14TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARAMENT AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: March 3, 1975
• Content Type: REGULATION

Ip 4~/LJ r aw 1
Approved For Rase 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495RO100040021-7
94th Congress, 1st Session - - - - House Document No. 94-64
A C-D A
14TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. ARMS CON-
TROL AND DISARAMENT AGENCY
MESSAGE
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
THE 14TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THEIU.S. ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY PURSUANT TO SECTION
50 OF PUBLtLAW 87-297
MARCH 3, 1975.-Message and accompanying papers referred
to'the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
48-172 0 WASHINGTON : 1975
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For R&i ase 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R 0100040021-7
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
To the Congress of the United States:
America's traditional optimism about the manageability of human
affairs is being challenged, as never before, by a host of problems. In
the field of national security, arms control offers a potential solution
to many of the problems we currently face. The genius of the American
people may be said to lie in their ability to search for and find practical
solutions, even to the most difficult of problems; and it is no accident
that this country has helped lead the world in the quest for interna-
tional arms control agreements.
Safeguarding our national security requires a dual effort. On the
one hand, we must maintain an adequate defense against potential
great-power adversaries; for although we are pursuing a positive policy
of detente with the Communist world, ideological differences and con-
flicting interests can be expected to continue. On the other hand, we
share with them as with the rest of the world, a common interest in a
stable international community.
Over the past year, we have made considerable progress in our arms
control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Vladivostok accord
which I reached with Chairman Brezhnev will enable our two coun-
tries to establish significant limits on the strategic arms race and will
set the stage for negotiations on reductions at a later phase. The U.S.
and U.S.S.R. have, over the past year, also reached agreement on the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty and on a limitation on ABM deployments
to one complex for each country.
The negotiations being held at Vienna on mutual and balanced
force reductions in Europe (MBFR), while they have not yet produced
conclusive results, are also an important endeavor to limit and reduce
armaments safely through mutual agreement. For our part, we shall
make every effort to achieve such an outcome.
Even as we see some encouraging progress in our relations with the
Soviet Union, we still face a growing danger in the potential prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons to more countries. The United States will con-
tinue to seek practical steps to avert this danger, while providing the
benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The 14th annual report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, which I herewith transmit to the Congress, sets forth the steps
which have been taken over the past year to meet these and other
national security problems through arms control.
THE WHITE HOUSE, March 3, 1975.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Re*ease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495RW100040021-7
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
January 22, 1975
I submit for your transmittal to the Congress,
as required by the Arms Control and Disarmament
Act, as amended, the fourteenth annual report of
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This
report covers the work of the Agency during calen-
daryear 1974.
Respectfully,
Fred C. Ikle
The President
The White House
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved Foelease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP8013014 59 R000100040021-7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
NEGOTIATING FORUMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS . . . . . . . . 7
RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR
WEAPONS TESTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION . . . . . . . . 18
MUTUAL AND BALANCED
FORCE REDUCTIONS . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND
ARMS TRADE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
PUBLIC INFORMATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
AGENCY OPERATIONS ... . . . . . . . . . . . 45
GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
APPENDICES
I - Organization Chart. . . . . . . . . . . . 56
II - Officials of the Agency . . . .. . . . 57
III Bilateral Agreements. . . . . . . . 59
IV - Multilateral Agreements . . . . . . 60
V - Depository Libraries.. . . . . . . . . . . 72
vi
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Rase 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495FiQp0100040021-7
INTRODUCTION
The Act establishing the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency states that the Agency shall provide
the Congress, as well as the President, the Secretary
of State, and other executive branch officials, with
recommendations concerning U.S. arms control policies.
The Director frequently meets with and briefs
Members of Congress and their staffs, and frequently
appears, as do other top Agency officials, before
interested committees of the Congress to testify on
arms control matters. In 1974 the Director made ap-
proximately 75 visits to Members' offices and also
continued' his practice of conducting periodic meetings
at the Agency with small groups of Congressional staff
of interested Members and committees of Congress.
Agency officials testified before Congressional com-
mittees 18 times during the year.
During 1974 the Agency was the subject of a
.thorough Congressional review of its activities and
role in the formulation of U.S. arms control policy.
The Subcommittee. on National Security Policy and
Scientific Developments of the House Committee-on
Foreign Affairs, under the Chairmanship of
Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, was charged with con-
ducting hearings, and for recommending possible
legislative changes.
The Agency welcomed this review. It cooperated
in the committee staff preparations which preceded the
hearings held in September and October. Director Fred
C. Ikle appeared before the Subcommittee on October 3
to testify on the Agency's activities and objectives
and to respond to the Subcommittee. During that testi-
mony, Dr. Ikle described the Agency as performing three
essential functions:
-- To serve as a catalyst by bringing opportuni-
ties for arms limitations and reductions into
the fore;
1
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B0149000100040021-7
- To serve to calibrate the counterbalancing con-
siderations between security through military
force and security through. arms restraints;
- To serve as a conscience to help ensure that
short-term tactical considerations will neither
obscure nor sidetrack the long-term national
and international interests.
The work of the Agency during 1974 covered a broad
spectrum of arms control issues and problems. Although
staff time and attention were devoted to the control of
"conventional" instruments and methods of warfare,
clearly the most urgent task was to seek ways to stop
the increase of nuclear weapons. The challenge must be
met on.two fronts: to limit and reduce the nuclear
weapons systems of the two major nuclear powers, the
Soviet Union and ourselves; and to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons to countries which do not now
possess them.
For the past two decades, the build-up of. strategic
forces by the Soviet Union has been the most dangerous
threat to our security. Although that danger is by no
means past, we are making progress with the Soviet
Government toward arms control in the strategic area.
The world's attention has now been drawn forcibly to the
danger of nuclear proliferation to other nations. The.
eager pursuit of nuclear energy to fulfill the energy
needs of developed and developing countries alike
carries with it the export of nuclear technology and
materials which could be subverted to military use.
Arms control achievements during the past year in-
cluded:
-- The Vladivostok accord between President Ford
and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev setting guide-
lines for a SALT agreement with a common aggregate
ceiling on offensive strategic weapons and on the number
of missiles which can be MIRVed.
- An agreed Protocol to the ABM Treaty which
further restricts the anti-ballistic missile systems to
one deployment area each for the United States and the
2
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For RIease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R4?0100040021-7
Soviet Union in lieu of the two agreed upon in 1972.
An agreement with the Soviet Union on a Thresh-
old Test Ban Treaty prohibiting underground nuclear
weapons tests having a yield above 15.0 kilotons.
Senate consent to ratification of the Geneva
Protocol of 1925 and.the 1972 Biological Weapon's Con-
vention.
The following report describes the Agency's
activities during 1974 in connection with. the above
events and with other development relating to arms
control.
3
Apopcpv2ed For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
48-192
 Approved For elease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B014dM000100040021-7
NEGOTIATING FORUMS
The Arms Control Agency participated in a number
of. negotiating forums in the past year -- larger
number than ever before.
Phase II of the bilateral SALT negotiations
between the United States and the Soviet Union, on
the further limitation of strategic arms, continued
in Geneva. The ACDA member of the U.S. Delegation is
Ralph Earle II. During 1974, sessions were held from
February 19 to March 19, and from September 18 to
November S.
The Agency is also directly concerned with the
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which was
established under the SALT ABM Treaty and the Interim
Agreement. Mr. Sidney N. Graybeal of the Agency is
the U.S. Commissioner. The Commission, which meets
at least twice a year in Geneva, is responsible for
considering questions concerning compliance with
obligations under those agreements, for reconciling
any misunderstandings or uncertainties that may arise
in connection with those obligations, and for con-
sidering, as appropriate, proposals for increasing
the viability of agreements already in force and for
further strategic arms limitation measures.
Delegates from NATO and. Warsaw Pact nations met
in Vienna to continue discussions on mutual and
balanced force reductions -- MBFR -- in Central Europe,
The ACDA.member of the U.S. Delegation in 1974 was,
successively., Timothy Stanley, Thomas Hirschfeld, and
John Lehman. The 1974 sessions ran from January 15 to
April 10, from May 6 to July 25, and from September 12
to December 12.
The Agency has primary responsibility for U.S.
participation in the Conference of the. Committee on
Disarmament (CCD), the principal forum for the negoti-
ation of multilateral arms control measures, which has
met in Geneva each year since 1962. Its members
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : 6IA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23: PASO
represent a ,geographic and political cross-section of
the world. Five new members were accepted during the
last year -- the Federal Republic of Germany., the
German Democratic Republic, Peru, Iran, and-Zaire
bringing the total to 31. The members of the U.S.
Delegation to the CCD are drawn principally from the
Agency's International Relations Bureau. The U.S.
.Representative to the Committee in 1974 was again
Ambassador Joseph Martin, Jr. In addition to Agency
political officers, the Atomic Energy Commission and
the Department of Defense send advisers who are
accredited as members of the delegation. The U.S.
Representative, along with his Soviet counterpart,
serves as Co-chairman of the Conference..
Ambassador Martin was a member of the U.S. Dele-
gation to the United Nations General Assembly and,
.assisted by other ACDA staff, advised the Delegation
on arms control issues. During the Twenty-ninth
Session, held in the fall, 21 resolutions relating to
arms control were adopted by the General Assembly.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) provides for a review conference to be
held in Geneva five years from date of entry into
force, to see if the purposes of the Treaty are being
realized. A Preparatory Committee of 29 nations met
twice during the past year to lay the groundwork for
the review conference, scheduled for May, 1975. The
head of the U.S. Delegation to the Preparatory Committee
was the Deputy Director of the Agency, J. Owen
Zurhellen, Jr.
The Agency was represented in three separate talks
held with representatives of the Soviet Union in Moscow
technical talks and negotiations. on a Threshold Test
Ban, follow-on.negotiations on peaceful nuclear explo-
sions in the context of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty,
and technical talks on environmental warfare.
.Lastly, the Agency sent representatives to the
First Session of the. Diplomatic Conference on the Re-
affirmation and Development of Internal Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts and. to the'Conference
of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional
5
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved Foelease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01405R000100040021-7
Weapons, which met in Geneva and Lucerne respectively,
under the auspices of the International Red.Cross.
A more detailed discussion of the U.S. policy
objectives pursued in these forums, and of how the
Agency fulfills its statutory responsibility for "the
preparation for and management of United States par-
ticipation. in international negotiations in the arms
control field," is presented in subsequent chapters.
6
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Rel ase 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80BO1495R 0100040021-7
LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS
President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev, meet-
ing in Vladivostok in November, signed a statement setting
guidelines for the further limitation of offensive
strategic arms which, in the words of the President, "put
a firm ceiling on the strategic arms race, which hereto-
fore has eluded us since the nuclear age began." This
agreement was the culmination of a two-year effort to
replace the Interim Agreement of 1972, which had the
effect of freezing levels of offensive strategic arms
existing then, with firm limitations based on the princi-
ple of equivalence.
Negotiating History Prior to Vladivostok
The 5-year interim agreement on the limitation of
certain offensive strategic arms., concluded between the
United States and the Soviet Union on May 26, 1972, helped
to stabilize the situation quantitatively and provide time
to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement on offensive
weapon systems. The most serious obstacle to reaching a
permanent agreement lay in the asymmetries in the com-
position of the two opposing forces. The numbers and
characteristics were so divergent that devising a formula
for setting comprehensive limits based on equivalent
forces proved very difficult. In the meantime, each side
continued to modernize its forces.
