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December 20, 1972
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Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :'T-01601R000 18 Dec 1972 Fr r M. LMETC)za PIS he Caret >+ 3, 02 c r on No doubt some kind. of simulated cease-fire will b; patched up in Vietnam, and probably before the end of the year; failure to achieve anything would be too em. barrassing for the Administration. It will be a militar, stand-still without a political foundation or, in propel bureaucratese, infrastructure. So it is quite natural that. in an adaptation of Clausewitz's famous saying, it wily be war carried on by other means. A recent report from Saigon by George McArthur, headlined in the Los Angele. Times: "Vietnam Future: U. S. Planners Thinking Big," gives a printout of the future. McArthur leads off his dispatch with the not very surprising news that, while the negotiations proceed bc- fits and starts in Paris, U. S. bureaucrats in Saigon "arc confidently using the time to blue-print empires in South; Vietnam." Some of them have acquired villas there; they find the climate congenial, and would like to stay on, enjoying the good life to which they have grown accus- tomed. It is impossible to get any accurate estimate of how many U. S.' civilians are hanging out in South Vietnam with some kind of official connection with the American Embassy, or the armed forces, or intelli- gence, or whatever. else in the way of "programs" may be under way. And if that is impossible, how can any- one estimate what number of bodies will be required to carry on a simulated peace? The only thin- certain is that proliferation is under way; the bureaucrats are "thinking big." "No single person or headquarters," writes McArthur, "seems to be running the show. Things are just growing, strangely enough, in a somewhat microscopic replay of the great buildup of 1965." Of course, microscopic can turn into macroscopic. The planners, at first stunned by Kissinger's forecast that "peace" was close at hand, are regaining their vigor and redoubling their efforts. They intend to stay on. Clothes may not make the man, but they can make him look different, and -by all indications such transfor- mations will be taking place on a large scale. It takes only a few minutes and some pieces of paper to change a colonel in uniform into a civilian bureaucrat in color- ful sport shirt and slacks. Or he may be nominally a civilian already, a Central Intelligence Agency type, striv- ing to win the hearts and minds of the people. In ad- dition to CIA, AID, CORDS and other organizations whose full names are rarely used, the United States now has four consulates in South Vietnam. McArthur pre- ' diets that these peace-loving, offices, complete with mili- tary attaches, State Department political ofncers, CIA operatives, et at., will be installed permanently 'at Can gress may want to be in at the finish. Constitutionally, this is no simple matter. Since we do not recognize North Vietnam, except for the purposes of killing and bombing,, an agreement with Hanoi would not be a treaty and the Senate would have nothing to say about it. But we do recognize South Vietnam, so if they sign, wouldn't that constitute a treaty? Some lawyers think so, but it is a safe bet that President Nixon will not. As Commander in Chief he can order a cease-fire at his pleasure. Sen. J. William Fulbright thinks an agreement to end the war should be submitted to the Senate for its scru- tiny. But the Senate wants a cease-fire and will doubt- less be reluctant to appear to be meddling in the inter- minable negotiations. All the same, the time will come when the Senate must insist on -a say. "I would assume," Senator Fulbright observes, "any agreement would in- volve obligations to spend several billions of dollars, a commitment that should be submitted to the' Congress." And. further, "with these secret agreements, we find so often that they. have obligations on our treasury or to send troops abroad, so it seems only fair that Congress. have a chance to examine them." If Congress hopes to maintain some degree of control over what happens in Vietnam after a cease-fire, it should note what is happen- ing there now. The bureaucrats are "thinking big" and will no doubt set programs in motion without initial Congressional approval, and then, as in the past, gamble that they can induce the Senate and House to continue and even expand them. So the time for vigilance is now. J Tho, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa and Da Nang-"by coinci-. deuce" the present locations of headquarters for the four Army corps of the million-man South Vietnamese Army. Four consulates may be thought a reasonable number, since in France, with 50 million Frenchmen and hordes of U.S. tourists, we have five consulates in all. There is ' also a legal side to this orgy of preparation for "peageF;' ~~ c bti~ i1 fiMffP80-016018000900040001-1 tically n"otl"i ng to say about e start o t ue war, on- Approved For Release 2001/07/27: CIA-RDP80-01601R0009000 LOS ANGELES TIMES 13 DEC 1972 uildup in Vietnarn President Nixon has reduced the .American mili- tary forces in Vietnam from almost 600,000 in the first months of his Presidency to 25,200. The num- ber now is frozen pending clarification of where the Paris peace talks are going. But the remaining :.troops are organized for withdrawal on a 57-day -schedule to conform with the 60-day limit written into the nine-point peace plan tentatively agreed on . =two months ago. At the same time, the United States is quietly and -slowly building up its civilian forces in South Viet- nam, actively recruiting additional personnel, re- portedly authorizing the transfer of some soldiers to civilian status, alerting Indochina experts now in other posts that they soon may be sent, to Vietnam. Unofficial estimates indicate that a civilian force of as many as 10,000 Americans is being prepared for Vietnam. There is no official explanation because, official- ly, there is only a denial of such a buildup. But it is clear from some of the categories being recruited .that the new band of Americans in mufti will be doing in the future some of the things that Ameri- cans in uniform are doing now, including such -tasks as operating computers for the Saigon milita- ry command, advising troops in action, repairing, servicing and perhaps flying combat and transport aircraft, and assisting with espionage and sabo- 1age. To put it bluntly, there is evidence that the 'American government has no intention of ending American involvement. in Indochina, that it is only working to convert the involvement to the form that prevailed before the massive buildup and di- -sect battlefield role of 1965 and 1966. If this is the intention, it is time for Mr. Nixon to be very clear about it. It must be explained. It must -be debated. The ultimate decision must represent the will of Congress, a national consensus. As matters now stand, we know of no good rea- _ son to justify the buildup. Of course, it can be argued that there are not enough skilled Vietnamese to operate the sophisti- cated weapons and instruments of war that were given.them by the United States. But the point is that peace, not war, is to be' waged now. Of course, it can be argued that President Nguy- en Van Thicu will be weaker without the Ameri- cans, more vulnerable to overthrow, and it can be anticipated that there will be cheating on a cease- fire, and perhaps no absolute peace for years and years. But it is no more reasonable to propose a prolongation of the American commitment than to advocate the right of Hanoi to recruit advisers from Moscow and Peking. Aid there must be, aid both to the north and the south, a reconstruction of Vietnam, regardless of ideology and political commitment, but not aid that is a screen to preserve American influence and pro- long Amnrican commitment. It is not in the American interest to talk, as American officials now are talking, of enlarging the number of U.S. consulates in South Vietnam and placing them just where U.S. Army corps headquarters have been operating. It is a travesty to suggest that the military attache in the U.S. Em- bassy requires "hundreds" on his staff. There is no logic to recruiting a 100-man team of Americans to monitor the cease-fire unless the United States would be looking for an excuse to reenter the hos- tilities. It is folly,to leave even a suspicion that the reconstruction contractors may be operatives of the CIA. Mr. Nixon sought office in 1968 and reelection in 1972 on a commitment to get out of Vietnam. That is what the American people understand is being arranged in Paris. That is what the American peo- ple have shown so clearly that they want. They want to get out'not'just because they are weary of the war, not just because they now recog- nize the madness of the war. They want to got out because they now know that this Js not and never was their business. It is not for the Americans, it is for the Vietnamese to decide the future of Viet- nam-the Vietnamese by themselves, not through the-mask of a new and clandestine army of Ameri- cans. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA7_ 4 R0009000 By Joan P. R\ocne Ever since the Supreme Court held that the relationship between a reporter and his sources was not privileged (that is, protected from scrutiny on the model of the lawyer-client connection), there has been a great deal of discussion abort curbs on freedom of the press. This controversy was intensified when the Supreme Court held that a Harvard assistant professor, Samuel Popkin, had to answer a grand jury's questions on the Pentagon Papers or go to jail for contempt. A handcuffed Ponkin was seen en route to prison. (Ile was sub- sequently freed.) There are two aspects of this problem, one of which has been almost entirely overloo'.ked. Understandably, emphasis has been placed on the moral obligation of a, newsman to protect - a confidential source. (Or, in Popkin's case, on the duty of a?scholar to safeguard his infor- mants.) But very little has been said about the inherent dangers - to journal- ism as to schola.rshio - of using unveri- fiable sources. Let us look first at the legal issue, which is historically simple. In the American majoritarian tradition there were no inherently privileged relation- ships. Indeed, the very foundation of a democratic order is that every citizen is a cop, that laws are enforced by the citi- zenry not by the police. This ma or- itarianism, which somewhat resembled vigilantism, would only tolerate privi- leged relationships if they received stat- utory approval. Given the role of law- yers in politics, the first privilege to re- ceive general acceptance was- that be- tween lawyer and client. Contrary to supposition, the doctor-pa- tient and minister-parishioner relation- ships have largely rested on custom, not statute. Indeed, a case can be made that to privide special privilege to the priest or minister would violate the separation of church and state. In practice it is hard to conceive of a grand jury throw- ing a priest in jail for protecting the se- crets of the confessional. Ilo.vever, not more than a year or so ago in New York a psychiatrist was forced to testify, the state courts holding (correctly) that only a. statue could?provide immunity. The answer to the press' (and Dr. Popktn's) problem then (as the Supreme Court pointed out) is an act of Congress stipulating immunity for the reporter or the scholar. In the meantime reporters or professors who choose to protect their sources just have to take certain risks, and in the process thank God they are not dealing with British judges, who really throw the contempt power around. But what about the other side of this matter the growing use of unverifiable "confidential sources"? Of course, jour- nalists have done this routinely for years. It is a practice I try to avoid because, -having been one, I are suspicious of the motives of "high White House sources," who are normally trying to play the press like a salmon. Iio;':ever, with-the advent of "instant history," we now find who're volumes which at crucial evhl ?n- tial points rests on a "confidential source." Or worse perhaps, on no cried source wtiatsoever. Imagine my interest when, in llerbert Para' is "Eisenhower and the A,tnct-i- Can Crusades," I learned, that "one of Dulles' closest confi(lants" had revealed that Ngo Dinh Diem was "discoverer!" by the CIA and "rammed" into office in 1954 by John Foster Dulles. Later we are told that during President'. Eisen- hower's 1955 heart attack. Dulles was the "quarterback," that "nothing was done without. his approval." This is in- teresting because 1) it sounds like Dul- les' view of his own role, and 2) it is in contradiction to what others have said. Good, let's find out - check footnote "Confidential source." Thanks a lot. Parrnet, however, is a small-time op- erator when it comes to "conficdential sources." David Halberstam has just turned out a 6G.5-page book on the Ken- nedy-Johnson era in which a number of people are quoted in extraordinary fash- ion, and even more non-people (a ":John- son aide," a "Kennedy confidant," etc.) turn up saying the strangest (hat siag- ularly useful from Ilalberstam's vicw,v- point) things. There is not a single foot- note in the book! I suppose if you can't heat 'em, join 'em: Did I ever tell you how Jack Kennedy told me never to-be- lieve anything ken Galbraith said? Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 Lk RAMPARTS STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/07/27: 0 % A1A 1N90L Q'I 11, 11 ull! tho victor marchetti story by fames Otis "I'm a scoutmaster" Marchetti. lie is, in fact, scoutmaster. says Victor more than a Until 1969 he was executive assis- tant to the deputy director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Rufus Taylor. More recently, he has beer' the subject of a legal case which could crack open the darkest recesses of America's clan- destine government. "I am the kind of a guy who manages Little League teams," he goes on. "Well, my scouts and ball players began to grow up on me and they became draft age. They let their hair grow; they changed. Now I know these were good boys, and they started to get to me. They began saying, 'I'm not going to go and get shot in Vietnam, because it's an unjust war.' " Doubts, gnawing doubts about Vietnam and the CIA's role in foreign affairs. Ile -says that he saw himself becoming a lifer, an intelligence bu- reaucrat., and he "didn't want to play the game any longer." After 14 years as a spy for America, Marchetti quit. That was 1969. Now, in August, 1972, in Washington, D. C., he sat in a Chinese restaurant . known as a place frequented by CIA agents. Far from the taciturn and glamorous killer, Mar- chetti looked stolidly middle class, of conservative mien and talkative manner. As he spoke, lie furtively sized up the occupants of the other tables and mentally chronicled the M Fs?.i ?PF if I was at the Agency. I was going to dinner parties ... we'd sit around and talk. In fact, I saw as much of Agency people as I did when I was working." But somewhere along the line he got the notion that he wanted to blow the whistle on the CIA: "I would go down to a shopping center and walk around. For the first time in 15 years, I began to look at a check-out clerk as a human being, instead of a check-out clerk. I got interested in people and my ideas about the Agency became firmer and sharj)er, and I began to written book with his literary agent, publishers, or wife. It is an injunction of unprecedented scope-never before has the government gone to court to prevent former employees from speak- ing or writing. At the heart of the case lies a basic conflict between the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and the government's interest in keep- ing a lid on its various clandestine--and often illegal-activities. Provoked by the wave of "whistle-blowing" atten- dant on Daniel Ellsberg's release of the Pentagon Papers, the conflict arises because of official activity which of- fends the moral sensibilities of rather ordinary, and very loyal, public ser- vants like Victor Marchetti. If the Su- preme Court backs Marclietti's right to talk, it could open a floodgate for a torrent of revelations about the ne- farious activities of American spy agencies. If it upholds the CIA', it could cut down on the trickle of infor- mation which currently keeps the In- visible Government on its guard. Aside . from the broader implica- tions of the case, the CIA has good reason to fear what Marchetti himself might reveal about his erstwhile em- ployers. He is unquestionably the highest-ranking intelligence official to threaten exposure of the Agency's more questionable endeavors. Ile knows where the skeletons are hidden. Indeed, Marchetti is given credit for developing the surveillance techniques which led the CIA to discover Russian missiles in Cuba and thereby provoked- the 1962 Missile Crisis. As Marchetti tells the story, "After I was with the Agency for five or six years, 1 was assigned to the Cuban problem. This was exciting and per- sonally very satisfying because another fellow and I evolved a strange analyti- cal working tool which we called crateology. With it we were able to identify the merchant ships that were arms carriers.. Over a period of time, since the Soviets were very methodi- 1 we began to learn which crate O ~QaWd a SAM 2 and which crate 1Uarchc1li: Blowing the whistle focus on precisely what was bothering nie." Victor Marchetti decided to write a book. While the process of writing can be a solitary and private experience, he could scarcely expect to scribble away, merrily exposing his former em- ployers, without it coming to their horrified . attention. True, the CIA's record has been afflicted with tragi- comic vicissitudes, but it can pre- sumably keep tabs on its own. Within weeks of his book outline being shown to various New York publishers, the CIA obtained a copy through a source within the industry. It immediately sought, and received, a court injunction against any further revelation of the book'.s contents. The comings and going of all patrons, pre- sumably out of Habit. Did he think the interview was being bugged? "It's not beyond them," he replied, his face a mixture of edginess and resignations It had not always been like this. He had left the agency on the best of terms, his boss assuring Win that he "had a Aip1ottecbFnorOR 1Gase"2O0 the first year I was away, it was just as from even c iscussing ie as t t A profile of Maj. Gen. EdM6riT"artsdalo, the original "Ugly American is a gray, unassuming man whose validity of their arguments, a As he walks his poodle along effacement.' Some of his friends ure of literary immortality Vkfil- . the shaded street near his split- sug_est that he has lost much of liam J. Lederer and Eugene lour-' level Alexandria home, Maj. Gen. his verve since his wife's death dick portrayed him in The Ugly Edward Geary Lansdale resembles last spring, and he himself con- American as Col. Edwin Barnum any number of retired officers cedes that her passing has left Hillendale, whose sweet harmon- pasturing in the Washington sub- him lonely and dispirited. Except ica purportedly stimulated rural urbs. He is still lean and erect de- for occasional evenings with old Filipinos to oppose Communism. spite his 64 years, and, like so cronies, many of them Asia voter- Graham Greene, on the other many military. pensioners, he ans like himself, he leads a rather hand, depicted him in The Quiet finds life somewhat tame after his secluded existence. American as.