CARNEGE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000100080002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 67
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Board of Trustees
Milton Katz
Chairman
Harding F. Bancroft
Vice- Chairman
Dillon Anderson
Charles W. Bailey II
Thomas W. Braden
Alfred Brittain III
Anthony J. A. Bryan
John Chancellor
Hedley Donovan
John W. Douglas
Henry H. Fowler
Marion R. Fremont-Smith
Ernest A. Gross
Lawrence R. Hafstad
Rafael Hernandez Colon
William A. Hewitt
Thomas L. Hughes
Joseph E. Johnson
George C. Lodge
Barbara W. Newell
Ellmore C. Patterson
Howard C. Petersen
Wesley W. Posvar
Norman F. Ramsey
Donald B. Straus
Honorary Trustees
Ben M. Cherrington
David L. Cole
Andrew W. Cordier
John Cowles
William L. Langer
Otto L. Nelson, Jr.
W. J. Schieffelin, Jr.
Whitney North Seymour
George N. Shuster
Theodore C. Streibert
Theodore O. Yntema
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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
345 East 46th Street
New York, New York 10017
Cable: 1NTERPAX, NEW YORK
Telephone: [phone]
Telex: 62314
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Cable: INTERPEACE, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Telephone: [phone]
Telex: 64485
Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale
European Center
58, Rue de Moillebeau
1211 Geneva 19
Switzerland
Cable: INTERPAX, GENEVA
Telephone: 34 23 50 - 34 23 58
Telex: 28167
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Contents
The Carnegie Endowment in Transition ........................ 1
Humanitarian Policy Studies .......................................... 6
The Commission on the Middle East ............................ 14
The International Organization Program ...................... 15
Face-to-Face .................................................................. 21
Arms Control .................................................................. 25
Project Dialogue ............................................................ 31
Programs in Diplomacy .................................................. 36
The German Marshall Fund of the United States ........ 40
Foreign Policy ................................................................ 41
The European Center .................................................... 45
The International Law Program ...................................... 49
The Rhodesia Project .................................................... 55
Officers and Staff .......................................................... 60
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The Carnegie Endowment in Transition
A Preface by the President
sonnel are going. In the final analysis, programs are run by
people, and their background, their thinking processes, their
values and objectives-all will shape the programmatic con-
sequences. Interviews allow people to think out loud about
their work and their aspirations, and to give the observer a
glimpse of the Endowment in transition.
As an aid in setting their discussions in perspective, these
personal notes may be useful.
The pages which follow report on the Carnegie Endow-
ment's continuing search for self-identity and public service
in the decade of the seventies. That decade opened with the
Endowment's status confirmed as an operating (not a grant
giving) foundation under the new (1969) tax law. In that
setting, as the Endowment's new president, I was charged
with the tasks of rethinking priorities, restructuring programs,
and, as appropriate, recruiting new personnel.
At decisive points in this process, the informed participa-
tion and active encouragement of the Endowment's board of
trustees has been noteworthy. Their sustained collaboration
and warm support have been invaluable, especially in the
case of the chairman, Milton Katz.
This report uses primarily the unusual format of interviews
with the Carnegie Endowment's program directors. We have
chosen the interview device in order to capture some of the
flavor of the evolution through which our programs and per-
Right at the beginning, in 1911, Nicholas Murray Butler
tried to take Peace out of the Endowment's title and call it the
Carnegie International Endowment instead. Perhaps he had
the clairvoyance to anticipate Alfred North Whitehead's later
warning that the deliberate aim at Peace very easily passes
into its bastard substitute, Anaesthesia.'Or perhaps he antic-
ipated the inevitable corollary: that peace as an unexcep-
tional goal would evoke an endless argument about means.
In any event, more than any other word in our language,
peace does unleash emotional attachments to a multitude of
differing and often inconsistent positions, each of them
strongly felt by somebody to be the proper path to peace. For
peace needs defining. Even Lincoln found it necessary to
modify it by prefixing "just and lasting...."
For over sixty years the Carnegie Endowment has had an
unrivalled perspective on the disputatiousness among would-
be peacemakers pressing their preferred projects - on,
indeed, the frequent contrast between the Happy Warriors
and the unhappy peacemakers. We have experienced the
discord among the high-minded, heard the dialogues of the
deaf, and watched the defeatism of the disillusioned. in the
process we have discovered what should have been obvious
to begin with: that there are more roads to peace than roads
to Rome; that peace, like heaven, has many mansions; that
peace, like man, has many seasons.
We knew all this long before two self-styled peace can-
didates contested the 1972 U.S. Presidential elections -
long before that unlikely twosome of Kissinger and Tho won
the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize. We suspected it even before we
faced the special doubts and dilemmas of the Vietnam
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trauma, when the Peace Endowment found itself seeing
things less clearly than either a war-embarked government
or thousands of militant peace protectors. That was a time,
wrote Emmet Hughes, when
"200 million American peace lovers divided into two
armies distinguishable not by confidence in their own vir-
tues but only by their choice of weapons: the older seekers
of 'peace with honor' principally relying on incantations,
helicopters, and a little napalm; the younger zealots of
peace with love' usually favoring obscenities, bricks, and
a little vandalism."
The Endowment is called to work for peace publicly, ac-
countably, and with fairness, at a time when differing cham-
pions of peace are very clear that peace is enlisted cleanly
on one side of an issue only-whether of bombing, mining,
and invading in Southeast Asia; or of linking emigration to
detente; or of emphasizing North/South relations over East/
West or West/West; or of indiscriminately concentrating on
international institution building; or of providing arms to
African liberation movements; or of embargoing arms to the
Middle East; or of "tilting toward Pakistan" against Indian
"aggression" with votes in the Security Council or nuclear
carriers in the Indian Ocean; or of quietly underwriting the
multinational corporation as the de facto new internation-
alism.
People have regularly come into my office who have been
clear on all these things. Often I have had to confess, for
reasons which may be experiential or chemical, that it has
not been vouchsafed to me with apocalyptic clarity which
side peace is on. The slide rule, for instance, is not an infal-
lible guide to the social reality of peace. Frequently the point
at issue is inherently not subject to proof, although it is
always subject to argument. Yet those to whom instant in-
sights occur will inevitably be disappointed in those of us
who lag behind. More often than not, they will want to write
off our obtuseness as a lack of moral keenness, and attribute
it to years of double vision or to a chronic inability to make
up our minds.
On one thing the Carnegie Endowment long ago did make
up its mind: it was unlikely that we, unaided, would prevent
World War Ill. That much aside, the magnitude of our pro-
fessed objective still looms so large as to appear presump-
tuous. The sheer implausibility of relating our goal to our
means has, I suspect, always plagued us. It has frustrated our
finding any fully satisfactory organizable framework. Pro-
grammatic coherence has been, and is, elusive, because the
goal of peace itself is so grandiose, ambiguous, and over-
arching. It semantically spans and artificially bridges most of
the gravest polar tensions in world politics: like defense and
detente, development and equality, justice and stability, free-
dom and order.
Consequently over the years, in honest pursuit of our trust,
we have had to rethink the Endowment's open-ended assign-
ment. The decade of the seventies is once more a time for
new perceptions.
Yet unleashing the hounds of redefinition is always treach-
erous business, for us especially. For the Endowment's as-
signment to work for peace guarantees that our frustration
potential will inevitably be greater than-or at least different
from-that of any other existing foundation. Moreover, differ-
ing and changing perceptions of peace will merge imper-
ceptibly into the Endowment's own continuing search for
plausible priorities. We know to start with that peace activity
normally tends to exaggerate theory, that rhetoric regularly
exceeds reality, and that at the end of the day there turns out
to be a difference between the real world and the world of
make believe. Indeed the Endowment itself, in its grant-giving
days, was often the bearer of this bad news to activist peace
groups resentful of our refusal to supply funds.
After all, the taxonomy of peace is a central issue which we
confront as an institution every time choices are made. Our
small scale decisions have to be taken against the back-
ground of what is going on in the large scale world. In posi-
tioning ourselves to deal with, and choose among, contem-
porary issues of war and peace, we have tried to keep the
operational problem and the intellectual problem equally and
concurrently in view. We have found that we had better rec-
oncile ourselves to a certain elusiveness-that living with
some imprecision about our secondary goals may be the
better part of wisdom.
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In the Endowment's new programs, we have sought to
resist the caution that leads to inconsequentiality, as well as
the idealism that leads to otherworldliness, and the zeal that
leads to trouble. (We intend to be innovative and tax-exempt
too.) We are trying to act within a frame of reference suffi-
ciently broad to avoid overly identifying the Endowment with
episodic concerns, sufficiently narrow so that no one will
think we are presuming to do everything, and above all con-
temporary enough so that we will be seen to be probing close
to the margins of serious, significant three-dimensional
issues.
Taken seriously, peace, like politics, will always be an area
where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and
coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work
out their many temporary, uneasy compromises. If we wish to
pursue peace persistently enough to have any impact at all
on decision making, it will help if we pursue central subjects
in central places on a continuing basis. Even then, we will
still have to engage in hard, utilizable thinking and commu-
nicating.
The alternative, almost effortlessly achievable, is to ar-
range for peripheral subjects to be pursued by peripheral
people in peripheral places. There is always researching for
peace: and we live in the most research-ridden era in history.
There is always travelling for peace: and we are part of the
most over-travelled generation ever. There is publishing for
peace: and we are engulfed in the most publication-surfeited
society of all, where reading, meanwhile, is rapidly becoming
a lost art. There is conferring for peace: and hundreds of
respectable devotees worldwide devote some of the best
years of their lives repeating themselves to one another at
one conference after another.
Researching, travelling, publishing, and conferring we still
wish to do, especially since these are the activities least dis-
couraged by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. In every case how
peripheral they really are can almost be measured by the
distance, physical and psychic, from those who actually
decide or have a role in actually deciding. At a time when it
is harder than ever to make a real difference, to be relevant
is to be proximate-to bring, in a variety of ways, ideas of
potential impact in combination with people of potential
influence into the orbit of potential war-makers and peace-
makers.
There are legally permissible inventions still to be made in
the arena of public policy influence-new ways to organize
for effective communication, new levers to be grasped for
constructive perturbation. Here the Endowment is in a posi-
tion to turn to contemporary advantage its conservative heri-
tage in a new and pertinent context. Comparatively speaking,
we have been the archetypal symbol over sixty years of the
value-free approach to international peace. With minor lapses
here and there, we have chosen to identify ourselves with
symbolically dispassionate institutional-instrumental pro-
grams like international law, international organization, train-
ing diplomats, and examining "the changing role of force".
Highly combustible subject matter may actually be lodged
within these safe-sounding, grey-appearing, tranquil-seem-
ing rubrics, but they have cushioned us from controversy. As
it is, our neutral, public image of prestigious non-controver-
siality provides easy ground for enhancement via further insti-
tution building.
At the same time many of these traditional law-and-order
subjects have a fateful ring of obsolescence about them in a
world where there is increasing disagreement everywhere on
the goals of societies, burgeoning challenges to legitimacy
and authority, and next to irreconcilable arguments over the
operational rules-especially over the merits of continuing to
approach real world problems through the filter of traditional
Western forms. Hence it has been clear to us that without
jettisoning the past, we must experiment seriously with the
future.
In charting that future course, we have wanted to avoid
complacency, self-delusion, and cynicism, all three. We have
recognized that, whatever we do, our leverage will be modest
at most. Since, therefore, we are serious about being rele-
vant, we are trying, as actively, inventively, and imaginatively
as possible, to achieve the highest intensity of useful involve-
ment, deliberately choosing, whenever possible, operational
situations of pertinence, combining pertinent people with
pertinent subjects in pertinent places.
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The Endowment's three locations - New York, Geneva,
and Washington-providentially have provided appropriate
settings for the programmatic experiments upon which we
are already engaged. Some of these will succeed, some may
fail. Others will take their place. Some of our programs are
better known abroad than in the United States, some better
known in New York than in Washington. Operating in three
such diverse locations has given us easy options and en-
hances our flexibility in selecting both new programs and
new personnel.
The first years of the 1970's have been years of both con-
tinuity and change. Each new Endowment program has been
devised with existing ones in mind. Often a new program has
had multiple rationales. At minimum we have hoped for the
cross fertilization of multiple relationships. Especially in the
case of our joint ventures with other tax-exempt organizations
in Washington, we have consciously sought the side benefits
of linkages and synergism.
Moreover, redesigning our operating style has been, in
part, mandatory as well as volitional. "One of the most basic
decisions that must be made about the use of a foundation's
funds", according to a Ford Foundation authority, "is that
between making grants to other organizations or conducting
operations itself." When the Carnegie Endowment decided to
qualify legally as an operating foundation, long distance
grants had to give way to direct expenditures, and arms-
length relationships had to make way for the Endowment's
own or integrated programs. As an operating foundation we
have had to ask ourselves not only what subjects did we wish
to stress, but with and through whom did we closely want
to work. We have embarked on selective incentives.
Now, more than before, we have had to base our organiza-
tional activity on the most effective arrangements of human
resources we could devise in our own centers of activity. In
seeking enhancement of the Endowment's reach and aug-
mentation of the Endowment's role, we also had to recognize
that the necessary resources of human skill, commitment,
and perseverance were scarce.
A frequent organizational retreat under such circumstances
is nevertheless to sub-optimize: to locate what personnel can
be found, put them directly on the payroll, and then go for
broke. The costs of this method of operation can be found in
the scattered debris of talent and purpose littering the land-
scape of contemporary American nongovernmental organ-
izations. Multiple claims are made on dwindling funds, scarce
resources are squandered or worn thin, psychological sus-
tenance is strained all around, and the results are bound to
be less than the sum of the parts.
That is why the Endowment has opted for the opposite
course. We deliberately decided to orient our new Washing-
ton programs to take account of the rapidly changing interna-
tional picture, the serious contemporary breakdown of the
American dialogue on foreign policy, and the need for a new
and realistic domestic consensus as a basis for international
performance by the United States government. Husbanding
our resources and judiciously looking for greater reach, we
decided to build new institutional networks, linking other
compatible tax-exempt groups, in integrated joint ventures
satisfying our legal requirements. Choices of partners were
made with a view to their compatible scale of operations, their
young and energetic leadership, their economy of structure,
the mutual benefits to be obtained by co-location, the poten-
tial coherence to be found in the complementary outlooks of
those with daily working responsibilities, as well as the auto-
matic augmentation of all the networks involved.
Links with the American Foreign Service Association, the
Student Committee, the Arms Control Association, and
Foreign Policy represented different models. But each also
constituted a deliberate incremental advance toward a
growing beneficial association happily combining different
universes of discourse with scarce skills and capacities.
When supplemented as necessary with the direct appoint-
ment of new Endowment program officers, as in the Humani-
tarian Studies program, the total complex was designed to
represent most of the advantages of orchestration and
many of the elements of central casting. Meanwhile, as
catalyst, we believe we have widened the audience, enhanced
the participation, expanded the readership, broadened the
coverage, stimulated interactions and reciprocities, and given
the whole cluster a collective significance beyond the reach
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of their individual resources. In the process, we have also
impressed the Endowment's developing personality on the
whole set of interacting relationships.
This experimentation in extending the Endowment's reach
through joint ventures has proved helpful not only for the
intrinsic merits of the operations, but for what we can learn
about future possibilities. There are obvious built-in resources
for new program generation. We have increased our ability
to seize targets of opportunity in a time of rapid social change
and controversy. We have been venturesome and yet, by
engaging strictly in term arrangements with program officers
who themselves are young and mobile, have preserved our
flexibility to launch other, quite different, programs from time
to time.
The same purposes have inspired our looser facilitating
relationships with young organizations like the German Mar-
shall Fund of the United States, the Commission on the
Middle East, and the Institute for Congress, where co-loca-
tion and administrative support assist in the pursuit of goals
compatible with the Endowment's programs.
Our new infrastructure promotes a broader base and
greater freedom to experiment at the same time as it moves
us away from tendencies toward permanent programs and
personnel. In a sense, joint ventures must be exercises in
creative ambiguity. They are both sustaining and innovative
in purpose. Hence they do not necessarily lend themselves
on either side to excessive clarification. When they work,
they give promise of new forms of dynamic growth. Most
important of all, they provide us with an operational defini-
tion of our mission-perhaps the most reliable kind-ex-
pressed in terms of actual programs and projects.
Hence it seemed to me that one good way for others to
reperceive the Carnegie Endowment might be to provide a
contemporary mosaic of the Endowment in transition and to
do so by means of the unconventional layout and presenta-
tions which follow. With that in mind, I asked Richard Hol-
brooke, the Managing Editor of Foreign Policy and the
Endowment's Special Assistant for Publications, to inter-
view program directors about the range and dimensions of
their work. He has been very ably assisted by Robert C. Rich-
ter. Together we thought that the interview format might pro-
duce more lively and readable insights than can customarily
be found in foundation reports. We believe this objective has
been achieved.
The resulting panorama is necessarily uneven and un-
doubtedly more personalized than usual. In view of the
comparative newness and importance of the Humanitarian
Studies program, for example, we have given it more space
than the others. We hope, however, that in this way we are
conveying more genuine information about the type of work
actually being done, and the type of people doing it, than
would normally be the case.
I like to think that in some of the following pages the reader
will find a certain validation of what I had in mind for the
Endowment when, one spring evening in New York in 1971,
I used these words to conclude my first formal statement to
the Carnegie trustees:
"The service of peace in the 1970's lies, at least in part,
in arresting the flight from foreign policy, in providing new
agents for dialogue, and in striving to bring purposes and
means into balance again. If we live 'in the street called
Now and the house named Here,' we will not have to con-
vince ourselves of the need for timely action, nor for the
politics that rises above politics, nor for those indispens-
able catalytic factors that can constructively reengage the
estranged elements of contemporary life inside and out-
side the United States. In the process, perhaps we shall
find-who knows?-not only a renewal of character, and
not only a new chapter in the life of this old Endowment,
but a contemporary glimpse, as well, into the efficient
secret of peace."
Thomas L. Hughes
January 15, 1974
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HUMANITARIAN POLICY STUDIES
Roger Morris & Donald F. McHenry
Roger Morris: The Humanitarian Policy Studies program
is designed to bring to the foreign affairs field some of the
research techniques which have been so effective on the
domestic scene in monitoring the behavior of government.
I think Carnegie has recognized that public interest studies
in the domestic field have been much more successful than
similar work in foreign policy, that the past decade has
brought to the domestic area a new rigor of analysis, a new
depth and intensity of public interest research. As a result,
government agencies nave become somewhat more account-
able and open.
However, the foreign policy community, the Defense De-
partment, the Department of State, AID, other agencies, the
Congress, are still largely immune from any kind of public
scrutiny except for academic research, which tends to be
either abstract, or quick draw journalism. The techniques that
exposed the cyclamate offenses in the FDA, the misfunc-
tioning of the FTC, the scandals in nursing homes in Mary-
land, all the public interest studies that have been done over
the last decade in so many areas-health, education, human
problems of the United States-have not been brought to
bear on foreign policy. Yet as we learned in Vietnam, there
were high human costs being paid all around the world, many
of those costs paid by the American people.
So the Humanitarian Policy Studies program is an effort to
apply a technique. But it is also an effort to revive within the
U.S. government the legitimacy of the whole realm of the
human factor. As people who had had experience in govern-
ment, we were concerned with the inability of government -
for a variety of bureaucratic and intellectual reasons-to
come to grips with the human factor as distinct from the more
traditional categories of foreign policy dealing with regimes,
relations among states ....
Let me interrupt for a minute. What do you mean by the
human factor? To what extent has it been missing in our
policy? Surely almost every senior policymaker would resent
the implication that they are not concerned with human lives.
Yet clearly you are implying that ....
Morris: I don't think we're implying that they were uncon-
cerned with human lives. What we're trying to find out in an
empirical way is just how much they were concerned with
human lives.
But aren't you starting from an assumption that they were
insufficiently concerned?
Morris: Well, what we are suggesting is that a number of
decisions over the last decade have had the result-whatever
the intentions may have been-of subordinating human con-
siderations to more traditional considerations of power, inter-
state relations, and all the rest.
Don McHenry: I think the questions which get attention
in foreign policy tend to be those questions which revolve
around U.S.-Soviet or Chinese relations or problems of
the Middle East, or the like. What gets less attention in
the newspapers, in the Administration and in the Congress
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are things like crises in Bangladesh, the drought in West
Africa, or some of the endemic human rights questions in
Southern Africa. The focus tends to be on those things which
are traditionally major issues. People in government and the
public both pay much less attention to human rights or hu-
manitarian questions. It's true that they pay a great deal of
attention to human rights questions when they grow large-
when drought threatens the lives of millions of people-but
there is a possibility of paying more attention, and of in-
fluencing situations before they reach a crisis stage.
Does your work rest on the assumption-and f think if it
does, it's worth stating specifically-that human considera-
tions should be the starting point for foreign policy rather
than strategic or balance-of-power considerations?
Morris: No, and this is a critical distinction to make aboui
the program. We are really not that theoretically oriented.
What we're trying to do is to describe a policy process in
Washington, and describe it in terms of real life as distinct
from traditional academic analysis. We're highly empirical.