Another obstacle was the Soviet position that nuclear
systems of our Allies and U.S. nuclear systems directly
committed to our Allies be taken into account without con-
sidering their substantial nuclear threat to our Allies.
The United States consistently maintained that SALT, in
which our Allies are not participating as negotiating
partners., should only deal with nuclear arms that are
central to the U.S./Soviet strategic relationship.
Moscow Summit Meeting
As the June summit meeting approached, ACDA and'the
other agencies involved in SALT studied various
approaches to the problem of achieving an agreement.
7
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
The two heads of government and their advisers met
in Moscow from June 27 to July 3. They discussed
strategic arms limitations extensively and, as
Secretary Kissinger said, "with a frankness that would
have been considered inconceivable two years ago..."
The Secretary emphasized that the thoroughness of these
discussions removed the danger inherent in "misapprehen-
sions about each other's general intentions and general
perceptions of the nature of the strategic environment."
One benefit of the SALT negotiations to date which
has perhaps not been sufficiently recognized is a
clearer understanding within the U.S. government of
strategic issues derived from interagency discussions
leading up to U.S. negotiating positions and to nego-
tiating exchanges with the Soviets. It seems likely
that similar benefits accrued to the U.S.S.R. The
result can only be a plus for prospects of improved
strategic stability, as well as an improved overall
ll.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic relationship.
An important achievement in the summit explorations
was the decision that the focus of further negotiations
would. not be on a brief extension of the 1972 Interim
Agreement but on the negotiation of a ten-year agree-
ment, i.e. to 1985. The longer time,frame would permit
modernization programs for systems which had been
planned but not yet carried out to be included in the
calculations, and would therefore permit a more stable
negotiating basis.
The U.S. and Soviet Delegations to SALT resumed
their work in Geneva on September 18, with instructions
reflecting this new approach.
Agreement at Vladivostok
Arrangements were made for a meeting to be held
between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev
at Vladivostok in November. The President,
Secretary Kissinger and their advisers, and
General Secretary Brezhnev, Foreign Minister Gromyko
and their advisers engaged in very intensive talks on
the question of offensive strategic arms during their
two-day working meeting. The result of their dis-
cussions was agreement on the guidelines for further
negotiations leading to a ten-year agreement limiting
8
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Re1v'ase 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80BO1495RW100040021-7
offensive strategic arms under ceilings to be applicable
to both sides.
On the afternoon of the second day of their meet-
ing, the President and the General Secretary reached
agreement on guidelines for further negotiations, which
are embodied in an aide-memoire which has been submitted
to the appropriate congressional committees. The guide-
lines cover the following points:
** The new agreement will cover the period from
October 1977 through December 31, 1985;
** Each side will be entitled to have an aggregate
total. of 2400 delivery vehicles of strategic
arms;
** Both sides will be limited to no more than an
aggregate total of 1320 ICBMs and SLBMs equipped
with MIRVs;
** The new agreement will incorporate the relevant
provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26,
1972;
** The new agreement will include a provision for
further negotiations no later than 1980-81 on
the question of further limitations and possi-
ble reductions of strategic arms.
Each side has essential freedom to mix the composi-
tion of weapons systems making up. the aggregate total.
This means if either side should decide that some part
of its present mix of offensive weapons has become
vulnerable to attack, it may replace that.part of its
force with more survivable weapons, thereby enhancing
strategic stability.
The significance of the Vladivostok accord lies in
the fact that it provides for the first time an outline
for an agreement establishing equal,'clear ceilings on
strategic offensive arms. Equality in aggregate numbers
of strategic systems :has been a primary U.S. goal in
these negotiations.
Intelligence projections just-prior to the
9
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Aft
Approved Foelease 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
Vladivostok meeting forecast the probable total number
of Soviet missiles and the number armed with MIRVs at
higher levels than those agreed to, and the same pro-
jections placed Soviet capabilities with respect to
total numbers and to MIRVs at substantially higher
levels than those agreed to.
Agreed common ceilings will be conducive to future
negotiations on reductions, since they provide equal
levels as a point of departure. The Vladivostok accord
provides for future negotiations to take place on re-
ductions in the agreed ceilings.
Finally, the Vladivostok accord sets aside the
question of third-country nuclear forces and of
shorter-range nuclear delivery systems, thus removing
what had been a major obstacle to progress in SALT.
ACDA Participation
Development of SALT policy within the US government
is a process which engages the personal attention of the
President, senior officials of several agencies, and a
large number of staff members of those agencies. The
factors to be addressed include US strategic arms pro-
grams, assessment of Soviet strategic programs, and the
military and political considerations affecting not only
US and Soviet interests, but also the interests of our
Allies and the interests of the world community. Research,
analysis, and policy recommendations in the area of
strategic arms limitations are among the most important
functions of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
In coordination with the Departments of State and Defense
and the CIA, the Agency has thus been deeply involved in
the SALT negotiating process.
The Director of the Agency has a statutory responsi-
bility to act as the principal advisor to the President
and the Secretary of State on arms control matters. He
is a member of the Verification Panel, which is chaired
by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger in his capacity as Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs. This group
reviews the verification aspects and strategic implica-
tions of possible SALT limitations, making recommendations
to the full National Security Council (NSC) and to the
President. Dr. Ikle attends NSC meetings where key arms
10
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Ref se 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495ROq#100040021-7
control issues are presented for the President's decision.
In addition to his. participation in the NSC, the Director
makes direct recommendations to the Secretary of State.
Under the Special Assistant to the Director for SALT,
ACDA contributes to the Verification Panel Working Group
which prepares studies and analyses for the Verification
Panel and coordinates the work of all agencies in support
of SALT. Some 20 ACDA officers participate either on a
full-time or part-time basis in this work.
ACDAA also participates in the work of the Back-
stopping Committee which is chaired by ACDA's Special
Assistant for SALT or the Assistant Director for Nuclear
Weapons and Advanced Technology. This cc:.r:ittee supports
the work of the US SALT Delegation in GeIe:p, during
negotiating sessions, in implementation of Presidential
instructions and guidance for those negot.i tins.
The ABM Protocol
A concrete achievement of the June summit meeting
was agreement on a protocol to the 1972 Treaty on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems, which
further restricts the deployment of defensive missile
launchers by the United States and the Soviet Union to a
single ABM deployment area for each.
The 1972 ABM Treaty had allowed two sites for each
country - one for the protection of the capital city
and the other for an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) field, providing the latter was at least
1,300 kilometers from the capital city.
By last summer the Soviet Union had an ABM system
deployed around Moscow and the United States was near-
ing completion of an installation at Grand Forks, N.D.,
the site of a Minuteman III missile complex. Funds had
not been authorized to move ahead with a system around
Washington, and the Soviets, for their part, had taken
no action to build a second site near a missile field.
The new protocol is seen as important because it
eliminates the possibility of a decision by either
country to build the second site. As Dr. Ikle recalled,
in a press conference of July 3:
11
48-172 0 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved F-,Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01R000100040021-7
There have been concerns that such a
development towards two ABM areas would
provide the takeoff basis for wider com-
petition in ABM systems. Now this agree-
ment helps lay to rest these fears.
Under the terms of the Protocol, the Soviet Union
could decide in the future that it would prefer its one
ABM system to protect an ICBM complex rather than
Moscow. Similarly, the United States could exchange
the Grand Forks installation for a system around
Washington. This option can be exercised only once by
each country, however, and the Protocol requires advance
notification if this is to be done.
The Protocol is of unlimited duration, as is the
ABM Treaty itself, and will enter into force as soon as
both nations have exchanged instruments of ratification.
The Protocol was transmitted by the President to
the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification in
September. It is pending in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)
In keeping with its basic charter and regulations,
the Standing Consultative Commission held two sessions
during 1974. The principal result of the first of these
(April 2 - June 19) was the completion of work on the
formulation of agreed procedures governing replacement,
dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof,
for strategic offensive arms limited under the Interim
Agreement and for ABM systems and components in excess
of the limitations established by the ABM Treaty. Two
Protocols containing these agreed procedures were signed
by Secretary of State Kissinger and Soviet Foreign
Minister (romyko during the Moscow Summit Meeting of
June, 1974.
During the second 1974 session (September 24 -
October 28), SCC activity was focused on discussion of
procedures required for the replacement of ABM systems
and components permitted by the ABM Treaty, as modified
by the Protocol to that Treaty of July 3, 1974. Work
on this and other current SCC agenda items, including
12
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Rele 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R0QQ#00040021-7
U.S. proposals related to improved implementation and
increased viability of the "Measures" Agreement of
September 30, 1971, will continue at the next SCC session,
in early 1975. Mr. Sidney N. Graybeal of ACDA is the
U.S. Commissioner on the SCC,.and Agency personnel
contribute to the work of the Commission as advisors and
technical experts, both during preparation for and conduct
of the bilateral SCC sessions.
13
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING
Since 1963, when the treaty banning nuclear weapons
tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and outer space
entered into force, United States policy has called for
an extension of the prohibition to underground tests, if
such a ban could be adequately verified. Eleven years
of efforts toward this end, in the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and elsewhere, have not
been successful, primarily because of the verification
problem.
During the Spring session of the CCD, the U.S. and
Soviet delegations repeated their long-standing posi-
tions. The United States favors an adequately verified
comprehensive test ban but does not believe, despite
advances in seismic technology, that national means
alone give sufficient confidence that low-yield under-
ground nuclear weapons tests can be distinguished from
earthquakes. The United States therefore maintains that
effective monitoring of a comprehensive prohibition re-
quires some on-site inspection. The Soviet Union has
consistently refused to accept such inspection on its
territory in order to verify a CTB, maintaining that
national means of verification are adequate.
In view of the longstanding impasse, the United
States and the Soviet Union agreed in the Spring of 1974
to pursue on a bilateral basis the possibility of
further partial restrictions on nuclear weapons testing.
Review of U.S. Policy
An intense study was undertaken within the U.S.
Government to determine what options were open and the
implications of each. This interagency review was con-
ducted under the chairmanship of ACDA's Deputy Assistant
Director for Nuclear Weapons and Advanced Technology,
Dr. Robert W. Buchheim. Once a decision was made by the
President, a team of U.S. experts was sent to Moscow for
technical talks. The U.S. delegation was led by the
American Ambassador to the Soviet Union,
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 !4CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For ReT! se 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495R0QP100040021-7
Ambassador Walter Stoessel. ACDA's Assistant Director in
charge of the Nuclear Weapons and Advanced Technology
Bureau, Thomas D. Davies, and two of his staff served as
members of the delegation. The talks were held from
May 30 to June 26, and developed the framework for the.
discussions on this subject at the Summit.
Threshold Test Ban Treaty
A few days later, during the July Summit meeting,
President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which established a ban on
underground nuclear weapons tests having a yield above
150 kilotons (equival-ent to 150,000 tons of TNT).
The Treaty contains a commitment by;the parties not
to interfere with the national technical means of
verification of the other, and provides for regular con-
sultations to take care of any questions which might
arise relating to the implementation of its provisions.
The Treaty is accompanied by a Protocol setting
forth technical data to be exchanged to facilitate veri-
fication. It also.limits testing to designated test
sites; and the data to be exchanged includes information
on the geology of these testing areas. Geological data
-- including such factors as density of rock formation,
water saturation, and depth of the water table -- are
useful in verifying test yields because the seismic
signal produced by a given underground nuclear explosion
varies with these factors at the test location. After
an actual test has taken place, the geographic coordinates
of the test location are to be furnished to the other
party, to aid in verification. Other information
available to the United States will be used to cross
check the data provided.
