial, food and occasionally prisoners all over Southeast Asia. Extravagant Salaries The brochure, dated June 29, 1972, boasts that Air America ranked as one of the most profitable corporation in the United States in 1969, a year when most of the world's air- lines lost heavily. Air Ameri- ca's customer is the U.S. government. It employs about 436 pilot's, according to the pamphlet, of which 384 are working in Southeast Asia. The center of Air America's operation is Laos, where the presence of military or military-related personnel is prohibited by the thuch-abused Geneva Confer- ence of 1962. { Air America's profits are high despite the somewhat ex- travagant salaries it pays for flying personnel. According to the repo 4,a ppilot i 11 years ~PC 6~V i 1,o ff Ull-34D helicopter based . at Udorn air base in Thailand an average of 100 hours monthly, it hints at the subject of con- will take home $51,525. All sal- traband: aries are tax free. "Although flights mainly A newly hired pilot flyinga serve U.S. official personnel C-7 Caribou transport based in movement and native officials Vientiane, averaging 100 hours and civilians, you sometimes flying time monthly, would engage in the movement of earn a minimum $29,442. The friendly troops, or of enemy U.S. commercial pilot average captives; or in the transport of is $24,000. cargo much more potent than Also available to Air Ameri- rice and beans! There's a war ca personnel, in addition to a going on. Use your imagina- liberal expense account, is life tiont" and medical insurance, two- Air America works hand- weeks leave, tickets on other in-hand with the U.S. Air airlines at 20 percent normal Force. At Udorn air base in cost, PX and government Thailand, Air Force mechan- mailing privileges and educa- ics repair the airline's trans- tional allowances for depend- ports and helicopters, many of ents. Many Air America pilots them unmarked. The Air are retired military men re- Force has reportedly leased ceiving military pensions. giant C130 transports when the -`Good' Investment planes were needed for opera- Americans can also become tions in Laos. In the section on "air freight specialists", com- Air America's benefits, the monly called kickers. Their brochure lists in. addition to job is to push cargo out over normal home and sick leave: drop. zones. S a 1 a r y is "Military leave will be gx'ant- $1,600-$1,800 per month. Quali- ed appropriately" - an appar- ficat.ions: American' citizen- ent acknowledgement t h a t ship, air borne training, expe- there are military people rience with the U.S. Air Force working directly with Air America. Seattle First National 'Brink; director of General Insurance 'Co.; director of Boeing Co.;; director of Pacific Car Found- ry Co.; director of Nor:nern Pacific Railroad; director cf Stanford Research Institute. Arthur Berry Richardsall - foreign service officer in Rus- sia, China and England from '1914 to 1936; chairman of the b o a r d of Cheeseborough Ponds, Inc. from 1955 to 1961; director of United Hospital Fund, New York; trustee of Lenox Hill Hospital. James Barr Ames - law partner in Ropes & Gray, Bos- ton; director of Air Asia Co.., Ltd., director of International Student Association; member, Cambridge Civic Assoociationl and trustee of Mt. Auburn Hospital. preferred. One should not conclude, STATINTL Air America, Inc., is owned laries ex- t the th sa a however ,by a private aviation invest- citement, and tax advantages ment concern called the Pacif- mean that Air l.nicrlca pilots is Corp. Dunn and Brad- hope the war will continue. As street's investment directory the brochure's author notes in places its assets in the $10-$50 million category, and rates it typed postscript: "good" as an investment risk. "Foreign aid situation un- Air America itself employs al- clear pending outcome mili- tary situation in RVN (P~epub- together about 8,000 persons, lie of Vietnam), but it looks as ranking in size just below Na- if we'll finish the war (and tional Airlines and above most peace terms favorable for our of the smaller U.S. domestic airlines side); if so, it is expected that . a boom among contract opera- Formerly called Civil Air~tors will result when imple- Transport (CAT), Air America mented, due to inevitable re- was organized after World 'habilitation and reconstruction War II by General Claire 'aid in wartorn areas.... Job Chennault, commander of the market highly competitive and American fighter squadrons in ybu'll need all the help you Burma and China known as can get." the Flying Tigers. CAT played According to Pacific News a major role in post-war China Service, the following men sit supplying Nationalist troops. on the Air America board of CAT also supplied the French directors: during their phase of the war Samuel Randolph Walker - in Indochina. chairman of the board of Wm. Air America is commonly IC. Walker's Son, New York; considered an arm of the CIA. director of Equitable Life As- In Laos, the CIA for the past surance Society; member of 10 years or more has main- Federal City Council, Wash- tained an army of hill tribe- ington, D.C.; member of Ac- men, mainly Thai and Lao tion Council for Better Cities, mercenaries. Most of the air 'Urban America, Inc., and life supply and transport needs for trustee, Columbia University. this army have been handled William A. Reed - chair- by Air America. man of the.board of Simpson chairman of the Co Ti b ; er m . Relea ' t2b0 fl : CI7 DIRN4161 R.OOO600120001-5 Though the brochure oes Co,; director of Crown -Imp- not mention opium explicitly, son Timber Co.; director of Approved For Release ;'I J'72CIA-RDP80-01601 R ENEMY HITS HARD- "AT LAOS POSITIONS The New York 11mes/Dec. 12, Heavy Communist attacks were reported near Long Tieng (1). Laotians were driving eastward in the Dong Hene area (2). Start of Drive on Key Base Near Plain Is-indicated By MALCOLM P.I. BROWNE Special to The Neir York Times VIENTIANE, Laos, Dec. 11- Communist forces mounted heavy attacks on Laotian Gov- ernment positions near the for- ward base supporting opera- tions on the Plainc des Jarres over the weekend in what may be the start of a new drive to overrun the base. The attacks, which were be- lieved to have overrun two Government positions, in- creased .pressure on Long -k STATINTL A third position attacked and, believed overrun was only five) miles east southeast of Long Tieng, military informants here) said. Contact with the Govern-? ment unit there was lost and many of the defenders are be-j lieved to be missing. Long a Focus of Fighting In another action near the; plain, Communist commandos reportedly attempted to set off. explosive charges against do-; fenses at the eastern end of the Long.Tieng valley, but were repulsed. The Long Tieng base, which is supplied by air, is surround- ed by mountains in which strong Communist forces fre- quently operate. Military offi- cials here say the Communists could probably take the base any time they choose, provided they Were willing to pay a high cost in casualties. But a military source said today that the situation there was not regarded as "any worse than usual" and that the several thousand military de- pendents living at Long Tieng were apparently not seeking to leave. The Plaine des Jarres, a pla- teau surrounded by mountains, bas been fought over for more than a decade by Communist, neutralist and rightist forces, changing hand frequently. In official disatches it is frequently referred to as "stra- tegic," but there are increasing doubts among military observ- ers here as to its real strategic value. . "Obviously we would like to get it back if only because the refugees who left there when jhe Communists took over could like to go home," an American officer said. "It is important to the Moo tribes- men whose home is there. But in terms. of deciding the war in Laos the plain has long been overrated." In recent months General Vang Pao and his Moo troops have made several attempts to regain a toehold on the plain, but have been driven off each time. Drive in South Continues In southern Laos, Govern- ments forces were reported to- be 0 -O 1u 1 O alcently recaptured mar et own of Dong Hcne past, Muong Tieng, the Government's for-' .ward base in the mountains southwest of the Plaine des darres. The plain itself is occppied by strong North Vietnamese forces, and Long Tieng serves as a base for air operations and Government guerrilla at- tacks against the plain. The base, which lies in a rugged valley, is the headquarters of Gen. yang Pao and the irregp- lar Moo troops he commands. Laotian forces in the area are. supplied, advised and in some cases commanded by of- ficials of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Two of the positions believed Approved FortRelease 2000/0506: shelling and ground attacks Friday and Saturday were close to the southern tip of the plain. Phalane and toward the Ho Chil Minh Trail network bordering South Vietnam. The Vientiane troops were said to have recaptured a large cache of Communist mortar and rocket shells in a clash seven miles southeast of Mu- ong Phalane. Street fighting was reported continuing in Muong Phalane against North Vietnamese bunkers. Elsewhere, in southern Laos, 10 clashes or shelling attacks were reported around Sara- vane, which has changed hands a number of tines during the last month. Govern- ment troops have a precarious hold on the abandoned and shattered town, but Communist pressure remains intense, and a North . Vietnamese counter- thrust is expected. 0600120001-5 PHILADELPHIA, P They Want Out , Sow CIA militarization has PULY ET 6 proved For ~t 9,OO OS ?5 1"MA-B '80L01'60IRO t a o escape he the Lao eung. But the once E - 634,371 S - 701,743 OCG 1 0 1972 $GU and the war, return to prosperous Meo have been their villages and families, decimated by the CIA's mili- and grow rice. tary programs. ' The deterrent to escape was . The tens of 'thousands of un- the Royal Lao Army - 26 willing and unknowing tribes- years in the Royal Lao Army. men helicoptered up to the Military service is compul- Plain of Jars each dry season sory for all males of 15, though since 1968 have been cut to Irm La"o U1 if a 13-year-old is big enough pieces by communist guns and to hold a gun he will be drafted, shelling. N And once a soldier, the only Barely 10 percent of the Getiway out is bribery or serving .Meos survive in their tradi- until you're 40. Twenty-six tional mountain-top homes. As years in the Royal Lao Army their villages fell behind Com- G s ~ is risky at the very best odds. munist lines, they were bomb- T 66 A r in y recruiting teams - ed by the Americans. B JOAN EVERINGHAM reach even remote villages, Dispatch News Service Inter- ,/ Y getting in by helicopter where national Special to The Bulletin trucks won't go. Phou Dum, Laos - The twin antennae of a small U.S. communications transmitter sticks up from a lonely moun- It isn't hard to see why' those who had the chance opted for being an "American soldier" instead. "American tain top'10 miles northwest of- Army" pay begins at 12,500 the village of Luang Prabang in northern Laos. According to a `Thai civilian J employed by Air America (under contract to the CIA) to Maintain the installation, it provides the U.S. military with communications between Northern Laos and the U.S. air base at Udorn, Thailand. Pro-Communist Pathet Lao f .o r c e s control everything north and west of the moun- tain, beginning just a few hun- dred meters from the trans- mitter. Not 'Irregular' The 400 Lao Teung (moun- taln>Lao) "irregulars" at the lhttallation are among the 30,- 000 mountain villagers who form the backbone of the CIA's no longer secret army jh Laos, an army that is vir- tually independent of Laotian control. ? kip? per month ($15); Lao army at 4,500 per month ($5). Food too, I was assured, was far better and more plentiful, chiefly because the Americans deliver it them selves. Even big jars of local. firewater whisky are occa- sionally given out. In battle, SGU troops have access to superior weapons and a more reliable flow of ammunition than their broth- ers in the Lao army. Air sup- port comes faster and their wounded are evacuated more swiftly, said Lieutenant Ohn See, the company command- er. More Respect The Lao Teung speak of the "American bosses" with more respect than do the Meo SGUs with whom they share these highlands. . Before CIA militarization of, Officials refer to them as 1M"r'fl"rtet%t44 tribes, the "irregulars," but they are Meo had a firmly established f u l I t i rn e, highly trained s o c f a l-political structure Troops. The Special Guerilla which the CIA brushed aside. Units (SGU) are given credit But the Lao Teung were dis- l o r the Vientiane govern- organized and scattered; and Inent's not having lost control the CIA had no need 'to inter- of the whole country. Commu_ fore with their traditional h i s t forces occupy ' three- leadership. fourths of Laos. The Lao Teung's economic ' How did these mountain sol- position has always been well diers wind up in an American below that of the Meo. Their army? crops were less carefully ten- "Money," I was told over ded:and their livestock fewer. .and over again on a recent 'overnight visit to the moun- lain. (Chances of a journalist being given a lift aboard the -American helicopter that- ? serves the mountain are about .STATINTL nil. The ni>~~olrt~dtlFor Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 mountains t BALT1:,:v:S:. SUN 80-01601 V' 4'~J J. 0 id (:/ 3 Ci 4Y .t.,' t:l t/ i3 E/ G:~ perysion, though others ntay li- 'It is known, though. that the BY ARNOLA n, ISAACS have faded across the border. Sv.n?Staff Correspovident ,i bombing has been very heavy. IThn mal? m,ickiv t'esntned. altdl' r.. 110~ ,~~h .. ..._.,.a ......,.:,.,. Vientiane, Laos-The United so (lid American support, States role in the Indochina war may have diminished-but not, in Laos. war in Indochina and the ported. to have been 900 a day- No longer top secret but still North Vietnamese increased Iii-her rate than has ever partly concealed from public their commitment o, Alen and 1been reached over N has iet-. view, the American war effort I arms to the battles in South Want. in support of the Lao govern Vietnam, the Laos war tool; on In the ground war, American went remains as large as a pattern that tins remained Embassy officials, military at- ever. Without it, U.S. and Lao essentially unchanged ever tac}tes and Central Intelligence officials agree, the war against since. Agency personnel arc deeply the Pathet Lao and its North The U.S_ seeking to fill-,ode involved in war planning. ']'he 'Vietnamese allies would col- the flow of Communist troops U.S. Embassy spokesman in lapse not in months but possi- and supplies dot ?n the. Ito Chi Vientiane, gives a military bly in days. Minh trail complex in eastern ? "They might last a couple of Laos; stepped up its support of: briefing .for correspondents at weeks without us," said ' an ~ Lao government troops in re- 11.30 every morning. American officer with long ex- turn for diplomatic silence on The briefings are. quite' de-I perience in Laos. He. grinned, U.S. bombing of the trail. The tailed except on U.S. opera but he wasn't joking. A Lao l North Vietnamese in turn in- tions. 'I' hough the spokesman woouldl take askedv with continued But-! Communist eforces in north einl forlexoctet) amplejeheowiair ll'not strikes, side' aid for the Lao I rrny to Laos, committing thousar.-Is of whose planes: .were flying be able to defend itself, said; their own Wien to keep Lao them. seriously: "Eight or 10 years". government troops pinned All supplies In support of the govern- clown safely away from the 1 meat's war effort, the U.S. is approaches to the trail and On the ground, the U.S. fur- prov'iding direct niiliary aid of North Vietnam's border. nishes all the weapons, animu- ;+350 million a year. This is In the ensuing years. both nition and supplies for the about 10 times the whole Lao Washington and Hanoi at-! 56.000-man -Royal Lao Army national bud.-et, and almost 'I tempted to hide the degree of I -which, despite the, U.S. aid, twice the country's gross na-their involvement in Laos. The still is regarded as ' poorly tional product. North Vietnamese have never trained, badly-led and largely The aici totals do not include ]acknowledged the presence of i ineffective, except for defensive the cost. of American bonihill ;, their troops in the country- garrison duly. i which is mounted from outside now estimated to number The Alain American effort. Laos. Although t'.:e present ex- about 20.000. The Americans, has been with the irregular tent of bombing in Laos is not trough feeling their aid was' units, originally. ..'organized, known, fighter-bombers and 1justified by iNorlh Vietnam's trained, paid and in many B 52's have at times in the4 violation of the Geneva agree- cases directed by the CIA. The felt it ivou' I ! i arentl ular forces have grown to' a t , pp rreg past reached sortie rates over Inen y the embarrassing to intervene; 'bol't 3x1000 ? men and many] highest Laos exceeding the ever reached over North Viet. cans launched full-scale air most bombing of North Vict- nam was suspeneded. the sor- tie rate over Laos was re- openly while 1-lartoi continued Hof then] are only'ver;v loosely to deny its role. contr'olicd by the Lao military Warn. Though an effort as large as U.S. aid,to Laos began in the U. S war i^ Laos could not 1350's. During the confused the warfare preceding the Geneva really be kept. hidden, official Conference of 1362, the Amen- secrecy was maintained for a cans supplied nearly half a long time.. It was not until billion dollars for militar, sal- March, 1970, that President aries and equipment, adminis- Nixon publicly acknowledgd tering the military assistance! All,erican aircraft were bomb-I,a through a mission misleadingly i en aos,though be(c?Irfacts. had 'called the Pro ;rants E . 'lua- , tion Office and manned by . Few details military officers in civilian, ,,l t, It,,. t,nn,hinv is now 1oug command--a fact which is now! giving some concern to the government and to U.S. offi- cials looking ahead to a possi- ' ` ~TATI NTL regular units "just grew'"- partly he au~c many ?Anieli- i cans felt the IP yal Lao Army. was simply too inept to he illade into a capable fighting forces "Has etrdvcd" .. ,'. "The situatit>it' has e ohvecl, said , an ? Anu~rican officer; speaking of the formation of the irregular units. "and F.111 not sure our policy' has evolved along with it as it should ' have. ' Along with 'the irregular units. tile 1:.S. bay's and equips battalions of "volunteers". from Thailand. Almost every- thing; about the Thai units is classifled, because both (he Lao and 'Thai governments are sensitive oil the subject, There are said to? he about 12.000 Thai troops in the country now, almost double the' num- ber present a year 11"'0. Working with the Lao forces, according; to the U.S. Em- bassy, are 3^_0 U.S. advisers, which does not seem a large ntltnber but aclualty represents a far higher ratio of American advisers to local troops than his existed foi y~eari in South Vietnam. i It is not known how many Americans working for "the annex"--local slang for the CIA-are directly involved with military or paramilitary units. Between 300 and 400 Ameri- cans provide logistical support for Lao forces, mostly ' through Air America, the CIA-financed ,charter airline that flies troops houi d ? sut,r,,,es ,,., ~?,,,; ble cease-fire.: i an The origins of ' the irregular i i country. Air America's helicop- forces are still shrouded in '1ter's m1(1,..transport planes, secrecy, but the information some -of-them with the conlpa- available suggests that the; riy's insignia but most nu- Americans did not intend, in marked, can be seen at vir- the beginning, to create what I tually every airstrip in Laos. has become a parallel army. i The first. units apparently were; e the a tt d - d nd e , ?----- . mi clothes a-- , otlicially a "teclilliciai1S"-ail ouer,`ion are glade available. 'Tile'111m1-! guerrilla warfare against the! that foreshadowed later clan beg of missions each day, for llo` C1ui Minh trail-an activity ";. destine efforts. example, is not disclosed, nor 1 that might have ernbarrassedi \\'hen the Geneva Accords' are. weekly, monthly or eveni tilt, 1 ;lo novernmeut; ' which': banned foreign military aid. yearly totals. Presumably this has always regarded' the' war' the Americans conscientiously' is not for security reasons, , in Laster]] Laos as the affair withdrew 6G6 military advisers. since the Americans have for of the Americans and'. North Only 40' of the 10,000 North' years released fairly precise Vietnatese ' t' .. Laos awiy p' F uitc)-- Iftei n Wr s 11 ' E!' IQrf Dk~~80-0Ai6 80100600120001-5 American official sal he Ir- Itional Control Commis,ion su- and South Vietnam. NA'L IUn. Approved For Release 2000i0tPM: lC'1J t-RDP80-0160 THE POLITICS OF HEROIN' IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By-Alfred W. Mc- Coy, with Cathleen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams 11. Harper & Row. 464 pp. $10.95. nnUcF m. 3F ssr,' , r Mr. Russets teaches political Yale University. ably you in our less-enlightened days) contributed by failing to know or to care much about the more subtle conse- quences of that policy. As McCoy points out, there were around 20,000 addicts in the United States in 1946; the best estimates are that the figures then grew to about 57,000 in 1965, 315,000 in 1969, and Most Americans used to think that the costs of an interventionist foreign policy were low. For relatively small expendi- tures of foreign aid money, arms, or oc- casionally ? the presence of American troops, one could build bastions of the Free World all around the globe. Anti- Communist governments in the under- developed countries could he supported or created, and anti-Communist politi- cians subsidized. Indeed, as in the Shan states of Burma or the Indonesian islands, separatist forces could be encouraged- if the ruling government could not be overthrown, or at least persuaded to. move in desired directions. Some of these efforts might also bring enlightened gov- ernments and policies, to the countries in .question. Others would succeed at the cost of strengthening or imposing cor- rupt, oligarchic, reactionary govern- ments. Many others would fail, at the cost of death and misery for the peoples who lived in those distant countries. But the costs to the United States would be minimal, easily tolerated by the world's richest power: And those small costs to us seemed far preferable to living in a world of Communist or neutralist. nationalist states. Our innocence about the costs of an interventionist foreign policy has been lost in the wake of Indochina. Even if we could (as many still would) ignore the costs of our war to the wretched peoples of that area, we now have felt some substantial costs to ourselves. Fifty- six thousand young Americans dead, $200 billion spent, an economy and for- eign trade balance badly out of kilter, intense strains on our domestic, social and political system-these we now recognize as part of the price we pay. In this new book Alfred McCoy and his associates show us another cost, very possibly the grimmest of all, resulting from our addiction to interventionism: the heroin plague. 560,000 in 1971. The avalanche of ad- diction was made possible by an evil combination of supply and demand. De- mand means the ability of American drug consumers to pay high prices, social conditions feeding the desire for an es- cape, and the enthusiasm of pushers pre- pared to distribute free samples gener- ously. Under such circumstances the market will grow as fast as supply will permit. The supply comes from abroad: formerly from Turkey and Iran, now largely from Southeast Asia-60 to 70 per cent of the world's illicit opium from the "Golden Triangle" of Burma, Laos and Thailand. It is grown by peasants, shipped to the United States and dis- tributed by Corsican and Mafia under- world gangs, and moved from the peas- ants to the gangs with the assistance of such friendly Freedom Fighters as Gen. Phoumi Nosavan of Laos, and Ngo Dinh Diem and Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam. After enormous and carefully documented exposition McCoy finds that the United States: has acquired enormous power in the region. And it has used this power to create new nations where none existed, handpick prime ministers, topple governments, and crush revolu- tions. But U.S. officials in Southeast Asia have always tended to consider the opium traffic a quaint local custom and have generally turned a blind eye to official involvement. . . However, American involvement has gone far beyond coincidental complicity; em- bassies have covered up involvement by client governments,, CIA .contract airlines have carried opium, and in- dividual CIA agents have winked at the opium traffic. opium runners and their accomplices in Southeast Asia, that was just the. way it had to be. In any case, it usually 'seemed to -be the. citizens of the countries far away, not Americans, who paid the price of such alliances. Until 1970, for in- stance, opium grown in the Golden Tri- angle stayed almost entirely in South- east Asia for Southeast Asians. Only in that spring did the great flood of heroin to GIs in Vietnam begin, and only later still did it start to flow directly to the United States. And it was not until that time that senior officials in the U.S. Gov- ernment decided that the Southeast Asian heroin trade should be suppressed. McCoy and his 'colleagues show us, convincingly, that the heroin trade grew with the acquiescence and some- times with the assistance of men in our government. Without our government's history of single-minded anticommu- nism, and of meddling in the politics of foreign lands, our government and our people would now have a heroin prob- lem of much smaller proportions: Official American complicity in the drug trade has to stop. No matter. how much some cold-warrior leaders may like the foreign policy of a particular foreign govern- ment, if that government is condoning heroin traffic, American military and economic aid should be withdrawn. The STATINTL. This important book should not be interpreted as a piece of yellow journal- ism or ' as an expose of scandals in the CIA. It details none of the. classic sort of corruption for personal enrichment on the part of CIA men or of any other , U.S. Government officials (though there is plenty on the part of the locals). The Drug addiction has of course been corruption is of a more subtle sort, stem- a curse of men for many centuries, and ming from the enthusiasm of "good" men the United States has had thousands of for doing a good job. The job was de- heroin addicts since about sixty years fined as halting, communism; the choice ago. Neither the CIA nor Dean Rusk of means or of allies was not so im- nor Henry I:AM? e t r ~~d- rM910 `'Cet tAP n` 51601 R000600120001-5 diction. But s e ct , enthusiast for an interventionist foreign in Marseilles, the Mafia in Sicily, or policy (and that includes me and prob- FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS NEWSLETTE Dec 1972 THE INTELLIGENCE CO1M,UNITY: TIME FOR R VIEW? Approved For Release 2008/05/15: CIA-RDRPA0 -tR000 The intcllit;c ace community, and its budget, pose many a rrrrries such additional services of common concern as, Council determines can be more f Amcr-' the National Securit i y on o problcnrs of traditional concern to the Federat ican Scientists: governmental reform, morality, proper' . eiTcctively accomplished centrally; use of high technology, and defense expenditures. In the "perform such other functions and duties related to N a- last quarter century, intelligence agencies have prolifcr- tnreiligeirce affecting the national security as the ated. The United States has established an agency which tional Security Council may from tlmc to lima direct goes thcyoncl intelligence collection and, periodically, inter- (italics added) fcres in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology suited to the invasion of national and personal privacy has been developed apace. And the $4 to $6 billion being spent for intelligence might well be termed the largest ".unrcvicwcd" part of the defense budget. Twcnty-frvc years after the passage of the National Sc-' eurity Act of 1947, it sears a good time to consider the problems posed by these developments. . Of least concern in terms of its budget but of over-riding significance in its international political impact, is the Di- rectorate of III-iris of CIA, within which clandcstinc politi- cal operations are mounted. This is (lie issue discussed in dais newsletter.' More and more, informed observers qucs- tIon whether clandestine political operations ought to be continued on a "business. as usual" basis. In the absence of an investigation, a 'secret bureaucracy---which started in the Office of Strategic Services during a hot war and which grew in the CIA during a cold war-may simply continue to practice a questionable trade. Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs not only' abroad but at home, where they are encouraged only too easily. And is not interference in the affairs of other nations wrong? Two decades ago, as the cold war gained momentum, one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D.. I,asswcll. wrote a comprehensive and prophetic boo}:, "(?7arional Security and Individual Freedom." He warned of the "insidious menace" that a continuing'crisis might "undermine and eventually destroy free institutions." We would see, he predicted: 'pressure for defense expendi- tures, expansion and centralization of Government, with- holding of information, general=suspicion, an undermining of press and public opinion, a weakening, of political p4rtics, a decline of the Congress, and. of the courts. :Today, with the Cold War waning, it seems in order to, reexamine our institutions, goals and standards.. Which responses to the emergency of yesterday can we justify J today? ^ {} The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intcllircncc Agency and gave it overall responsibility for coordinating the intelligence activities of the several role-: vtint government departments and agencies interested in' Such matters. Today, a quarter century later, CIA is re ported to have a budget of about $700-million to $I billion and a stall of perhaps 18,000 people, or about 1,000 more than the Department of State! (This ad vantage in sic gives CIA an edg*_c in interdepartmental ptectings for which, for example, others may be too rushed fo (ally prepare or not be able to assign a suitable person.) These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intclligcnc collection but they are also used, to justify clandestine po litical operations. However, overthrowing governments secret wars, assassination, and fixing, elections are err tainly not done "for the benefit of the existing inteliit,cnc agencies" nor are they duties "related to inteiligcncc. Someday a court may rule that ,political activities are no authorized.' In any case, at the urging of Alien Dulles, the Nationa Security Council issued a nccret.ctrcctivc (NSC 10/2i ii 1948, authorizing such special operations of all kinds provided they were secret and small enough to be pausioi .deniable by the Government. Even this. authority has been exceeded since several irn possible-to-deny operation's have been undertaken: ti., U-2 flight, the flay of Pigs invasion, the Iranian Coup, ,It Laotian War, and so on. , The National Security Act: gave the CIA no "polio subpoena, law enforcement po\a?crs, or internal securit functions ..." But another secret Executive Branch docu fnent evidently did give the CIA authority to cnFa;;c i domestic operations related to its job. It was under t6d authority that such' organizations as foundations, cduca- 'tional organizations, and private voluntary groups were involved with the CIA at the time of the National Student J Association revelations (1966). ' Tbe. "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover for the "black" side. CiA supporters and officials invarianiy er.- phasize the intelligence, rather than the ? rttanifrur,.;;?:ln function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrase., tat gloss over it quietly. The public can easily accept the .ic- siiability of knowing as much as-possible. But its instincts oppose doing abroad what it would not tolerate at home. And it rightly fears that injustices committed abroad may begin to he tolerated at home: how many elections can be fixed abroad before we begin to try it here? The last election showed such a degeneration of traditional Ameri- can standards. The, present Director of Central, intelligence, Rici-hard Helms, is working hard and effectively at presenting; an image of CIA that will not, offend. In a recc it speech. he laid: "The same objectivity which makes us useful to o,rr government and our, country leaves us uncontfortabi;, aware of our ambiguous place in it..... We propose tc adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa." Even construed narrowly,-this is no easy job, and adapt- ins, clandestine political operations to American ideals nta> well be quite impossible.. At the time of the Bay of Pigs, President Kcrtncdv gave ~ ..' ?' UViiat ,xLurtay r%e,r dllluvllfvu wrL w. p nC yC C y~ t ~f l' {~y j r w~lFor k "perform foorrpthe hVe~r oft eeeisting in(ewgeoce 1 st c ~tl.ll c s~c?F i~tl'IOoi ~sidcnt 2 9 NOV 1971 Approved For Release 200G/05/15: CI T&Aa.b1 Republic of Vietnam in the early 19b0's, as documented in the Pentagon Papers, but which provided few details. The present program, apparently undergoing a partial "Vietnamization," is. an outgrowth of the original escalation of CIA-Special Forces ne Speciaf`Forceswe[eranT who par- ticipated in Command and Control raids from Danang, said he had taken part in missions in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. "lid said they were. for'the pfurpose of gathering intelligence, rescuing supplies and disrupting enemy com- Although the Post Dispatch does not Command and Control Central, operating mention the CIA, it is clear that Studies and ut of Dakto and Kontum, near the tri- Observations Group is a CIA operation. Thelorder area of South Vietnam and Laos and informant most knowledgeable about SOG, a Special Forces officer, was described by correspondent Meyer as fearful of being jailed or fined, saying: "If I talked to you and got caught, I could get 10 years in prison and a $10,000 fine." The Special Forces officer said that the connections between Command and Control and the 'MAC-V 8OG' organization in' Saigon were so highly classified that we would not risk commenting on them," wrote Meyer. Despite his reluctance to talk the officer explained that the Command and Control operations were "formally" under the By Richard E. Ward Second.of a series Clandestine sabotagz, combat and espionage missions have been conducted- in Laos and Cambodia by U.S. military per sonnel, despite White House denials and contrary to congressional prohibition. Such missions are top-secret actions directed by the Studies and, Observations Group of the U.S. Army Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, located in Saigon and generally known by its initials, MAC-V SOG. The most comprehensive picture of these activities available, based on testimony of former participants in these missions, known as Command and Control operations. is contained in a series of three articles by Gerald Meyer, published in the Nov. 5, 10 and 12 issues of the St. Louis Post 'Dispatch. Unless otherwise indicated all material in thisart.icle is based on the articles by Meyer, a regular staff member of the Post Dispatch, who interviewed former Special Forces :members, helicopter pilots and others who ,took part in the Command and Control operations during the 1960s and into 1972. The Post Dispatch's informants, whose names were not revealed to protect them from possible prosecution, stated that the clandestine commando raids were still in ;progress as of August. One informant said that in August when he left Bien Hoa, one of the Command and Control bases, more than 100 Army Special Forces were stationed there and reinforcements were being sent from Okinawa. The commando raids in recent years, utilizing Army personnel who generally command teams composed of mercenaries from Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, were also sent into North Vietnam and liberated areas of South Vietnam. There is evidence that the Air Force has operational jurisdiction over a similar program based at direction of the Fifth Special Forces Group until January 1971, when the Fifth Special Forces officially was described as having been withdrawn from Vietnam. Actually, according to Meyer, "numerous Fifth Special Forces were left behind at Command and Control bases throughout South Vietnam" and various efforts were employed to conceal their continued presence. They were forbidden to wear the green.beret and .Special Forces insignia while they remained in Indochina. Symbolic of the Command and Control operations, was a gestapo-like insignia, used by one of the units, a green-bereted 'skull with blood dripping from its teeth. This was the emblem of Command and Control Central. There were at least two other main units, Command and Control North and Command and Control South. The North, Central and South referred to the base areas of the commando teams. Apparently most of the operations under the Command and Control program, at least in recent years, took place in southern Laos. However, after the U.S.-Saigon invasion of Cambodia and subsequent Congressional prohibition against use of U.S. ground troops in Cambodia, it is safe to assume that the secret U.S. missions were increased in the latter country. Airborne bandits Typically, Command and Control missions comprised several U.S. officers or NCO's commanding a mercenary team which would land in Laos' or Cambodia, and "aimed at taking prisoners, gathering in- formation and disrupting communist ac- tivities." The commandos would be tran- sported in four helicopters, while four helicopter gunships would. provide air cover, Cambodia, was used for raids deep within the two latter countries. "A Special Forces soldier formerly assigned to Command and Control Central said that the group's missions were handled by about 150 Americans and from 30Q to '100 Montagnard tribesmen. Men participating in missions first were transported to Dakto and then sent by helicopter across the borders, he said. "The missions were rotated among the men and casualties were severe, the man said.... Such teams usually included two or three American leaders and about half a dozen Montagnards. "Dakto was the starting point also for large'hatchet forces; with larger numbers of Americans and Montagnards... . "Less frequently-apparently only about once every six months-very large groups of Americans were sent across the borders on so-called Slam (Search, locate and an- nihilate) missions. More than 100 men sometimes participated in such missions.... "Some penetrations into Laos apparently were quite deep. Both the Special Forces' (two of Meyer's informants) said the U.S'. operated a radio relay station on a mountain top about 30 miles inside Laos. 