We work on the basis of intensive interviews of public offi-
cials. We bring in students from around the country who
come to Washington and examine documents and then talk
to all sorts of sources, both in and out of government. We're
trying to tell a story which is intelligible to the general public,
and which will describe what has happened. Now, inevitably
out of that story will come judgments. All we're really starting
with in terms of an assumption is that human considerations
of the kind Don is talking about are a very legitimate factor in
the making of foreign policy. We're trying to measure in a
hard empirical way how that factor gets weighed. If it is
subordinated to other interests, why and how is it subordi-
nated? If it is ignored, why and how is it ignored?
McHenry: Roger mentioned an aspect of the program
which I think is probably the most exciting part. That is the
involvement of the students. Through interviews, through
contact with government officials, with the legislature, and
with knowledgeable people in the foreign policy community,
they get an appreciation of government, of the decision-
making process, and of the complexity of these problems.
Morris: Yes, I think that our experience thus far suggests
that three hours of interviewing government bureaucrats is
worth 30 hours of credit in most political science faculties.
How did you pick your students?
Morris: Students were recruited with an emphasis on areas
outside the northeastern United States. We looked at those
areas which did not have the usual Washington intern pro-
grams. The recruitment process was very simple. We've
worked through the Student Committee and through con-
tacts in various universities. For example, the first group
of students came from a wide variety of schools-the Uni-
versities of Houston and Cincinnati, Iowa State, Rockhurst
College in Kansas City, UCLA, the Universities of Oregon
and Nebraska. Others came from Reed College, USC, Texas,
Iowa, and Minnesota-again areas primarily west of the
Mississippi.
Morris: These are primarily graduate students. We have
one or two undergraduates in their senior year.
Are they headed for careers in public service?
Morris: Not necessarily. Many of them are. I'm afraid in
some cases they may have changed their minds after an
experience in Washington. But most of them we tried to re-
cruit from the point of view of interest, motivation, and origin-
ality. Some of them are in anthropology, others in psycho-
logy. We didn't look primarily at political science majors.
Morris: Yes, all of those who have requested credit have
received credit.
McHenry: We had a young law student from the University
of Kansas last summer who got law school credit for her work.
You chose as your first two projects Biafra and Bangla-
desh. Why?
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Morris: Yes, that's right. We thought that they were two
classic recent cases of humanitarian crises and that the U.S.
response to those problems would probably illustrate as
vividly as any other recent examples how the United States
weighs the human problem as against all the other factors
in foreign, policy.
Is it possible to accuse you of having deliberately chosen
two projects in which you knew at the outset that American
humanitarian efforts have been sorely delinquent?
Morris: No, I don't think that's quite true. I think that the
surface publicity suggested some delinquency, but we se-
lected two problems which involved massive human dis-
asters of the last decade-Bangladesh in terms of ten mil-
lion people driven from their homes into refugee camps,
Biafra where the human toll was enormous. We try to measure
it in terms of the intensity and scope of these disasters, and
we also selected those cases because they involve very com-
plex factors of civil strife and international involvement.
The foreign policy community in the United States seems
to be endlessly studying things, forming task forces, doing
special projects. Why are your projects and studies differ-
ent from those that have been done elsewhere?
McHenry: I think that when you look at most of the studies
under way in the think tanks around the country, you discover
the difference. Many of the studies that we're doing are
the kinds they don't do. You won't find Biafra-Bangladesh
studies. I don't think you'll find Burundi. You won't find an
inquiry into Rhodesian sanctions. They are studying those
larger issues that we were discussing earlier.
Morris: And they're also studying the issues as distinct
from the process itself. The Brookings Institution may study
a decision on naval weapons procurement in terms of the
pros and cons of a particular weapons system. They may
study the issue of troop levels in Europe. They will not, as a
general rule, tell you how the Department of the Navy weighs
naval weapons decisions, or precisely how AID or State made
its policy toward the Indian subcontinent. The distinction is
critical-again getting back to my original comments about
public interest research. What distinguished many other
groups in public interest research in the domestic area was
that they were describing institutions and processes of gov-
ernment, really for the first time. People had been talking for
years about the issues of the environment, of drug control,
and of automotive safety. But no one had really described
how General Motors builds cars or safety features, no one
had really described how the FDA polices the drug business,
no one had really described how the FTC does or does not
deal with industry. We're going to try to describe how the
Department of State and AID and the Department of Defense
and other foreign affairs agencies actually work on a day-
to-day basis on human questions.
McHenry: I think it is the difference between traditional
academic research and how decisions are really made.
Morris: I remember a prominent academic, leaving the
government, saying, "I'll never again be able to draw those
diagrams on the blackboard with a straight face." We've had
the same reaction from students who, having studied political
science, have now spent time with bureaucrats. After prowl-
ing the halls of the Department of State, they come back
and say, It isn't that way at all."
Do you think that you're open to the criticism that this is
just another series of swipes at the United States govern-
ment?
Morris: Yes, I think that could be a valid criticism, in the
sense that we are looking at what may be failures of U.S.
policy. But we're trying very hard to be objective. In the
cases of Biafra and Bangladesh we're talking about a civil
war, civil strife, international involvement in rather distant
areas, areas of minimal strategic interest to the United States,
where the factors influencing U.S. policy were extremely
complicated and the pressures on policymakers intense from
all sides. We're not trying to make value judgments on that
total policy process. What we're going to try to do is describe
the environment and the atmosphere in which policymakers
had to operate, the pressures that were put upon them, the
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decisions that they made, and then let the reality of the proc-
ess speak for itself.
McHenry: Incidentally, what's wrong with another series
of "swipes'' at the U.S. government if they are deserved
"swipes?" Particularly with the kinds of studies we're talk-
ing about-issues which ordinarily are handled very quietly.
They are not front page news until they reach a crisis or
disaster stage. The only way the public or the Congress can
have any influence on them is as a result of someone trying
to bring these issues out to the public in a reasonably ob-
jective and intelligent way. Now if that's described as a
"swipe" at the U.S. government, in our system of govern-
ment it's probably all to the good.
Morris: I think that's very important. We're dealing here
with a bureaucracy largely immune from public accountabil-
ity. The Department of State in particular, unlike most of the
other agencies of government, has escaped public account-
ability to a large degree. If one goes to the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, or to HEW, HUD, or Transportation, one can find
there people who are responsible for policy who have gone
out and actually faced their constituents in a very direct way.
If you've gone to an Indian reservation in Minnesota and
faced some very angry mothers and fathers on a school is-
sue, if you've talked to welfare workers in New York or in
Watts, if you've gone from the Department of Transportation
to face the labor unions in a trucking dispute, then you've
dealt with the American public in a way that the Department
of State rarely experiences.
McHenry: What is more, there are people dealing with
these issues in the government who actually appreciate at-
tention because it strengthens their hand. They aren't able
to get attention in the bureaucracy as long as the issue is
quietly handled and no one cares.
So by drawing public attention to humanitarian issues
you've strengthened those elements in the bureaucracy
which are very often the weakest.
You both have made a very interesting point. The do-
mestic branches of the government have to respond to a cer-
tain extent to domestic pressures because their constituents
are in the United States. Those American officials who are
dealing with foreign matters rarely feel constituency pres-
sure, except in great national catastrophes like Vietnam .. .
This leads to the larger issue of American concern for
humanitarian matters. We have always believed that our
country is a great humanitarian source of strength in the
world. But what will happen in an era of resource shortages if
large areas of the world are short on food and face famine
or drought, and the United States finds itself in control of
the world markets, with inflation driving up the price of wheat
and beef? How will Americans react? Are they going to be
willing to make sacrifices to help people with different skins
who are continents away?
Morris: I think one of the encouraging results of Vietnam
is that there has really been no decline in public interest or
in public contributions to humanitarian efforts in this country
-perhaps an increase.
Now I think that's a striking paradox in the American char-
acter, that humanitarian concerns and feeding starving peo-
ple, caring for children in disasters, are still seen as legitimate
purposes and goals of American foreign policy. When the
President of the United States announces that he's just given
10 million dollars to feed some refugees someplace, it's one
of the few things he can still do which is truly, genuinely
nonpartisan and gets bipartisan support in the Congress.
McHenry: It's one of the reasons I don't accept all the
talk about isolationism. I think Americans are still very will-
ing to play a part in world affairs if they believe we are there
for legitimate purposes and if they have some belief in the
cause.
I'm glad that you have a positive view of American hu-
manitarian concerns. When confronted squarely with the
issue - should we send food to people on the verge of
starvation? - Americans respond yes, from Herbert Hoover's
famous effort in the 1920's for a country which we opposed
ideologically, Russia, right up to our 1973 efforts to airlift
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supplies into the Sahel. On the other hand, when the issue
becomes a little more indirect, and strategic considerations
are raised, I have greater doubts. You said earlier, Roger,
that there were minimal U.S. strategic interests in either
Biafra or Bangledesh. From the way the United States gov-
ernment behaved in those crises, perhaps your view of
American strategic interests would not have been shared at
the White House.
Morris: That's true, and what we're trying to do is identify
and get out in the open what rationales underlay these
policies.
When strategic interests are perceived, the United States
has been willing to subordinate humanitarian considerations?
McHenry: The best example of this is coming out in the
Endowment's Rhodesian sanctions study.* Clearly, the hu-
manitarian objectives which lay behind the whole sanctions
effort became subordinate when the Congress thought the
United States was being hurt strategically by observing the
chrome sanctions. The Congress chose to violate interna-
tional law. Now, I suspect that this is an example in which
there was too little knowledge on the part of the public and
the Congress of the real issues. Because there wasn't suf-
ficient knowledge, it was possible for lobbyists to put across
quite successfully the idea that the United States ought to
violate international law because we had some strategic
interest in continuing to buy chrome from Southern Rhodesia.
Now, let's go on to another type of cross-fire. In addition
to the Rhodesia example which you cited, Don, there's an-
other category of issue in which humanitarian considerations
may run up against another principle often honored in the
breach: that of non-intervention in the internal affairs of
another country. Greece, the Soviet Union, Brazil, Indonesia,
Czechoslovakia, and Chile, to choose countries across an
ideological spectrum, all fall in the category today of having
documented and notorious violations of human rights. When
humanitarian issues intersect that principle of non-interfer-
ence, how do you choose?
Morris: I don't think it's possible at this point for us to
postulate any kind of theorem on what may be the most
agonizing problem in American foreign policy in the re-
mainder of the century-that is the whole question of inter-
vention. And humanitarian intervention in particular in the
cases that you suggest raises all sorts of practical problems
of national security and propriety under international law.
Our thinking is much more modest than a new postulate.
It would be wrong to assume that the purpose of this
program is to draft some kind of guideline or to arrive at
some kind of lesson for American policymakers in a humani-
tarian crisis. It's by no means clear that we're going to dis-
cover in the case of either Bangladesh or Biafra that it was
necessarily easy, let alone that it was right, or clearly in the
national interest, to have acted in a more humane or human-
itarian way. All we really want to do is to describe the pres-
sures and the complexities facing these policymakers,
because humanitarian crises are going to recur again and
again in a variety of different contexts involving a variety of
conflicting national interests. We want to make the govern-
ment better able to deal with those conflicts, more urgent
and alive in its approach to humanitarian concerns, and to
make the human factor a much more legitimate and closely
considered factor in foreign policy.
McHenry: I think it's entirely possible-arid I hope we'll
succeed in this-to be extremely hard-nosed about recogniz-
ing that there are conflicting interests which have to be
weighed in reaching a policy decision in all situations. But
we want to assume that the humanitarian factor is weighed
as heavily as it ought to be weighed, no more than that.
I think from my own experience in government that it isn't
weighed that much. It may be there in the backs of people's
minds, but in discussions it certainly isn't articulated.
Morris: I prefer to think of measuring the government
against its own claims. I don't think any President in the last
50 years, certainly no recent administration, has disavowed
a humane stand in foreign policy. President Nixon tells us that
the United States is most of all concerned with the lives of
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children around the world and with the generation of peace,
and with security only as it bears upon the ability of people
to build a better life for themselves. President Johnson was
concerned about wiping out poverty and despair and hope-
lessness around the world as well as in the United States.
President Kennedy wanted to man the ramparts of freedom
for the same purposes. Every administration articulates its
foreign policy in humane, moral terms. We're simply trying
to hold up to the government its own standards and measure
its performance.
Let's turn from the general to the specific. You first gained
attention through your Burundi study. Could you describe
how that study got going? Your conclusions received a great
deal of press attention, and more policy attention has prob-
ably focused on Burundi since your study than before.
Morris: When we began the program, we envisioned two
kinds of studies. One was longer term analysis and descrip-
tion of a policy process of the kind we've been talking about
(Biafra, Bangladesh, Micronesia, Rhodesia). We also en-
visioned a capability in the group to do from time to time
certain shorter ad hoc studies on humanitarian problems of
which Burundi was a prototype.
Burundi came to our attention when some young Africans
came to our office and simply raised the issue that the U.S.
government and the international community had been con-
spicuously negligent in dealing with the human rights prob-
lems there. Three of the student researchers who were
working on Bangladesh volunteered to work extra hours in
order to do interviews on Burundi. They were Michael Bowen,
Gary Freeman, and Kay Miller. We began with no clear pre-
conception at all of what had happened there. We knew that
there had been massive murders of the Hutu tribe by the
ruling Tutsi, but we had no idea of what American policy had
been. We set out to find out as best we could by interviewing
nearly every public official who had been associated with the
policy.
The Burundi study is an illustration of what we've been
talking about because the real faults that we found in the
U.S. government were not faults of concept or of approach
-they were faults of process. We discovered that the United
States had not considered actively or seriously its alternatives
by way of economic sanctions against the Burundian regime,
though the United States purchases 80% of Burundi's coffee
and has an economic stranglehold on the country. We found
that the government had ignored legitimate and serious argu-
ments made by the Department of State's own legal advisor
for African affairs with regard to our obligations under inter-
national law to deal with abuses of human rights of the kind
that went on in Burundi. We were describing the process by
which the U.S. government had been confronted with this
humanitarian crisis, and for bureaucratic and other reasons
had simply ignored alternative approaches. We were much
more distressed that the government had not done these
things, than we were with the policy itself. I don't know
how to draw the distinction very clearly, except to say that
we would have been less distressed if we had found that the
U.S. did the same thing after the most laborious and serious
consideration of all the alternatives. What we found was that
the U.S. government had dismissed policy alternatives with-
out real debate and had done so for a variety of reasons.
The Burundi study also illustrates something else which
is very important. It was personalized-we named names,
we tried to identify which officials were responsible for policy,
who had acted when and in what way and for what reasons.
This occasioned some controversy even among our own
colleagues in the sense that the foreign policy community
is not accustomed to being named that way. Officials, par-
ticularly in the African bureau, had operated for a long time
in relative obscurity. They did not appreciate publicity. So
long as these men are as immune as they are from public
accountability, so long as they're as obsessed as they are
with their own client considerations, then whenever those
policy considerations are consigned to them, they're going
to behave in the same unfortunate way. If we have any single
audience that we're trying to reach in addition to the Amer-
ican public and the Congress which ought to be more in-
formed, it ought to be younger foreign service officers who
are going to have responsibility in the future and who will
have to weigh these factors carefully.
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Well, perhaps it isn't institutional so much as attitudinal. It
doesn't matter whether it's the White House or the State De-
partment that made a certain policy. What matters more are
the values that the mid-level officials bring to their job.
Morris: It's a seamless web - attitudes are obviously
shaped in part by the institution and in part by a whole series
of cultural and social factors. What it boils down to is per-
sonalities. Foreign policy in the end becomes a matter of
temperament. Institutions are shaped by men, and are men,
and we're trying to reach those men, and this emphasizes
again the importance of the objectivity of the study. We're
going to try to describe the factors that these men have to
weigh. I hope we can get through to them.
Along those lines, what do you feel about the impact of
your Burundi study on policy?
Morris: Well, we've had some encouraging reports. Exactly
at the time the study came out, there was a resurgence of
violence in Burundi. We understand that a new initiative was
taken by the U.S. government to prod the African leadership
into dealing with the situation, particularly the OAU. And
we've been told privately that those initiatives would not
have been taken without the Carnegie study. Now that's the
most gratifying and direct kind of success you can have-to
be told that human rights have been moved to the top of an
official agenda because the Carnegie Endowment put it there.
I wouldn't hope for that kind of direct success in other
studies, but I think we have a very good chance in the case
of Micronesia, which is the newest study of the Humanitarian
Policy Studies program. Bangladesh and Biafra are ex post
facto. Rhodesia tends to be ex post facto. Micronesia is an
effort to study someth ng more prospective, a crisis waiting
to happen.
MICRONESIA
McHenry: Micronesia is one of those issues on which a
great deal of attention is being focused within a small seg-
ment of the U.S. government. Eventually, the Congress is
going to have to make major decisions on everything from
the extension of American sovereignty to the role of the
Micronesian islands in our foreign basing strategy. It's one
of those classic cases where there is a potential conflict
between the strategic interests of the United States and the
traditional American view that we are for self-determination.
Would you elaborate on that, because most people don't
know much about the issue.
McHenry: We took the Micronesian islands from the Japa-
nese during World War II. At the time, the United States held
the position that we did not want to take territory by con-
quering, that people ought to have the right of self-deter-
mination. At the same time the American military, remember-
ing the bloody battles that had taken place in that area, and
looking at the strategic location of the islands, wanted to
maintain them under American control. So we compromised.
The UN Charter had a specific category of Trust Territory
under which Micronesia fell, the only so-called Strategic
Trust which ever came under the UN. But 25 years have
passed, and we have to decide whether we are going to
fulfill our commitment to self-determination for those islands.
The military says that there is still an American strategic
interest in those islands, or at a minimum denying them to
other powers. The United States is trying to fulfill this com-
mitment to self-determination while not letting go of the
islands. As a result, the Administration has been negotiat-
ing with the people of Micronesia, trying to work out some
kind of arrangement whereby they would enter into a new
and lasting association with the United States.
Is this a problem in which no other nation is involved? Is
it between us and the Micronesians?
McHenry: Well, we can do nothing toward changing the
status of those islands without the agreement of the United
Nations, specifically the Security Council.
Morris: There is also intense concern about the Soviets
and Japanese because of the strategic considerations.
McHenry: We're looking basically at four areas: the first
is the international legal and political factors involved in
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changing the current status of the islands from a Trust Ter-
ritory to whatever it's going to become. Second, assuming
for the moment that the islands will in some way become
associated with the United States, what are the domestic
legal and political factors involved in their association with
the United States? And here you get into questions like:
does American sovereignty extend to the islands? Do the
islanders get citizenship? If they have self-government, does
the U.S. Congress have the right to pass legislation to veto
theirs? If the Congress makes appropriations, does the
Congress have the right to oversee how those expenditures
are made? If the islanders want their land protected, is it
possible for them to become a part of the United States
and have a situation where only Micronesians can own land
in Micronesia and other American citizens cannot?
Third, there are strategic questions. Is it valid to assume
that Micronesia is of strategic importance to the United
States? Many people say it isn't, and that even if it is, you
could fulfill our strategic interest in the area by other means,
by neutralization, by coming up with some kind of inter-
national agreement which would deny the area to other
powers - that we can indeed fulfill strategic commitments
without necessarily using Micronesia. The whole strategic
area is one we want to take a hard look at. Obviously in
doing so you get into domestic issues of how much in mili-
tary expenditures we want to make. Should we be opening
new bases in Micronesia when we're closing bases in the
United States and around the world?
The fourth area which we are taking a look at couldn't
more clearly be labeled a humanitarian area. Are there steps
which we ought to be taking in negotiations with the Micro-
nesians which might assure a respect for Micronesian rights?
Are we going to have a situation fifteen years from now
where the Micronesians will have been had, where we'll
have another trail of broken treaties along the lines of the
American Indian experience?
flow many students are working with you, Don?
McHenry: I think we will have had a total of 11 by the time
the project's finished.
Morris: Let me add a final comment to that. Some people
feel that these projects are new departures for the Carnegie
Endowment. I think what Don has just said illustrates a
rather more basic truth, and that is that all of these studies
are really concerned with some very traditional interests of
the Endowment - human rights, international law, inter-
national organization, the international role of the United
States, how the United States adjusts and makes its way in
the international community, the interaction of domestic and
foreign policy considerations - I think these interests fall
well within the charter that Andrew Carnegie set forth, and
well within some of the traditional interests of the Endow-
ment as practiced in programs for several decades. We may
be adopting a somewhat different and unorthodox approach,
and we may be enlisting students in a new manner and
tackling problems of unusual controversy, but the traditional
concerns of the Endowment are still very basic to what
we're trying to do.
The involvement of the students is an interesting additional
factor here - you really seem to have dual objectives. The
education of students surely must rank as one of the highest
returns of this whole project.
Morris: It may be the single highest return in the end. In
personal terms, it's by far the most gratifying part of the
program, because we're dealing with what tend to be very
depressing subjects, and sometimes the most cheerful thing
is the dawning awareness of young people about what's
going on.
Does this dawning awareness take the form of hope that
if they work at it they can change things, or cynicism that
it is all just too big to affect?
Morris: I think we have disabused several young people
of a somewhat conspiratorial view of American politics, in-
stitutions in general, and foreign policy in particular. The
result is to leave them with the awareness that these prob-
lems are intensely human, and therefore soluble, and that
while they may be difficult and complex, they are not really
overpowering. ^
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The Commission on the Middle East
Judging the conflict in the Middle East as a critical threat
to peace, in 1968 a number of private citizens from many
countries constituted themselves a Commission on the Mid-
dle East to devise regional economic measures to enable
those who had been uprooted by the conflict to re-establish
themselves and become productive and self-supporting.