Agreement to exchange such detailed data represents
a significant degree of direct cooperation by the United
States and the Soviet Union in the effort to control
nuclear armaments. For the first time, each will make
available to the other specific data relating to its
nuclear. weapons program. Verification is an essential
element of any arms control agreement. The Threshold
Test Bdn Treaty establishes important precedents for the
exchange of data between the Soviet Union and ourselves
Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 ,r+r.
Approved FoRelease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
to facilitate the verification process.
The true significance of the Treaty is that it is
a further step in the negotiating process to restrain
the U.S.-Soviet arms competition. Its restriction puts
an end to all megaton tests. It contains a commitment
by the parties to continue negotiations with a view
toward achieving cessation of all underground nuclear
weapons tests, and therefore may be viewed as a step
towards a comprehensive test ban, in keeping with our
obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty of
thres-
fh19thres-
and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
hold ban helps balance the obligations undertaken by the
nonnuclear weapon states in those two earlier treaties
and furthers the cause of nonproliferation.
For the purposes of the Treaty, all underground
nuclear explosions at specified test sites will be
considered nuclear weapon tests. Peaceful nuclear
explosions (PNEs), which may be conducted at locations
away from the specified test sites, are to be covered
by a separate agreement -- called for by Article III of
the Treaty -- to be negotiated between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Negotiations to implement
Article III began in Moscow on October 7. The talks
were recessed on November 6, and are expected to resume
in early 1975. A more detailed discussion of PNEs is
contained in the following chapter.
The Treaty is to enter into force upon exchange of
instruments of ratification by the two parties, with
the threshold limitation taking effect on March 31,
1976. The Treaty is to remain in force for a.period of
5 years, but each party has the right to withdraw upon
6 months' notice if it decides its "supreme interests"
have been jeopardized. The Treaty may be extended for
successive 5-year periods, unless it is replaced by a
comprehensive test ban.
The Agency has supported seismic research in the
development of mathematical techniques of pattern
recognition to discriminate between earthquakes and
nuclear explosions and the development of computerized
models that permit an evaluation of proposed seismic
networks to detect and identify underground nuclear
explosions. Design studies have also been undertaken
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : C1At-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For ReIse 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495RV100040021-7
for an improved unmanned seismic observatory. The Agency
has also theoretical studies on the characterization of
multiple seismic events and evaluations of the seismic
data obtained at short ranges for establishing the loca-
tion, depth and nature of seismic events.
Approved For Release 2005/11/237: CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved A"hRelease 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
One of the most pressing concerns of the Agency
is the danger inherent in the rapidly increasing spread
of nuclear technology and materials throughout the
world.
The Agency was primarily responsible for the Geneva-
based negotiations, lasting four years, that resulted in
the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), which entered into force in 1970. The Treaty com-
mits the signatories possessing nuclear weapons not to
share such weapons or the technology for making them with
any country which does not have them, and commits the
signatories who do not possess nuclear weapons not to
acquire them in any way. The Treaty also obligates the
parties to facilitate the "fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."
A. current and extremely important question to be
addressed by both nuclear and non-nuclear nations is how
nuclear technology may. be made available for peaceful-
uses while insuring against the spread of nuclear
weapons
The root of the problem is the inherent dual
nature of atomic energy. Like fire, it can be used
beneficially or destructively. One answer seems to lie
in further development and expansion of international
procedures for safeguarding nuclear materials and
facilities, to guard against diversio-a to military pur-
poses.
In the process of nuclear fission of uranium --
the element used in reactors to generate electric
power -- plutonium is produced as a byproduct. Plu-
tonium isa man-made element; it is not found in
nature. It is also a fissionable material and can be
used to fuel a reactor, just as the original uranium
was used. The danger lies in the fact that plutonium
can also be used for bombs. It must by separated from
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 :A-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Rase 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495R0100040021-7
the uranium, but this can be done. by a chemical process
which is simpler and less expensive than producing
highly enriched uranium, the principal alternative
material for making nuclear explosives. There are now
almost 100 reactors in non-nuclear weapon countries in
the world which produce electricity -- and plutonium.
In the next few years, as the world's energy require-
ments increase, this figure is expected to more than
double.
Safeguards
The Nonproliferation Treaty stipulates that non-
nuclear parties must conclude safeguards agreements
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The IAEA, with headquarters in Vienna, was established
under the auspices of the United Nations as an out-
growth of the Atoms-for-Peace proposal made by
President Eisenhower in 1953. It is financed by its
106 member nations. The U.S. contribution for 1974
was $7.4 million. The staff numbers about 1,000 in-
cluding.scientists and technicians who devise and
implement safeguards techniques and inspections.
IAEA inspectors face problems far more difficult
than those routinely encountered by domestic safe-
guards inspectors. IAEA safeguards must insure the
highest degree of confidence that peaceful nuclear
activities are in accordance with agreements, while at
the same time taking into consideration sensitivities
relating to national sovereignty. The United States,
through the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and
the Atomic Energy Commission, has given substantial
assistance to the IAEA in its efforts to work out pro-
cedures which are both effective and nonintrusive.
ACDA Research
During 1974, the Agency continued its work on
research and development of safeguards and equipment.
The work falls into four main categories:
1. The development of portable measuring instruments.
Portable instrumentation has been designed and
19
4a-Z o Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved Fd elease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
built by ACDA contractors which permits a safeguards
inspector to measure the amounts of uranium and plutonium
which he is required to inventory without destroying the
container in which the fuel is sealed. These non-
destructive techniques permit measurement of both the
gamma rays from uranium and the neutrons emitted during
the spontaneous fission of plutonium.
2. The development of tamper-resistant, unattended safe-
guards surveillance instrumentation.
ACDA has worked with the Canadian Government to
sponsor design, building, installing, and testing of
unattended tamper-resistant instrumentation to safeguard
reactors which are continuously refuelled while operating
-- a class of reactors which presents a number of
challenging safeguards problems. Additional secure safe-
guards surveillance systems have been designed and built
by ACDA for enrichment plants and for plants which re-
cover uranium and plutonium from spent reactor fuel.
't'his equipment includes secure cameras for optical
surveillance, neutron power monitors for reactors, and
instruments to count and monitor the movement of spent
reactor fuel elements.
3. The development of safeguards seals.
Seals can be very useful in safeguards to assure
inspectors that during their absence doors, vaults and
containers of various types have not been opened. These
include reactors, bottles of plutonium, cylinders of
uranium, and the special containers used to protect
tamper-resistant instruments. ACDA contractors have
developed a seal using a glass or plastic fiber optic
bundle. The random pattern of the ends of the many
fibers in these bundles provide a unique and unrepro-
ducible means of identification.
4. The development of advanced techniques for verify-
ing the plutonium production of reactors.
The relative amounts of the various plutonium and
uranium isotopes present in reactor fuel are dependent
on the nuclear processes occurring in the reactor.
Measurement of these quantities can assist inspectors
20
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : C
IA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Rase 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495W0100040021-7
in verifying the origin and history of the fuel and the
amount of plutonium which was produced in a reactor and
which thus must be accounted for.
In order to expand further the Agency's initiatives
in the field of physical safeguards and to stimulate
outside participation in research and development, the
Agency published a notice in the Commerce Business Daily
in mid-November inviting "new, creative, imaginative and
innovative ideas and programs for the improvement of
and/or the creation of safeguards instrumentation,
devices and techniques that can be used by the IAEA."
To date, 34 firms have expressed an interest and re-
quested additional information.
Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNEs)
The explosion, in May of 1974, of a nuclear device
by India -- which is not a signatory to the Nonprolifer-
ation Treaty -- drew new attention to the relationship
of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the
problem of nuclear proliferation.
The Nonproliferation Treaty contains an article
which obligates its parties "to take appropriate
measures to ensure that, ...under appropriate inter-
national observation and through appropriate international
procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applica-
tions of nuclear explosions will be made available to
non-Nuclear-Weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-
discriminatory basis and that the charge to such states
for the explosive devices will be as low as possible and
exclude any charge for research and development."
This article was based on a recognition that acquir-
ing anuclear explosive capability for peaceful purposes
is equivalent to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
At the same time it is intended to insure the non-
discriminatory availability of any benefits that may
accrue from. the peaceful use of nuclear explosives.
The United States -- as a potential supplier of
nuclear explosive devices for peaceful applications that
might prove useful in the future -- has participated in
efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency to
Approved For Release 2005/11/231 CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved Fo'elease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B0149 8000100040021-7
prepare for assistance of this kind. The IAEA has taken
steps to facilitate the exchange of information and to
anticipate the needs for such services. The IAEA Board
of Governors has approved initial procedures for IAEA
response to requests from members for PNE, services, has
developed guidelines for international observation in
connection with such services, and has authorized the
Director General "to establish within the Secretariat,
at a suitable time, a separate organizational unit for
implementing an international service for nuclear explo-
sions for peaceful purposes under appropriate inter-
national control."
Thus far, PNEs have not proved to be the ideal way
-- as compared to conventional methods -- for carrying
out engineering projects which many had hoped for. Re-
search is continuing in this field, however -- including
the examination of non-nuclear alternatives.
Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, (then) Chairman of the AEC, told
the 18th General Conference of the IAEA at Vienna on
September 17:
I would like to emphasize the need for in-
depth studies to establish the feasibility
and desirability of using peaceful nuclear
explosions in any project under considera-
tion. The United States stands ready to
contribute to the planning and performance
of such feasibility studies. Where these
studies demonstrate the practicability of
conducting a peaceful nuclear explosion
project consistent with the provisions of
pertinent treaties or agreements, we are
prepared to meet our obligations under
Article V of the NPT to provide PNE serv-
ices at prices that will exclude any
charges for research and development.
An example of ACDA external research in this field
is a study of the rate at which the use of PNEs is likely
to develop, since this question will have obvious sig-
nificance for the relationship of PNEs with arms control
agreements. The study will examine the technical, econ-
omic and regulatory variables affecting PNE activity in
22
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Rase 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495PZ0100040021-7
the 1980s. It is being conducted by the Gulf Universities
Research Consortium, a non-profit group with close ties
with experts in the oil, gas, and minerals industry. They
are approaching the problem essentially from the view-
point of potential user industries, and are making
extensive use of petroleum and chemical engineers to
assess the potential for use of PNEs in a wide variety of
underground engineering activities.
Worldwide concern over the nuclear proliferation
danger was reflected in the debate in the UN General
Assembly this fall. Among the Resolutions discussed was
one calling for examination of the PNE question in the
CCD, the IAEA, and the NPT Review Conference scheduled
for 1975. The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 91 to
3, with 11 abstentions. In a statement to the Assembly
advising that the United States would vote affirmatively,
Ambassador Martin elaborated on the U.S. view of the
relationship between nuclear explosions for peaceful pur-
poses and those for testing weapons:
For countries in the early stage. of
.developing a nuclear explosive capability,
we cannot see how it would be possible to
develop such a capability for peaceful
purposes without in the process acquiring
a device which could be used as a nuclear
weapon. In the case of advanced nuclear-
weapon States, however, it may be possible,
under certain conditions, to develop
criteria that would be adequate to ensure
that nuclear explosions for peaceful pur-
poses are not used to further nuclear-weapon
development. But, I should add, if such
criteria could be developed they would not
be applicable to the problem posed by the
development of a nuclear explosive capability
by a nonnuclear-weapon State.