-Alden Pyle, the naive adventurous career. Other friends point out that he in contrast to the.superan U.S. official who believed that he But ls who ? repe r c- is weary after years of battling could mobilize Vietnamese peas- mutated colonels the - bureaucrats who oppose his un- ants to resist the Communists by battles dinner table, Lan were le high conventional ideas, and Lansdale instilling them with the precepts' dale's c order. . experiences l or he was times of f high a past a himself substantiates that view of Town Hall democracy. with bitter humor when he says Although the old soldier has dynamic, influential and often that "''the knives going in don't faded away, the debate lingers controversial figure who single- seem to hurt anymore." Yet, as lie handedty managed foreign gov- speaks, it is clear that he still on. Just as Lederer and Burdick ernrnents and whose behind- approvingly quote their hero ro as the-scenes counsel helped to burns with a hard flame that is saying that "if you use the right nearly religious in fervor. His reli- ke you can maneuver any U.S. policy and practice at y, y Y Rer- critical junctures . in recent his- gion, he explains, is not formal. it son or nation any way you want," is his faith that the United States t? s? Lansdale 's disciples still con- In the Philippines during the could world have successfully played tend that the United States could early 1950s, for example, Lansdale policeman by propagating have attained its objectives in Vi- its political philosophy. virtually directed the campaign At the core of l ansdale's doc- etnam by developing psycholo gi- against the Communist-led 1-luks trine is the conviction that Corn- cal warfare methods more effica- in his capacity as special adviser munist guerrillas can be defeated cious than those employed by the to Ramon Magsaysay, then that Communists. This view, which country's defense secretary. In in brushfire wars by "winning the became popular during the Ken- count not long after, he effec- hearts and minds" of people. In nedy Administration, is best artic- tively kept South Vietnamese Vietnam, according to this thesis, ulated in the articles of Lansdale 's President Ngo Dinh Diem in of- the United States should have close friend, Robert Shaplen, the fice by conspiring to crush his do- exported American democratic New Yorker correspondent in Sai- rnestic foes while . persuading prlnci plchinlong with sounds, moWne gon, who has long asserted that Washington to support him.. y ~' the United States and its South Vi- Later, as the Vietnam war esca- couldn't afford to? be just against etnamese proteges could have the Communists, Lansdale has beat the Communists by lated,Lansdale was instrumental in written. "We had to be for some- preempting the revolution. And convincing President Eisenhower n and Kennedy that the United thiL :sdale's ro osals often ro- just as Graham Greene indirectly States and its Vietnamese clients ked the fu of Establishment reproved Lansdale by declaring could defeat the he Vietcong by rely- vo ~' that Vietnamese "don't want our ing on counterinsurgency tchni- strategists, some powerful white skins around telling them ques. Some of these techniques, enough to block his, advance- what they want," so his present- as disclosed in the secret Ponta- rnent. He has also been derided day critics claim that he never ae- on Papers, have revealed him to as a dreamer whose perception of e considerably less savory than reality same was, time, though, he, At Washing on n PostrsAs the an ' 1 corre- thepublic public image of him as an ide- spired a coterie of disciples who spondent and the author of Mao alist. regarded him as nearly infallible. and China: From Revolution to Little oA toeVx~Y c teh,'t 2104/Qi ante C 1> RDP80y#1s16AAt2D00900040001-evolution. characterrr ansc a e ' several years ago in two cele- apparentinhispresent rnannor. He brated novels that, whatever the Conti :u~0. f yil " ], C; J I _J` G_~~`, F4, .71 1 a-, File] OJ C 37 PARAD ?'ASHING1O,'i MOL Approved For Rele%i'1407/27P41P8o1601 R000 I. F. Stone The pending cease-fire agreement, as so far disclosed by Hanoi and Washington, is like a delicate watch., intricately fabricated to make sure it won't work. ST TI~T~ NEW YQiii REVIE'/2 OF BOOKS Approved or a ease 2001/07/27; flt D8 -01601 R00090 No agreement ever had so many in- genious provisions calculated to keep it from succeeding. If by chance one spring doesn't break down, there is another in reserve that almost surely will, and if by some unforeseen mishap that one also should work, there is still another which will certainly go blooey sooner or later. The fragility of the agreement to end the second Indochinese war is put in better focus if one compares-it with the cease-fire which ended the first, at 'Geneva in 1954. The only signed document that emerged from the Geneva conference was a cease-fire agreement between the military com- mands on both sides. It was accom- panied by a . final declaration which nobody signed and to which the United States and the separate state the French, had created in the south objected; then as now the puppet was more obdurate than the master. The first Indochinese war ended, as the second seems to be doing, with a cease-fire but no political settlement. The prime defect, the "conceptual" flaw, to borrow a favorite word of Kissinger's, lay in the effort to end a profoundly political struggle without a political settlement. A cease-fire then, .as now, left the political problem unresolved and thus led inevitably to a resumption of the conflict. It will be a miracle if the new cease-fire does not breed another, a third, Indochinese war. A political solution was left to inah"ana and "free elections." But the -Geneva cease-fire agreement, dis- appointing as its results proved to be, was far more precise in its promise of free elections than is the new cease- f- if - a firm ft ite.-tiny. 1956-for all persons who, having in any way contributed- to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities. I - The new cease-fire agreement gives him far more power than he would have had under the proposals he and Nixon made jointly in January. Under Point 3 of those proposals, there was to have been "a free and democratic presi- dential [my italics] election" in South Vietnam within six months. One month before the election, Thieu and Nobody knows how many thousands his vice president were to resign. The of political prisoners are in Thicu's president of the senate was to head a jails. The most famous is.Truong Dinh caretaker government which would "as-. Dzu, the peace candidate who came in sumo administrative responsibilities ex- second in the 1967 presidential elec- .cept for those pertaining to the elec- tion, the first and only contested one. Lions" (my italics). rhieu's most notorious instrument for these round-ups was Operation Phoe- nix, which the CIA ran for him. A Saigon Ministry of Information pam- phlet, Vietnam 1967-71: Toward Peace and Prosperity, boasts that Operation Phoenix killed 40,994 militants and activists during those years.2 These are the opposition's civilian troops, 'the Administrative responsibility for the election, according to those Nixon- hieu terms, was to be taken out of the hands of the. Saigon regime and put in those of a specially created electoral commission "organized and run by an independent body repre- senting all political forces in South Vietnam which will assume its re- cadres without which organizational sponsibilities on-the date of the agree- effort in any free election would be. ment."3 crippled. Arrests have been ii'tehsified in preparation for a cease-fire. The fate of the political prisoners figured prominently in the peace nego- tiations. The seven-point - program put forward by the other side in July of last year called for the dismantling of Thieu's concentration. camps and the release of all political prisoners. The eight-point proposal put forward by Washington and Saigon last January left their fate in doubt. It called for the simultaneous release of all POWs and "innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina." The ambiguous phrasing seemed designed to exclude po!iti.cals since these were neither "cap- .tured" nor, in'the eyes of the Thieu regime, "innocent." January indicated that the electoral commission would be free from the inhibitions of the Thieu constitution, under which communist and neutralist candidates can be declared ineligible. According to those proposals, "All political forces in South Vietnam can participate in the election and present candidates." How much weaker is the setup under the new cease-fire agreement.` There is no provision for Thicu's resignation .before the election. The existing government is no longer ex- cluded from responsibility in holding the elections; no clear line is drawn between what the Thieu government can do and what an electoral commis- The new cease-fire terms do_ not sion will do: what happens if the latter" bother with such ambiguity. Dr. Kissin- is reduced to observing the irrcgu- ger in his press conference of October larities of the former? Thieu will 26 seemed to take satisfaction in continue to be in control of the army the fact that the return of US and the police, and there is no way to POWs "is not conditional on the keep him from using them to harass disposition of Vietnamese prisoners in the o osition and herd the voters. pp Vietnamese jails." Their future, he instead of an electoral commission, the new agreement would set up a tripartite Council of National Recon- ciliation and Concord for much the ternees"; Appr'4?edge!:FStrt l@rdlaea2O01 7V1~eCgALFgD1P'BO-01601 R000900040001-1 political prisoners liy defining civilian This is only one of the many built-in internees as vetoes by which Thieu can block free LL-4 VU 1!-41.16? ~t'"v.-.__ -"'-? --' . of the elections was "to bring about namese parties," i.e., between Thieu the unification of Vietnam'.'; provided and the PRG. So the politicals will for the release within thirty days not stay in jail until Thieu agrees to let only of POWs but of "civilian in- then' out. This may. easily coincide coji PARIS, LE NOUVEL OBSERVATELTi 27 Nov - 3.Dec 1972 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0009000400 T S.TATI NTL Michel R. Lamberti e Catherine Lam our ont fait le tour-du monde pour remonter tortes les filieres qui menent aux vrais patro/ls de la drogue e Si nous tie venous pas a bout de ce fleau, c'est lui qui vicndra a ,out de noes ', s'exclamait. le 17 juin 1971, le president Nixon devant des dizaines de millions de telespectateurs. Les Etats-Unis ont, en effet, le triste pri- vilcge de compter le plus grand nombre d'heroinomanes du monde : plus d'un demi-million actuellement, dont trois cent mifle pour ]a scule ville de New York. Plus de 50 % des crimes perpetres dans ies grandes villes sont directement lies a la drogue : on tue pour se procurer ('argent necessaire a 1'achat d'une. dose d'heroine. Lc phenomene nest pas seulement ameri- Cain : tons les pays europeens voicnt croitre a une vitesse vertigineuse le nombre de leurs heroinomanes. En France, of ]a pe- netration de Ia drogue n'a etc sensible qu'a partir de 1968, on en compte deja vingt mille. Et le ministere de la Sante estime. que le pays pourrait compter cent mille heroinomanes en 1976. Coaaer fe , smartie La drogue n'est plus un simple pro- bleme de police. Partant du Principe dvi- dent, expose dernierentent a tin journaliste americain de c U.S. News and World Report par l'ancicn directeur des Doua- nes americaines, Myles J. Ambrose, et scion lequel c on tie pent pas devenir toxico- inane si l'on ne trouve pas de stupe- fiants a,, Washington a decide de remon- -er a la source, c'est-a-dire a la produc- tion' meme,, de l'opium, dont 1'heroine est on derive. Couper ]a source d'approvisionnement des trafiquants, c'est intervenir dans les affaires des pays producteurs : de poli- cic're, la lutte contre la toxicomanie est devenue politique. Se posant une fois de plus en c gendarmes du monde k mais, .cette fois, pour une c'ause dont personne ne songs a discuter le bien-fonde, ies Etats- Unis se sont lances dans une croisade que d'aucuns jugent d'avance vouec a 1'echec. On produit, en effet, chaque annec, dans le monde, assez d'opium pour approvision- ncr Ies cinq cent mule heroinornanes ame- ricains pendant cinquante ans : deux a trots mille tonnes, dont In moitie seule- ment est destinee a l'industrie pharmaccu- tique. Le reste passe stir le marchc entre les mains des trafiquants qui approvision- nent les fumeurs d'opium et les heroino- manes. L.es trafiquants peuvent se fournir a deux sources differentes r A 1) Les pays dans'lesquels la culture du pavot est legate et contr6lee par dEtat, mais oit une partic de la recolte, echappe aux autorites ad.ninistratives. 0 2) Les pays dans lesquels ]a culture du pavot est en Principe interdite, mais qui n'ont pas ]es moyens materiels et poli- tiques - ?ou le desir - de faire respecter cette loi. La Turquie, troisiente producteur mon- dial, cntrait dans la premiere categoric. Jusqu'a cc clue le gouvernement d'Ankara decide de proscrire la , culture du pavot sur tout le territoire turc a partir de 1972, 25 % de la production d'opium etait de- tournec vers le marchc clandcstiii. alors qu'clle aurait du, en Principe, titre entiere- ment achctee par dEtat. Cc pays n'est pas le :soul a connaitre pareil problems, une enqucte effectuee par le service strategi- quc des renseignements du Bureau des-Nar- coti.ques americain (B.N.D.D.) dounait, pour 1971, les chiffres suivants. : Production Production (1) ecoulee ecoulee sur sur le march6 le marchc Iicite clandestin Turquie . .... 150 35 a 50 Inde .......... 1 200 250 . Pakistan ........ 6 175-200 Iran . .......... 150 ? U.R.S.S. . ...... 115 7 Republique laire de popu- Chine 100 ? Yougoslavie .... 0,83 1,7 Japon ' ... 5 - Triangle (Thailande - d'or Sir- nmanie - Laos) 750 Afghanistan .... 100-150 Mexique 5-15 tt) En tonnes. Contrairement a ce que l'on pourrait penser, les c fuites > ne sont pas propor- tionnelles a l'importance de ]a production licite ni a Celle des superficies cultivees en pavot. Elles dependent du plus o moins grand sous-developpement admini: tratif du pays concerne et de la capacil des autorites locales a exercer un contr6l effectif sur les paysans,. au moment dr recoltes. Pourtant, mcme des controles rigor reux ne suffisent pas a evitcr les detour nements, compte tenu de la difference di prix pratiques sur le marchc officiel et st le marchc clandestin. L'exemple de l'lnc le prouve, ou, en depit d'un systeme c contr6le gouvernemental cite en' exemp par toutes les instances internationales, l fuites s'elevent a 18 % de la productic totale. La Yougoslavie laisserait cchappi pros de 70 % de sa production. Le Paki tan, enfin, qui nroduit 1e clement six toi nes d'opiurn, contribuerait pour pres e deux cents tonnes a l'approvisionnemc des trafiquants. Le p.; uvot pfvric t t Dans une deuxieme categoric dc pa} ]a production de l'opium est Ails',ale. n'existe evidemment aucun orvanisn d'Etat charge dc contr6ler une productic qui, en Principe, n'existe pas. Clandestin la recolte d'opium est entierement ecoul sur le marchc parallele.Selon le B.N.D. ces pays contribueraient pour huit cent ci quante a mille tonnes a l'approvisionn ment du trafic. D'autres regions, stir lesquelles on possede absolument aucune informatic produisent de ('opium en quantitc apps ciable : le Nepal et, probablement, la Sys et le Kurdistan irakien. On sis;nale' au 1'apparition de champs de pavots en Ar rique du Sud. Contrairement a ce que I' a souvent affirme, la culture du pavot requiert pas de conditions geographiq ou climatiques exceptionnelles. Elle reciar seulement une main-d'oeuvre abondantc bon marchc car ]a recolte demande bea coup de soins et de minutic. Nombre de pays qui ne sont pas c producteurs traditionnels d'opium poc raient, s'ils le voulaient, se mettre a cuiti% du pavot.. C'est le cas toui recent du pon. La production d'opium a, de cc f. tendance it croitre en fonction de la i mande et pourrait encore augmenter con derablement. Des indices nombreux m. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/07T2T,,IEii='8T0-""1i01R000 1 Fufure: Anan U,.S. Planners Thinking Big `. ?Civiiian Advisers, Rising; Bureaucrats See Country. Taking on' American Tone BY GEORGE McARTIIUR TIrnef Statf writer SAIGON-While cease-fire ne- gotiations proceed with questiona- ble progress in Paris and elsewhere, the U.S. bureaucrats of Saigon are confidently"using the time to blue- print future empires in South Viet- ham. As of. now, their vision is unset- tling. Although past American expcr fences in Laos and Cambodia can hardly be called successful, the plan- ners are casually using those coun- tries as partial models for the Viet- nam' blueprints.. - President Nixon's senior wordsmith, H e r b e r t G. Klein, has denied plans to station "either civilian or military advisers" with South Vietnam's army after a cease- fire. He was treading a semantic tightrope, according to all the evidence in Vietnam. itself. The American military population has at least temporarily levelled off at about 27,000 men. But the overall U.S. presence in South Vietnam once gain has started to slowly 'grow. Civilian technicians have ar- rived in sit;tlificant numbers and ci- vilian contractors are stepping up operations in dozens of areas like training, maintenance and supply. lmpossible to Get Estimate At this moment it? is impossible to ?get an accurate estimate of the num- ber of U.S. civilians in South Viet- nam with some kind of official con- lnection with the U.S. Embassy, mili- l,ary, intelligence or others. No single person or heaclquartct?s fieems to be running the show. Things are just growing, strangely enough, in a somewhat microscopic replay of the great buildup of 1963. No one seems to expect this civilian ~f 1,f'1 "7Z (.