Initially with Ford Foundation funding, and subsequently
with financing from the Carnegie Endowment, Near East
Emergency Donations, and matching funds, the Commission
sponsored two major study projects in the 1967-73 interwar
period. Under the direction of former Ambassador Vladimir
Velebit of Yugoslavia, with Professor Richard Gilbert as Eco-
nomic Consultant, studies were prepared aimed at future
development plans covering that portion of the Middle East
in which most Palestinian Arabs live: Jordan, the West Bank,
the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and, when political conditions
should permit, Syria. The plans were oriented towards em-
ployment, but covered all aspects of development. They were
to provide for both public and private financing. The purpose
was to contribute toward the solution of the refugee problem
by integrating the refugees into the general populations, not
by direct aid to the refugees, but by providing economic op-
portunities for all. The intention was not only humanitarian:
it was to promote peace. It was hoped that the plans would
serve as an incentive in the peace negotiations under UN
Resolution 242. It was also hoped that economic betterment
itself would create a climate that would facilitate peace mak-
ing.
Two research projects were undertaken: one for the ad-
ministered areas-the West Bank and Gaza, the other for
Jordan. The studies deal with the refugee problem in an
economic context rather than with the Arab-Israeli military
or political confrontation. Using somewhat different ap-
proaches, they make several recommendations concerning
economic development that are currently under study by au-
thorities in the Middle East and by international funding
agencies. The Commission has not endorsed the specific
analyses or recommendations in these preliminary studies.
However, they serve to emphasize the contribution that de-
velopment could make to peace in the area--the subject of
the Commission's ongoing concern.
Members of the Commission: Herman J. Abs, Kurt Birren-
bach, Eugene R. Black, Roberto Campos, Hollis B. Chenery,
Kermit Gordon, Thomas L. Hughes, Jacob K. Javits, Joseph
E. Johnson (Convenor), Edward M. Kennedy, James Linen,
Edward Mason, Reginald Maudling, Gunnar Myrdal, Aurelio
Peccei, David Rockefeller, Eric Roll, Pierre Uri, Eric Wyndham
White. Executive Director, Larry L. Fabian. ^
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THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION PROGRAM
Charles William Maynes Jr.
Bill, as you sit in your office here in New York, you can see
the United Nations. Many people say that it is becoming
irrelevant in the modern world. Yet the Carnegie Endowment
has been deeply committed to programs concerning the
United Nations. As the Endowment's new Secretary, what is
your view on the future of the world organization, on the future
of international organizations in general, and the relationship
of the Endowment to such institutions?
Bill Maynes: The United Nations is in trouble, but it is
not alone in its difficulty. I see the UN's difficulty as related
to the difficulty faced by others. If we return to a period
where more people have positive attitudes towards the UN,
we probably will see many of the same people with more
positive attitudes about the U.S. State Department. It's the
turning away from foreign issues in general which is the
most crippling development of all.
Why do you think people are turning away from institutions
like the UN or the State Department?
Maynes: One reason is that they don't believe the institu-
tions are effective in coping with the forces that are troubling
the average citizen. And, of course, they're right.
Traditional institutions of foreign policy like the State De-
partment or the UN operate on the assumption that nation-
states are in control of, and can be held accountable for, the
forces at work in the international community. The theory
may have made sense in the past, but now it breaks down
in the face of some of the newer international issues. What
government controls the terrorist who hijacks a plane? What
government controls the drug traffic? Or the pace of science
and technology? Or sudden shifts in trade which bankrupt
domestic industries?
In brief, the challenge to the UN probably is not an isolated
challenge.
Maynes: It's a common challenge addressed to all of us
in the field of foreign policy. That's why those hard "realists"
who point to the UN's disarray are deceiving themselves.
The disarray is everywhere.
Would you say then that the Carnegie Endowment, through
its New York office, has a vested interest in the UN or in any
other international organization?
Maynes: We don't have a vested interest in any particular
organization, national or international. We do have a vested
interest in the problems that require some form of interna-
tional organization to be solved. I'd like to make another
point on that issue. Today, there's a growing feeling that
foreign policy institutions like the United Nations or the State
Department aren't terribly relevant. But sharp swings in
popular mood shouldn't be the only policy guide for founda-
tions. It may make sense to set up programs like "Face-to-
Face"-our joint venture with the American Foreign Service
Association-or to continue our program in international
organization precisely because it is at least possible that
the popular mood may be wrong.
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How can a private, American foundation with modest re-
sources make a major contribution in the field of international
organization?
Maynes: The truthful answer to that question is that any
contribution will be extremely modest, although, heaven
knows, on problems like this everyone's contribution, even
that of many governments, is modest. But it's useful to look
al the environment in which we find ourselves. It's completely
different, I would think, from the environment in which the
Carnegie Endowment found itself in, say, 1946. Then, in part
because of the League experience, it was believed that there
would be relatively few organizations interested in or sym-
pathetic to the United Nations. Moreover, there were fewer
private organizations or foundations then actively interested
in promoting research on international issues. Look at the
situation today. Now the United Nations has its own research
institute, the United Nations Institute for Training and Re-
search, or UNITAR. There has been an explosion of research
institutes and university departments, all working on inter-
national questions, many of which are related to the UN's
activities. Today the Carnegie Endowment is only one among
many private and semi-public institutions trying to come to
grips with pressing international issues. In such a changed
environment, it would be especially arrogant to think that we
had any monopoly on wisdom or resources.
Now that you have modestly and wisely set limits for your-
self, what can the Carnegie Endowment do?
Maynes: To answer that question we probably have to ask
what any operating foundation like the Endowment can do.
Under current legislation, we can engage in educational
activities, but even that has to be done only in certain ways.
We can hire qualified people to do research on important
issues, or provide them with fellowships on condition that
we manage the program. We can form research teams. We
can convene conferences. And operating foundations can
set up training programs. Naturally, we hope to do any or
all of these as imaginatively as possible. But in the Iasi
analysis, what we're trying to do is create opportunities that
otherwise would not exist. That is not to say that these op-
portunities would never exist. If the problem is important
enough, I think that some day it probably will be faced. But
wouldn't it be better to face the problem earlier?
Could you describe some of the specifics that flesh out
the generalities that you have been talking about?
Maynes: Let's take, as the best example, our new ef-
forts to establish an international fact-finding center in
New York. The Endowment is convinced that there could be
a role of significance and usefulness for such a center to
play. Some institutions are studying the problems of the year
2000. Some others have studied crises that have already
broken out. There are very few, however, that tackle prob-
lems of the present plus the next six to 24 months, the so-
called near-horizon issues. Yet in the very near future these
are the issues that will lead to tension or violence.
There are, of course, good reasons why few organizations
concentrate on such issues. For example, as long as one
believes that the nation-state is the only significant actor on
the international scene, then some will argue-I think falsely
-that there isn't much for a nongovernmental organization
to do. They contend that only the nation-state has the rele-
vant information, and it may refuse to share that information.
But particularly with the rise of so-called transnational issues
among states-that is, issues where at least one of the actors
is not a government-there may be a greater opportunity
for international, privately-funded fact-finding. A private body
may be able to bring to the attention of the international
community in a timely and thoughtful fashion possible con-
sequences of such transnational issues. Or to seize other
opportunities.
Maynes: We see the center as bringing together teams of
first-class investigative reporters or others with relevant ex-
perience to work on issues like possible festering relations
between a multinational corporation and a nation-state, arms
flows into particular regions which seem to be assuming
ominous proportions, certain aspects of the energy crisis,
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internal issues that have external effects such as gross viola-
tions of human rights where evidence is available but where,
for various reasons-primarily political in nature-neither the
member-state nor the United Nations itself is in a position
to speak out in time.
But every issue you have mentioned is an issue that many
others have been studying and writing about. / take it you
have something more in mind than just another research and
study group effort?
Maynes: Perhaps the difference we have in mind can best
be explained by looking at some of the projects which the
Endowment has funded in the past.
Most have fallen into the area of policy-related research.
But like most other organizations the Endowment often
waited until an event actually took place before it decided
to study what the consequences might be for the international
community and what lessons might be drawn for similar
situations in the future. Thus, while there were important
exceptions, the Endowment funded a study of UN peace-
keeping forces after the 1956 decision to send UN troops
into the Middle East; it funded a study of the Congo after the
UN had been involved there; it funded a study of what the UN
could do in Berlin after the Berlin crisis had flared up again.
Now I'm as conscious as anyone else of the difficulty of
trying to begin studying such issues before they flare up.
There are reasons why organizations study such issues as
the energy crisis only after it has become a crisis. But to the
degree that it is possible, we hope that an objective of the
international fact-finding center will be an attempt at crisis
anticipation. The role the Endowment played in the 1950's
was an important role. But others are playing that role now.
The needs have changed.
You study an issue, hopefully, before it flares up, and then
what happens next?
Maynes: Much will depend upon the kind of report pro-
duced. In some cases, for example, gross violations of human
rights, simply publishing information can serve a useful pur-
pose by stimulating positive action. On other issues the need
for action will not be so clear. In those cases, a report
presumably would identify certain trends. The next step might
be a study group with appropriate representation organized
by the Endowment to consider what the policy consequences
of these trends might be-what steps might be taken either
to counter them or accelerate them. If we have a good draft
report which is controversial, we may also consider sending
it to the primary actors involved and asking them to comment.
In that way, it would be clear that both sides had been given
a chance to express their views prior to publication.
There seems to be some overlap with the Humanitarian
Policy Studies program. Is this intentional?
Maynes: There may turn out to be similarities. But there
are also differences. Take personnel. In the case of the
Humanitarian Studies program, we have teams of students
directed by Endowment staff. In the case of the international
fact-finding center, we will have teams of professional jour-
nalists and other experts with professional experience. Or
look at the focus. In the case of the Humanitarian Studies
program, the focus is primarily on the actions of the U.S.
government. In the case of the international fact-finding
center. the focus will be more international. Even the audi-
ence of the two programs may be different. The international
fact-finding center would hope to have a more international
audience.
If the fact-finding center is a good idea, why should it be
located in New York, rather than Geneva or Washington or
elsewhere?
Maynes: I don't think there is a better place to locate it
than New York where we hope to benefit from several ad-
vantages. One, the proximity to the United Nations. Two, New
York remains the media communications hub of the world.
Three, the city, despite its difficulties, remains the economic
capital of the world. Finally, New York has unparalleled in-
formation resources, the universities, the various UN mis-
sions, the large number of important visitors-all in all, I
really can't believe there is a better place for such a center.
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There is no question about the value of gathering the kind
of information you are talking about. But why should a private
organization act, even in part, as a service and information
resource for the world organization-the United Nations.
Why can't the UN itself do this?
Maynes: We're not trying to replace anyone. We are trying
to provide a service of interest to many audiences besides
the UN which for various reasons existing organizations
either won't or can't provide. Everyone recognizes that on
many issues, for political and other reasons, the UN and
member-states tend to be crisis prone and to deal with issues
that are already on the front page rather than with issues that
are still several months or a few years from being on the
agenda. In this sense the UN mirrors the governments that
make up its membership. Also, because of the rapid sur-
facing of new issues and the inability of established institu-
tions to study them in tame, there may be an opportunity for
a small, private group to be of use.
Turning from the future to the past of the Carnegie Endow-
ment, I wonder if you can trace for me how the Endowment
reached its present level of involvement in international orga-
nization affairs?
Maynes: To answer that question, we have to go back to
the immediate postwar period. In 1945 Dr. Nicholas Murray
Butler decided to retire after serving as the Endowment's
president for 20 years. Understandably there was a desire
on the part of the trustees to look at the overall program of
the Endowment. But there was another more important
reason for an overall review. The postwar era clearly called
for efforts to think of new ways the Endowment could under-
take relevant work on international questions. The trustees
therefore decided that the Endowment should increase its
concentration on the "practical problems" of the day. And,
as I said, they were traumatized by the experience of the
1920's. They didn't want the U.S. to make the same mis-
takes. So they decided to help the new United Nations estab-
lish itself.
Since that decision the Endowment's international orga-
nization program has gone through three stages. There was
the initial stage of trying to develop understanding and
support for the world organization. As part of this stage, the
Endowment supported a large number of studies on the UN
from the standpoint of individual member-states. Some 28
national studies were launched and more than 24 of these
were published.
The second stage of implementation took place in the late
50's. The Endowment turned its attention to more practical
questions involving expert assistance to the UN. I could cite
several studies as examples: the 1956 study of UN peace-
keeping; the 1958 study of the Berlin crisis in the UN; the
1962 study on Portugal and the African territories; the various
studies on procedures and practices of the UN.
In the middle 60's, the Endowment entered a third stage.
In this stage, the Endowment trustees and staff began to
focus on two important changes. There was a changed con-
text first in terms of who was interested in the UN, and
second in terms of the kinds of issues that were relevant to
international organizations. In the past, UN officials had often
informally asked the Endowment to undertake a particular
study. Now UNITAR exists to do research on problems from
the inside. There has also been a proliferation of research
institutes all over the world which, some hope, will be linked
with one another through the UN University which the Jap-
anese government has taken the lead in trying to establish
in Tokyo. These developments had and have clear implica-
tions for the Endowment's international organization program.
This was a different environment for the Endowment whose
response was to begin to feel its way toward new program
areas. Though the Endowment continued work on traditional
questions like peacekeeping in the form of two simulation
conferences, there were newer issues to take up like the
law of the seas, space, accelerated impact of science and
technology on foreign affairs. And the Endowment spon-
sored conferences on such topics as satellite communica-
tions. In another attempt to deal with some of the newer
issues, in 1968 the Endowment launched the travel and
maintenance assistance program to encourage young doc-
toral scholars to conduct field research on questions related
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to international organization issues. This program promotes
scholarship on such questions as transnational relations,
particularly from the standpoint of possible influence on
shifts in the locus of political authority in the international
system. Carnegie Visiting Research Scholars like David Kay,
now Editor of International Organization, turned to these new
subjects. Another change that the Endowment made was
in the subject areas covered by some of its publications.
Thus the Endowment participated in the World Order Models
Project, an attempt by scholarly teams from several con-
tinents to posit a desirable 1990 world order and concrete
steps to achieve it. In the 1970's, the Endowment will con-
tinue work on many of these issues through the fact-finding
center, if that turns out to be an appropriate vehicle.
Speaking of talking with other nations, what is the United
Nations Study Group? I notice it has been an activity of the
Endowment since 1964.
Maynes: Basically, it's a group of some of the more active
UN ambassadors from all regions who are interested in
meeting to talk about common problems. Obviously, as am-
bassadors, even in the informality of the Study Group, they
represent their countries, but there is a personal camaraderie
and a free flow of ideas which the participants have found
extremely useful for a decade now.
How often do they meet?
Mayries: Maybe five or six times a year. And over time,
they have discussed a large number of issues from reform
of the General Assembly, issues before the Security Council,
actual operations of the Security Council itself, and the
impact on the operations of the UN of admission of certain
key countries to membership. We have also introduced the
group to outsiders who are interested in or relevant to the
work of the United Nations. For example, the group had a
useful meeting with ten editors of important U.S. newspapers
to discuss the declining public interest in the activities of
the UN.
Maynes: The membership fluctuates but primarily repre-
sented in the group are countries that might be described
as just below the big power level. These are the countries
that actually do much of the work at the United Nations.
They do not have the veto in the Security Council, but they
carry tremendous weight among other delegations because
of the size or wealth or geographic position of their countries.
The future of the organization probably lies in their hands.
They're the ones who can make the organization work.
Maynes: They're off the record, but some of the discus-
sions have led ultimately to publication of reports. For ex-
ample, in the early stages and for the first time ever, dis-
cussions in the Study Group led to a synopsis of UN cases
in the field of peace and security from 1946 through 1967.
The synopsis has since become a useful reference tool for
delegations.
The Carnegie Endowment is one of the oldest foundations
in the U.S. Are there some resources that have been devel-
oped in the past which will be useful for future programs?
Maynes: I think there are great resources, and I hope that
every program we develop will exploit them. For example,
the potential growth of a fact-finding center should benefit
greatly from the enormous number of contacts the Endow-
ment has built up around the world for so many years.
What about training?
Maynes: I think the Endowment has a proven capability to
engage in training projects, and we are exploring the possi-
bility of new projects which the Endowment might sponsor.
One could be the identification of young people who might
ultimately become employees of the UN Secretariat or of
permanent missions in New York. If you look at some of the
studies that have been made of the personnel structure in the
United Nations, the statistics are startling. Less than four per-
cent of the people in the Secretariat are under the age of 30.
Thirty-seven percent of the people in the Secretariat are over
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the age of 50. The last major study of Secretariat personnel
concluded that these figures were likely to become even
more unbalanced.
Isn't it often argued that UN jobs are uninteresting?
Maynes: Yes, but that can't be really true when you look
at the excitement which some very distinguished people
have found when they moved to the United Nations. Look at
the cases of Rudolph Peterson who used to run the Bank
of America and who now heads the UN Development Pro-
gramme, or Maurice Strong in the environmental field, or Brad
Morse who is now Under-Secretary General. I think an ef-
fort needs to be made to try to attract young people of that
quality at an early age. They shouldn't have to make their
careers outside of the IJN and then go into it later on.
What appeal should you make to a young person today
interested in public service and considering the United Na-
tions?
Maynes: Let's put it this way. The UN is probably going to
get first crack at some of the more exciting issues facing
the international community. It's not at all clear, of course,
that the UN, any more than the various governments, will
rise to the challenge. And if the UN fails, the issues may be
dealt with in other ways. But the first effort will be made in the
UN. We see this with the environmental questions, the space
issues, with the law of the sea, with international control of
multinational corporations, with the drug question, etc. So
the UN will be a place where much of the initial excitement
of trying will take place.
Ws good to see an optimist about the United Nations be-
cause, as you know, the UN is no longer an area in which
many Americans in the foreign policy field retain much hope.
What do you think of this loss of faith by Americans in the
UN?
Maynes: I think it will be restored when Americans and
others - others because around the world there is a general
retreat inward - see that they cannot run away from inter-
national problems. I am not an optimist to the point that I am
willing to say that the United Nations in its present form is
going to succeed in coping with the newer international
issues. I am optimistic in the sense that I think some way is
going to have to be found to deal with these issues that will
involve international organizations, perhaps international or-
ganizations that do not now exist.
Most of our discussions, including this one, have dealt
with ideas and programs. The Carnegie Endowment also has
a substantial asset in its eleven-story building on United Na-
tions Plaza and East 46th Street, facing the United Nations.
How does the Endowment plan to use this building to sup-
port its objectives?
Maynes: We shouldn't make the distinction between pro-
grams on the one hand and the building on the other. The
building is a program. It was always intended as a program.
The issue is what we can do to make the building a more
effective program.
We are looking for new opportunities to locate in the build-
ing organizations whose objectives closely parallel the En-
dowment's and with which we can plausibly anticipate some
fruitful interchange. We would like to move away from the
more formal landlord-tenant relationships where they exist.
We prefer the co-location of colleagues who have obvious
mutual interests and potentially joint programs.
As a result of recent efforts, we have two new organizations
moving into the building this year - the African-American
Institute, which concentrates on African issues as its name
implies, and the Trilateral Commission which will deal with
the whole cluster of political and economic issues confront-
ing the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan. They join such old
and close friends of the Endowment as the Foreign Policy
Association, the United Nations Association USA, and others.
In the case of UNA, for example, the Endowment has recent-
ly worked successfully on a number of joint projects. We
hope this will continue. ^
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FACE-TO-FACE
David Biltchik
Dave, you say that your Washington program facilitates the
exchange of information between the foreign affairs commu-
nity inside the government and outside. What is this commu-
nity you see outside the government? Whom are you trying
to reach and how do you go about trying to reach them?
Dave Biltchik: It's one community, but divided into a lot
of parts. There's academia, the nongovernment organiza-
tions., the business community, and the media people, to cite
four obvious groups. Although we do pay attention to the
more, general public outside the government and outside
the traditional areas of special foreign affairs expertise, we
are not equipped to deal with citizen education in world
affairs in a thorough way.
Why do you think "communication" is important? Why
is this kind of program necessary at all?
Biltchik: Well, various people have described a break-
down in communications between the government and the
people -
And you feel that this breakdown has, in fact, taken place?
Biltchik: Yes, even in more usual channels, let's say be-
tween academia and the State Department, I've sensed, for
example, a lack of dialogue, a lack of real utilization, a lack
of real interest on both sides. Take, for example, the use of
advisory committees in the Department of State, or rather
the non-use of advisory committees - people don't pay any
attention to them.
I start from the premise that no institution can be self-suf-
ficient, particularly in a field as involved and complex as
foreign policy. You should want to reach out no matter who
you are-academia or government-you should reach out,
trying to draw on the best ideas available. If some people in
the government are reluctant or hesitant to reach out, then
let's try to help them. The Carnegie Endowment and the
American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) are well
placed to help.
Obviously AFSA backs your program heavily and so does
the Endowment. Has the United States government in gen-
eral and the State Department in particular shown any inter-
est in the program-any willingness to open its doors more
widely because of the things you've done?
Biltchik: Certainly the State Department has given us
all the rhetorical support one could hope for. Ambassador
Macomber was very supportive of us when we first started
out, and he was Undersecretary of State for Management.