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty -- signed during the
1974 U.S.-Soviet summit meeting -- in addition to placing
an upper limit of 150 kilotons yield on nuclear weapons
tests, calls for the negotiation of a separate agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union governing
PNEs, and in accordance with this agreement, negotiations
23
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved Fd elease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B014 8000100040021-7
were begun in Moscow. The Agency chairs the.inter-
agency Backstopping Committee on the Test Ban. The
basic purpose of these discussions is to seek agreement
on criteria for assuring that nuclear explosions said
to be "peaceful" will not be used for military purposes.
Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference
The Nonproliferation Treaty provides that 5 years
after entry into force, i.e. in May 1975, a conference
shall be held in Geneva to review the operations of
the treaty to see if its purposes and provisions are
being realized. By the end of 1974, the Treaty had
been signed by 106 countries, 83 of which had completed
the process of ratification and thus become parties.
During the 1973 session of the U.N. General Assembly,
an agreement was reached among treaty parties to form a
preparatory committee to lay the groundwork for the
Review Conference. Under the formula devised for member-
ship, participants -- in addition to being parties to the
NPT -- are members of the I?ard of Governors of the IAEA
or are members of the CCD.-
The U.S. Delegation was led by ACDA Deputy Director
J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr.; he was assisted by Charles N.
Van Doren, a senior staff member of the International Re-
lations Bureau who has been a specialist on the NPT
since the early 1960's.
The Preparatory Committee held two meetings in
Geneva during 1974. The first, in April, was mainly con-
cerned with procedural matters, such as working
languages, records, decision making, and entitlement to
attend and to address the sessions. An informal and
open-ended working group was established to analyze and
summarize the factors involved in financing the Review
Conference.
'nations now eligible under the formula are Australia,
Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Iraq, Lebanon,
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, the Phillipines,
Poland, Romania, Sudan, Sweden, the Soviet Union, Thailand,
the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, and
Yugoslavia.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : 24A-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Rase 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495RQp0100040021-7
Following the April meeting, the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, the IAEA, and the Agency on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL)
were asked to prepare background papers on questions
bearing on the Review Conference. These documents were
received and commented on during the second session,
held from August 26 to September 6. In general, they
were found to be of great value for the anticipated work
of the Review Conference, and were placed on the agenda
for the third and final meeting of the Preparatory Com-
mittee, to be held from February 3 to 14, 1975. The
Review Conference itself, which is expected to last for
up to four weeks, will be convened on May 5.
The Secretary-General of the U.N. submitted four
working papers relating to fulfillment of the Treaty's
purposes -- notably with regard to: The preambular
paragraph in the NPT relating to a comprehensive nuclear
test ban; Articles I and II, dealing with nontransfer
and nonacquisition of nuclear weapons and technology;
Articles IV and V, relating to the promotion of peaceful
uses of nuclear energy and to peaceful nuclear explosions;
and Article VI, the commitment to negotiate toward the
cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarma-
ment.
The working papers prepared by the IAEA incorporate
analytical and technical reports on the IAEA's activities
under Article III, the safeguards article; Article IV,
peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and Article V, peaceful
nuclear explosions.
OPANAL's paper is a report on the implementation of
the Treaty of Tlatelolco (establishing a Latin American
nuclear-free zone), and contains comments relating to Ar-
ticle VII of the NPT. (Article VII guarantees the right
of groups to conclude regional treaties-banning nuclear
weapons.)
These documents reflect some of the principal ques-
tions to.be addressed in assessing the effectiveness of
the NPT.
Considering the nuclear proliferation problem to be
a matter of paramount concern and importance, ACDA has
devoted major efforts to dealing with it. The Agency
25
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved F elease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495k000100040021-7
chairs a Nonproliferation Backstopping Committee that
coordinates inter agency positions on negotiations and
conferences, and is a member of a new Verification
Panel Working Group on Nonproliferation, chaired by
the NSC staff, which considers major policy issues in
the field. Within ACDA, a new Nonproliferation Staff
has been established in the International Relations
Bureau. Devoting full time to the subject, it also
draws on the expertise available in other bureaus and
offices of the Agency, and works closely with those
engaged in discussions at the UNGA and the CCD.
Approved For Release 2005/11/2326CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Rase 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495O100040021-7
MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS
Negotiations continued in Vienna between NATO and
Warsaw Pact nations on the "Mutual Reduction of Forces
and Associated Measures in Central Europe." The NATO
nations directly participating in the conference are
Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the
United States. Warsaw Pact participants are
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland
and the U.S.S.R. Seven other nations are participating
with special status: Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway,
Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania. Although Hungary is
participating with special status, the Allies have re-
served the right to raise the issue of Hungary's
participation in the negotiations or in any agreement
at some future date.
During the preparatory talks in 1973, both sides
agreed that the central objective of the negotiations
should be to contribute to a more stable relationship
and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe
without diminishing the security of any party to the
negotiations. In the fall of 1973, both East and West
put forward proposals as to how these objectives might
be achieved. The three negotiating sessions held in
1974 (January-April; May-July; September-December) have
permitted each side to explore thoroughly the other's
views.
In the Western view, any agreement must take into
account major disparities favoring the Warsaw Pact in
geography, manpower and the character of opposing
forces. Within the defined reductions area agreed to
by both sides, NATO's ground forces at present total
777,000 men (193,000 of them US) with 6,000 tanks, as
against 925,000 ground troops (460,000 Soviet) and
15,500 tanks for the Warsaw Pact. The West believes
that it is the disparity in conventional forces that
poses the principal military threat and hence becomes
a source of tension in Central Europe and, consequent-
ly, that a more stable relationship should be achieved
27
'48_172 0 -Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved Foftelease 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
only by eliminating the imbalance. For this reason, the
NATO participants believe that the negotiations should
focus on ground forces (which in contrast to air forces,
do not lend themselves to rapid redeployment) and aim at
approximate parity between the forces of the two sides.
Accordingly, the Allies have proposed to the East
that the final outcome of reductions should be a common
ceiling on the overall ground manpower of each side.
This would be achieved in two phases of reductions, the
details of which would be agreed upon in two phases of
negotiation. In the first phase, there would be signifi-
cant reductions in U.S. and Soviet ground force manpower,
as well as in Soviet tanks. During the second phase,
there would be further reductions leading to the common
ceiling. On the Western side, these second-phase reduc-
tions would focus on the forces of Western direct
participants other than the United States.
The West believes it is essential that the US and
USSR, as the leading military powers on each side,
should make the first reductions in order to create the
necessary climate of confidence which will permit other
participants to make reductions of their own.
In contrast, Eastern negotiators have proposed that
all direct participants should reduce their forces from
the outset by equal numbers or equal percentages. All
types of forces -- ground, air and nuclear -- would be
included in the reductions. Such an agreement is un-
acceptable to the West since it takes no account of the
existing disparity in ground forces and would not only
enshrine the imbalance in an international treaty but
increase the force ratio in Europe to the East's
advantage.
U.S. Participation
Ambassador Stanley Resor has been head of the U.S.
MBFR Delegation since the beginning of the talks. The
Agency representative on the delegation has been,
successively, Timothy Stanley, Thomas J. Hirschfeld and
John Lehman. In addition, staff officers serve as
advisers to the delegation.
28
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Reuse 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80BO1495RW100040021-7
Subject to coordination with our NATO allies, MBFR
negotiating positions are determined by the President
and the National Security Council on the basis of
recommendations made by the Verification Panel. The
Panel is chaired by Dr. Henry Kissinger in his capacity
of Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.
Day-to-day guidance and support to the U.S. Delega-
tion in Vienna is provided by the Interagency MBFR
Coordinating Committee, which is chaired by the Agency's
Assistant Director for International Relat'ons. The
Director's Special Assistant for MBFR also represents
the Agency on the Committee.
ACDA Research
The Agency's research programs in support of the
MBFR negotiations have included in-house ACDA studies,
ACDA participation in inter-agency studies, and contract
research. While in 1973, the bulk of ACDA's MBFR related
research was oriented toward development of the Western
MBFR proposal, this year's research has concentrated on
refinement of certain aspects of the Alliance proposal
and examination of the proposals put forth by the Warsaw
Pact nations.
Considerable attention was devoted to developing the
specifics of "stabilizing measures" -- i.e., measures
designed to reinforce stability in the area of reductions
by regulating troop movements and exercises. Such
military activities, after reductions, should be con-
ducted so as to avoid practices that might be considered
threatening or be misinterpreted by the other side. De-
tailed proposals applicable to the conduct of major
military exercises and to troops introduced into the
reductions area for exercise or rotation purposes were
developed. Particular attention was given to how these
measures would contribute to warning of an impending
attack.
Studies relating to verification examined the con-
tributions which both national means of verification and
negotiated inspection measures might make to confidence
in compliance with an MBFR agreement. Alternative ways
Approved For Release 2005/11/ : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Aft,
Approved F6P'Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
of using inspectors and inspection equipment in the re-
ductions area were examined with a view towards making
specific recommendations to the Alliance.
Warsaw Pact proposals embodied a number of
features not contained in Alliance proposals. In order
to provide the Alliance and the U.S. Delegation with
considered responses, Warsaw Pact positions on a number
of issues, such as coverage of forces, have been sub-
jected to rigorous political and military analysis.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 4CCIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For R lease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495 00100040021-7
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE
The Agency has pursued international agreements to
prohibit certain specialized weapons systems from the
arsenals of nations, or at least restrict their use in
warfare, because of the excessive violence they do to
man and his environment. These efforts, in coordina-
tion with other federal agencies, have resulted in
positive steps being taken by the U.S. Government during
the past year.
Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention
On January 22, 1975, President Ford signed
the
in-
struments of ratification of the Geneva Protocol
of
1925
and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972.
Senate had voted unanimously to give its consent
The
to
ratification on December 16, 1974.
The Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the use
in war of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of
bacteriological methods of warfare," was sent to the
Senate by the Administration in 1970, for the second time
in its long history. (Though originally-an American
initiative, the Protocol succumbed to a strong lobbying
effort when submitted to the Senate in 1926, and Senate
action on it was not completed.)
The Biological Weapons Convention is a commitment by
the Parties "never in any circumstances to develop, pro-
duce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain"
biological weapons. It will enter into force when it has
been ratified by the three depositary governments -- the
United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. --
and at least 19 other countries. Thirty-eight of the 110
nations that have signed the Convention have ratified, so
that only ratification by depositaries is still required.
Ratification of both these measures had been held in
abeyance because of the Committee's disagreement with the
Administration's interpretation as to whether the Proto-
col banned the use of herbicides and chemical riot
31
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Alt~
Approved Forelease 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
control agents.
In response to the Committee's request, the Execu-
tive Branch undertook a comprehensive review of this
Legal interpretation and analyzed possible alternatives
for resolving differences of opinion on the scope of the
Geneva Protocol. The Agency contributed to an evaluation
of the military utility of riot control agents and
herbicides by presenting alternative approaches that would
accomplish arms control objectives.