~ : Ir minibuildup to get out of hand. But ;nobody has yet said "stop." Part of the problem is that. Wash- ington has not stepped in to provide answers to some specific bureau- cratic questions. With Saigon's military warehouses bulging with liquor, PX goods and other supplies for some 30,000 men, the supply officials naturally want to know "how long?." and, more sup- plies are en route by ship already. Planners Regain Vigor Meanwhile, the planners, who were stunned by the mid-October revelation that a cease-fire was near, have regained their vigor. Having been frozen out of earlier planning by the secrecy of the talks, they are redoubling their efforts. 1 "Plans are proliferating prodi- 'giously," admitted one staff colonel, who retained a sense of. humor and perspective despite a tiring and un=ending round of 'committee meet- n nb S The plans, partial plans, contin- gency plans and perhaps some wish- ful dreaming on paper now provide for a South Vietnam with a pro- nounced American govermental cast. While many of the new experts or technicians (or advisers) will be wearing civilian sportshirts, the sus- picion is strong that underneath they will have dogtags, or at least retirement papers. And, 'the civili- ans already here, including many / Central Intelligence Agen cy types, will simply change titles and continue what they are doing, and possibly do more. One'staff officer, already sporting civilian clothes much of the time, admits that the biggest change in his office will be the remo- val of some awards and military knickknacks, in- cluding a mounted enemy. AK47 rifle, which would not fit his "new" identity.. 'He also admits that he .could get different orders tomorrow, and he halfway expect8 them, "To tell you the truth," one colonel admitted, "ho- body can make flat state ments around.he4?e.".: The new plans seem in some measure to be an outgrowth of this military insecurity. When in doubt plan for cvcrything,!`. joked an en- listed clerk soon to depart In the initial days 'fo]- lowing Washingtoir's an.. nouncement that it had agreed to a GO-day evacua- tion. period following 'a cease-fire, the -U.S. com- mand was mainly con- cerned with the crash pro-. gram to bring in aircraft, guns and priority military equipment. Planning Activities As the negotiations be- came more and more ex- tended, so did the plan- ning activities at the U.S. - Embassy and M ACV Military Assistance Com- i inand Vietnam. Recom- mendations began to load the coded radio circuits back to Washington. In more or less finished form, a dozen or more ma- jor plans now exist. The first is a troop with- drawal scheduIe, with evacuation starting the day after a cease-fire is signed and extending until about D-plus-57,'when the last evacuation' flight will depart Tan on phut Air- port (probably to be fol- Iowed-on the runway by a .jet landing with mail for the U.S. military attache's office). . Other plans cover setting up various military at- tache offices and speci- fying the troop numbers needed, the setting up of `.finance teams (as required -by U.S. law) to cheek on Vietnamese use of fn.'liYa- ry equipment, provisions to provide military infor- mation to international su- pervisory teams and a new cloak for an agency known as CORDS-Civil Opera- tions and Rural Develop- ment Support. The CORDS agency is a scheduled casualty since it is now largely manned by military officers and is di- rectly under the U.S. mili- tary command. ' As the chief "civilian" agency for pacification, CORDS .al- ways has included many young State Departnient officers, although it has been directed by either a CIA man or a retired mili- tary officer. Approved For Release 2001}MOr?CIA-RDP80-O1601R000900040001-1 STATINTL J STATINTL STATINTL THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE - Approved For Release 20Q16A -I(Pt -R Bloodbaths, .or allegations? To the Editor: In his zeal to reassure him- self and his readers of the soundness of past literature on North Vietnam, John S. Carroll ("After we get out, will there be a bloodbath in South Vietnam?", Oct. 15) violated the first rule of honest argumentation, which is to represent with reason- able accuracy the text which you wish to refute. Having chosen my "revisionist" cri- tique of past and present alle- gations ? of a "bloodbath" in North Vietnam as his target, Carroll manages nevertheless to avoid reference - with a single exception--to any of the specific evidence which I have offered in the two publications which he cites. I object, of course, to his taking out ,of context my re- mark that I no longer wish to rest my case against Nixon's bloodbath allegations on the International Control Commis- sion reports alone, and using it to conclude that "at least one of the principal assump- tions on which the revisionist history rests is not even be- lieved by its own author." I made the remark: in the con- text of a long, fully docu- mented study of the North Vietnamese land reform which I was then completing. As I explained to him at that time, in comparison with the evidence I had found of a general distortion of the North Vietnamese land-reform cjlmpaign in both primary and secondary sources available to Americans, the I.C.C. re- ports simply receded in Importance; As a matter of fact, I did not and do not "acknowledge that the original I.C.C. ap- with my study of the land re- loci is that the Communists proach is weak." Carroll has form. He cites all the usual did not use the word in ques- completely misrepresented the sources alleging a "blood- tion to mean "execution." f d , And if Carroll had bothered nature of the evidence to be bath" in the North (Buttinger o essary, therefore, to repeat it here: From April, 1955, to February, 1961, during which time the Diem Government was actively pressing charges of Vietminh violations of the Geneva Agreement with the I.C.C., the French Government and Diem submitted only 43 complaints of political re- prisals in the North alleging these works do not stand up contexts which ? make this under careful analysis. An en- clear beyond any doubt. chapter of my 60-page sal Finally, his flippant dismis- tire study is devoted, for exam- of the documentary evi- ple, to an analysis of how dente used in 'my study Bernard Fall systematically indicates that Mr. Carroll is misunderstood the socio- simply unfamiliar with sc3ioie economic background of the arship on Communist affairs. land reform in arguing that Most of the documents which it was economically unjusti- I cite, primarily the party were l D a total of 56 incidents of re- fied. But Carroll repeats Fall's prisal. However, of the first argument that there were no 12-complaints, three were in- "real" landlords as though it vestigated and it was found lucre unchallenged. that there was in fact no I have also documented damage to life or property how Hoang Van Chi's sup- to the alleged victims. And of posedly "authoritative" ac- the 18 cases of reprisal by count has been the primary D.R.V.N. alleged to have oc- I source for virtually every newspaper N Jan an, intended to communicate with an audience of party members and general public in. North Vietnam what the general political line and specific pol- icies of the party were during the land-reform period. These are precisely the documents with which any serious scholar would begin in a F ll d b t t th l d ncl n g a y o ), u u s e an re or m cam- of the land reform campaign v there is . no mention in paign. Moreover, the D.1;.V.N. --only one involved alleged Carroll's article of this history of the land reform, loss of life, dependence. . which is based on official pol- Even more important, dur- But most important, Carroll icy directives and statistical- ing this same period of time, ignores the evidence that surveys of the land-reform the population of the North, 1 oang Van Chi's account was period, is in no way incon- which submitteti m th any ou- sands of personal petitions to fixed and mobile teams of the E.C.C. complaining of viola- tions of their freedom of movement, submitted only 41 petitions complaining of po- litical reprisals. This evidence thus has nothing to do with the D.R.V.N. land-reform law or the I.C.C.'s inability to in- vestigate airfields. As much as Mr. Carroll and others i would like to believe that mass reprisals were carried i out against former French and puppet Government per- sonnel. the evidence indicates that the worst thing to befall the former civil servants, sol- diers and policemen of the French regime in Vietnam was that they were shamed into accepting the same low salary that Vietminh cadres Il oang van Lm s --loose" D. Gareth Porter, received. (See Duong Chau, "The Seventeenth Parallel," translation of Vo Nguyen Research Associate 1.R.EJL, Saigon, 1958, p. ? 147.) The Giap's statement by citing Cornell University former resistance fighters in the opinions of unnamed ex- Ithaca, N. Y. South Vietnam did not fare perts that the Communists so well during the same normally used the terms in period question as euphemisms for terror and execution. But re- I am eve . d n more .sap- nointed that Mr_ Carroll diet gardless of the opinions of written for the explicit pur- sistent with these earlier pose of advancing a propa- documents. ganda campaign against the As for the estimate of E.0O D.R.V.N. behind which were. to 2,500 executions during the the U.S. and the South land reform, which I have Vietnamese Governments: the suggested on the basis of the repeated instances in which available data, it is entirely Chi fabricated evidence where consistent, as I point out in none existed for a policy of the study, with statistics on massive executions of inno- death sentences in several cent people; Chi's close rela- provinces in the North dur- tionship with the U.S. and ing the land reform-statis- Saigon propaganda organs tics published by the South and the C.I.A., all of whom vVietnamese Government. funded and promoted his Readers of The Times writings; the significant Magazine who wish to pur- change between 1958 and sue the subject further may 1964 versions of his charge order. copies of my study, of "landlord quotas"; and his "The Myth of the Bloodbath: lack of qualifications to write North Vietnam's Land le- from personal experience form Reconsidered," from the about. the party's policy on International Relations of land reform. E t A i t} t ll C as s a rojec , orne Carroll attempts to defend University. C Gilt:,.:::- .I an "1ArQ V1P6F1Khleg 2 (37/2t7neir.IA4MEB 6il6Mb66W6( l8Clb Control Co i fission reports- . Van Chi) without even ac- numerous usages o the word evidence to which he never knowledging that the meth- specifically refers. It is nec- 1 1 5 NOV 1072 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 CIA- 601 R000 %RPA L Blare' In 1.3.J. "Public Safety Advisors," recruited primarily from the F131, Th ese the CIA and military police units, work closely with the National Police Directorate and Internal Security Bureau in Saigon. the National Police "Special Branch" (political police), and ssi[h Operation phoenix personnel assigned to the hundreds of provincial and district "interrogation centers" where political suspects are routinely beaten and tortured before being shipped to Con- Son prison island. "These acts isory activities are accompanied by lavish subsidies and grants of police materiel, sshich have turned the South Vietnamese aratus into one of the largest and most heasily anted a li pp po ce t E N 1 f (f' QL1 paramilitary forces in the world. Under Diem, the National Police force numbered only 19.(X)0 men-a number which at that time \\ its By Michael T. blare considered sufficient to justify pinning the label of it "police stage" Under the terms of the peace settlement announced by the on the Saigon gosernnnent. Democratic Republic of Vietnam and presidential advisor Henry Since 1902, hosseser. the IU.S. has financed a sixfold increase in Kissinger on Oct. 26. all U.S. military personnel are to be svith`drawn NP strength-to 114,000 men on Jan. 1, 1972. U.S. support of the NP from South Vietnam within 60 days of the signing of the agreente'nt. under the AID program antcttmted to 585 million between 1961 and Although many, provisions of the treaty require clarification, the 1971 and additional millions of dollars were provided by the impression one gets from reading the published text is that the Department of Defense tender Vietnam at appropriations. '} he entire U.S. warntaking machinery shill be remOsed from Indochina. cost of the Phoenix program, estimated at 5732 million, is totally It is for this reason that documents recently acquired by the borne by the CIA. Guardian on the U.S. "Public Safety" program are cause for special It is clear, from the documents made available to the Guardian. concern. that U.S. aid to the Saigon police apparatus may syell increase in These documents, the Agency for International Development's future years, if the battle shifts to a political struggle between Thicu (AID's) "Program and Project Presentation to the Congress" for and his ninny opponents. In the preface to the Fiscal Year (17Y) fiscal 1972 and 1973, indicate that `4ashington would like to 1'972 AID presentation. it was stated that: ;maintain an elaborate police-support apparatus in Vietnam for' "As one aspect of Vietnamization, the Vietnamese National some time to conic. Police are called upon to carry a progressively greater bat This apparatus. supervised by AID's Office of Puihlic Safety in the must share with the Vietnamese armed forces the burden of St;tte Department. is administered as part of the foreign aid countering insurgency and provide for daily peace and order--tot program and thus is not identified as a military program. Neser- only in the cities, but throughout the countryside. It is planned to theless, the Public Safety program is directly tied to the war effort, increase police strength from about 100,000 at present to I2l.(X 0 and is considered a major part of Operation Phoenix-the CIA's during Fiscal 1972 to allosN assumption of a greater burden in the effort to destroy the political structure of the National Liberation future. The U.S. plans to make commensurate assistance as ailable.- Front (in Pentagon parlance. the "Viet Cong Infrastructure," or Specifically, AID listed these -activity targets" for the Public VCI). Safety program in FY 1972: According to the AID documents, which the Vietnamese are no "Provision of commodity and advisory support for a police force doubt aware of. the purpose of the program is to assist "the Viet- of 122,000 men by the end of FY 1972, increasing the cap: biiity of namese National Police (NI') to maintain law and order and local the police to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure in coordination security in pacified areas, combat smaller VC elements and deny with other Government of Vietnam security agencies (under resources to the enemy." An added function is to help Saigon Operation Phoenix); assisting the National Identity Registration dictator Nguyen Van Thieu consolidate his control of urban areas Program (NIRP) to register more than I2.0(X),0(X) persons 15 years by suppressing dissent and crushing all opposition to the Saigon of age and over by the end of 1971: continuing to provide basic ,:uul regime. specialized training for approximately 20,0(X) police amnuailly; "The development of an effective National Police and the in- hrosiding technical assistance to the police detention sy tem. stitutionalization of law enforcement," AID reports, "are important ineludinY, the planning and supersision of the construction 01 '34 jail elements in pacification and long-term national development." facilities during 1`}71 : and helping to achiese a major increase in the Launched in 1955 number of police presently working at the s illage les el." The Public Safety program in South Vietnam was launched in The Fiscal 1973 program sets the same oserall objeetises. but 19,55, when 33 American police instructors arrived in Saigon under calls for a Nast increase in the number of NP officers assigned to the the cover of the Michigan State University Group (MSUG) to train sillage police posts-front 11,000 in 1972 to 31,000 by the end of Ngo Dinh Dient's palace guard and secret police in modern 1973. counterinsurgency techniques. To finance this ntassise effort during the FY 1971-1973 period, In 1902? the program ssas expanded under President Kennedy's All) asked Congress for an approprinttion of $17.9 million, of which orders, and administrative responsibility shifted to the U.S. 513.6 million would pay the salaries of the nearly 200 Public Safety Operations Mission. In 1967, as the pace of the U.S. war effort was A(Isisors. $3.3 million would go for conunodities (11) systems. accelerated. Public Safety, operations were placed tinder Pentagon radios, patrol cars, tear gas, etc.), and $013.(X10 ssould he used for jurisdiction through the Civil Operations and Re\olutionarv training several hundred Saigon police officers in the U.S. and other Development Support program (CORDS). ."third countries." 'i he resident U .S. police staff seas enlarged \Nith'eaclt of these the Puistratisgchaut Us, l in?jn) with uy, sc fj I7 nten in f~ the Public ie It 1CxIAT a ) 80-016018000900040001-1 190 in 1972. C0 t "t;. d BAL1TIL10R IIE7S AMERICAN Approved For Release 2001/07/27: ClAft6f 0 01R000900040001 ay Tliat'Will Ne~r ~ottie Question: Do you think there'll be a day for anti-Thieu former generals, colonels and ' officials. It is a mark of his potential power that he has not been forced into oblivion, as has ne-time premier Nguyen Cao Ky. The rule of Big Minh, as he is called, lasted only from Nov. 1, 1963, to Jan. 30, 1969. He was pushed out by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh. Be retired to Thailand to raise orchids, but sur- faced again in Saigon several years ago and briefly opposed Thieu's election last year! He dropped out before Election Day with an an- nouncement that the election was rigged. Since when the U.S. is not bugged by somebody named Nguyen, or Duong? Answwer: Ngo. Retired Maj. Gen. Ihuong Van Minh, the CIA puppet who overthrew the South Vietnamese government of President Ngo Dinh Diem nine years ago, has cone out against the Kissinger "peace is at hand" plan. Ile says a ceasefire at this time, when the fighting is spread all over the country in small pockets, would be impoossible to police by neutral forces and the U.N. Better to have the estimated 150,000 North Vietnam invaders retire to large regrouping areas, where they can be more easily watched. President Nguyen Van Thicu won't budge until his'-land is completely clear of his enemies from the North. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 Approved For Release 2001/07/27: CIA-RDP80-01601R0009000 O. R+_ATL QUINCY, MASS. PATRIOT LEDGER NOV 4 1972, E 65,785 NO . SECRET WAR An Associated Press report yes- the "secret wars" in Laos an terday from Saigon that the United Cambodia. States is planning to keep a mill- Nobody in the U.S. government, tary advisory group of American of course, is going to confirm that civilians in South Vietnam after CIA or er agents will remain regular military forces are with- behind to do what they can secret- drawn is disturbing? ly to prevent Communist takeovers The report quoted military in Indochina. Obviously a number sources as saying that the ad- , of American civilian officials will visers would be employed by ci- stay in Laos, Cambodia and South vilian firms under contract either Vietnam in. various capacities. to the Defense or State Depart The New York Times reported ments. this week, for example, "In convey- Whether such activities would sations in recent days with Prime, be covered by a Vietnam peace Minister Souvanna Phouma of -agreement or excluded frond them Laos and others, Nixon has remains conjectural. There is as stressed that he would seek to con- yet no signed peace agreement? tinue American economic and other The. U.S. is insisting upon reach- assistance to Laos, Cambodia, and ing certain mutual understandings South Vietnam because he believed concerning the basic accord that is it was important to maintain non- being worked out. Communist governments in South- ' The implication of this report is east Asia. quite clear --- the continuation of It would be all too tempting to American clandestine operations use "civilian" aid officials, for ex- in Vietnam after the uniformed ample, for covert operations. It -egulars are withdrawn, the kind would be naive to suggest that operations being. conducted in the United States have no intelli- gence agents in Indochina after a peace agreement. But the U.S. should not shift its involvement in Vietnam from an open war to ,an underground war waged by agents under- cover. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R00090OQ40001-1 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 LIFE LETTERS, ,r rmaom AND nje CIA by Flora Lewis THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTH- EAST ASIA by Alfred W. McCoy Harper & Row, $ 10.95 One fact is beyond dispute: heroin .is flooding into the United States in sufficient quantities to support an ever growing number of addicts. Esti- mates about the drug traffic are unre- liable, but trends are painfully clear in mounting deaths, young zombies stumbling through city streets., crime to the point of civic terror. There are ? said to be some 560,000 addicts in America now, twice the number esti- mated two years a.go and ten times the level of 1960. Another fact goes unchallenged: suddenly, in 1970, high-grade pure white heroin, which Americans prefer to the less refined drug more nor- mally consumed by Asians, appeared in plentiful and cheap supply wher- ever there were GI's in Vietnam. The epidemic was a vast eruption. It took the withdrawal of the troops to douse it, for the fearful flow could not be staunched. Beyond those facts, the sordid story of drug trafficking has been a shad- owy, elusive mixture of controversial elements. It was obvious that there must be corruption involved. It was obvious that there must be politics in- volved, if only because the traffic con- tinues to flourish on such a scale de- spite the energetic pronouncements of powerful governments. It takes a map of the whole world to trace the drug net. Since the United States suddenly became aware of the sinister dimen- sions of the plague and President Nixon bravely declared war on drugs (unlike the persistently undeclared war in Indochina), it has been cus- tomarvv for U.S. officials to pinpoint the poppy fields of Turkey and the clandestine laboratories of Marseille as the source of most of the American curse. Nobody denied that the bulk of the world's illicit opium (some say 70 percent, some say 50 to 60 percent) is grown in Southeast Asia and partic- ularly in the "golden triangle" of mountains where Burma, Thailand, and Laos meet. But the U.S. govern- ment insisted, and continues to insist in the 111-page report on the world opium trade published in August, that. this supplies natives and seldom enters American veins. Not so, says Alfred W. McCoy, who spent some two years studying the trade. And further, it is certain to become less and less so as measures which the United States demanded in Turkey and France take effect in blocking the old production and smuggling patterns. This is of crucial importance for two reasons. One is that firm establishment of an Asian pattern to America means that the crackdown in Turkey and France will be next to futile so far as availability of heroin in the United States is con- cerned. The second is that focusing attention on Southeast Asia would bring Americans to understand that the "war on drugs" is inextricably in- volved with the Indochina war, and has to be fought on the same battle- ground from which President Nixon assured us he was disengaging "with honor." . McCoy, a twenty-seven-year-old Yale graduate student, worked with immense diligence and considerable courage-for the opium trade isdan- gerous business and the combination of opium, politics, and-war can be murderous-to document the facts of the Asian pattern. A good deal of it has been common gossip in tawdry bars of Saigon, Vien- tiane, and Bangkok for years. But the gossip mills of Indochina are a long way from the streets of Harlem and the high schools of Westchester County. The general knowledge that the rumors reflected is a long way from precise, confirmed detail. So the Asian pattern had .never come through clearly in the United States. Now, in his book The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, McCoy has set it down. To show how it devel- oped, he had to backtrack. The use of opiates in the United States has a long history. It wasn't until after World War I that widespread oppro- brium, added to growing understand- ing of the dangers, turned the trade into an underworld monopoly. But World War II disrupted the supply routes. Unable to get drugs, Ameri- can addicts were forced to quit the hard way. The market diminished, and, with a modicum of enforcement effort and international cooperation, might have been wiped out. A single U.S. official act, McCoy believes, turned that chance around and enabled the creation of a world- wide octopus of evil almost beyond .Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 DAILY WORLD ele sTg,-200 %07/27-:- CIA-A[-(1 R000900 By GENE TOURNOUR and TIM WHEELER ' } 1\LJ1f 1\llt.ll, 'JS_V. Va a ?~.......u?.. v.. r.+.. ....... ..:ration to'sign a Vietnam peace agreement mounted vis- ibly today even as the. original Oct. 31 deadline passed in Paris without the initialing of a treaty. In New York and Washington, peace activists warned of Nixon pre- election trickery and the possible abandonment of the agreement.after Election Day. "The next week is the most im- portant of the war," Cora Weiss told several hundred anti-war activists who crowded into Hunter College Assembly Hall last night. The meeting was held on strategy .to thwart President Nixon's man- euvers to sabotage accords reached on Oct. 8 with the repre- sentatives of the Vietnamese people. "If Nixon is not forced to sign the nine-point peace accord in the week before the election, then he has four more years to sabotage peace and keep up the killing, Mrs. Weiss warned; Seven-day drive The vigil was scheduled to con- tinue until 6 p.m. tonight which is midnight Paris time, the end of the day on which the U.S. had committed itself to signing the nine-point peace accord. In other parts of the country similar demands are being ex- pressed that the American people prevent Nixon from sabotaging the chance for peace. Congressman Parren Mitchell (D-Md.) in a statement to the Baltimore Afro-American, now on the newsstands, declared, "If reports from North Vietnam are correct, then every person in this country ought to be apply- ing pressure on the White House to achieve at long last an end to a futile, wasteful war which we could not win. 'Thieu must go' "If indeed President Thieu stands as the only opposition. to peace in Vietnam then he must go. 'His administration has been cor- abandoned after Nov. 7. "Is it a trick or is it a treaty?" "Our job in the next seven days shouted the marchers to passers- is to put the U.S. on record in sup- by as they made their way to the port of the peace agreement vigil site.. reached in principle on Oct. 8." Mrs. Weiss and David Dellinger, a leader of the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice, called on the audience, many of whom were veteran peace workers, to help mobilize the city for what they termed "the supreme test of the peace movement." Telegram forms circulated During the meeting, telegram forms were circulated that car- ried the message: "If this is not an election maneuver, sign the agreement now." For 25 cents the. message will be sent to Nixon im- mediately, the audience was told. At the- meeting's conclusion at Reporting on her meeting in 10 p.m., 400 participants, despite Paris Friday with representatives near-freezing temperatures, mar- from North and South Vietnam, ched to Nixon campaign head- Mrs. Weiss said, "It is up to the quarters at Madison Ave. and 53 U.S. peace movement whether or St., and began a vigil in support not Nixon manages to turn this of the immediate signing of the chance for peace into just another peace agreement. election maneuver which can be 'Trick or treaty?' Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 cari~il2t1ed 1 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0009000400 SAN FRAIACISCO, CAI,. EXAM IlY 1+R E - 204,749 EXAMINER & CHRONICLE S -- 640,004 0CT2619 `i Bob Cotes n,e D.ie Subsidies If the truth were known -. and that's a pret;,5 prepos- terous thought in these times ----- we may' have offered President Nguyen Van Thieu a considerable fortune to. get lost. There is precedent. To clear the path for President Diem we must leave underwritten some or all of Pao Dai's departure from Vietnam and his subsequent posh life oft the French Riviera. Before President Kennedy imeluetantly okayed the CCi A's scheme to unseat Diem, we offered to send Madam 7iiu and her husband. Diem's, brother, on a long visit to Paris, all expenses paid, to get (Diem was incensed. In what must have been the best interview he 'gave before his murder, he said to Bill Hearst,, Frank Conniff and this reporter, "How would President Kennedy feel if I suggested that lie send his brother Robert and Robert's wife away?") The U.S. taxpayer was tapped, without his knowledge, for our buildup of Diem.'s successor, Big Minh, and money paid to him and the nine other military officers who took over the Saigon government, among them one Col. Nguyen Van. Thieii. When Big Minh fled or was pushed to Bang- kok, where he lived the life of a country gentleman. and orchid fancier, we unquestionawity supported him.. If Thicu acts out alive, good old Sam The Man will be picking up his tabs. Maybe for life. The bills for the Vietnam war will'still be coming in for a long time. As President, LBJ pledged that when the war ended the U.S. would spend a billion dollars rehabili- tating both the North and the South, We'll spend a lot more than that, putting back what we bombed away. and for the ' relief_ of victims on both sides of the DMZ. As for the pensions of the men who served there. and the pay-, ment:s to the families of those Americans who died, they will Iast well into the 21st Century. You have to be terribly rich to make war, or engi- neer coups d'etat. RE 11II11ItlEll ALL THOSE.. nice things the British did for the gang of American tourists who were stranded at Gatwick Airport, London, when their U.S. charter plane company went bust? Happened a couple months ago.The Americans, 1.22 of them, were a pathetic group. Most of them were broke at this sorry ending of a nice cheap vacation. For three days and nights they lived in a cor- ner of the terminal. Their beds were hard seats or the floor. ' They were fed by an office of Social Security at near- by Crawley at a cost of about $750. British travelers, touched by their plight, gave them money to make phone calls to their relatives in America, brought drinks, diap- ers and whatnot. A delegation of the strandees called on the U.S. Embassy and asked for help but were told that there are no funds earmarked to cope with a situation of this type. ' Wimpy International, the firm thai, introduced the hamburger to Britain, put up the money to fly them home. Their fourth and final night in England was a comfortable one, thanks to Grand Metropolitan Hotels, which put them up and picked up all their bills. Many of the Americans were tear-streaked with grat- itude as they boarded their British Caledonian Airways jet for the trip to New York. They swore that they would return the money that had been spent on them by the Social Security Department. That was two months ago. So far, the office at Craw- ley has received a total repayment of $27.50. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/07/27 ,&g,1MMC 01R0009000400 _-2.4 OCT 1972 In the Absence of Facts, Saigonese Intoxicate ' ' Selves ?n Rumor SAIGON, Oct. 23-"Every- not, as commonly thought, ounce the concept of coali? one is intoxicated by ru- involved Vietcong. Rather, - / -tion government, yet accord- Mors," a Vietnamese ob- commandos of the U.S. Cell- v ing to the rumors this may, server said a few hours be tral Intelligence Ageucy come about. At. the .same fore Presidential adviser were said to be spearhead- Henry Kissinger left Saigon ing the attacks, hoping to time, warnings of a possible Vietcong attack on Saigon for Washington Monday. force Thieu into submission Indeed, even if Kissinger's at the negotiating table by are still being made. Six-day visit to Saigon pro- showing him that his mili- Some people have reacted. duced no known outcome, it tary situation is untenable. by buying provisions in case has generated a remarkable of attack. Others take serf quantity of rumors, covering Complexity ;breeds Rumors ously the idea of a cease- every conceivable turn of The complexity of the ne- fire, and depending on their the talks. gotiating points has helped point - of view are either Even in quieter times, Sai- to produce so many rumors. cheered by the1 prospect. of ' on Even which thrives Observers, who include ?gov- an end to the fighting or de- gon rumors. a arcc . city More often n ernment officials, intelli- pressed by the possibility Bence experts, politicians, that Communists will be in joyed than believed, they journalists and cab drivers, the next government. Most, provide a balance to the had a chance to contemplate go about their business as bland and sometimes too ob- _ the vagaries of cease-fire, usual. viously facile announce- For people intimately in- ments of the government. tripartite government, con- .- By Jacques Leslie According to one, the recent Los Angeles Times fighting around Saigon has ners around the 'city de . y But during the last few, stttutional amendments, the volved in. Kissinger s .,vtisit days tl.le,rumors became ob- makeup of neutralist fac -to Saigon, the six days awei-e sessional, a psychological re tiaras and predictions by var- a tense, exhausting tithe. ious astrologers. lease. Here was a time, the Halfway through his visit, rumor-makers seemed to Near the end of the six- day period, . journalists one journalist who was think, which when ch the has fate been n a at seemed to have given up being tempted by juicy r-u- war for decades was being ? asking for the latest rumors. mors but had no hard 'evi- determined, yet no one AMeanwhile,they found them- deuce of any kind and found selves constantly being , himself waiting for any bffi- knew for sure the substance decided to asked to explain what was cial word said, ,This is very The of the talks as photographs and plaques, seemed to be who had met had been removed from his with whom, and for how living quarters, long. This information was Rumors had both Kissin- given out by the U.S. ein! ger and Thicu "winning" the brassy. Just to make sure, a talks, while just what either few reporters , stood with had won was another contin- binoculars . on the route ual topic of discussion. his- from the embassy to the singer also was frequently presidential palace to check suspected of having taken official cars as they passed off for a brief, secret trip to by Hanoi. As a result, Ameri- All this has had an odd im- can embassy officials were pct on Saigon residents. often questioned on the They do not have much ac- exact time they had last c.c,ss to news, particularly seen the elusive negotiator. with local newspapers sonie- Rur aors r1 ne~l~ T -2001 /'d 2mlkzigt J DP$Ui04$01 R000900040001-1 Q~ fib press code. Government ra- dio and television and ban- deny in doubt, another was rewarded with oa free rumor circulated: All his glass of cognac. - personal mementoes, such - The only certain facts ?-"'??` -1 --- ?-?- When one journalist sat On Monday a small elec- Rumors Spread down in a Saigon restaurant trical fire broke out in the A few weeks ago, a rumor for a late dinner, lie was Saigon bureau of a French spread that the wife of - apologetically approached news agency. A reporter snw South Vietnamese President by the manager, a French- - it and yelled, "Stop tliefii?e! Nguyen Van Thieu had left man, who said, "Excuse me. Stop the fire!" Those words Saigon for Paris with 27 We arc- told nothing. Can also mean "cease-fire"-'in pieces of luggage. Now, with you tell its what is happen- French. The people around the talks under way and ing?" The journalist passed hint got very excited, -for iiot Tliicu's hold on the presi- on what he had heard and haying seen the blaze, tiie?y thought lie had a scoop. -r, W #VATIUAL GUARDIAN STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/07/27 CIA [~c+~~, 9'P'80-~7~ ti"16~v1 914 By Richard E. Ward A congressional subcommittee has Charged the Pentagon with failure to investigate charges of war crimes carried'out under the U.S.