In terms of my own detachment from the Department,
there were no problems; they encouraged me to do it.
Whether or not our efforts have had any impact on the
Department or on other parts of the government community
-that's obviously more difficult to answer.
Let's take a specific example: the luncheon honoring the
''Old China Hands'that we organized in January, 1973. One
of the comments we heard from a man whose judgment I
respect was that this particular event had done more to con-
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vince people in the Department of State that McCarthyism
was really dead than anything he could remember. So that
luncheon had some impact.
Biltchik: Well, there was some controversy but not very
much. Some people were worried about a negative impact on
the President and some people around him. I think that those
fears were exaggerated. In fact, the Secretary of State com-
plimented AFSA on the luncheon. He said he was sorry he
couldn't be there and thought it was an excellent affair. We
also got a letter of endorsement from the Secretary of
Defense.
Was the "China luncheon" your most successful single
effort to date?
Biltchik: Just in terms of newspaper, radio, television cov-
erage - the word getting around inside and outside the gov-
ernment - there's no question.
/ see your program as having two kinds of targets. You're
aiming at the community outside the government to show
them that the government is theirs and accessible. You're
also aiming at people inside the government to show them
that the government doesn't have to be a closed corporation.
How are you doing on the latter target? Do you feel that the
Face-to-Face program has, in tact, shown officers - particu-
larly younger officers, many of whom are thinking of leaving
the government - that the Foreign Service is a more open
place for them to work?
Biltchik: In terms of getting the government to realize that
it should be more open to the outside, we've brought 200-300
government people over the course of the last year together
with outsiders to talk seriously about things-to talk about
the U.S. budget with people at The Brookings Institution over
a period of seven weeks (once a week); to talk about devel-
opment with the Overseas Development Council experts; to
participate in evening meetings with people as different as
David Halberstam, Stanley Hoffmann, and Dean Rusk. These
are all excellent examples of the kind of open exchange we
are stimulating. To give you an example, on the evening
David Halberstam talked about his book, "The Best and the
Brightest," some people described it as a somber evening,
almost a wake. Halberstam faced senior level civil servants,
people who had lived through the '60's, who were intelligent
enough to be questioning, and who are somewhat apprehen-
sive about the '70's. He didn't have any answers. I won't say
it was a confrontation, but it was a difficult evening for a lot
of people, for a lot of us. It was a very unusual session. This
sort of thing just doesn't happen very often in Washington.
This is the purpose of the program-to try to get all of us to
think more about the hard questions. That's the benefit of
bringing in an outsider. He can make you think about some
things that you don't ordinarily think about.
Am / correct in assuming that your program avoids advoc-
acy? In other words, you do not have specific policy objec-
tives that you try to advocate as U.S. foreign policy.
Biltchik: Correct. We deal with topics that seem important,
and we try to bring in people to talk from different points of
view on that particular topic. Let's take Japan-we're going
to have a series of sessions on Japan and U.S. policy towards
Japan. We are going to have Japanese and American indus-
trialists, academics and journalists meeting officials, but we
won't support any specific policy.
Why can't this be done under the normal auspices of the
State Department?
Biltchik: Some of it can be done and is being done by
the government and by other groups. We are trying to sup-
plement what's being done, to fill gaps where they exist. We
have more flexibility and more freedom of action-we can
move faster. We can invite just about anybody we want
because we go under the somewhat unique dual colors of
an Endowment for peace and also a private professional
organization whose members are all in government-but
both are completely independent of the government. We are
trying to reach deeper into the government, get beyond the
dozen or so token government people who regularly attend
outside meetings, and get to the permanent, nonpolitical
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level to try to share with them the thoughts of people on the
outside who are working on the same problems.
You have referred to your consultant's role. What kind of
work have you done as a consultant under this program?
Biltchik: Consultant may be too fancy a title. From the very
beginning the idea was that we would serve as a broker, as
a middleman. This means not only organizing discussions,
or organizing an occasional workshop, but also helping
groups who call us and ask for advice on some specific
problem. Some specific examples: when Amherst College
was organizing its Copeland Lecture Series, they wanted to
bring to Amherst interesting younger people from many walks
of life, including the government, to talk about their own
careers. I was able to give some suggestions to the organizer
of that program. Various World Affairs Councils have called
in the course of the year. They know me and our program
from my visits around the country and from our 1972 confer-
ence on ''Citizen Education in World Affairs.'They've called
and sought advice about speakers. Or I've called them and
told them about matters of interest to them. Then there is the
Foreign Policy Association-I've met with them a number of
times over the past year. They've asked for suggestions. The
American Association of University Women has a yearly mail-
ing to 1700 local chapters, and they've asked for suggestions'
as to what they should put into it on foreign policy. I get calls
from television programs asking for names of expert partici-
pants for television shows that deal with foreign policy. And
people in the government call up and ask for ideas on pro-
grams and people-how they might best utilize outside
resources. This includes the Planning Staff and External
Research of State. I don't want to make this seem too gran-
diose, but it adds up.
Summing up your program, is it worth it? Is it worth it to
the Carnegie Endowment and AFSA? Is it worth it to you
personally? Is it worth it to the State Department? Is it worth
it to the larger foreign affairs community which you describe?
Biltchik: Let's take it in sections. For me personally, this
has been a creative and positive experience, and I've enjoyed
"FACE-TO-FACE" _
1717 Massachusetts Averiue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
[phone]
Sponsored jointly bg the Carnegie Endowment for International
peace and the American Foreign Service Association.
A program begun in December,1971. to improve understanding
of international Issues through direct communication between
government officials and private citizens.
David Brlt?hik
Director
it immensely. The range of subjects and people has been
wide. For the financial contributors to the program, the
Endowment and the Association, a considerable amount of
money is involved. How does one judge whether a program
is relevant? From the Association's point of view, it is worth
it because of the Association's professional dimension. Its
members want it, they feel the need for it. This is the first
time in the history of the Association that it has organized
active and widespread contacts between the professionals
inside the State Department and professionals outside the
State Department, all talking about their common interests,
on relatively neutral ground. And from the Endowment's per-
spective, I believe we have strengthened foreign affairs
dialogue between the policy operators and the public.
Where do you think this program is going to lead?
Biltchik: As you know, I intend to leave the program in the
near future. It's important that I do so because a new man
with a fresh approach should come in and decide what to
do next, what to throw out and what to change or keep.
But I think that some kind of program with this mixing of
people has got to continue. That's the essential element;
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you've got to bring people, as we say, face to face. But
there may be better ways of doing it, more efficient and more
productive ways. There may be other things we could do
which would have greater impact. It's important that in some-
thing as experimental as this program there be changes from
time to time.
To get back to your question of whether it was worth it, the
reactions I've had from people in the Department indicate that
this kind of activity was previously almost unknown to 99 out
of 100 people in the Department. Any time that we can reach
a substantial number of responsible government officials with
thoughts expressed in new ways-anytime we can do this
consistently, then we have a program that's worth doing.
Perhaps, then, the most important impact of the Face-to-
Face program is on the government and people within the
government rather than on the foreign affairs community out-
side the government. Is that a fair conclusion to draw from
what you've said?
Biltchik: Certainly, in terms of relative numbers, yes. On
the other hand, rarely does anybody from the outside turn me
down when I ask them to participate in this program.
I assume this is because they are pleased at the rare
opportunity to talk directly to mid-level government officials.
Biltchik: Exactly. This indicates to me that we haven't yet
begun to tap potential interest on the outside. If nearly every-
one I invite accepts, it indicates that there's a lack of other
opportunities with the same impact. And as time goes by,
the impact will spread within these outside communities. ^
THE JAMES THOMSON SHOTWELL LIBRARY
The James Thomson Shotwell Library serves as a major refer-
ence resource for the Carnegie Endowment staff, for other
organizations in the Carnegie International Center, and for the
United Nations community at large.
There are more than 8,000 books, over 250 periodical titles, 35
drawers of vertical file pamphlets, 1,100 archives of Endowment
publications as well as an extensive United Nations documents
collection, all easily accessible.
The Library has borrowing arrangements with other libraries in
New York and belongs to the New York Consortium of Founda-
tion Librarians. The Library has been designed to support the
program interests of the Endowment.
Two professional librarians, Vivian 0. Hewitt and Jane E. Low-
enthal, supported by two clerical assistants, are In charge of the
Library.
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ARMS CONTROL
Herbert Scoville Jr. & Thomas A. Halsted
How long has the Carnegie Endowment had an interest in
arms control?
Tom Halsted: Arms control always has been central to
the Endowment's concerns for promoting international peace.
I was looking the other day at the 1913 annual report of the
Endowment and found that one of the major projects then
was planning for the celebration of the 100th anniversary of
the Treaty of Ghent, which ended the War of 1812. It was
going to be a celebration of 100 years of peace; the birthday
party was to take place in December, 1914!
More seriously, in recent years the arms control program
has been concerned a great deal with strategic arms ques-
tions related to SALT, both from a technical and a political
standpoint. Perhaps Pete Scoville, who was in charge of
these programs from 1969 until 1971, could fill in a little
better than I on the recent background of Endowment pro-
grams in this area.
Pete Scoville: Actually, the first study to be carried on
in the strategic weapons area was done before I was involved
with the Endowment. It was a study for the Endowment in
which George Rathjens looked at our strategic arms policies
and the future of the strategic arms race. This particular
pamphlet ("Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for
the 1970's") was prepared in the summer of 1968 and pub-
lished in 1969. It was really the first in the public literature in
this general area. It turned out to be extraordinarily useful
because of the public debate, which began in the spring of
1969, over whether or not we should go ahead with the
deployment of ABM's and what should be the U.S. policy
vis-a-vis SALT. Carnegie made a very important contribution
since there was really nothing else in the public literature
useful in supplying background information for these discus-
sions.
Scoville: Well, there have been a number of studies in this
area. There was one which was done specifically on SALT,
analyzing various options for the SALT negotiations. I per-
sonally was involved in that study. Another particularly useful
thing, done in the year prior to the signing of the SALT agree-
ments, was a joint study carried out at Talloires, France, with
the International Institute for Strategic Studies. This was an
attempt to bring European and American thinking together
on the whole subject of limitations of strategic arms.
Can you explain more clearly what you mean by the impact
on policy of pamphlets like George Rath lens' and the Tal-
loires conference?
Scoville: Well, it is probably easier to detect a real impact
on policy from the Rathjens pamphlet. This was a key docu-
ment which was used not only by the public and newspapers,
but also by the Senators engaged in the debate, to develop
an understanding of strategic policy issues. This enabled
them to comprehend what up to that time had been con-
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sicered such an esoteric subject that the public couldn't
address itself to the problem.
Of all the areas of foreign policy which the Carnegie
Endowment deals with, / think arms control and disarmament
questions are the most technical and those with the lowest
level of American public understanding. How do you see the
role of the Endowment together with the Arms Control Asso-
ciation in increasing public understanding and awareness of
these problems?
Scoville: Some of these pamphlets are particularly useful
as a means of getting the facts out in the open. Of course,
they point out various policy options rather than becoming
an advocate for a specific line of policy. I think this is the way
Carnegie can best serve the public, not by being an advo-
caie, but by being an educator, so that what appear to the
public to be very complicated issues are simplified to the
po nt where they can understand them and make their own
judgments.
Well, let me try to be more specific. What is the role of the
outsider? In that senses / am referring to the Arms Control
Association and the Endowment as informed outsiders in
technical matters such as SALT, Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions, and general disarmament discussions. Are you
trying to educate the informed and interested American lay
public, or are you chiefly trying to talk with considerable
expertise but from outside the government to those people
in the government who are responsible for the formulation
of policy?
Halsted: We're trying to be effective on both levels. The
Endowment can team up with other groups with an objective
of exchanging information of a technical nature among in-
formed people who have different geographic or institutional
bases. It can also communicate through the Arms Control
Association (of which I am the Executive Director) on a less
specialized level to make developments in the arms control
area more comprehensible to the general public.
Arms Control Association and the arms control studies that
are directly sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment.
Halsted: I would say they complement one another. The
studies of the Endowment are generally by specialists for
specialists. The educational and informational work of the
Arms Control Association makes extensive use of those
studies. However, it isn't principally concerned with the spe-
cialists but rather with the more generally interested public.
Let's stick to the former for a minute, the Carnegie Endow-
ment's plans and programs. Can you give some more ex-
amples of the kind of work that you've done and what your
plans are for the future over the next two or three years?
Halsted: Well, we're into a range of subjects, mostly in the
strategic arms area, often having to do with the efforts to work
toward a SALT II Treaty. Occasionally we have participated in
joint undertakings with other organizations. For example,
we've been engaged in a study for several years with The
Brookings Institution to produce a fairly extensive overview
of strategic arms and arms control policy, how they have
evolved, and how they might develop in the future.
Who is working on that project?
Halsted: The principal researcher is Jerome Kahan, but
this is the product of an extensive study program involving a
good many more people who have been involved in meetings,
discussions and conferences over the last several years. A
second study of almost the same magnitude is one whose
principal researchers have been Abram Chayes, George
Rathjens and Jack Ruina. This project, originally intended to
look into the verification of arms limitation, has now been
broadened in scope to focus more on the actual operations
of arms agreements with a particular emphasis on SALT.
They're looking into how the agreements are working, what
some of the pitfalls are, and what some of the political impli-
cations of SALT may turn out to be.
What is the reaction of the U.S. government to this kind of
work by former officials? Do you think that senior American
officials now involved in the formulation of policy regard this
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kind of work as gratuitous or an additional valuable input
into their thinking?
Halsted: One bit of evidence suggests that this is not a
major problem. Senior government officials have participated,
in an individual capacity, in many of the conferences and
study groups that we've organized over the years in New
York, Washington, Talloires and Geneva.
Scoville: I might mention a study on a slightly different
subject that dealt with the control of chemical and biological
weapons. This looked at the Geneva protocol and particularly
at the use of such chemicals as herbicides and riot control
agents in military operations and whether these should be
included in any bans on chemical weapons.
Scoville: I feel that the study was very useful. One of the
participants was Major General Stone, who was then the
senior official in the Army's chemical warfare program. Some-
body from the White House/NSC staff also was an informal
member. These people participated in a nonofficial way and
provided valuable inputs of information. They in turn had an
opportunity for freewheeling discussion with outside experts
in legal, scientific and academic disciplines.
Halsted: The process you've been describing is something
very important, where an outside group is heavily involved in
a technical field which almost all other Americans have been
willing to leave in the hands of a handful of American officials
who formulate policy under heavy security constraints. Here
we have a very serious effort to develop communications
between informed private citizens and responsible officials
who can have a real impact on policy.
What is the role of an informed public in the field of arms
control? Why do you feel that anyone other than technical
experts should know much about it?
Halsted: Well, first of all, the public has an enormous stake
in the outcome of arms control thinking, arms control discus-
sion, arms control negotiation ....
But the traditional counter to that is that while they have a
stake, it is too complicated an issue for them to understand
their own best interests.
Scoville: I strongly disagree that that is the case. I think
that people on the inside claim these issues are too com-
plicated because they don't want any criticism of what they
think is best. I think these issues can be reduced to terms
which are understandable at least to the educated public. I
think this is a function which the Carnegie program and the
Arms Control Association have performed very well. They
have taken these issues, which very often were described in
technical jargon and where high security was invoked, and
stripped them down to terms that can be understood. One
can evaluate these subjects without access to classified in-
formation because there is enough unclassified information
available to make an informed judgment. The important
thing is to avoid burying these issues in technical details
which are not fundamentally important to making the right
decisions.
Why can't the government itself do the informing of the
American public?
Scoville: Well, I think the government can. On the other
hand, one of the great advantages of an outside group or
foundation is that it has flexibility. It is divorced from having
to make the policy, therefore it can draw on people from all
walks of life. It can call in foreigners in an unofficial capacity,
while if the government calls in a foreigner it becomes an
official action. So there are all kinds of opportunities for a
foundation to focus a wide spectrum of opinions on a prob-
lem. At the same time they can cut away a lot of the under-
brush and make the issues understandable to the public.
If I understand you correctly, it is not a primary objective
of either Carnegie or ACA to press specific positions on the
U.S. government.
Halsted: That certainly is true of Carnegie. It is perhaps a
little less true of ACA in that ACA starts from the position
of advocating arms control as a method of maintaining na-
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tional security. Therefore it would tend to promote those arms
control measures which it felt promoted national security. On
the other hand, even the Arms Control Association does not
promote specific solutions. Instead it provides a look at
alternative arms control options which might be useful and
ventilates various sides of issues even when reaching a con-
clusion or judgment.
Is arms control basically a technical or political issue?
Scoville: I feel it is basically a political issue, and the only
reason for bringing technicians into it is that one has to make
technical points more understandable so that the political
decisions can be made more clearly and easily.
Some weapons programs can be quite destabilizing and
can increase the risk of war. These are the kinds of weapons
which we would look at and try to bring to the public's atten-
tion. For example, MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targetable
Re-entry Vehicles) can increase the risk of war because they
make a first strike advantageous. Therefore, we urge serious
attempts to try to control them.
Could you give us some background on the formation of
the Arms Control Association? What has it done up to now,
and where would you like it to go?
Halsted: The Arms Control Association was set up in 1971
with the objective of providing better information on arms
control to the public than existing organizations were able to
produce. It proposed to inform the public of the results of
on-going projects in the arms control area, including those
produced under the Carnegie arms control program. In addi-
tion, it wanted to educate the public, often through the news
media, on issues in the arms control area such as SALT, the
test ban, chemical and biological warfare issues, and so
forth.
ACA produces a newsletter, conducts seminars, organizes
conferences and, upon request, provides testimony to Con-
gressional Committees and individual members of Congress
and the Executive on arms control issues. The Arms Control
Association has undertaken a number of these projects on its
own, and others in conjunction with Carnegie and other
organizations. An example of a program where both organi-
zations might work together very closely, and one that we
hope can be implemented in the near future, is a summer
school training project which would focus on improving the
size and quality of the body of experts professionally inter-
ested in arms control and in providing new and better ways
of informing the public generally about arms control prob-
lems. This would be a continuing project that would train
young university professors in the history of development of
arms control issues. In turn, we would hope they would go
back to their institutions around the country and incorporate
arms control thinking into their curricula.
What about the risk that you are just preaching to the con-
verted? Perhaps the only people you actually reach are those
predisposed towards arms control. Maybe you never really
reach vast numbers of people who have a vested interest in
large defense budgets and large weapons procurement pro-
grams.
Scoville: I think that is a very serious problem. It is hard to
get information out to those who are not interested in the first
place. On the other hand, we do make headway at reaching
a mixed audience by our contacts with the press. Very often
the reporters at our educational seminars are not necessarily
biased towards arms control; in fact, in some cases they can
be quite hostile. But they attend these meetings and listen to
all the freewheeling discussion in which a variety of points of
view are expressed. These ideas are later reflected in articles
which are published around the country. In this way you
reach a much wider audience. But it is certainly true that it's
very hard to get the military-industrial complex representa-
tives to attend a meeting on arms control. They don't seem
to want to open their eyes and ears to this particular subject.
Looking to the future of the Arms Control Association, Tom,
what do you see?
Halsted: The main focus for the immediate future will be to
expand considerably the public information programs. We
have a periodic newsletter that comes out approximately
quarterly. We also have had several seminars and informa-
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Lion discussion sessions with the Washington press corps.
We'd like to do more of both, perhaps holding more debates
and discussions for the benefit of the media at locations other
than Washington - perhaps one in the Middle West, one on
the West Coast, one elsewhere. We'd like to put out our news-
letter more frequently and perhaps supplement it with an
information packet which might be useful to editors and
editorial writers, as well as to scholars and libraries. In the
months ahead we will be looking for ways to best implement
these ideas and related notions in the public education area.
I mentioned the arms control summer school idea. There
are other substantive areas as well. For example, there's a
growing public interest in conventional arms transfer ques-
tions. It seems to me that this is one area where the Arms
Control Association can educate the public a good deal
about both the mechanisms and the implications of the
process of selling arms to other countries. Secondly, useful
studies in this area might be undertaken on the implications
of arms transfer policies, perhaps prescribing ways of deal-
ing with them. Maybe there are ways of reaching agreement
with other governments that have not yet been adequately
pursued to see if some kind of suppliers agreement could
be reached.
As with all the activities of tax-exempt, nongovernmental,
educational organizations like the Carnegie Endowment,
there seem to be four general categories: holding confer-
ences and seminars, facilitating and brokering the activities
of others, training new experts and fostering the publication
and dissemination of information. You are obviously doing
all of these. But which do you feel is the most valuable, the
most productive?
Halsted: I think they're all valuable; what appear to be the
most immediately productive ones are perhaps the confer-
ences and seminars. Publications are going to have a long-
range impact, but they may be aimed at a narrower audience.
Scoville: Not all the studies are for that narrow an audi-
ence. For example, the Rathjens pamphlet had 20,000 copies
distributed and was used as sort of a basic textbook for stu-
THE ARMS CONTROL---ASSOCIATION:
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.G. 20036
[phone]
A nonpartisan national membership organization,founded In 1971,
dedicated to promoting public understanding of effective policies
and programs in arms control and disarmament.
OFFICERS
Archibald S. Alexander
President
Adrian S. Fisher
Vice-President
Herbeert Scoville, ,Jr.