The Director of the Agency testified before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on December 10, in
support of ratification of both the Geneva Protocol of
1.925 and the Biological Weapons Convention. Dr. Ikle ad-
vised the Committee that the President was prepared to
renounce as a matter of national policy:
(1) first use of herbicides in war except use, under
regulations applicable to their ddmestic use,
for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and
installations or around their immediate defen-
sive perimeters,
(2) first use of riot control agents in war except
in defensive military modes to save lives such
as:
(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control
circumstances to include controlling riot-
ing prisoners of war. This exception would
permit use of riot control agents in riot
situations in areas under direct and
distinct U.S. military control;
(b) Use of riot control agents in situations
where civilian casualties can be reduced or
avoided. This use would be restricted to
situations in which civilians are used to
mask or screen attacks;
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue mis-
sions. The use of riot control agents
would be permissible in the recovery of
remotely isolated personnel such as downed
aircrews (and passengers).
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 2CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495 00100040021-7
(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon
areas outside the combat zone to protect
convoys from civil disturbances, terror-
ists and paramilitary organizations.
Dr. Ikle further advised that Presidential approval in
advance would be required even for those uses of riot
control agents or chemical herbicides in war as listed
above.
In his testimony, Dr. Ikle pointed out that veri-
fication of compliance with the Biological Weapons
Convention in countries with relatively closed societies
is difficult, particularly the prohibition on.develop-
ment of these weapons. Nevertheless, he argued that it
is in the net interest of the United States to become a
Party to this Convention for three reasons: the
military utility of these weapons is dubious at best;
biological weapons are regarded internationally with
.particular repugnance from a moral point of view; and
widespread adherence to the Convention can help dis-
courage misguided competition in biological weapons.
In urging ratification Dr. Ikle emphasized, how-
ever, that the limited verification of this Convention
should not be construed as a precedent for other arms
limitation agreements where these special conditions
would.not obtain.
Chemical Warfare
The United States is committed to the objective of
effective prohibition of chemical weapons and is con-
tinuing negotiations at the CCD with a view to reaching
early agreement on effective measures.
During the summer session of the CCD an informal.
meeting with technical experts was held from July 17-22
in an effort to clarify some of the technical issues
involved in establishing effective restraints. Twenty-
two experts from 13 countries attended the four-day
meeting. The.United States was represented by two
experts from ACDA and one from DOD.
The principal topics discussed were (a) definition
33
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 CIA RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO149 R5 000100040021-7
of chemical warfare agents, (b) scope of CW.limitations,
(c) criteria for defining the scope of the prohibitions,
and (d) verification. An encouraging degree of
similarity was apparent in the views put forward by the
experts on some topics, such as criteria.for expressing
the scope . of. limitations.
The problems involved in verification were given
particular attention at the meeting, especially those
problems related to destruction of stockpiles.. The US
experts pointed out that certain technical methods of
inspection could provide a high degree of assurance that
destruction was being carried out. However, they also
noted the difficulty in verifying that no stocks had
been hidden.
Nonetheless, ACDA and the other agencies within the
Executive Branch involved in disarmament questions are
attempting to overcome the difficulties involved in
achieving effective restraints. The question.of possible
limits on chemical weapons was subjected to intensive
study in 1974-by an interagency panel which included an
ACDA representative.
In response to Congressional invitations, ACDA
officials testified before several Committees on the arms
control implications of'a US Army proposal to establish a
production facility for a binary . nerve. gas artillery
munition. This new type of chemical munition utilizes
two chemical components, neither,of which is supertoxic.
The two components are placed in compartments in the
artillery shell, separated by a membrane. As the
artillery shell is fired, the membrane is broken and the
two chemicals are mixed together, becoming a lethal agent.
The Agency. expressed its concern that moving ahead with
binary production at this time could make it'more
difficult to achieve international restraints on chemical
weapons. Both the House and Senate later'decided to deny
approval of the Army request for FY 1975 funds for binary
poison .gas production facilities.
Environmental Warfare
The Congress and the Executive Branch pursued
parallel. objectives in 1974 towards the control of
Approved For Release 2005/1q123 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Re `se 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495ROQW00040021-7
environmental modification techniques that might be used
for military purposes. House Resolutions 116 and 329,
of the lst session of the 93rd Congress, express the
sense of the House of Representatives that the U.S.
Government should seek agreement with other governments
on the prohibition of research, experimentation, or use
of weather modification activity as a weapon of war.
During the Summit meeting in July, the President
and General Secretary Brezhnev signed a joint statement
"advocating the most effective measures possible to
overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modi-
fication techniques for military purposes," and agreeing
to hold a meeting of U.S. and Soviet representatives for
the purpose of exploring the problem. The joint state-
ment recognizes that the scientific and technical
advances in this area may open possibilities for military
use and that "such use could have wide-spread long-
lasting, and severe effects harmful to human welfare."
ACDA Assistant Director Thomas D. Davies testified
on this subject before the House Subcommittee on Inter-
national Organizations and Movements of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs during its September hearings on House
Resolutions 116 and 329.. He advised the Subcommittee
that the objectives of the House Resolutions were essen-
tially consistent with the aims of the Summit joint
statement.
A meeting was held in Moscow during the first week
in November, in implementation of the Summit agreement.
Assistant Director Davies headed the American group of
experts; Academician E. K. Fedorov, together with Soviet
experts, represented the USSR.
In a joint communique issued at the conclusion of
the November meeting, the delegations expressed satis-
faction with the exchange of opinions and agreed to meet
again in Washington after a working interval. The next
meeting is expected to begin in early 1975.
In a related but separate move, the USSR Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, proposed that an
item be placed on the agenda of the fall session of the
UN General Assembly on the "Prohibition of action to
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
influence the environment and climate for military and
other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of
international security, human wellbeing and health."
There was almost unanimous support in the UN General
Assembly that the question of environmental modification
should be referred to the CCD for consideration. The US,
however, believed that the reference in the Soviet
resolution to the need to conclude "an appropriate inter-
national convention" prejudged the question. of whether
"the most effective measures possible to overcome the
dangers of the use of environmental modification tech-
niques for military purposes"--the formulation employed
in the joint US-Soviet statement on this subject at the
.July 1973 sammit--would most appropriately take the form
of a single international treaty.
In a statement to the First Committee, Amb. Martin
presented the viewpoint of the United States as follows:
"We believe that at this stages oof or fiour etplorationeof
the problem what is needed
issues involved in possible restrictions. In our
view, we must define the problem and formulate the
;Measures which will effectively deal with it before
we can consider the advisability of adopting an
international instrument on the subject."
Amb. Martin pledged active U.S. participation in
the CCD and elsewhere "not only [to' bring about new
understanding but also to develop effective measures to
deal with the serious problem of environmental warfare."
The Agency will be primarily responsible for pre-
paring the U.S. Delegation position papers and state-
ments o1a this question for the 1975 session of the CCD.
The Agency's interest in the problem of environ-
mental changes for military purposes goes back a number
or' years. Nuclear Weapons and Advanced Technology Bureau
staff monitor scientific advances in this field in
journals and by attending conferences and seminars. ACDA
is represented on the Interdepartmental Committee for
Atmospheric Sciences, which is under the parent Federal
Council for Science and Technology.
Approved For Release 2005/1W3: CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Rtt'ease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B014950100040021-7
Humanitarian Laws of Warfare
International humanitarian law consists for the most
part of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the
Protection of War Victims, to which the United States is
a party. International attention has focused for several
years on the need to draft new rules to supplement the
existing conventions. The first session of the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
was held in Geneva from February 20 to March 29, under the
auspices of the International Red Cross. Its purpose was
to review two Protocols drafted by the International Con-
ference of the Red Cross, one on International Armed Con-
flicts and the other on Non-International Armed Conflicts.
Representatives of 125 nations participated in the
Conference. The U.S. Delegation was headed by Mr. George
H. Aldrich, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State. A
representative from the Agency's Office of General
Counsel was a member of the delegation.
The issue of wars of national liberation overshadowed
all other issues, and accounted for the fact that little
progress was made. A second session of the diplomatic
conference will be convened in 1975.
A related conference, convened by the I.C.R.C., was
held in Lucerne from September 24 to October 18. Experts
from the United States and 48 other countries, as well as
representatives of some national liberation movements, the
U.N. Secretary General, and the World Health Organization
attended. Two technical experts from ACDA were members of
the U.S. delegation. The discussions, which were primari-
ly of a technical nature, and intended to define the scope
of the problems, centered on developing data for sub-
sequent consideration of possible prohibitions or restric-
tions on the use of conventional weapons which may cause
unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. The
agenda included discussions of such specialized weapons as
incendiary, blast and fragmentation, delayed action, and
new weapons which may be developed. It is expected that
another such conference of government experts will be held
late in 1975.
37
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For lease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND THE ARMS TRADE
ACDA has continued to concern itself with the issues
of military expenditures and the international arms trade.
One of the products of research and analysis in the sub-
ject areas was the publication, World Military Expenditures
and Arms Trade 1963-1973, prepared for tiotrlbun during
the year. This publication provides estimates of the
military expenditures, gross national product (GNP),
population, armed forces, and arms trade of 136 countries
over an eleven year time span. These data, which must be
regarded as approximate, indicate that world military
expenditures, measured in constant 1972 dollars, rose from
about $197 billion in 1963 to about $241 billion in 1973.
During this same period the value of international arms
exports in constant 1972 dollars increased from about $4.4
billion to an estimated $8.7 billion in 1973.
Military Expenditures
The Agency also examined the economic implications of
certain arms control agreements as well as the potential
economic impact of possible arms control arrangements. A
contract study completed for the Agency as a follow-on to
.in earlier study indicated that the "savings" in U.S.
Military outlays resulting from the SALT I ABM treaty were
on the order of $6.5 billion, or $700 million higher than
originally estimated. This figure represents the differ-
ence between ABM costs calculated with the SALT ABM treaty
and without it -- assuming that wit out it the U.S. would
have gone an to a four-site deployment. The new study
found that the three localities most adversely affected by
,,he ABM treaty subsequently made a significant recovery,
owing in large measure to energetic local efforts and to
programs of assistance by the Federal Government. Actions
proposed by the interagency Economic Adjustment Committee,
of which ACDA is a member, helped to mitigate the effects
of contract cancellations.
The Agency also sponsored contract research on U.S.
mobilization problems in an arms control environment.
38
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Ffease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01490100040021-7
Effort was devoted during the year to a consideration
of certain technical aspects of international military
expenditure limitations. The most important problems
addressed dealt with definition of the scope and content
of military budgets, valuation of resources employed in
the military sector, techniques for international com-
parisons of military expenditures, and alternative
approaches to the verification of agreements. In support
of this work the Agency continued contract 'research on the
measurement of price changes of military expenditures and
technical aspects of military expenditure limitations.
Of specific concern with respect to military expendi-
ture limitations was the UNGA request at its 2194th
plenary meeting on December 7, 1973, that all Governments
extend cooperation in the development of a technical study
on the "reduction of the military budgets of the States
permanent members of the Security Council, which should
also cover other States with a major economic and ,-nilitary
potential, and on the utilization of a part of the funds
thus saved to provide international assistance to develop-
ing countries."
ACDA provided technical assistance to the United
States private expert who worked with experts from ten
other countries at meetings in Geneva during the summer of
1974 in response to the UNGA request. Such technical
issues as the nature of military expenditures to be reduced,
the effect of military expenditure reductions on military
force posture and international security, and the pro-
cedures for ensuring confidence in. the equitable implementa-
tion of an agreement were developed for the technical study,
which was submitted to the UNGA in the .fall of 1974.
Other research interests centered on the arms control
implications of intensified global economic and financial
problems caused by critical resource imbalances and oil
price increases.