-sponsored Phoenix program in South Vietnam. The criticism of the Pentagon was made in a report by the House of . Representatives Foreign Operations and Government Information sub- committee, which noted that many of the so-called "Vietcong" killed under the Phoenix "pacification" program were innocent civilians. The report also expressed reservations about U.S. support for a program that "allegedly included torture, rr,urder and inhumane treatment of South .Vietnamese civilians." - The report, not approved for public release by the parent Government Operations Committee, was sum- marized in an Oct. 3 UPI dispatch. According to the news agency, the Department of Defense refused to ,investigate the charges when they were brought to the attention of high officials. Public release of the cautiously worded subcommittee report has apparently been delayed because members of the full committee are less than enthusiastic about con- fronting the issue of U.S. war crimes. In July 1971 at the time of hearings that constituted the basis for the report, two subcommittee members, Rep. Ogden R. Reid (D-N.Y.) and Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Calif.) charged outright that the Phoenix program had. been. responsible for "in- discriminate killings" and the illegal imprisonment of thousands in South -Vietnam. In September of this year, during a hearing before the Senate Refugee subcommittee, a top Defense Department official described the: Phoenix. program as an intelligence operation. Ile was challenged by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) in a surprisingly sharp interchange. Kennedy asked how the more than 20,000 "Vietcong" were killed and the witness insisted that the deaths oc- curred during "military" operations. "Intelligence operation'? During the 1971 `hearings the anti-U.S. resistance in South Vietnam The program had access to secre -CIA funds as well as large ap propriations from the U.S. military an economic assistance programs.STATINTL Assassination teams of mercenaries and U.S. agents who compiled lists of persons to be assassinated were secretly, funded. These aspects of the Phoenix program were revealed in testimony before the same House subcommittee in August 1971 by K. Barton Osborn, who served as an intelligence agent assigned to provide information to the Marines and who also worked for the CIA Phoenix program. Based in Danang, Osborn supervised agent House subcommittee heard testimony from William E. Colby who headed the "pacification" effort from mid-1968 to mid-1971. Colby stated that under the Phoenix program 20,587 members of the "Vietcong" infrastructure" were killed from 1968 through May 1971. Colby, who had been a top CIA of- ficial before serving in Saigon on assignment from the White House, insisted that the Phoenix program was "entirely a South Vietnamese operation," although he conceded it had been originated by the CIA. Colby tried to portray the U.S. role as primarily an "advisory" one, but he also admitted that U.S. personnel participated in the naming of suspects and the capture of prisoners. Ad- mitting "occasional" abuses-the assassination of civilians-had oc- curred, Colby stated that "we put a stop tothis nonsense" in collaboration with the Saigon authorities. With a facade of candor, Colby's testimony actually was riddled with lies about the Phoenix program, which was initiated under President Johnson and expanded by the Nixon administration. Essentially,' the Phoenix. program attempted to identify and then assassinate cadres of the National Liberation Front, the political leaders on a local level of the networks for 15 months beginning in 1967. Osborn contradicted Colby's disclaimers of direct U.S. respon- sibility for the Phoenix program and made it clear that U.S. personnel participated in murders and tortures. He said U.S. "advisors" were really directing the program. Osborn also described atrocities he witnessed, including seeing Viet- namese pushed from helicopters, a practice known as "airborne in- terrogations." He also described how Marine intelligence offi:ers held a Vietnamese woman prisoner in a small cage at their headquarters and starved her to death, refusing to give her either food or water. These and other examples given by Osborn provide only a small glimpse of the war crimes committed by the U.S. in South Vietnam. The atrocities were an intrinsic part of the Phoenix program directed by the highest U.S. authorities on White. [louse orders. Obviously the Defense Department is not going to investigate these war crimes. Approved For Release 2001/07/27: CIA-RD P80-01601 R000900040001-1 Iq9Tr*li.1r ' STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CI*Fap-Qq;E01R000900040001-1 Why No Peace? The men most responsible for the continuing carnage in Indochina are Nixon, Kissinger and Nguyen Van Thieu, whose role is explored in a just issued 108-page pamphlet, "Aid to Thieu," by Le Anh Tu and Marilyn McNabb of the American Friends Service Committee, 112 South 16 Street, Philadelphia 19102. Backed by 273 references and notes, the pamphlet is a calm account of tyranny, oppression and mass murder, carried on with vast amounts of American money, military aid and the partici- pation of the CIA. The last paragraph of the text reads: The demand that the U.S. cease its aid to Thieu is reasonable from the point of view of Vietnamese who want peace and national independence. It is im- perative from the point of view of Americans who want to bring this country's expensive and bloody adventure in Indochina to an end. The Nixon Administration locked itself into an alliance with Thieu at a time when that seemed the only alterna- tive to military defeat. With his four "no's," Thicu is now the principal obstacle to a negotiated peace. Getting rid of him is the problem of Nixon and Kissinger. If they persist in keeping Thicu in power no other conclusion can be drawn than that they are determined to win the war militarily, regardless of the moral and material conse- quences, to the American and Indochinese people. Approved- For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/07/27 p~~f9g1601R0009000 OCT '1972 By JOTIN PITT &IAN If the outlawing of strategic bombing is not on the agenda of forthcoming conferences on disarmament, it should be. The experience of the United States aerial warfare in Indochina con- firms the experience of the Ko- rean War and the Second World War that strategic bombing is essentially a means of terror and genocide. and that its effect on the military outcome of a conflict is minor. During seven and a half years of bombing Indochina, the U.S. Air Force dropped three and a half times more tons of bombs than were dropped by all the Allied Powers in all the thea- ters of the Second World War. Yet. a military victory for the United States and its Saigon pup- pet regime is not in sight, while Saigon is now threatened with encirclement. In both Korea and Indochina the U.S. Air Force has had full command of the air. Neither the North Koreans nor the Indochi- nese have been able successfully to challenge the U.S. control of their air space. although North Vietnam's defenses have become formidable. In both cases. the U.S. Air Force slaughtered thousands of civilians, mainly children. wo- men and the elderly. In Indo- china the extensive use of na- palm, poisonous chemical defo- liants. and anti-personnel bombs produced biocidal results. that is. the extermination of all living things. Military analysts draw a dis- tinction between strategic bomb- ing and the use of air power as an auxiliary arm of the army and navy. The distinction is pointed up by the contrast be- tween the U.S. and British use of air power and that of the So- viet armed forces in World War If. Military historians note that the Red Army never employed strategic bombing. but used its cG m Y,.4 ~?u,-7 ii ti: ~d air power for purposes of aerial reconnaissance and as a form of artillery supporting the troops. On the other hand, the English and Americans cold-b!oodedly dropped tons of bombs on heavily populated cities. as in the case of Dresden. to terrify the people. drive the workers out of their homes. and hopefully bring about a reduction in the nazi arms production. Yet. except for the distorters of the war's history who falsely claim that the U.S.-British alli- ance Ivor the war in Europe. it is generally known that the nazi war machine was smashed on the Eastern Front. And although the nazis also employed strate- gic bombing with genocidal ef- fects against the Soviet Union. they went down to defeat before the onrushing might of the Red Army. Strategic bombing fails to dis- criminate between civilian and military personnel and installa- tions. hospitals. churches, schools and the homes of workers and peasants are wantonly destroy- ed. Civilians who survive are driven in flight to refugee cen- ters. Some eight million or more Indochinese have now been herd- ed into such centers or pacifica- tion zones, where they are sub- jected to CIA supervision and control byThieu's police. What is more. strategic bomb- ing has been used mainly by highly industrialized imperialist powers against underdeveloped small peoples seeking independ- ence from colonialism and neo- colonialism. Nowadays the Por- tuguese colonialists are using strategic bombing. along with napalm. phosphorous bombs. de- foliants and antipersonnel bombs pc,lected in Indochina and pass- ed on via NATO. Their victims are the peoples of Mozambique. Angola and Guinea-Bissau who are seeking to throw off the yoke of colonialism. Who knows what small "Third World" country, striving to strike off chains of imperialism. will be the next victim of an imperialist bombing attack? Will it be South Yemen, Chile, So- malia, Burma. Syria, Peru? Clearly, it is in the interest of the national liberation movements of "Third World" countries that the bombing of strategic bomb- ing should become part of the struggle for disarmament. To claim, as the Maoists (10, that "Third World" peoples have no interest in disarmament. is to speak nonsense. In view of, the growing poverty gap between the developing countries and the de- veloped industrial countries. what "Third World" country will be able to construct effective air defenses against bombing raids of which the United States. Bri- tain. France and even South Afri- ca are capable? There should be no illusions concerning the scruples--now or as along as imperialism domi- nates U.S. society-of the gene- rals and politicians responsible for the destruction of life in In- dochina. Typical of Nixon was his hypocritical call for an in- ternational treaty against terror- ism at the very moment of his escalation of the f3-52 strategic bombing raids against Vietnam. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 Sirik Marak; In Tam; ailing Lon Nol: Letter from Washington. evert more so. Born in what is now South Vietnam, he is remembered for his anti-French and pro-Japanese posi- tion; his anti-monarchy stand; his co- operation with the Vietminh; his long exile in Saigon; and his connections with the CIA. Although he is currently Prime Minister, it is not clear whether he is working for the Lon Nol-Lon Non combination o.r simply using it for his own ends. Apparently he has the back- ing of a group of Pltnom Penh republi- cans and intellectuals who would rather have an accommodation with the Khmer Rouge than see Norodom Sihanouk back in Cambodia; this group has been encouraged by Soviet promises that, in the event. of a settlement, Moscow will see to it that North Vietnamese and NLF forces withdraw and that Sihanouk does not return to the country. Sirik Matak's position is much clear- er. Considered an agile politician and a capable administrator in Cambodian terms., he has the backing of business in- terests and some sectors of the military as well as that of the Americans, the Japanese and the French. Because he is a member of the Sisowath branch of the royal family, the republicans suspect him of royalist leanings - if not for war from an armchair in Phnom Penh. But since he has no political or clan backing, he would have to fall in with one of the other contenders for political power. All Chliloe has little to recom- mend him; an adviser to Lon Nol, he served Sihanouk in several cabinets. Should he be chosen as vice-president, the post would be deprived of every ves- tige of power. SOUTH VIETNAM Strangling the ICC By Benjamin Cherry . .41 Saigon: "We are ready for a ceasefire [but] to secure against the communists taking advantage of such a ceasefire, there must be conditions and the most important is the setting up of an inter- national control committee." On the day President Nguyen Van Thieu made this remark in a speech to government officials, professors and students at Sai- gon University's Faculty of Medicine last week, the last members of the In- dian delegation to the existing Interna- tional Control Commission were leaving Sihanouk, then for himself. Saigon for their new headquarters - This leaves In Tani and Au Ch.liloe. In Hanoi. Tam, a former genera], has considerable Friction between the Indian delega- popular support - especially in the tion and the South Vietnamese Govern- countryside - because he is a simple rnent came to a head in January when ly apolitical ~~$~ r s i m li ~,`~~7,q w i v raised its diplomatic mission exited, Son ;rg, 1'~;. ids position e em 2 `WT (he p by Bins cad o'f c~ c~ lie 9 'f fa'fib to embassy level, while declin . THE FAR EASTI;IiIN ECONOMIC l' 'VIEW STATINTL 7 Oct 1.972 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : -RpP80-01601 R0009000 By Edith Lenart Paris: President Richard Nixon wrote a personal letter to his Cambodian coun- terpart, Lon Nol, shortly after last month's National Assembly elections, asking the Marshal to nominate a vice- president and to include Opposition .members in the new government. !';drat had already disturbed the White House was the fact that Lon Nol had not bothered to take a running mate: the Cambodian Constitution invests much power in the president, and Lon Nol is a .very sick man. The Americans were dis- turbed further when Sirik Matak and In Tam - leaders of the Republican and Democratic parties respectively - decid- ed to boycott the poll because they con- sidered the electoral law unconstitu- tional. If President Nixon's demand for a multi-party government upset the Lon Nol-Lon Non duo's plan to consolidate their position, his request for a vice-pre- sident doubtless gave them splitting headaches. Apart from Nixon's need to see a more efficient and representative govermnent in Phnom Penh, his demand for a vice-presidential nominee may in- dicate a desire to prepare Cambodia for the possibility of a negotiated settle- ment to the Indochina War. Tile choice of a vice-president and im- portant Cabinet figures involves per- sonal, clan and party interests: who can be useful, who can be trusted and who can be manipulated. There would ap- pear to be four candidates for the vice- presidency: Son Ngoc Thanh, Sirik Matak, In Tani and Au Chliloe. If the political scene in fundamental- Continu.edl. N.AfiON 7: CI &80=t7~;01 R0009,0 STATI NTL I:^ RE Jr. CGO Mr. Cook, a long-tune contributor to The Natioii, is the author of many books, including the recently published The Nightmare Decade: The Life and Times of Senator Joe McCarthy. (Randorm House). T The. most damning document to come out of the war in, Vietnam has now struggled into the light in this, election year' It was indeed a struggle: the disclosures were, squelched for years by the highest arms of the American bureaucracy; the pith of the message was ignored by the Senate.subcommittee, headed by Abraham Ribicofl, which exposed the PX scandals; the revelations were verified by one of Life's top journalists-and pushed aside in favor of the incident on the bridge at Chappaquiddick; the truth set forth was . too much for major American publishing houses, and in the end was published in Great Britain, -coming to the American market on the rebound through the David McKay Company. This bombshell is The Greedy War, 'a 2.78-page book written by the British journalist James Hamilton-Paterson and detailing the Vietnamese experiences of Cornelius Hawkridge, a dedicated anti-Communist who spent seveal and a half horrible years* in Russian and Hungarian prison camps before' escaping to the United States. I Iawkridgc and Hamilton-Paterson call the war greedy and. the con- tents of this book fully justify the epithet. Hawkridge ? was born in Transylvania, the son of a Hungarian mother and a British father, a. colonel in the Hungarian police force-, His passionate hatred of communism and the Rus- sians led him into.protcsts and guerrilla actions-and into those long years in prison. He came to America believing all the dogmas of the cold war and eager to aid as a security ofliper in what he considered a holy crusade. Paterson writes describing II wkriZf e s MscovericS. "Won- dering What limits there Were he asked a Vietnamese sfallholder whether he could buy a tank, Tanks are a bit difficult right now,' this man admitted, but how about sonic armored personnel carriers? Or helicopters, of, course. Or how about a heavy-duty truck?" What the hell goes on?, Iawkridge thought. And lie rushed to' tell American authorities what he had ..found. They were' bland, uninterested. Washington, in its holy crusade delusion, had concluded agreements with the South Vietnamese. that tied the hands of any security agent who tried to put an end to the national, pastime-- wholesale looting. Two provisions were critical: trucks could be driven only by South Vietnamese drivers; and only 'South Vietnamese police could make arrests. Even if an A.nierican security agent like Ilawk idge trapped hijackers, in the act, lie was forbidden to lay' a finger on tJiem; he had to call in the South Vietnamese police. And when they arrived, they simply collaborated in the looting. Here, in capsule form, are some of the.things Hawk ridge learned and some of his experiences: South Vietnam all 'but sank into the sea under the weight of the tons of black-and-white television sets, radios, spin, driers, untaxed diamonds and oilier com- modities produced by a society of conspicuous consump- tion and shipped off to Vietnam to win. what must . be one of the most curious wars in history. .port of Qui Nhon was clogged with shipping, a fleet that spread out to the horizon, Some of the. ships waited for months to unload; meanwhile. small boats plied out to them in the night and' sometimes in the clay; and so, when they finally reached a pier, some 60 per cent of their cargoes had vanished. ?jTlie United States shipped enough cement into South Vietnam to pave the entire nation, but there was a chronic shortage of cement to extend airfield runways and erect facilities.. And the Vietcong always had a 'superabundance with which to build their individual bomb shelters. T,011 one occasion a truck containing several hundred TV sets was hijacked, tracked down in Tu Due and turned .over to the South Vietnamese police. I-Hawkridge went to reclaim this U.S. property, but was told he would haveto' get a Vietnamese driver to take the truck away. By the time he hind found a driver, the truck had been stripped of its contents right in the police compound. - One night Hawkridge was following a hijacked truck, .mystified because the Vietnamese were ripping open pac'i,- ages in disgust and tossing them into ditches at the roarl,- side. Hawkridge, kept stopping and picking up the pael:ages. They were a consignment of aircraft parts for fighter squadrons at Bien I-Ioa. When Hawkridge arrived at the air base, lie was hailed almost as a savior because ,several jets had been. grounded for lack of spare parts. ?Another time, l-Iawkridge chard a hijacked truck right into a compound belonging to the South Vietnamese Security Police. The panicked driver sped across the com- pound,'forgetting there Was a river on the other side, and braked to a halt at the last second with the front wheels 00I11 tS1.lLO Approved For Release 2001/07/27: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001 -1 The Dominican upheaval in 1965, in which IIawkriclge could not find the Communists President Lyndon B. John.