THE NIB, PRODUCTION STAFFING, AND THE(Sanitized) REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000600140009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 14, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Paul
Lehman handed me the attached memo
on how to restructure OCI and the Dailies.
He said that he would modify it somewhat.
The general thrust looks good to me; it is
in the right direction.
The recommendations begin on
page 13.
What do you think?
9 March 1975
(GATE)
FORM NO. IQ I REPLACES FORM 10-101
I AUG a:
DIA review(s) completed.
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14 February 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT The NIB
, Production Staffing, and the
0 Report
In looking for answers to the three inter-
related questions, I have talked with numerous
people who deal with almost all aspects of the
issues. What follows is an attempt to come up
with solutions that w-LZZ be acceptable--though
far from perfect--to all concerned, including
Mr. Colby, the IC staf. D
DIA, have not worked out the exactndetails of psaZf.
rng in all cases, and I am assuming that tao-
these recommendations, if some of
be implemented on a trial-andperrorwbasis. to
may prove unworkable Some
nfami7.iarit perhaps in part because of
my hut unfamiliarity with the complicated details of
g staffing, machines, and newspaper require-
ments. In any event, r hope it will be possible
to make changes without too much disruption but
changes which nonetheless will make the system
work a little better.
25X1
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Problems with the NIB
Some of the key goals in the April 4, 1974 memorandum
for USIB outlining production procedures for the new National
Intelligence Bulletin (NIB) have not been me't. The aim was
to enlist the 1>articipa7 iori' o ey in e geneproducing
com o}tents in Lhe community. Although D IA and NSA are in
fact regular contributors, the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research in the Department of State has r7 lined n .partic-
ipate. There is little reason to believe that INR will
cnge that policy. A second goal was to encourage the
presentation of.malternative and contrasting assessments as
.a regular feature ofuthe NIh3 and incorporated within the
body of a given article or in a separate piece published
subsequently. In point of fact, the tendency has been to
compromise, water down or withdraw an article altogether
rather than deaf directly with dissenting opinion. The
situation, then, is little different from that which pre-
vailed in the old Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), when
dissents were expressed--but rarely--as footnotes to a pub-
lished article.
Another aim was to focus primarily on intelligence
developments and publish on the avera
_d - m -..g- ten articles a7- .-
day. The average has been much higher than that and the
book sometimes runs as high as 15-20 pages.
In addition to these problems, there are others which
diminish the usefulness of the NIB as a vehicle of the
broader intelligence community. Given the early deadlines
for submission of articles, nece ary in order to obtain
community-wide coordination, th IB is not a, t' el< a pub-
lication as the NID. More inportant, the principal contrib-
utors to the NIB outside of CIA--DIAand, to a lesser extent,
NSA--have turned in,_ _agged and uneven
,. performances that, on
e whole; mange from the "fair
(primarily) to the
"
good
(occasionally). The panel secretary estimated that over 50
percent of the material would not be considered worthy of
publication were it not submitted by agencies other than
the CIA. To some extent, then, we are lowering our stand-
ards for current intelligence merely to acquire the impri-
mateur of USIB--to make the NIB "national."
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DI1 's NIB staff representative,
sees the 25X1
ux~ele~"v
fa as to what Constitutes truly national
intelligence as the greatest problem DIA faces. He also
feels that there is not sufficient internal criticisms in
DIA of articles written there, A third problem he cited_-
e ack of a formal requirement for editing within DIA--
has now been partially resolved. DIA in January made pro-
visions for in-house editing and review prior to submitting
Lhe articles to the panel chairman. I _J 25X1
that, despite reassurances to the contrary, DII~, also believe,, to the Defense Intelligence Notices VesT)XinritV
(DINS) rathe
the NIB.
--t
In addition to the above deficiencies, both DIA and
NSA tend to write articles that are narrowly focu9.V
on sometimes fragmentary data, and lacking As As one seasoned observer described it, NSA wants to writeSTis.
even if it has only one piece of SIGINT and no collateral
data and DIA tends to take all DDO reports as the gospel
truth.
The problems are not all one-sided. DIA feels it has
justifiable complaints agaiist the Agenc
PAlysts at the
entagon believe that CIA eople are too oftenauncom romising
in defending their posi lonstha they"" a a vantage
the fact that the NIB is headquartered at the Agency to pres-
sure DIA into coordinating a CIA article or withdrawing a
DIA piece, that the Agency can run virtually anything it
wants while DIA pieces are often rejected, and that the pan-
el chairman and-secret ar
w .. _.v. _. __.. rs_....
ar-y A1, s ob ' ectve,I'en-r.
these allegations are true or not, DIA analysts--and doubt-
less some NSA people--believe them to be so and thus feel,
in I _J words, "paranoiac" about the Agency.