Arms Trade
With respect to the international arms trade, ACDA
has continued to examine the feasibility of possible inter-
national arrangements among arms supplier and/or recipient
states to control transfers of conventional arms and
39
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Awk Aft
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
production technology.
At the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in
Geneva the U.S. Delegation again urged consideration of
restraints on conventional arms. In April 1974,
lmbassador Martin stated:
My delegation therefore believes it is timely
to begin to study seriously the question of
restraints on conventional weapons in the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
In the past my delegation has submitted for
the consideration of the Committee a number
of principles and guidelines related to re-
straints on conventional weapons. We would
welcome the comments and views of others on
this subject. Further consideration by the
Committee could eventually result in effec-
tive controls over these weapons to the
general benefit.
In order to obtain the views of experts outside the
Agency on possible approaches to international controls
over arms transfers, the Agency, in early 1974,
sponsored a seminar on conventional arms control, a
large portion of which was devoted to the arms transfer
problem. The seminar included experts from the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the government as well
as from outside of government.
ACDA has continued to participate with other de-
partments and agencies in the formulation and implemen-
tation of U.S. arms supply policy. Through its
participation the Agency seeks to insure that arms control
considerations are fully taken into account. In setting
forth its views ACDA focuses its attention on the degree
to which proposed transfers might (1) contribute to an
arms race, (2) increase the possibility of outbreak or
escalation of conflict, (3) prejudice the development of
bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements, or
(4) result in an unnecessary diversion of resources from
economic and social development.
The Agency is represented on the interagency Security
Assistance Program Review Committee, which advises and
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 4CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved Forlease 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B0149GR000100040021-7
assists the Secretary of State in the development of
security assistance annual programs and multi-year plans.
ACDA is also a participant in the interagency study of
U.S. arms transfer policy initiated by the Under Secre-
tary of State for Security Assistance in late 1974.
On a day-to-day basis the Agency has participated
with other agencies in studies of U.S. arms supply policy
toward particular areas, and has given advisory opinions
on issues involving the transfer of conventional arms and
production technology as they have arisen.
Along with other agencies of the executive branch,
ACDA provided information on arms sales policies and pro-
grams for use in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee
staff study.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 1 CIA-RDP80B0l495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B0149510100040021-7
PUBLIC INFORMATION
In August, after careful examination of the require-
ments for an active public affairs program, the Director
ordered that the staff and operations of the Office of
Public Affairs be expanded One organizational change
was the transfer of the Agency's historical unit. This
move will make it possible to broaden the use of the
historical staff's product, not only in the field of
scholarship but in public affairs generally.
This upgrading of the public affairs function was
consonant with the recommendations received from Congress
that a greater percentage of the Agency's resources be
devoted to the dissemination of information on arms con-
trol matters to the general public.
The Office of Public Affairs prepares guidance on
arms control questions for the White House, the Secretary
of State, and the State Department press spokesman.. In
addition, the Office maintains day-to-day contact with
the Washington press corps, domestic and foreign. During
the year the Director of ACDA has many times been inter-
viewed by both the written press and radio and tele-
vision, in addition to delivering four major addresses.
While its staff is small, it has been the policy of
the Agency in the past to honor all requests for speakers
when possible. The Agency also conducts briefings for
visiting groups at its offices in the Department of State
building.
An initiative taken to strengthen the Agency's role
in keeping the public informed is a new program of
liaison with the academic community. Staff members visit
on campuses and assist departments and faculties in
organizing arms control course studies, seminars, simula-
tions, lectures, and research projects.
The Agency provides scholars, students, the press
and the general public with information through its
publications program. In addition to its annual reports
to the Congress, ACDA publications include the following
Approved For Release 2005/11/2$ CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For ReIfb se 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495ROO0 00040021-7
items in print or under preparation:
Current Negotiations on Arms Limitations
status -- as o Spring 1974 -- o negotiations
in progress)
Arms Control and Disarmament A reements
a .istory'negotiations of all mo ern
arms control agreements, together with
texts)
Arms Control and National Security.
(a basic guide outlining contemporary arms con-
trol concepts and issues)
World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade
1963-1973
(a statistical summary)
SALT Lexicon
a glossary of strategic arms terms)
The Danger of Nuclear Proliferation
(a discussion o various aspects o the rela-
tionship of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes and military use)
Perspectives on Nuclear War
~a1,e
update analysis oof blast, heat, radiation,
electromagnetic and other effects of nuclear
explosions)
Documents on Disarmament
can annua series o selected statements,
proposals, and documents of both U.S. and
foreign origin)
Publications and research reports are sent to ACDA
depository libraries, which number 189 university and
public libraries. See Appendix V.
'The Agency has a statutory responsibility for pro-
viding public affairs guidance to USIA. This is done
on a continuing basis, parallel to the guidance given
to the Department. of State spokesman for his daily
43
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 AOW
Approved Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
briefings. It also takes the form of articles prepared
for the USIA's overnight wireless file, and materials
con-
prepared for the Voice of America. Recently,
vened a special panel to draw up a series of recommenda-
tions for USIA policy on arms control.
44
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved ForV*Iease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B0149500100040021-7
AGENCY OPERATIONS
The Agency is one of the smallest in the U.S. Govern-.
ment. Its personnel, totalling 214, are essentially
specialized, representing expertise in the military,
diplomatic, legal, scientific, and technical fields. The
Agency is organized along functional lines, with major
responsibilities divided between support of on-going
ne-rotiations and long-range planning.
The Agency's program responsibilities are carried
out primarily through four bureaus, each of which is
headed by an Assistant Director of the Agency appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. These are the Plans and Analysis Bureau, the
International Relations Bureau, the Military and Economic
Affairs Bureau, and the Nuclear Weapons and Advanced
Technology Bureau. Within the range of its program re-
sponsibility, each Bureau is responsible for generating
policy proposals. Other organizational units are the
Office of the General Counsel, the Office of Administra-
tion, and the Office of Public Affairs. In addition, the
Special Assistant to the Director and Executive Secretary
of ACDA, the Special Assistants for SALT and MBFR, the
Counselor, and other officers within the Office of the
Director furnish staff assistance to the Director and
Deputy Director, or policy guidance within their spe-
cialized area of competence.
Structure
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR (ACDA/J
The Director (D) of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency is the principal adviser to the President and
the Secretary of State on arms control matters. Under the
direction of the Secretary of State, he has primary
responsibility within the Government for formulation of
policy recommendations and for operations in such matters.
He is responsible for the executive direction and coordi-
nation of all activities of the Agency and the Agency's
relations with the Congress.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For lease 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B0149 00100040021-7
The Deputy Director (DD) assists the Director in
carrying out his responsibilities and acts for andexercises
the powers of the Director during his absence.
The Special Assistant to the Director and Executive
Secretary, ACDA (DIES) directs and rides staffwork
for the Director and Deputy Director; conducts interagency
and National Security Council liaison, as well as liaison
with the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and
Disarmament; serves as the link between the top Agency
decision makers and principal staff; and assists the
Director in keeping policy and management aspects of arms
control matters in phase.'
The Special Assistant for SALT (D/SALT) is responsible
for formulating ACDA positions and __policies on the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in coordination with and with
support from the concerned Bureaus. He also serves as
Chairman of the SALT Backstopping Committee -- an interagency
committee for backstopping the U.S. SALT Delegation. The
incumbent also serves as U.S. Commissioner on the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC).
The Special Assistant for MBFR (D/MBFR) is responsible
for formulating ACDA positions and policies on the Mutual
and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks in cooperation
with and with support from ACDA Bureaus, the Department of
State, and other concerned Government agencies.
The Counselor (D/C) is responsible for such special
projects essential to the formulation of arms control policy
as may be assigned by the Director.
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (ACDA/GC)
The Office of the General Counsel is responsible for
all matters of odic and internat oiof nal law and for
treaty affairs, and provides advice and assistance in the
preparation of all drafts of proposed treaties and
agreements relating to arms control, questions relating to
the implementation, interpretation and revision of treaties,
and other subjects relating to the form and content of
international agreements and their implementation.
The Office has primary responsibility for Congres-
sional matters, including all legislation, and for Agency
46
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495 ,x00100040021-7
liaison with the White House. It also is responsible for
the legal aspects of Agency policies and operations in
the areas of personnel, security, patents, contracts,
procurement, fiscal, and administrative matters. The
Office is responsible for the Agency's contracting,
reimbursable agreements and grants program, and partici-
pates in the preparation of Agency regulations.
PLANS AND ANALYSIS BUREAU (ACDA/PAB)
The Plans and Analysis Bureau is responsible for
long range planning an studies concerning existing arms
control agreements, possible new agreements, and policy
recommendations with respect to their interaction and
effect on strategy, posture and national security. In
these activities, the Bureau works closely with other
Agency bureaus and government agencies.
The Evaluation and Policy Division (PAB/EP) performs
long range studies and evaluations of the impact of
existing and possible new agreements on strategy,
postures and national security. It also studies
strategic doctrine and defense policy and participates in
community-wide studies. It analyzes the interaction of
on-going negotiations, and innovates ideas for new arms
control efforts.
The Verification Division (PAB/VN) conducts internal
studies and initiates external research cn the verifica-
tion process and its relation to arms control proposals,
negotiations and agreements. Evaluation of verification
procedures and systems is done to identify limitations,
opportunities and new requirements. The Division works
closely with all government agencies and activities
interested in the verification process. It also serves
as the Agency's central point of contact with the
intelligence community.
The Operations Analysis Division (PAB/OA) studies the
quantitative aspects of arms control policies and opera-
tions. its work includes analysis of present and future
relative force capabilities; analysis of operational and
technical constraints and the effect of uncertainties on
force structures; and the evaluation of verification
systems. The Division supports policy formulation in the
47
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved Fo lease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495F 000100040021-7
strategic arms limitations area, the mutual and balanced
force reductions area, the comprehensive test ban area
and other areas as assigned.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BUREAU (ACDA/IR
The International Relations Bureau is responsible
for the diplomatic aspects of U.S. multilateral arms
control and disarmament efforts. It is primarily
responsible for the Agency's participation in mutual and
balanced force reduction talks, the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and in the
multilateral disarmament negotiations at Geneva and in
the United Nations. The head of the Bureau also serves
as Chairman of the MBFR Interagency Backstopping Com-
mittee, which provides day-to-day substantive support to
the U.S. delegation to the MBFR negotiations. In
addition, the Bureau provides the Director with advice
on other regional arms control matters and on some
diplomatic aspects of SALT.
The CCD and UN Division (IR/CU) has the major re-
sponsibility for U.S. participation in the Conference of
the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and takes a leading
role in the annual United Nations disarmament debates.
The Division also oversees many matters that relate to
the Non-Proliferation. Treaty (NPT) and the implementation
of it and other arms control treaties.
The Regional Division (IR/REG), in addition to the
major responsibility of providing the support staff for
ACDA's interagency responsibilities for MBFR, is re-
sponsible for providing advice on the diplomatic aspects
of SALT and for pursuing arms control possibilities in
other regions. It also provides guidance on CSCE,
particularly with respect to Confidence Building Measures
that relate to European security.
The Non-Proliferation Staff (IR/NP), a new unit
established in November 1974, i's the focus for the
diplomatic aspects of the Agency's activities in the
nuclear non-proliferation field. One of its principal
concerns is the improvement and expansion of inter-
national safeguards surrounding the export of nuclear
materials and technology. In addition, this staff is
concerned with preparations for the Non-Proliferation
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 :ilA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495ii&00100040021-7
Treaty Review Conference in May 1975.