- son assured us we were opposing, was the first disillusion- ment. Then came Vietnam. Haw.kri.dgc's first day in the field there in 1966 was a shocker. Ile had. his nose rubbed immediately in the stinking squalor of the refugee camps of Qu.i, Nhon. More than 2,000 refugees 'Were living in pa- per shacks built largely of discarded American packing cases. Three contaminated Wells provided the only drinking water. ']'here were no sanitary facilities. "The inmates defecated between the rows of paper homes and the slow' seep of ordure crept up the pulp walls." Hawkridgc asked a priest what had happened to all the USAID. "Stolen," the priest said simply. "It's taken by the ~Iietnamese Gov- ernnient.'? Hawkridge soon discovered that virtually everything was being stolen. Only the smallest trickle of supplies and war, materiel being shipped to Vietnam in such prodigious, mullillillion-dollar amounts ever reached their intended destinations. The Qui N'11011 marketplace, an' area of a good-sized block next to the refugee camp, was stocked with "C-rations, K-rations, drink, clothing, guns, cannons, shells,. cases of grenades, television sets, washing machines the mounds seemed limitless." So Hamilton- itAt~P/!RTS SS NN~THD009 ----- --- Approved For Release 2001/07/27 ~&Alk&AT0Aq~TT 16~0'IK UL a]so bur Iied the paddy and the pcoplc :c thereb Technically, ROl~ indicates their Ira thereby made public what the Amer- houses. They burned the cow pens and place of origin--the republic of Ko- n government has known for at least six years. The 1966 document is re- the animals inside too. Cows are ccr- rea (South Korea); But the Amer- " lainly not VC] (ff) ront a reugee scans utter the term as if it were plete with these stories of barbarity Ror The introduction to the document which Americans have }earned t k " h ow d h o an , , as t ough it referred to " their, physical conditioning and the take in and ignore: notes that no effort has been made Co o "When they came to the VC-con- ascertain the veracity of the statements state of their sensibilities: as soldiers made by the interviewees." And AFS they are brutal, licentious and they get trolled areas . . . they raped?the women results. Militarily, they are trusted by in those areas. There' were times they quotes former RAND analyst Melvin billed the women after they had raped Gurtov as saying that the report was the American high command, Nvliic}r-- a draft circulated for comments . , . in the current fighting --has assigned them. I heard just recently women were raped and killed. The people were as opposed to a published study." It them the responsibility of keeping the would be a mistake to surmise, how- vital An Khe Pass open and preventing so frightened of the Korean troops, ~' they didn't dart to stay in their hoiltes ever, that this report outlines the full South `ietnant from being split in half.. ? extcnt.of the U.S. go'rernmcnl's infor.- Some 37,000 of these troops are but moved away." (from a 'National' Liberation Front deserter) station about South horcan murders presently engaged in South Vietnam. NJ: Referred to pretentiously as "allies," their involvement is said to. arise from ideological commitment to the cause of freedom, national self-interest, or some other self-serving platitude. In fact, they are latter-day Samurai, hired guns of the Orient, who have sold their services to Washington' for the dtira- lion. To' be specific, the normal salary of 'a ROK army private is $1.60 a month. But if-?that private elects to serve in Vietnam, he can earn 23 times that amount, or $37.50 a month. In one day, he earns almost as much as he would have made in a whole month had he remained in his homeland-- courtesy, to be sure, of the American taxpayer. The middleman of this op- eration is the government of South Korea, which receives a kickback of well over $300 million per year for C-1 service. Such - "allies" are to mercenaries what a "protective reaction raid" is to an unprovoked strike and what an "in- cursion" is to ? an invasion-namely, the same thing. For. some lime now, persistent' re- ports have linked these mercenary Ko- reaus to brutalities in. Vietnam which would make Rusty Calley, blush. In 'June, the Alternative Feature Service (AFS) of Berkeley, California released a heretofore secret study by.the RAND - see why the Koreans should kill 1113 HE AMERICAN SOLDIERS who work by Janes Otis children. 'Kids of two, three, or even With them in'Victnam speak re- five nr sev-en von- x--'f n'f V(` .1--, "' - U ,' '?J111V1,11I11GS. - - -- "". ' "`... only 50 villagers still lagged behind. Most of them were women, children and elderly people. The Ko- rean soldiers rounded there up in one place. The people thought that they were to be evacuated to the GVN-con trollcd areas by helicopters. . . . The Koreans suddenly pointed their guns at the crowd and opened fire. Only two babies of two and three survived. They crawled on their mothers' bellies." (front a refugee) o ". when the Korean troops came, they called all the old women 4 nd children down in the trenches to ,come up. Then these people were told to sit in circles. Afterward, the Ko- rean troops, machine-gunned them." (front an NLF prisoner) o "Everybody agreed that the Ko- reans were barbarous., They went on' operations without interpreters going along. They killed at random without distinguishing between the ? rights and wrongs. Some people said it. was be- cause the VC mixed themselves with the villagers, and thus the Koreans couldn't help. making a mistake. I don't think their reasoning was right. I don't iIt retn.rm. On the contrary, Amer- ican officials have received at least three other major reports on the sub- ject. On January-10, 1970, A. Terry Ram- bo, a graduate student at the Univer- sity of. Hawaii, told the New 'York Trines that he had reported the exten- sive killing of.civilians by South Ko- rean troops to U.S. Army officers in Vietnam in 1966, but the information had been suppressed. Rambo and two colleagues, Jerry M. Tinker and John D. Lenoir, were researchers for Hu- man Sciences Research (11SR), Inc., McLean, Virginia, on a refugee inter- view - project for' the Pentagon's Ad- vanced Research Projects Agency. Rambo took the atrocity information to American officials in Vietnam. He briefed a "group of ranking American officers in Saigon about the report." The result: Rambo was "ordered by a general officer of the MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] staff' to cease; investigating the Koreans- and no mention of it was to be made in our reports." ' The Rambo team ports, one without atrocity informa- tion, one with it. This was done, ac- cording to Tinker, because they "knew that if our report contained anything about murders it would be classified Corporatio+~ppe10t ted Forney?Qy2001/07/27 GIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 . cnougb-"Mention of Korean Troop ?Oflti ued STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/0, r eQIA f -01601 R000900040 September 1972 `l'1-i1a 7LD WORLD WAR TWO C-46 hounceca But he rnanaged.to drop clown afrr mountains on each side. The G-46 vwas'a'ncient, but its skin had been polished Thut arrested by his police. In the old imperial city of Hue, nearly 300 students were rounded up in one single night and taken Heaven knows where. in Saigon, a :tilling atmosphere prevails in all eleven districts. Police Chief Trang Si Tan is flinging himself about. At police headquarters, all detention rooms are filled to capacity and in the torture chambers near the Zoo, the lights are on all night. The Saigon government needs 200 billion piastres to rebuild its badly-battered army. Little is left of American aid, and so slogans are put out for " self- reliance " and " Vietnar nization. A hundred new taxes are decreed. Business slumps. It becomes ever harder tp earn one's bowl of rice. The nights are still. The streets are empty. A storm is brewing. In the workers' quarters at Khanh Iloi and Lo Sicu, the children are singing To stand on our own fret And have enough to eat Let's topple Thieu And knock down his whole gang. Saigon under Thieu in 1972 is just like Saigon under Diem in 1963, say many- people. The same chaos and tension, the same stifling, unbearable atmosphere. There is one difference, though : anti-Americanism, i.e. the disgust at, scorn for, hatred of and opposi- tion to the Americans, has become even more open and widespread. Over the last five or six years of contact with GI civilization, " the Saigonese have come to realize more fully than ever that nothing can be more precious than the spiritual values of one's own nation. Material wealth unaccompanied by a spirit of independence and self-respect only leads to moral ruin. Many school and college students, who formerly liked, believed in, and admired the Amer- icans, now turn against them and enthusiastically join movements with such slogans as : " Let's go back to our nation's roots " and " Let's speak to our compatriots' and listen to them." They want to cause the stream of the people's strength to gush forth even more strongly and to immerse themselves in it. Here is what a patriotic woman teacher said in the course of a recent meeting : " How fortunate that after such a long occupation by US troops our follow-countrymen still stick to their national baba silk garments, relish their milk-apples and mangoes, love their fragrant rice and sweet folk melodies... How fortunate that neither American miniskirts, Californian rice, nor GI music have succeeded in catching their fancy." n is beyond r tricve. I is which has K(J 4r~gor l16`~tled4W1 /a?1 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 When, following the Jail of Quaug Iri to the liber- io p.m. Sirens start howling, announcing the troop , Thieu hp~ to here tr to I roo ra remain up '-'P89 . 00-4 ! up his trrAM4~ie~at~rUl ~0 i~lcuCl~E u1 trio streets. Nil nary uu crvr ran po,ua, stalk tea-houses naturally turned to this topic. People said about. The US embassy is a windowless fortre-;. to each other : "Nixon is asking for more can- The MACV head uartc?rs is in a bustle. The USAI D nonfodder, and Thieu has of course' to comply. Now building is astir. The " Independence Palace " looks is the time for him to repay his debt to the Amer- strangely isolated, as the night descends on Saigon. ican President. Over the past few years, the Gfs , have died by the hundred of thousands for Thieu to T,:c men living in those headquarters, building remain in the Independence Palace. Now, it is the turn of Thieu's soldiers to die for Nixon to remain in the White House." What a penetrating remark ! It hits the nail on the head : many American and Saigon soldiers have indeed paid with their lives for the consolidation of two wobbly presidential seats on either side of the Pacific! SOS calls keep coming from Saigon generals in Tri Thien, in the Central Highlands, in An Lou, Binh Dinh and other places. They are so busy fight- ing for their lives that they have to put a tempo- rary halt to their wheeling and dealing. The whole of that social stratum, which we shall call the military-contprador?, brcreaucralic clique and which 1talitt~ft ..alt`.Ilte- infamous members of the Khaki Party, has been thrown into confusion and hetivitd- erment: For years, they have drawn comfort and support from American mrnfc,- and troops. Now, dollars are coming only in driblets and Ill.-Illy GIs have left. The backbone of that clique is now made up of the 13 ptippet regular divisions. But seven or eight vertebrae. of that backbone have alreariv been smashed. The pillars of the Khaki Party turn their anxious look to the Independence Palace, Thicu's residence. They know that if Thieu goes, nothing can save the lfhrki Party, which has neither popular roots nor following, from immediate collapse. In the sweltering days of this summer, neither Thieu nor his henchmen. seem to have nn:h confi- dence left in each other and in their American and Vietnauacse friends. In early May, T'hieo's wife again set out on trips to Italy and Switzerland and the generals began accelerating the flow of their money transfers to Hongkong and France. At the booking office of Air Viet Nally at No. i if,, Nguyen Iluc street,- wives and children of VI Ps are :t1~t PB"ih641 RQO t 4m8Ot~ry step Diem was ad- how to behave for the Vietminh take- vised by Lansdale who, at one pathetic they are sometimes referred to as un- reliable in the communist struggle. [While] priests in the refugee villages hold no formal government posts they aie gen- erally the real rulers of their villages and serve as contacts with district and pro- STATINTL SR: SATUFDAY RLV WI STATINTL April i9712- Release 2001 /071 7 CIA-RDP8Q-01601 800990 1 ^ Gfi 9 t to at a meeting o t e rest ent s over o the Hanoi. region in early Book Review Editor: ROCIHELLE ciRsm on January 29, 1954. property, money reform, and a three- Why is this important? Because if day holiday of workers STATINTL upon takeover. " t d L 1 T IN TIIE MIDST OF WARS: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia by I'sciward Geary Lansdale Harper & Row, 386 pp., $12.50 is, therefore, relatively brief, the period it Covets in the Philippines and Viet- nam is genuinely important. There is only one difficulty with In the Midst of Wars: from the cover to the final page it is permeated with lies. That Harper & Row finds it possible to foist such a package of untruths on the public-and for $12.50!-several months after the emergence of the Pentagon Papers, and years after the publication of other authoritative studies, exhibits contempt for a public trying to understand the realities of our engagement in Vietnam. The lie on the jacket describes Lans- dale merely as an OSS veteran who spent the years after World War II as a "career officer in the U.S. Air Force." In the text Lansdale never offers any explicit evidence to the contrary. In- deed, on page 378-the last of the text- he states that at the very lime Diem was being murdered in Saigon, "I had been retired from the Air Force." For all I know Lansdale drew his pay from the Air Force and, as the photo- graphs in his book attest, he certainly where, between 1951 and 1956, he stuck close to Ngo Dinh Diem during Diem's first, shaky years when Washington couldn't make up its mind whore to lap as the American alternative to Ho Chi Alinh. Lansdale's support insured Diem as the final choice for Our Man in Saigon. While the book's time span gel ~ is one \\or ., itsc a e uses r e- he day following the distribution of peatcdly it is "help"-anfl he uses it these leaflets, refugee registration personally, simulating a Lone Ranger- tripled." like urge to offer spontaneous assist- ance. Thus, the first clay he ever saw ,he refugees-Catholics, many of Diem, ". . . the thought occurred to whom had collaborated with the me that perhaps he needed help.... I French-were settled in the South, in voiced this to Ambassador Heath.... communities that, according to Lans- Heath told me to go ahead." The in- dale, were designed to "sandwich" formal atmosphere continues when Northerners and Southerners "in a Lansdale, upon actually meeting Diem, cultural melting pot that hopefully immortalizes him as "the alert and would give each equal opportunity." eldest of the seven dwarfs deciding Robert Scigliano, who at this time t' With the exception of the Pentagon what to do about Snow White." was advising the CIA-infiltrated Michi- Papers, Edward Geary Lansdale's Further desires to serve inform Lans- gar State University team on how to memoir could have been the most vale- dale's concern for the "masses of "help" Diem, saw more than a melting able eyewitness account of the inter- people living in North Vietnam who pot: nationalizing of the Indochinese war, would want to ... move out before the Lansdale, a "legendary figure even in communists took over," These unfortu- Northerners, practically all of whom are his own book, furnished the model for nxtes, too, required "help." Splitting refugees, [have] preeinpted many of the the Ugly American who, from 1950 his "small team" of Americans in two, choice posts in the Diem government.... through 1953, "helped" Magsaysay put Lansdale saw to it that "One half, [The] Diem regime has assumed the as. down the Iluk revolution in the Philip- under Major Conein, engaged i(n poet of a carpet bag gol'el'IlI en( in its J nines. Ile then proceeded to Vietnam refugee work in the North." dispu?alistsroportion of Northerners and Cen- ant ' C h ~~~?~~ " "-La iaeas on now to wage psychological Diem's success against the various live of the Central Intelligence Agency; warfare to "some nationalists." The sects, Cao Dai, Iloa Hao, and Binh on page 244 of the Department of De- Pentagon Papers, however, reveal that Xuyen. (At every step Diem was ad- fense edition of the Pentagon Papers, the CIA "engineered a black psywar wised b L d 1 h I ut us at ohcism.... The "Major" Lucien Concin, who was to Southern people do not seem to share the play the major role the CIA had in the murder of Diem in 1963, is identified in the secret CIA report included by the Times and Beacon editions of the .Pentagon Papers (see SR, Jan. 1, 1972) as an agent "assigned to MAAG [Mili- tary Assistance Advisory Group] for cover purposes." The secret report refers to Conein's refugee "help" as one of his "cover duties." His real job: "responsibility for developing a para- military organization in the North, to be in position when the Vietminh took over ... the group was to be trained and supported by the U.S. as patriotic Vietnamese." Conein's "helpful" teams also attempted to sabotage Hanoi's largest printing establishment and wreck the local bus company. At the beginning of 1955, still in Hanoi, the CIA's Concin infiltrated more agents into the North. They "became normal citizens, carrying out everyday civil pursuits, on the surface." Aggression from the North, anyone? Lansdale expresses particular pleas- ure with the refugee movement to the South. These people "ought to be provided with a way of making a fresh start in the free South.... [Vietnam] was going to need the vigorous par- ticipation of every citizen to make a success of the noncommunist part of the new nation before the proposed plebiscite was held in 1956." Lansdale modest ly claims tha t he "passed along" anticommunist vehemence of their North. em n and Central compatriots, by tvliom they are sometimes referred to as urr? reliable in the communist strvt'?gle, , [While] priests in the refugee villages hold no formal government posts they are gen? orally the real rulers of their villages and serve as contacts with district and pro. vincial officials. Graham Greene, a devout Catholic, observed in 1955 after a visit to Viet. nam, "It is Catholicism which has helped to ruin the government of Mr, Diem, for his genuine piety has been exploited by his American advisers until the Church is in danger of sharing the unpopularity of the United States." Wherever one turns in Lansdale the accounts are likely to be lies. He re- ports how Filipinos, old comrades from the anti-Huk wars, decided to "help" the struggling Free South. The spontaneity of this pan-Asian gesture warms the heart-until one learns from Lansdale's own secret report to Presi- dent Kennedy that here, too, the CIA had stage-managed the whole business. The Eastern Construction Company turns out to be a CIA-controlled "mechanism to permit the deployment of Filipino personnel in other Asian countries for unconventional opera- tions.... Philippine Armed Forces and other governmental personnel were 'sheep-dipped' and sent abroad." ausdale, two other men, and Allen y ans a e w o, at one pathetic Dulles are identife strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the moment even holds the weeping Chief Approved oF~*`8920[4{0#1 7 -i>? q}44MPM0~1i?Os1 000810g[,QQiQ'Lti~ arms.) Everything de- how to behave for the Vietminh take- 1 Approved For Release 2001/07/27yiA% %01f ff STATINTL APRIL 1972 a review by Taylor Branch d The i Two fathers of the Vietnam War published their memoirs in March.