'This station, called the 'Eagle's Nest,' was used to transmit messages between South Vietnam and Command and Control teams operating beyond the mountain top in the Laotian countryside." The radio station, whose exact location was not specified, could have been located near the Bolovens plateau, in Southern Laos, where the Pathet Lao told this correspon- dent in 1970 there was a secret U.S. base. The Pathet Lao liberation forces captured STATINTL 'Laotian -b- Rele6seR000600120001-5 Commando raids were ordered by the forward air controller, were also, in- THE Ai4ERI CAN NEB CVRY Approved For Release 200010AVLt1W-DP80-0160 "SIAIINIL r sozzt e ystei?ioucre~rsozz, the Sri X0,2 ' tlzisizzistratiofx o F is ~i=zg to the people tboi tizm,ports of opium and :'he,4 oin from Red China By KENNETH JOHNS H OW MUCH of President Nixon's re-election was en- gineered by "blood money" from the Red Chinese narcotics "death trade?" This is, the question that many observers are asking as they speculate about the sources of the large sums of money contributed to Nixon's campaign committee whose donors were not pub- licly identified. The informed guess is that these sums were payoffs from those who control the traffic in opium. Several Washington correspondents pointed out that the "missing item" not discussed by Presi- dent Nixon and Chinese Conununist leaders during the meetings earlier this year was the question of stopping the deadly shipments of heroin and its source material, opium, from the China tion ends up in the United States to sup- ply its estimated 600,000 heroin addicts. Yet, the Nixon Administration and its spokesmen constantly. play down or deny the existence of large imports, especially from China. Noteworthy also is the fact that while official pronouncements are made de- ploring the "evil" from President Nixon down, the Nixon Administration has as- signed only ten agents to all of Asia to intercept shipments. As one expert put it, "If he's [Nixon] really interested in slopping the flow he would see that the CIA, FBI and other agencies assign 500 to I-long Kong, 500 to Bangkok and 500 to Saigon. These are the major trans-shipment points to the U.S. This would make a dent in the supplies reaching the U.S." mainland. See No Evil, Hear No Evil ... The rapidly growing number of dope Preposterous as it may sound, the addicts is considered by experts to be Administration's official policy is that no the number one danger to this country's heroin or opinni comes fron.Red China. health and internal security. - Why this outright lie in the face of what all experts and foreign government of- Extremely suspicious also is the repe- ficials know is not so? tition of statements about stopping the. Red China's involvement in the flow of opium from Turkey. This coup- opium traffic has been known to in- try grows only a small part of total formed people, both in and out of gov- world production, about 400 tons, coin- ernment, for years. One of the first gov- pared to 1,000 tons in Southeast Asia ernment experts to point out the exist- and an estimated 10,000 tons in Red ence of the "death trade" was Harry J. China .Approved For Release 2000/0oj j' ; I d t f the Bureau of XwAUM! 1 ,0 100120001-5 A substantial part.of world produc- he told the Senate. Judiciary Committee C0ftiiiuc3. Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 BE,ST.COP Available Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 '1'ti1; EL1'LA13E'i'li, N. J. DAILY JOTSTAITINTL 27 Nov 1972 rovr Releas00/05/15: CIA-RD ~ 60 (Former GrtFn Fcrrt Capt. finl?srt F. ,1at'acrn and set-rn nfhrr Forces nlemheri were iil- ?vnlvrtl in one n( the mainr enlllinversu' or the `'iet- Itanl War ill ltllifl when nr. f.iicetl of tnrrrrinihro , trinin agent, Now i civilian ' ill Bloomfield, lip tprnt. norm hotirs hritr~ intrrvlr ved by Dally Jnnrnal repnrfrr TI minas liirlialshi, rrrill_ In.g ex-llt% c,lrrnitttdi11 ; Illy afisQ.KSinat-nn th:i( he say3 never were mails public), By Tuna 1S frtl(FlAl,SKI J'eutttal Staff ;Writer Former (ire-en Beret. Capt. Fohert. F. 1Tararn ;ajr] ha and nthel? sorrily) Pores; per,r!nnl were involved in clandectin' crn;s harrier in- telligence operations i n Cambodia a; far hack as OCR. That. fart i; actually {r rei?vanf, hnttcvrr, i.n that small Unit; of iT.,i. ;Military and the f'entral ItltrII ''ire A?ency have hcrn operating "Un;rrittell abant" -,emir; inf.h l;'ct_1h (C13111bodna anr) Lan; frir. F?vcra] year; prel'inu= to 12r,%, stilt '11.ara;rt and seven ether C?real krrFt; tcrrt3 grritb d b`r the Ar nl,, with the June 1?li'4 "rltmrnatiinn" of Thai Khac Chinyen, a triply anent who jointly :,river) the U F;. North Vietnam and i nllth 1'ir-team Fa -rrnnhrntc a; a tot'. This came directly a3 A Cambodia ;end bans during ?~F3. The ra;c, l-ln_ .omrd into an enln-tlon-lar)pn rnntrover=v that tnurhed (nnorp c, the cerretaire3 of the :lfrov and D-fen_e, the Crr.tral i11- teilt:ellce Agrnry a n d Mara;rn was charged with pumping fun iiiillei ; into (-l,it'en's h14'. " At the bottom were the says nothing about civilian 'words: "U. S. citizens only." The ad was one of the first open indications here of plans for an American civilian advi- sory corps to remain in South Vietnam after a ceasefire. NIIA INC. - one of the larger American contractors here -- is seeking mainte- nance men for South Vietnam- . ese aircraft, both fighter planes and helicopters. .The ad represented only a portion of the advisory corps' iceberg. The United States is devel- oping plans in many fields for advisers to maintain sophisti- cated equipment, run comput- ers, supervise economic as- sistance - and a good deal more. The force could easily sur- pass 10,000 - and that figure could be an underestimate. "YOU CAN BET that the Joint Chiefs of Staff can do more for South Vietnam than just help out technically. They'll, want 10,000 snake-eat- ers in here for sure," one source said. 'A "snake-eater" in Saigon advisers. It does say that the United States will not "intervene in the internal Vietnam:" AS NEARLY as can be dis- cerned from various sources here, all of whom would pre- fer to talk of the advisory corps in whispers, the civil- ians would fall into at least three major categories: -U. S. CONTRACT person- nel, working for companies that sign up to do specific jobs, such as NHA's aricraft maintenance work. -ADVISERS to the Saigon government in each of South Vietnam's 44 provinces, from the Mekong Delta to the de- militarized zone. COVERT MILITARY opera- tions - perhaps in the pattern of Laos, where di;,, CIA 1 1 boon running the Laotian war for years - would be another possibility. No one is willing to talk about that, and decisions may not yet have been made in Washington on a covert ba17- game. Such decisions may be held back until U. S. officials determine whether Hanoi vio- A U. S. officer said it will probably operate largely out of USIAD (U. S. Agency for International Development). . AID, headed . by former Michigan State University president John A. Hannah, has been used as a cover for covert military operations in Laos - much to Ilannah's distress. CORDS has maintained ad- visers to South Vietnam's 44 lates a ceasefire. province chiefs and to its 272 In Laos, plainclothes CIA districts. If a ceasefire aqree- military advisers have been merit is signed, plans call for attached to the U. S. Embassy continuing U. S. advisers at in Vientiane as military at- only the province level. Still, taches, they would travel extensively. One big civilian contractor j CORDS has about 1,500 ad- in Vietnam is Air America 1 visers in Vietnam. That num- a CIA-controlled airline which ber will probably be cut. has played a key role in the "T; IF BIGGEST contracts are going to gall in the area of maintenance and logistics,'.' said one official. "The Souith Vietnamese are going to need help in keeping our sophisticated equipment going. They do a pretty good job, overail, hurt there are just some things they can't yet do - at least duo well enough." In logistics, they'll need help primarily in running -MEN TO KEEP an eve on U.S. computers, to keep track the hundreds of millions of of mauntains of equipment dollars worth of economics as- and of military units. And sistance that is expected to they are used in intelligence pour in here to help rebuild work. South Vietnam. What all this adds up to is GOVERNMENT advisers perhaps 5,000 to 6,000 contract : will be organized along the people; 500 to 1,000 advisers, lines of the present "CORDS," most of them outside Saigon; the U. S. "pacification" and a few thousand oversee- ing the spending of huge stuns in American money. effort. (The initials stand for "Civil Operations and. Rural Development Support.") PRIMARY NEEDS in Viet- nam, according to experts, will be in agricultural advice, public health and engineering. Approved' For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 STATINTL DAILY YIORLD Approved For Release 2000Ogiy: ?)Jk-RDP80-01601 R EDITOR THE DAILY WORLD 205 WEST 19t T. PREMATURE OBITUARY Newsweek and Time this week prematurely buried the war in Vietnam as over. The theme was that it is all over except for final details. Of course. that is Nixon ,s pre-election propaganda line. Whether they fell victim to that propaganda line or consciously joined in the deception is still to be, discovered. The main fact at this point is. that they did it. As for Nixon. his strategy is obvious. In addi- tion to all that the Daily World has already written exposing that strategy, there needs to be added that not only is Nixon not winding down the war, he is once again shifting the basis of operations to continue it at a new level. Not only is he beefing up the Thieu mercenary regime, but U.S. advisers will continue to "guide" Thieu and pull other strings from behind the scenes as the CIA has been doing in Laos for years. Tricky Dick has lost none of his adeptness in deception of the people. -ROSS MALCOLM, Queens, N.Y. ~--'-FLEW YOPK 10011 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 Approved For Release 200 ATTACK total of about 90 rounds of mortar hit positions held by INTENSIVE name rbrne rangers about one mile~ north is north of Quangtri city. This MAI'sJijjJETS h b t 1000 ou t ON SUPPLY ROUTE. , a compares wi enemy mortar artillery and rocket shells that fell in the Only light ground fighting 300 Fighter-Bomber Strikes was reported elsewhere. Mili- tary officials said they would and 11 B-52 Raids Focus have to study the pattern of on panhandle Region fighting a few more days be- fore concluding whether it was related to reports from high By JAMES P. STERBA level American military sources Special to The New York 1'Imes Tuesday that some North Viet- Il d b k SAIGON, South Vietnam, Thursday, Nov. 16-The United States command reported yes- terday that American bombers had staged one of the heaviest days of raids of the war on the southern panhandle of North Vietnam. More than 300 tactical strikes by fighter-bombers were re- ported concentrated Tuesday in an area from about 20 miles, south of Thanhhoa down to the demilitarized zone that strad-i dles the border between North; Vietnam and South Vietnam. This. total, a ? substantial in-: crease' from the 220 reported Monday, was higher than the average number that formerly .was flown over all North Viet- nam. Biggest Raids in 3 Weeks I In addition, 11 three-plane. 'missions by B-52 heavy bomb- ers were flown over the pan handle. The raids, aimed at blocking the North Vietnamese supplies being rushed to Communist troops in South Vietnam before any ceasefire, were the heaviest since President Nixon restrict- ed bombing of the North to the namese units had pu e away from the fighting. In a delayed report, the South Vietnamese command said the bodies of 50 people that it described as the "enemy" were discovered in STATINTL bP80-01601 R000600 Meo Said to Retreat VIENTIANE, Laos, Nov. 15 (AP)-A United States military spokesman reported today that Gen. Vang Pao's army of Meo tribesmen, which the American Central Intelligence Agency finances, had been pushed off the southern edge of the Plaine des Jarres. He said North Viet-1 namese forces shelled a force of several battalions for sixi hours Monday night and then made a ground attack Tuesday. The Meos retreated after suffer- ing "moderate" casualties and were trying to regroup to the south, the spokesman said. Saigon Desertions Reported Special to The New York TI mes PARIS, Nov. 15-The Viet- cong delegation to the peace talks here asserted today that there had been substantial de- sertions from South Vietnamese forces last month, and Vietcong battlefield victories. A statement issued by the delegation said 1,640 South Vietnamese' soldiers, including "hundreds of the Saigon Sev- enth Division" deserted in the Mekong delta province of My- tho in October. It said this was the result of an organized cam- paign of 50,000 people who "marched on enemy posts to call' on their sons, husbands and brothers to return home." Quantin Province south of Danang. They were killed by an American B-52 raid, the com- mand said. The UUnited States command said that "preliminary bomb damage assessment reports" on the results of the bombing of North Vietnam on Tuesday in- dicated two transhipment i points, two airfields two fuel dumps, 38 trucks, 11 ware- houses, an antiaircraft gun, four supply caches, six supply, storage areas, seven boats, 15 bridges, 20 railroad cars, nine artillery guns and a railroad spur were damaged or de- stroyed. American pilots, meanwhile, continued raids on Laos, Cam- bodia and South - Vietnam. Twenty-two B-52 missions and 217 tactical airstrikes by fighter-bombers were flown over South Vietnam,mostly in Quangtri Province, the com- mand's news release said. Luang Prabang Cambodians Report Road Open PNOMPENH, Cambodia, Nov.' 15 (AP)-The Cambodian high command said today that its troops had recaptured the dis- trict capital of Trapeang Kra- leng and had reopened a 37 mile stretch of the road con- necting Pnompenh with the sea. The road, Route 4, from' Cambodia's sole deep water, 1 port of Kompong Som, was cut! area south of the 20th Parallel on Oct. 23. . Ground fighting, meanwhile, continued to be below average levels, with 45 North Vietnam- ese shelling attacks and only 20 ground actions reported in the 24 hours ended at dawn yesterday. Ground Fighting Light Fighting in the northernmost province of South Vietnam, g - ). North Vietnam( Quantri, -also tapered off, ac- ` upon entering the town; 1-se cording to Saigon military)( -411 1,n,vr-,,er that two to three ing waned near Quangtri esmen. mile f tl e road from Tra eang (2). Cambodians retook pproved For Releasea2 6 ~W5 v e URDP P81*60ePRGGO6 X 120001-5 held by the enemy., Laos, enemy gained on two weeks ago when the en- 1 emy seized Trapeang Kralcng. 1 The command spokesman, Col. Am Rong, said the 13th . today istance The New Xork Times/Nov. 16, 1972 U.S. stepped up bombing of southern panhandle of Fi ht 1 Plaine des Jarres (4). STATINTL Approved For Release 2000-/05.A g ?!b1A RbP80-01-604R00, By Michael Morrow Dispatch News service international Peace negotiations in I Laos seem to have reached a higher plateau since the re- cent talks in Vientiane be- 'tween Phoumi Vongvachit of the Comtnmunist Pathet r' Lao and Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Laotian prime minister. Phoumi and Prince Sou- phanouong, Prince Souvan- na's half-brother who is tit- ular leader of the Pathet Lao, served in the first Lao- tian coalition government in 1957. Negotiations .had shown steady improvement since Souvanna's acceptance ear- lier this ,year of a j%c-point Pathet Lao plan as a basis for negotiations. The talks between Phoumi, the real power in the Pathet Lao, and Souvanna may indicate that the Communists now are willing to compromise on these five points instead of insisting on them as the final settlement. If substantive discussions should move forward, stumbling blocks still exist. Only the second of Souphan- ouong's five points poses no problem. This calls for Laos to observe the Principles of .peaceful coexistence in the 1962 Geneva agreement- principles to which nearly everyone in Laotian politics pays at least lip service. The other four points are less simple. The first pro- poses that the United States must totally withdraw from Laos and halt all bombing of Laotian territory. The United States has agreed- in presidential adviser Hen- ry Kissinger's nine-point peace plan-to withdraw its forces when North Vietnam withdraws its troops. That pact is still unsigned. Since the Pathet Lao lists this point first, it may insist that this be a condition for further negotiations. The third point calls for establishment of a demo- cratic coalition government. Vientiane and the Pathet Lao, however, disagree on what happened to the coali- tion government established by the Geneva agreement of 1962. The Pathet Lao claims that it was dissolved by a military putsch in 1964, Sou- vanna and the United States maintain that the putsch was unsuccessful, and that the government of 1962 re- mains in power In Vien- tiane. Pathet Lao cabinet seats, says Solrvanna, are still empty for them to re. OCCUPY. This difference -pits the concept of a new, reconsti- tuted coalition government against the idea that the old tripartite (leftist, neutralist, rightist) coalition can he re- stored. Souvanna's legi.ti- niacy is thus called into question-the Pathet Lao no longer refers. to him as the prime minister-as well as the rightists' privilege of participation in the coali- tion. The Pathet Lao has long regarded the rightists as unacceptable in a new coa- lition. The rightists are, in general, members of the military and of the rich and powerful Cha.mpassak and Sananikone families. Although the Pathet Lao does pot question Sou- vanna's participation iff -a new coalition, it probably would not accept him as a neutral leader of a tripar- tite agreement, since the current government is lhcav- ily dominated by rightists. The fourth Pathet Lao point proposes a provisional coalition government pend- ing elections. The pathet Lao Is likely to oppose par- ticipation of the rightists and press for representation for the Patriotic Neutralist Faction, a splinter neutral- ist group which is consid- ered friendly to the Pathet Lao. The fifth point calls for pro-American forces - for example, the CIA-backed mercenaries and Thai troops -to withdraw from illegally occupied territory. It also demands that refugees be compensated and returned to' their native areas pend- ing unification through con- sultations. Redrawing the old Gen- eva cease-fire lines will be easy, but deciding who is to control what territory and what population will be a knotty problem. The Pathet Lao, with North Vietnamese help, has taken considerable territory, and U.S. bombing has forced large numbers of refugees into camps that are under Vientiane's control. The speed with which ne- gotiations in Laos are begun in earnest will be influenced by military developments there and by agreements reached between Washing- ton and ILanoi. Laos is still a sovereign state=--but barely so. Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-0160.1 R000600120001-5 NEW YORK 'It4ES Approved For Release 200OId /'19QbCF 4DP80-01601 RO STATINTL 51 Rockets Hit Laotian. Capital's Airport' By MALCOLM W. BROWNE !attack on Thakhck, a Laotian east of Savannakhet, had been, Spector to The New York Times town on the Mekong River bor- in Communist hands since last VIENTIANE, Laos, Nov. 13 dering Thailand. Just across I year. Communist forces fired 51!the river is Nakhon Phanom, al Military sources said that. Marge rockets into the airport Tlrai base operated by thciwhen Government forces end of the royal Laotian capital of;United States Air Force as its'tered the village of Bung Kha,1 Luang Prabang today, damag-main surveillance hea(Iquartersione mile from Doug Hene,' ing at least five military planes. for activity along the Ho Chi Saturday, they found the bodies The rocket attack was the Minh Trail network. of .42 North Vietnamese sol- first directed at the airport in) The attack on Thakhck was diers. nearly a year and reflected the' reported mounted from three Heavy fighting was reported increasing intensity of North; sides. An American plane was over the weekend in a wide Vietnamese pressure in the, called in to strafe the attackers. arc in the mountainous region area. 'The North Vietnamese rc- surrounding the Communist- A ntilita'ry spokesman saidiportedly withdrew from Thak- controlled Plaine des Jarres. Soviet-inadg 122-min. rockets hek after some fighting in the. Clashes were reported near damaged two T-28 propeller-, town. Military sources said the Khan- eKbay, s rst of the pear driven 1ghter-bombers of the enemy attack may have been. Laotian air force and three; reconnaissance as a rehearsal: in which at least 18 Communist light observation planes. An am-for a future large-scale at-soldiers were reported killed. munition, dump was reported' tack, But south of the plain, Govern- demolished and a military corn Town Reported Talcen ment troops were forced to pound damaged. !abandon a position nine miles Two Laotian soldiers were, In another part. of southern cast of Long Tieng, forward said to have been wounded. Laos, Government troops re-,headquarters of a force createdi ported having conipleted the and equipped by the American: Attack before Dawn capture of Dong Ilene Saturday; Central Intelligence Agency for The attack occurred before', after nearly a week of fighting.1 operations on the Plaine des dawn today, which is the 65thjThe town, 30 miles east south; Jarres. birthday of the Laotian King,1 Savang Vatthana. Laos is governed from its ad- ministrative capital at Vien- tiane, but the )ionic of the King and the traditional royal capital is Luang Prabang to the north. The two cities are connected by a road that is subject to fre- quent enemy ambushes. Political experts felt that an infantry attack on Luang Pra- bang is unlikely because the Communist-led Pathet Lao nominally accept the King as chief of state. However, Com- munist forces seem intent on1 ringing Ltiang Prabang and eliminating nearby Government strongpoints. Yesterday, the Government troops were forced to abandon; a position eight miles southeast) of Luang Prabang in the face? of heavy shelling. I Elsewhere, a North Vietna-; mese force of about 500 men reportedly launched a heavy Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 STATINTL AP vioc] Far. Rai e 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R00060 AUS i ii1, TLX, STATESMAN THE `SECRET' ARMY'- Thy verted T-28 planes flown by Meo L waiting at Long Cheng to drop these in northern Laos. (NEA Photo) 250-pound bombs. Beyond _are - con- Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 DAILY 1,'ORLD Approved For Release 20000/M1&Yd!AZRDP81-0160 0 pi drug's ? ~i. ?'-..vnsFt7 C By DONNA >il>'iU bU.,~,. Use of drubs-- marijuana, soft trade, while they seem to have no drugs" and heroin-}s rampant trouble harassing and arresting r s secondary thousands of black, Chicano and in New York City' Puerto Rican youth for no reason schools, according to the Flcish and disrupting and intimidating .mann Commission, a special com- movement organiz2tions and mission formed to make an over- leaders. all evaluation of the NYC school The role of the CIA and the mil- system. , itary in the drug smuggling trade, The commission's report, re- Pal .ticularly from Thailand, Laos cently released, estimates that nearly half of NYC high school and Burma has been established, students and approximately one- as has police cooperation in drug fifth of the junior high school pushing in cities like New York. students use drugs of some sort. This must be stopped. an the commission's Equally important, however, Will Iti vg , assdciate director of research, is the need to get rid of the causes said the students' use of drugs is of drug usage among youth. A basic cause, Tyner has point- generally more than "occasional." y Black Fifty percent of "inner city" ed out, particularly among crime in'the United States. is said youth, is unemployment, The Bur- to-be heroin-connected. can of Narcotics and Dangerous Recent reports have estimated Drugs says the majority of young that the number of drug addicts in drug addicts are without steady the nation has reached 600,000, employment, arguing that previous surveys "Lack of jobs turns large onto underestimated the extent of her,, of ghetto youth towards drug drug addiction. addiction," Tyner says. "People's The National Industrial Con- spirit can take but so much with- ference 13bard of New York said out working for long periods last year, that a survey of 222 com- time. Some youth have come out a You andnh ve neveunderstandr how panics showed 53 percent reported of school some drug abuse among employ- drugs seem like a way out." ees. Despite claims by President lie added, "We believe this is a Nixon last month that Federal conscious policy on the part of anti-drug funds increased eleven- the Administration." programs and guar Yet, fold since 1969, that arrests anteeing that youth and young ex- d doubled in the same period an with mean- given j, that a recent sharp increase in ing addicts d are ecent salary, are not a heroin prices on the-East Coast that the "supply is major part of a drug rehabilitaticn dry- t evention programs. ing up," drug usage and addic- or drug p' Lion have dramatically increased, It was recently revealed in a among youth. survey commissioned by the La- particularly bor Department that the question John Finlator, who retired last of jobs in relation to drug rehab- January as deputy.di rector of the ilitation has been largely ignored Bureau of Narcotics and Danger- by the drug treatment programs ous Drugs, charged that "we are and employers. in worse shape in the war against "Employers are actively ex drug abuse today than on the day closing people with a history of the present Administration took drug problems from the labor office." force in the belief that these peo- Jarvis Tyner, national _ chair pie constitute bad business risks man of the Young Workers Liber- and endanger the productivity of ation League and candidate for the company," the report said, Vice President on the Common- and added that "drug programs ist party ticket, has commented do not see vocation training or often on the apparent inability (or job placement as playing an mm- unwillingness) of tile' FBI, the ortant role in the rehabilitative - 11 alp ice pat tments and p Ap c Fnq 1gqrn 1easea2000FO5Pt5 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 to crush organized crime and put The program of the YWW'LL and the election platform of the CP advocate in addition to establish- STATINTL ing a massive drug-abuse educa- tion program in the schools, get- ting to the root of the drug prob- lem. The, program calls for a massive construction of decent. medical centers, sing t h ou low cos , schools, recreation and cultural centers which would create mil- lions of jobs for youth and at the game time meet their basic social needs. The .funds for this would come from ending the Vietnam war, dismantling .U.S. military bases all over the world and gen- erally drastically r0d"cincr the military budget. Along with edu- cation and drug rehabilitation pro- grams, this would greatly con- tribute . to ending drug addiction and the widespread drug usage that is plaguing youth. NEV AYORK DAILY NEWS Approved, For Release 2000/0%A %V: v": &-RDP80-01601 R000 IN THE WORLD He Likes the French Paris, Nov. 6 (AP)-Prince Souvaima Phouma, the premier of Laos, said today would like to see the French military mission bolster-. ed when peace returns to Indo- china 'and re- gain the impor- tance given it by the'1954 Genera agree- china. Souvanna Phouma discuss- ed the matter Messmer . w i t h Premier Pierre Messmer. The French mis- sion was authorized under the Geneva agreement on Laos. Its importance gradually diminished / as United States military aid and .Central Intelligence Agency oper- ations took over more and more of the military functions in Laos. Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 SAN D >r t e~eof2~~/~1tl~arfiCIA-RDPS9PIMlR000600120001-5 SJNIQN ckers, and allowed American -- 139 , 739 - 246,007 NOV 519123 military aircraft to be used to transport drugs 4 I E1 p r TIlE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.. By Alfred W. McCoy, Harper & now, $Ia."s). Heroin didn't always have The charges are difficult to refute because, in the main, they happen to be true, McCoy has done his home work. Critics may quarrel with sonic of his facts and dispute many of his judg- ments, but he convincingly denmonstrates, for example, that the Cl. .heroin epidemic in South Vietnam could not have happened without the active participation of greedy generals and government of- ficials who owed their jobs to the United States. U.S. involvement In the drug traffic was, as the au- thors contend, an "inevitable consequence" of our in- volvement in Southeast Asia, where opium was a way of life. But it did not become an' a bad name. Around the turn ' "American problem" until it of the century it was hAiled touched American lives. as a "miracle drug" and ap- proved by the AMA for gener- al use. in fact, it didn't even have a name until Germany's Bayer chemical combine in- vented "heroin" as a brand name and put it on the mar- ket as a cough medicine. The book is not quite the scholarly work that it pre, tends to be. It is as much an indictment of the Vietnam war as it is a documentation of the drug traffic. The au- thors suggest that all will be well if President Nixon is de fcated and the United States pulls out of Southeast Asia But this fascinating flit of 'lock, stock and barrel. drug lore is only incidental to Maybe so. But the sad thing the central theme of this dev- is that the book's chief vic- astating book; that because Urns are a handful of dedi- of its commitment to contain cated CAA men who vent to communism in Southeast Southeast Asia to do a job. Asia, the U.S. government, That job was to fight commu- helped create a generation of nism, not reform a society, junkies. -Chicago Daily News Southeast Asia's "golden triangle" where Laos, Thailand and Burma meet - has been an opium-growing area for centuries. But what McCoy and his fellow authors are concerned about is how M'ithin the last 20 years the "triangle" has expanded its production until today it ac- counts for 70 per cent of the world's illicit supply of her- . I For this the authors hold the United States responsible. They specifically, charge that in their clandestine war against the Communists, U.S. agencies, notably the CIA, al- lied themselves wittli - ele- merits known to be engaged in the drug traffic; ignored and a rW(ome4 Fnorc elease 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 DE'nVER, COLO. ROCKY MT. NEWS ApproWdAf eI M - 192,279 ? 8 -- 209,887 NOV 5IM ! ,.New' book delves info probleM 1971 opium harvests were flown cut in Ai America UII-11.llucy'.' helicopters. RENDEZVOUS IS DI SCR1131;D District Officer Ger Su Yang described th 'rendezvous with Air America: "_Moo officer came from Long Chieng 'to buy our opium They carne in American helicopters, perhap two or three men at a time. The helicopte leaves them here for a few days and they wal to villages over there (swinging his arm in i semi-circle in the direction of Gier Goot, Lon; Makkhay and Nam Pac), then come back hen and radio Long Chieng to send anath, r helico ter for them. They take the opium back to Lon Chicng." The pilots were always Americans and the Meo army traders did the buying. The head man of Nam Ou, a Lao Theun By JIMI MORRELL For Pacific News Service A doctoral candidate in Chinese History at Harvard University, Jim Morrell has previously written for scholarly journals in the Asian Studies field. WASHINGTON, D.C. - "It's a damned lie. You can say THAT'." We were asking, Arthur Berry Richardson of New York, about reports that his air- line, Air America, was one of the big- gest' opium. shippers in the world. "We've discussed them at our board meeting, these scurrilous articles. There's no substance to them." Last month Harper & Row published Alfred McCoy's long-awaited book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." The heavily docu- mented book is based on some 240 interviews with C !~,,,^ I:}1ts, Bureau of Narcotics officials, top Laotian military commandes, and opium- growing Moo tribesmen. And it presented strik- ing evidence that Air America has been flying Meo-grown opium out of north- and northeast TRADITION OF POLITICAL POWE7t A.PtSW'EI{ 7'O 'I'IIE VILLAGERS Laos ever since 1905. 1 The village of Lang Pot is a Meo community Fit ht or starve -- this was the CIA's answe When asked specifically about McC'oy's of 47 wooden dirt-floored houses. It is one of 12 to the villagers of Long Pot. Air America flee Interviews with the ,Meo opium farmers whose Meo and Lao Theung villages that make up the village's young men away to fight and re harvest was flown out on Air America, all Ar- Long Pot District. One of the oldest Moo vil- turned their corpses to the. village - proles thur Richardson would say was: "Some guy ]ages in Northeast Laos, it has a tradition of po- sionally %~,Tapped in sanitary plastic bags. thinks he's clever. Just take my word for it. it teal power and is the home of District Officer For the CIA the Moos offered a eonvenien GGoodby!" Ger Su Yang. According to Ger Su Yang, the instrument for keeping alive their war in Laos Interviews with the publicity-shy directors village households produce 15 kilos (33 pounds) but for the Mcos their alliance with the CIA any of Air America tend to be brief but emotional of opium apiece. They are guaranteed an ode- Air"America has only broui?ht disaster. 11re~ affairs. For years Air America, the CIA's "pri- quote food supply by Air America rice drops. have been decimated and the survivors have vate" charter airline in Southeast Asia, has In return, officers of the CIA's "clandestine fled the hills for the refugee camps arounc Indignantly denied any involvement in the army" (led by the -lleo Chieftain Vang Pao) Long Chieng. Southeast Asian heroin traffic. This year, pay them a high price for the opium. The Long l'ot's 1972 opium harvest was destroy though, fewer people than ever seem inclined source of Vang Pao's money, of course, is. the ed when "allied" fighters napalmed the village to take their word for it. tJA. and three nearby Lao Theun g vill ;r;es. Anc MOTTO IS NO IDLE BOAST ? Long ~ Pot is s one of , the -._ few remainig areas in Vietnam's National Liberation l rout. re;;ortet Air America's motto is 'Anything, Anytime, Northeast Laos where opium history can still that on Jan. 1.0, 1972, units of the Lao People' Anywhere - Professionally" and it is no idle be observed: close enough to Long Chieng still Liberation Army took Long Pot. boast. From dusty airstrips in the Meo hill to be controlled by Vang Pao but far enough to Because of the fighting, in fact, Laos toil country they have been airlifting the raw only account for a fraction of Southeast Asia': opium to laboratories 'in Lou- Chieng or Vieti- escape the fighting. The Moo tribesmen's only estimated 1,000-ton 1972 harvest, L-nd Ah & e where it is refined into No. 4 heroin (90 to cash crop is opium, and the CIA's deal with America may be shipping more dead bogies 9S per cent pure), then smuggled abroad by Vang Pao, badly put, comes to this: you send than opium this year. Corsican gangsters or Laotian diplomats for us soldiers and we'll buy?your opium. Revelations like these in McCoy's boo] ultimate disposal in U.S. markets. The 47 households' harvest of 700 kilos of made the CIA so nervous that they cotntacie The Opium Trail leads from the poppy fields opium will yield 70 kilos of pure morphine base the publisher and insisted on a prior review, a of the Southeast Asian "Fertile Triangle" (of after it has been boiled, processed and pressed unprecedented move. After coil sider,at-le err' Burma, Thailand, and Laos which nowv produce into bricks. Then further processed in one of twisting, Harper & Row reluctantly agreed, I" over 70 per cent of the world's opium supply) the region's seven heroin labs, the Long Pot found the CIA's critique of the book unur,f;: e to Saigon, Ilong Kong, or ?,Iarseilles, and then harvest will yield 70 kilos of No. 4 heroin. sive and went ahead with publication rnyvra y right to the waiting arms of America's estimat- Worth $5e0 to the villagers of Long Pert, it will Since the CIA is Air America's r^.-.or Co ed one million heroin users. bring $225,000 on the streets of New York or tractor, the trail of responsibility leads dir.eci In separate interviews, Laotian Gens. Ouane San Francisco. to the Executive Branch of the U.S. ; ,over; Rattikone and Thao Ma both told McCoy that Formerly Long Pot's opium harvest was meat. It neatly undercuts all the 'T aiv a Air America began flying opium to markets in bought up by merchant caravans, but these order" statements flowing from ti Wlti Long ChienApprov nd F6r5RVe 2 /45 n1G1 RDP8OsO4& OOO6QQ12QQQ1.-a5?... _ ........._, .-est heroin refinery in Southeast Asia. Gen. tlko officers helicoptered into TanSr:n village Thao Ma is former commander of the Laotian hiked to Nam Ou, and purchased the opiun Air Force. harvest, then continued on their way to, Ivan After several more interviews in Vientiane, Suk and Long Pot. McCoy told its he took a bus out of Luang The harvest of 1.971 may well have bee: Prabang, hitched a ride in a government truck Ling Pot's last. In return for the rice drops an and, when the road gave out, started hiking opium purchases, Vang Pao and the CIA )cep over the mountains. By nightfall he reached a demanding soldiers. _LS AID (United States A, - small village, spending a sleepless night under ency for International. 'J:5evelopment) built a thin thatched roof. " y school in the vi}.age, and "Mr. Pop" (hdga There was always . ~otherneth sound nme it t of a plane 1,111011, then the CIA's chief operative in Laos away sometimes lie d it seemed right was s far r had high hopes for the place, but in 1970 Van away and overhead. Pao demanded that all the young men in th And every so often you would hear the sound of its mini-guns going off=600 rounds a minute at village including 15 year-olds join his arm, who knows what, anything that sets off its fighting the Pathet Lao. Ger Su Ynag complies infrared detectors, anything that moves or and they were flown away by Air America hell breathes or gives off warmth." copters in late 1970. The next morning "McCoy and an interpreter But reports of heavy casualties came in an walked down from the mist-enveloped mown- the village refused to send more. Ger Su Yaps tains into the village of Long Pot, 10 miles west described what happened next: "The Ameri of the Plain of Jars. There, tinder the shadow cans in Long Chieng said I must send all t of 6,200-foot Mt. Phou Phachau, which dom.- rest of our men. But I refused. So they stopper nates the entire district, 1l:cCoy had reached dropping rice to its. The last rice drop was ii eplaced by pony Cara RDP80-01601 R0'i 4'4,9 e ,. But the 1969, 1970 an, Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 STATINTL QUINCY, MASS. PATRIOT LEDGER NOV 4 1972, E - 65,785 NO SECRET. WAR An Associated Press report yes- terday from Saigon that the United States is planning to keep a mili- tary advisory group of American civilians in South Vietnam after regular military forces are with- drawn is disturbing. The report quoted military sources as saying that the ad- visers would be employed by ci- vilian firms under contract either ,to the Defense or State Depart- ments. Whether such activities would be covered by a Vietnam peace agreement or excluded from them remains conjectural. There is as yet no signed peace agreement. The. U.S. is insisting upon reach- ing certain mutual understandings concerning the basic accord that is being worked out. The implication of this report is quite clear - the continuation of American clandestine operations in Vietnam after the uniformed egulars are withdrawn, the kind operations being. conducted in the "secret wars" In Laos an Cambodia. Nobody in the U.S. government, of course, is going to confirm that ,IA or er agents will remain behind to do what they can secret- ly to prevent Communist takeovers in Indochina. Obviously a number of American civilian officials will stay in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam in various capacities. The New York Times reported this week, for example, "In conver- sations in recent days with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos and others, Nixon has stressed that he would seek to con- tinue American economic and other assistance to Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam because he believed it was important to maintain non- Communist governments in South- east Asia." It would be all too tempting to use "civilian" aid officials, for ex- ample, for .covert operations. It would be naive to suggest that the United States have no intelli- gence agents in Indochina after a peace agreement. But the U.S. should not shift its involvement 'in Vietnam from an open war to an underground war waged by agents under- cover. Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 DAILY WORLD. Approved For Release 200b/09/~9\ ~IA-RDP80-'iOW Daily World Ccmbined Services The U.S. has assured Saigon puppet President Nguyen Van Thicu it will not sign any agreement allowing South Vietnam's patriotic forces any participation in governing the country, United Press International said - yesterday. The Nixon Administration move was the latest in maneuvers to back out of the agreement reached Oct. 8 .with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and in effect was the equivalent of Thicu's re- jection of a coalition government. Reports from the Pentagon yes terday stated that the U.S. is rush- ing hundreds of new warplanes to Thieu's forces, while UPI news- man Walter Logan quoted a high- ranking U.S. Army. officer in New York as revealing that U.S. ad- visers would remain in South Viet- nam even i,f all U.S. troops are withdrawn. Logan's story follows': = By WALTER LOGAN NEW YORK, Nov. 3 (UPI) - A cease-fire in Vietnam will not end the American presence there, even. if all U.S. troops are with- drawn, a high ranking U.S. Army officer told UPI today. The officer, himself a veteran of the Vietnamese army training program, said a large group of civilian advisers would remain after the cease-fire to aid the South Vietnamese armed forces but that the advisory group would consist largely of a brain trust of young West Point graduates work- ing as an unofficial joint chiefs of staff... The officer. said the first of these civilian advisers already had arrived in Saigon and were consulting with U.S.. officers and South Vietnamese military offi- cials on the future program. The program would amount to a continuation of the Vietnamization program but with the American civilians advising the South Viet- namese command not only on war- fare techniques but on training programs for the South Vietnam- ese armed forces, the officer said. The program would, in effect, put the United States back where it started in South Vietnam. In the early days of American involve- merit in Vietnam in 1s' .0 there was only a handful of military advisers. The advisory group in South Vietnam would to a large extent resemble the program carried out in the "secret war" in Laos and to a lesser extent in Cambodia, the officer said. The Central Intelli- gence Agency (CIA) trained and equipped the army of Maj. Gen. Yang Pao, Meo hill tribesmen who operated out of a once secret base at Long Tieng. The CIA-financed group in Laos even has its own airline, Air America, and such an arrange- ment presumably could be used in South Vietnam and Cambodia. In recent years West Point graduates expert in training pro- grams and still in the U.S. mili- tary service, carried out wide- spread officer training programs in South Vietnam in hopes the South Vietnamese eventually would be able to handle their own training programs on warfare geared to American weapons. U.S. military advisers also accompanied South Vietnamese Units in the field and worked di- rectly with the troops, a practice that tapered off, Some advisers are still working with the South Vietnamese, the Army officer said. The officer was mainly con- cerned with the South Vietnamese Army but said there presumably would. be similar programs of advising the South Vietnamese Air Force and Navy. None of the training programs were men- tioned in the cease-fire agreement worked out by Presidential ad- viser Henry A. Kissinger and the North Vietnamese. Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 STATINTL jp~bX WORT D Approved For Release 2000/0 CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600 4 NOV i3i2 Betraying peace The White House has worked out an immediate pro- gram for stalling and sabotaging peace in Vietnam; and a long-range program of neo-colonialism in Indochina, to take up where direct U.S. military action leaves off. Henry Kissinger's promise of peace within days has vanished. Now, White House officials point, vaguely, a month or more hence. Kissinger said that one more meet- ing with the representatives of Democratic Republic of Vietnam would seal the pact. Now the White House says that any agreement with the DRV would have to be ap- proved by Nguyen Van Thieu. Nixon's puppet. Under the short-term program, stalling of the treaty signing is being used. even .now, for a massive buildup of the U.S. air fleet and of war materiel in South Vietnam. with the ownership papers made out in Thieu's name. For the longer range. the White House is now pro gramming the "sale" of arms to Laos and Cambodia, and the shipment of "economic" aid to U.S. puppets in Indo- china. For the long haul, too, the-White House is planning the continued presence of U.S. "advisers" in Indochina - ,of para-military forces in mufti, of CIA agents. and of assorted mercenaries. . Last week the White House "leaked" the demand that. in violation of the agreement, the DRV should remove some 35.000 of its troops. Now, days later, the number has been escalated to unspecified dimensions. Violation of the still-unsigned Vietnam treaty is par- alleled by violation of U.S. undertakings in other areas. Thus, the White House has'decided to continue the use of the island of Culebra, off of Puerto Rico, as a U.S. Navy gunnery range. in direct violation of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's pledge to end such use. The press reveals also that. contrary to Nixon's personal pledges, the U.S. is continuing at the Fort Dettrick. Md.. infectious diseases laboratories. preparations for biological warfare. J Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 W'ASHII;GTON STAR Approved For Release 2000105 1PCIW2RDPR~Wk By HENRY S. BRADSIIER Star-News Staff writer SAIGON - The thin end of a wedge has appeared here which could lead to a continu- ing U.S. military advisory pro- gram for South Vietnam after a cease-fire. It consists of plans to use American civilians for mili- tary training and maintenance as a continuation of the Viet- :namization program after U.S. troops leave Vietnam. According to the peace plan worked out between Washing- .ton and Hanoi, but now begged down in dispute, all U.S. and allied military personnel must :leave South Vietnam within CO days of a cease-fire agree- ment. The terms of the plan made public by Hanoi last week say neither the Saigon government \._ nor the Viet Cong will "be allowed to accept the sending of forces, military advisers, personnel, weapons, ammuni- tion and war material into South Vietnam." Laos Pact Ignored The full text of the tentative agreement is still secret, but the published summary is not so tight on advisers or other personnel as the 1962 Laos agreement. The unsuccessful effort to neutralize that neighboring country contained wording which theoretically would pro- hibit the kind of plans now being made here. American servicemen in Viet- nam. North Vietnam had original- ly sought in peace negotiations The Laos agreement was Command nor the embassy quickly ignored. An American here would comment on this "secret war" under Central p port from well-qualified mil- Intelligence Agency auspices /itary sources. developed against North Viet- A far broader program than namese violations of the C130 training has been sig- agreement. Whether the seeds haled by advertisements in of a similar development here Saigon's only English- exist in the plans for civilian language newspaper, the Sai- training and maintenance of gon Post. South Vietnamese weaponry One Ad for an unidentified might now depend on how well employer is seeking "person. a cease-fire is observed, once nel familiar with U.S. Army agreed upon. methods and procedures" with The United States has been specialities in armaments, rushing military equipment to communications and electron- South Vietnam against the ics, and other fields. "Posi- possibility t It a t agreement tions to ' be filled no later than might cone quickly and fur- 1 January 1973 are available ther weapons be cut off. for Americans or third-country Transports Rushed nations, the ad says. "Third-country nationals" Equipment being" sent in- usually refers in this context eludes items such as F5 jet to Filipinos or South Koreans fighter planes to defend the who followed the U.S. war ef- South a g a i n s t Hanoi's fort to South Vietnam. Soviet -m a d e MIIG21s and Sonic Veterans Stay On Chinese-made MIG19s. This is y simply a speedup of an exist- Another ad, by Lear Siegler, ing program. Inc., seeks U.S. citizens for But in at least one case a immediate positions that in- new item has been added to elude helicopter and fixed- the Vietnamization program. wing aircraft' mechanics, jet This is the C130 turboprop and piston engine mechanics, transport plane. Some 30 of and related specialities. them are being rushed here In the past, American con- even though South Vietnamese tractors here have hired U.S.? pilots and maintenance men servicemen who take dis- are not trained for them. charges in Saigon and stay on Ace o: r d i n g to military doing work similar to their sources, they will be trained military jobs. by American civilians on con- The CIA staffed much of its tract to the U.S. government. Neither the U.S. Military all its military equipment home, when it left - taking away from South Vietnamese units the weapons which America had supplied. Hanoi retreated from this position by agreeing to let ex- isting equipment stay. As that equipment wears out, the draft agreement says. It can "be replaced on a one- for-one basis by weapons of the same characteristics and similar characteristics and properties," Dr. Henry A. Kis- singer explained last week. Kissinger said nothing about civilians staying behind to ad- vise on that equipment. Sweeping Prohibition The 1962 Laos agreement re- quired the withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel, with none to bo reintroduced. Foreseeing prob- lems, the countries that sought to neutralize Laos added a protocol which said: "The term `foreign military personnel' shall include mem- bers of foreign military mis- sions, foreign military advis- ers, experts, instructors, con- sultants, technicians, observ- ers, and any other foreign mil- itary persons, including those serving in any armed forces in Laos, and foreign civilians connected with the supply, maintenance, storing and Laos operations by hiring utilization of war materials." -/ Applied to South Vietnam, such wording would seem to prohibit the kind of civilian program which the U. S. gov- ernment is now organizing here. But the -hasty dispatch of C130s to South Vietnam indi- cates confidence in Washing- ton that it will not be applied. Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION Approved For Release 2003 Sri RDWMINUR The Central Intelligence Agency: A 5hQrt History tbTf l L1363 ~- . P James Hepburn "1 never had any thought ... when I set up the CIA, that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in a part attributable-to the fact that this quiet Intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role .. . Introductory Note by the Editor The book "Farewell America", by James Hepburn, was published in 1960 in English by Frontiers Co. in Vaduz, Liechtenstein; 418 pages long, including 14 pages of index. Jae s Hepburn is a pseudonym; the book is reputed to have been written by the French Intelligence, in order to report to Ameri- cans %-,hat actually happened in the assassination of. President John F. Kennedy. Copies of the book may be purchased readily in Canada, and at one or two addresses in the United States. No bookstore in the United States that 1 know of will order and sell copies of the book. (Inquire of the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations, 927 15th St. NW, lfashington, D.C. 20005, for ways to pur- chase the book.) The twenty chapters are ab- sorbingly interesting. Information about secret intelligence services and the way they operate is of course not in the open literature. In the two and a half years since I read the book, 1 have seen no demonstra- tion that any of the information contained in the book is false - and the information does tic in with much else that is known. Perhaps more than 90;0 of what is in the book is true. The following article is based on Chapter 15, "Spies", of "Farewell America". - Harry Truman, President of the US- quoted at the start of the chapter kov's "Tsar Saltan" at the Kiev Opera.l The assassin, a lawyer named Din, itri Bogrov, was convinced he had acted in the cause of freedom, and many others before him had sacrificed thpmselves in the struggle against the Tsars. But fanatics like Bogrov who are pre- pared to die for a cause are few indeed, and the nihilists lost more men,-than the imperial families. Professional Soldier Assassins Today,' professional soldiers and guerilla war- riors have taken up where the nihilists left off. .They are just as courageous, but often less success- ful. In Germany, in 12 years of Nazism and 5 years of war, despite the Kreisau Circle and the numerous groups that claimed in 1946 to have belonged to the underground, despite the work of the Allied intel- and the plots hatched by several high-ranking officers of the Welirmacht and the OK',f, Hitler was never assassinated. Two officers, how- ever, tried. The first planted a bomb on one of Hitler's :es, claiming it was a bottle of cognac. The bomb was due to go off in the plane carrying the Fuehrer to the eastern front, but it failed to explode. The assassination attempt was never dis- covered. It was publicized later by its author, who meanwhile had recovered, his "bottle of cognac.". Colonel Von Stauffenberg Against Hitler The second, more serious attempt was the work of Colonel Klaus Von Stauffenberg. His failure dealt a deathblow-to the.plot of July 20, 1944. Stauffen- berg either didn't dare or didn't care to shoot Everywhere - and the United States is no excep- llitler.2 Instead, he pl6ced his briefcase, contain- tion - there are criminals who will do anything for ing the equivalent of a pound of TNT3, under the money. But it is one thing to murder a creditor, a conference table there Hitler was sitting and left Senator or a jealous husband, and quite another to the room, claiming he had to make a phone call. The assassinate the President of the United States. Thf was set off by a detonator a few minutes later. Hired Killers But Colonel Von Stauffenberg, while a brilliant Hired killers are rarely employed by a parapolit- cavalryman, was a poor saboteur. His bomb would seal or paramilitary group. They are much too dan- have killed Hitler, and probably most of th, other gerous. Their connections, their morals, and their officers present, if the conference had been held, insatiable avarice pose too many problems for a as was usually the case at Itastenburg, in the case- responsible organization. On the other hand, a ment of a cement blockhouse. The closed quarters number of individuals active in groups like the would have magnified the compression, and the explo- John Birch Society, the Patrick Henry Association, Sion would have proved fatal. On that hot July day, and the Christian Crusaders would be only too happy however, the conference was held instead in a wooden only to volunteer for an ideological crime. But, although barracks with the vindnws open. Hitler was successful assassinations have on occasion been the knocked to the floor and slightly wounded by the work of fanatics, serious-minded conspirators would explosion. prefer not to rely on idealists. History tells us. Colonel Von Stauff.cnberg was mistaken in his Why. choice of an explosive. TNT is excellent for blow- Approved it fRt eanggse 2000/05/ ((C~IA-R $P4it,Ea J~' h an d es al 5naforus~~5~ type The Tsar's Prime Minister, Stolypin, was s~ 't 3'' death In 1911 during a performance of Himsky-horsa- defensive grenade of the type used by the German ATL1.11TIC Approved For Release 2000/O J1I51b f IA-RDP80-016 LIFE' LETTERS THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTH- EAST ASIA by Alfred W. McCoy Harper & Row, $ 10.95 One fact is beyond dispute: heroin Js flooding into the United States in sufficient quantities to. support an ever growing number of addicts. Esti- mates about the drug traffic are unre- liable, but trends are painfully clear in mounting deaths, young zombies stumbling through city streets., crime to the point of civic terror. There are ? ?said to be some 560.000 addicts in America now, twice the number esti- mated two years ago and ten times the level of 1960. Another fact goes unchallenged: suddenly, in 1970, high-grade pure white heroin, which Americans prefer to the less refined drug more nor- mally consumed by Asians, appeared in plentiful and cheap supply wher- ever there were GI's in Vietnam. The epidemic was a vast eruption. It took the withdrawal of the troops to douse it, for the fearful flow could not be staunched. Beyond those facts, the sordid story of drug trafficking has been a shad- owy, elusive mixture of controversial elements. It was obvious that there must be corruption involved. It was obvious that there must be politics in- volved, if only because the traffic con- tinues to flourish on such a scale de- spite the energetic pronouncements of powerful governments. It takes a map of the whole world to trace the drug net. Since the United States suddenly became aware of the sinister dimen- sions of the plague and President Nixon bravely declared war on drugs (unlike the persistently undeclared war in Indochina), it has been cus- tomary for U.S. officials to pinpoint the poppy fields of Turkey and the clandestine laboratories of Marseille as the source of most of the American curse. Nobody denied that the bulk of the world's illicit opium some say 70 percent, some say 50 to 60 percent) is grown in Southeast Asia and partic- ularly in the "golden triangle" of mountains where Burma, Thailand, and Laos meet. But the U.S. govern- ment insisted, and continues to insist in the 111-page report on the world opium trade published in August, that this supplies natives and seldom enters American veins. Not so, says Alfred W. McCoy, who spent some two years studying the trade. And further, it is certain to become less and less so as measures which the United States demanded in Turkey and France take effect in blocking the old production and smuggling patterns. This is of crucial importance for two reasons. One is that firm establishment of an Asian pattern to America means that the crackdown in Turkey and France will be next to futile so far as availability of heroin in the United States is con- cerned. The second is that focusing attention on Southeast Asia would bring Americans to understand that the "war on drugs" is inextricably in- volved with the Indochina war, and has to be fought on the same battle- ground from which President Nixon STATINTL assured us he was disengaging "with honor." McCoy, a twenty-seven-year-old Yale graduate student, worked with immense diligence and considerable courage-for the opium trade is dan- gerous business and the combination of opium, politics, and. war can be murderous-to document the facts of the Asian pattern. A good deal of it has been common gossip in tawdry bars of Saigon, Vien- tiane, and Bangkok for years. But the gossip mills of Indochina are a long way from the streets of Harlem and the high schools of Westchester County. The general knowledge that the rumors reflected is a long way from precise, confirmed detail. So the Asian pattern had -never come through clearly in the United States. Now, in his book The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, McCoy has set it down. To show how it devel- oped, he had to backtrack. The use of opiates in the United States has a long history. It wasn't until after World War I that widespread oppro- brium, added to growing understand- ing of the dangers, turned the trade into an underworld monopoly. But World War II disrupted the supply routes. Unable to get drugs, Ameri- can addicts were forced to quit the hard way. The market diminished, and, with a modicum of enforcement effort and international cooperation, might have been wiped out. A single U.S. official act, McCoy believes, turned that chance around and enabled the creation of a world- wide octopus of evil almost beyond .Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 .L'riis iVhW XUHK '1'1M1J5 MAUAZLNJ; 29 Oct 1972 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-R fi6!b1h0 An "T that an insider has publicly discussed the "secret' r war." Who .-Cr, That war has evolved into a steady procession of rainy-season offensives by the Pathet Lao and Rile ftQxe2s 20;26. North Vietnamese. The other side has gained stead-' :.3 4i Ily and now controls at least two-thirds of the territory and about half of the three million popu- lation of Laos. In essence, the United States' mis- ; , 'J ! Sion in Laos is ?still the same as it was five years Ci in Vientiane. Bombing wasn't working militarily in Laos or in North Vietnam then, and-according `~ t tl bl' h d d By Seymour M. Hersh Seymour M. Hersh is a member of The Times's Washington bureau. His latest book is "Cover-Up: The Army's Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai 4." J Jerome J. Brown could easily be mistaken for a typical American businessman living abroad. He's 30 years old, slightly beefy, profane and constantly wears oversized sunglasses. He's now a partner in a management consulting firm headquartered in Malaysia, where he lives with his Indonesian wife a bachelor's degree in 1964. His family, moderately and their young son. wealthy, now lives in Wilmette, Ill., a high-income Brown has been in Southeast Asia less than suburb of Chicago. Brown's biggest passions, be- seven years, but he knows it extremely well. He fore Vietnam, were golf, baseball and a sports car should. He was once in charge of bombing parts his father bought him for his 17th birthday.' of it. "When I first came back to the States in 1970," For 18 months, beginning in early' 1967, Capt.- he said, "I wasn't ready to sit down and talk. I Jerry Brown operated covertly as the chief Air don't care now. I think the country's ready for it. Force targeting official for the secret air war in Something has to be done." Laos. He was assigned to Project 404, a still- Brown is convinced that what was wrong with classified bombing operation personally controlled the air war in the nineteen-sixties is still wrong. by the American Ambassador to Laos. And for "The bombing can't work and the senior air officers more than a year before his assignment to Laos, would never totally present the picture as it really. Brown - then a lieutenant - worked as a highly was. The politicians and the ambassadors and the. trained photo-intelligence specialist for the Seventh Presidents are continually being lied to," Brown Air Force in Saigon. Later in his career, he was said during the interview, which took place at assigned the key job of writing intelligence man- the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. uals for Southeast Asia reconnaissance operations. He described what he said were the two most Because of the secrecy, Captain Brown never wore his uniform in Vientiane, Laos's capital. He dressed instead in another uniform: business suit, white shirt and tie, and he carried papers identifying him as an employe of the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.). He worked in an unmarked building in the center of the city, 'along with more than 100 other Air Force and Army attaches who were also clandestinely assigned. His job was a remarkable one for a junior Air Force officer-picking targets for a secret bombing war carried out under the direction of the American Ambassador, Captain Brown left the Air Force in late 1968 and began his business consulting career in Malay- sia, but he kept in touch with former colleagues and with the air war. ' On a recent business trip to the United States-only his second visit since 1968-the former officer agreed to a wide-ranging .interview, in violation of his agreement not to disclose clasflf fapp dif arvf a a$ist2_ _ - IM'" y pu is e Unite States intelligence estimates-it still has failed to slow down the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese operations, de- spite causing widespread damage and many deaths In both North Vietnam and Laos. There was little in Brown's background to sug- gest he would become a maverick, A number of his former colleagues and superiors, while reluctant to discuss specifics, had high praise for him. "He's a very respectable guy in our business," one high- ranking Air Force intelligence officer said at the Pentagon. Another officer said simply, "He's credi- ble." And another privately confirmed many of Brown's facts and specific recollections. Brown was born in Newark and attended the College of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minn., earning important myths about the air war: "One, that bombing is accurate" and two, "that when it's accurate it totally destroys targets, which it doesn't." He cited a number of examples that demon- strated, he said, that the North Vietnamese-de- spite the heavier bombing and improved reconnais- sance technology of the nineteen-seventies-were capable of coping. Among them: their ability to move scores of Russian-built tanks without detec- tion down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the months before the North Vietnamese offensive this April. The tanks were deployed around the province cap- ital of Anloc, which was later besieged. "Even the laser bomb can't make a difference," Brown said. "It's an agrarian society. We can knock out a bridge at Thanhhoa [in North Vietnam] and they'll go down river 10 miles and ford it there: We can knock out all the electricity and taey'II burn wood. We can mine Haiphong Harbor th i p eum, P601 0?'20001 -5 5 the a ro eum oil an u scants continued f Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-R5T*bLK401 R00061 Oc1obci ?5, 1972 CONG fl SSJONAL 1'I?COPD-E.l'xC;I51(IIIS of Remarks Laotian ge ith ,ls, it scenes, are provkl- ing the tin n , ration for chug sm u - plers. Ironically', according to the n pons in Andei:SON'S poa..ession, the and trucks to tram;sport the. Al em'ica-ljound naa.rcotics are ]r~: a for by the U.S. mili- ta.ry programs which Con'lre_:S has said should be cut of in just this kind of ei+.uat;ion. Ihi; secret report goes on to say, ac- carding to Andei oil, that the didiculiy of cuts n'g off aid is gaeet since ?tla ink of jeopardizing smile part of the military is high Our $240 million aid to Cambodia goes to help support one of the major `h ip- ment Points for Southeast, Asuin heroin and the tlrst able ecrfupt governri.erit that protects this operation. lin.iervon goes on to We from We report: If US. Ad v,ere wa5hdrr n, the govern- n;ertt'S chit Iy to sichvland Comrlllni.>t ag- gic.,:sion would be vwOened to the paint of collapse. Are we to believe that the prospect of the Collapse Of a tiny corrupt govern- ment on the other side of the world is more important than We deaths of hun- dreds of our young people, black and white, because of heroin? The story is no better in South Viet- na:n. While the . Thicu regime has mouthed promises to stem we flow of heroin from its mountainous areas, Aih- delmSon quotes this report as saying, "the ecaruption among government, civili n, military and police aft;ciois, retie of whom have been participating in the narcotics traffic themselves shakes the prospects of stopping South Vietnamese heroin traffic without drastic action very dim. As for these drastic actions, the report is further quoted to saty: it is not in the U.S. interests to lnipleineiit an a-r cut-off, evert to punish Vietnam for failure to control Ui-age. Thailand and much of South America repeat this some dcpressin c story. OU i- ously, the war on drugs'has become the victim of the war in Southeast Asia. Up to 100,000 American GI's sent to fighht in Vietnam since 1939 because ad- Acted to heroin prod ucect and marketed by our Southeast Asian allies. This salve heroin is now taking its toll in our own country. Claims of impressive seizures, impor- tant arrests, and international coopera- tion can :simply not hicle the failures. Bidding America cf the heroin plague should be a seriously pursued national go'=.1. When we spend $60 billion to figi:ht North Vietnam and less than $1 billion to fight drug acidicticn, the priorities are an thing but correct. In September 1070, a leading Federal narcotics officer said: Every time one addict is cured, more take his place because of the ever-increasing amounts of heroin available. A year ago, the American people were told that opium production was being phased out in Turkey-nhich linen in the past accounted for 00 percent of the her- oin being smuggled into the United States. For Americans today, this elicits sever- al questions which should be asked. If opium production in '1arkea is bcint ph d out, hbe; can Perot is i n,.rt.m?C tin,,--and aciciicticn---ie mm;cr.rasnig? aid why is tit c ema11 l,ics;le;a t`;orsc. than ever after all the calls for special asiioit? T]hr answer, again, lies in the region k:?asseni as the Golden T'mam-yIC where tlae bordors of Thai!; mid, Lau war and hno.i c*rivcrgo One s'ear's cru:: cif 759 to 1,0 h Laos cr li be refaned 11110 el,ot a;li l eromu k-snlllily Amherica?s addicts for 10 years. Mere aid more of this herdn is r.'eachin Ow Anic'-icmen market. SonIin st Asia has been a Ina or pro- dsrs_er of audit and lima had titaar l:rc eIeihhs of its ov n some tityc. BS only in 1009 did the wit^_ mire No. 4 it,.roin prized by Ai,ic:rican >tair. Put- two years ago, w'?n heroin addic- tion hit epidemic prapot'tions among .Antericon Gis in South Vietnam, th Astan narcotics traffic -sud~'.~r,hr became Amer- ica's busineo;. Nov 1the GI market almost has ',vanished with the with- drawal of America n troops from \'ietn;:re. But the drug problem It tern on - a legacy of the Vitamin War as the her- oin trafiiclcers seek now out- lets in the Luber States to no- place their ks: GI market. At the Barre time President Nixon I:as drti, \C4t ~cAii 6 iC \i t) 11 n C ]1 I'I uI ctarr the' r.15!:'ii,Cc drE:,,ttll. I'ATT_A.~t,, I tn.: rc .r1 hconic Alrlei'1Ca11 Iile:1 ii:l)C!1 in C2,.1lU~it ell i~lr Lt-,t,t'~riS 1'1 IC',1 111 tli In'benl'I st :aar h, a!`II1vr 9 q 9 II 'iel C"f+'it l ;1 r):ii:El 71 {rfl alal,ch of \vair d GU1E`.11dc ~l 1Jonui ,,ir listed a rniszitl~ n!' csl'i;iu'ed this v'c2 nto~t th:trter alld hauler) ;nff ill to fist fc~.;r tiwrt:: of In each ca,c inlrttse Cntn ', your ; m^n raU'ht vrithout 192 __.;i?.,lii I The ?' itrStic are rllltiist. A11L1:'i'`:' h 'tr Cc ".d 11rnper Well! f1C'Atioil Impor's. StrifCCI U al1C, of 1',uman riVC fritttr,l d:SaUit At,tl}r reH'I'llit^1's Ill SnUtilerll litltu e. SCtit ht :)ds d of Tan;1 n ~ lsc7 t~l t. ~1\) ] cr'.d 1,111 hitrt. In T.nder drag c:.f th^ age. The tit r i as f the Americans. The, dirt air Lon;; Chong had come under a heavy North Viet- namese attack in January'. For the. fiest time,'the North Vietnamese breached ridge- line defenses that protected the Long Cheng Valley and a vital air strip. Because of the situation around Long Chong, it base strip is receiving an all- weather surface, and office buildings and warehouses STATINTL are being built besides tie being enclosed with a chain- link fence. airstrip. The entire area is Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 ROANOKE, VA. Appr 4rF tr1RePa se 20-00/05/15 : CW*b O-01601 -U G i 1i72 ' F - 49,146 Vere have been only a few braye individuals in Congress will- ing to take on the whole of the Nix- on~'Administration's war on interna- t}onal drug trafficking. The reasons are obvious. No one All his right mind wants to he placed in the category of being pro-heroin, and on the surface, the opposition of Rep. Robert Steele, R-Conn., and a few others would appear to be a misjudgment. In addition, the corn- pleXities of the traffic are so great that one has to know his facts be- fore venturing any opinion; those who. couldn't- even follow the plot line of "The French Connection" would be totally lost after one'pass at'the real world of drug trade. But . the opposition has some good points, and it turns out that Rep. Steele and the others are not, after all, suggesting that addiction can be fun. What they are suggest- ing is that the administration's 18- month-old drug trade abatement program may be both self-defeating and. ,limed in the wrong direction, toward European' labs and Turkish "sources. It is self-defeating, some of the ? critics say, because if the flow of heroin into this country is apprecia- bly slowed, it will "only guarantee that the price for the commodity will rise and that a price rise, in turn, will cause more drug-related crimes. There is no answer to.this objec- tion except the British system of -drug-maintenance for addicts. A law professor. at Stanford, Herbert Packer, mainttains that decrimi- nalization of heroin and related ac- tivities 'would dry up the tremen- dous profits in drugs overnight.. That may be an exaggeration; but the British solution would make such trade and sales less profitable. 14owever . the strain of Puritanism AOptoved Ior Release 2000105/15 -in America, which would equate such a drug maintenance program as trafficking with the Devil, runs strong enough to make prospects for such a program dim for the foresee- able future. The . second charge--that the U.S. program. is misdirected, is based oil- the contention that the Nixon efforts are largely ,overlook- ing the tremendous role of South- east Asia in the international heroin. picture. Alfred McCoy, a student of Southeast Asian history at Yale, makes the case (in excerpt- ed in Harper's magazine) that the greatest potential source of heroin is the "Golden Triangle" of Burma, Thailand and Laos. I-le-claims, also, that the CIA, in its long struggle to orgaili t4o1ril men of Laos in a counter-insurgency war, has pro- -vided the logistics. for vastly in- creased heroin traffic and has re- fused to admit the terrible implica- tions of that traffic because some of its most important "clients" are making profit from that traffic. The. Bureau of -Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has admitted, be- latedly, that there is some truth in .the McCoy argument. In a recent secret report that leaked out, the agency says that the Southeast Asian heroin sources are larger than previously thought and that there is evidence that the potential of the, "Golden, Triangle". is n 6t being lost on organized crime. That area has produced as much as 70 per cent of the annual production of opium, the source of heroin; and if the CIA continues to build airfields and prop up corrupt local generals, production might even increase. J The administration should be listening to the voices of dissent. Drug trafficking; like prostitution, is I not so much rooted out as temporar ily inconvenienced. If the demand continues, the administration had better face up to some of the real-. problems of pinched supply. ;CIA-RIP '0=01601 R00060012'6001-5 NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOON Approved For Release 2000/05Q11155,~I/ DP80-0160 On June 1 of this year an official of the US Central Intelligence Agency paid a visit to the New York offices of my publisher, Harper and Row, Inc. This CIA official was Mr. Cord. Meyer, Jr. (now the CIA's Assist- ant Deputy Director of Plans; formerly the CIA official . in charge of providing covert financial 'subsidies for organizations such as the ? National Student Association, Erz- eount(cr Magazine, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom).' Mr. Meyer urged sev- eral of his old friends among Harper and -',Row's senior management to provide him with a copy of , the galley proofs of, my history of. the international narcotics traf- fie, The Politics of heroin in Southeast U Asia. In this book. I sJiow the complicity of various US agencies-particularly the CIA and tlr State Department-in organizing the Southeast Asian drug traffic since the early 1950s. 'Mr. Meyer presented one. of Harper and Row's senior editors with some documents giving the .CIA's view on the Southeast Asian drug traffic. His manner was grave. -lie Said, "You wouldn't want to publish a book that would be full of inaccuracies,' embarrass thb United States government, or get you involved in libel suits, would you Alfred W: McCoy the galley. proofs to the CIA could set a dangerous precedent and ultimately weaken First Amendment guarantees concerning freedom of the press. Moreover, in view of what I had learned of the CIA's operating methods in Southeast Asia I was convinced that the Agency was. capable of using unethical means-such as coercing my sources into retracting statements they had made to me about US complicity in the international narcotics traffic-in order to induce Harper and Row to withdraw the book from publication. After a week of negotiations, however, Harper and Row, told me that they would not be willing to publish the book. unless I agreed to submit the manuscript to the CIA. Faced with what I believed would be lengthy delays if I took the book to another publisher and the prospect of losing my Harper and Row editor, Elisa- beth Jakab, with whom I had worked closely, I capitulated. ? Thus began more than 'two months of lengthy negotiations between the CIA, Harper and Row, and myself. Most of what happened during these elaborate negotiations is in the corre- spondence reprinted below. 1 have added introductory notes to explain some of.the attending circumstances. ; Harper and Row's management promised considered collectively, this. exchange of to' consider Mr. Meyer's request and sum-' letters provides us with another important n1pned me from Washington, DC, where I reminder-perhaps the first since tlce Na was then testifying before the Senate tional Student Association scandals of Appropriations Committee on my findings 1967-of the contempt this most clan- after eighteen months of research into the destine of our governmental agencies has Southeast Asian drug traffic. This research for the integrity of the press and publish- included more than 2$0 interyiews with ing industry. As the CIA's letter of July heroin dealers, police officials, and intelli- 28, 1972, shows, it was unable to rebut STATINTL and Row by stating categorically that it could rebut all my charges about its complicity in the international narcotics traffic. We were surprised, however, that the CIA made no reference to "national security" as one of its concerns in.request- ing to review the manuscript. Rather, the Agency made its request purely on grounds of government privilege. Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 Mr. 13. Brooks Thomas Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 5. July 1972 gence agents in Europe and Asia. effectively my analysis of its role in the Dear Mr. Thomas: . international heroin traffic during the last ,lir. Cord Meyer has asked me to At a meeting in New York on the quarter century. Since the CIA simply-had respond to your letter to him of June 30th afternoon of June 8, Harper and Row's no plausible defense against this charge, it in connection with the book, The Politics president, Mr. Winthrop Knowlton, and. its ,tried to impose prior censorship in order to of Heroin in Southeast Asia, by Alfred W. senior vice president,. Mr. B. Brooks avoid public scrutiny of its record. If it McCoy. s, told me that they had decided to was not already clear, it now should be As you are no doubt aware, Mr. McCoy provide the CIA with a copy of the galley obvious to publishers that the Agency testified on '2. June 1972 before the proofs prior to publication for the follow- cannot be regarded as a responsible critic Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the ing reasons First, the CIA would be less likely to when its pubic image is seriously ti neat- Seri- to Appropriations Committee. His te..ti- ened by what is. written about it. mony included allegations concerning sup- seek a temporary. court -injunction barring publication of the book if the Agency were port of the international opium traffic by given a chance to persuade itself that U. S. agencies, including the Central Intel- II- national security was in no way endangered 1 ligence Agency, and numerous other allega- by portions of my book; and secondly, 1 In this letter, written after Cord Meyer, tions concerning participation in the opium Harper and Row felt that a responsible Jr.'s visit, Harper and Row asked the CIA traffic by both Americans and local per- ' sonnel in Southeast Asia. publisher should have enough confidence in for official confirmation of their interest in pernicious' nature of the veracity , of any of its particularly seeing the book. Since the CIA had never In light traffic, of allegations ththe pernic in- controversial books to show them to any before been quite so willing to defend the the dthe vemuthe gt trfafthe U. S: concerning cr in- . reputable critic for comment prior to itself publicly, neither Harper and Row nor r ticalien of American citizens publieati?