Secretary
Barry E. Carter
Treasurer
Thomas A. Halsted
Executive Director
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
William C. Foster
Chairman
Archibald S. Alexander
George Bunn
Anne H. Cahn
Barry E. Carter
William T. Coleman, Jr.
William H. Dodds
Adrian S. Fisher
Thomas L. Hughes
James F. Leonard
Saul H. Mendlovitz
David A. Morse
Franklin A. Long
Robert R. Mullen
Maurine B. Neuberger
Herbert Scoville, Jr.
Barbara Stuhler
Herbert York
dents and all kinds of groups all over the country. It had a
very broad impact lasting over several years. The problem
with the pamphlets is that the time between when you write
one and the time you get any results is considerable. That's
the advantage of face-to-face conferences and seminars.
There you get your point of view across in a relatively short
period, while the subject is still hot.
Pete, how many years have you been involved in arms
control?
Scoville: I was first involved in arms control in 1954 when
I was working at the Pentagon and the problem of a compre-
hensive ban on nuclear testing came up. Although I was test-
ing nuclear weapons at the time, I got involved in trying to
see what could be done to stop it.
Can you describe your own perception of how the public
awareness of these issues has changed over the last 18-20
years?
Scoville: Well, I would say that unfortunately all too often
the public attitude has been conditioned by some extraneous
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aspect of the problem. not necessarily the arms control as-
pect. For example, probably the basic reason why a test ban
was agreed to in 1963 was not because it was an arms con-
trol measure but because people were worried about the
hazards of fallout from atmospheric tests. Now just because
an arms control measure is approved for the wrong reasons
doesn't mean that it failed. But the public tends to focus on
one or two items which are particularly catchy or which poli-
ticians tend to emphasize. I think it is therefore very impor-
tant for a group of people like the Arms Control Association
to try to bring out the really important issues and develop a
broad base of understanding on these.
After all these years, are you optimistic or pessimistic
about the future and the field of arms control?
Scoville: Well, I guess you wouldn't be in the field of arms
control if you weren't a perennial optimist. On the other hand,
there are very discouraging aspects of arms control. One of
the most discouraging has been that in recent years arms
control has all too often been used as an excuse for buying
new weapons rather than for restricting weapons procure-
ment. Unfortunately, one saw this very graphically after the
SALT agreements in Moscow in 1972. Here was a very good
agreement which was signed, the ABM Treaty, which really
did put a brake on the arms race and cut down on the risks
of nuclear war. But what happened? Instead of cutting back
on our weapons program, we went full blast ahead on spend-
ing more money on weapons than we ever had before. The
bargaining chip theory that you have to buy weapons to
have bargaining chips in arms control negotiations is a very
discouraging development and one which we are very inter-
ested in exposing. ^
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PROJECT DIALOGUE
Michael Krepon, Wendy Witherspoon & J. Griffin Lesher
What led you to create Project Dialogue?
Grit Lesher: Project Dialogue began in the summer of
1971 as a result of discussions between the Carnegie En-
dowment and our own particular group, The Student Com-
mittee on International Affairs. We had established ourselves
in 1970 just after the Cambodian invasion, and we decided
that an important enterprise for our Committee with the
Endowment's assistance was to try to develop programs that
would foster rational communication between student groups
and the general public. Our feeling was that dialogue had
broken down. With the Endowment's backing, we began a
series of student-public conferences. Our staff has been
administering the program with the Endowment's profes-
sional cooperation and financial support in this enterprise.
From what f gather, then, your original stimulus was the
Cambodian invasion.
Mike Krepon: That's right. Back in May of 1970, there
were thousands of students swarming into Washington en-
gaged in various kinds of opposition to the Cambodian
invasion. Among them were approximately 150-200 graduate
students from seven schools of international affairs, the
Woodrow Wilson School, the Columbia School of Interna-
tional Affairs, Johns Hopkins/SAIS and others, and we were
involved in organizing this particular group of students to go
up on the Hill and speak to their congressional representa-
tives about the war.
What made you give up lobbying in favor of a longer term,
tax-exempt approach in association with the Endowment in
Washington?
Lesher: The mood, the climate at that 1970 crisis point had
been very tense-almost ruling out any kind of interaction
between students and communities. Our perception of the
situation was, for a number of reasons, most of them tactical,
that we were better off trying to communicate with, rather
than conflict with, communities, and that is where the notion
of dialogue came in. It was only by setting up some system,
some form of communication, that we were really going to
be successful in conveying our concerns.
By now you have been in the business for several years.
You've sponsored or cosponsored scores of conferences
involving students and the general public. You've had na-
tionwide activities. Have you found the dialogue concept
appropriate to fulfilling your objectives?
Wendy Witherspoon: The dialogue concept meets some
expectations that we had for it and doesn't meet others. It
certainly is a means of breaking down stereotypes on both
sides. Those stereotypes often are as damaging as the kind
of rhetoric that both sides indulge in. Dialogue is not a
vehicle for radical social change; it is a way within the Amer-
ican construct of values to explore different perspectives
among people who don't trade views very often.
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serves a useful purpose in building working relationships with
various constituencies.
Can you give me an example of a particularly constructive
dialogue, one that really worked?
Witherspoon: When I joined the staff, my first task was to
organize a dialogue in Denver on the general subject of
racism in foreign policy. The primary resource there was the
Center for International Race Relations at the University of
Denver. I went there and started working on it a couple of
months ahead of time. The plan was to bring students from
various universities around Denver and from the Air Force
Academy together with businessmen in the Denver area
whose businesses had substantial investments overseas, par-
ticularly in Southern Africa. A representative group of minority
leaders from the Denver area would also participate. The
theme was to be the implications of race in American foreign
policy with the specific case study of South Africa.
In preparation for the dialogue, I met with the people who
eventually came and with a lot of people who finally didn't
come. Stereotypes were very strong there. Some of the
students were African. Most of them were American. All of
them had very strong suspicions about what the business
people would be like, and how awkward the communication
would be. The business people did not want to come. Racism
was not a subject that they particularly cared to confront.
They had strong ques'ions for me about how I saw racism
as a factor in foreign policy, and they also held strong sus-
picions about what communications with students would be
like. They were doubtful as to the value of even sitting down
to talk to students about a fairly controversial subject. There
are two minority groups in the city, Chicano and Black, both
of which were just beginning to become politicized. Some
minority group leaders were genuinely interested in dialogue,
while others were interested in confrontation with the prom-
nent businessmen.
And what eventually happened?
Witherspoon: Well, January came and there wasn't a bliz-
zard. The first thing that happened was that there weren't
enough rooms in the inn. People had to double up and triple
up in rooms, with some very strange mixtures of business
people, African students and minority group people stuck
in rooms together. My first fear was that there would be racial
conflict right there and that the dialogue would never happen.
But that worked out, and generally, as the dialogue devel-
oped, we began with personal perspectives on racism,
moved into the United States as a society that experiences
racial tension, and then turned to foreign policy subjects.
Communication between businessmen and students did de-
velop. But the most interesting thing about this group of
businessmen was that they really provoked each other and
this brought about not only a good exchange of opinion but
a valuable revelation about some of the basic value struc-
tures that influenced their own feelings about racism as a
factor in foreign policy. Gradually, then, some students began
to realize the diversity within the group of businessmen which
tended to make discussion easier.
Out of this dialogue came the formation, by a group of
students based at Colorado College and the University of
Denver, of a research-watchdog group to look into corpora-
tions in Denver and the Colorado area that have investments
in South Africa. The group wished to begin trying to com-
municate with the businessmen involved, exploring their own
thoughts on the value of investments there, and to begin to
try to raise the issue in the state of Colorado. One interesting
thing that happened as a result of that dialogue was that a
couple of months later I got a call from one of the business-
men, a young guy who at that time worked for a large cor-
poration in Denver. He called me up to tell me what an im-
pact the dialogue had had on his life. He actually had quit
his job with the first corporation and taken a job with an-
other corporation strictly on the grounds that he would not
have to move to an urban center in the East, and would be
allowed to start a minority relations board within the corpora-
tion and start some technical training programs for inner
city children.
Your organization was founded in the days of student tur-
moil in 1970. The general opinion today is that the campuses
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THE STUDENT COMMITTEE
ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.M
Washington, DC. 20036
[phone]
tionships between domestic concerns and foreign policy
issues.
Lesher: I would agree with Mike's assessment. I think there
is less broad student interest in foreign affairs than there was,
but I also think that those students who were in the field and
who, for one reason or another, decided to leave have
already left, and what you've got now, I think, is a nucleus of
very good people who, in fact, have stayed in the foreign
affairs field and are clustered on certain campuses in the
country. Those are the people we try to locate, people who
were formerly, for example, in the Peace Corps, who have
since come back, who have an interest and orientation
towards working in their own communities. We can't draw
large groups of people as we could have done in the mass
politics of the late 60's. What you do find now is deeper
commitment for community education in foreign affairs, but
not involving as many people. It took us a while to realize
this, we had to do a lot of ground work in our recruiting, but
good people are out there. We've also discovered strong
interests in areas of the country where we really didn't expect
it. We consciously tried to go all over, not simply to the East
Coast and the West Coast, and were able to organize good
projects in areas like Madison and St. Louis.
A nonmembership educational organization established in 1970
to promote, through issue-oriented projects greater student and
community inval~ement In''the formulation of American foreign
policy.
WASHINGTON STAFF
Wendy Witherspoon-, Carol Yaggy
J. Griffin Lasher, Michael Krepon, Paul Clifford
REGIONAL STAFF
Horst Dornbusch, Brandeis University/Marvin Dunn, University of
Oregon] Margaret Leahy-Zondejas,San Francisco State Univer=
sltylBarry Lenk, Wesleyan University/Sid Melekos, Wayne State
University/Alan Schmidt, St. Louts University
ADVISORY BOARD
Richard Barnet Klaus Knorr
Elizabeth iMerin Borgese Eric Kocher Elise Boulding Arthur Larson--
Zbigniew iBrzezinski John P. Lewis-
Locksley Edmondson George C. Lodge
Richard A Falk Robert Meagher
Julian Friedman Robert Osgood
Richard Gardner George Shepherd
H. Field Haviland Barbara Stuhter
Joel Henning Marshall Shulman
Malcolm Kerr Willard Wirtz
are quiet and the students are apathetic. Do you agree with
that assessment of the change in the campus situation, and
if you do, how has it affected your own work?
Krepon: I think we_generally agree with that assessment.
In our own travels to campuses to set up projects, we have
found a great deal of student apathy. We have found it dif-
ficult to draw the numbers of students that we had wanted,
but then we realized that you don't need large numbers of
students to do a successful project. This forced us to modify
our original program design and to work on foreign policy
issues that had very clear connections to local community
problems. We found that it was difficult to build interest in
academic or remote foreign policy subjects, either on or off
campus, but it could be done if we could show direct rela-
Which foreign policy issues have you been most con-
cerned with and why did you choose them?
Krepon: After experimenting with a variety of issues, we're
going to concentrate on two, both in Washington and in the
field. They are the need for economic conversion in defense
industries and the international environmental crisis. For the
period just ahead, we have narrowed our interests to these
two issues because we feel they help clarify the relationship
between foreign policy and localized concerns. If a commu-
nity is concerned about unemployment and lack of social
services, we can often relate those concerns to local defense
production. We can also relate all this to foreign policy, by
associating the microcosm of local defense production and
lack of social services to national problems - what this
means in terms of health care, what it means in terms of
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transportation. It becomes the kind of issue that people can
get involved in on the community level.
'Witherspoon: We play two roles as members of the com-
miiaee. We are interested in fostering dialogue and commu-
nication, and in that sense our approach to constituencies is
the neutral one of providing an educational experience for all
of those involved. But having worked on an issue fairly inten-
sively, I think it's also important that we do voice our opinions
about current policy and, within the limits set by our tax-
exempt status, we point out areas where we think policy can
be improved.
You must have frequent frustrations. How do you keep
them from overwhelming you?
IKrepon: It is frustrating work. There are a number of differ-
ent problems that we face. One is just working on the issue
of public involvement in foreign policy making. That's an
enormously difficult problem; it takes a lot of stamina to keep
working on that. There s the frustration that both Wendy and
Grif mentioned earlier between the advocacy role and the
brokerage role between constituencies. There is the frustra-
tion of trying to get work done and then trying to keep the
organization going. We find far too much of our time is spent
do ng administrative paper work. The frustrations are there,
bu: they are certainly not overwhelming.
We're here, and we will be here in the future. We have a
pretty good idea of what the problems are and what needs to
be done. We come in contact with really good people all of
the time. All of this keeps us going, plus the certain know-
ledge on our part that students who become involved in our
projects gain a greater knowledge of what the problems are,
what can be done, and how to be successful in working for
change.
You talked about the students involved in your projects.
Recently, haven't you begun to place more emphasis on pro-
gramming outside Washington - on selecting students from
various campuses to work on projects in their own commu-
nities? Why did you make this shift?
Lesher: That shift was really based on two observations.
One was that our spending lots of time trying to work with
Washington groups inside and outside of government was
really not going to get us very far, simply because this is a
town full of influence peddlers and we're small fish in a big
pond. Secondly, when we were programming outside of
Washington during the first year our work was hit or miss.
So we decided to locate and work with students on the
campus and offer them follow-through resources. Our re-
gional representatives would be there for a full ten month
period organizing dialogues, following through on ideas that
had been generated from the forums, and beginning to work
on broader public education. We've had one student in New
York working with cable TV as a means for broader dialogue.
We've had another organize a high school speakers bureau
in New York. A project in California on arms control and eco-
nomic conversion promoted the formation of an inde-
pendent Citizen's Conversion Committee that's going to
study the question of transforming the midpeninsular area
around San Francisco to more of a peacetime economy. Our
regional concept was that we had to have local leadership for
projects, and that this really couldn't be supplied by the
administrative staff in Washington.
Witherspoon: The lesson that we have learned is that the
old model of student confrontation politics was a good way
for students to run around, to get rid of their inhibitions, and
to have a great time in the spring, but not to achieve any kind
of lasting constructive action. The model of regional staff
people that we have now is one in which a member of a com-
munity who happens to be a student works with the resources
of the campus, adds those to the human resources of a com-
munity, and attacks a larger foreign policy question that has
definite local manifestations. There are a few instances of
immediate gratification in a model like that, but it's a slow
process. However, in many ways it makes the student a more
effective agent for social change. It teaches the student who
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is involved where the power centers are, how they interact
with each other, and where change is possible.
1 understand what you're trying to accomplish in the short
run, but I'm not sure where you think it might lead. What are
your long range objectives?
Krepon: Certainly one long range objective is to build up a
probing relationship between the people who make foreign
policy decisions and the people in whose names those deci-
sions are made. We're really talking about participatory pol-
itics, an informed public, in the true sense of a democracy.
As Wendy said, we're not talking about confrontation politics
per se. We build in notions of civility and being able to work
towards change, but we realize where the power lies now,
and we realize what the problems are. The goal in the long
run is to build up public participation.
Witherspoon: As Mike said earlier, we'll be working in two
issue areas, the international environment and arms control
and economic conversion. We will have two staff people in
Washington working on each issue. At the regional level we
are establishing up to ten projects on conversion and envi-
ronment issues. We also feel we have developed a certain
amount of expertise in linking local concerns to international
affairs problems, that this kind of communication can be a
healthy input into the media reaching the American public,
and we intend to explore more avenues to increase that
input. Among those avenues are things varying from cable
television to the use of more readable pamphlets.
Lesher: We'd like to try to set up as many of these regional
projects as we possibly can. The arrangement between the
Endowment and Project Dialogue enables us to keep the
basic nucleus of our staff going while we get resources for
additional regional staff projects outside.
Could you describe a specific regional program?
Witherspoon: One of the projects that we're undertaking
is a good example of the shift from confrontation politics to
a more systematic exploration of political problems. It will be
at what used to be called San Francisco State College, which
was one of the centers of student dissent back in the late
60's and early 70's. It's a project on an issue that, superficially
at least, is one of those issues that will have very little public
impact - the law of the seas. A student who is working on
her master's degree will orient her research toward an explo-
ration of how the San Francisco Bay area will be affected by
future oceans policy and what the long-term interest of the
Bay area is in regulating ocean use and ocean management.
The general theme of a project like this is to make a seem-
ingly remote and uninteresting issue into something that local
people can understand and relate to their own region.
Are there advantages in your relationship with the Carne-
gie Endowment?
Krepon: Well, the positive outweighs the negative. The
advantages of working with the Endowment are having a
physical plant in which to conduct our work, having the con-
fidence and financial support of the Endowment, and having
relationships with other joint ventures under the Carnegie
umbrella. All of these things are helpful.
Witherspoon: I think one really positive thing has been the
ability to interact with people who have been in government
for a while, here or abroad, and who have a vast storehouse
of contacts that we don't have as newcomers to the field.
Lesher: Our program is mostly outside of Washington in
terms of our programming emphasis. The Endowment, on
the other hand, is very much involved in Washington, New
York and abroad. This difference in approach obviously con-
tributes to expanding the Endowment's reach. The relation-
ship is advantageous to both, I feel. ^
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PROGRAMS IN DIPLOMACY
Ruth Jett
Ruth, as someone who has been involved with Programs in
Diplomacy from the beginning, how would you define the
goals of this activity? And to what degree would you say
that they have been met?
Ruth Jett: The original aim of the program was to provide
diplomatic training for selected young foreign service officers
from newly independent countries in Africa, Asia, the Carib-
bean and the Mediterranean. From the beginning, in 1960,
we had the active encouragement and financial support of
the Rockefeller Foundation for what we all considered to be
an experimental program geared to the first years of inde-
pendence. At that time the governments concerned agreed
that these young foreign service officers needed to know
more than they did about international law, international
economics, current world politics and the functions of inter-
national organizations, and they asked the Endowment to
help. Some 350 fellows (including 21 women) from 60
countries have participated in the programs.
Prior to the recent shift to Africa, year-long courses were
arranged for English-speaking fellows at Columbia Univer-
sity in New York and French-speaking fellows at the Institut
Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva. In
addition, about 500 others have participated in the regional
institutes and seminars which the Endowment arranged in
various parts of the world. A sizeable portion of the interna-
tional diplomatic community has had some involvement in the
Carnegie Endowment's diplomatic training programs.
In helping people from so many countries, how did the
Endowment take into account all the different backgrounds,
needs and aspirations? Do you feel that Programs in Diplo-
macy was sufficiently flexible?
Jett: It was indeed difficult in the beginning. We were
working with people who had experienced different colonial
administrations and lived according to different traditional
patterns. Fortunately, we were able to make special arrange-
ments with the faculties of the School of International Affairs
at Columbia and the Graduate Institute in Geneva who often
gave individual attention to the needs of the Carnegie fel-
lows. At both institutions an academic counsellor was em-
ployed to advise fellows on their courses. The Endowment
organized special lecture programs outside the universities.
In addition, we provided a program of summer travel at the
end of each academic year to give the fellows some ex-
posure to a number of international organizations, special-
ized agencies of the United Nations, and government opera-
tions in a number of major foreign capitals, including Eastern
Europe.
Apart from the tact that the Endowment's headquarters are
in New York and its European Center in Geneva, was there
any other reason that these two universities were chosen?
Jett: The fact that both institutions had strong ties with the
United Nations made for a happy coincidence. As you will
recall, the early 60's was the period of rapid decolonization
in which the United Nations was often dramatically involved.
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There was the Congo crisis, for example, and a host of re-
lated problems of immediate importance to the people in our
diplomatic training programs. Since the United Nations was
the most important forum for newly independent states, it was
necessary for the younger foreign service officers to under-
stand the United Nations as well as the problems and oppor-
tunities for solution provided by international organizations.
With the development of international organizations came the
diplomatic innovation of the permanent mission. Many of our
former fellows have returned to New York and Geneva to
assume important posts in their missions.
Were there any particular problems for the Endowment,
which, after all, is an American foundation, in developing
and implementing such a program with its possible political
implications? For example, was it ever perceived as promot-
ing American interests or views?
Jett: In the beginning there were questions raised by some
governments about the suitability of such a program being
developed by an American foundation. On the other hand,
many governments were familiar with the Endowment's half
century of activity in international fields, its worldwide reputa-
tion for impartiality, its research and publications related to
the work of the UN and its agencies. Whatever suspicions
and sensitivities existed were overcome by the experience
of the programs. Columbia University, of course, had its own
international reputation and the same was true of the Gradu-
ate Institute in Geneva.
Jett: From the beginning fellows were nominated by their
governments on the basis of a commitment to serve those
governments after the training period. In some cases they
were already in service; in others, they were newly recruited
from universities. They were interviewed by an Endowment
staff member or a UN official in their area. The interview gave
the candidate some idea of what the program was all about
and how he or she might fit into it, and, as well, gave the
Endowment some idea of the personality of the candidate
who in most cases would be living and studying in a strange
environment. The principle was to help governments as much
as possible with their training needs. Returning fellows have
often assisted with in-service training programs in their
ministries.
Has the Endowment made any attempt to maintain contact
with the fellows once they return to their foreign service?
Jett: Yes, we are in almost regular contact by mail, and we
get to see a large number of the "Carnegie alumni" when
they return to their missions in New York and Geneva. Many
show up every year in New York for the General Assembly.
In addition to the personal contacts with Endowment staff
members who travel on business to various areas of the
world, the fellows themselves have taken some initiatives to
maintain contact as a result of their common experience.