* General Edward Lansdale's In the Midst of ,'Wars and General Maxwell Taylor's Swords and Plowshares re- cord the statements of defense for men wlio& symbolize the two doctrines that combined to produce American counter-guerrilla strategy in Southeast Asia. More importantly, Lansdale and Taylor represent two distinct schools of war supporters-those who saw Vietnam as a crusade and those who saw it as a burden. Lansdale is America's first expert in counter-guerrilla warfare-the legend- ary figure who achieved fame in the fifties by teaching our cold warriors that the only way to defeat Asian revolutionaries,, the guerrilla fish in a sea of popular support, was to learn how to paddle around a little ourselves. Mixing modern "psywar" (psychological warfare) techniques with James Bond derring-do and the kind of cultural savvy that later was coveted by exponents of foreign wars and foreign aid alike, Lansdale mana- ged to position himself for exploits and lever-pulling in palaces and rice paddies, Asia's smoke-filled rooms. Lansdale's knowledge of the players and the bystanders-the French, the Americans, the local warlords who were beset with kaleidoscopic person- al intrigue-helped him contour Diem's strategy to fit both interna- tional politics and contending Viet- namese jealousies.. Lansdale became mysterious and controversial--two *In the Midst of Wars. Edward Geary Lansdale. Harper & Row, $12.50. Swords and Plowshares. Maxwell D. Taylor. Norton, $10. Taylor Branch is an editor of The Washing- ton Monthly. can an novels, The Quiet Amer Ugly American, are modeled on his doings. He helped move American military strategy from the conven- tional concerns of how you position your armored divisions, tanks, artil- lery, and nuclear weapons, to more political questions like where you put your psywar leaflets, why you need pacification teams, and how to - win the hearts and minds of the people. As a counter-guerrilla man long before the fashion, Lansdale contributed about half the ideas that led to Vietnam. General Taylor symbolizes another idea, flexible response, which, floating On a common sea of anticommunism with Lansdale's doctrines, helped direct troop ships across the Pacific. At the apparent end of a long, successful military career that began at West Point under Superintendent Douglas MacArthur,Taylor found him- balanced budget so badly that they persuaded Ike to stick with a bargain- basement nuclear strategy. Secretary George Humphrey wan Taylor retired from the Army in 1959 to write The Uncertain Trumpet and thereby take his case for flexible response to the public, where it way well-received because most people were chilled by so much talk about the bomb during the Eisenhower Administration. A powerful fear that nuclear vertigo might draw our leaden toward the button was activated especially among liberals, and its nerv( endings remained exposed until aftc: the Goldwater-Johnson race in 1964 When President Kennedy and hip dandies came to Washington in 1961 they regarded Maxwell Taylor as cultural and strategic ally. Alread} alarmed at Khrushchev's speech pro claiming an open season for wars o: national liberation, the President per suaded the general to become Iii! military counselor (when Taylo: turned down the top post at the CIA to help the Administration enshrinf flexible response as official dogma an( to apply this wisdom in trouble spot: like Southeast Asia. Lansdale wa already in Washington, working or Vietnam, and the Pentagon Paper record that by July, 1961, 1Lansdalh self a very dissatisfied Army Chief of presented Taylor with a long, classi Staff from 1955 until 1959. 'He fied report "in response to your desir+ dissented from the Eisenhower-Dulles for early information on unconven strategy of massive retaliation (which tional warfare resources in Southeas essentially promised to nuke the Asia." The two vials were bein; communists if they made a move poured together, and the Kenned, anywhere) because he considered it Administration bought both flexibli unlikely that the Russians would response and counter-guerrilla warfar, believe our threat to blow up the in a logically compatible package world if they seized the post office in symbolized by the Green Berets. Nairobi. Of course, Taylor also had Against the background, of th bureaucratic reasons to oppose the Eisenhower years, the thoughts of thi Eisenhower nuclear strategy: the Air two generals appear quite harmonious Force was getting missiles, the Navy rising to the top of the nc% was in line for nuclear subs,'while the administration, but the memoirs sho' Army was getting little but budget that their personalities were sharps cuts. His development of the flexible different. While Taylor is a reserve response posture paralleled a.series of pragmatist, Lansdale is a true believe frustrated battles for more Army a gunb ho cold-war missionary, a ma funds, which Taylor implies were lost of action, whose writing calls fc because conservatives like Treasury frequent crescendos of the nation ~012t1' 2j20d Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :180-01601R000900 g a luover-m-1 o argi.n .. P .. Reviewed by non, Riaen,uour In 1969 the reviewer wrote a, letter to the Secretary of Defense and other highly placed persons that led to the revelations of the lily Lai massacre and all that fol- lowed. lie is now a student at Arizona State ? University and writes for New Tintes, an underground newspaper. It came as a bitter shock to most Americans when the COVER-UP. By Seymour M. Hersh. (Random House, 305 pp., 55,95) Army was reacting, accord- to protect their fellow offi- ing to Hersh, to charges of a cers-even those they've never met, whitewash. The public was Beyond these revelations, promised full access to the however, lies the deeper Peers discoveries after the question of command re- military trials, barring the sponsibility, not only for My usual "national security" Lai but for all the undiscov- rovision The ered-publicly at least- catch-all p .?nation's young began filling trials are now over except massacres and atrocities of ;the streets in protest against the Vietnam war, leveling charges against our own government and military that had traditionally been reserved for only our vilest adversaries. They were charges few Americans for Calley's appeal, but the the war. Inmphcit in the han- Pentagon still refuses to re- dling of the My Lai affair by lease the report. the administration and the The reason, Hersh says, is Pentagon is the assumption that the massacre was all that the investigation of the atypical incident, a kind of whitewash, is itself a cover- horrible aberration caused up. by a freakish and compli- ?Hersh shows the Peers cated combination of factors could accept. group collecting detailed ev. that could never be re- But in n November, 1969, ,, n ~n_ adence of a second massacre peated. tr..-.-h a nalist who specializes in cov- ering the military, rocked the nation and the world with a series of articles ex- posed what became known as the My Lai massacre. The series won Hersh the Pu- litzer Prize and later be- came a probingly thorough book. Although most people refused to believe it, it began to look as if the worst charges made by the anti- war groups were true. Now Hersh is back with a second book based on My other company from Task the atrocity syndrome was Force Baker, Charlie Com- widespread throughout the pany's parent unit, but Gen. Ame1-ical Division, at least, Peers denied any knowledge and that the military poli of it at a press conference cies then in effect. policies announcing the investiga- designed in the highest mili- tion's results. tary echelons made them *He shows Lt. Calley sent- inevitable. In the chapters enced to life imprisonment Hersh devotes to the sub- (later reduced to 20 years) ject, one is struck by the while his two commanding identical line that issues generals are let off the hook from a variety of witnesses by a fellow general in a deal from numerous echelons: .that smacks of the "old boy" "Kill, kill, kill". If they are syndrome-even t h o it g h to be believed, the official each accuses the other of ul- emphasis was on body count timate responsibility and and little else There is . Lai. It is potentially more both their testimonies are hardly any conclusion left to explosive than the story of full of holes and hedging. draw except that as far as th it lf i i e massacre se ra s ng , *He shows wholesale de- serious questions that cut to struction and alteration of the core of the military as records by privates through ?-an institution and laying generals. open to question the integ- : *He shows the CIA's shad- ri'ty of our top military and 'oavy hand in operation and civilian leaders as well as the the part' a CIA agent played American brand of justice, in planning the My Lai op. ration. "Cover-up" Is based on *He shows a-loose, unoffi- 28,000 pates of testimony cial but fiercely loyal alli- and documents gathered by ance of field grade officers the Army's investigation of willing to break all the rules the My Lai affair by a much ballyhooed blue-ribbon panel. named after its chief, Lt. Gen. William R. Peers, plus Hersh's own extensive inves- tigations. The purpose of the Peers inquiry was to dis- cover what happened at My Lai, why it happened and a .. as z 1 ~! ssa.cre CBooks - the brass was concerned, what really mattered was not who was killed, but how many. In Hersh's final analysis It becomes clear that not only was My Lai inevitable, but so was its cover-up and the cover-up's cover-up. Perhaps the most disturbing issue he raises is that what made it all so inevitable is integral to the United States Army today. And that raises some questions. Hersh threads the story of My Lai and its sister massa- cre at My Khe, their investi- gation and the double cov- er-up, into a broad tapestry tightly stitched together with the most damning evidence of all-the testimony of the men who participated at every level and every stage of the whole sordid affair. Years from now, when schol- ars attempt to understand the Vietnam phenomenon, "Cover-Up" is the one book to which they will all turn. And they will ask them selves, I suppose, why the vital questions raised by Hersh about an institution as powerful in and impor- tant to America as its army were allowed to go unan- swered-as they surely will in a nation that has had the war up to here. how it coulA ?leFor Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 long - undiscovered. The'. 'to command of the air force which he held before becoming premier seven years ago. Be-. sides, Thieu seems disinclined to give Ky any position of au- thority-not surprisingly, since Ky threatened in September to "destroy him and all his clique." Ky is not so easily written more determination and, at 43,? ary urea-1 Yic U UU+ i---,? is an attempt by the An Quang he is younger. He can wait for The first is primarily corn- Buddhists to purge Communist the next presidential elections posed of union members led sympathizers from their own in 1975, when Thieu will be by Tran Quoc Buu. He has had sy m r ks especially their student constitutionally unable to seek strong American support since vements. After denying another term. the days when the U.S. Centralernment accusations that Intelligence Agency financed~h ov they often served communist Way Charter Reads the creation of anti- b d purposes, the church leaders Or at least that is the way the Constitution reads at the moment. But that Anierican- inspired limitation may prove no more realistic for Vietnam than other ideas copied from the U.S. Constitution and later abandoned, like an independ- ent judiciary. Few observers would want to predict as far ahead as 1975. But if Thieu is still running the same kind of government then, it seems likely that he might decide to emulate Presi-. dent Chung Hee Park of South Korea. A few years ago Park found himself so indispensable that he had to force through his parliament a change in the American-inspired two-term limitation. Thicu works from behind a screen of Oriental aloofness. Ile tours the country exten- sively to meet with local offi- cials, who form the basis of his political power, but he does not try to establish a popular image with the masses. He has made little effort to explain his policies. The presi- dential palace provides almost no information to the Vietnam- ese press about what it is doing. More than just a retic- ence, there seems to be an absolute hostility toward the American press. Parties Too Fractious STATINTL "No one has the right, through ill-considered acts, to go counter" to the constitu-. be coming back to the idea tion, Huyen said. Thieu's pro- that organized political sup-' posal to let the Communists port can have a value beyond contest elections would violate his use of local officials and the anti-Communist provisions army officers to rally popular of the Constitution. backing and turn out voters. Cautiously Quiei The three parties that show The opposition groups which signs of coalescing behind had voiced desires for peace Thieu are the Workers' and have been cautiously quiet. Peasants' party, the Progres- and the Revolution- The most interesting devel ?o,?to ... Communist unions a roa . now seemed concerned about The second party unites pro- this. fessional ?rnen and civil serv- Their supreme patriarch re- ants. Its highly respected lead- cently accused both the Saigon er, Prof. Nguyan Van Bong, and Hanoi governments as was assassinated in Novem- "merely acting as puppets for her, weakening the party. foreign powers." This even- The third, part of the old Dal handed condemnation was a Viet semi-se c r e t political change from attacking Thieu movement, is led by a former while being polite to the Com- minister of the interior, Ha munists. Thuc Ky. Position Strengthened Thieu gave these parties some help of dubious legality in August's elections to the lower house of parliament, and they strengthened their position. Now, he might be looking toward next year's lower house elections. If a constitutional amend- ment is to be passed allowing a third term, . Thieu would need more parliamentary sup= port than he now has. I The president is still pre- senting a stoutly anti- Communist determination to the world., But he has gained politically - and weakened his critics - by offering in Janu- ary to resign and fight presi- dential elections against the Communists. This helped Thieu to capture much of the credit for favor- ing peace which had been held by various opposition groups. s t could bring to Minh the call to Thieu dickered in 1969 with a a n. After a six caused concer national leadership that he the idea of uniting seven politi- week silence, the president of wants. cal parties behind his pro- the upper house of parliament, The other man whom Thieu grams. But they proved too Sen. Nguyen Van Huyen, who maneuvered out of the presi- fractious. By early 1970 he was would run the country tempo- dential race, former Vice denouncing all politicians as rarily under Thieu's plan to President Nguyen Cao Ky, would-be leaders without any resign for new elections, ex- plays tennis and talks with his followers.- ressed warded d i s a r e e- military cronpproved For Rd1easdBQDAtp7U27e: QI9A- O0 01601 R000400040001-1 Now outranked by a former signs that the president might subordinate, he cannot return WASHINGTON STn_, Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA -F 1 8 601 R000900 geu IS) NMI :Drop r FOLIOS Po' it c a I C a Cflm to Vetrnin By HENRY S. BRADSIIER Star Staff Writer SAIGON - In the half-year since South Vietnam's presi- dential elections ended with a whimper instead of a bang, this country has been political- ly more quiet than at any time in recent years. The quietness is a sign of President Nguyen Van Thieu's political mastery, of the de- moralization of his opponents, and of preparations for a pos- sible eventual political contest with the Communists. And it might also be taken as a sign of the narrow focus of Vietnamese politics on a small handful of people, with the bulk of the population knowing little about them and caring less-in the normal way of underdeveloped coun- tries with strongman tradi- tions. In the offices and villas of .those persons who consider themselves Saigon politicians, there is some desultory discus- sion these (lays of new politi- cal alliances. Thieu might once again be interested in gathering the support of some politicians, instead of spurning them all. The An Quang pagoda group of Buddhists is busy cleaning house, the student movement is hardly visible, and war vet- erans are being taken care of fairly well. These are the groups that have caused the most political turmoil in re- cent years, but not now. Few Pay Attention Retired Gen. Duong Van Minh, the self-appointed savior of Vietnam from both Thieu and communism, has issued a few statements since deciding in August not to fight a losing presidential e l e c t i o n cam- paign. Not many people pay atten- tion. Vietnamese politicians, journalists and other observ- ers find it hard to imagine any Approved For Release 2001/07 fr 77; ,f# "2P80-01601 CIA A., gent Blarhed for My Lai Error WASJJINCTWK zip --- Author Seymour M. Ilersh said an agent for the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency misled the planners of the 1968 attack on My Lai by telling' them they would'. find a Viet Cong battalion. there. The agent denied it. The assault units met only old men, women and children in the South Viet- namese v ill a g e. Many were 'killed by the Ameri- can troops. Hersh, who won a Pul- 1tzer 'Prize' for breaking the My Lai story, identi- fied the agent in. A new book as Robert B. Rams- dell, now a private inves- tigator in.Orlarido, Fla; "Ramsdell refused to speak, specifically about. the information he provid- ed Task Force Barker be- fore the My Lai 4 opera- tion, but acknowledged that his intelligence un- doubtedly was a factor in the planning for the mis- sion," Hersh wrote in "Cover-Up," published Sunday by Random House. . Denies Charges In a telephone interview, Ramsdell denied Hersh's allegations and said that although he was working for the CIA in the My Lai area at the time of the kill- ings, he had notiong to do with intelligence reports to the Americans. Of his role in the 'CIA, Rat isdell said, "MV func- tion eras with the Viet- namese. I had very little to do with the Americans." He said that information gathered by the South Vietnamese was at 'times relayed to U.S. troops, but added that he doubted those: reports could have become the basis for the m i s 1 eading information fed to planners of the My Lai assault. Viet Cuing Sought In the , 'y Lal courts- martial of Lt. William 1-,,, Calley Jr. a n d others, there was testimony that the attack was made in the belief the village was the home ? of the 48th Viet Cong.Battalion, -which pre- viously had inflicted hea- vy damage to American units. The source of that belief was alluded to only as "in- telligence reports." 