Actually, the acceptance rate for DIA articles is
considerably higher than one might presume. In December,
DIA had 75,percent of its military submissions accepted;
CIA was a bare one percent ahead, with an acceptance rate
of 76 percent. (But CIA had proposed, and had accepted, a
much higher number of articles). In January, DIA proposed
87 military articles, 55 of which were published for a 63
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percent acceptance rate. During the same period, CIA pro-
posed 84 military articles, of which 64 were published--an
acceptance rate of 76 percent. Even this record, however,
probably is not satisfactory to DIA. CIA is still writing
a considerably higher number of,r_y.rticlcs than is
or Gera,. Faurer's
QIA which is C-br rary to Major a' p _H'~ for military
desire'tTat-DTA have rimar " res onsibility for military
articles and therefore write the largest share of them.
From conversations held at DIA, I came away with the
feeling that the higher-ups _did-. _.:t a.-_.make the
NI __ ork,
but without a concommitant realization on their part that
some changes would be necessary in the way DIA does business
if their contributions were to be sought after and valuable.
No one seems to have any great desire to return to the DIA
Intelligence Summary and most seemed to value the prestige
they felt was accorded the NIB because of the USIB stamp of
approval.
There are suspco,n_F4 CIS-and probably justifiable
ones--that Gen. Graham still wants to put CIA out of the
military reporting business altogether. One line of rea-
soning was that, if the Agency reverted to a bulletin put
out solely by CIA, DIA in the form of the General would make
an even more determined effort to grab the whole share of
the military pie. The thought was, then, that CIA should
keep DIA reasonably happy by accepting their articles for
the NIB and thereby diminish the chances that Graham would
try to usurp the field of military reporting. If battles
are to be fought, the reasoning goes, better that Mr. Colby
should save his heavy weapons to ensure OSR and the Agency
a place in military intelligence rather than use his pres-
tige to get DIA out of the NIB.
On the positive side, even those most critical of DIA
se dvaaz es i:n.-thatAgency' s participation . There is a
fund of recognized expertise , LnD? A _t-t, properly chan-
neled, coo o'! real service to NIB readers. DIA par-
ticipation also ensures greater attention to the needs of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff--consumers whose interests are de-
serving of national consideration. And the closer--if
grudging--cooperation that is fostered by the NIB does tend
to keep both sides honest and careful.
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There are pros and cons, ;.hen, in having the NIB as
a national product. The cons considerably outweigh the
pros at this juncture. Nonetheless, there are a number of
factors and goals--sometimes conflicting--which must be
considered in determining what should be done with the NIB.
What follows is an attempt to evaluate various options,
giving particular attention to such questions as coordina-
tion, security, prestige, and priority of audiences.
Options
Option 1: leave the NIB as is: Clearly, the NIB
as presently constituted isn?t working properly. There are
a number of frustrations and complaints on all sides and
some, but not all, can be eliminated if we tinker with the
present system. That system is time-consuming, wasteful of
analyst time, duplicative, and overly hierarchical.
Option 2: IC Staff proposal for general circulation
NID plus supplement. Option 2, as described in a memorandum
for the DCI on June 11, 1974, does appear to have some ad-
vantages. It would decrease by a net of one the number of
major periodicals produced by the intelligence community--a
goal to which the IC staff is committed. Use of a general
circulation NID would mean a more clearly defined role for
other members of the intelligence community and the produc-
tion of a prestige periodical which would be genuinely
"'national." And a merger of the NIB and NID would save
some resources of permit some reduction in t e urden ana-
lysts, editors and others now bear.
The disadvantages of the IC staff proposal clearly
outweigh `fne a vantages, however. Coord'nation already is
amajor problem for all anal sts in t e community. --"
i einoordinate the huge vo ume oTrticles that appears
in the NTD would be a nightmarish proposition. The NID would
lose the flexibility it currently enjoys as a publication
which is only "loosely" coordinated and it would be much
more difficult to make it as timely as it now is. More im-
portant, the necessa -i- aj-o11-QL a number of B~In N0A
articles woul quite bluntly, ?sebae the pub. ication.
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:Security problems would be increased Security of-
ficiaTalarmed in the-i"rs "" n Lance about publishing
a document like the NID which could be so easily,tucked away
in a stack of unclassified materials. The risks would be
greatly magnified if an insert were included on a regular
basis, particularly because the insert would contain the
most highly classified material in the whole paper.
The questions of presti ce and priority of audience are
closely related. The key audience is that which now receives
the NID. That the NID goes only to this small group makes it
an elite publication and in part explains the high value at-
tached to it. Were the NID, even with a supplement, to be
circulated to a much wider audience, top policy makers might
find their interest waning. Moreover, the layout of the
paper is designed to service the busy policy official, with
key items and a summary on the front page. With a supplement,
some crucial items would still be on the front page, some
would be in a supplement, and the summary would no longer be
a reliable guide.
Layout problems would also be aggravated, because cer-
tain vital items, which would be considered of front page
value, might have both a secret version and a highly classi-
fied one. Where, then, does each version run?
Option 3: two-tiered '0I Technically, a two-tiered
NID is"_feass ble with some modification of the present system.
Additional layout and paste-up people would probably be needed,
but the number of people associated with the NID would not
otherwise be increased; those now working on the NIB would be
reassigned, thereby effecting some reduction in the layers of
editing. All of the disadvantages (except the security risk)
cited in option 2, however, would still apply.