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS BUREAU (ACDA/MEA)
The Military and Economic Affairs Bureau is re-
sponsible or the evaluation o t e military and economic
implications of arms control agreements and potential
arms control measures. The Bureau works in close co-
operation with other agencies, such as the Deparnts of
Defense, State, and Commerce; the Atomic Energy Commission; and the intelligence community.
The Militar Affairs Division (MEA/MA) participates
directly in the ormulation o specific arms control
negotiating proposals and develops background and posi-
tion papers bearing on the military aspects of current
U.S. national security policies, and on the current and
potential weapons systems and military postures of the
U.S. and other countries, as they relate to arms control
policy formulation. This Division is particularly con-
cerned with evaluation of the impact on U.S.. and allied
national security interests of potential arms control
measures affecting the roles and capabilities of theater/
general purpose/conventional and nuclear armed forces.
This Division also provides support for such inspection
and control systems (e.g., inspection of Antarctica under
the Antarctic Treaty) as may become part of U.S. arms
control activities.
The Economic and Arms Transfer Division (MEA/ET)
assesses the fiscal and economic e ects o military
spending and of arms control agreements;. compiles and
disseminates data on national military budgets; develops
policy recommendations and negotiating proposals
.to the limitation of military expenditures as an arms
control measure; develops data on worldwide conventional
arms transfers and indigenous arms production; ensures
that arms control factors are taken into account in
policy decisions relating to U.S. arms transfers; and
serves as the focal point for developing Agency recom-
mendations on regional arms control. This.Division also
develops economic techniques for use as verification
procedures for specific arms control measures and cost
analyses for arms control scenarios.
49
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For lease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495l O00100040021-7
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY BUREAU
DA,N~
The Nuclear Weapons and Advanced Technology Bureau
has technical and policy responsibilities in such -arms
control areas as strategic arms limitations, curbing
proliferation of nuclear weapons, banning nuclear weapon
tests, limiting chemical and biological weapons, and
controlling other kinds of advanced weapon technology.
The Strategic Arms Division (NWT/SA) focuses on the
U.S.-Soviet bilateral SALT negotiations. It generates
proposals and evaluates options for quantitative and
qualitative limitations on strategic missiles and
bombers. The Division also sends personnel overseas to
support the U.S. SALT delegation when negotiations are
underway.
The Advanced Technology and Test Ban Division (NWT/AT)
devotes most o_ it's resources to multilatera arms control
measures that might come under negotiation in CCD or else-
where. These include nuclear weapon test bans, chemical
weapons control, nuclear non-proliferation, and other
technical developments having potential importance for arms
control.
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION ACDA/A
The Office of Administration, under the direction of
the Executive 0 icer, is responsible for administrative
management of the Agency and for providing support to all
of its components. This includes all personnel, budget,
fiscal, supply, security, communications and general
administrative activities. The Office advises the Director
and other senior officials of the Agency on these and other
matters relating to the management of the Agency, and
maintains regular liaison with the State Department, the
General Services Administration, and other organizations
providing services for the Agency.
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (ACDA/PA)
The Office of Public Affairs, under the direction of
the Public A airs Adviser, carries out the Agency's re-
sponsibility for the dissemination and coordination of
50
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495F0100040021-7
public information concerning arms control matters. It
also advises the Director,. Deputy Director and other Agency
officers on the public information aspects of such matters.
Within the Office, the ACDA Historian is responsible for
the preparation of historical analyses on arms control
topics and previous negotiations.
Resources
In recent years about half the Agency's total budget
has been devoted to salaries for a highly trained profes-
sional staff, most of which is either recruited from the
physical and social sciences or assigned on a reimbursable
basis from the Departments of State and Defense. The re-
maining'budget has been divided into three roughly equal
parts: (1) the conduct of international arms control
negotiations -- predominately SALT, plus certain expenses
of U.S. participation in other negotiating forums; (2) re-
search activities, designed to backstop negotiations; and
(3) administration, public affairs and other supporting
activities.
The following
pertinent to this
annual appropriations
report:
levels are
Program
eration
O
External
Research
Total
Funds
Total I/
Positions-
p
FY
1974
$ 6,965,000
$ 1,100,000
$ 8,065,000
204
FY
1975
8,130,000
1,280,000
9,410,000
214
FY
19762/
8,990,000
1,700,000
10,690,000
216
1/ Includes personnel who are assigned on a reimbursable
basis from other agencies.
2/ Presidential request to Congress.
Research
The Agency's external research program not only
focuses largely on arms control issues under active or
imminent negotiation but also explores new opportunities
for arms control and provides a sound basis for policy
planning. The FY 1975 external research program supported
the negotiation or implementation of major agreements in
the areas of SALT, MBFR, Nuclear Test Limitations and
51
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B014000100040021-7
Nuclear Non-Proliferation, as summarized by the following
table:
Category
Amount
1.
SALT
505,000
2.
MBFR/Conventional Arms
205
000
3.
Nuclear
Test Limitations
,
80,000
4.
Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
460,000
5.
Other
30,000
1,280,000
In all ACDA research efforts, extensive liaison is
maintained with Government agencies (particularly the
Department of Defense and the intelligence community) for
coordination and to prevent duplication of effort.
52
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Rusk ase 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495RQa0100040021-7
GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
The General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and
Disarmament was established by Section 26 of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 to "advise the
President, the Secretary of State, and the Disarmament
Director respecting matters affecting arms control,
disarmament, and world peace." The law provides that
the President shall appoint the Committee by and with
the advice and consent of the. Senate.
The Committee was reconstituted in 1974 with the
selection of Harold M. Agnew as Chairman and the appoint-
ment of additional members to bring the total to
fourteen. The Committee held its first meeting at the
end of August 1974, with subsequent meetings in October
and December, during which discussions were held with
senior officials of the Government and with. both govern-
mental and nongovernmental experts regarding the major
arms control issues. The Committee has examined the key
problems involved in the SALT negotiations and the
November 24, 1974 Vladivostok Agreement, developments in
the discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions
in Europe, the range of inter-related problems affecting
limitations on the proliferation of nuclear weapons
capabilities on the part of other states than the existing
nuclear powers, and the arms control issues considered
in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)
and in the United Nations General Assembly. The Committee
has been advised of major technical developments bearing
on the strategic arms relationships, and has conveyed its
views with respect to strategic arms negotiations and its
concerns regarding nuclear weapons proliferation.
In its meetings, the Committee benefited particularly
from discussions with Secretary of State Kissinger,
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, ACDA Director Ikle, CIA
Director Colby, Ambassador-at-Large U. A. Johnson, senior
officials of the National Security Council Staff, Depart-
ment of State, ACDA, and CIA, as well as such non-
governmental experts as Dr. Thomas Wolfe of the Rand
Corporation, Rear Admiral LaRocque (Ret.) of the Center
for Defense Information, and Mr. Paul H. Nitze.
53
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B014 R000100040021-7
While the Committee draws on the resources of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for its support, as
provided by the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972
and relevant Executive Orders, it also has a small staff
located in the Committee's offices in the State Depart-
inent Building. As presently constituted, the members of
the Committee are:
Dr. Harold M. Agnew, Chairman
Director, University of California Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory;
I. W. Abel,
President, United Steelworkers of America;
Gordon Allott,
lawyer and. former Senator;
Dr. Harold Brown,
physicist and President of the California Institute
of Technology, member of the SALT Delegation, and
former Secretary of the Air Force;
Edward Clark
banker and lawyer, former Ambassador to Australia;
William C. Foster,
businessman and engineer, former Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and former
Deputy Secretary of Defense;
Lane Kirkland,
Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO;
John A. McCone,
businessman, former Under Secretary of the Air Force,
former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
and former Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency;
Carl Marcy,
former Staff Director of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee;
54
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Re ase 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495F 0100040021-7
Joseph Martin, Jr.,
lawyer, Ambassador and U.S. Representative to the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;
Dean Rusk,
Professor of International Law, University of Georgia,
former Secretary of State, former President of the
Rockefeller Foundation;
William W. Scranton,
lawyer and banker, former Governor of Pennsylvania,
and former member of Congress;
Gerard C. Smith,
lawyer, former Director of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, former Assistant Secretary of
State and Director of the Policy Planning Staff;
Dr. John A. Wheeler,
scientist, Joseph Henry Professor of Physics at
Princeton.
55
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR
(B)
SPECIAL
ASSISTANTS
ID/SALT)-(D/CS]
COUNSELOR
ID/C)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
(08)
OFFICE Of THE
GENERAL COUNSEL
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
(D/ES)
OFFICE Of
ADMINISTRATION
(A)
PLANS AND ANALYSIS
BUREAU
(PAR)
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BUREAU
(IR)
1
VERIFICATION
DIVISION
OPERATIONS
ANALYSIS DIVISION
REGIONAL
DIVISION
CCD AND UN
DIVISION
(VN) 11 (011) 1 1 (REG)
(CU)
(MA)
ECONOMIC AND
ARMS TRANSFER
DIVISION
([T)
GENERAL
ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
OFFICE Of
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
(PA)
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
BUREAU
(NWT)
i
STRATEGIC ARMS
DIVISION
(SA)
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
AFFAIRS BUREAU
(MEA)
MILITARY AFFAIRS
DIVISION
ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY AND
TEST BAN DIVISION
(AT)
 Approved For Rase 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495RQ(D100040021-7
APPENDIX II
OFFICIALS OF THE AGENCY
1974
DIRECTOR
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR SALT
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR MBFR
COUNSELOR
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
PLANS AND ANALYSIS BUREAU
DEPUTY
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BUREAU
DEPUTY
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
DEPUTY
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
DEPUTY
GENERAL COUNSEL
DEPUTY
PUBLIC AFFAIRS ADVISER
DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
DEPUTY
Fred C. Ikle
J. Owen Zurhellen,
A. M. Christopher
Sidney N. Graybeal
J. David Linebaugh
John Newhouse
BGen. Kermit C. Kaericher
Robert H. Miller
J. David Linebaugh
Robert M. Behr
Robert H. Kupperman
Thomas D. Davies
Robert W. Buchheim
James L. Malone
Thomas Graham, Jr.
Ralph Stuart Smith
Adalyn Davis
James T. Hackett
Sidney D. Anderson
57
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For3elease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B0149 000100040021-7
ACDA REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS Ralph Earle II
ACDA REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED
FORCE REDUCTIONS
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT
John F. Lehman
Joseph Martin, Jr.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 :5I lA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Rase 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495RQ00100040021-7
APPENDIX III
Bilateral Arms Control Agreements
Between the United States and the Soviet Union
December 31, 1974
Signed
Entered
Into Force
"Hot Line" Agreement .