While I would not want to exaggerate the strength of these
ties, I do know of instances where two or three former fellows
have participated in international conferences in which their
respective governments have had differing positions. On
more than one occasion, their previous association has
helped to resolve difficult problems.
You said that there had been a shift of training programs
to Africa. Can you discuss the reasons for this move and give
some information about what is taking place in Africa where
the programs are now located?
Jett: The year-long training program we have just talked
about was first envisioned as a five year experiment. It quickly
became apparent that the program was of great value to the
governments concerned and, largely on their recommenda-
tion, the period was extended to ten years so that for many
the critical first decade of independence was covered. During
this period, as more and more people were attracted to the
program, the transportation and living costs mounted. It also
became evident that the year-long courses in western univer-
sities could not fully respond to the immediate needs of some
of the countries, particularly in Africa, where the largest num-
ber of fellows were coming from. We were impressed with
the successful experiences of the regional Institutes in Diplo-
macy which the Endowment organized at Makerere University
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College in Uganda, at University College in Tanzania (Dar es
Salaam), and at the Kenya Institute of Public Administration
where problems of the East African community were treated
in a much different way from universities thousands of miles
from the scene. We concluded that it might be more appro-
priate to shift the program to one or more African sites, and
by so doing to continue to help meet the over-all educational
needs of that continent.
One of the seminars that had taken place annually over a
period of years was the Consular and Chancery course held
at the University of Cameroon, in Yaounde, so that in con-
sidering the transfer of the training to Africa, the University of
Cameroon was a likely place for the establishment of a full
year's diplomatic trainirg program. We were aware that in the
beginning Yaounde would cater primarily to French-speaking
countries, but French and English are official languages of
Cameroon and, in the future, it will be possible to offer
courses in both languages. Since we were concerned about
the most recently independent countries in Southern Africa
and for English-speaking Africa as well, the Endowment also
decided to provide limited support for a diplomatic training
course now being organized at the University of Nairobi.
How have these new programs been progressing? Is there
any special role that they are playing to meet more specific
regional needs for the present and immediate future?
Jett: Well, after the usual start up period, the program in
Cameroon is now in full swing. There were some initial prob-
ems, especially since the International Relations Institute of
Cameroon (IRIC) was a relatively new institution. It needed
personnel, library resources and buildings. But for the most
part, these problems have been overcome. One of the excit-
ing innovations of the program last year was the seminar
sponsored by IRIC on the law of the sea in relation to African
concerns - the first such seminar held on the African con-
tinent and one which produced a policy statement that has
found its way into the continuing international debate. IRIC
has also collaborated with the Hague Academy's External
Program (with which the Endowment has worked for many
years) on a series of seminars examining African perspec-
tives on international law, and on the regional harmoniza-
tion of technical cooperation between African and other
countries and institutions. Another seminar at IRIC has
focused on African universities and the teaching of interna-
tional relations. All the universities and organizations in
Africa concerned with international relations were invited
to send representatives. We also anticipate that the diplo-
matic training course at the University of Nairobi will devote
its attention to environmental problems, particularly since
the Environment Secretariat has now been set up in Nairobi.
Can you give some of the highlights of the program that
you remember particularly well, some personal reactions to
the experience of being associated with such an unusual
program?
Jett: Your question contains a part of the difficult answer.
It has been such an unusual program that it is difficult to
speak in terms of highlights. Enjoying the successes of fel-
lows who make straight ''A'records at Columbia, travelling
with them to Europe and North Africa, seeing their countries
become independent, watching former fellows go about their
duties at the United Nations where some are now full ambas-
sadors, participating in high-level meetings on the seabed
or at UNCTAD with the problems of trade and development
uppermost in their minds - these are all highlights. I have
found the whole experience especially rewarding personally.
Quite apart from the wonderful people I have met from all
over the world, I have learned a lot each year about the con-
duct (or misconduct) of international affairs, about the needs
of the developing world, about the limitations of diplomacy
and the contraints imposed on those international organiza-
tions which we once thought could solve all the problems.
Also, it has been interesting to watch the development of
other institutions concerned with these problems -the Ni-
gerian Institute of International Affairs, the Eastern Regional
Organization for Public Administration, the Institute of Inter-
national Relations at the University of the West Indies, St.
Augustine - and others - with which the Endowment has
cooperated. There are naturally problems and frustrations
but our faith has been strengthened by the cooperation and
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mutual respect which the programs have engendered.
All you have said, thus far, would seem to indicate that
close relationships have developed between the Endowment
and the governments who have sent candidates to the pro-
gram. Has this been a particularly difficult task? Have there
been any special problems?
Jett: To answer the second part of the question first, the
only problem we have had is in trying to accommodate the
many requests that come from a number of the more recently
independent countries. As I have said, the program became
widely known, and for many, especially in the 1960's, the
Endowment stood as the single nongovernmental organiza-
tion that was in this respect responding to their needs. The
problem today is one common to so many organizations -
limited resources.
It is certainly true that we have enjoyed close relationships
with many governments from the very beginning. Before the
program was put into operation, the Endowment conducted
a worldwide survey of the needs of newly independent and
about-to-become independent governments. We tried to tailor
the programs to meet these needs. But the close relationships
with governments was due, in my opinion, to the personality
and dedication of the first director of Programs in Diplomacy,
Reginald Barrett. Prior to coming to the Endowment to start
the program, Barrett had worked as Liaison Officer for Nigeria
in the British Embassy in Washington, and had worked with
the Race Relations Institute at Fisk University in Nashville,
Tennessee, while on leave from Cambridge University. He
had a deep knowledge and interest in the third world
coupled with boundless energy and charm. An important part
of his success came from his ability to understand the psy-
chological as well as the material needs of the countries with
which we were dealing. And, of course, the same must be
said for my predecessor in this job, J. R. P. Dumas, who was,
in fact, a graduate of the first program we ran in Geneva in
1961. At that time, Dumas was a young foreign service officer
from the Federation of the West Indies. When the Federation
was dissolved and Trinidad and Tobago became indepen-
dent, he was sent to help establish his government's first
embassy in Washington, and subsequently to Addis Ababa
to open the embassy there. So you see, by the time he be-
came director of the program (on leave from his government)
he had an unusual accumulation of experience and know-
ledge to bring to the job. He left the Endowment in 1971 to
take up the post of Minister-Counsellor of Trinidad and
Tobago's Embassy in Washington and in late 1973 returned
to Ethiopia as Ambassador with accreditation to several East
African countries.
The whole subject of diplomacy in a transnational world
has lately become something of a favorite academic subject.
And it's clear that traditional methods of approaching inter-
state relations are undergoing revision. Have you observed
any changes over the 1960's in the way African participants
in the programs in Yaounde and Nairobi are approaching
their diplomatic careers in the 1970's?
Jett: It is too early to say whether there have been any
different approaches to careers based on the Yaounde and
Nairobi experience. In general, there is a tendency toward
specialization in diplomacy because world problems have
become inextricably tied up with science and technology,
whether they be problems of disarmament, communication
satellites, the seabed or the environment - all of these are
of much deeper concern to third world diplomats who have
less expertise to draw upon than developed countries have.
The questions of development and trade and the elimination
of racism are, of course, continuing preoccupations.
I would say that African countries are more and more ap-
proaching their problems from the standpoint of the African
continent's interest rather than their specific national inter-
ests.
Of course, the Yaounde and Nairobi projects are new and
will have to be evaluated. Meanwhile we are keeping in touch
with Programs in Diplomacy alumni through such devices as
a recent meeting with them, along with academics and En-
dowment trustees, on the subject of the future of African
diplomacy. ^
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States
The German Marshall Fund of the United States shares the
Washington and New York offices of the Carnegie Endow-
ment. Under an arrangement between the Fund and the En-
dowment, the Fund will use Carnegie facilities and admin-
istrative support for as long as it is deemed mutually desir-
able and programmatically advantageous for both parties.
The Fund, a private, nonprofit American foundation, is a
memorial to the Marshall Plan, created by a generous gift
from the Federal Republic of Germany. The arrangement
made between the German government and the American
Board of Trustees stipulates that "... the German Marshall
Fund will administer its proceeds without any influence by
German authorities, and will use them to promote American
and European study and research projects."
The Fund will concentrate its activities in three main areas:
(1) the comparative study of problems confronting advanced
industrial societies; (2) the study of problems of international
relations that pertain to the common interests of Europe and
the United States; and (3) support for the field of European
studies. The Fund's stated purpose is:
To contribute to the better understanding and resolution
cf significant contemporary or emerging common prob-
lems of industrial societies-internally and in their rela-
tionships with each other and with developing societies-
by facilitating new and sustained contacts and coopera-
tion between persons with shared interests and respon-
sibilities in the United States, Europe and elsewhere.
Board of Trustees: Arlin M. Adams, Harvey Brooks, Chair-
man; Richard N. Cooper, Robert Ellsworth, Treasurer; Max
Frankel, Guido Goldman, Thomas L. Hughes, Secretary;
Carl Kaysen, Donald M. Kendall, Elizabeth Midgley, Benjamin
H. Read, William M. Roth, Howard R. Swearer.
Honorary Trustees: C. Douglas Dillon, Chairman; James 13
Conant, W. Averell Harriman, Gabriel Hauge, Milton Katz,
Robert A. Lovett, John J. McCloy, James A. Perkins, David
Rockefeller.
Officers and Staff: Benjamin H. Read, President; Marianne
Santone, Executive Secretary; Peter R. Weltz, Research Con-
sultant; Brenda Appleby, Secretary; Peggy Hanson, Comp-
troller; Richard C. Ferguson, Assistant Treasurer. ^
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FOREIGN POLICY
Samuel P. Huntington, Warren Demian Manshel & Richard Holbrooke
FOREIGN POLICY began in the Fall of 1970. Could you
tell us what led you to found it?
Sam Huntington: We had the idea of the magazine in
1968 or 1969. Warren and I had had somewhat different views
on the question of Vietnam, after having been close friends
for 20 years, dating from our graduate school days. But we
shared a mutual concern about what was happening to the
discussion of American foreign policy in the professional
community and felt that it was desirable and necessary to do
something to restore communication between people who
had been shouting at each other....
Did you feel that the existing magazines at that time did
not fulfill that need?
Huntington: We felt there was a need for a new magazine.
I think if one looks at the history of magazines concerned
with foreign policy and international affairs, you can see that
at each major turn in U.S. foreign policy, each shift in the
U.S. role in the world, a new magazine has come into exis-
tence - after World War I and again after World War II, for
example - and we felt this was the time for a new journal
lacking an institutional memory or too strong an identification
or image from the past.
When the magazine was founded, did you envisage pre-
senting any particular point of view?
Warren Manshel: No, on the contrary, we had no partic-
ular point of view. We had divergent points of view, which we
wanted to present in the pages of the magazine. One of the
main purposes of the magazine was to bring together people
who, under the impact of the disagreement on Vietnam, had
not communicated with one another-to bring them together
in the pages of one magazine to discuss the direction of
American foreign policy after the war. These points of view
were too divergent to be considered pleading for a special
cause.
This was not your first venture in publishing, Warren. To
what extent was FOREIGN POLICY related to your earlier
founding of THE PUBLIC INTEREST magazine?
Manshel: Well, the only thing it reflects is an ability to learn
quickly. I started THE PUBLIC INTEREST about five years
prior to FOREIGN POLICY. It was edited by Irving Kristol
together with Daniel Bell - now Nathan Glazer - and had
gotten a great deal of attention and serious interest. I enjoy
my association with that magazine, but my own training and
primary interest are in foreign policy, and that field was in
particular need of a new publication.
Now that the magazine has outlasted the Vietnam war, how
do you look back on its success? Has it moved towards the
objectives which you set over three years ago?
Huntington: Yes, I certainly think it has. As a matter of
fact, I just went back and reread a memo which I sent to
Warren in the summer of 1969 about what the purposes of
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the magazine we hoped to found might be, and in looking
over that memo it seems to me we have done very well in
terms of promoting the goals which we had in mind then.
Can you be more specific about those goals and how you
feel you've achieved them?
Huntington: One goal was to have a variety of viewpoints
expressed in the magazine. A second goal was to serve as a
vehicle for the expression of new viewpoints on policy issues,
iconoclastic viewpoints, and to promote a reconsideration of
the role of the U.S. in world affairs. I think that both in general
terms and in terms of specific articles we've done that.
Manshel: I think if FOREIGN POLICY hadn't existed for the
last three years it would have to be started today. What Henry
Kissinger is talking about today, an end to civil war on the
issue of foreign policy, is the kind of motivation which under-
lay the founding of our magazine. In the pages of FOREIGN
POLICY we bring together people of divergent views .. .
Can you give some examples of the divergent authors that
you've published?
Manshel: Our authors range from Senators Goldwater and
Stennis to Richard Falk... .
Huntington:... and Richard Barnet ....
Manshel: . . . and our Editorial Board brings together
people like Zbigniew Brzezinski and Stanley Hoffmann. But
I don't want to play up the differences. The purpose of the
magazine is not to create or cash in on controversy, but, on
the contrary, to stimulate a discussion of topics by people
who disagree but have important things to say. One good
debate on an important issue was the one between Ronald
Steel and Pierre Hassner on spheres of influence, and
another was the varying views we've published on the virtues
and vices of multinational corporations.
Huntington: Let me cite some other examples of what I
would consider important articles. We ran an interview with
George Kennan on the 25th anniversary of his "X" article.
This was reported all over the country, and reprinted in
several places. We ran the most controversial article ever
written on the oil crisis, "Is the Oil Shortage Real?" by Pro-
fessor Adelman of MIT. It was reprinted in the Wall Street
Journal and provoked what amounted to a quasi-official reply
by a senior State Department official.
Manshel: We have also run personality analyses of leading
personalities, such as Dean Rusk and John Foster Dulles.
I am also pleased with our efforts to pair contrasting view-
points, such as the debate on the War Powers Bill between
Goldwater and Eagleton.
Huntington: I would add that, from my vantage point as a
professor at Harvard, FOREIGN POLICY has become an es-
sential forum for the exchange of ideas on the front edge of
the debate over our future. We print major articles by such
men as John Kenneth Galbraith, Albert Wohlstetter, Paul
Warnke, Leslie Gelb, Philip Windsor, all used extensively in
the field of political science.
Manshel: In economics, Richard Cooper, Fred Bergsten,
Harry Johnson, Harald Malmgren, Raymond Vernon, Dwight
Perkins, and others, have made us the leading general circu-
lation magazine in the field of international economics.
Looking back on the first three years of the publication, it
seems clear FOREIGN POLICY has been a success edi-
torially. You've received a great deal of attention in the press
and have been quoted extensively. How does the magazine
look to you from a business point of view? Is it losing money?
Manshel: The magazine is not making money, but then it
was not established for that purpose. The circulation of
FOREIGN POLICY has gone up substantially. We started with
3,700 subscribers three years ago. We now sell more than
three times that number. When the Carnegie Endowment
entered into its agreement with us in April 1972, we had ap-
proximately 5,000 subscribers; today we have about 11,000.
This is a substantial increase, achieved with a relatively small
input of money. I couldn't claim to be totally happy with it; I
would prefer the magazine at this time to have at least 50%
more subscribers than it does. But I am confident that we are
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You talk about the audience of the magazine. Who are the
people you are trying to reach in America today?
Huntington: We're trying to reach the people who have a
serious concern with foreign policy. This includes people in
the government, in the Washington community, in the press,
academic people, and citizens who are concerned with for-
eign policy issues. We have subscribers in every state and
in at least 83 foreign countries.
Manshel: One of the major differences between this
magazine and any other magazine dealing with American
foreign policy is that we interpret foreign policy in a very
broad manner. We do not deal with government-to-govern-
ment relations, but concern ourselves with economic issues,
bureaucratic issues, relations with other countries. We have
carried many articles on trade; from trading with different
areas to the possibility of trade wars. We have dealt with the
problem of international balances of payments, the dollar
crisis, SDR's, to a far greater extent, I believe, than any other
journal in the field.
We began, by the way, with a brilliant young Managing
Editor, John Franklin Campbell, who died at the age of 31.
He did an enormous amount to create a viable magazine,
and we miss him greatly.
Manshel: The agreement with the Carnegie Endowment
was for a preliminary two-year period, with the expectation
that it would become a renewable association after this initial
two year arrangement. The Carnegie Endowment is helping
National Affairs, Inc., which publishes FOREIGN POLICY, with
the expenses of publishing the magazine, and provides, in
addition to that, office space both in Washington and New
York. The initial agreement also made provision for FOREIGN
POLICY to take over the unexpired subscriptions of Interna-
tional Conciliation magazine, which the Endowment pub-
lished until 1972.
Is the arrangement an essential part of the magazine's
present character?
Manshel: It is certainly a very enjoyable aspect of it and
one that we value greatly. The association with the Carnegie
Endowment has given us additional prestige and has helped
us in many ways, not least of which, by any means, is the
presence of Tom Hughes as Chairman of our Editorial Board.
I should emphasize that the Endowment as an organization
plays no role in our editorial policy. We are not a publication
of the Endowment. The editors of the magazine are com-
pletely free to make decisions about what to include and
what to eliminate from consideration in the magazine.
You wrote in 1970 that "The two editors of this magazine
are old friends who have, during the past six years, dis-
agreed sharply over Vietnam. Now, however, we have decided
to join together in an effort to stimulate rational discussion
of the new directions required in American foreign policy. We
both feet that the basic purposes of American foreign policy
demand reexamination and redefinition. We at FOREIGN
POLICY will probably continue to differ in our individual think-
ing as to the course which American foreign policy should
take in the next phase. But we all want FOREIGN POLICY to
be revisionist, in the most catholic sense of this word. We
think this is a good time for new and, we hope, more con-
structive controversies." When you wrote that three years
ago, the United States was still at war in Vietnam. Looking
back on the magazine and the three years, how do you feel
about your own efforts, the personal commitment of time and
money, that you've made to the creation of this magazine?
Manshel: I feel very positive about it. I think that we have
succeeded in large measure in doing precisely what we set
out to do. I think our purposes were modest, and our achieve-
ments within the modest framework of our purposes have
been substantial. We have not changed American foreign
policy, but then we did not set out to change American for-
eign policy. We wanted to bring together those people we
thought had the most to contribute, regardless of their points
of view, in discussion of where the main problems of Ameri-
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can foreign policy lay and where the main initiatives were
required and what these initiatives should be. Our editorial
disagreements continue, and we work them out in the pages
of the magazine. We continue to feel - I'm sure Sam Hunt-
ington as well as I - that American foreign policy demands
reexamination and redefinition because this is a process and
not a one-time occurrence. We think that our magazine has
contributed towards that function in a small but effective way.
Huntington: I think, Warren, you may have been overly
modest in saying what sort of an impact we have had. We
obviously aren't solving any foreign policy problems, but it
seems to me that the extent to which we are read and quoted
is some indication of the extent to which our articles have had
an impact on the way in which people think about foreign
policy issues, and in several cases - some of the articles
have been very important for policymakers.
And yet it has been said of both FOREIGN POLICY and
other magazines in the field that they have not come up with
the kinds of far-ranging prescriptions for future policy which
some people are looking for and which some people believe
existed in George Kennan's "X" article.
Manshel: I think it is not the function of a magazine nor
even of a foreign policy to provide a lasting solution to prob-
lems. Foreign policy, like any other policy, is a pragmatic
process which requires constant redefinition, reexamination
and reevaluation of means and ends. A foreign policy which
has only one objective is either a foreign policy of necessity,
like a wartime foreign policy, or a policy of neurosis, like the
policy which we pursued for two decades after the second
World War. Normally, a foreign policy is a flow in which the
problems constantly change, in which the solutions are tac-
tical, not strategic, and in which no final solution is ever
achieved. Here I reflect a personal philosophy because I
don't believe that there is such a thing as a "solution" to a
foreign policy problem. I think all you can ever hope for is to
modify your problems, or to divide them into smaller prob-
lems, some or which you can then ignore because they're so
small, while others develop a whole life of their own and
grow into bigger problems again.
Huntington: I think another major difference with our for-
eign policy in the past, brought out by your reference to
George Kennan's containment article, is that quite clearly
the whole foreign policy world is far more complex now than
it was before. One used to be able to sum up American
foreign policy for two decades in a single phrase like con-
tainment, whereas now there are so many arenas and so
many issues and new actors in the foreign policy field that
you can't have any sort of simple formulation like that. That's
one of the reasons why things seem confused-they are. ^
FOREIGN POLICY
345 East 46th Street
New York, New York 10017
[phone]
A quarterly magazine concentrating on American foreign policy
issues. First Issue: Fall, 1970. Association with the Carnegie
Endowment began in April, 1972. The Endowment has no respon-
sibility for editorial content, which remains entirely in the hands
of the Editors.
EDITORS
Warren Demian MansheI and Samuel P. Huntington
MANAGING EDITOR
Richard Holbrooke
ASSOCIATE MANAGING EDITOR
Pamela Giifond
EDITORIAL BOARD
Thomas L. Hughes (Chairman), W. Michael Blumenthal, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Richard N. Cooper, Richard A. Falk, David Halber-
stam, Morton H. Halperin, Stanley Hoffmann, Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
John E. Rielly, James C. Thomson, Jr., Richard H. Ullman.
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THE EUROPEAN CENTER
John Goormaghtigh
John, you are now the senior person among the key pro-
gram staff at the Carnegie Endowment. Could you start by
reflecting on the development the Endowment has taken
over the years, particularly its European Center in Geneva
which you direct?