~ AR(cove Fob telea U/0 /'15'Yt'O A'R[~P~~20 6 h dd 1 4 OA,3~200fild5on hard At first I disc a strongly wn larper Agency. and Row's decision, arguing that submitting evidence.' It is our belief that no reru?able NEWS`R'EEK 21 AUG.CI RDP80-01601 R000 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 Sparks or Sputters? A Washington drawing room was the scene last year of an unlikely encounter between poet Allen Ginsberg and Rich- ard Helms, director of the Central.Intel- ligence Agency. The subject of the post- poetry-reading confrontation was opium /-and Ginsberg insisted that the CIA was deeply involved in shipping it around Southeast Asia. So totally false did Helms consider the accusation that he agreed to a fascinating bet with the poet: Helms promised that he would sit down for an hour of meditation each day for the rest of his life if the charges wei-e proved correct. The same accusations-true or not- boiled again last week. This time, the STATINTL Robert R. McElroy-Newsweek McCoy interviewing Laotians, and his provocative book front guerrillas to government officials, are so deeply involved-the CIA not only even helps them transport opium and heroin. Soon afterward, the CIA's gener- al counsel, Lawrence Houston, wrote to Harper & Row: "We believe we cannot stand by and see baseless, criticism ... without trying to set the record straight," After considerable deliberation, har- per & Row sent the agency a set of gal- leys. Seven days later, the CIA weighed in with a lengthy critique-which Hai-per up their own minds. "I had hoped that Thy work would be interesting enough to spark a public debate," lie says. "Now the CIA, by attempting to suppress the book, has itself sparked the debate." Still, there is no indication that CIA director Helms has been convinced by the book's charges; he has not disclosed any plans to begin daily .meditations, & Row editors judged rather light. B.t,/ Brooks Thomas, vice president and gen- eral counsel of the publishing house, then replied to- Houston: "We believe the best service we can render the author; the CIA and the general public is to CIA, which almost never takes a public stand on any issue, clashed with the re- spected publishing firm of Harper & Row. At issue is a book-"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia"-in which au- thor Alfred W. McCoy presents a heavi- ly documented argument that the CIA has assisted in the flow of opium and its 'by-product, heroin. The CIA challenged the book before publication, and Harper & Row reluctantly allowed the agency to peruse the galleys. Then, despite ~a list of objections specified by the CIA, '.Harper & Row announced that it was satisfied that the book was sound and would publish it this week=a month ahead of schedule.. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate student, first made his accusations during Congressional testimony in June. McCoy charged that because drug traffic is such a local custom in Asia-and U.S. allies, publish the book as expeditiously as pos- sible, and that is what we intend to do." Privately, the Harper.. & Row lawyer commented, "We were underwhelmed by their criticism." Why did the CIA-usually the most silent of government' agencies-take on Harper & Row so publicly? One agency insider observed that McCoy's charges had been made before-mostly in under- ground or fringe publications. "But what I think has got the - backs up around here," he suggested, "is that the "charges are now showing up in Harper 's maga- zine and in a Harper & Row book. That is hitting where these people live," he said, gesturing around him'at CIA head- quarters. "These are people with vast contacts in the academic community and government. They can't let this ridicu- lous falsehood be accepted as fact." McCoy is content to let readers make Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 THE HOUSTON POST .' 00/05/15 : CIA-R p80-01 60.1 R0 20 AUG72 Despite Its full commitment to the light against the narcotics trade, the CIA runs into continual accusations of engaging In the traffic itself. . The accusations. center around Air America, an airline operating in Viet- nam and Laos and Into the "Golden Triango where 70 per cent of the world's Illicit opium Is produced. It is an open secret that Air America was covertly established by the U.S. government to provide safe and ade- quate air services in a part of the world where commercial. carriers provided nei- ther. The capital to start It v:as funneled through the CIA, which still serves as a -funding mechanism for operating costs, but it is a?semi-autonomous organization t{hose employes are. all civilians under contract to the airline and not to the CIA or the U.S. government. AIR AMERICA, RUNS scheduled flights throughout 'Vietnam and Laos, and it Is used by all manner of passen- gers with official travel orders. fined for use only as currency In Meo village barter. Far, more serious is the problem of ranking Laotian diplomats and military notables who smuggle large quantities of opium and heroin out of Laos and into the world market. The diplomats are Immune to search when they travel, and an Air America employe - a resident alien, in Laos - would be on a sticky wicket if he tried to search the luggage of a senior Lao- tian official in Laos itself. The responsibility, moreover, is not that of the airline but of the customs service in the country of arrival. Here again, diplomatic luggage Is immune to search, as are certain official aircraft used by the military, and a country that insists on an illegal search' had better find what it i.$ looking for. T1H JULY IT. BPEJi'S magazine fear tares an extract from the forthcoming book "The Politics of Heroin in Soutast Asia," by Yale Ph.D. student Al l feed McCoy. The extract starts, with a detailed description of the arrival at Orly Airport in Paris on 2.5 April 1971 of Prince Sopsaisana, the new Laotian am- bassador to France. Despite'the presence of a large recep- tion party, the prince insisted on waiting for his numerous official suitcases like an ordinary tourist, and when they ar- rived he at once noticed one was miss- in Laos, it' fs also used or a charter basis to' support the irregular war effort against the North Vietnamese, trans- porting supplies, equipment and food as well as advisers and the Moo tribesmen and-their families from hilltop airstrip to hilltop airstrip. Throughout the "Golden Triangle" - ing. Ile angrily demanded that it he pro- which is beyond all formal ' adminis duced, but was forced to depart with the tration, no matter what the lines on the promise that it would be delivered to the map say - no currency has much value, Laotian embassy- as soon as it was and raw opium serves as the basis of found. what passes for an economy. ' The suitcase contained 132 pounds of The CIA does not and never has paid its assets in it and does not and never has dealt in It. The tribesmen with whom the CIA works, however, -do deal in it, and raw opium in small amounts has undoubtedly moved on Air America flights in the bundles of Meo personal possessions. pure heroin. France refused to accept Sopsaisana's gtedentials, and he had to return to Labs.( The gist of 'McCoy's article Is that the. drug trade in the "Golden Triangle" flourishes with CIA support. His argu- ment runs,. . 0 All the leading figures in Laos 'are deeply involved In the drug trade. of these figures. 0 Ergo, the CIA Is supporting the' STATINTL While the first two statements are cor- rect, the conclusion is not valid and :is not borne out by any evidence. McCoy might, for example, have asked who tipped the French govern- ment off to this particular shipment. Customs officials do not 'take it upon themselves to search an ambassador's luggage. Authority for that can only come from the highest levels, and takes days to arrange. The Orly, officials, moreover; knew precisely. which suitcase to sequester. They, removed the right piece of luggage and let the rest go in a matter' of min- utes, obviously before there had been .any chance to -search all of them. In short they had heard from Victiane ex- actly what to look for, and this tip did not come from the Laotian government.. The U.S. government, through. the State Department and the CIA, is doing all it can! to scotch the trade. The gov- ernment of South Vietnam has had im- pressed on it that collusion between its customs officials and arriving smugglers is a f;erious_matter, and it has arrested .both its own citizens and halted and searched ranking foreigners. In s Ii o r t , neither ' the CIA nor any other U.S. agency has ever deliber- ately 'engaged in, fostered or cast a de- liberately blind eye on narcotics smugcl- ing, although it has worked in other fields with officials who have been pri- vately active in that one. Raw opium has undoubtedly been transported on Air America flights in the past, but only as a private venture of a foreign passenger, and never with the connivance of an Air America employe. And the CIA has done what it can to prevent the use of Air America for such purposes. The stories will no doubt continue, as -long as there is a need for air services hi-Indochina, and as long as opium holds the peculiar place it does in the econo- my of that part of the world. But the stories must be seen in perspective, and in no way will they support the con- tention that ' the U.S. government, through the activities of the CIA, has de- liberately furthered the International narcotics trade. Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01 601 R000&00120001-5 AM AMERICA WILL stop this when it can,' but it Isn't easy. No U.S. airline, for example, has yet discovered how to prevent even shotguns from being 'smuggled aboard their flights. The prob- lem is in any event inconsequential, 1since the amounts are small and des- I THE MIAMI HURAID "AMRDP80-016*01 R00 000/6 A I k fl f~-{b .. niter t is m the coc pit of Ino- L china. that Marlin finds him- self. disillusioned with the "Company" because of a se- ries of gory missions, includ- ing one which devastated the fishing villages of North Vietnam and triggered the Tonkin Gulf incident and ul- timately the Tonkin Resolu- tion-which plunged the U.S. headlong into the Vietnam- COMPANY MAN, by Joe Maggio; G.P, Putnam; $5.95. Re4fewed by't.AWRENCE MAHONEY About the most accurate appraisal of this first novel is to call, it an expanded version of the:'men's blood and guts Fiction that appears in pulp magazines.- That essen-. ese Civil'War. tially is what Miamian Joe . IT .IS. IN 'Laos. near. the Maggio has done. -North Viet border. that Mar- Tho publisher touts it as a ';tin crosses up his superiors sand finds himself arrested for powerful novel of modern 'crossing the border to rescue warfare, a rival to. Robin .tribesmen he had trained and Moore's "The Green Berets" sent over. stag of a few years back. Heady' The hook ends With'a to- adventure stuff, but it; tally disillusioned Max) leav- ing "the Company" for a ? local mercenary' force in the MUCH of.the book is set In Miami, Coconut Grove to be exact. Maggio has long -played the soldier-of-foll tine there and the book's Nick Marlin doubtlessly' is -based on himself. The paragraphs of this .'book are stuffed to over- flowing with military abbre- viations. his doesn't help Maggio's. chopped style ei- ther and he has a lot to learn about dialogue. it is' quite easy to write such fiction about the Cen= tral Intelligence Agency be- cause 'the truth about that superspy "company" is so hard to come by. MAGGIO'S story line cen- ters on Nick Martin, 'a Hem-. ingway=type hero, a mavet- Ick who finds himself in the contract employment of the CIA in Miami and Guatemala during the buildup for the Bay of Pigs episode. Congo, -where lie becomes a true mercenary, risking his I i f e in combat only for money, with no concern for cause. - If Maggio's. book is based' on fact, which th.e publisher claims it. is, then the CIA' training and operations' are even i'nore weird and un- checked than Americans have had reason to believe y}befoi . . ' 4 Lawrence Mal*ney Is a Herald -staff 4 ritcr. Specifically, he is --cm -.~, ployed by something called SOD (Special Operating Divi? sion), a paramilitary group used to do the CiA's dirtiest work. After the abortive Cuba invasion, Martin finds' himself in a variety of other, difficult spots.. I>nwts STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R QUINCY, MASS. PATRIOT.LEDGER E - 6 f35 1 9 1972': L BAL C NN 9J I Two U.S. government reports released this week show the size and complexity of the drug prob- lem and point to some gloomy con- clusions about, the effectiveness of attempts to control it. A "World Opium Survey, 1972, put together by the State Depart- ment, Central Tntelligcln4p A? en- cy, Bureau of Narcotics, Customs Bureau and Treasury, found that the international heroin market controlled by international crinri- nah "cartels," continued to have enough heroin. to supply the Nvorld's users. despite increasing crackdoiw,ns and seizures. A mini- nhumn of 200 tons of opium (from which heroin is refined) were es- timated on the world market in 1971; in the same year, about one- tenth of that amount was seized by law-enforcement a g e ii c i e s world wide. This year, seizures are running somewhat higher than last, year. The report estimated that 100 kilo ''rams of heroin, representing an investment of less than $300,- 000 to the French Corsicans who control the European trade, would ultimately sell for $22 million on the streets of New York. Although efforts are under way to control the growing of the ophnn poppy, notably in Turkey,' the report said those efforts are unlikely to be successful in' vari- ous areas unless accompanied by "serious changes in a number of long-standing roc.ial and economic traditions." An illustration of the complexi- ties involved in the opium trade' is the case of the Meo hill tribes- "T ' men of Laos. The 117eo tribesmen have been an important force in the U.S. effort to support the Lao- tian government in its war with the Communists. On the other hand, the principal cash crop of the Meo is the opium poppy. .The other report this week was on an investigation by the Covern- ment Accounting Office of chug abuse. control programs in the U.S. military services. The report found that although the Defense Depart- went has actively cooperated in the enforcement of laws against drug trafficking, there is no way of telling whether its drug educa- tion programs are effective. The study suggested that en- forcement erackdowvns may have contributed to the replacement in the drug- trade of marijuana, which is bulky and easily detected by smell, by more dangerous drugs such as heroin. And, said the report, military, programs offering c? cmptions from prosecution for drug users who voluntarily turned themselves in for treatment had resulted largely in confusion, distrust and resentment among; both troops and their immediate superiors. Fur- ther, said the accounting office, rehabilitation programs for drug users have mef with very limited success. The conclusions to be drawn .are as familiar as'they are cheerless: the drug problem is a reflection of deep and complex problems in the modern world, and most of our attempts to deal with it to date have been hasty, shallow and in- sufficient. Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600126001-5 Approved For Release 2000/( /11 : CIA RDP80-01601 R00 G 1972 STATINTL .Free (drug). enterprise Perusal of news dispatches about the Federal '-World Opium Survey 1972" discloses several deficiencies in the report. It does not deal with the role of the Central Intelli- gence Agency in conspiring in the opium traffic in the "golden triangle" in Burma. Thailand. and Laos. That CIA 'role is dealt with in detail in Alfred W. h'IcCov's "The-Pol- itics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." published yesterday by Harper & Row. The.Survey is. thus. a coverup for the CIA's drug oper- ations. The Survey does not deal with the drug traffic in Sai- gon where several of President Thieu's generals are major operatQrs. That traffic has been protected by the U.S. com- mand. One consequence has been the massive drug addic- tion aiiiong GIs. addiction which.lias returned to the U.S. with them. The Survey reveals one useful.-consequence of Pt?esi- dens Nixon's visit to Peking. For years the U.S. Narcotics Bureau. and I1arry Anslinger. its chief. carried on a sland-' erous war,against the Peoples Republic of China as the main source of the world's opium traffic. The present re- port admits. in effect. that that was a lie.'There is "no re- liable evidence that China has either engaged in or sane- tioned the illicit export of opium or its derivatives." it says. The Survey concedes that. world-wide. government "seizures... represent only a small fraction of the illicit flow." The obvious conclusion is than the flow, of opium through the capitalist world is made possible by massive corruption of government officials. police agents, etc. The inspiration for the massive business in opium is the same one that inspiresother business - profit. In this respect. it is a shining example of "free enterprise." Approved. For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 .I1.AI.VVl 0VU111 VJ.i LOH1v 111 />111VV17JJ. l4+ Aug 1972 .Approvedil-For'Release 2000/051`15 CIA-RDP8 Ax, "IN '11.1. an V c~ 1'J itJ~ J tit 9 ~tJ ~? VIT3'~~ ftfi,~ H, (Ili 1~t3 ~ti 1 G1t4+ Si '~E7 f.aiial[,.~'q t r t inriirislratian has been striving to foster the Nguyen Van Ni h xo n m e Editor's note. - T Thieu regime as a tool for (lee 11 t'ietnamization " of the uurr. lint ino glossy velieer can hide the latter's nature as a traitorous clique, a gang of robbers tridhq in prostitutes, drugs and war niearrs, -n~arheteers and embezzlers rewho have been 1;hrnstering "aid / bl : oc a band of political speculators, fiends and the salaries, and :va;tes 0/ their awns civil servants. and soldiers -all this treader fl+.i:erican. Protection. The follotz,ing inquiry by 1'h-rnh Aana exposes part of this corrupt and ro'tan US-preppet AIGON, in early 1972. Tens of thousands of Honda and Suzuki motorbikes and Mercedes and Datsun sedans of every colour and line rush along, belching clouds of exhaust fumes which ruin the foliage and flowers .'of the trees lining the stre.cts. The 3-6 niilliorl people of Saigon live cowd'd in eleven districts. ?11igh-rise US-style buildings of nine, ten, eleven stnrevs tower insolently- in Doug 1 lianh and Nguyen Iluc avenues chile along muddy and' refuse-strewn alleys in workers' quarters at Chlio ng Dnong, Birth Dong and Chclon. whole fami- lies are crantnlcd into'shantnes of thatch, tin and card-board. The number of Americans in military uniform has decreased a great deal. More and nu,rc snack- bars, Turl:islr-bath esta,blishincuts and massage parlors catering to the. American soldiery are closing down. Americaa military police continue to stall: about, but in dwindling numbers. Aid- yet, while the war is being " Vietnamizcd, the Arincrican' presence remains intact, over.vhclnt- in? in this city. Ir seems to have ro?s It heavier, more stifling.'Tlie scream of aruericiul jets keeps coming from the Tan Son \hiit airfield, Crowds of American civilians and air force officers continue to thrum; To Do boulevard. The 'American hand, the tricks of oil Bunker, the desperate moves of President Nixon to avoid checkmate, as well as the histrionics of Thieu, Ilc,onig, I hiem 'rand Co. are still daily topics of discassion for the Saigcnnese. People talk al-out the fiasco staring Nixon in the face, the inre"itable departure of Nguyen %'-,in Thieu, the collapse of " Vietnantiza- tion. " For the Last seven or ci;;ht year-c, the Saigonese people have had their e. rs full of the " lofty missiuu of the Americans '' in this country and the "stability " of the " Second Republic. " More and more cleairly, the truth is appearing to theta. The fortress in the city Everyone in Saigon knows about the new Amer- ican fortress embassy, Bunker's residence. The of;l embassy at the corner of Ham \ghi and Vo Di N u street's now serves only for the reception of and defended by nnachirlegun nest's. It is served by a puuvcr-house in the backyard, Military police stand guard day and night. The Americans boast' that all building materials came from the United Suites and that plans were drawn and cornstro'.ction supervised by a renowned Anierieann military engineer, at the cost of 2.25 million dollars. in early 14?-11, in an interview with it French journal- i f, .Bunker bragged about the solidity of this "White House " oil tiio eastern shore of [lie Pacific. The iiniinpressed Frenchman replied with it %rrv smile III: Ambassador, in my opinion, the fortress style ci the embassy building suits. gout nanie rather- than ;unbassaclorial Lurlctions. " t3unkcr's face showed that he was not amused by the play on word. In fact, Bunker was no ordin- ary ambassador- and the unusual style . of his residence indeed fits his unusual assif;nment. Banker has been in Saigon for six consecutive years. His is the most difficult and dangerous job eve: ht'hl by an American diplomat in any period of Americair history. I'oliticad circles in Saigon are rife with stories and rumours about the man and the policies to li;'s, been pursuing. In spite of his 7v ccars, Punka is very fastidious about his clo- thes, and the expensive ea-c", de Cologne he uses vary according to the season-hind the occasion. Ile has beer:, before his appointment to Saigon, ambas- sador to Argentina, Italy, India- and Nepal. The Aniericnii prosy considers hint as it skilful trouble-shooter who shows cold toughness not only to his adversaries but also to his allies. Saigon politicians nickname hint The Old Fridge, while the Saigon press has dubbed him the Proc,nusul. His business is to pull the strings on which Nt,eve11 Van Thieu dance;, and It,! seems to' perform it well, Even when the g)ing is 'hard, he knows luny to smooth away the obstacles. For instanc' he would lower his' voice and call Thieu by his name (instead of dr President) and tell hint : "I lie United States is a great country, but one of her foibles is to lack patience. So you should realize that there are limits to American forbearance. Or he would say bluntly' " This has been decided in \Vashington. Once our President has taken it decision, there is no turning back. " Then the only thing Thicu can do is to shut his mouth and stay quiet. If he doesn't, fiunker will have this clin- cher : " You know, Mr Thieu, Congress has became rather restive. They might reduce or even cancel some of the aid appropriations..." And that settles it. STATINTL g y passports ordinary visitors and the delivery of The above arc part of what the world press calls and visas. The new embassy is white painted and the tactics pf pressure and blackmail, the main- six storeys hilt, ii'itlt a helicopter landing strip 's ring of Anicrican diplomacy. on its terrace roof; where it chopper and its pilot ps fact, " Fridge " Bunker. still has one more are standing by at all hours of the day trick reserved for when Thieu is really intractable. and night. The. box shaped et, building is set back lie would smile and give- the. latter a gentle tap on sonic distance from the stn et, surmunair by a the shoulder and say softly NIr Thieu, we happen `solid Ferro-concrete wall, ter s anal with el oni- to know that you and Mrs Thieu have some persona linncrs, electronic computers ass a hot telep phone al financial affairs to settle. We should be clad to line linking it to the ??hito House in Washing toll, yea r A ,~ ~ ~ Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-v~ V/ Doceill- d o Although the pout}cal groun `? anytime." bcr were dec?inlaterl. So gain for the NVA by ~~ more plausible ex the urge to reenlist, for standing, fast is aparent, Gen. Nguyen Giap's army planation-is that, the Royal shnrt-time high-paid duty In Laos has-been under lit- Lao Army is using this in Laos has lost some of its wet, season to rebuild and appeal. ate pressure from the ?will be stronger than Gen. ,Yang Pao',, inac?ti- American - backed Royal eve,, before" when it takes re City may he explained by wet Army so far. With }cthealf the field again. his only recent return from ef season almost '- Thanks to the political a five-week sojourn in the' have the Loo generals wizardry of U.S. Arnbassa United States. The color-- have made no effort yet d G AT ~Jur'rie Godley ful tribal leader and ex- c ~ LOS ANGELES TIMES F rt eIease1 ~ ~ h~ 1 ~1 ~i 1 (:. miles north of here. In the tice has been for each re- south, the strategic I3olov- gional .warlord ,family to ens plateau, totally lost for hold onto its troops and' f g~ the first time to the enemy wait for the enemy to in- , I i s TC--! !!~ 6 l this year, is'still finally Un- vade the fiefdom before tier NVA control and the giving battle. ` town of Pakse is threa- Gen, Vane Pao's Mco ` tened. motintain t r i b a l army, ru"J With the furthest ever- noiv being suz1ported Io- n 1 :CIS' JACK FOIS1E advance of the Communist gistically by the American Time. scarf writer forces in Laos bean ; Tc- Army as well as the C'en- tained, only a third of the teal Intelligence :Agency, VIEN'T'IANE, Laos - .nation remains under pro- also is undergoing recruit- The "yo-yo" no longer government control. But ing and training. seems a part of the Lao-,as the royal army. still Perhaps all this is ncc?c.- tian war. holds all the Mekong river nary, for the Royal Lao Em? the first time in the towns, about. two-thirds of Army-regular and irre- decade since it became Laos' estimated three mil- gulag--is said to be out- part of the Indochina in- lion people give at least ntinlbcred by the ccnn- surgency conflict., combat nominal allegiance to the biped NVA and Palhet in this landlocked' Asian Lao king in the royal capi- Lao (communist) force. buffer state has ceased to tal of Luang Prabang and According to'A.merican cs- thr, be a series of seasonal ad- to Prime 'Ministcr Souvan- timates, in mid-Jul.07,600; t'ances and retreats by na Phouma and his c.abi- enemy t o t a 1 1 c d both sides. The lines are net here. ? men. They included 13,20'l virtually stationary. . Various reasons are ad- NVA. with the others be-- . North Vietnamese- vanced for the inability, or ing' NVA-led Pathet ],ao Pathef. 'Lao forces, Which reluctance, of the Lao gen- units, PL irregulars and a forplerly utilized the dry erals to do what normally handful of Communist; season for attack and then. comes naturally at this leaning ("neutralists") La: retreated when the rains time of year in Laos-ad- otians. came, are not doing so this ranee on the heels of the Thai Volunteers summer. Despite having NVA and Pathet Lao units ? The equalizer for the. to .commit some of its falling back to rainy sea- Loyal Lao Army has been -Laos-based troops to the .on quarters,- th Po a 1 '1' h a I 1r?ny , c _ NVA three-front offensive IIcbui}ding Operation ? - in South Vietnam, those I t oluAntecrs, tvho for bet- t r o o }i s remaining have Putting the best face on ter-than-Thai army pay dug in at their forward- the no-go status, American provided by the 'Amen= host positions. advisers say. the Lao gen- cans, cross the \ This is generally true all crams are reluctant to at- river .to fight in critical along the loosely contest- tack without customary areas. ed 800-mile front. There is U.S. close air support- -During the past.Novem speculation that llanoi's and that all American air ber.llay dry season, about stay-put order is predicat- power is preoccupied with 10,000 Thai infantry and ed on possible ne ;otiations bombing North Vietnam. artillerymen were fh htin ; t d tli J 1 'I ? r Air officers deny that its in Lao; under ;\nlcrican . o en e llcoculla tin . The? present front would Thailand-based 400-plane sponsorship, authoritative ,presumably then become b o ni b e r armada is sources revealed. Put. Thai the cease-fire line, stretched thin and say units trying to steal the h ' t e are ready to support NVA offensive on Little Pressure p bevy of his children. u:ho live with cx-I-ao veterans in ~Tis oula, ~[ont. As a man from the tropics, Gee. Vang - Pao was able to touch snort- for the first time when he hut'itcd in'- the Montana inountain --- and he frolicker) in t.hhr: cold white stuff harefoot- ecl. CIA Relocates What promises of new support he obtained, is Washington is not ap- parent, but "it's not his na- ture to stand still," alt American friend ex- plainerl?. If he intends to push back the foe front around ' Long Chem, tho NVA is not hacking nff: They periodically shell his base and his CIA support team has recently relocat- ed in Vang Vieng, closer to Vientiane. - Even while "wintering." the NVA command has ventured, for the first. lire; in the war, into the Ale kong Valley. An enemy force captured Ehnng So- done, a town in south Lang on the main north-south highway adjacent to the .Mekong River. In its one, forceful retaliation of the present wet season, Lao troops claim to have i?e captured the town, killing. 225 enemy. By Lao war standards that's a big bat-. tle. Throughout Laos since .Tan: 1, the Royal Lao army admits to having lost 400 men in battle. y r '--r no move to recapture ' man .ao n . ~Vestmnreland and sew l+',s.t Plain of Jars in the will be prepared under the Disneyland. He s p e n t even sortie out tc plan, at ]east in theory, to t14rc~edf>artlQe`t'(4013/'i~ CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 # rm ~a t c, , to stage their annual or . -,- t h e warlord - controlled French army sergeant. is Hunks at critical points Lao forces are being. the top soldier of the War slang the long front. forged into Amer i c a n in CIA opinion. With Awn ('-`n. Fang; Pao, regarded wives he visited Washing- L4 tlir Laotians' most ag- army divisional format. U One-third of the 1,,000 ton, chatted. u ith fellow ~ irs~l~ a colmlli.ilder, has oldier Gen. .William C. "s? egular arm I STATINTL WASHINGTON STAR Approved For Release 2004/09 46 1 1A-RDP80-01601 RO VA [4 111C 0 By TA'.1r\Iy AIIBUCKLE town on the Mekong bank west dent U.S. aircraft strafed what 11 Special to The Star-News of Khon nown bn C full VIENTIANE - Is the Unit- These sources said the infor- of was students claimed at to a k k a om- ed States using its giant mation officer will he compen- munist near by crossing point near C130 Spectre. gunships for sated with new furniture b Aloulahamok nighttime assassinations of 41 between Kf:ong Communist officials, U.S. embassy. and Pakse. How effective is icials, Commu- Why should a high ranking the gunship if it is used in such nist sympathizers and Com- official of the friendly Lao a way? munist s u s p e c t s in their government and homes? a Lao infor- mation officer also a Lao goy- Pinpointed House This charge is being leveled cr t nmen employee mkh There is n dbt it ae sucoou success- at the U.S. by Lao officials, accusations against the United fully pinpointed a single house" ouse authoritative d i p 10 m a t i c States? and shot it sou apart b its inhab- rces say, after an incident itants escaped because at Khong island on the Lao- Deals in Contraband? first firing the Cambodian border Friday The answer may be guilty zero in on the pass target, used td night July 21. ma get, informed ht l quote Lsources conscience. sources said. as sayingats a quote Lao Spectre sources Informed U.S. sources have One drawback to use of the circled the house of Khong is- consistently asserted Lao offi? Spectre for assassination of lands's chief information offi vials in Pal;se working with Khong officials is that it would cer then opened fire blasting it Lao' officials in Khong have be rather obvious to the Lao five times and reducing it to a been dealing i.n contraband public who did the killing as shambles. The officer and his with North Vietnamese forces North Vietnam hasn't got o und to flying Spectres yet. family escaped unharmed aft- and Pathet Lao whose. forces ar surround the island. This traf- The incident has left a bad er the first firing pass. taste in the mouth of Laooffi- The sources. say weather fie in fuel, other petroleum vials even in Vientiane and de- was clear and point out that pro Nets, batteries, rice and fense minister Sisouk Na Khong Island which is 3,ciro the connivance of ? high-ranking on with orChal ders ss, c has given stern yards long by 5,ooo yard; j~ ide orders not to discuss the inci- and located in the middle of charge. army officers, Americans dent with the press, the Lao the broad Alekong, is clearly say. distinguishable. ?1?s ore, On June 5 a Royal Thai Air If the U.S. Air Force is they say, the Spectre cannot' Force 01fF 10 Bronco fired on carrying out assassinations have mistaken its target. ' and sank a boat traveling with Spectre gunships in Com- from the ?Mekong town of munist-held areas off South- Afraid to Go home ? Pakse to M;on i i d Diplomats quoted Khong's province chief as saying the 'Central Intelligence Agency was out to get him .and he is afraid to go home each night. Well informed sources, how- ever, gave another version Qf the incident. They say the Spectre was about 12,000 yards off target. The Spectre zeroed in using a starscope, an instru- ment which turns nihttime into daylight' but colored' green and shows the target almost as clearly as in daylight. These sources said the tar- get was a house near Khom- pong 'Srilao, a Cambodian ado edly filled with s contraband targeting seems more n necessary. cloth for Communist uniforms. Diplomats say a high-ranking The boat's owner was believed group of U.S. officers is press to. be Col. Sann?an Rajphakdy, ently in Vientiane to investi- brother of the Laos army chief gate the incident but the em-, of staff, Gen. Phasouk Rajph- . ' bassy has not confirmed- the akdy. In another earlier inci- report... - ----------- Approved For Release 2000/05/15 :.CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 t tit ;d dt D ~Ilf STATINTL CIS STATINTL Approved For Release. 2000105/15: CIA-RDP80-6,1 601 ST. LOUIS, MO. POST-DISPATCH E - 326,376 s - ab G 68 ' 121972' Tope r' lid The publishing firm of Harper & Row is to be commended for' its rejection of Central In- telligence Agency criticism of a book on the heroin traffic in Southeast'Asia which it plans to release this month. The author, Alfred W. / were . "underwhelmed" by the CIA critique. Ile Wadded that the CIA had been very courteousf McCoy, alleges that some American officials and CIA agents have allied themselves with groups engaged in the drug traffic, have abetted the traffic by covering up for drug runners .and have been involved "in the transport of opium and heroin." The CIA, which has undertaken an unusual publicity campaign to throw down the charges .(some of which have been published previ- ously), asked Harper's for _permission to ex- amine the advance text. The firm complied, and received a long CIA criticism of the book. Harper & Row editors went over the comments with Mr. McCoy, examined his substantiating documents, and then informed the agency it-saw no reason to make any changes in the book. } B. Brook Thomas, Harper & Row vice presi- dent and general counsel, said 'the -publishers W~'~would consider the, very. request by. the- : CIA to be a form of pressure, however, '.and Harper & Row was well-advised to resist it.. IISr. McCoy makes-a strong case for the charge ? that CIA policies have in fact aided the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. This has come about through the agency's free-wheeling clandestine efforts to control events in remote areas of Indocfiina. If the CIA would stick to intelligence gathering it would not : be, subject to such charges as M. McCoy has .leveled, and would not ,have to defend itself. Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R00.0600120601-5 DAILY WORLD , STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/J&1 v GGqJ RDP80-0 By: Dan Siegel By the way, Young also happens to be world ivhere'USAID fronts for the CIAO, STATINTL chairman of the Asia Society! - but his admission suffices to prove that. % His Introduction rambles on about Penn counts the CIA as one of its patrons "professional advisors" a while longer of higher learning. . and then finally mentions "specific sub Moreover, Young's Introduction states jects". SEADAG will study: Develop- flatly that USAID has "the final veto pow- ment Administration, Education and er on every SEADAG grant," exercising Manpower, Mekong Development, Poll- the following criteria:. tical Development, Regional Develop- 0 "Projects should be related to are- mont, Rural Develoment, Urban De- as of AID geographic concern.. Priority velopment and -- nota bone - the Prob- will be given to projects involving or lems of Development Under Conditions relevant to the Philippines, Thailand, of Insurgency, which means how to foist Laos, Indonesia, Vietnam and Korea... a capitalistic game plan on people who ' 0 "Priority will be given to projects hate capitalism. which are?relevant? to AID programs, ac- "Clearly," the.Penn students wrote, tivitics and planning. - one of the imperatives behind the for- 0 "Projects will be considered as to mation of SEADAG was that money their sensitivity to. local political situa- would be available from the Federal Gov- tions."(My emphasis - D.S.) crnpnent," thus enabling Penn scholars to go ahead with their research without having to worry about the rent. "It is note- worthy," the students point out, that Young chairs both SEADAG and the Coun- cil on Foreign Relations which helps Nix- on formulate foreign policy. Obviously, the Penn scientists' thoughts are fathered by the wishes of Washington, not the - needs of future Vietnamese. - One more anagram is relevant here. although the ubiquitous Central Intelli- gence Agency's (CIA) ties to USAID are almost common knowledge by now. In an interview with Dan Blackburn of Metro- media News, Dr. John Hannah. director of USAID, was asked: "Doctor, how do you respond to complaints that the AID ' Program is being used as a cover for CIA operations in Laos?" "Well," said Dr. Hannah,. "I just have to admit that that is true. This was a de- cision that was made back in 1962 and by. administration from now until then (sic), and it is the only place in the world that we are." Hannah was lying through his teeth about Laos being the only country in the Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 WAS} T NGTON POST Approved For Release 2000/0N- C~o~qq Dff,QiQ 1., UG19T2 131 L'_4 . _1 r J I_ 1 By Tim O'Brien Washington Yost Stall Wnter The Central Intelligence Agency has sent Harper ands Row, Inc., a detailed critique of a book the firm is about to release, saying the v,o; h will do a "disservi'ce" to the fight against narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia. The Nev., York publishing house, however, has decided to go ahead with publication of /'The Politics of Ilcroin ink Southeast Asia" by Alfred W, McCoy. The firm informed the CIA that "it is our sincere meat protection censorship." prior )McCoy cited "extralegal ac- tions" taken by the CIA to ob- struct the book's publications. IT SP (1, "Visits by the (:IA to Harper and Row, the tele- phone calls, and the letters are extralet al attempts by the CIA to Iiatass and intimidate Inic and rat' publ.isiher." Thomas replied in a July 18 letter, however: "We Want. very much to publish (the book). I3ut. '.e want even more to live up to the traditions and opinion that * Mr. hIccoy's responsibilities of a great l ,ub- scholarship remains unshaken lishing house as we see them. and we do not see any reason' if we are forced to make a.i l i f h i h or ma t ng c anges. e n t text " choice between the two, there; can be no doubt what that of the CIA's efforts to sup-I choice must he." press opium production and; McCoy, under "strong pro- smuggling in Southeast Asia. test," agreed to give the CJA On July 5, CIA General an advance copy of his book. Counsel Lawrence It. lloustoni lie (lid so, he said yesterday, wrote to Harper and Rose, ask- "for pragmatic reasons," ingi "to see the text" of the partl be 1 f ' y cause o t Lr- firm s book. "In the light of tlte'per- decision not to publish the C contradict it." . ":11r. ? McCoy's charges against the CIA, both directly and by innuendo, have been repeated be editorial writers area. Out of all that, this is all! throughout.' the nation and they (the ('1P.) could conic 111) could create an accepted myth with. Tier c~' only criti,rizinc; that the CIA has been in- about 2 per cent of coy total volved in the drug traffThe information." truth is that CIA has never ''The most remarkable thing, been involved in the drug about the CIA's critirt,w is traffic and is actively engaged that the agency actually ad-I in fighting against it.. Wl'e be- mitted that one of its. 0%V1 liege that the effect of Ni-. mercenary army eornmanders. I1cCoy's hook is to do a dis- 1 Laotian Gen. Chao Lt:, v, as .,c' vice to this fight and to dis- running a heroin lab in north- h earten the many sincere peg- western Thailand. Although ple in CIA who are at least as the CIA said it destroyed his concerned about this menace laboratory in mid-1971, it, had McCoy said yesterday that j 'there are over 200 pages of material on American opera-: tious in fire Golden '1'rian:;le In his book, McCoy r guest t I the lrnency's full tiled?? ' that `.