6/20/63
6/20/63
Improved "Hot Line" Agreement
,9/30/71
9/30/71
Nuclear Accidents Agreement
9/30/71
9/30/71
ABM Treaty
5/26/72
10/ 3/72
Interim Agreement on Offensive
Strategic Arms
5/26/72
10/ 3/72
Standing Consultative Commission
for SALT
12/21/72
12/21/72
Basic Principles of Negotiations
on the Further Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms
6/21/73
6/21/73
Threshold Test Ban Treaty
T/ 3/74
with Protocol
Protocol to the ABM Treaty
7/ 3/74
59
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
P - Party
S - Signatory
Status of Multilateral
Arms Control Agreements
December 31, 1973
Treaty Bio-
Limited Outer Prohibiting Nuclear Seabeds logical
Antaractic Test Ban Space Nuclear Nonpro- Arms Geneva Weapons
Treaty Treaty Treaty Weapons liferation Control Protocol Con-
in Latin Treaty Treaty vention
America
Agreement Opened
for Signature 12/1/59 8/5/63 1/27/67 2/14/67 7/1/68 2/11/71 6/17/25 4/10/72
Agreement Entered
Into Force
6/23/61 10/10/63 10/10/67 4/22/68 3/5/70 5/18/72 5/10/26
M
o
US
P
P
P
P(1)
P
P
S(2)
S(2)
USSR
P
P
P
P
P
P
UK
P
P
P
P(1) (;)
P
Afghanistan
S
P
P
S
Algeria
S
Argentina
P
S
P
S
Australia
P
P
P
P
S
P
S
ro
Austria
p
p
P
p
p
p
ro
Barbados
P
P
S
P
P
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495FNW100040021-7
E
.rI
r?I
cu
I-I
N
cC
Fr
PQ
Cd
cd
ri
PQ
+j 1 b
a .t+ cri
U U
61
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved Foelease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
.+m e
5a10
.4 10.0 4
al01SU~
0 Y O
0
a`4
mu
14
00a
R
0
11y4111
4$1141441
.~
0. wY ill
U 0 CHHI
0 -4
zZ
'-4 E?
n
.v
r
N
.d
0%
in
..
H
r1
O
r
rn
U
wl
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 :6IA-RDP801301495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Rase 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80BO1495R 00100040021-7
A
rt 14
~I 044
E) o
0 U 0
W U
w
r4
w
N
63
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01000100040021-7
r-1 a a
a ao 1 0
4-.1 0.04)
0 moo r.
Oi 0 u >
-4
0
O p
<
0O
0 $4
0a
M I +-
0 0 0 >1
0 two
?+a0a
0 a W 01
Z Z .4
+) F
N
0
rd
I
v
N
i
0
N
N
b
m
0
H
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 s61A-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Rejease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R 100040021-7
U
w
0
u
rl
.rt
r-1 ,
i-i
p
?m cd
O .H
cd
1 "O
Q)
0
4) O
Cs'
U cd
9
0
cd
u
0
4
?rl
?r1
cd
cd
F+ cd
cd
9
41
Fr
b
U
cd
to
cd
0
4)
a
0
0
.
0
.o
to
c
r
0
4)
.[
0
:3
Cd
~
t
h
ti
h
.
W.
~4
al
65
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved Felease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01R000100040021-7
0
d~+
CO
co.
)uqu~
O VW E'
11
10
.,4
r-I
0
f."
0
E
r-~
zl
Approved For Release 2005/11/2365CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Re{wse,2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495R0100040021-7
z
0
z
J
~i
0
04
r-4 I
0
m'
67
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved Ft"Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B0R000100040021-7
I I I I I I I I I I I
ri
0
10 U
> O
0-6)
C O
0 H
r,a
C
0
N 1 Y
toOto >1
011 $4.0
4aOro
(1944 0
09?.4$4
zz-4E?
N
.?1
N
00
?- La
Y eO
In H
4) U b
N a Q1
U W F
M
q9y
10
O
?.4 10
w
rd
O
.7 4
U
U N
-I
q 10
H 01
2E"
N
10
0
U
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 F.' blA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Fase 2005/11/23: CI1-RDP8pB0
ro
b
r-4
.rl
16
0
Hi
a
0
O
H
(DI
69
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B014000100040021-7
0
b U
co
07 M
0w
N
0
\
N
a4 to
00 N
M 1~
.-I
O
ri
41
U
Iy
0
w
0
?.i
4)
a)
H
0
W
c
IN
a
4)
I4
A4
U)
U
H
b1 H
Ir
???I .-1
: U
r-4 0
U
O
?~ N
Ow
U) H
a) (d
?'4
+J o
$4
0 41
04 -11
N b
N 't
G. C/]
O O
11) d'
ac/)
r-q M
N
a cn
co Un
%0 m
Approved For Release 2005/11/2370 CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Relgase 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80BO1495RQQ0100040021-7
N H r
?~ r-1 a)
o ri P a)
a) U A ? 4)
4 U)
U 0 '0
a) w .,4
+)
?-1
44
o
(
a
cn
~1
o
?r1
0
ri
ra
ro
u)
1-4
a)
>1
1-1
17-1
N
M
d
4f)
71
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved Foelease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01`sR000100040021-7
APPENDIX W
ACDA Depository Libraries
University of Alabama
Birmingham, Alabama
Stanford University
Stanford, California
University of Alaska
Fairbanks, Alaska
Alaska State College
Juneau,-Alaska
Arizona State University
Tempe, Arizona
University of Arizona
Tucson, Arizona
University of Arkansas
Fayetteville, Arkansas
University of California
Berkeley, California
Claremont College
Claremont, California
University of California
Davis, California
California State University
Los Angeles, California
Los Angeles Public Library
Los Angeles, California
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California
University of California
Riverside, California
San Francisco Public Library
San Francisco, California
San Jose College
San Jose, California
University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado
USAF Academy
Colorado Springs, Colorado
Denver Public Library
Denver, Colorado
Western State College
Gunnison, Colorado
Wesleyan University
Middletown, Connecticut
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut
University of Connecticut
Storrs, Connecticut
Silas Bronson
Waterbury, Connecticut
University of Delaware
Newark, Delaware
American University
Washington, D.C.
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.
Howard University
Washington, D.C.
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C.
University of Miami
Center for Advance
International Studies
Washington, D.C.
Approved For Release 2005/116 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Re. se 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80BO1495RQ 100040021-7
Florida Atlantic University Illinois State University
Boca Raton, Florida Normal, Illinois
University of Florida
Gainesville, Florida
Illinois State University
Springfield, Illinois
University of Miami
Miami, Florida
St. Johns River Junior College
Palatka, Florida
University of Georgia
Athens, Georgia
Atlanta Public Library
Atlanta, Georgia
Emory University
Atlanta, Georgia
University of Hawaii
Honolulu, Hawaii
Boise State College
Boise, Idaho
University of Idaho
Moscow, Idaho
Idaho State University
Pocatello, Idaho
University of Illinois
Champaign, Illinois
Chicago Public Library
Chicago, Illinois
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois
Western Illinois University
Macomb, Illinois
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana
Purdue University
Lafayette, Indiana
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, Indiana
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa
Des Moines Public Library
Des Moines, Iowa
University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas
Kansas State University
Manhattan, Kansas
Wichita State University
Wichita, Kansas
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Kentucky Department of Libraries
Frankfort, Kentucky
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky
Louisville Public Library
Louisville, Kentucky
73
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved F?r Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01 3R000100040021-7
Louisiana State University Tufts University
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Medford, Massachusetts
New Orleans Public Library University of Michigan
New Orleans, Louisiana Ann Arbor, Michigan
Tulane University
New Orleans, Louisiana
Detroit Public Library
Detroit, Michigan
Bates College
Lewiston, Maine
University of Maine
Orona, Maine
U.S. Naval. Academy
Annapolis, Maryland
Enoch Pratt Library
Baltimore, Maryland
Goucher College
Baltimore, Maryland
University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland
Kensington. Park Library
Kensington, Maryland
Montgomery College Library
Rockville, Maryland
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts
Boston Public Library
Boston, Massachusetts
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Wayne State University
Detroit, Michigan
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Minneapolis Public Library
Minneapolis, Minnesota
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Carleton College
Northfield. Minnesota
University of Southern Mississippi
Hattiesburg, Mississippi
Mississippi State University
State College, Mississippi
University of Missouri
Columbia, Missouri
Lincoln University
Jefferson City, Missouri
University of Missouri
Kansas City, Missouri
St. Louis Public Library
.St. Louis, Missouri
Montana State University
Bozeman, Montana
74
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Rase 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80BO1495RQ 0100040021-7
University of Montana New York State Library
Missoula, Montana Albany, New York
University of Nebraska
Lincoln, Nebraska
State University of New York
Binghamton, New York
Wayne State College
Wayne,.Nebraska
University of Nevada
Las Vegas, Nevada
University of Nevada
Reno, Nevada
Washoe County Library
Reno, Nevada
University of New Hampshire
Durham, New Hampshire
Dartmouth College.
Hanover, New Hampshire
Jersey City Public Library
Jersey City, New Jersey
Drew University
Madison, New Jersey
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, New Jersey
Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey
University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, New Mexico
New Mexico State University
Las Cruces, New Mexico
Eastern New Mexico University
Portales, New Mexico
New York University
Bronx, New York
State University College
Geneseo, New York
Colgate University
Hamilton, New York
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
;sslumbia University
New York, N.Y.
New Yoik Public Library
New York, N.Y.
New York University
New. York, N.Y.
United Nations Library
New York, N.Y.
U.S. Military Academy
West Point, N.Y.
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill., North Carolina
Duke University
Durham, North Carolina
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, North Carolina
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota
75
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100040021-7
 Approved Foelease 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01R000100040021-7
University of Akron
Akron, Ohio
Bowling Green University
Bowling Green, Ohio
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, Ohio
Gettysburg College
Oet,y ,,burg, Pennsylvania
Juniata College Library
Huntingdon, Pennsylvania
St. Francis College
Loretto, Pennsylvania
Cleveland Public Library.
Cleveland, Ohio
Ohio State University
Columbus,. Ohio
Kent State University
Kent, Ohio
Oberlin College
Oberlin, Ohio
Miami University
Oxford, Ohio
University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma
Oklahoma State University
Stillwater, Oklahoma
Oregon State University
Corvallis, Oregon
University of Oregon
Eugene, Oregon
Multnomah County Library
Portland, Oregon
Willamette University
Salem, Oregon
Bryn Mawr College
Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania
'Philadelphia Public Library
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Duquesne University
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
University of Puerto Rico
Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico
University of Rhode Island
Kingston, Rhode Island
Brown University
Providence, Rhode Island
Providence Public Library
Providence, Rhode Island
The Citadel
Charleston, South Carolina
Clemson University
Clemson, South Carolina
University of South Carolina
Columbia, South Carolina
Northern State College
Aberdeen, South Carolina
Approved For Release 2005/11/237 CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7
 Approved For Re1ase 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01495RA(i6100040021-7
S. Dakota State Library Commission William and Mary College
Pierre, South Dakota Williamsburg, Virginia
.ioint University Libraries
Nashville, Tennessee
Washington State Library
Olympia, Washington
University of Texas
Austin, Texas
Dallas Public Library
Dallas, Texas
Rice University
Houston, Texas
Baylor University
Waco, Texas
Utah State University
Logan, Utah
Brigham Young University
Provo, Utah
Salt Lake City Public Library
Salt Lake City, Utah
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah
University af Vermont
Burlington, Vermont
Randolph-Macon College
Ashland, Virginia
Virginia Polytechnic Institute
Blacksburg, Virginia
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia
Washington State University
Pullman, Washington
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington
Seattle Public Library
Seattle, Washington
Kanawha County Public Library
Charleston, West Virginia
West Virginia University
Morgantown, West Virginia
West Liberty State College
West Liberty, West Virginia
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin
Milwaukee Public Library
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
University of Wisconsin
Platteville, Wisconsin
Laramie County Library
Cheyenne, Wyoming
University of Wyoming
Laramie, Wyoming
U.S. Mission
Geneva, Switzerland
77
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100040021-7