John Goormaghtigh: The European Center has had its
ups and downs. When I joined the Endowment in 1950, the
European office was a small concern in a large building on
the Boulevard St. Germain in Paris. The war years had upset
the traditional operations of the Carnegie Endowment out-
side the United States, and we were looking for ways in
which we could again fulfill the role of contact in Europe
for an American foundation, and also how we could bring
the voice of Europe to the United States.
In the early years of my involvement with the Endowment
this was, I suppose, my main role: to inform headquarters
in New York of some of the thinking of scholars and others
in Western Europe about international affairs in general, and
about international organizations in particular. Very soon the
operation became more complex, when we attempted to
bring about a real dialogue between specialists in the field
of international affairs on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean
and to initiate projects in international law and relations.
As you know, international affairs were not integrated into
the academic programs on the continent. One of the first
missions of the Endowment in the postwar years was to help
diversify the range of studies in academic centers and in
institutes. Until then, the studies we sponsored had been
mainly legal.
We were instrumental in getting the focus shifted from a
rather formal approach towards political science, and I think
one can see in the development of the various institutes of
international affairs in Europe the input of the Endowment.
An important catalyst in this process has been the Endow-
ment's Visiting Research Scholarship which brought well
known American scholars to the European Center for a year's
research. The most recent scholar, Leon Lindberg of the
University of Wisconsin, has been particularly successful
in stimulating some new thinking among our colleagues on
post-industrial problems.
Why did you move from Paris to Geneva? Do you see ad-
vantages in Geneva over any other city in Europe?
Goormaghtigh: The Endowment chose Paris because it
was the main political center of Europe in the period after
the Treaty of Versailles. After 1945, with the United Nations
becoming the key focus of the programs of the Endowment
in New York, the trustees felt that the European office should
move close to the main center of the international organiza-
tions in Europe: Geneva.
I think there are real advantages in being in Geneva. It is a
small place with a large international community, where
things are actually going on. They're not spectacular things
because the political life of the world is not determined in
Geneva. But most of the technical aspects of international
cooperation are centered there.
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Could you give an example or two?
Goormaghtigh: First, the main specialized agencies of
the United Nations are located in Geneva. The big Nixon
Round of trade negotiations has brought to Geneva hundreds
of people connected with international trade who are shaping
the face of the world to a greater extent than the Kennedy
Round did several years ago.
Also, there is the United Nations Commission for Trade and
Development, the major organization dealing with economic
relations between the third world and the developed coun-
tries: the World Health Organization; the International Tele-
communications Union; the UN Economic Commission for
Europe, which maintained precious contacts between East
and West during the whole of the Cold War; the International
Labor Organization, which our former colleague James T.
Shotwell helped to set up; and many other important inter-
governmental and nongovernmental agencies.
How does this location of activities in the same city as
the European Center of the Endowment affect the work of the
Endowment? More importantly, how does the Endowment
affect these organizations?
Goormaghtigh: We would be very presumptuous indeed
if we thought that a small private organization like our own
could really change the face of these organizations. But I
do think that in the course of time we have had a certain
impact. Since we have seen them operate from day to day,
we have become very familiar with their problems. We have,
I think, contributed to a better understanding of their tasks
and of the limits to their possible action. Officials from these
organizations are brought into our meetings and discussion
groups; resulting publications are widely distributed.
But your role is not always limited to studies. In some
cases, don't you also help solve a specific problem?
Goormaghtigh: Yes. The convention setting up the High
Commission for Refugees was quite restrictive. It limited
the High Commissioner's operations to the European scene,
mainly to refugees leaving Communist countries. By the
1960's, however, the refugees were not only located in Eu-
rope. The major problems were posed in Africa, in the Middle
East, and in the Far East.
We brought together a small group of lawyers to prepare
the text of a draft protocol to the 1951 Convention, broad-
ening the terms of reference of the High Commissioner's
office. Although this was a purely private initiative of the
Endowment, the instrument is now operative and has made
possible large operations throughout the world - in southern
Sudan recently, for instance, and in Bangladesh where hun-
dreds of thousands of refugees have been helped by the
High Commissioner's office.
This was a case in which the international organization
was blocked because of its structure. The Endowment man-
aged to play a positive role in changing that structure. There
are other examples.
What about your efforts in the field of territorial asylum?
Goormaghtigh: This follows very logically from what I
was saying about our work with the High Commissioner's
office. There is no agreement which obliges a country to
grant asylum to a citizen of another country, and although
there is a declaration of the United Nations, it is not binding.
We wanted to contribute to giving greater protection to the
individual in the international community by a convention
which would make it illegal to return a political refugee to
the country from which he is escaping. So we brought to-
gether a small group of legal experts from East and West,
North and South. We actually had the participation of the
legal advisor of one of the Eastern European countries. We
wanted to draft a text which had a real chance of being
accepted by the majority of states, so we had to be modest.
It is quite a conservative document, but at least it creates
an obligation for states to respect the non refoulement prin-
ciple, meaning that one does not push someone back across
the border from which he came. It is on the agenda of the
General Assembly.
Could you give more examples of the kind of work you're
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doing -? particularly those which show the practical outcome
of your projects?
Goormaghtigh: In a completely different area, we have
had an interest in the International Telecommunications
Union. Everybody is aware of the importance of satellites in
the contemporary world and particularly of communication
satellites.
Now, partly because of the very complex decision making
process within this specialized agency, the question of regu-
lating the use of communication satellites could not be
solved by the organization itself. What resulted was two main
regional groupings, one based on the American Intelsat, and
one based on the Soviet Union's Intersputnik. This was an
unfortunate development in which political divisions rein-
forced technical differences.
So, together with the Twentieth Century Fund, we decided
to bring together competent experts in the field of control
of telecommunications, both from the Soviet Union, the major
Socialist countries, and the Western world. We held a series
of conferences and consultations designed to have some
impact on the diplomatic conference of the International Tele-
communications Union.
Considering the new direction which the Endowment is
taking under its new leadership, how do you see the past
merging with the future?
Goormaghtigh: The Endowment has established over the
years a reputation for itself throughout the world which is an
asset difficult to evaluate in dollars. For example, during the
last fifteen years we have established a kind of working re-
lationship with the Socialist countries which I think is unique
among American foundations. There was no time during the
whole of the Cold War when we did not have some contact
with scholars in Eastern Europe. This is an important asset.
Now, we have also developed a network of good relations
with the third world through our Programs in Diplomacy
which you are covering in another interview. Recently we
have assisted the Cameroon government in establishing in
Yaounde a graduate institution for the study of international
affairs and a diplomatic training center.
I think the goodwill generated by past programs, including
the one devoted to international law, can still serve us well
in the new programs toward which the Endowment is moving.
What about your efforts to discuss the postwar recon-
struction of North and South Vietnam? How did that come
about and what do you think the chances are for some con-
structive role in Indochina?
Goormaghtigh: This brings me back to something I was
mentioning earlier, namely, our very close association with
international organizations, and our desire to make them
more effective.
In 1971, a group of us in Geneva felt that there was not
sufficient thought being devoted inside the United Nations
to the complex problem of relief, rehabilitation and recon-
struction in Indochina after the end of hostilities.
We were quite aware of the immensity of the task and the
difficult political context in which this problem would be
posed. However, we felt that we could gather information
about what initiatives had been taken by individual govern-
ments and by nongovernmental organizations.
It was the feeling of our working group that funds would
be readily available, possibly not sufficient funds, but many
millions of dollars, if governments were sure that there was
a coordinating mechanism to enable the funds to be put
to the most effective use. The United Nations for well known
reasons was not able to solve the problem. So, we attempted
to indicate some of the paths which might be followed and
some of the ways in which the obstacles could be lifted.
I notice that you make frequent trips to Eastern Europe
and that you work with Eastern Europeans. Could you talk
a little more about that? To what extent, if any, has this con-
tributed to a dialogue between East and West?
Goormaghtigh: We have become involved in dialogues in
cooperation with colleagues in Eastern Europe on many
topics. Initially, our contacts were mainly with scholars in
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the study group on international organization which we have
been running in Geneva for the last several years. This group
has regular members who come from universities in Poland
and other Socialist countries. With them we have developed
a sort of common language: there's no longer any problem of
communication.
In addition to this activity of the study group, we run con-
ferences on subjects ranging from international trade to
conflict management. We organized in Hungary in 1967 one
of the first of the major dialogues on the obstacles to inter-
national trade between Western and Socialist countries. We
were at the beginning of the end of the Cold War and the
beginning of serious trade negotiations between the two
parts of Europe and the United States. The Endowment's
initiative came at a propitious time.
One last question, John. How did you come to be asso-
ciated with the Endowment in the first place?
Goormaghtigh: It was, of course, an accident, like most
things in life. I had been running the Belgian Institute of
International Affairs for a number of years when the Rocke-
feller Foundation gave me a fellowship to travel in the United
States. While I was in America, the Carnegie Endowment
asked me to attend one of their meetings, a discussion group
in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Later, while I was still in the United
States, I got a message from the Carnegie Endowment ask-
ing me if I'd be interested in running their European office.
In New York I was interviewed by Joe Johnson shortly
after he, himself, had been appointed President. For a time
I ran the European office of the Carnegie Endowment on
a half-time basis. I was spending one week in Paris and one
week in Brussels where I was still running the Belgian Insti-
tute of International Affairs.
After a few years of commuting, I decided to opt for the
Carnegie Endowment and have never regretted it. ^
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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROGRAM
Ralph Zacklin & Thomas M. Franck
Ralph, why has the Carnegie Endowment been so identi-
fied with programs in international law over its long history?
Ralph Zacklin: I think the history of the Endowment has
been in large part the history of international law in the 20th
century. The creation of the Endowment was related directly
to the hope of increasing the role of law in establishing and
maintaining international peace. It was a somewhat naive
assumption, looking back on 60 years of history of both the
Endowment and the international community. But in the
1920's and 1930's the Endowment's activities in international
law were quite pragmatic and filled a function which was not
at that time filled by any other international organization. We
have to remember that the creation of the Endowment pre-
ceded both World War I and the creation of the League of
Nations, and until that time there were no intergovernmental
institutions which were active in the international field. So in
its early period the Endowment performed pragmatic func-
tions which no one else was performing, and this legacy has
come down over the years. In the 1960's and 1970's we have
tried to renew the Endowment's role in a very different in-
stitutional environment.
What is the audience for international law work today? Are
you aiming at governments, or international organizations, or
the general informed public?
What do you hope to accomplish?
Zacklin: Well, I think we start from a basic assumption that
an international legal order is a necessary thing, and there-
fore we're working towards improving it. The international law
activities of the Endowment today are designed to enhance
the overall functioning of the international legal system. They
are designed to play some role in the progressive develop-
ment of international law, to act as a channel of communica-
tion between international legal theory and different cultures,
and to act as a quasi-diplomatic sounding board for the ex-
amination of international legal problems which may be on
the horizon.
When you talk about international law, I take it that you're
talking about codification of legal relationships between na-
tions, particularly in new fields such as the law of the sea,
in which new problems caused by modern technology require
new adjustments between nations. But how much emphasis
do you place on solutions to major political problems through
international law?
Zacklin: International law functions at different levels.
There is international law as an instrumentality for achieving
a stable world order. In that sense I think it would be naive to
expect a great deal, given the political realities and the ab-
sence in the international legal system of any central sanc-
tioning authority. But international law is also a system which
provides a framework for states in which they can conduct
relations with one another. It provides a method of regula-
tion for certain intergovernmental activities which are ab-
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solutely essential in fields like the environment or the sea or
civil aviation. The functional approach is the approach that
the Endowment has recently stressed.
Tom Franck: Nations and states are constantly in a
bargaining position. The role of international law in any
dispute is, first of all, to help the parties spell out the ex-
change which is to take place in order to resolve the particu-
lar dispute in hand. And secondly, to remind the parties that
there is a negotiable future addressed as well, which is im-
plicit in any legal solution. The legal solution defines the
relationship not only it the immediate case but also in any
possible future disputes.
!s the emphasis of the Carnegie Endowment on the sub-
stance of international law-the formulation and codification
of new international legal understandings or relationships-
or is it on the training of international lawyers throughout the
world?
Zacklin: Really both. Both are important functions the
Endowment can fulfill. From the point of view of the interna-
tional law program, I think that certain assumptions were
made in the 1960's. It was perceived that there were qualita-
tive changes taking place in international law which were of
great importance, and many of these....
Zacklin: The substantive content of the law was changing
as the makeup of the international community changed.
There was rapid expansion of the community of states in the
1950's and 1960's-largely newly independent African states
---and this brought about a shift in the balance of the inter-
national community which in turn is now bringing about a
change in the substance of international law. If you look at it
from a historical point of view, until the 1940's or 1950's in-
ternational law was largely regarded as basically European
law to govern the relations between a relatively homogeneous
group of states. Now we have a different situation. We have
many new states for whom the existing legal structure and
content of the law is inadequate. As a result the law is being
changed. It's happening very slowly, but it is happening. If
you look at the law of the sea, for example, you see that the
new law which is being discussed will reflect much more of
a balance between the needs of new developing countries
and the interests of the older maritime nations.
What have you emphasized in the Carnegie Endowment's
training efforts?
Zacklin: Developing international legal capability in the
third world. We have attempted to use the Endowment's fa-
cilities to train legal advisors who are working in govern-
ments. The most important program of this kind has been the
Hague Academy External Program, which has conducted a
number of seminars in developing countries in Africa, Asia
and Latin America. We have trained more than 200 legal
advisors and other persons in government service in those
countries, as well as teachers for universities.
What is the Endowment's role in the Hague.Academy's Ex-
ternal Program?
Zacklin: We have a role both in the administration of the
program and in the technical side, deciding what subjects
should be discussed, selecting the professors, and choosing
the participants. There has been a related effort, of course, in
the Endowment's Programs in Diplomacy, because many of
the fellows who have participated in that program at Colum-
bia or in Geneva have also taken international law courses.
To turn from training to research, what is the main focus of
your research efforts?
Zacklin: The guiding principle for research has been to try
to identify some of the issues which we think are going to
receive most attention, issues where the substance of the law
will change or is changing. We have tried to devote our re-
sources to gaining an understanding of the interests of de-
veloping countries in these areas.
Why the continued emphasis on developing countries?
Zacklin: Well, because the existence of these new states
is one of the primary factors affecting the international legal
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system today. Any improvement in the effectiveness of the
international legal system must take into account the interests
of developing states, otherwise it's not going to be an effec-
tive system. For example, among the research projects which
have been sponsored by the Endowment, the most ambitious
is the Inter-American Study Group. This group of about a
dozen persons has worked on problems of democracy and
international economic law. The results are being published.
One book on the law of the sea sets out the law and its prac-
tice by Western Hemisphere states. Another book deals with
such questions as state trading, commodity agreements, the
role of multinational corporations, and so forth.
A separate study is an examination of the role of interna-
tional institutions like the World Bank in developing the legal
systems of third world countries. This study seeks to de-
scribe what the role and impact of these institutions has been
on their legal and political systems.
Who is doing that study?
Zacklin: It is a joint project between the Endowment and
the International Legal Center. Reputable scholars are doing
case studies of particular developing countries such as Pak-
istan, Turkey, Ghana and Colombia.
You have written that the real issue is not change in legal
systems per se, but the mechanisms employed to produce
change and the intricate interaction between governments
and international lending and regulatory agencies. What do
you mean?
Zacklin: I think we started out with a fairly healthy skepti-
cism about the actual role of lending agencies in developing
countries. Although in popular mythology such agencies by
definition almost always do good, the evidence is beginning
to accumulate that they too can make mistakes.
Which lending agencies do you have in mind?
Zacklin: The World Bank is a good example. For many
years the World Bank did not lend for educational projects.
This is now changing. But the Bank and similar agencies
operated on certain assumptions which they are now begin-
ning to see were not always accurate and in some cases were
actually dysfunctional. This particular research project has
shown that not only has the leverage of these institutions in
certain countries been quite extensive, but the interaction
between the institution and national institutions and even
individuals has had a great impact on the way in which
certain countries have developed.
But why is this a part of an international law study, and not
just another study of the economic, political and social im-
pact of international lending organizations on third world
countries?
Zacklin: I think what makes a difference is that we have
accumulated a good deal more evidence than was available
heretofore, mainly because much of the research was carried
on in the borrowing countries, as distinct from the usual re-
search carried out at the headquarters of institutions. So we
have been able to accumulate evidence, and from it we've
been able to draw certain deductive and inductive conclu-
sions.
Are you in a position to discuss some of your conclusions
and their potential political impact?
Zacklin: Yes. I think one example would be the role of the
World Bank in Colombia, a very interesting case. On the
basis of our study we have been able to determine that the
World Bank was in fact responsible for certain policies which
were translated into Colombian realities. It has distorted Col-
ombian development because of its insistence on industrial
projects such as hydroelectric plants. And it has played a
significant role in internal politics through the creation of
autonomous agencies in certain public sectors such as
energy.
Let me pursue this, Ralph. 1 accept the importance of this
subject, but what does it have to do with international law?
Zacklin: Well, the answer to that depends upon your per-
ception of international law. What we're trying to do is ex-
amine the interaction between international agencies and a
particular country. We feel that the result could and should
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lead to a set of well defined international legal relations
between a country and an organization. This is an input into
the changing international legal system. In other words, there
is an impact on the actual substantive content of interna-
tional law through this relationship.
is international law a potential avenue for control over
multinational corporations?
Zacklin: It is a potential avenue. The role of multinational
coroorations is presently being discussed in a number of
international arenas, and I think that both governments and
international institutions are having difficulties dealing with it.
The regulation of the activities of such corporations is going
to be a major issue in the near future.
What about international law as a means of communica-
tion with the Soviet Union?
Zacklin: The Carnegie Endowment played a significant
role in the 1960's in the area of communication between the
Socialist world and the Western world. About 1963, the En-
dowment organized the first international law conference
attended by representatives of Socialist countries. The En-
dowment has a reputation in many of these countries over
half a century, and its activities are well regarded. There have
been several other conferences with substantial Eastern
European participation, including a major one in 1969 on
the law of conflicts.
Do you and Tom Franck see the field of international law
as one in which the Western European nations and the U.S.
on the one hand and the Soviet Union and perhaps the
Chinese on the other can work out arrangements which will
reduce tension?
Franck: Let me try a generalized response to that ques-
tion. There is a distinction between international law as a pro-
cedure and as a substantive issue. As a procedure for adjust-
ing differences between states, international law has to do
with getting people around a table to talk in structured fash-
ion about a specific problem and to do so not in isolation
but in the context of an on-going relationship. This recip-
rocity which is at the heart of the legal process has to do not
only with how you solve today's problems, but how you place
the search for a solution in the broader context of negotia-
tions that aim to create a continuing relationship. As a pro-
cess, international law is always asking politicians to think
about the consequences of today's initiatives for the on-going
systemic relationships among states. They are always telling
policymakers: "If you do such-and-such, that will be a sign
that other states can count on having the right to do similar
things. Are you sure that might not be to our disadvantage in
the long run?"
Perhaps some problems may be solved without a thought
for tomorrow. Other problems are better solved by bringing
in trade-offs that have to do with future relationships and
predicting the long-run system. The only way to solve a here-
and-now problem may be by placing it in a broader context
of contingent futures. Whenever policymakers decide that
they want to have an on-going relationship - what lawyers
call a "regime" - usually somebody presses a button to
summon an international lawyer to help conceive such a
regime. If he is any good at all, he himself will have some
ideas as to what the future problems may be. He will not
only be talking, for example, about the problems of this year's
herrings off the coast of Peru, but also talking about a con-
tinuing relationship. Hopefully, that relationship will govern
not only our herring catch off Peru during the next 50 years,
but will also be able to adjust to changes in technology, take
into account changes in the pattern of herring movements,
be able to deal with disputes that will arise as to whether a
particular fish is a herring or a sardine, and perhaps set up
some kind of low level way of resolving such problems before
they become the source of more profound hostilities.
Whenever politicians want to confront an immediate prob-
lem with a solution that embraces not only that immediate
problem but an on-going predictable series of future con-
tingencies, you're really talking about law. Incidentally, I see
no inherent reason why the designing of procedural adjust-
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ment mechanisms should have to be a monopoly of lawyers.
It could be done by psychiatrists or sociologists....
.... or conceivably even politicians. But lawyers tend to
play that role in the international community, particularly in
the United States. In part this is because politicians tend to
be tied, to a considerable extent, to solutions for today's
problems. They're responsible for bringing home today's
bacon to today's constituents, and so they tend to want to do
that, regardless of tomorrow's costs. It's a job for someone
else to think about tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and
try to resolve a particular problem by placing it in a larger
systemic context.
That's the procedural aspect of international law. The sub-
stantive aspect has to do with actual rule-making and that
can be done outside the context of a specific dispute: often
only outside that context. The hard way to write a treaty on
terrorism is by fixing on the Arab-Israeli dispute.