`American diplomats and he sand. secret agents have been in-' Elisabeth Jakah, the editor volved in the narcotics truffiel handling the mtu~usc il't, wilt at three levels"-coincidental yesterday that "the industry complicity- by allying with has been very c?antidus on giouns engacted in dru ; traf-, things like this ever time the Picking; abetting trafficking Clifford Irvin story bi covering up for Strulheart' A source at harper and Row Asian traffickers; and active' said the CIA wrote the pill,- engagement "in the t ansport lishing firm that it could 01 opium and heroin." .~ "prove beyond doubt that. The CIA critique covered;.DIcCoy's facts were svroc,gt. several, although not all, of! "They just didn't do it," the the illustrations used by source said. McCoy to substantiate his" On Friday, the firm ~,vrote' three charges. For, example, McCoy said that Air America -"which is really a CIA charter airline.."-has been ac- the CIA, responding to cock of --he agency's criticisms. Tire "best service we call rollcer the author. the CJA and tlie' tively involved in the trans ; general public is to publish port of opium products out. of I the book as expeditiously as Laos. Ibis sources, he said, in- possible, and that is what we elude former' Laotian chief of intend to do." The book is staff Ouane Rattikone (him-~ ed led fo4- release on Aug. self a suspected drug smug-I A` INTrL - gler), Laotian air force cone-~ mander Gen. Thao Ma, a USAID officer in Laos, and I McCoy's own interviews with officials in Laotian villages. The CIA critique said: "We' believe the statement 1M r. Paul Velte, Managing Director of Air America, made on 2 June 1972 in response to these allegations, labeling them .11 1 'utterly and absolutely false,' clearly expresses the company letter) to 13. Brook Thomas, the and intcrpreiations," the 1.1 and CIA views on this mat-' fu'n's vice president and gen-, page criticism said. "From an; 'ter." t G nicious nature of. the drug - svdr;c if it were not first re-' traffic, allegations concerning viewed by the CIA. involvement. of the U`.. go',- Acknowledging receipt of ernment therein or.the l arlici- the manuscript, CIA counsel pation of American citizens itouston wrote harper and should be made only if based l Row on July 21: "It is not our on hard eviden(e," Houston intention to ask you to make Wrote. "It is our belief that no changes in air. McCoy's book I reputable publishing house even if we believe some of the would wish to publish such Ill- statements mielit be harmful) legations without being as- to the government. it is possi. surcd that the support evi- ble that we might find some I dence. Was valid." I Staten-tent which is currently "This, of course, in no wa and properly classified in the affects the right of a publisher r interest of national security. If to decide what to publish. I so, we will consult with you find it difficult to believe, however, that a responsible but we believe this is highly unlikely. Our primary interest publisher would wish to be as- sociated with an attack on our is in the validity of the evi- government involving the Vi- dence with which Mr. McCoy cious international drug supports his allegations." traffic without at least trying A CIA agent hand-delivered to ascertain . the facts," he the agency's formal critique of wrote. the book in a letter dated July Author McCoy, when told 28. - that Harper and Row planned "Mr. McCoy supports his to release galley proofs to the theme by citing a large nurn- CIA n-otested Ile ,,-pied in a her of allegations assertions Ccla Ouane categori- cally dnenied that Air America I was in any way involved in; -ftl"OEdl 601 R00060b 120001-'5 ble inform;,'tici i? s; loch ,n' ghi prior review is, to agree to .1~ 1LS citations to those sup- take theApprp ~ ter I PIS " O~bt /O5/ 51e $r~I abandoning the First Amend- ? nave ignore availa. 2 LOS ANGELES TIMES STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/1 t :A A P80-0 e , ~ ? t ? ~1 f \ r QF , { 1S t ~/ C C n s`.n, P cs i r ~~ y E e, i Es:` U.S. Mlifit'ry 'f,a os )'r`iorc Far-{it;n ing. Ctolef :~ofticiill IRe-i1io1clin;t Row l l-,rrny \\'ith ? Godleys sec-for- yourself policy, one plight, assume his image V:ould, have improved in the press. But he is still 3- c.-garde(i in most profiles as a ciiplonlat-turned v:arri- or. Ile USC such I'r.tton- lihe eX pl e lions as "giving them the (,teel in refer.. ring to a larger import of artillery to he used agiinst the ~orth.Vietnamese and Pal bet Lao force'. in Liao:;. And while there is still some denial, many pre- -V i o ll S 1''ici.ior)S on 111ierican military activi- lies in Laos have bccn- 1'elaxed Burin:; G0-11cv's r e f; i in c. As a foreian diplopia t ob-erVed: "The- J 2 Geneva bib _ pn vcr at,rn0)11('11t (to non-involved i'n. the: in- dochina year) is the mo t violated document .in re.- ('c))t hi'stor'y ?-- by both, silo." BY JACK FOl CIF. Times Mai( V,riier' VIENTIANE, Laos - to oversee.- the process at American involvc,'mcnt in each of fora' I r a i n i n r; South Vietnam dovch'FopiRelej" 2000MSMZNs '~:~`IA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 "two or- three" Americans American coverup still exists. . ' arge adlied a secon building, is nov, construct- ing a third. Such diplo- mats es narcotics agents are housed inside. The All) rr,i lion, be- sides its own legitimate ci- i?ili of opium.' country in Southeast Asia, that the vast ma?jorit~; of the lated among congressmen Tartaglino said the sum- high grade herein sold to Cris early ' last month gives a mary was based on "raw Intel- The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs esti- fighting in South Vietnam is gloomy forecast for U.S. ef- ligenee" and had been "dis- mates that Burma's illicit manufactured in Laotian lab counted as unreliable." He ! oratories." forts to stern illicit narcotics opium production is about 400 said the summary is classified ' in northern Laos," he sai;}, trafficking in Southeast Asia,; ons a year. Vietnam. and cannot he released ,iith- It According to the report, Air America aircraft and hel- particularly Burma and South out going through "established ,the - Burmese government's icoPtees chartered by the U.S. procedures. policy of non alignment and Central Intelligence Agt mcy The little noticed report I The United States paid $1 sensitivity aett, gn influence and USAID have been trans- shows that a total of only 29 ri ff million for the 26 tons of ma- is a limiting factor in its in- porting opium harvested by tons of illegal opium or its de- terial that was voluntarily vohvement with the U.S. or the the agency's tribal nmerccnar- r}vatites were seized in South- turned over by bands of Na- United Nations in the narcot- ics on a regular basis." east Asia bets een August 1971 tionalist Chinese living in ice field." ! Publication of the hook by and June 1972. This represents northern Thailand according "There are no BNDD (Bu Harper and Row. Inc., has about four- per cent of the an- to Tartaglino? rrau. of Narcotics and Danger- been held up by a CIA request nual illicit production in ti se The White House study, ous Drugs) or U.S. Customs to review it. McCoy, t:nc3er .region, which according to the strong protest." agreed to ^ .. r rT^... - ^ ^.,a n^ signed by Richard Harkness, programs in Burma such as uc h* Drugs By Tim O'Brien Washin ton Post Staff Writer The report-a chronology of "narcotics action" in Thailand, Laos, Burma and South Viet.- nam-shows th- t 26 of 29 tons wel-e destroyed at Chiang Mai, Thailand, last March. ? The action has frequently -been cited as an indication o~ a crackdown in Thailand. cam/ But' columnist Jack Ander- son says that "the CIA and other federal agencies have quietly informed Washington that something besides opium went tip in that bonfire." Ile said that all but five of the 26 tons was nothing but fodder, plant material and chemicals. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs refuted those charges, claiming that on-the-spot U.S. inspectors ex- amined the material under mi- croscopes and found it to be " fl Program, said there would be difficulties in any Iong-term effort. to stem the flow of Ille- gal drugs in South Vietnam. "Smuggling is endemic in the country and real control is unlikely," the report said. According to the. study, South Vietnam President Thieu was handed a memoran- dum on May 3, 1971, "which notes relationship between narcotics problems and future U.S: role in Vietnam." The memo urged him to greatly improve "intelligence and en- forcement activities to iden- tify and arrest narcotics ring- leaders and pushers." The following day, the head of the Vietnamese national po- lice's narcotics bureau was re- placed, and its personnel ex- panded from 26 to 52. But the unpublicized White genuine opium. ? House report summarized: Andrew C. Tartaglino, Dep "Encouraging as Vietnam's uty Director for Operations in recognition of the problem the BNDD, said "our chemist tested and (its) dynamic response may it before it was burned. progress of a la `there is' no question-it was be , term real nature Is questionable." c+piu This conclusion stands in Anderson's colleague, re- contrast to the administra- porter Les Whitten, was pies- {Ion's public optimism, reiter- >/ Summary, Whitten said, con- p t y~ taIi puce edeF?rtl eifeasj i?e *1i~ki5l~3 Ohe?~r~ c~ okn i Im, HT ~tt` `s, ~ ;4000 001-5 feet lbiat extraneous matter ction chr^n01oc'V t i(h t t ca rrrri+te~ sa with which the U.S. is allied r-.ast "rill a>, t or his common security inter livered "writ. ten comments ests and programs," the study and criticisms" to the New said. York publisher, but the corn- et announead The White House said "very pang has not yet' , hether the Ci A asl; it for re- little opium is now grown in w Laos; less than 30 tons a Visions or a halt to pubiica- i tion. It is believed the firm year. However, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous!; will not agree to alter the Drugs estimated last Tuesday ? manuscript, a source close to that Laos produces more than 1McCoy said. three times that amount - about 100 tons a year. "Nearly all of (the Laotian opium) still being grown is consumed by the growers," the report said. "There is no evidence that significant amounts of Lao-grown opium are entering the international traffic. Laos is a conduit for Burmese opium and, opium de- rivatives, including heroin, however." Of the 30 or 100 tons of opium products grown each year in Laos, less than one ton was confiscated between Au- gust 1971 and June 1972, ac- cording to the t eport's chron- ology of narcotics actions. Although the report said that Laos is a "conduit" for Burmese opium and although only one ton was confiscated there in the 10-mouth period, the report concludes that "the flow of opium and heroin through Laos has been seri- ously disrupted." Alfred W. McCoy, author of I a soon to be published book ent at a BNDD press confer- ated only a week ago by presi-I ence, challenging Tartaglino dential assistant, Egil I roghi o make available a weekly in- . Jr. telligence summary compiled, The study was compiled for by the bureau from CIA and the white House by those State Department reports. The State Department desks re- . , fore a Den. e The report listed no specific I early last month that "all U.S. __. .,,. errocrc in tlnrrna i ASEI :GTo2l S` ! 000/05/15: CIA-RDP8O-0 2 AUG 197?TATIN By ROGER JZ?LLINvEK New York Tines News Service In 3941 a British naval intelligence officer named Ian Fleming recomrnend- efi to Gen. William (Wild Bill) Donovan that he recruit as American intelligence officers men of "absolute discretion, sobriety, devotion to duty, languages, and wide experience." Donovan, a World War I hero and successful Wall Street lawyer, understood the fantasies of writers and presidents, and in a memo to President Roosevelt promised an in- ternational secret service staffed by young officers who were "calculatingly reckless," with "disciplined daring" and trained for "aggressive action." The Office of Strategic Services came to include such James Bonds as John Birch, Norman 0. Brown, David K. B. Bruce, Dr. IZalpli J. Bunche, William Bundy, Michael Burke, Julia Child, Clark Clifford, John Kenneth Gr.lbraith, John W. Gardner and Arthur J. Gold- berg. There were others - Sterling Hayden, August Heckscher, Roger 0. '?Itilsman, Philip Morton, H. Stuart Hughes, Clark M. MacGregor, Herbert Marcuse, Henry Ringling North. And still others: John Oakes, Walt W. Ros- tow, Elmo Roper, Arthur M. Schlcsigner Jr., Ralph de Toledano - to name just a few of the hundreds in this book by R. Harris Smith. SMITH, WHO W A-8 in the trade him- self, resigning in 1968 after a "very brief, uneventful, and undistinguished association with the most misunderstood bureaucracy of the American govern- ment," the Central Intelligence Agency, now lectures in political science at the University of California's Extension Division. "This history of Americi..'s first central intelligence agency" is "secret" because Smith was denied ac- cess to OSS archives, and so had to rely on the existing literature supplemented by some 200 written and verbal recollec- tions of OSS alumni. The book is densely packed with the bewildering variety of OSS exploits in World War II: Spying, sabotage, propa- ganda, military training missions, poli- ticking and coordinating resistance groups against the Germans. OSS agents had to compete as much with their allies as with their enemies. OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency. By R. Harris Smith. Univ. of California Press. 458 pages. Illustrated. v10.95. In France and Switzerland, where Alleml Dulles operated, the British SOB (Special Operations Executive) was especially grudging.. In Germany itself, the OSS lo.3t out to more orthodox Arnnri- can military intelligence, though para- doxica ly they were strongly represent- ed at Nuremberg, where Gen. Donovan was himself a deputy prosecutor at the same time that the head of the Nazi secret service, Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, was under OSS protection in exchange for his intelligence network in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. From present perspective the most (literally) intriguing story is that of the OSS in China and Indochina. There were both pro-Com-niui ists and anti C ommu- nists in the OSS, and most a verts syrnpa- thized with A. ian riatic.ualistr. so that the OSS aided Thai partisans a~~ainst the British and, of course, more i rnou ly, the Vietminh against the French in Laos and Vietnam (an OSS. medic saved Ito Chi Minh's fife). Smith's retelling of the tragicomedy of Indochina after the Jap- anese surrender in 1945, with Vichy and Gaullist French, British, Chinese and the Vietminh jockeying for control, makes a fascinating sctpiece. The book ends v.'ith an a,ecoi nt of tt,,e transformation of the OSS into its "mirror imago," the CIA Sa:ith's admi- ration for the OSS's wa.rtir:e prr.erns tism, its "tradition of dissent" and is anticolonialisrn suggests his thesis: That the OSS/CIA has been mead;- the straw man of the radical and lil.r,l left. In fact, he asserts, the CIA hss keen the principal guardian of li errl values in the "intelligence comet' unity." HE REMINDS US that the CIA fought Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy, and he argues that tLe CIA's carnp:iigmi to fund anti-Communist liberals successful .y undermined international Cenuimunist organizations and disarmed the para- nuid anti-Cornier nisin of the FBI and others at home. Ile notes that CIA lil-er- als worked against Batista for Castro, who betrayed them, allowing., the CIA conservatives to plan the Bay of Pi ;s action. Finally, he points to the evidence in the Pentagon Papers that the CIA has been a critic cf the Vietnam War from the beginning. . But the question remains whether the OSS "tradtion of dissent" is mean- ingful, whether it doesn't cornpromise' liberals as much as aid them. Smith's book is full of cryptic references to for- mer OSS agents now prominent in inter- national business and finance. CIA liber- alism has not prevented a number of CIA-fomented coups d'etat in favor of military regimes. Even CIA liberal criti- cism of the war in Vietnam seems to have had little effect on policy. All migit be fair in time of war, but Smith ought to have scouted the need for a permanent bureaucracy part of whose function is officially devoted to clandestine political manipulations abroad in time. of ' `peace." Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP8O-01601 R000600120001-5 ST. LOUIS -POST DISPATCH Approved'For Release 2000/081151-9nA-RDP80-0160 r.G,_[0St V rr D he: CIA Intelligence Agency Deities Links With Drug Trade In L STATINTL (The following letter to the editor of the Post-atch takes issue with statements made in an editorial printed on this page. The sti,twrrents, although iefleeting charges publicized over a period of several years, were based in this instance mainly on tun article in the July 1972 issue of Ilarper'a Magazine, titled "Flowers Of Eril, The CIA and the Heroin trade," by Alfred IP, McCoy, The article. was adapted from a chapter in The Politics of 1leroin in Southeast Asia, a book by Mr. McCoy, a I'll/) student in Southeast Asian history or Yale University, to be published in September by Harper & Role, Inc.) In. your editorial of June 27, you state: "The connection of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency with the dope traffic in Laos has long been no- torious," I write you to state that this allegation is false and unfounded. It is disappointing to see a journal of the Post-Dispatch's reputation repeating such an unfounded assertion without a check of its accurac;,v, any reference to the public record to the contrary, or any apparent effort to specify its sources, - ' ?Normally CIA does. not respond publicly to alle- gations made against it. Because of the serious na- ture of the drug problem in this country, I am writing to you to make the record clear, although the.sweeping phraseology of your comment is diffi- cult to counter in detail. CIA's real "connection" with the "dope traffic in, Laos" has been to work against it. John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, in a letter to Representative Charles S. Gubser of California on May 27, 1971 (reproduced in the Congressional Record of June 2, 1971), stated: "Actually, CIA has. for sometime been this bureau's strongest partner in identifying foreign sources and routes of illegal trade in narcotics. Their help'has included both direct support in in- telligence collection, as well as in intelligence analysis and production. Liaison between our two agencies is close and 'constant in matters of mutual interest, Much of the progress we are now making in identifying overseas narcotics traffic can, in fact, be-attributed to CIA co-operation." Roland Paul, investigator for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reported in the April 1971 issue of Foreign Affairs "that due to the long asso- ciation with the CIA, the Meo tribesmen in Laos were shifting from opium to rice and other crops. You also allege that "The big shot of the Laotian trade is Gen. Vang Pao, an unsavory character who for the last decade has been commander of the CIA's secret army in nor theasiern Laos. Ameri- can diplomatic officials in Laos seem to look the, other way; they have confined their recent efforts to promoting Laotian laws against opium addicts." In truth, Gen. Vang Pao is not engaged in the ? in Laos. On the. contrary, he has, as a leader of the Meo, conducted an energetic program over the years to bring this tribal group to aban- don their traditional growth of the opium poppy and develop substitute crops and new forms of livestock to provide daily sustenance and income. Ile has done this in the course of fighting off a North Vietnamese invasion of the Moo territories in Laos. Ile has received American asssistance in both of these efforts, While vague assertions such as your editorial have been made about him in the past, the U.S. Government personnel in- constant contact with him for many years have never found evidence connecting him with trafficking in narcotics. More than one year ago, in an address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Rich-' I and Helms, director of Central Intelligence, stated / the followitig: "There is the arrant nonsense, for example,. that the Central Intelligence Agency is somehow in- volved in the world drug traffic. We are not. As fathers,, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grandchildren as are all of you.,,, As an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing 'the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution; we know we are not contributing to the problem." This statement remains Valid today. W. E. Colby Executive Director Central Intelligence Agency CNv't6{sARPT I'osbbispatch, July 25, 1971 ... And I Thought It Was An Escape!' Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R0006.00120001-5 STATINTL Approved For Release 200&IO59i1,5 'CIA-RDP80-01 STATINTL A Re,-porton to Qovern ent oc r mr- By Carol *M. Barker and Matthew H. Foxe The Twentieth Century Fund/New York/1.972 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA=RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 aantli:~c=] RAMPARTS Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-0160 AUG 1972 A OUT T111RTY MILES NORTHEAST of CIA head- quarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the Baltimore-\Vashington expressway overlooking the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large three story building known informally as the "cookie fac- tory." It's-officially known as Ft. George G. Meadc, head- quarters of the National Security Agency. Three fences surround the headquarters. The inner and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses span- ning ` the complex at regular intervals house specially- trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear irri- descent I. D. badges - green for "top secret crypto," red for "secret crypto." Even the janitors are cleared for secret codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's longest "corridor"-980 feet long by 560 feet wide. And all along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting STATINTL the doors of key NSA offices. At 1,400,000 square feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000 square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more spacious. But the D11RNSA building (Director, National Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the headquarters buildingti of these other giant bureaucracies -it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No. For DIRNSA is the command center for the largest, most sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in the world's history. Here, and in the nine-story Op,,ra- tions Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work to break the military, diplomatic and comnicrcial. codes of every nation in the world, analyze the dc-crypted mes- sages, and send on the results to- the rest of the U.S. in- telligence community. Far less widely known than the CIA, whose Director STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 liSHINCTON POST. STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05115pj{ l4y DP80-0160 CIA Moving Base In'Nort ern Laos Special to The Washington Post VIENTIANE, July 30-The headquarters for CIA-backed Laotian irregular forces in northern Laos is moving from the Long Chong area to a new location 17 miles west, accord- ing to highly reliable U.S. ;sources here. - ' Vang Vieng, a town on Route 13 85 miles north of Vi- entiane and 34 miles south- west of Long Chong Valley, has been chosen as the new operations and logistics center for Gen. Van." Pao's guerrilla force. The move to Vang Vieng be- came necessary as a result oI setbacks suffered by Gen. Vang Pao's forces, according to the U.S. sources. Arms, ammunition, petro- leum and all other war mate- rial supplied by the United States to Gen. Yang Pao's ir- regular army of Moo tribes- men are expected to be stock- piled at Vang Vieng for greater safety, sources said. Both CIA and i11eo planners, coordinators and advisors also ,will be based at the new cen- ter, where they will be in less danger than they currentlyJJ~ are in at Long Chong and Ban Song. U.S. sources in Long Chong; recently reported yang Pao'sl' forces are having considerable; difficulty recapturing posi Lions strategically important to the defense of Long Cheng Valley. U.S. advisers to Vang Pao! are said to be increasingly worried about the vulnerabil- ity of the Ban Song base. Ban Song replaced Long Chong as headquarters for Vang Pao's irregular army early this year when North Vi- etnamese forces launched heavy attacks on Long Chong} after capturing the Plain ofI Jars. Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 App ' oCO Poi eai2000A)5/15 : CIA-RDP80 0 JOURNAL STATINTL M - 23 1 1972 S - 350,303 U0S; for the drug t ra fi rs? AS PART OF the effort to combat drug abuse-which, according to President Nixon last summer, has "assumed the dimensions of a national emergency"-the administration is' committed to an all-out attack on the inter- national narcotics. trade, This'involves not just the breaking up of the syndicates that. pro- cess and import the heroin to the United States, but persuading other governments, particularly in Southeast Asia where most of the world's heroin now originates, to come :down hard on the- growers and marketeers. IBut is the Nixon administration trying as hard as it could to cut off this profitable trade at its source? Disturbing evidence is accumulating that it may not be. -There is The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asiq,'to be published this fall but excerpted in the July issue of Harper's by a young. 'S',',e graduate student specializing in Southeast Asian history and politics. This doculnerits the involvement of high govern- !merit and military officials in Laos and Thai- land in ',t]n narcotics trade; it even charges complicit' by the Central Intelligence Agency. JThe CIA has challenged all the author's alle- gations, asserting that most of them are with- out foundation. `Lever' is hard to use "The place to start. is the other. end." of the opium poppy. In Turkey's case the United States is to help in compensating the thousands of peasant farmers for whom poppy- growing has been an innocent livelihood for centuries and who now must switch to other cash crops. Whether the Turkish government or anyone else is compensating the many mid- dlemen who have grown fat off the opium trade is not discussed publicly. But the United States has another way of persuading reluctant governments to join the anti-drug campaign. Congress lacked on a pro- vision to last year's foreign aid bill permitting the President to suspend aid to any country that doesn't take action against the drug traf- fic. The only problem is that suspending aid to the governments of Southeast Asia would virtually end the Vietnam war overnight. It's a dilemma, to be sure. But it's worth recalling that last winter, when President Nixon was vehemently reiterating this coun- try's commitment to keeping President Thieu in power in Saigon, even though this was the main obstacle to serious negotiations in Paris, the same regime was one of the major factors being blamed by U.S. officials for the eon- But there is also the study made last winter by top-level officials of the CIA, the State De- partment and the Pentagon, and just now dis- closed. This report concludes that there is no prospect of cutting off the smuggling of nar- cotics from Southeast Asia because of, "the corruption, collusion and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thai- land and South Vietnam." This conclusion, too, is being discounted by administration of- 'ficials, who argue that it is out of date and that "substantial progress" has been made in the past four months. Yet it would be naive to assume that a situa~ Ap t- Ead, 09 @d0 S 0AW ei%I*i iU> 8ArO l a01 Q60 4QQI-01C ing the success it scored last year when it ?'as ' war on drugs, or must that effort still rank Mlle to persuade the Tllriiiil ? government to way below a certain view of a solution for tion that was so bad could have improved as tinuation of our own "national emergency" STATINTL Appr ,Rplea52000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000 STATE JOURNAL, JUL 6 0 1972. E - 15,301 S - 15,679 Wanted: Answers on Laos Last week Americans learnedthroughthe press that the Central Intelligence Agency is experimenting with rainmaking techniques in Laos to retard the flow of enemy supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail into South Vietnam. The report came from "military sources " , not from the Nixon administration, Sec. of Defense Melvin Laird refused to comment on the subject. THAT IS HOW the American people have learned over the years the extent of their country's involvement in Laos, an involvement that does not seem likely to diminish as a re- sult of "Vietnamization" of the war or any other scheme that focuses primarily on Viet? nam. Reports started appearing several years ago that U.S. bombers were ranging far,be. yond the Ho Chi Minh trail to drop their J deadly cargo on the Plain of Jars in central Laos. There have been persistent rumors that. the CIA has been training mercenaries to fight"41?m the Communist Pathet-Lao, which is engaged in a civil war with the Lao government (admittedly with the help of the North Vietnamese). There is also consider. able evidence that Americans in the Army's elite Special Forces Have been fighting on the ground in Laos. Only recently has the Nixon administra- tion acknowledged that U.S. bombers have ,operated -over Laos, generally giving the Impression that American air strikes there have been directed ualy against North' Viet. namese supply routes. The other reports have either been denied or, as in this in- stance, dismissed with a highhanded "no corAment," YET REPORTS from U.S. military and civilian personnel returning home from Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam indicate that the hum. ber pf bombs dropped in Laos since 1265 prob. ably amounts to hundreds of times the destruc. tion rained on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. That attack was rightfully considered an act of war by the American leople, But when the tables are turned, when the U.S, unleashes literally thousands of air attacks on a small Asian country, both Democratic and Repub. lican administrations have refused to so much as comment on what is going on, let alone ask Congress for a declaration of war or for its token approval with another Tonkin Resolution. Although the U.S. Constitution stipulates Congress is the only power that can legiti- mately commit American fighting men to combat, reports coming out of Laos show the which Congress has lost control over the U.S. war machine. This'newspaper recently ran a two-part condensation of a report to Congress by Rep. Paul McCloskey, R-California, whichpre. sented evidence that U.S, ambassadors in Laos have been able to order Air Force strikes against virtually any village in the country with little interference from Con- gress or the White House, 'McCloskey's re- port, based on interviews with dozens of U.S. servicemen and Laotian refugees, suggests that lower echelon policy makers have used bombs to "herd" the Laotian civilian popula- tion out of Communist territory and into gov. ernlnent controlled areas, the loss of a few thousand lives notwithstanding. There was even some evidence that biological warfare materials have been used in Laos on a selective basis. THIS INFORMATION is hard to believe, if only because it seems unlikely that the U.S. military and diplomatic corps would dare to so flaunt the powers the Congress seems to have lost by default. But the reports continue to come in, despite government silence on the war in Laos. If true, they provide a sad commentary on the extent to which American Oplomacy has been brutalized during adecade of military free rein in Indochina. It has been said that thanks to the clever posturing of Richard Nixon during his trips to Red China and Moscow and `yith the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, the war in Indochina will not be an issue in this election year. Americans may be able to write off the tragedy of Vietnam, once our troops are back home and the prisoners of war have been re. ,leased. But there will remain the tragedy of Laos, of which most Americans are hardly aware, thanks to the deliberate efforts of the executive branch. According to the present 1 ietna*nization schedule, a substantial number of U.S. bomb- ers will remain in Thailand, the source of most of the air strikes into Laos. The Viet- namization idea does not represent a signifi. cant change from the kind of. thinking that got his country involved in the quagmire of Southeast Asia in the first place. The U.S. Air Force will remain to literally fly to the rescue of political regimes in Laos or who- knows-where else. THIS IS A good year for Americans to ask the politicians where they stand on con. tinuing this presence in Southeast Asia, and, for those who favor it, whether they would make it accountable to Congressional author- ity. Yes,' the reports coming out of Laos are hard to believe. But impossible? As, your- self, And then ask the candidates, - G;L Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 STATINTL Approved For Release 2MM /W :IA RD D1601 RO 30 July 1972 By 14'ILLIAf4I If. WYANT ,IR. A Wasiin ;ton Correspotzclent 01 the Pont-Dispatch WASIliNcG'I o,,NT, July 29-Sen- ator Stuart Symington (Dora,), Missouri, denounced Saturday the A g e n c y for Jnternatioual Development's involvement i n Laos with the Central Intelli- gence Agency. "The activities and funds of these two agencies in Laos are now so mixed," he said, "that it must be impossible for Lao officials. to know whether they are dealing with AID or with the CIA." Symington, chairman of the S e n a t e foreign relations sub- committee on security agree ments and coin niitnients abroad, made the statement in a preface he rrote for a.declas- sified version of hearings over Which he presided last April 13. He 'criticized the Executive Branch. of the government for making oxtensive deletions in the hearing record, made public Saturday, He said the deletions were made "On alleged grounds of security, T h e hearing transcript was scissored so- severely, Syming- ton said, that his panel was at first reluctant to make public what remained. II o w e v c r, it was decided that the report would add to information avail- able about Laos. Roderic L. O'Connor, co-ordi- nator of AID's bureau for sup- porting assistance' appeared be- fore . the subcommittee in re- sponse to a letter Symington wrote March 21 to John A. Han- nah, administrator of the Agen- cy for International Develop. ment. Symington's letter had asked Hannah a series of questions about the relationship in Laos between AID, which adminis- ters foreign assistance, and the CIA, which finances irregular troops fighting Communists. In' a separate statement is- s u e d Saturday with the cen- s o r e d but now declassified hearing r e c o r d, the Missouri Senator said the facts now com inn out "raise serious questiops about the legality of some Unit-' ed Stales e x p e n d i . t u res in, Laos. ? The facts also disclose, Sym- ington said, "a pattern of de- viousness, if not actual decep- tion, Which has characterized the conduct of our policy in Laos for the last decade." O'Connor told the subcommit tee that AID was not novi fi- n it n c i n and, never had fi- naced, military or intelligence operritions in Laos, as suc.h..Ile conceded that AID's assistance had helped the royal Lao gov- ernment carry its defense bur- den. In fiscal 1i72,thewitness said, the CIA is reimbursing AID in the amount of c ~,500,OOo for medical services and sup- plies for paramilitary forces or their dependents in Laos, O'Connor said AID supplied certain services in the health and humanitarian fie ] d s for "anybody' in -Laos who is ill, sick, or wounded," I' l se Approved For'Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 LA Ap v> F;drsR@1e?eb?2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-0 EXAMi,1ZR E - 204,749 EXAMINER & CHRONICLE S -- 640, 004_ - FOUL 3 01972 sciuMP-ast Elsie STATINTL FOIV`-9CS 0 The ( T WAS the harvest land j for raw opium, the infa- ? moos "golden triangle."In the corner embracing north- eastern B u r m a, northern Thailand and northern Laos about 1000, tons of raw opium was produced, about 70 per cent of the world's supply. - From there it eventually found its way to the Ameri- .cap market, but that source of heroin, according to Ad- ministration officials, had been turned off. "We think all the coun- tries are cooperating with us .and we are quite satisfied with that cooperation," said Secretary of State William P. Rogers to a Senate sub- committee last May. On the Defensive How much cooperation, however, was subject to dis- 'pute, with the Central Intel- ligence Agency and eventu- ally the Administration on the defensive last week. ..Part of the official worry originated with the soon-to- be-published book by r Alfred W. McCoy. a 26- V year-old Yale graduate stu- dent who spent 18 months in- vestigating narcotics opera- tions2 in Indochina. In "The Politics of Heroin -in Southeast Asia." McCoy charged that the CIA knew of the narcotics trade but failed to take action and that both CIA and State Depart- ment officials had. provided political - and military sup- port for America's Indo, chinese allies actively en- gaged .in drug traffic. had vered up evidence of'such in\ ement and had been actively involved themselves in the trade. The CIA launched a big ef- fort to refute the charges, calling them unwarranted, unproven and fallacious, and managed to persuade the publishers of the expose, Harper & Row, to permit the CIA to review the manu- script prior to publioation. The book has been based on more than 250 interview- ers, some of them, McCoy said, with past and present officials of the CIA. H e said that top-level South Vietnamese officials, The CIA was accuse?f drug. trafficking including President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Tran Van Khiem, were in- volved. The CIA began an unusual public defense by sending two letters fpr publication to the Washington Post, which had -printed some of McCoy's allegations. .The Approach The CIA -began its ap- proach to. Harper & Ifow in learning of McCoy's appear- ance before a Senate sub- -committee. Harper & Row decided that although "we don't have any doubts about the book at all ... as one of the oldest publishing houses in America, Harper &Row has an obligation to itself and what it stands for." A. Harper & Row spokes- man added that if McCoy did not agree to the CIA re- view, it would not publish the book. Cabinet Report Then came a Cabinet level report, released last Sunday. Contrary to administration assurances of success in halting drug traffic, it said, there was "no prospect" of slowing the traffic "under any conditions that can real- istically be projected." The report was prepared by'officials of the CIA, State .~/ Department and Defense Department and noted that "the most basic problem and that one that unfortu-. nately appears least likely of any early solution, is the corruption, collusion and in- difference at some places in some governments, particu- larly Thailand and South Vietnam ..." The report also stated that "it should surely be possible to convey to the right Thai or Vietnamese officials the mood of the Congress and the Administration on the subject of drugs." To which, Lester L. Wolff, a- New York Democratic critic of government's han- dling of Southeast Asia drug traffic, said, "We think the trade has got so much pro- tection in high p l a c e s in Thailand that the Adminis- tration is afraid they'll tell iu to take our air bases out if we put too much pressure on them," - .a Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA'-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 STATINTL Approved For Release. 