'Ilersh said: The link between Ramsdell and the poor intelligence for the March 16 operation was never explored by the Peers panel (the exhaus- tive Army investigation headed by Lt. Gen. Wil- liam R. Peers). For one thing, none of the high- ranking officers on it had any reason to suspect that Ramsdell was poorly in- formed about Vietnam." Ramsdell was sent into Quang Ngai Province, on' Feb. 1-40, days before My Lai-to run ',the_ clandes- tine Operation Phoenix, Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 4i'ASITIITGT014 POST Approved For Release 2001/07/27: 'fAV 1 01R00090 -Arorurui the N;fflon CIA in Mylai Author Seymour M. Hersh says an agent for the Ccn- tral Intelligence Agency mis- led the planners of the ill- starred 19(38 attack on My- lai by telling them they would find a Vietcong bat- talion there. The agent de- nies it. The assault units met only old men, women and chil- dren in the South Vietnam ese tillage.' Many were killed by the American troops. Hersh identifies the agent in a new book as Robert B. Ramsdell, now a private in- vestigator in Orlando, Fla. Ramsdell denied liersh's al- legations and said that al- though he was working for the CIA in the Tdylai area at the time of the killings, he had nothing to do with in- telligence reports to the Amercans. . Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 26 MAR 77 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP81 -0"1601 R00090 STATINTL By RICHARD CRITCIIFIELD Star Staff Writer IN TILE MIDST OF WARS. By Maj. Gen. Edward Geary Lansdale. Harper & Row. 336 pages. $12.50. When Edward Lansdale returned to an almost-defeated Vietnam in the fall of 1965, he was already a fabled figure, the legendary Asian hand who had been the mentor of the Philip- pines' great anti-guerrilla fighter, Roman Magsaysay, as well as Ngo Dinh Diem's first American political-military adviser in the mid-1950s, Although he was then 58, he still had an air of youthful Idealism; with his haggard good looks and brown hair only tinged with gray, he mi ht have stepped out of the pages of Eric Ambler or Ian flaming. One saw at once why he had inspired major characters in both "The Ugly American," by William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, and Graham Greene's classic on the Indochina war, "The Quiet American." BOOKS In "The Ugly American," Lansdale was barely disguised as Colonel Edwin D. Hi]landale, a haromonica-playing good guy who "loves to be with people, any kind of people." In a frankly admiring sketch, the authors wrote, "In 1952 Colonel Hillandale was sent to Manila as liaison officer to something or other. In a short time the Philippines fascinated him. He .ate his meals in little Filipino restaurants . he even. ,attended the University in his spare hours to study Tagalog The counsellor up at the American Embassy always spoke of him as 'that crazy bastard.' But within six months the crazy bastard was eating breakfast with Magsaysay and he soon became Magsaysay's unofficial adviser." BUT THERE was another way of interpreting Lansdale and Greene turned it into literature in his bitterly brilliant "The Quiet American." The novel is a despairing portrayal of a young idealistic CIA operative who blunders tragically through the intrigue, treachery and confusion of Vietnamese 'politics. Innocent and well-meaning, but naive, the American leaves a trail of blood and suffering in his wake. Greene's young American was sent to Indochina in the early 1950s to help create air indigenous political force that could resist a Communist takeover when the French pulled out. In May, 1954, John Foster .Dulles dispatched Lansdale to Saigon with secret orders to see if anything could be salvaged from the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Lansdale became Diem's adviser at the time the Vietnamese leader was defying the Geneva agreements, which both he and the United States refused to sign, resettling almost a million refugees from the Communist north: and beginning to make South Vietnam a nation. ' 1965, It was rather like Ctireene's quiet American coming back to Saigon in 1935, it was rather like Greene's quiet American coming to life again. Oddly, the Vietnamese started calling Lansdale "the phoenix" after one of their household gods. What would he do? "What does a man do," Lansdale told us at the time, "when he returns to a country, 10 years later, with great stress on its social and political structure, great suffering,' great pain. I have no great plan. One's got to move in with tremendous gentleness; these people have been divided and hurt and a lot of clumsiness could divide and hurt them more. But there isn't much time. They need rule of law, consent of the governed in how they are governed and a life in which kids have some hope of tomorrow. I feel the Vietnamese are in their last quarter. This is the ninth inning and we either do it now or not at all." He was brimming with plans for sweeping land reform, rural electrification, bringing back all the able administrators purged for serving Diem, restoring Confucian ethics, putting strict restraints on American artillery and air strikes. But he was quickly stripped or any real authority. On Jan. 21, 1965, Philip Habib, now ambassador to South Korea who ran the embassy's political ection, sent Lansdale a memoran- dum, reportedly signed by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, forbidding him further contact with the Vietnamese leaders. Lansdale the phoenix. Perhaps the Vietnamese should have remembered a line of Greene's in "The Quiet American: ". " . but nothing nowadays Is fabulous and nothing rises from its ashes." "IN THE MIDST of Wars" Is his own discreet account of the years in Asia from 1950 to 1956, the brilliantly successful four he spent helping to defeat the Huks and elect Magsaysay president in the Philippines, the less successful two in Viet- nam assisting Diem to unite the feudal religious sects, defeat the,gangster army which ruled Saigon and begin a pacification effort against the budding Vietcong insurgency. It is an invaluable historical document and an exciting adventure story, and like the author himself, rugged, humor- ous, compassionate, baffling, naive and a little infuriating. In the book's anti-climactical final paragraph, Lansdale briefly notes he returned to Vietnam again from 1965 to 1968, closing his book with the cryptic sentence, "But that's another story, quiet. different from the experiences described in this book?" Why another story? From his personal viewpoint, of course, he went back as a civilian in an enormous, disarrayed American mission torn by interagency rivalry in a war already going badly, and he was never allowed to come up to bat. But would his approach have worked if he had? The book's final chapter is devoted to Lansdale's belief that Irregular war is not just another aspect in the art of fighting but is a complex primarily political struggle for political ends. "Fundamentally," he writes, "the people of a country are the main feature on a' battleground of Communist choosing In the novel, the Lansdale figure, after becoming involved since the ensuing struggle becomes one between the Commu- in a terrorist explosion in Saigon - an incident that actually nists and the government over which side will have the took gnlacR gt ffiWfsoa, d bRD@,1}~gi @0 #v1r side wins that allegiance the Col wen , s a e eftne ac o Sanaon in ~v~" e c un ry ... not er words, a country's strength STATINTL WASHINGTON POST BOOK WORLD Approved For Release 2001/07/27: CIA-RDP8Q91MMROQM040001 STATINTL war CC tUf~rAft ndu %.w W In the Midst of Wars An American's Mission to Southeast Asia. By Edward Geary Lansdale. Harper & Row. Illustrated. 386'pp. $12.50 Reviewed by SHERWOOD DICKERMAN . To' Graham Greene's jaundiced British eye, he was a inodel for Pyle, the naively dangerous "Quiet American." Burdick and Lederer took an approving, American view of him as Colonel Ilillandalc of The Ugly American. In .Jean Larteguy's Yellow Fever, he was Colonel Teryman,, astute, somewhat sinister and, of course, anti-French. Now Major General Edward Geary Lansdale has finally written his own book about himself. In the Midst of Wars covers the six years from 1950 through 1956 when Lans- dale, in the Philippines first and then in South Vietnam, ivas Washington's leading agitprop agent for American- style democracy and 'against ainst communism. An Air Force ntelligence officer well connected with the Central In- elligence Agency, Lansdale was a cold war condottiere. Sherwood Dickerman spent five years in Southeast Asia as a foreign correspondent. - Madame Nhu, Dam, Lansdale, 1956 .'elected:president despite. the op ,Filipino political establishment. In South Vietnam, lie did his best to perform the same role in a more difficult situa- tion with Ngo Dinh Diem. Throughout, Lansdale promoted his belief that deinoc- racy on the American model was exportable, desirable, and an effective method of countering Communist "peo- ple's wars." In his view, the theories of Washington, Jeffer- son, and Lincoln were both morally and tactically superior to those of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, and his evangelism was unabashed: In sharing our-ideology while snaking others strong enough to embrace and hold it for their own, the Ameri- can people strive toward a millennium when the world will be free and wars will be past. The Washington officials to whom Lansdale addressed this message were, he notes, "not too happy" over it. In the sadder and wiser America of tie 1970s, perhaps most Americans would not be happy ',:ith Lansdale's sense, of global commitment to democratic panaceas. (Yet. the Lansdale spirit is not so dated as it may sound, it survives, perhaps in more sophisticated forms, among able and in- telligent men at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, and else. where.) In trying. to realize his ideal, Lansdale was 'ingenious and ruthless. Ile was an early student of Maoist military theory and psychological warfare. "Dirty tricks beget dirty tricks," he writes, and the premise is that the other side played dirty first. Thus he writes approvingly of a Filipino psywar squad that drained the blood of an ambushed Huk through punctures in his neck to terrify the man's com- rades of a vampire. Lansdale also recalls his success in causing a mass work stoppage in Hanoi at the time of the Communist takeover there-through distribution of phony leaflets proclaiming a' one-week victory holiday. He does not tell all, however, which is probably one reason why the book by Lansdale reads less melodramat- ically than the ones about him. Through the Pentagon Papers, it is known that Lansdale's American agents in Hanoi also sabotaged the city's bus fleet at that time to embarrass the Vietminh and that American-trained Viet- namese guerrillas, the "Hao" and "Binh" teams, were in- filtrated into `Haiphong under his direction for anti-Com- munist underground activity. It may not be surprising for a retired career officer to omit such secret and sensitive material, but in Lansdale's case there are grounds for sus- pecting that lie may have omitted more than he put in. His protests about exaggerated news reports of his activity in Vietnam sometimes have a hollow tone. Certainly Lansdale's 386-page book is no comprehensive record of the U.S. involvement in either the Philippines or Vietnam during this period. Neither are there any major historical revelations. What does emerge strongly is the personal philosophy and style of America's best-known `.`nation-builder" in Southeast Asia at a time when the nation-building concept was generally accepted and ap- who became possibly the -most influential single American plauded. Anecdotes, alternate with moralizations. Out of in Southeast Asia and certainly the most controversial. As these, Lansdale appt-ars as idealistic and courageous (he the close friq,A,~z/,c ~ve~~.(gg egg a A_ p$g p ~ t 6e. rlkid for assassination in helped to eat t is om,nums uk a all dale he lap re elli o i , am a and argon a warmly sentimental man to. 'in the 'Philippines and to get the idealistic lllagsaysay ward Asian friends,. and a quick-study improviser and Approved For Release 2001/07L27i. lAgTP80-01601 R0009000400 D Daily World Combined Services American B-52 heavy bombers yesterday made their heaviest attacks in two weeks against the northern provinces of South Vietnam. In Saigon, more evidence of political skulduggery emerged, in the case of a Saigon puppet general fired by puppet President Nguyen Van Thieu at the beginning of the week on the "recommendation" of U.S. adviser John Paul Vann . Gen. Le Ngoc Trien, command- er of the Saigon puppet 22nd In-. fantry Division, was relieved of his command on Monday by Thieu at what was described as a "high- level" military conference at Nha Trang, 190 miles northeast of Saigon. Nha Trang was formerly U.S. Special Forces headquarters in South Vietnam and is also a center of U.S. Central Intelligence Agen- cy operations. Vann, the U.S. adviser - not otherwise described recommended that Gen. Trien ?Police. se be wa eca s -r ; 're u f n't Thieu declared, according to . from a b a se of nerves and ra within the context of U.S. domes- tic politics. Thieu's remarks appeared on Tuesday in two Saigon news- papers: Tin Song, which is financ- ed by his own private secretary, Hoang Due Nha, and the news- paper Chinh Luan, which was de- scribed by United Press Inter- national as having a "special relationship" with the (Saigon puppet) presidential palace. Chinh Luan is also known to be in the good graces of the Saigon National The Central Highlands region of South Vietnam has been a cen- ter of fierce struggle against the Japanese, the French colonial- ists, the Saigon puppets and their U.S. masters. In the 1946-54 war against the French, the Central Highlands were regarded by the French com- mand as a center of Viet Minh strength; among the French lower ranks, being posted to the Central Highlands was regarded as the equivalent of a death sentence: In the 1954 Geneva discussions, the Vietnamese patriots argued that the Central Highlands should leiku e io n achieve final success. To help their control. but agreed to the of the Central Highlands g of the province Binh Dinh. bring about Nixon's defeat, North region temporarily being assigned Tied to U.S. elections Vietnamese must try to demon- to the French zone until scheduled What made tl U.S.-inspired strate the failure of Vietnamiza- elections were held in 1956. The me by adieu significant was d tion by inflicting a crushing mili- elections were never held. Lary defeat." Heavy fighting was reported ov Thieu on Monday tied in the defense of the vital Central High- lie asserted that the "Commu- raging yesterday in the Central lands region to Nixon's reelection nist thrust" would be aimed at Highlands and the adjoining goal. Thieu asserted that "the , Gen. Trien's area, and thus Trien Binh inh coastal province. Seven Communists" would try to defeat was being fired. separate B-52 air strikes were Nixon by gaining military victor- called in a single, 450-square-mile 13' It was not until yesterday that area in the region, while in other les in the Central Highlands and' U.S. newsmen dug up the fact areas, U.S. fighter-bombers thus disproving Nixon's "Viet- that Thieu's action and the reas- were called in to drop napalm and namization" scheme. The firing ons behind it all originated with bombs around encircled Saigon of Gen. Trien therefore is a move the U.S. puppet army units. Approved For Release 2001./,07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000900040001-1 y BELL IN, FAt ei EcbhRelease 2001/07/27: CIA-RDP80-01601R0009000 HER AI MAR 1 1972 E - 21,494 S - 22,543 arse earns S Snits he criticized because the entire incident had been falsified, he IT- I ? had been attacked wasn't 65, 0ex~rq~ rl miles at sea and?its mission had ~,y u C been spying. He said because of the nature' By HUNTLY GORDON Morse,?? considering himself t of the ship, the international Of the Bellingham Herald strict constitutionalist. said o' doctorine of hot pursuit pre, Former U.S. Sen. Wayne constitutional law: "I didn' vailed. teach it all my life to walk out Morse of Oregon told a Western on it." And secrecy, too . Washington State College au- Morse retraced the years of dience Tuesday, numbering no his obstruction on the Senate; He criticized government se- more"than 100, that the nation is Foreign Relations Committee,: crecy which made the resolu Well on its way to "government during which he, called the Eis tion possible and said: "If 5 per by executive supremacy and se- enhower administration's top: cent of the truth had been crecy." men "liars." known. it would never have got- Morse, one of the Senate's lie accused then Secretary of ten out of committee." earliest doves, used the series State John Foster Dulles of sit- Although he criticized Con, of "presidential wars" as an ex- ting at the conference table in gress for failing to halt presi- ample of presidents exceeding Geneva working out a peace far! dential power, encroachment, he their constitutional authority. Indochina while secretly seek- was just as tough on the courts. "The President has no power ing alliances from Britain and. He said the Supreme Court to make war-that power , is France to perpetuate the