It's been part of the tradition of the Carnegie Endowment
and the Harvard Law School and others to try to propose
substantive rules for resolving problems before they become
too hot to handle as legal issues, before they become politi-
cized. So there is another aspect of the role of the creative
lawyer as a predictor of future problems. The United Nations
lawyers prod states to predict and deal with problems not yet
arisen but likely to arise in the future - with, for example,
the retrieval of outer space vehicles or territorial and other
kinds of proprietary interests in outer space territory - things
of that sort. They advocate resolving these "far out" prob-
lems by creating a code or system of law applicable to dis-
putes before they arise. This they do on the lawyers' theory
that men are more likely to reach an agreement before they
have begun to disagree, before they are at each other's
throats. On the other hand, sometimes it requires a specific
controversy to get people thinking about the larger legal
context, to sit down to try to work out some procedure, some
regime to solve problems.
Tom, do you see a new set of priorities for international law
as a program within the Endowment as you take over from
Ralph Zacklin and assess the future course?
Franck: The priorities are inherent in the job. The Endow-
ment wants to look at where international law fits in the new
directions of the Endowment; to have a look at on-going pro-
grams, to consider a series of possible future models. If the
overall direction of the Endowment is to be more activist,
more directly relevant-and I agreed to work with the Endow-
ment because it's my feeling that this is happening - then
the task is to determine whether international legal projects
can also be more activist. Are there things that can be done
with legal tools that directly and measurably improve the
capacity of the international system to promote peace with
justice? Or is international law largely irrelevant? Or, worse,
is it hopelessly geared to the status quo? Those are the
questions I want to look at.
Are you doing this while continuing your duties at N.Y.U.?
Franck: I have resigned as Director of the Center for Inter-
national Studies there, although I will continue to be Pro-
fessor of Law at N.Y.U. and at York University in Canada.
How many years have you been working in the field of
international law?
Franck: Well, I started to specialize in international law at
the Havard Law School in 1953, primarily, I think, because
international law seminars were given in the afternoons. I
found I worked better in the afternoons and nights than in the
mornings. International law placed me, at least briefly, in
equilibrium with my nature.
So twenty years later, you're still working on this problem.
Can we focus on the basic question of whether international
law itself is related to international peace? Or are we talking
about a fairly technical field which has intrinsic value but will
not affect directly the great issues of war and peace?
Franck: I think that's very much like asking whether eco-
nomics is a subject which has only broad hortatory and edu-
cational functions or whether it is capable of making a differ-
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ence in the condition of men. The Endowment has a reputa-
tion for tackling the role of international law primarily in the
context of research, training and the related drafting of model
instruments for international law. It has built up a great deal
of credit in the international community by focusing on those
issues. I think one of the things the Endowment will be asking
itself now, and that I will be asking, will be whether some of
that credit can be drawn on to actually involve people at the
Endowment in the inter-governmental processes.
Now, it's difficult to make the connection between research
and training on one hand, and an actual on-going crisis and
its solution on the other. But perhaps there are ways of doing
it. The mixed training/research/litigation function of the pub-
lic interest law firm is one approach that is attractive to law
students today. It has made some impact both on the aca-
demic and research community and on the government, often
in an adversary role to both. There are possible variations of
that model that could be applied in international law.
But here's an even further out suggestion. We all know that
one of the reasons that international law is popularly and
wrongly thought to be a dormant field is because the two
instruments of lawmaking that are most familiar to you and
me, that is, the legislature and the court, have no real equiva-
lent in the international community. The international confer-
ence and the United Nations, through its quasi-legislative
processing, both play a role vaguely analogous to that of the
U.S. Congress. But the World Court as an equivalent of our
domestic traditional institution is still a very pale shadow.
One of the reasons that the World Court gets so little business
is because countries have to agree, either in a specific case
or in general, to accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
More than half the countries of the international community,
including in effect the U.S., have refused to do that. Even if
they did, even if countries were willing to go to Court, there's
the additional question of enforcing judgments against them.
Even before coming to that second hurdle, the failure to
accept compulsory jurisdiction on the part of so many coun-
tries has been a tremendous barrier to the development of
law through the Court.
Could something be built that could become an instrument
for placing before distinguished jurors actual disputes or
issues which the parties were unwilling to take to the World
Court? Could a nongovernmental organization make deter-
minations in a judicial manner that would make a contribu-
tion both to world order and to the development of interna-
tional jurisprudence?
This could be a way of getting more issues into international
law and placing international law itself in a framework in
which it could grow.
To conclude, then, one can say that both of you are opti-
mists about the potential value of international law in the
modern world. In various ways, you both have been able to
identify mechanisms and subject areas in which influence
can be brought against governments, international organiza-
tions, and private multinational organizations to create an
atmosphere of cooperation in at least limited spheres - and
perhaps, if I understand your final comments correctly, even
in larger political issues at some future date. Is that a reason-
able summation of why each of you has spent 20 years of
your life working in a field which many people would say was
never going to produce a fundamental change because the
elements of power always lie elsewhere in international rela-
tions?
Franck: Well, I don't know where the power does lie in the
field of international relations. It certainly hasn't lain with the
armed forces or with the State Department over the last six or
seven years. I'm not about to claim that it lies with interna-
tional law. It's a recurring but fundamental decision for each
state to make in its relations with other states. Does it want
to try to resolve its problems in case by case negotiation, or
in the use of systems and regimes that are established by
legal instruments? I suppose the answer is still that they will
probably continue to do it from a mixture of both. But I am,
and will remain, an optimist about the role of international law.
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THE RHODESIA PROJECT
Anthony Lake
Now that the Endowment's Project on Rhodesia has been
under way for over a year, how would you describe its overall
purposes?
Tony Lake: The Rhodesia Project consists of two parts.
The first is a study by Ralph Zacklin on Rhodesian sanctions
generally, looked at from an international perspective with
particular attention to the international legal implications of
the sanctions and the actual performance of the United
Nations and member states in observing them.
The second part is the study we have been working on
here in Washington. It concentrates on the response of the
United States to the Rhodesian problem. For example, we
are looking into the origins of American policy towards Rho-
desia, the American response to the choices that we have
faced at the United Nations on the issue, how the United
States has observed the sanctions program, and American
attitudes toward the Smith regime itself.
Why do you think this issue was significant enough to have
two parallel studies, one in New York and one in Washington?
Lake: Because the Rhodesian issue is really a very special
one. It represents the only effort by the United Nations ac-
tually to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against
any territory. You recall that the League of Nations foundered
in part because of the failure of its sanctions against Italy.
Many believe that the future of the United Nations itself
is very closely tied to the future of the sanctions program
against Southern Rhodesia. The Rhodesian problem provides
a strong test of how the American government and the
American foreign policy community operate on an issue
which involves a basic choice between short-term economic
advantage and an international legal obligation on an issue
that involves human rights. To the extent the United States
chooses the former over the latter, it is undercutting both the
future of the United Nations and international law itself.
There is widespread cynicism concerning the United Na-
tions these days. It suggests that few governments, and few
members of the so-called "attentive" public, really take the
UN seriously as an organization which can enforce some-
thing like sanctions. You seem to be suggesting that the
UN still has potential teeth in an area such as this. Why do
you feel that at all?
Lake: My general view is that the people who criticize the
United Nations for being weak tend to make their criticism
self-fulfilling. If the organization is weak in the political area
why not try to strengthen it rather than write it off?
And, more specifically, Rhodesia is a special case. Kis-
singer and others have argued correctly that the reason the
United Nations is not an effective instrument on major politi-
cal issues is that it is automatically blocked when there is
a difference among major powers. That is not the case on
Rhodesia. The sanctions would not have been voted if the
major powers had not been in general agreement on the
question. In addition, sanctions represent the most powerful
instrument the United Nations has at its disposal, short of
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force. This is why the Rhodesian issue is so important. If the
United Nations fails when the major powers agree that such
an instrument should be used, it would be a real blow to the
UN's political role in the future.
So the United Nations voted sanctions. What has hap-
pened since then? What has the United States done to carry
out its affirmative vote on the issue in the United Nations?
Lake: Let me begin by saying that that affirmative vote in
the Security Council represented the acceptance by the
United States of a legal obligation under Article 25 of the
Charter. So private American compliance with and imple-
mentation of sanctions is not a voluntary action. It is legally
required.
In fact, until recently the American performance on sanc-
tions was probably as good or better than the performance
of any other major nation in the world. The British perhaps
have been more meticulous, but I think otherwise the Amer-
ican performance would compare very favorably with any
others. At the same time there have been lapses. The most
serious was the passage by the Congress in 1971 of the
so-called Byrd Amendment, which prohibited the President
from embargoing any strategic and critical materials from any
non-Communist nation if those materials were imported
from any Communist nation. The sponsors of this amend-
ment designed it to allow the importation into the United
States of Rhodesian chrome. The amendment was passed,
in fact, after a major lobbying effort by American ferrochrome
and stainless steel interests. Its passage made the United
States one of only three members of the UN which, as a
matter of official policy, allow the import into their countries
of any materials from Rhodesia. The others are Portugal and
South Africa. This has been a strong blow to the American
position at the United Nations and in Africa. Assistant Sec-
retary of State Newsom called it the worst problem we have
had in our relationship with Africa over the last few years.
Beyond this official breach in sanctions-a breach which
was forced by the Congress despite the State Department's
objections-there has been some slippage in observation
of sanctions by a number of American companies. For ex-
ample, we learned that a number of airlines registered in
the United States have apparently been violating the Execu-
tive Orders and Federal Aviation Administration's regulations
implementing the sanctions. They have been selling tickets
on Air Rhodesia, and cooperating with it in other ways.
Why, if the United States has been one of the better coun-
tries in implementing this UN decision, have you chosen to
study the U.S. instead of France or Portugal, or South Africa,
countries that have been more flagrant in violation?
Lake: Well, the short answer is that I am an American, and
as an American citizen I am more concerned with how the
American government maintains its international legal obli-
gations than how any other government does.
At the same time, Ralph Zacklin in his project considers
the performance of other nations. I also think it would be
helpful if private monitoring procedures were established to
check out the compliance of such nations as West Germany,
France, Switzerland and Japan. There is a private group
that does this kind of work in London.
You talked about the influence that your reports might have
upon the U.S. government. This leads us to a discussion of
the form in which you are going to make your findings public.
You have already published two interim reports and, as I
understand it, a book length study is now in process. Why did
you choose this particular approach to making your findings
public?
Lake: Initially, we had thought we would simply do one
study at the end of the project. But during the summer of
1973 we discovered that there were two areas in which in-
terim reports would be valuable.
The first concerned apparent violations of sanctions by
American air carriers, by the New York Journal of Commerce,
which has been publishing advertising for Rhodesian firms,
by American tourist companies that are transmitting funds
to Rhodesian tourist enterprises, and by a number of others.
We thought we should do an interim report on this simply
because these were apparent violations of American law.
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We felt they should quickly be brought to the attention of the
American government and others who could investigate the
matter. We also thought that some questions of interpreta-
tion of the Executive Orders deserved public debate. So we
issued our report in August 1973. It received rather wide-
spread attention in newspapers, radio and TV. It is reprinted
in a journal of African affairs and in a report on hearings by
the House Subcommittee on Africa. More importantly, it led
to a request by the State Department to the Treasury Depart-
ment and FAA to investigate the matter.
The second interim report, ''Irony in Chrome,'concerned
the consequences of the Byrd Amendment since its passage
in 1971. Certain American ferrochrome producers who lob-
bied strongly for the amendment did so largely because they
needed cheap Rhodesian chrome in order to be more com-
petitive with foreign ferrochrome producers. Ironically the
Byrd Amendment was couched in such very broad terms, in
order to help its passage, that it not only allowed the import
of Rhodesian chrome, but also a flood of cheap Rhodesian
ferrochrome. This has in fact worsened the competitive po-
sition of some of the sponsoring companies, and has helped
create a situation in which it appears likely that most or all
of the American ferrochrome industry will have been driven
abroad within the next few years.
Are you or your team in effect lobbying for repeal of the
Byrd Amendment?
Lake: No. The Carnegie Endowment is not, of course, a
lobbying organization. Under the tax laws it cannot be. And
whatever the laws, I do not think it should be such an organi-
zation, since that would damage its credibility and interna-
tional reputation for objectivity. In working on ''Irony in
Chrome," we were fully conscious of this question, so we
concentrated on trying to help inform the public debate by
laying out the issue as clearly and fairly as we could. I have,
of course, a point of view on the issue. But I do not think it
prejudiced our analysis. Nor did we focus the report on a
future debate. We included all the arguments that had been
made in 1971 on both sides of the debate about the amend-
merit, and then in a factual way simply checked off which
arguments had held water in the light of experience and
which had not. We noted that some of the arguments on
both sides had not held up as well as their supporters had
predicted, while other arguments on both sides were indeed
prophetic. At the end of the report, having stripped away
the 1971 arguments that didn't, in retrospect, hold up, we
laid out the choice that the United States now faces: a choice
between recognizing and maintaining our obligations under
international law on the one hand, and on the other a pos-
sible effect that repeal of the Byrd Amendment could have on
prices in the stainless steel industry. I think the reaction to
the report has been all we could have hoped it would be.
At hearings held by the Senate's Africa Subcommittee, wit-
nesses on both sides of the argument, as well as the Chair-
man, Senator Humphrey, quoted the report. Representatives
of the stainless steel industry have said that they felt that
the report was accurate in its description of the issues, al-
though they did not agree with some of the conclusions we
reached on specific points. The report was included in its
entirety in the record of the Subcommittee hearings. So I
hope the report will be considered a kind of model of how
we can provide analytical work on issues that are before
Congress without running afoul of the letter or spirit of the
tax laws. The laws do not rule out dissemination of infor-
mation on contentious legislative issues. They prohibit lobby-
ing efforts as well as materials that consider only one side
of an issue.
Some of the large private companies mentioned in your
other report must have been concerned. How did they react
to the extraordinary passage in your report where you and
members of your team made reservations for round trips to
Rhodesia through their ticket offices in Washington, in ap-
parent violation of U.S. law?
Lake: Well, they hardly greeted the report with joy. The
possible violations that we suggested be investigated could
lead to severe penalties. Under the United Nations Partici-
pation Act, violations of the Executive Orders carry with
them, upon conviction, a fine of not more than $10,000, im-
prisonment for not more than 10 years, or both. So we hardly
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expected that those involved would have applauded our
bringing these facts to the government's and public attention.
Lake: To answer that I should discuss very briefly the
different kinds of apparent violations that we examined. In
some cases, for example the American air carriers I men-
tioned earlier, the facts seem to indicate reasonably clear
violations. In other cases, it depends on interpretations of
various sections of the Executive Orders. For example, the
latter do not allow the supply of any commodity to any Rho-
desian business by any American individual or business.
Now, if you look at a trade name as a commodity, then when
Avis and Hertz sell their names to Rhodesian subsidiaries,
they are supplying a commodity to those subsidiaries and
are violating the Executive Orders. I don't know yet whether
the government accepts this interpretation of the word com-
modity or not. In another case, when the Journal of Com-
merce sells advertising to Rhodesian firms, we argue that
it is apparently violating the Executive Orders' prohibition
against investment in Rhodesia or any act which promotes
or is calculated to promote trade with Rhodesia.
Would it be against the law for the Rhodesian government
to take an ad in the New York Times explaining their political
position?
Lake: No, I don't think so, because that's not promoting
trade. But advertising investment opportunities, or running
advertisements for Rhodesian businesses and project hand-
lers who can arrange shipment of goods outside of Rhodesia,
would seem to be-especially when coupled with an article,
as they were, that suggests that there are many, many op-
portunities in Rhodesia and that "where there's a will, there's
a way.'' Advertising, by definition, "promotes." But the Amer-
ican government's position is that for the purposes of the
Executive Order, the word promote means actually helping
to write a contract, doing something that is related to an
actual transaction, not simply putting out information. So
here the government does not agree with our interpretation
and apparently does not agree that there has been any vio-
lation of the Executive Orders. Another difference in inter-
pretation has involved the airlines. At least one disagrees
with us on what constitutes even an "indirect transfer" of
funds to Air Rhodesia. With regard to the facts themselves,
nobody has shown that any of the facts we put out were
inaccurate. We had, of course, checked them carefully.
Since you feel that you uncovered violations of U.S. law,
do you intend to pursue action through the courts?
Lake: No. Our purpose was to stimulate the American
government into an investigation of these matters, and we
have succeeded in doing that.
What is the relationship between the study and the Hu-
manitarian Policy Studies project?
Lake: We share both purposes and offices. We too are
trying to bring more public attention to bear on the kind of
international human rights issue that tends to get lost in
Washington. In addition, just as the Humanitarian Policy
Studies program is beginning to give officials in the govern-
ment a sense that there is an organization which is monitor-
ing their performance on humanitarian policy issues, I think
we have succeeded in making a similar impression on those
concerned with Rhodesia, both in the government and in
certain American companies. We have had a number of re-
quests for copies of the report from American businesses
who apparently have some sort of real or potential ties to
Rhodesia.
Turning from the specific study to the general approach to
American policy which this Rhodesian study represents, you
said at the beginning of this interview that Rhodesia was
perhaps a unique situation in the world today because it was
subject to sanctions agreed upon by the United Nations
Security Council. At the same time you said that this kind
of study has general applicability. What are the general les-
sons that you have derived?
Lake: The general conclusions we reach in our final study
will cover two areas. The first will involve the substance of
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the American approach to Rhodesia: what it tells us about
the American approach to Africa, to the United Nations, to
international law. The second set of conclusions in some
ways should be just as interesting, because they will concern
how the foreign policy machinery in the United States reacts
to the kinds of choices that Rhodesia presents, how it per-
forms on complicated issues involving human rights. An
examination of how the Byrd Amendment got through the
Congress, how special interests were able to be as effective
as they were against the voices of concern for international
law, tells you a lot about how the process could work on
similar issues in the future. It also suggests how those sup-
porting international law could be more effective.
You came to this job from the Foreign Service, the White
House and the Congress. You're going on from it to some-
thing quite different. Could you put this experience in per-
sonal terms? What it has meant to you and to the evolution
of your own thinking on foreign policy?
Lake: I found frustrating the way in which foreign policy
is now treated by the government in highly abstract terms,
without strong concern for the human consequences of the
decisions that are reached. So I was very glad to get a
chance to work at Carnegie on a question that involves
human rights. In the process, my view of international law
has changed. I had always looked on it as a dry, arcane
matter to be discussed among the experts. But I have discov-
ered in the process of working on Rhodesia that in fact inter-
national law is much more; it does directly involve human
lives, it does provide, in fact, hope for those who are without
political and other rights now in Southern Rhodesia.
I am about to become the Director of the International
Voluntary Services, a kind of private Peace Corps that oper-
ates in a number of countries. Like Carnegie, it allows one to
combine an interest in foreign policy with an involvement in
human issues. I am leaving Carnegie with a much better
appreciation of those issues, and am grateful for the oppor-
tunity to have worked here. ^
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OFFICERS OF THE CORPORATION
Milton Katz-Chairman of the Board
Harding F. Bancroft-Vice Chairman of the Board
Thomas L. Hughes-President
Charles William Maynes, Jr.-Secretary
Alfred Brittain III-Treasurer
Administrative Officers
Richard C. Ferguson--Director of Finance and Administration
John Goormaghtigh--Director of the European Center
Robert C. Richter-Assistant to the President
Program Officers
David E. Biltchik, Face-to-Face
Larry L. Fabian, Middle East Commission
Thomas M. Franck, International Law
Alton Frye, Institute for Congress
Thomas A. Halsted, Arms Control
Vivian D. Hewitt, Librarian
Richard Holbrooke, Publications
Ruth Jett, Programs in Diplomacy
Anthony Lake, Rhodesia Project
Jane Lowenthal, Assistant Librarian
Charles William Maynes, Jr., International Organization
Donald F. McHenry, Humanitarian Policy Studies
Roger Morris, Humanitarian Policy Studies
Jean Siotis, European Center
Ralph Zacklin, International Law
STANDING COMMITTEES
Executive Committee
Charles W. Bailey II
Harding F. Bancroft-Vice Chairman
Hedley Donovan
Ernest A. Gross
Thomas L. Hughes
Milton Katz-Chairman
George C. Lodge
Howard C. Petersen
Finance Committee
Alfred Brittain III
Henry H. Fowler
Thomas L. Hughes
Ellmore C. Patterson-Chairman
Howard C. Petersen
Connie Arnold
Gabriele G. Barrett
Natalie S. Berman
Barbara Bishop
Christiane Bouvard
Marie Brenna
Marieta A. Brozas
Margaret Ameer Cataldo
Ann Chong
Marie-Claude Coppier
Georgette Dustour
Scott K. Ferraiolo
Jane Flood
Victor-Yves Ghebali
Eunice A. Godbold
B. Irene Golden
Nathalie Goufas
Grace 1. Hansen
Heidi L. Hansen
Peggy Hanson
Brenda J. Haskins
Catherine Kubiak
Walter Leyes
Sue Liss
Concepcion Lorenzana
Catherine E. Neville
Ronald Newsome
Eva Resnicow
Carol J. Ritter
Hilda Rush
Barbara Russo
Robert L. Smith
Susan K. Summers
Bernice Torres
Mildred H. Understein
Charlotte Van Deusen
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Photo Credits
Antonia Lake and Anne Rigby pp. 1, 6, 21 & 55
Henry Myers pp. 31 & 49
Jean Von Muhlenen p. 45
Bernard Pierre Wolff pp. 15, 36 & 41
Design by Bernard Pierre Wolff
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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
34, O,pst 46th Street 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, New Tork, New York 10017 Washington, D. C. 20036 NW Centre Europeen, 58, rue de Moillebeau
II 1211 Geneve 119
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