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R _:7 A 17, TORRINGTON; CONN. REGISTER JU L: Z 9 1972 E - 11,792 Editor Uiicie Sam -dreg pusher Acting FBI 'Director Patrick army, the CIA built up the power Gray declared the other day that of tribal commanders both mil- a shortage of heroin on the street itarily and economically. But by market has developed . as a result Laos tradition, economics is opium, of the gove'rnment's crackdown on' starting with poppy farmers' like the drug traffic, "the most intensive the Meos and extending into the drive this nation has ever directed royal Laotian government. against narcotics racketeers." This One of the commanders of the might be encouraging news were CIA secret army, McCoy reports, it not- for. the fact that while the is General Vang Pao,' a major en- FBI is trying to crack down on. the trepreneur in the opium business drug merchants another federal since 1961. C14 ,,operatives guided agency has been aiding and abet- the buildiizg of airstrips to link his ting them: villages via Air America planes - A detailed report linking the which, naturally,, soon were flying 1 CIA to the enormously profitableleo opium to market. CIA and the traffic in heroin is presented in the 13. S. Agency for International De- July issue of Harper's magazine. velopment later helped finance a It was written by Alfred W. McCoy, private airline for Vang Pao,, who a PhD student in Southeast Asian ? went on to open a heroin processing history at Yale, not as a journalistic plant near CIA headquarters. expose but as a chapter in a Harper A year ago, President Nixon de- Row book scheduled for Sep- clared war on the international he- tembet publication under the title roin traffic, and -- under U. S. pres- "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast sure opium dens in Laos were Asia." shut by the hundreds. But, ac- It is a shocking indictment that cording to McCoy's report, neither McCoy presents in reciting how, as U. S. nor Laotian officials are going a result of direct and indirect Amer- after the drug traffickers. He notes i.can involvement, opium production that, according to a United Nations it Southeast Asia is increasing and report, 70 per cent of the world's the -export of high-grade heroin is illicit opium has been coming from flourishing. Most of the heroin used "the Golden Triangle of Southeast by American GIs in Vietnam has . Asia - northeast Burma, northern come from Laotian areas where the Thailand and northern Laos. - CIA is active, McCoy writes, and "capable of supplying the U. S. with increasing amounts are being sent unlimited quantities of heroin for to the,United States. and Europe. generations." As part of the US. effort to McCoy's conclusion: "Unless bolster. Southeast Asia against Coin- something is done to change Amer- mutlist inroads, the CIA has been ica's policies and priorities in South- working since 1959 with the Meo east Asia, the drug crisis will deep- tribesmen. of hilly northern Laos. en. and the heroin plague Will con- I.1i forging an effective guerrilla tinue to spread." Approve-d;for Release- 2000/05/45-: -CTA=RDP80'=0t601R000600-T2000'Y=5 Looking .t .aos THE END OF NOWHERE: American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954. By Charles A. Stevenson. (Beacon. 367 pp. $0.95) VOICES FROM THE PLAIN OF JARS: Life Under an Air li'`er. Compiled with, an. Introduction and Preface by Fred Branfmart. '(Harper Colophon. 160 pp. 61,93) Revi.ewced by Wait. Haney T h c reviewer taught in. Lac for three ?tears and is the author of "A Survey of Civilian Casualties Among Refugees from. the Plain of Jars," published by the Ken- tredy Subcommittee on Refu- gees. Millions upon millions of words have been written about America's involve- ment in Vietnam but 1?c- markably little about United States actions in Laos-de- spite the 'fact that we have spent some $5-$S billion on that small country in the last' four years. These two books, though strikingly dif- ferent in many respects, rep- resent valuable eontribu- tionsto a loner needed public discussion of the American role there (or as one U.S. official interviewed by Charles A. Stevenson calls that kingdom, and whence the title of his book, "The End of Nov;here"). Stevenson and Fred Branfman differ as much as their books. Stevenson is the pedant; footnotes and bibli- ography span almost 50 of his book's 300 pages. An ear- lier version of "The End of Nowhere" served as his dog- 'toral dissertation at Har- vard. In writing it, Steven- on interviewed 816 past and present government officials -from AID bureaucrats to CIA operatives, from ambas- sadors to congressional staff members. At first one thinks: Now remarkably thorough, this man must have traced dosi'n nearly every Ameri- can official who ever had anything to do with Laos. But he did not interview a single Laotian. Whether this omission represents the arrogance of American academia or whether it reflects a de facto acknowledgement that Laotians have never had much say about what t h e U.S. (lid in their country is not made clear. I suspect it represents a mixture of both. For as Stevenson writes: "The basic fact is that Americans control most of what happens in areas alle- giant to the Vientiane gov- ernment. The United States ]provides essential advice, coordination and supplies for the war. Outside of a few cities, Americans or their agents perform most of the functions of the cen- tral government. U.S. funds support the economy and the government." and then as a free-]ghee (13ranfman :.peaks of'' a se- journalist.. cret decision to wage an air Like Stevenson, he inter- war against the Plain, as if viewed dozens of people there was some sort of huge about U;S: policy in Laos. But conspiracy in the U.S. gov- unlike Stevenson lie talked ernment when even the Pen- with people on the receiving taron Minors afford little end, with hundreds at Laouan evidence to support such a refugees, which led him to the theory.) First, Stevenson remarkable idea (and like shows the cavalier indiffer- many innovative ideas,,quite ence of U.S. officials. For obvious once it was put for- example, Dean Rusk told ward) that is the basis for Stevenson, "After 1963, Laos this book. Ile simply asked was only the wart ? on the the refugees to write of hot; of Vietnam." And Ches- their lives and the war they ter Cooper, a member of the to Security 1967 Council experienced-as they called National Security - T,n the result of the airplanes. from mented, 19 "Laos was not all. huo honks , oaksg on all Indo- that goddamned important." china, is hundreds truly unique. - Second, by the example of c:hIts is' his own analysis, Stevenson Its greatest weakness helps to explain why the 13raiifman's ? introductionn, . A Plain was destroyed. For. history of Laos as abhrevi- the pded. he ated as his must inevitably like th studies, Stevenson carefully contain sonic partial truths avoids moral judgments of and consequent distortions. who escalated the conflict in Yet the introduction to Laos of why the U.S. did "Voices from the Plain of Jars" contains too many. whaiour actions Lon pos- speaks For example, BranIrnan whether e justified a the speaks of the present condi? h be seek. Matter-of- the of the refugees from ends the Plain of Jars in ahnost y/ Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : ?CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 STATINT Approved For Release 200p~0&i Ic T: '914-~~800 in line with the changes already voted Otherwise, we may again be drawn into through 1971 received 0,919.8 million worth c~ . military arrangements without our full of U.S. farm commodities under Food for enat in by the PI this bill? Peace. Of that, ~'.742.7 million was kicked 'i he PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the knowledge and consent. back to the Saigon government to use for Senator repeat his parliamentary, in- Personally, I consider the use of food "common defense" purposes. quiry? for peace as food for war to be a perver- Authority for the expenditures is provided Mr. IIUGHES. Is the section 15 men- sion of the basic intent of Congress. I also in Section 101-0 of the Food for Peace Jaw, tioned in this amendment now a properly believe that it does our credibility no good Further, the report shows, Korea I,.st year numbered section, in view of the changes at home or abroad to have these. funds received $20 million Food for Peace aid to already made in the proposed legislation rechanneled for war under the label of help pay military bills, and Cambodia got food for' place. $7.4 million. before the Senate today? . Through 1971, Korea had received ~5pa.1 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the For too long we have learned, after the million in common defense" funds under Senator ask unanimous consent that the fact, of unauthorized funds going for Food for Peace out of it total aid under the amendment be properly numbered? foreign aid-the under-valued excess tie- program of $752.2 million. Cambodia?begaih The Parliamentarian informs the Pre- louse articles, the CIA money for Laos receiving the aicl last year. siding Cfliccr that that will take care of which has been channeled through the Under a typical arrange ertt. the United o pr to ee puts for Vietnam with the problem of the Senator from Iowa. AID budget, and the quiet reprograming farm commodities, t Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask which leads to mushrooming commit- currencies. About co per cent is then klckcd unanimous consent that the amendment means without the prior - consent of back for "common defense" cent is purposes. . be properly numbered to conform with Congress. The report says: "The major uses ... are the changes already made in the bill. This is merely another example of for personnel equipment, mostly clothing, The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without such concealed aid. construction anti construction materials, and bjection, it is so ordered. 1il order that Congress can advise and local services provided for the United States FOOD FOR PEACE VERSUS FOOD FOR WAR consent to such agreeme>t-s, I am today Military A::slstance Command-Victnain." sion of the "common de- Mr. IIUGIHES. Mr. President, I was offering an amendment to the pending Oyer-all supervi tense" money e vision b the om ion de- startled to read an article in this morn- bill which would provide simply that. no ?lent of Defense Find the Agency for Inter- Ing's paper citing the latest report on agreement for common defense purposes national Development, the report says. the food-for-peace program and noting under Public Law 480 shall be entered In the case of Korea, the study tars the that in some instances about 80 percent into unless authorized by further affir- money is used "to help offset the Increasing of the payment received for agricultural motive legislation by Congress. defense costs" which re being the triinsfearedl commodities is funneled back to the local Since the hour is late and the time on defense btmilit. F aid mission governments for military equipment and this bill is short, I believe that this pro- in Cambodia is used "tar iuili- facilities. vision would give Congress the Opportun The money tai ?y pay and allowances," the report gays. On further investigation, I discovered ity to step back and look at these dis- "Although 1971, was the last year local that this activity is perfectly leial under guised military aid then currency arrangements will be signecl,'it is section 104(c) of Public Law '480, which accept or reject then as we choose, anticipated that 104-C grants will continue permits agreements to use these repay- Mr. President, as I have stated, this to be made to Vietnam and Cambodia out o' meats "To procure equipment, mnat.erials, amendment, vei:y simply, would give funds generated under credit agrceuxents," facilities, and services for the common Congress and the proper committees the the report says. Since Food for Peace was enacted in 195?}. defense including internal security." right from this point on, after the pas-. more than $1.7 billion has been spent oil Perhaps, Mr. President, I and singular- sage and signing into law of this bill, to "connnon defense" arrangements. The report ly naive in supposing that this fine pro- renew these matters if -our Government sbows that about $12.9 billion in total aid, grans-which I have long supported and wants to rechannel the food for peace the military kickbacks have amounted to 1:3 which has done so much to help share funds into military channels. per cent. America's abundance with the hungry Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President., will the Although Vietnam, .Korea and Carhb:,dia Senator yield? are the only current recipients, many cut n- and undernourished people of the Mr. 7IUh;PHREY. Mr. President, will tries over the years have shared In the "cons- be used only for peaceful moil defense" benefits. activities. the Senator yield? Mr. HUGHES. I yield to the distin- Mr. HIJMPIIP.EY. Mr. President. his t After all, the declaration of policy at guished Senator from Minnesota. year, you in iy recall, the Presiding Of - the start of this Iltw declares a major i\, r. IIUr~1PIIREY. Mr. President, will facer now in the chair ('.1r. Pl oxsln l r purpose: the Senator yield me 3 minutes? Rill sure will, introduced an amendnlcnt; To use the abundant agricultural produc- ity of the United States Mr, HUGHES. I yield. sponsored by the Senator from ~;iir:c'. and malnutrition c Mr. IIUMPIIR~EY. Mr. President, I ant sin (lair. Pr.O}C,1lYR Ii) , the Senator from a malnutrition and to o to encourage economic coonnomiom it r development in the developing countries, very pleased to join the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANsmirao), the S'en~!tor with particular emphasis on assistance to Iowa (Air. HUGHES) in offering this from South Dakota (Mr. A cGovu:n u) , those countries that are determined to ins- amendment. and myself to the Foreign Assistance Act prove their own agricultural production. I was very much disturbed this morn- of 1971, designed to repeal the wording- But there is another declared purpose, ing to read reports indicating that the in Public Law 480 which in practice had one which has apparently become a United States had funneled 078 million become a means for the U.S. Government, blank check for many activities abroad: into South Vietnam's war budget from to provide additional military assistance To promote in other ways the foreign poi- the surplus agriculture conlmoclities beyond the amounts authorized or ap- icy of the United States. tier the terms of Public Law 480. The propriated by Congress. The amendment report was brought to our attention this was designed to restore the original pur- This catch-all clause has permitted morning in the press. I ask unanimous pose of Public Law 480 of which I was one the U.S. Government to return nearly consent that the AP story on the White of the earlier sponsors. three-quarters of a, billion dollars to the House report, entitled "'Food for Peace' Public Law 480 is the Food for Peace government of South Vietnam in the Funds Arm Saigon" on food-for-peace Act. Its purpose is to promote interna- .orm of military aid, nearly $600 million operations in Indochina last year, be tiona] trade in agricultural colnmoditie,:. to the government of South Korea, and printed in the RECORD. to combat hunger and malnutrition, and now we are doing the s,,me in Cambodia. There being no objection, the article to further economic development. Over the years since 1954 we have 1 was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,' Putting $78 million into South Viet- turned over 01.7 billion in defense-re- Dam's defense budget hardly fulfills the late~l aid, as follows: spirit of the Food for Peace Act, It is Although this amounts to only 13 per- "Peon FOR Peace" ru es Arir SAIGON hardly in keeping` with the anlendnlent cent of total Public Law 480 assistance, A White House report shows the United introdui_cd last year, the PrO%Inire-llulli.- St?s.tes funneled $78 million last year into grey bTaI15f]el yeasCGOV anleridi'tiCll t, the figure is about EO pe1'CCrlt for Vietnam budget under the Fooci p find Korea. South Vietnam's war for Peace foreign-aid program. written into law as Public Law 92-226. Perhaps Congress would approve such - The disclosure came Ina report to Congress This amendment attempted to close a provisions if given the opportunity. But on ,Food for Peace operations last year. it loophole and to prohibit any use Of Public as signed by President Nixon on June 29. Law 480 funds for military Purposes. I believe that we should be given that was' Opportu M According to the report, South Vietnam That was its intent, and that was the proved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-.5 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: I WL80-0 NEW HAVEN, CONN. U~hE~9 JOURNAL-C JUL M 32,217 A Yale University graduate student's forthcoming book. on heroin traffic in Southeast Asia is reportedly being reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency Alfred W. McCoy, 26, of 29 Lake Place, a Ph.D. student in Southeast, Asian studies, spent '18 months in Asia investigating narcotics operations and recent- ly testified' before the Senate .. Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Aid. He testified at the time that .aircraft chartered by the CIA 'and the Agency for Internation- 'al Development "have been transporting opium harvested by the agency's tribal merce- c E i.EYE i The CIA, with the permission of Harper & Row, the book's publishers, is reviewing t h e manuscript of McCoy's book with the intention of demon- strating that some of the book's claims t+re "totally false and. without foundation," according to a recent article in The New York Times. McCoy testified in two Con- gressional appearances in June that the material in the forth- coming book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia". was based on more than 250 inter- views, some with CIA officials. In a chapter of the book print- ed in the current issue of Harp- er's Magazine, McCoy charged that "American involvement the Golden Triangle-northeast- ern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos-produce 70 percent of the world's supply of raw opium and that. much of it is being funneled to addicts on New York streets. "After pouring billions of dol- lars into Southeast Asia for over 20 years, the United States has acquired enormous power in the region. And it has used this power to create new na- type" by a senate staff mem- ber. In the magazine article, McCoy wrote. that during the ast several months of 1970, ore American soldiers were vacuated "mas casualites om South Vietnam for durg- lated reasons than for reasons aving to do with war wounds." lie also wrote that farmers in portedly carried opium a n d individual CIA men have abet- ited the op ium traffic." t. At the time of his Congres- sional testimony, McCoy was described as a "very thorough scholar and not the antiwar ~IA contract airlines have re- Iment by client governments, :has gone beyond coincidental complicity; embassies h a v e consciously covered up involve- tions were non-existed, to hard pick prime ministers, to topple governments and to crush revo- lutions. "Unless something is done to change America's policies and priorities in Southeast Asia., the drug crisis will deepen and the heroin plague will continue to spread," McCoy wrote. - McCoy could not be reached Sunday night for comment. KATIM.YN POLKl1OfS11 Approved For Release 2000105/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 "0 LUit.i 1 i tar z) 2 4 JUL 197PTATINTL Approved-Fog _%12WO106t1&1:pG1A4RQp84"L Foreign Report to U.S. Sees No Hope of Halting Asian Drug Traffic By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, July ' 23-A Cabinet-level report has con-i eluded that, contrary to the Nixon Administration's public .op,timism, "there is no pros- .pect" of stemming the smug- gling of narcotics by air and .sea in Southeast Asia "under any conditions that can realisti- cally be projected." "This 'is. so," the report,. dated Feb. 21, 1972, said, "be- cause the governineiits in the region are unable and, in some cases, unwilling to do those thjngs that would havi to be done by them; if a truly ef- fective effort :were to be made!" ' The report, prepared by of- t/ficials of the Central lntelli- gence Agency, the. State De= . partrnent and the Defense Dc-' Iaartment, noted that "the most basic problem, and the one that unfortunately appears least likely of any early solution, is the- corrtiption, collusion and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam,) that precludes more effective 'supression of traffic by the, ppnu.lJ ments on whose territory The report sharply contra- t'n`af'~i 1O1e Official Administra- tion position and Government intelligence sources say its conclusions are still valid today.! In May, Secretary of State Wil-' ]fam P. Rogers told a Senate subcommittee that "we think all the countries are cooperating with us and we are quite satsi- lied with that cooperation." Similarly, Nelson G. Gross, Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics, Matters, testified before Congress in June on the subject of narcotics smuggling that "the govern- ments of Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have already joined us in the fight and, while we have C a long way to go, we feel'that during the past year some real progress has been achieved." All officials concerned with the drug problem acknowledge that the United States agencies, under personal prodding from inte nsffpli'av~eV9f intensive ive e. ~t~p than Administration officials say it is. . Critics' Charges Backed Two leading critics of what they allege to be the Govern- ment's laxness in stopping the flow of narcotics are Represent- ative Robert H. Steele, Repub- lican of Connecticut, and Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale, graduate student who has writ- ten a book on narcotics in Southeast Asia. The New York Times reported Saturday that Mr. McCoy's allegations con- cerning the C.I.A. and the drug traffic had been the subject of an intense and unusually pub- lic rebuttal by the agency. saia, is monitoreu oy umtcu During a Congressional hear- States intelligence agencies. ling into drug traffic last month, Thai-U.S. Agreements Cited Representative Wolff disputed Mr. Gross, the State Depart- ment's adviser on international narcotics, said in his Congres- sional testimony that "during the past year the Thais have increased their efforts in the /drug field with United States and United Nations assistance." He cited two agreements, signed in late 1971, calling for more cooperation and more long-range planning between Thai and United States officials ,to stamp out the trade. "Based on all intelligence In- formation available," Mr. Gross er c t'f' d "th 1 d f th the Administration's contention that it was making "real prog- ress" in stemming the narcotics flow and said, "we think the trade has got so much protec- tion in high places in Thailand that the Administration is afraid they'll tell us to take our air bases out if .we put too much pressure on them." s o The Cabinet-level report, ~ tes i le , e ea made available to The Times, Thai Government are not en- buttressed many of the charges gaged in, the opium or heroin made by the two critics, par- traffic, nor are they extending ivotal im- protection to 'traffickers." He bout the l l i p y a ar t tu portance of Thailand to the in- added that the top police of-! ternational drug smugglers. ficial in Thailand had publicly Thailand is also a major Air stated that he would punish Force staging area for the Unit- any corrupt official. ed States. The cabinet-level report, sub- In a report on the world mitted to the Cabinet Commit- heroin problem last year, Mr. tee one International Narcotics American viewpoint, Thailand is as important to the control of the illegal international traffic in narcotics as Turkey. While all of the opium pro- duced in Southeast Asia is notl grown in Thailand, most of it is smuggled through that coun- try." Mr. Steele's report, filed with the House Committee on For- eign Affairs, noted that many American citizens had estab- lished 'residence in Bangkok, and had moved into the nar- cotics trade. The report added that the inability of the United States to have a few notorious smugglers deported had led some intelligence officials to conclude that the mien were pay- ing Thai officials for protec- tion. Mr. McCoy said in testimony before Congressional commit.- tees last month that hundreds of tons of Burmese opium passed through Thailand every year to international markets in Europe and the United Stales and that 80 to 90 per cent of the opium was carried by Chi- nese Nationalist paramilitary teams that were at one time paid by the C.I.A.. There are a number of opium refineries along the northern Thai border, he said, and much of the processed high-quality heroin is shipped by trawler to Hong Kong. "Even though they are heav- ily involved in the narcotics traffic," Mr. McCoy testified, have sponsored legislation that "these Nationalist. Chinese ir-!would cut off more than $100- regulars units are closely allied million in foreign aid to Thai- witin the Thai Government."-He ;land unless she took more ac- port duty", of about $2.50 a!fairs Committee on June 21 The New York Tinrccs Nelson G. Gross asserted that there has been prog- ress against smuggling. Robert H. Steele charged the Government is lax in halting flow of drugs. .Iic u'4 tt~ ,i A61010113 it qt 1'Tt iii8 '1'ir~fr i e si'tt000600120~A-h NTL border area and collect an "im-1cleared the House Foreign Af- ay- for suppression or tne trat- fic by Thai trawlers, noting that each trawler "would rep- resent something like 6 per cent of annual United States consumption of heroin." The report said that the trawler-traffic should have pri- ority because "it is possible to. attack the Thai trawler traffic without seeking the coopera- tion or Thai authorities and running the attendant risks of leaks, tip-offs and betrayals." After such a seizure, the re- port said, the United States' Embassy in Bangkok could "re-' peat with still greater force, and insistence the representa-, tions it has already often made to the Government of Thai-I land" for more effective efforts "to interdict traffic from the north of Thailand to Bangkok and also the loading of nar- cotics on ships in Thai har- bors." At another point in the re-, port, a general complaint was voiced. "It should surely he possible to convey to the right! Thai or Vietnamese officials the mood of the Congress and he Administration on the sub- ject of drugs," the report said. "No real progress can be made on the problem of illicit traffic until and unless the local gov- ernments concerned make it a matter of highest priority." Representatives Steele, Les-' ter L. Wolff, Democrat of Nas- sau County, and Morgan F. ti Y''.(i..''Yi t' iZZKI;J Approved For Release NOM A ~ 198A9WW:KU 6 GALA, AIDES ASSAIL ASIA DRUG CHARGE Agency, Fights Reports That It Ignored Heroin Traffic Among Allies of U.S. t By SEYMOUR M. HERSH special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, July 21 - The Central Intelligence Agency has begun a public battle against accusations that it knew- of but failed to stem the -heroin traffic of United States allies in Southeast Asia. In recent weeks, high-ranking officials of the C.I.A. have signed letters for publication to a newspaper and magazine, granted a rare on-the-record interview at the agency's head- quarters in McLean, Va., and most significantly -. per- suaded the publishers of a forthcoming expose on the C.I.A. . and the drug traffic to permit it to review the manuscript prior to publica- tion. The target of all these meas- ures has been the recent writ- ings and Congressional testi- mony of Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate stu- dent who spent 18 months in- vestigating the narcotics opera- tions in Southeast Asia. His book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," is schcd- tiled to be published by Harper & Row in mid-September-bar- ring delays caused by the in- telligence agency's review. In his book, Mr. McCoy al leged that both C.I.A. and State Department officials have provided political and military support for America's Indo- chinese allies actively engaged in the drug traffic, have con- sciously covered up evidence of such involvement, and have been actively involved them- selves in narcotic trade. C.I.A. officials said they had reason to believe that Mr. Mc- Coy's book contained many un- warranted, unproven and falla- cious accusations. They ac- knowledged that the public stance in opposition to such allegations was a departure from the usual "low profile" of the agency, but they in- sisted that there was no evi- dence affil drug traffic i aft' A ia. One well-informed Government official directly responsible for, monitoring the illegal flow of ington-based official with Air did not agree, he added, Harper narcotics complained in an in-,America, a charter airline that & Row would not publish the terview that many of Mr. Mc-flies missions foi; the C.I.A. in book. Coy's charges "are out of date." Southeast Asia. Both categoric- In a subsequent interview, "Go back three or four years," ally denied the allegations link- ? Robert L. Bernstein, president he said, "and no one was con- ing C.I.A. personnel to any of Random House and president cerned about this. It wasn't! knowledge of or activity, in of the Association of American until our own troops started: the drug traffic. Publishers, Inc., said that his to get addicted, until 1968 or A similar letter of disavowal, concern had twice refused of- '69, that anyone was aware" of signed by Mr. Colby, was sent ficial C.I.A. requests for per- the narcotics problems in South-' for publication to the publisher mission to revise manuscripts . east Asia, of Harper's Magazine within "In general," Mr. Bernstein This official said that In the the last week. Robert Schnayer- said, "our opinion would be .eyes of the C.I.A., the charges son, the magazine's editor, said that we would not publish a were "unfair." Ile said of the that the letter would be pub- book endangering the life of C.I.A., "they think they're tak- lished as soon as possible, anybody working for the C.I.A. ing the heat for being un- The C.I.A. began its approach or an other Government agency. aware and not doing anything to Harper & Row in early Short of that, we would pub- about something that was go- June, apparently after learning lish any valid criticism." ing on two or three years of Mr. McCoy's appearance be- In a series of interviews with ago." fore the Senate subcommittee. The New York Times, a number Based on 250 Interviews Cord Meyer Jr., described asL of present and former officials During two Cb?b?ssional ap- with officials of the publishing l pearances ast :month, Mr. Mc- (concern and informally asked Coy testified that his accusa- tions were based on more than 250 interviews, some of them with past and present officials of the C.I.A. He said that top- level South Vietnamese officials, including President Nguyen Van Thicu and Premier Iran Van I hiem, were specifically involved. . In July, 1971, Representative Robert H. Steele, Republican, of Connecticut, said during a , e my House Foreign Affairs suhcom American citizens should be !bottom dollar that they were' mittee hearing that the United dl if bd o hd i i mae onyasenarnt . States Government possessed evidence." east Asian officials, including. Maj. Gen. Ngo Dzu, then com-I mander of the South Viet namese II Corps, with involve-1 meet in the narcotics trade. Mr. Steele's accusations were denied and mostly ignored. Mr. McCoy also alleged that Corsican and American syndi- cate gangsters had become in- volved in the narcotics trade. He said that such information was known to the C.I.A. In a chapter of his book published in this month's Harpers Maga- zine, Mr. McCoy further charged that in 1967 the in. famous "Golden Triangle" - an opium-producing area cm= for review prior to publication. nineteen-sixties. But many noted On July 5, a formal letter that the agency had since taken making the request, signed by; strong steps to curb such prac- counsel of the C.I.A. was sent. to Harper & Row. Mr. Houston's request was not based on 'national securit but on the thesis that "allega- tions concerning involvement of our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations with- out being assured that the sup- porting evidence was valid." If the manuscript were handed over, the letter said. "we be- lieve we could demonstrate to you that a considerable num- ber of Mr. McCoy's claims about this agency's alleged in- volvement are totally false and without foundation, a number re distorted beyond recogni- ion, and none is based on convincing evidence." A copy of the letter was made avail- able to The New York Times. Mr.McCoy, in an interview, said that the book had been smuggling and "looking the oth- er way" was common through- 4Ycars in Southeast Asia, said, 1 don't believe that agency , staff personnel were dealing L/ in Opium. But if you're talking/ about Air America hauling the stuff around then I'll b t (described Mr. McCoy's pub- Ilished writings as "1 per cent 'tendentious and 90 per cent of the most valuable contributioot :1 can think of." (bracing parts of northeastern commissioned by Harper & Burma, northern Thailand and Row and carefully and totally northern Laos-was producing reviewed by its attorneys with about 1,000 tons of raw opium no complaint until the C.I.A. annually, then about 70 per request was made. cent of the world's supply. The bulk of Mr. McCoy's accusations-both in the maga- zine and during the Congres- sional hearings--failed to gain much national attention. None- theless, the C.I.A. began its unusual public defense after a Washington Star reporter cited some of Mr. McCoy's allegations in a column. Letter Sent to Paper Two letters were sent to i roReel segQ604D 8 Colby, the executive director of the C.I.A., and the other ,by Paul C. Velte Jr. a. Wash- ! B. Brooks Thomas, vice presi- dent and general counsel of the publishing house, said in ,an interview in New York, We don't have nay doubts ,about the book at all. We've :had it reviewed by others and we're persuaded that the work is amply documented and schol- arly." i "We're not submitting to censorship or anything like that," Mr. Thomas said. "We're taking a responsible middle po- J -TATINTL 'P l- 1 -e , 011 'n X600120001- to review it.". If Mr.. McCoy 9 STAB, STATINTL 22JUL19 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-0 MILTON WORST Just in case you've for- gotten how all that fuss down in Miami Beach (and since) got started, may I remind you that it was a war in Indo- china-which, in the absence of large American casualties, has dropped off the front pages again. ? For myself, I'm grateful for a little book by Fred Branfman, who spent four years in Laos, called "Voices From the Plain of Jars." It's an account, largely in the words of the victims, of what living beneath an American air canhpaiall is like. It's worth $1.93 for this grim reminder .of Orwellian struggle. The Plain of Jars, Branf- man tells us, is a small and beautiful plateau, whose 150,- 000 inhabitants lived in vir- tual isolation from the out- side world in tiny farming villages. For centuries, the Plain was fought over by dif- ferent tribal groups, none of which seemed to hold it for very long. In 1961, the Plain was tak- en rather effortlessly from the right-wing, Laotian heirs of the French colonial regime by a local Communist group called the?Pathet Lao. To res- cue it from this fate, the United States decided to bomb the Plain of Jars, as we say, back into the Stone Age. The entire operation was conceived by the CIA-and, of course, the American peo- ple were told nothing about it. Over the ensuing years, U.S. bombers literally destroyed the ancient satiety there, killing tens of thousands of people and driving the others Loth the forests and the cities. It was a stirring American victory or, as Tacitus put it, "where they snake a desert, they call it peace." It is hard to know what strategic pur- pose was served-but the Plain of Jars victory has been amply confirmed by outside sources. At first, I was disposed to think that Branfman exagger- ated when he wrote; "Al- though few people realize it as yet, the disappearance of the Plain of Jars is one of the signal events of our time, as significant in its own way ? . . as the atomic bombing of Iliroshinha." He went on to explain that the Plain of Jars marked the historical advent of ''automat- ed" warfare. The armies of our allies, he pointed out, were so ? much weaker than their adversaries that conventional air support was inadequate. "So," lie wrote, "the traditional roles of air and ground forces were reversed." Air power became the principal arm of conquest, with ground forces supple- menting the bombs. To a superpower, he said, the advantages of automated war are that it is "relatively inexpensive and . . . its own citizens are barely or not at all aware of it, and their lead- ers are free to' wage war at their pleasure." But, even more frighten- ingly, he adds; "The basic psychology of war is altered as well. Ileretofore, hatred of the enemy and love of country or faith -- real or manufactured-has been a necessary prerequisite for sending men off to war. "However, when tens of thousands of technicians are called upon to wage war against a country and a peo- ple they, will never see, then the need for such motivation disappears. When even the relatively few who do enter enemy territory remain 5,000 feet in the air and wage bat- tle. by pushing buttons and pulling levers to release ord- nance on unseen persons be- low, even the tenuous human bonds which once existed be- tween enemies are dissolved. "War 'becomes a technical exercise, bereft of malice or rancor, freeing combatants from pangs of conscience and the moral constraints." Branfman finished his book before the full implications of President Nixon's Indochina strategy became apparent- but it is clear that the lessons we learned over the Plain of Jars have been incorporated into the fighting in South Vietnam. We no longer fight on the ground. We send our bombers in from our sanctuaries in Thailand, Guam and the car- riers in the Tonkin-Gulf. After releasing their destruction, the technicians who fly them re- turn home to martinis and a hot supper. . Not even the Pentagon, claims that the South Vietnam- ese -army is more than a minor auxiliary of American air power. As Secretary Laird said re- cently, we will "be continuing air and sea power in Asia for a good time. The idea that somehow or other the Nixon Doctrine means that we will not have air or sea power in Asia is a great mistake." So the next time someone tells you slow swell it is that President Nixon has wound dow, n the war in Vietnam, you can answer that he hasn't wound down anything. IIe's just shifted from the obsolete kind of war to the new, in- vigorating automated war. Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 STATINTL WAS l: AS13i 11? -10 :. TATINT Approved for Release 20o&d5A :1F?i4-RDP8 .- s 4 dos By TAMMY ARBUCI~LE Special to The Star-News VIENTIANE - Considera- ,ble rivalry exists between the U.S. State and Defense depart- ments on who should run the Laos- war and how the Laos war should be run, wc1l- informed U.S. official sources say. This rivalry is sd great that sometimes one group of U.S. officials is not totally aware of what other another depart- ment is doing, sources said. Right now the Laos war is run by the State. Department through its man on the scene, U.S. Ambassador G. Mc- Murtrie Godley. Personal Direction Godley orchestrates the war very personally, deciding for example whether and where ;]352 strikes should be made. To help and advise him from the field the ambassador has the Central Intelligence Agen- cy. The agency acts as the State Department's executive assistant in Laos with its em- ployes coordinating and direct- ing the activities of the Laos irregular army, which takes the brunt of the Laos fighting. Representing the defense Department is the 127-man army of the attaches' office. It, too advises the ambassa- dor, but its men in the field are found only with units of the Royal Lao Army, which does not do very much fighting in Laos. Senior army attaches are present at most policy meet- Ns, -but a senior U.S. official said this does not mean they are always up to date on a fast-moving military situation because the CIA doesn't al- ways tell them. A source said one Army attache was "just about in tears when he left Laos because lie coulch"i't keep up with it (the situation)." During the military crisis in north Laos the first three months of this year, Godley was conferring with. Central Intelligence Agency officials as soon, as they returned from the field. The sessions were in private, U.S. owned buildings at the Vientiane airport, not at eet- full dress embassy team meet- Reports Conficted During the battle for the provincial capital of Khong Se- done the U.S. Army was say- ing the mountain overlooking the town was in friendly hands when in fact it wasn't, accord- ing to irregular commanders on the scene. This preemi- nence of the State Department in a war has not caused the top-ranking U.S. military to love Godley. A high-ranking visitor here from Cincpac (Commander in Chief Pacific) headquarters in Hawaii snapped "Get rid of that man (Godley) and we would be all right." T h e Defense Department has assigned an officer to oversee what Godley does in a roundabout way. The officer is Brig. Gen. John W. Vessey, deputy chief of the U.S. military mission to Thailand. Vessey is based at Udorn in northeast Thailand, and is in charge of logistics for the Laos war, which is paid through Defense Department funds. "Vessey's very sharp, a kind of watchdog on Mac," is how one U.S. source described him. Most of the Defense De- partment's animus seems di- rected at the State Depart- ment rather than the Central Intelligence Agency. "That's because they. know the CIA wants- to get out of this busi- ness," an informed American source said. "The Army would like to be doing what the CIA is doing - outrunning the ir- regulars," one source -said. And, in fact, the Defense De- partment is getting more and more into the act in Laos through control of funds for the war. Except, for $7.1 million from the Defense Department, the CIA has been funning the Lao irregulars to the tune of close to $100 million. All costs of Lao irregulars, however, will come out of Defense Department funds In fiscal 1973, according to a report this year for the Senate Foreign R e l a t i o n s Committee. The Defense Department is also taking over the $44 mil- lion cost of air sunnly con- ings wren ar>;lnv l 6n e O al X,ei rvrces a'n'8 ent. t Air Development, contractors who handle the delivery of war supplies and other chores for the U.S. government in Laos. Ridden by State These costs were previously hidden in U.S. aid funds under State Department control. Un- fortunately, one shudders at the thought the U.S. Army and Defense. Department are run- ning the Laos war. For under their aegis, most U.S. officials believe, U.S. involvement would become greater and more costly. As ambassador, Godley is abreast of political develop- ments and' therefore better able to orchestrate the war. The CIA has set up a sepa- rate Laos army relatively free from the corruption and in- trigue which plagues the Roy- al army. Irregular officers are promoted or demoted on mer- it, the soldiers are paid on time, they are fighting on a voluntary basis and they fight pretty well. Guerrilla Instruction The agency has introduced some guerrilla warfare con- cepts (though not enough) such as mobility, keeping away from static defense and using small teams to find the enemy. Each individual weap- on is accountable and frequent on-the-scene Inspection b y Americans insures against material wastage. The State Department, CIA and Army have all sent their best officials to Laos, and it is easy to sympathize with U.S. Army frustrations here with a war nobody will let them get into. But given the Army's record in South Vietnam, U.S. officials here prefer to see the war remain in the competent hands of the State Depart- ment's Godley and the CIA. Generals, Staffs, Cooks "The Army would have gen- erals, an appropriate staff, then cooks for the staff and so on. We'd never get out of. here if they were running ' it," an American official said. Sources said the Army had shown itself not to be geared for guerrilla warfare in Viet- nam just from the point of view of infantry tactics alone. "They'd probably get the Lao going on these big fancy oper- ations with no results," sources scoffed. All U.S. offi- cials here, however, admit to one major problem looming which concerns State, Defense and CIA. Downgrade or Upgrade? 0 C, The problem is that at some point .Lao irregulars and the Royal army will have to be integrated. How does one do it? U.S. officials ask. Obviously the latter is more desirable and if it is going to be done, who is going to do it? The CIA -tends to shy away from further involvement here and that leaves the.job to the Defense D e p artin eat, in- formed U.S. sources say. This plus increased participation in funding by the Defense De- partment indicates the Penta- gon is likely to play an in- creased role in Laos. Some .Americans believe that is the situation if Laos and Laos con- glomerate military forces sur- vive long enough against the continuing North Vietnamese pressure - currently a very questionable factor indeed. .They say there' has only been a rise of 219 in the num- ber of Americans involved in the Laos war with 1,259 Ameri- cans involved in early 1972 compared to 1,010 in March 19411A-RDP80-01.601 R000600120001-5 Tl $1fIl'iiJljjOI:ii O$ Approved For Release 2000/05/Td :fA-RD92 P80-01601 RO By Peter Smith PAC!HG News Service PIrITS.ANULOK, T h a 1- land-In a U-shaped bend of a small river about l5 miles east of this northern district capital lies a secret U.S. military training base known as Camp Saritsana. Near the point where I ,bad been told to turn off the road to find the c mp, a Thai waitress in a small restaurant said that there were usually about 1,000 Thai soldiers at the site, but that. most had just left. She falso told me that 10 or 15 Americans were station- ed. there, and that planes landed on an average of five times gin' day. As l: wal'ked' along the river away from 'the high- 0 Til. supervises and pays for the tag, a frequent tip-off that' training of these irregulars people are engaged in ac- in Thailand and provides tivity which might not their salary, allowances (in- square with formal pro- eluding death benefits), and nouncements of U.S. Policy. operational costs in Laos." Scattered a m o n g the These T'torthcrn Thai usual pin-up!-, and memor- speak a dialect similar to abilia of home were other 711eo dialect, and they are siggns. One said: `"No war easily integrated into Van., was ever won with modera- l'ao's forces. talon and civility. 1-ILL!" At the^. Twos stopped Another said: ' i'dalte war, at the main irate by three not p''ace. War is the final Jhai ,,^;u?.rd wire called t: eir answer." commanding oft:;er, a Thai The men were polite, al- special forces sergeant ma- most p sinfully so. 'J'hey did jor, on the phone. When I not mention their mission, told hint I hart once served and i',hen I expressed in- with 1,11c c pc'eial h'orces terest they changed the in '1,wd and just wanted subject. tall' with some Arneric.,ms Finally one of the men of- t o way the whine of d!eselon the base, he :raid, Sure, ferZd to escort we to the generators guided me until come on." O n e of the gate, and I followed his I says several coca rc,te and wooden buildings, a 100 foot- high water tower, axed a generator shed. Purther up, a steel suspension bridge carried truck traffic across the river. The scene re- minded me of places where 1. had served in Vietnam guards got on the back of truck out. and waved to tlro lily motorcycle and we drove Thai guards as I left.. to headfill arters. The 50-acre site is divid- cd roughly in the middle by an airstrip. heavy woods surround the +rase. Ten bar- racks for 'Thai er,ldiers were on the left aide. of the en- and tThailand, trance road; Ial~e,viiere on. At' Sariis ura, U.S. Army'. tile grounds were a Thai spe- Special forces -train J-hat soldiers for combat in ne'ig'hboring Laos. Since the early 'd0, CIA-financed Mco mercenary armies, led by their most powerful chieftain Vang Pao, have been fighting in Laos, and estimates of the number of .Moo mean killed run t m4 high .as 50 per cent. To replace these losses, the United states has been training Thais for the last three years. hut the training and the fact that Thailand has been sending troops to Laos have not been acknowl- edged by U.S. or. Thai of- ficials. Senate Report But a -U.S. Senate sub- committee on security agree- ments and commitments abroad reported last year: cial forces headquarters, a jump tower and cable rig for paraclitite training, a drying loft for tine parachutes, and several inaintenarice build- 'A'ir America' Sinn After checking with the Thai sergeant major, the guard took me across the runway to a building mark= cd "Air America," the namo of the charter line which flies secret missions for the CIA throughout Asia. My Thai escort ushered me in- to a U.S. Special Forces team room, where, five men were having their morning beer. All w o r oo civilian clothes or jungle fatigues without insignia or . name "The That Irregular pro- gram ... was designed by the CIA specifically along the lines of the irregular program in Laos. The CIA I STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 STATINTL W.ASHINGTON STAR Approved For Release 20b/s/3i 51$&IA-RDP80-01601 RO tUr rl trr t r '1 y~ 0 0 f ?_s Se (> ~::-,599 . SIR: I refer to the letter of W. E. Colby, executive director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who re- butted the charges made by some American newspa- permen that the CIA was involved in opium traf- ficking. I do not question Colby's good faith, neither do I say that the CIA, as an entity, traffics in opium; but, I am sorry to say that there is more to these charges than mere "gossip, conjecture and, old history." I also know what I am talking about because 'I was involved in security matters for the South Vietnamese government under President Ngo Dinh Diem. In effect, one day; the President told inc to investigate into the activities of our chief of secret police, chief of our own "CIA" and chief of military security, and to report di- rectly to him, because, as he put it: "I cannot ask my own chiefs of police, `CIA,' and military security to investigate into themselves." I found out the corruption of two. chiefs, and the President took very drastic measures against them. I have kept the contact with my security agents ever since. They firmly confirm that a few CIA agents in Indochina are involved in opium trafficking. But above all, a line must be drawn between Indochina and the rest of the world, because, due to the fact of the coun- ter-insurgency warfare, the operations of the American CIA in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are extremely im- portant when they are compared to open ations of the same agency in other countries. In Indochina, the CIA is a real army with his own aerial fleet. A number of CIA operatives deal directly with Vietnamese, Lao, or Meo warlords or officials at the highest level, with whom they share the proceeds of the opium traffic. For good American citizens in the United States, it is very difficult to imagine the influence and power of these operatives in Indochina. Their power, in fact, is ua- limnited-they are the true rulers of Indochina; their desires are orders-no Vietnamese, Laotian or Canmbo- i dian official would dare resist their orders. Corruption growing from a de facto power-affects some of these CIA operatives. The traffic of opium involves a relatively large num- ber of persons. Outside a few Americans, there are Vietnamese, Laotians and Meo who are involved. Since these persons have their clans, families and friends who live from this traffic, the total number of persons con- cerned become so great that it is impossible to keep secret the operations. I also do not question the good faith of CIA Director Richard Helms when he said that "os an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution; we know we are not contributing to the prob- lem ... ," However as I said previously, a line must be drawn and a distinction must be made; for circum- stances are not the same-there is not the vaguest re- semblance between CIA operatives in Indochina and their colleagues operating in other countries. In conclusion, CIA Director Helms and Colby, Miss Randal, and Mccoy said the truth and did not contra- dict one another; they perhaps did not talk about the same country. Tian Van Khiem, Attorney, Former Deputy, Vietnamese National Assembly. Chevy Chase, Md. STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 WASHINGTON STAR Approved For Release 2000M(tty Gppq RDP80-01601 STATINTL LAN Ignored Involvement More importantly, the CIA, the U.S. Embassy and the whole U.S. apparatus in Laos ignored Gen. Ouane Rattikone's involvement in the narcotics traffic, even while American troops in Vietnam were being deci- mated by Laotian heroin. His involvement, as well as the location of the heroin laboratories, was common knowledge among even the most junior U.S. officials'., As late as June 9, 1972, Nelson Gross, the State De- partment's drug coordinator, called my charges of Gen. Ouane's involvement "unsubstantiated allegations." However, John Warner of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in a June 19 interview in The Star admitted for the first time that Gen. Duane controlled and protected the Laotian narcotics traffic for years. Colby quoted Warner in his letter to try to discredit my charges, but conveniently emitted mention that the former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army was also the chief narcotics trafficker. Southeast Asia is fast becoming the major source of heroin for the U.S. market, and high government of- ficials in Laos and South Vietnam are involved in the narcotics traffic. 'i''he U.S. government knows this but ignores and covers it tip. The time has come when we have to decide which is more important to our country--propping up corrupt governments in Southeast Asia or getting heroin out of our high schools. Reply air :CIA Drug Charges SIR: On July 5, N. E. Colby, executive direc- tor of the Central Intelligence Agency, responded to a June 29 column by Judith Randal in a letter. He stated that charges of CIA involvement in the narcotics traf- fie from Southeast Asia were "unsubstantiated." Since I am one of the persons who have made such charges, I would like to give the basis for my findings. The specific charge is that Air America aircraft chartered by the CIA have been transporting opium harvested by the CIA-supported Meo tribesmen in Laos. I have three sources for this information: (1) This was told to me by Gen. Ouane Rat.tikone, former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army, who also admitted to me that he had controlled the opium traffic in northwestern Laos since 1962. (2) Air America's involvement was confirmed by Gen.-Thao Ma, former commander of the Laotian Air Force,. v,who refused to carry opium for Gen. Duane. (3) I spent six days in August 1971 in the opium- growing Moo village of Long Pot, Laos. (The writer assures us that that. is, in fact its name--Ld.) Gcr Su Yang, the district officer, told me: . "Meo officers with three or four stripes (captain or more) came from Long Tieng to buy our opium. They came in American helicopters, p?:,~rhaps two or three men at one time. The helicopter leaves them here for a few days and they walk to villages over there, then come back here jnd radioed I.,ong Tieng to send an- other helicopter for them. They take the opium back to Long Tieng." Verified by Others This account was verified by other officials, farmers and soldiers in Long Pot. Ger Su Yang also reported that the helicopter pilots were always Americans. Long Pot harvests weighed approximately 700 kilos (1,513 pounds). and could not have been carried without the pilot's knowledge. In my June 2 testimony before the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee. I charged that "by ignor- ing, covering up and failing to counteract the massive drug traffic from Southeast Asia our government is aiding and abetting the influx of heroin into our na- tion." I stand by this charge. The U.S. has put top priority on its military and political goals in fighting the war in Indochina. As long as our Asian allies have fought the war, U.S. officials have tolerated govern- mental corruption. Narcotics trafficking has not been treated differently from stealing U.S. aid, currency manipulation or black marketeering, all of which are rampant. The CIA has organized a mercenary rimy of most- ly Agee tribesmen .in Laos under Gen. Vang Pao. The Moos' cash crop has been opium, and the CIA merely followed their French colonial predecessors' dictum: "In order to have the Aieo, one must buy their opium." The CIA may not have bought their opium, but did ship it to market. Alfred W. McCoy. Editor's Note: McCoy is the author of the Harper's Magazine article, "Flowers of oppcaring in its July, 1972, issue, quoted by Miss Rarulal. STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 eVI'dF ; 1W 4 239,949 S - 350,303 6-11 ~m 'vlnuials (or perhaps, as seems to be com- r, }n.; THE S~'~:~iE people who gave the v:c~Ild the Gatling the A-bomb and plastic shrapnel we now have, once again, a new, im- proved way of making war. V The U.S. Air Force. and the CIA can now Snake it rain on your parade, whether that parade is a military convoy on the Ilo Chi Minh 'Trail or a political demonstration in Saigon (or Louisville?). We understand. the Nixon administration's unwillingness to brag about the clouds eding operations that the United States "has` been conducting .1n :Indochina. Any, brag ding, ;ion' or, even any -admission that such operations have, indeed, taken place-would make it it)- pear that Defense Secrat:ary Laird lied to the Senate Foreign Rei.ations Committee last i.eonth when he was asked about Air Force rainmaking activities. The Secretary said, "V,'e have not en ;aged in any over North Viet- n am." ,Now at least a dozen present and former military and civilian officials tell The New York Times that our planes have seeded clouds over North Vietnam at least as late as I5171--and over Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam as well. In addition to damaging Secretary Lairci's impeccable credibility, premature admissions to rainmaking might also lose Mr. Nixon f he votes of those environmentalists, if any, who f`orse than rain. However, the citizens V, ji'll)w ~-)L'~', or our eastern scaboard ~~ trol panels, instructing 'Mother Nature. where rnttit nut gree. And the ti ~htly cl se ~i .l 1 t 1 mouths atAp>proa~e fOrtil~~ @ e? 060/ 0 ~,o -Af `L') P ~" '1 ~ t b066620001-5 There'll be no need of nos then, and "World War" will have a new meaning. or Release 2000/05/1117 P 9 JUL 1972 , Approved For Release 2000O5f4,1Y4,Z WR.DR&0S016II Pentagon: 'WASHINGTON-Dr. Gordon J. F. rhIacDonald, a prominent geophysicist ,who had just completed a tour as vice president of the Defense Department's Institute of Defense Analysis, pub- ,-lished in 1968 a little-noted but chilling .study on the military potential of ?met.erological warfare. He listed a num- ?Jaer of options available to those who would choose to tamper with nature. ,Among them: .n- a Altering the world's temperature .by rocketing materials into the earth's ;upper: atmosphere to either absorb light (thereby cooling the surface below) or .absorb outgoing heat (thereby heating' .she surface below). This technique could be targeted at a specific area. a Triggering tidal waves by set- ting off a series of underground ex- plosions along the edge of the Conti- 'hental Shelf, or by producing a natural riarthquake, A guided tidal wave could be achieved by correctly shaping the fflergy-release sources. ? Changing the physical makeup , ? the atmosphere by creating, with a rocket or similar weapon, a "hole" in the important ozone layer between 90* and 30 miles up that is responsible for absorbing much of the ultra-violet Ii ht cast from the sun. Without the protective layer of ozone, a molecular -form of oxygen, the radiation would -be fatal to all human, plant and animal life that could not take shelter in the affected area below, ,'-`Dr. MacDonald (who is now a -member of the White House Council on "rivironmental Quality) made it clear Ahat' his essay was based only on spec- ulation. Last week, however, it became r' known that at least part of his maca- bre weather arsenal had been secretly s't'n use by the United States since the `1960's. l "Air Force planes, supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, have been .,,?.?6 ?. ~,,. ?..~~? ,a? , ? ,a~? ~.~ published data suggesting that weather the infiltration trails of Laos, Cam- modification, in combination with bodia, North Vietnam and South Viet- nam. ecological stresses such as air . The intent: suppress enemy anti- and pesticides, may have a missile fire, provide cover for South pollution synergistic effect-that is, result in Vietnamese commando teams pene- collective changes far greater than movegment the of men North and and materiel hinder from the either abuse would have- caused by movement I'orth Vietnam into the South. In Indochina, where heavy bombing The first experimental rain-making /already has robbed much of the land- mission was flown by the C.I.A. in scape of its natural water-holding ca- South Vietnam in 1963, but it was not pability by destroying foliage and trees, until 1965 that a group of Air Force artifically induced rains may result in scientists officially was ordered to far greater flooding than expected, start thinking of ways to turn nature along with heavier soil erosion. i t ' l n o a mi itary tool Technically, there are " We all sat down in a big brain- storrping session," said one of the scientists who participated at the Air Force Cambridge Research Labora- tories at Hanscomb Field near Bedford, Mass. "The idea was to increase the rain and reduce the trafficability in all of Southeast Asia." Within a year, the Air Force and C.I.A. began a highly secret rain-mak- ing project over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, in Laos, known as "Operation Pop- Eye." There were heated protests from the State Department, and eventually a directive from the Secretary of De- fense Robert S. McNamara ordering a halt to the project. Instead, well- qualified sources - said last week, "it went underground-into the dark." . From 1969, through at least early this year, weather warfare was a covert operation being directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with White House acquiescence. The fact that the program existed at all came to light only last week in, The New York Times. But, despite an extensive investigation, it could not be learned how successful the program had been, how many missions were conducted or whether it was-still being used in connection with the heavy bombing of North Vietnam that fol- lowed the enemy offensive last April. Making rain has long been techni- cally feasible. Scientists have learned that rain fall can be increased by as much as- 40 per cent after seed- ing clouds by aircraft with silver-io- dide particles, Other chemicals, includ- ing dry ice, also have been used with success, both in the United States and in Southeast Asia. . Military and Government specialists acknowledge that there is little precise scientific knowledge of the short-range impact of cloud seeding and practi- cally none of the long-range ecological effect of changing the amount of natural rainfall. Some scientists have tional agreements outlawing such war- fare. But Government officials made clear last week that the weather-mak- ing activity of the Air Force was shielded from public view because of White House sensitivity to what could be regarded as the impropriety of the action. The issue, one well-informed official said, was one in which Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national. security adviser, took a personal hand. "This kind of thing was a bomb," the official said, "and Henry restricted information about it to those who had to know." SEY11IOUR Al. I-ERSII Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001--5 L `yv?F,.~ T`;E STATINT 7 JUL 1972 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R W r in Air Decentralized by Nixon, But the Controls Are Termed Strict Targets are then selected by By NEIL SHEEHAN the field commands from those Special to The New York Times on the authorized list. The field WASHINGTON, July 6 commands tell the Joint Chiefs President Nixon is waging the' in advance what they intend to strike and by what date, thus air war against North Vietnam giving the White House prior with a decentralized 'system of ;notice. command and control that dif- ' Mr. Nixon resumed full-scale fors significantly from the air attacks on the southern highly centralized system em- panhandle of North Vietnam ployed by his predecessor, Lyn- in the first part of April after don E. Johnson, during the the North Vietnamese had 1065-68 air campaign. In the launched their offensive across view of a number the demilitarized zone. The News of civilian and mil- new air war moved into high itary officials withi gear in the latter half of the Aiialysis experience in Indo- month, with raids throughout china, the decen- the North. tralization does The civilian and military of- not imply the unraveling of ci- ficials, explaining their view vilian control over the military! that decentralization has not or the loosening of the chain of weakened coniniand and con- military command. trot, say, first, that the Presi- In effect they reject sugges- dent still decides how military Lions of such a deterioration force will be applied and. to made in the wake of the ac- what extent he will delegate Lavelle that forces under his command made at-least 28 un- authorized air raids on the North between last Nov. 8 and March 8. 1-10 was dismissed as commander of the Seventh Air Force in Saigon after a secret) inquiry that was completed there March 23. In the 1065-68 air war, lists of proposed targQts were for- warded from the war zone through subordinate commands to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, who modified or approved them and sent them, to the White House. At Tuesday luncheon meet- ings, President Johnson and his senior Vietnam policy aides de- cided that certain targets could be attacked by a given date. If the attacks were not carried out by then, the authorization lapsed. Robert S. McNamara, who favored this highly centralized system when he was Secretary of Defense because he felt that it resulted in calculated doses of force carefully applied, in- formed the Joint Chiefs, who in turn informed the subor- dinate commands what targets could be attacked by what dates. List of Authorized Targets Under the Nixon Adminis- tration's system, according to the officials, who were inter- viewed by The New York Times, a list of authorized targets in the North was transmitted to the subordinate commands by the White House and the Joint Chiefs ; - that would automatically prevent the kind of insubordi- nation and falsification that General Lavelle acknowledged in testimony before the House June 12. The officials interviewed Special Forces commander in Vietnam at the time, may have inadvertently misled Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, General Westmoreland's successor, about the killing of a Viet- namese agent suspected of sny- contended that there was no trig for the other side because way to build checks into the the colonel had in turn been structure to automatically fore- misled by his subordinates. stall insubordination and falsi- Subterfuge Proposed fication without so thoroughly Before President Nixon's deci- eroding the responsibility and lion to launch ground attacks: initiative of subordinate com- on Communist bases in Cam manders as to make the cure bodia in the spring of 1070, worse than even the possibility Generals Westmoreland and, of the disease. Abrams were repeatedly frus- In the view of the officials trated in their pleas for per- interviewed, a case similar to mission to assault those sanc- the Lavelle affair could have turaries. occurred - although there is Staff officers, it is now no evidence that it did --- ten- known, proposed using the so- der the highly centralized sys- called rules of engagment -- tem used by the Johnson Ad- in the way General Lavelle ministration. They also believe used the rules of "protective that it could occur under the reaction" - as a subterfuge present system, to get around the prohibition. . Conforming to the Format The rules of en a ge en per g u d re American troops TO re- It was pointed out that Gen-1 m centralized system, in the light era1 Lavelle met the format oft turn fire across the border or of the failure of the Johnson ' to condo t h the reporting system by de- Administration's policy to bring scribing the unauthorized meththeod war of to a halt, applying is air a better power strikes, bas "protective reac- in a coordinated campaign: tion'" aimed at depriving North Viet- S milarly, when Air Force nam of imports, both economic. jets accidentally strafed a So- and military, through rain- Viet freighter in the North Viet- ing and bombing. If air power n;rlese port of Campha in 1067 is to be effective, the officials while Mr. McNamara's highly added, the commander on the centralized system was in force, scene must be free to select the pilots and the acting wing his targets and to time his at- commander, in an tulsuccess- tacks. In the end, regardless of what guidance is issued by the civilian leadership and the Joint Chiefs, the sources asserted, Washington and the various of pulstut lZl.o Cambodia in the midst of bat- tle. "People suggested getting lost, or saying we were gettira shot at and shooting back, but Westmoreland and Abrams re- fused to chisel," an officer re- lated. Some officials say that, spe- cific cases aside, actions by re- cent Administrations in the fill attempt to cover up the) conduct of foreign policy and mistake, filed a false report war-making have encouraged and burned the gun-camera' an atmosphere of deception.! film that had recorded the in-' They assert, for example, that, cident. when the civilian leadership' In the case of the Mylai in"-,j subverts the Congressional pro-I to rely on what they are toldlJohnson Administration was in;; third country's troops in Laos ' by the field commands. warded to headquarters in Sai- gon said that 128 Vietcong had "On the way back you are'been killed and three weapons the slave of the reporting sys- captured. Because the guerril- tem," an official said. "It las are often able to recover would be very difficult to tell most of the weapons from their whether the report was falsified dead and because dozens of if it met the required format, similar reports were received all especially when you are ban- the time, the senior officer who dung dozens of messages a day, saw this one ordered the rou- It is highly improbable that tine message of congratulations you would smell a rat unless from Gen. William C. West- somebody tipped you off." rnoreland, then American mil- The deciding factor in the itary commander, sent to the system, the officials main- unit that had committed the taired, is the )honesty and dis-massacre. General . \Vestmore- cipline of the commanders close land may not even have read enough to the scene to know'the report. what 1s actually happening.! The circumstances of the fa They noted that. there were mous Green Beret murder case no checks -- sometimes re-the following year indicate ferred to as fail-safe devices.that Col. Robert B. Rheault, by having the Central Intelli- gence Agency secretly hire Thai mercenaries, this has an im- pact on the willingness of sub- ordinate officials to abide by restrictive orders that they dis- like. The Possibility of Error It is also noted that ev-n the most carefully devised sys- tem of civilian control can prove ineffective because of human error. Mr. McNarnara's rigidly cen- tralized target selection did not prevent the bombing of schools, churches, hospitals and homes in North Vietnam because in- dividual pilots mistook them for designated military targets or dropped their bombs pre- maturely. _ U, April. t'A if v'`ed P r Release 200 0/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120PO%11~iuee a- DIUUY STATINTL Approved For Release 2060%oI11S7E CIA-RDP80-01601 R0006 5A C) r U'_`[j C D CC jlcl Ff:)(DU,Cj0 cn, j" z crn By LENO1tr WEISS NEW YORK, July 4 - Returning from a three-day meeting last week in Paris with veterans of the Southeast Asia liberation forces, 15 delegates of the Vietnam Veterans Against'-die War (VVAW), announced plans here to report their' findings. to their local areas. This includes, said William They had to do their own pub- is last wee .they had III(.( with del Rosario, a national coordina- licity, the veterans said, because veterans of the South Vietnamese tor of the - VVAW, "speaking their trip had been. ignored by Natronrrl l.rber;rtron Front, the tours, articles, testimony to Con- ? the commercial press, Ar,,,y. .{ ,,,.. .....-. -- r??- -1 ? " ti l.a lrr. Ull' I'Zinlet Lao oan tos documenting the effects of and the larub x(ian United Front The interview took 'place at U.S. bombing raids on North to find c?rrrlllorl basis for. VVAW headquarters on West 26 Vietnam- ell dingtheIva r-," street. In their three-day talks in Par- 't'hv talks had been organized Approved by I? r'cnclr pe;fee E'roups and rep- resentalrvv of the War Crimes Comnrsston, a ertrzens' group es- ttrhlished several years ago by 13crlrand Itus'sell: the late Brit- ish philosopher. "We arhreved ,note in three days than our government has achieved in three years, said John 13oyvhuck, an active-duty GI who was due to return to Mt. Ilonle Air Force Base in Idaho. "We didn't have to de- cidc if we Wanted round ash- trays, square ashtrays or who was going to sit Where." Precious minutes Toby Hollander, of East St. Louis, Ill., an Annapolis grad- uate, said the PItG spokesman in Paris, Ly Van Sau, expressed the purpose of the meeting when he said, "if our efforts cause the war to end one minute ear- lier, this equals four tons of bombs.." Veterans learned in Paris of specifications by the U.S. mili- tary for . 40,000 new "tiger cages," which are cells 8 by 10 feet on Coll Son Island, for the prisoners of the Saigon regime. Laotian and Cambodian repre- sentatives in Paris told the vet- erans, said Paul Richard, Seattle, that the war, contrary to U.S. State Department reports, is not limited to Vietnam. They cited the presence of U.S, ad- visers and helicopters along Routes '4 and 5, as well as a training camp in Cambodia con- I/ ducted by the CIA. The Paris meeting, said Rich- ards, demonstrated the solidarity of liberation o For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RD80-0161 O0buu1 0001-5 'A4IING~ N STAR Approved For Release 20000. L51ailA-RDP80-0160 Lefte's to the Editor The CIA Responds .Agency seldom responds to 'criticism of any sort. It cannot remain silent, however, when a newspaper with The Star's reputation prints an article alleging that this agency supports the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. I refer to the column by Judith Randal in The Star of 29 June. So serious a charge should be made only on the basis of the most convincing evidence. Miss Randal states only that "retorters have been hearing for more STATINTL rljrd n. [A- ~brp P$Ug ~y601 R000600120001-5 Approved For Release-2000/05/1 than a year" and 'then refers to an article in Harper's magazine by a graduate student, Alfred W. McCoy. Charges of this nature have been made previously and'each time have been most carcfuliv investigated and found to be unsubstantiated. The public record on this subject is clear. There is, for instance, a report by Roland Paul, investigator for the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee, in the April 1971 issue of Foreign Affairs, which states: ". . due to the lung association with the CIA, the Mco tribesmen in Laos were shifting from opium to rice and other crops." The Congressional Reoerd of Jo'-c. 2, 1P'1.'rinlod a letter from John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and. Dangerous Drugs, to Bcpresentative Charles S. Gubser of California, which states: "A ctual- / ly, CIA has for some time been this bureau's strongest partner in identifying foreign sources and routes of illegal trade in narcotics. Their help has included both direct support in intelligence collection, as well as in intelligence analysis and production. Liaison between our two agencies is close and constant in matters of mutual interest. Much of the progress we are now making in identifying overseas narcotics traffic can, in fact, be attributed to CIA cooperation." Miss Randal's article is also in contrast to the two a/ articles by your staff writer, Miriam 4ttenberg, on June 18 and 19, 1972, in which she pointed out: "U.S. narcotics agents are making a sizable dent in the Southeast Asian dope traffic and-despite reports to the contrary -- America's Asian allies and the CIA are helping them do it." And she quoted John Warner of the / Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs as saying, "hc had seen nothing of an evidentiary nature from X r. McCoy `other than gossip, conjecture and old history'." Narcotics addiction is one of this country's most serious social problems. The Central Intelligence Agen- cy is dedicated to eradicating this menace and, specifi- cally, to interdicting the flow of narcotics entering this country. It is difficult to understand why a writer would publish material tending to undermine confidence in this effort, without the most convincing proof. More than one year ago, in an address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, stated: "There is the arrant nonsense, for example, that the Central Intelligence Agency is some- how involved in the world drug traffic. We are not..As fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grandchildren as are all of you. As an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots - of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are help- Ing with a solution; we know we are not contributing to the problem." This statement remains valid today. W. E. Colby, Executive Director, 3 J U L 1972 Approved For Release 2000/05/15.: CIA-RDP8 ~ mina M6 Is Usca' . V ap n by U.S. !Cloud Seeding; in Indochina Confirmed_ Chemical Also Employed to Foil Rai:dar By SEVi'.IOUR M. I E RSII S;;e: al to 'file New York TJmes WASHINGTON, July 2--The "What's worse," one official' United States has been secretl}' asked, "dropping bombs on seeding clouds over North Vi-i rain?" etnam, Laos and South Viet-I All of ' the officials inter-' gam to increase and control the: viewed said that the United! rainfall for military purposes. Government sources, both ci- vilian and military, said during an 'extensive series of inter- States did not have the capabil-: ity to cause heavy flooding dur-!. ing the summer in the northern parts of North Vietnam where affect Laos and Vietnam. "It was just trying to. add on to something that you already' got," one officer said . (Military sources said that one I main goal was to increase then Iduration of the southwest mon-1 soon, which spawns high-rising cumulus clouds - those most susceptible to cloud seeding-- over the panhandle areas of Laos and North Vietnam from May to early' October. The long- er rainy season thus would give the Air Force ntoro opnortmi hours on one of our Forces camps." Despite the professed sl.epti- cism on the part of some mom- hers of the Johnson Adlninistra- tion, military men npparently took the weather modification prot,ratn much more seriously. Accordin,; to a documentl contained in th- I'entaodn papers, the Dc tense Dy_ _u t- nnent's secret hi- tory of the v.eatlrer modification was one' ity to trigger rainstorms. of seven basic options for step?I "We were trying to arrrngel ping up the war that were l ie the weather pattern to suit our; rented on request by the Je?nti convenience," said one formcr~ Chiefs of Staff to the Government official who had! Douse in late February, 1967, detailed knowledge of theoper- ation. According to interviews, the Central Intelligence Agency in- itiated the use of cloud-seedinp; reduce trafficability along infif- " views that the Air Force cloud-' serious flooding occurred last' seeding program has been' era,. over Huu; to the nolchern ping tratlon routes. of - South Vietnam. "We first! 1 ' v ather program over Laos- w tclall,y' 1>tlon as Operat on v i Pop Eye--as an attempt "to "''i ,,.,,L1 ?,..,,."Li of 1933," one former C.I.A. ing movement of. North Vier and State Department declined, n ment rL, t said,, "vvhrn the Diem namese troo s and e ui p q p and suppressing enemy antiair- craft missile fire. The disc,osure confirmed growing speculation in Con- gl'essional and scientific circles about the' use of weather mod- ification in Southeast Asia, De- spite years of experiments with rainmaking in the United States and elsewhere, scientists are not sure they understand its long-term effect on the ecology of a region. Some Opposed Program The weather manipulation 111 Indochina, which was first tried in South Vietnam in 10,63, 1 is the first confirmed use of meteorological . warfare. Al- I though it is not prohibited by, any international conyentionsi on warfare, artifical rains-nak-' ing has been strenuously op- posed by some State Depart-. adept officials. It could' not be determined whether - the operations were being conducted in connection with the current North Viet- namese offensive or the renewed American bombing of the North. ra ,. on o icials depicted. the North Vietn?nnesc attack a.,d Effectiveness Doubted operations along the trait as raids in south Vietnam sex er Beginning in 1967, some e,\ltcriny or ta Ta iloring ihe: p imtatal. State Department officials pro- rain patterns over Nothl'iet-i,c The state of the pot. had not to pot tested that Ili(,, United States, nam and Laos to aid United!it was `po possible le the by deliberately altering the nat. State.; bombing missions. one China, was taking Cr1V11'OnnlCrt' ''' fl iOltS to kCCp I,nlddied Govern official 581(1,!1 A Nixon Administration of- tar risks of unknown propor- roads and other lines of We used to go out flying ! corn - ficial said that he believed the tions. But m ally advocates of ,inanication in operation. around and loolunp for a cer first use of weather' modifi- thc operation have found ]illle Keyed To NlonsoolI vial twin cloud formation," the of(i-! cationover NorthVictnanr i ' ~.~ 17V"i ~. iOT. Wron; with t1 11 p e brUl~n~O'~t~ti3laf (IW ~CRt Ol nos ~ ~LL -& Call, ~ It said that - Presidential authorization was "required to comment on the use of mete- regime was having all the t -implement operational phase of orological warfare. This Is one trouble with the Luddhists." ; vieatltor modification of those things where no one''They would, just stand; Previously successfully tested ? 'around durinf; d monstratiorns and evaluated in same nrca." officiis going to said. say anything, oue: i1 n the police threw tear gas The brief scaniuarv concluded ,. < I at t~tann, but we noticed that by stating t.nat. "ris? of cout- ?,lost officialr7 i.ntervicv,'ed ',then the. rains came they promise is minimal.'' agreed that the seeding had,vvouldn't stay on," the former A similar o;;t;on v. as cited accomplished one of its main'~c'genl s; :id. n another 15;;7 vvrrking ctocu- objectivcs edmuddying roads The agency pot an A' ntent published in the Penta,~zrn nmerica I ccci!craft and hrlc P~!p"rs. Neither attr:,cted arty and flooding linos of communi- it tic",ed up with silver iodide," immediate public attention, cation. But there were also he said. "There was another' the Laos cloud-::ceding o_ ., malty military and Government' demonstration znd we seeded orations (Ltd prow; e, however, officials who e;.pressecl cloubt'tlic area. It rained." a lengthy and, alir; it that the project had caused any A similar cloud-seeding was secret, dispute inside the ?lohn- carried out by C.I.A. aircraft in scan Administration in 1967, A dramatic results. Saigon at least once during the team of Shale Department at- The sources, without provid-stln;mer of 19`64, the former torneys and officials protested inc' details, also said that a I agent said. that the use of cloud-seedin method. had been cievelo}led for!' Expanded to Trail was a dangerous precedent for treating clouds with a chemical the United States. The Intelligence Agency Cx "I felt. that the military and that eventually produced an, paraded Its cloud-seeding activi- agency hadn't analyzed it to acidic rainfall capable of foul-, ties to the Ho Chi Minh Supply' if it was in our ing the operation of North Viet-'trail in Laos sometime inpih interest," one official who was nantese, radar equipment u?.ed 1 middle nineteen-sixties, a num- involved in the dispute said. for directing surface-to-air mis- ber of Government sources lie also . was concerned over silos. said. By 1967, the Air Force the rigid secrecy of the project, In addition to hampering had become involved although, he although, "although it. might SAM missiles and delaying as one former Government of- have been all right. to keep it North Vietnamese infiltration, ficial said, "the agency was secret if you did it once and the rainmaking program had calling-all he shots." - didn't want the precedent to the folldwin,; guiposer: "I always assumed the agen- become known." t;Providing rain and c::uld cy had a mandate from the The general feeling was sum- cover for infiltration of South \Vhite House to do it," he marized by one former State Vietnamese commando and in- added. Department official- who said telllgence teams into North, -A nunmber of former CIA, an he was concerned that the Vietnam, hi h " g ranking Johns Adii rainmakig ihtiltht onmns-nmf', voae wa (;Serving as a "spoiler" for t tl ff we considered the general rule of the thumb for an illegal weapon of war-somethin; that would cause unusual suf- fering or dispropr;ate damage.'' There also was concern. ho'' 25X1A Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 THE ANNALS OF T11 I M. ACADI AY OF. POLL Approved For Releas pQQIJ ,1 ? ?1 i RDP80-01601 RO July 19'r2 The Use of Force. In ores ~ olic} by the eo,ple's Republic of China By ALLEN S. ` )IITING ABSTRACT: President Nixon' 'Journey for peace" to Peking has implicitly modified the image of a Chinese Communist at nressive threat delineated by all previous administrations. Ho\w'ever, it has not cxp)icitly redefined the adminiStratollicic accompanying its growth for full efaectivc r C.--cs. "There's always been ris eari:,y of i. come," says AID's ` i vor man can't step into the modern sectc simultaneously. Every man didn't get a Inc tory job at once in the days of the indus trial revolution, It's what y0:: Co abot: it - your policies - that are i mnortant." Vmile virtually everyone e reel :teat t`}; rich-poor nap must be na ro.ved, the divi sion between critics is sill sh,:rp on an other ecorcmie point: the degree to 1~:pecu;d to arrive in tile next few weeks, Hundreds of marines and N+'y sral ees lounge in the bar- racks areas of tl:e tens cities -,,t up to house them or work in the new storage vans \\ here the nnassi\ c amount of incoming Air Force equipment in crates and serbee construction rr.,ate- rial was bein4 sorted ow and deposited, awaiting later use. Several Thai civilian co,;i.'.'ectors have already conic up from Ba inl?o:: with earth equipment. They intend to start clearing almost Immediately to slake way for the aircraft nlaintenence and parking areas and for the many adminis- trative buildings that the base will r'equir'e to become folly operational. ! The base is divided into two parts. The first comprises the main air strip and related buildings and is entirely American- operated, Later, when the construction is completed, this part of the base will be turned over to the Royal Thai Air Force, according to Thai press sources. But this is only a convenient Peter Smith sorved vtltlt the U.S. Special Forces as a. sc?r- geant in Vietnam. tic trained for at year ilt la 0,1, formality ihat vt"ill alloy Anierii-;in; to give gP:ir'd duty and respon,;ibiiities to the -l7hais, and l_t them fly the 'Thai flag, while lestto ; effective Conlin)) ilit .t ' i' 0\':11 ha.tlds. - i~ig ilersonnet loercasc The second part of the base, selraralrtf -fl'rsill the tl-st, is e secret ran;p a C-d to support the cti:ssified grott,:d ear k-:?ii g Coaducted by he Cl?.-tln~SpI`~ttboi~d~t;R~QtO on the Republican hopefuls. 1, a t o m a e 1. S ly withdraw all its armed forces (Al- diers, sailors and airmen) from Viet- nam on the sole condition of an agree- ment for the repatriation of prisoners of war, timed to coincide with our withdrawal? 2. Shall the U.S. similarly withdraw its armed forces from all of Indochina on the same single condition? What about U.S. bases in Thailand? CHISHOLM: . 1. I firmly believe and stand for an immediate total withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam;. with the sole .ondition being an agreement for the repatriation of prisoners of war. 2. I also believe that it is imperative that we withdraw our armed forces from all'of Indochina. I must further support a withdrawal of U.S. influence on the lives of those who seek a pres- ervation of their culture. HUMPHREY: 1. Yes. 2. Yes, although in regard to Thai- land the critical point is that these bases not be used for strikes in Indochina. The question of leaving these bases al- together is a longer term proposition, involving issues that go beyond the Vietnam war; this calls for further study at the Presidential level. McG OV ERN : 1. Yes. It is important to note, how- ever, that leaving U.S. forces in South Vietnam to defend the Thieu regime is a circuitous method of achieving re- lease of our prisoners. I am convinced that they will be returned within the framework of Article 1 l8 of the Gen- eva Convention on prisoners of war, which provides that prisoners ? will be released without delay "after the cessa- tion of hostilities." This requires a com- plete American disengagement from Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 CHISHOLM: 6. Yes, it is most essential to any ef- fective withdrawal that a time certain be set and announced. ? 7. As a date for total withdrawal of U.S. forces, I propose July 1, 1972. HUMPHREY: 6. Yes. 7. I was co-sponsor last year of the Vietnam Disengagement Act which called for withdrawal of all our troops by December 31. I still support any ,subsequent deadline within six months. I endorsed this principle when I sup- ported all the Mansfield amendments calling for a withdrawal date six months after the particular legislation was en- acted. MCGOVERN: 6. Yes. 7. The single limitation} should be a calculation of time required to accom- plisli the physical withdrawal. Last Sep tember an American general who has been responsible for, transport of sup- plies in Vietnam told me that all equip- ment worth salvaging, along with all U.S. manpower, could be moved out within 90 days. That is the date I have been proposing but it is, of course, quite possible that: withdrawals since then have considerably shortened the time needed. MUSKIE: 6. Yes. 7. The earliest possible date. The basic impression one gets from these responses is that all the candi- dates gave the,right answers, namely: yes, yes, yes, and soon. The most strik- ing difference is on the Thailand bases: McGovern's readiness to part with them and to define their objective with- out euphemism has a forthright ring in contrast to the geopolitical *raffiing of. Muskie and Humphrey on that issue. Of course, how far McGovern would pursue the implications of this attitude for the American role in S.E. Asia, or for U.S. fleets and bases which "exert influence" elsewhere, remains an open and. interesting'question. But, Thailand aside, in these four questions we have the basic elements which have come to be widely ac- cepted as the Peace Alternative to Nixon'g policy of war. It is a program that took shape in the divisions and de- bates within the U.S. Senate. The peri- odic gathering of the Senate doves to fight for various amendments froni the Hatfield-McGovern to the Cooper, Church and Mansfield, in the absence of an aroused and visible popular movement became the most dramatic center of political opposition to Nixon's war. Now these Senatorial initiatives, whether they won or lost, or were di- luted in the House, or arrogantly,, flouted by Nixon himself, seem to have defined the content of Presidential peace politics, And one of the prob- lems we find is that a Vietnam peace settlement, negotiated with a House/ Senate conference committee, is treated as if it had already been negotiated with the Vietnamese. McGovern distinguishes his plan for withdrawal from a negotiating position: it is not an offer coupled with a con- dition, but an intention coupled with an expectation. At first glance this seems an amiable but moot distinction; as if, instead of signing a peace treaty, we would say, "we all trust each other, let's skip the formalities," But it has other implications that will appear be- low. While Muskie's formulation sounds more businesslike, most people would accept *his summary of the Peace Alter- native, "the basic exchange would be a complete end to American military par- ticipation in the Indochina war for the' return of our prisoners." A considera- tion of the remaining questions and answers make clear, however, that this "basic exchange" is not in fact a for- mula for peace or genuine American withdrawal, but a perilous negation of these aims. ECAUSE THE SENATORIAL defini- tion of the peace issue has been accepted, it is easy to think that, when we turn to questions 3 and 4 which deal with cutting off U.S. mili- tary and economic aid to the Saigon .government, we are no longer dealing with the meat of anti-war demands, but with the gravy. There are a num- ber of misconceptions involved in this. One is that, if the candidate at least answers Yes on those four questions, then even if he falls down on the oth- ers he is nonetheless committed to get- ting the troops out' and ending the U.S. bombing. But a closer analysis of questions 3 and 4 will show the opposite; such a candidate would -be committed to maintaining the troops and bombing indefinitely. 3. Shall the U.S. end all military aid to the Saigon regime (whether or not President Thieu should resign) on the same basis? 4. Shall the United States end all economic aid to the Saigon regime on .the salve basis (with any humanitarian exceptions such as an imported rice dole to be distributed through an agency agreed to by the PRG)? Question 4 as posed in this way might seem to ask the candidate in effect to recognize the PRG as the government of South Vietnam, and to endorse it at the cost of humanitarian aid. Therefore We sent a follow-up let- ter reformulating the question to make clearer the intended point, to distin- guish granting aid to the country and people of South Vietnam, in a politi- cally neutral way, from underwriting the government we have created in Saigon as the chosen instrument of American power. The revised question 4 was in three parts: A. Pending an overall settlement of the war, should U.S. economic aid to Vietnam be of a form agreed to by-all the major political 'forces there, in- cluding the Provisional Revolutionary Government (or NLF)? It. Pending such a limited agree- ment on aid, should all other aid (that is aid worked out only with the Saigon side of the conflict) be suspended be- ginning from a "date certain"? C. What date? McGovern and Chisholm answered first the original and then the revised question, both answers are included here. Humphrey and Muskie respond- ed after the second letter and were able to take the revised question into account. CHISHOLM: 3. There is no question in my mind that the U.S. government must initiate an immediate halt of all military assist- ance to Saigon. 4.(Original question) I believe that we can in good conscience leave the people a land which we have both po- litically and economically raped, with- Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 c."+t t rt rI out some degree of economic assist- ance. However, this is an item which must be left to negotiation after total military withdrawal. 4. (Revised question) I believe that multilateral aid should be dispensed, but with the approval of all sides in- volved. An agreement on the specific mechanics of distribution should be worked out in consort with neutral nations. ' I further propose that all military assistance to South Vietnam be ended by July 1, 1972. What sum of U.S. Dear Mr. Kolodney: economic assistance is granted to the Vietnamese by the United States should be taken directly from Pentagon funds, and so allocated in, the military or De- fense budget. reiterate what I0 lave already said on this subject in the past. I view eco- nomic and humanitarian. assistance as a matter which transcends govern- mental relationships since its primary purpose is to assist people in need and not prop up any particular govern- ment. Whereas I am clearly' against any continuation of military assistance to South Vietnam, .I do favor economic assistance for all of Indochina. I think that the same criteria for aid to South Vietnam should be applied as is ap- plied to0other countries. In other words, the need for American assistance and the programs where our money would be channeled would have to be rigor- ously' justified before any approval would be given. Any massive recon- HUMPHREY: 3. Yes, I voted for a 250 million dol- lar ceiling for military assistance to Laos and 250 million to Cambodia. I am against any further military assist- ance to Vietnam. 4. With respect to your question on 0 economic aid to Vietnam, I prefer to UNITED STATES SENATE' Committee on Armed Services Washington, D.C. 20510 February 29, 1972 Thank you very much for your recent letter and for the advance copies of the pieces by you and by Professor Chomsky. I must say that both articles seem to have accepted, in a totally uncritical manner, the North Vietnamese position in regard to the Southeast Asian conflict. I doubt that such onesidedness can cdntribute very much to a just and equitable solution to the war, one that is fair to all .the parties involved. Nonetheless, I am happy to respond to the issues raised by the several 'giLestions you Put forward in your letter. On September 1, 1970, in a letter to President Nixon initiated by Senator Scott and me and signed by 28 other Senators (a copy of which is enclosed), I proposed a multi-step program which would have required all parties to the conflict to take affirmative actions toward peace. I continue to believe that this sort of mutuality and reciprocity is an acceptable framework for. ending the The President's recent eight-point peace proposal embodies many of the same features of bur earlier suggestions. I believe that the President's initiative is a basis for genuine negotiations; and that it is now incumbent upon the North Vietnamese to cease demanding the complete capitulation of the Republic of Vietnam as a condition for halting the killing. I do not believe that the cause of peace is furthered by irresponsible, politically-inspired, criticisms. Indeed, endorsement of the North Vietnamese position by well-known Americans only reinforces North Vietnamese intransigence, thereby prolonging the war. The diplomatic deadlock should not, however, prevent us from reducing our military presence in South Vietnam. I have said that all of our ground combat troops could have been out of Vietnam by the end of 1971. In any event, it is clear that substantial reductions in American force levels have already been made. These can be, and should be, continued. On the question of future outside aid to the parties involved'in the Indochina conflict, I proposed on February 10, 1972, a mutual big-power freeze on military aid to North and South Vietrfam (stateipent enclosed). It seems to me that this is one useful way of ending-or at least reducing-the role of outside powers in the Indochina situation. ' The war in Indochina has proved difficult and painful for all concerned. On April 6, 1968, I said that "contrary to the notions of some critics, oui? basic problem in Vietnam has not been an arrogance of power. Rather, our basic problem has been to achieve a reasonable compromise with an adversary who has not wished to compromise." That, I am sorry to say, is still our basic problem almost four years later. Sincerely yours, /s/ Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S. struction program in Indochina would only be undertaken after a settlement had been reached, but I do think that we should focus our attention on this possibility now. It is likely that future aid programs to South Vietnam, assuming that the United States withdraws and the war continues, would be Most acceptable if they had the 'approval of all major political forces in the country. This approach has been taken by the United Nations in Laos and Cambodia. The United States would do well to study this example and work closely with in- ternational organizations in any future aid program to South Vietnam. Finally, I .would say that I do not think aid should become 'a lever to force our will on other countries. This kind of quid pro quo arrangement de- feats the central purpose of economic and humanitarian assistance and rarely achieves the goal it sets out to achieve. The Senate during the recent aid de- bate expressed a desire to move out of bilateral aid programs and into multi- lateral assistance where there would be fewer strings attached. I support this orientation. McGOVERN: 3. Yes. Unless we do we will have no basis for claiming that hostilities be- tween the United States and other parties in Southeast Asia have ended, 4. (Original question) No. The U.S. withdrawal could easily push Vietnam over the brink of economic disaster, and I have no' wish to accelerate that process. It is a certainty that the re- moval of our forces and the end to Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 curt., r.:; roved For Relea military assistance would result in Pres- ident Thicu's resignation, and in the emergence of a government which would be capable of negotiating a po- litical settlement. Under those condi- tions I think we have a responsibility to'' begin repairing the incredible dam- age we have done to the people and the terrain of Indochina. 4. (Revised question) A, Yes. Economic aid should be sup- plied in forms which cannot be used by ~? the South Vietnamese government as a method of solidifying its political posi- tion. An effort to achieve agreement of all parties on the form and distribution of. such aid would be the best way to achieve that result; and I would strong- ly pursue such an effort. B. Since his entire 'claim to power in Vietnam is based on our military guarantee, there is not the slightest reason to believe that President Thieu could continue to hold power in the context of our complete military dis- engagement. Both be. and the North Vietnamese and National Liberation .Front. representatives in Paris have told me this directly. I have to say frankly, therefore, that I think the question is based on an impossible premise. In that light, and considering the potential prgblems involved in reaching agreement on the kinds of economic aid allowable, I would not favor a total economic aid cutoff in the absence of a multiparty agreement. In- terruption of humanitarian aid pro- grams going on now would intensify the suffering of a great many innocent people in South Vietnam, and many of those people are suffering at our hands. . C. As noted above, I would not set such a date, although I think an adjust- ment in our aid program designed to focus on humanitarian relief should coincide with our military withdrawal timetable. MUSKIE: ` ' , 3. With regard to the maintenance of military aid to the Saigon govern- ment after American withdrawal, I have said that "we must urge the gov- ernment in Saigon to move toward a .political accommodation with all the elements of their society. Without such an accommodation, the war cannot be ended. And it is clear that the Ameri- can people will not support an indefi- nite war either by our presence or by proxy." Thus, I would not use our aid to perpetuate a war that benefits only the dictatorial Thieu regime. I would. condition our military aid. on progress toward a political accommodation (and' thus an end to all the fighting) in Viet- nam. 4. 1 would treat the economic aid which serves to support the Saigon government in the same way that I would treat military aid. I would de- finitely make an exception for humani- tarian aid which goes directly 'to serve the needs of people. (I believe this and the previous answer also cover your more recent questions on how I would handle aid to Saigon.) It would be difficult not to note first of all what--given the vague Liberal, Moderate-Conservative spectrum that usually places Muskie to the left of .Humphrey---would appear to be a. sur- prising result: Humphrey is prepared to go further than Muskie on the aid issue, i.e., to oppose at least military aid. Both Muskie and Humphrey discuss the question of aid as if the withdrawal of direct U.S. military participation by a certain date could proceed even if the aid issue were not satisfactorily' settled. But their plans to withdraw "within six months" or "at the earliest possible time" are proposed as offers made on the condition of a POW agree- ment. They treat Vietnamese accept- ance of this condition as a foregone conclusion. However, the North Viet- namese Nine Point Peace Plan has al- ready made clear that they are un- willing to meet this condition of re- lease of PC)Ws unless withdrawal of U.S. forces (Point 1) is accompanied by an end to U.S. support to the Saigon regime (Point 3). (The Nine Points end with: "The above points form an integrated whole.") This was underscored last January after Nixon made public his "generous offer" and denounced the enemy's in- transigent rejection of it. The press spokesman of the North Vietnamese delegation. in Paris countered: "In the private meetings we had the very clear impression that the Nixon Administra- tion is clinging to its positions anc has not, budged an inch on our demands for total troop withdrawal and cessa- tion of support for the Saigon regime." This casts a different light on the 00 Peace Alternative as formulated, for instance, in Muskic's response to ques- tion 1. "The basic exchange would be a complete end to American military participation in the Indochina war for the return of our prisoners." Muskie campaigns as if this "complete end" awaited only his election, but in fact it is merely an offer of a deal he already knows to be unacceptable. What would the new President Muskie do when he could not deliver the withdrawal and the POWs? Would he pretend surprise? 1auld he, like -Nixon, denounce the enemy for rejecting his generous offer, and keep on pounding them with bombs to force them to submit. Any candidate who raises hopes of such a POW-Withdrawal exchange, while balking at a critical ingredient on the question-of aid, is playing a dangerous game at best. And Mc- Govern, who proposes to go ahead with our part of a nonexistent deal, is setting the stage for vengeful public outrage if they "stab us in the back" by keeping our boys imprishned. The effect of McGovern's plan-whether intended or not-would be that for the Vietnamese to act as they had clearly said they would, would be made to seem a terrible breach of faith (not to men- tion a violation of the Geneva Con- vention on prisoners as interpreted by McGovern in answer 1j. The question of aid to Saigon then is central, not peripheral, to the pros- pect of peace, and failure to confront it could end in an explosive resurgence of hawkish sentiment. What exactly is at issue? For Muskie, with his backing of military as well as economic aid, a commitment to continued dominance for the Saigon regime (sans Thieu) is fairly explicit in his answers to 3 and 4. He proposes to use military aid to force Saigon "to move toward a po- litical accommodation with all the elements of their society." He would "condition our military aid on prog- ress toward a political accommoda- tion (and thus an end to all the fight- ing)." Giving military aid to one side in a war to force it to accommodate its enemies is a novel idea; normally we give such aid to help force its enemies to submit. He does not want "an indefinite war" even "by proxy," but the political accommodation he wants to bring about seems to amount Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 P:;Ltinred Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5 to conciliatory terms for a' Saigon victory. Of the four candidates only Muskie proposes military assistance, and only he acknowledges support for a broad- ened Saigon regime as an aim of aid. The others restrict themselves to eco- nomic aid, and the aim projected is humanitarian, any benefits to the Sai- gon regime as the recipient and agent being purely incidental. Now this is really a pretty thin argument. A less likely model for humanitarian effort is difficult to conceive than the U.S. financing of. the government in Saigon -a government legendary for corrup- tion, preoccupied with maintaining an army of a million with which to prose- cute an abhorrent war, which still man- ages to channel most of the foreign exchange we provide right back out of the country for the purchase of lux- ury. goods by its pampered elite; an economic assistance program 'watched over by USAID which functions ex- plicitly as a military' adjunct and no- -toriously as a CIA conduit and cover in Indochina, Can there be any ques- tion that, pending a political settle- ment and ,a new government, humani- tarian interests would be better served if all U.S. financial assistance to South Vietnam were funneled through the Swedish government or the United Nations and programmed and adminis- tered independent of Saigon's control or ours? . Rep. Chisholm seems to accept such a plan in her answer to revised ques- tion 4 (assuming her second paragraph merely refers to how the aid described in the first should be -accounted in the U.S. Federal Budget). Humphrey's second paragraph is tentative and non- comittal. McGovern's argument is curious: The denial of military aid by itself will unseat Thieu, leading to a political settlement. Since the military cutoff will suffice to bring on a settle-0 meat, the suffering that would be - caused by withholding in the interim economic aid as well would be unnec- essary, gratuitous. All the better, one would think, to bypass the Saigon gov-. ernment- in the first place through Sweden or the U14. And that will has- ten Saigon's downfall, cutting short the unnecessary suffering of continued war while we wait for the military cutoff alone to bring it down. LL THIS HAS LITTLE TO DO with the real issues at stake. Access ,( to American money is the prin- ciple of cohesion that holds together the structure of the Saigon govern- merit's power, its military machine, ad- ministrative apparatus, all the greased palms and beholden elites that support it. It is not really even a question of economically starving this entity. Should it become known 'that the access to U.S. money was going to be cut off, this center.of power which ?' is the prime instrument of American influence in Vietnam would begin im- mediately to disintegrate. Humphrey and McGovern apparently accept the possibility of a coalition government in Vietnam, perhaps formed during the early days in office of the new U.S. President. But what' a coalition govern- ment means depends. on how the Sai- gon structure enters into it, to what extent 'it remains intact, how much control of its military and administra- tive resources it retains, what territory it effectively controls, what social ele- ments gravitate to it. If it remains in- tact, if it can make good use of con- tinued access to U.S. money and back- ing of American power,. then, even though it were the weaker element of. a coalition, all is not lost for U.S. strategy in Vietnam. Such a coalition, as we proved in Laos, leaves myriad open- ings for the U.S. to expand its influ- ence. Compromises can be torpedoed, coups engineered, discord programmed -everything, secret armies, Air Amer- ica, the CIA, a whole new beginning is i possible. But, if a new government is formed in Vietnam on the basis of a disintegrating Saigon regime, the ele- ments of its power dissolved and dis- persed, that is a different story. The weight and unity that our Sai- gon subsidiary would carry into a new government depends in great measure on the resolution of political and mili- tary forces at the moment the settle- ment is made. And that turns in large part on two things: whether the assur-' ance of access to U.S. money holds it together and whether the bargaining power of the U.S. military threat stands behind it. The North Vietnamese Nine Points call for 'formation of a. new government at a point when both these elements would be absent. The peace plans of Humphrey and McGovern would in effect get around this. It is worth considering what the offer of withdrawal tendered to the Vietnamese actually amounts to. Nixon is most likely going to offer some kind of dove-pleasing spectacular before election day. (Last January's did leave the opposition speechless, but it was too early to be his last word.) What- ever - else it includes, the ' number of U.S. ground troops in South Vietnam by next January_ 20._ is likely to_be relatively small. -At the same time Nixon will by then surely have given the Saigon government enough mili- tary supplies and reserves to make fur- ther military.aid not critical for some time to come. Now the basic with- drawal plan proposed calls for with- drawing as fast' as they can go, those GI s whom Nixon has left around, cut- ting off the military aid that Saigon hardly needs, and stopping the bomb- ing (or promising to do so as soon as the date certain arrives and the GIs are out). The North Vietnamese are supposed to be rushing the U.S. POWs home at the same,rate the GIs leave the. South. The exchange: the North Vietnamese give up the most critical political leverage they hold on U.S. policy in Vietnam, the one thing that has kept the war a serious political lia- bility at home, presses us toward a -peace. settlement; and limits our op- tions of aggression. In'return, they get a few thousand non-combat GIs out of Vietnam and two American promises. The first they can add to their collection of U.S. bombing halts; the second, that mili- tary aid will not be resumed, they can file with the similar provision of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. Pre- sumably if we break these promises we have to return the POWs to them. - If there is to be a coalition govern- ment, the question is whether it will be formed with the Saigon dollar line intact, the POWs safe at home, and U.S. airpower, at best withdrawn any- . where from 6 to 48 hours away, stand- ing behind it. - What it comes down to is that each side has one fairly irretrievable con- cession at stake: For them, release of the POWs. For us, allowing a coali- tion government to form in a context where the Saigon regime is not backed Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R0006001 N~'Ort~ by access to money and the U.S. bomb- ticable. Nor would a commitment to may speculate that the issue of cutting t~ ~(Q ((~~'f~~~ t side ing threat. Approved tFuarc~eag`~s2c0ip90?3T1~'Sa~ iris &80-0 AS ~i"00~'ttfii'eri l Ada- fore first, by releasing the POWs be- sumes awe an t ort tctnam- 5` p fore a coalition forms, our concession ese can settle all'of the issues of the ti6n is not politics, and the political will never be made. But, once a colon war between us. This issue would be- point at least must be made. Moreover, tion is formed, they would have' to come academic in the context of a to take the passive attitude of a foot- political settlement worked out ty the ball fan exhilarated by a winning make their concession good because the POW s would then be a.liability Vietnamese themselves. As I have said, team would be callous and destructive. , a political basis for new U.S. attacks. The we should urge sack a settlement. These are costly victories and the price Nine Points call for this timetable: we of every victory is increased by the All the answers missed the intended torpor of the anti-war movement at stop supporting the Saigon regime, al- point. The candidates deal with the home. And, finally, the measures of lowing it to collapse, at that point the residue of equipment still it) U.S. Even- victory may far from clear. process of coalition will begin along hands next 3anuaiy 20. The question tually a new government may well be l be .with a cease-fire, U.S. withdrawal and meant to point to the fact that arms, forced into being, but it will represent return of POWs. which even now are still American, a complex resolution of victories and That is the sjgnificance of their in- are being given and transferred to the defeats, military and political, in Viet- cluding a, cessation of support' for Sai- Saigon army and will be magically nam and in the United States. .Son, as well as withdrawal of troops, transformed into indigenous Vietnam- For the Presidential Peace Candi- as conditions for the POW release. So ese resources by the time the candi- dates the fundamental question in Viet- when the doves gloss over the question dates' promise of withdrawn, comes nam is the same as it has been since of economic aid as a purely hurnani- due. Of course it was a question that the U.S. first subverted the Geneva tarian, politically incidental problem, could not really be confronted because Accords of 1954 (after paying 80 per- they are plating a serious obstacle in how could they answer? I-low far back cent of the cost of the French war). the way of peace, and they are evading does one draw the line? It was all Does the peace candidate propose now the demands of true withdrawal from American once, and that reveals the Vietnam. I ? key point about a true withdrawal: It to make our intervention cheaper, in- The ode question of the seven not still is, that government which we cleaner, struments less of direct, our to control, to salvage the leave an yet covered, question 5, though rather called into being to serve its. We gave inconclusive is nevertheless illuminat- it its constitution and its political police, opening for a resurgence of our ponv the ing on this point., its bureaucracy and its corruption. Its Or will he really turn his back on the savage 20-year attempt at American 5. Shall withdrawal of U.S. forces leaders are our viceroys, its armies our domilrio0 e include. withdrawal of any or all of the mercenaries. Even though the last GI military equipment bases, supplies, and may ship out and President Thieu may reserves now being transferred to the be discarded, it stands as the corner- Saigon regime, or are these to be looked stone of our intervention, the creature on. as Vietnamese and therefore im- of our aggression, the fruit of genocide. triune to withdrawal? If any of this That is why we have a responsihil- material is to be withdrawn, what: ity to cut off its support and undo its How much? power. That is also why the most CHISHOLM: dovish candidates may balk at cutting 5. I believe that total immediate off economic aid, because to do that is withdrawal of all U.S. manpower to to deny its legitimacy, to renounce our be the imperative priority. The usage control, to admit defeat.. of residual equipment bases, supplies, At this writing the results of the etc., should be left open to negotiation offensive launched in early April are only- after that first priority has been still undetermined. For radicals there achieved. is ilways a tendency, especially be- cause they understand its illegitimacy, HUMPHREY; to dismiss the ci.ent government as. 5. I have sponsored Senate Bill weak, corrupt and doomed. Thus one S2985 which would halt such give- aways of military materiel in Indo- china not authorized by Congress. McGOVERN: 5. We should withdraw that portion of military equipment which costs less to transport-than to replace. MUSKIE: 5, Although the United States would naturally withdraw much of the equip- ment its forces have been using in Viet- nam, dismantling all bases built by the United States and withdrawing all American w ap tetFor Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5