Option 4: return to the CIB. This option is not via-
ble, and for a reason which is also inherent in the other
ofons discussed. In talks with and the IC
staff, it became clear that Mr. Colby is committed to the
concept of a more integrated intelligence community and that
his strategy over the longer run is directed toward that end.
The IC staff holds the same views. One way to get more of a
handle on the intelligence community, and particularly on the
military (which has the money and the power), is to devote a
-6-
25X1
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really serious effort to the community as a whole. Through
such institutions as the KIQs, the NIOs, and the IC staff
with its product review function, Mr. Colby has fostered
the idea of community participation. The production of cur-
rent intelligence is one of the most visible and prestigious
of the community's activities. If Mr. Colby were seen as
withdrawing his support from the NIB, the embodiment of a
community commitment to national intelligence, the other_
agencies in the community might question the need for nq on other projects the DCI is
words, it would bo "politically sunwise" Ifor Mr. 25X1
Co by to retreat and in 25X1
certainly a non-starter, words, "it's almost
Given this, any option which does not retain the concept
of community participation--both in the submission of articles
d in coordination--almost certainly is doomed to fail.
,Option 5: drop theaublication entirely. In light of
the above, eliminating the publication is no solution. More-
over, the Agency does have a responsibility to provide a
large, middle-level audience with a current intelligence
publication.
Option 6: the NIB as a total by-product of th NID,
Were it not for the Colby commitment to national" e NI i-inte gence, the option that makes the most sense is number 6.
Articles could be written by the analysts
a :yin le - p1sed ur through
g production chain, coordinated "loosely" for_och
oubhi? nt'is; and then run -i two differen=t` ormats: the
newspaper format and the buTTetin format." edi'toria1/
production staff could be colhinnecT-ito a single unit and
streamlined, analysts would have to deal only with one ver-
sion of a given piece, and the troublesome aspects of
community participation--heavy coordination and outside sub-
mission of items--could be eliminated. The prestige of the
NID would be retained and the priority audience would con-
tinue to get an elite publication (and without security haz-
ards). The second-level readership would also be served,
seeing many of the same articles but served up in the tra-
ditional format.
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This option recognizes that, in fact, the NID and NIB
already duplicate each other. The difference is that the NIB
version of an article is more heavily coordinated; that the
NID and NIB articles have been edited by two separate staffs;
and that the NIB contains items by outside agencies.
To illustrate the duplication: in January, approximate-
1 2412to (including annexes but exc u 'or the The cor(
ubmiss s published. Of these 19eared in some
version in the NID as well. Of_ the 48 published solely in
the NIB, only 'T?8`" were produced by CIA. Thus it is clear that,
when the CIA analyst writes, his items in the vast majority
of cases appear in both publications. Yet in many instances
he must treat the item as two separate ones, following each
version along the route it must take to reach publication.
However appealing the NIB-as-offshoot-of-the-NID appe~nr
it runs contrary to the Colby concept and has only the re-
motest chance of acceptance. Therefore, the option I recom-
mend. be7 ow is not one I consider to be the most desirable
solution in terms of what is best for OCI. Rather, it is
one which probably will beacceptable to the DCI and the IC
staff and tolerable to OCT.
Ooiion 7: the NIB as a partial off-shoot of the NID.
`.Chis solution is predicate on a belief that, whether we like
it or not, we are stuck with the command to produce a national
intelligence vehicle which has DIA and NSA as active partici-
pants and coordinators. With such an option, there is no
extra security risk because the NIB format is retained; the
prestige of the NID as a limited distribution publication is
preserved; the priority audience continues to be the one that
receives the elite publication; and coordination is still
"loose" for the NID and "heavy" only for the NIB.
The changes necessary for such an arrangement would be
f mainly in the production end (to be explained in detail nn
.-the next section). If the system works properly, the analyst
will write an article which will go through a set of editors
who will handle items both for the NID and NIB. Changes
Trade at night by editors to take account of the space prob-
lems inherent in a newspaper would not be incorporated in the
NIB version, which should already be coordinated.
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0 Report
The 0 report makes a number of good points.
There are too many layers of review; there are good ana-
lysts who wish only to be analysts but who nonetheless
would like--and deserve to have--the prestige and salary
of a senior official; there is a tendency toward laxity in
the divisions because there are so many editors "upstairs;"
Lhere should be more than it handful of GS-14 and GS-15
positions reserved for senior analysts; there are too many
people who "manipulate" current intelligence in comparison
to those who actually create it.
I ieartily endorse the conceit .tha r.the kcay_?_w Zould
be done
t Fie division level and
.~..,.-;_a~ too many o the be
peop7Te.=,~ave been xicked u the
sqa rs. Over the longer run,
CI could reduce its production superstructure if it took
two major steps. a It would have to regard the div' n
PO as Q.Ie of- the absolutes.-.1 .p . e in the wzo e
and j proven ..... J?rsac:.cs,s
select for Bose o
and bs officers with editorial
and substantive-skills. The PO, it seems to me, should be
every bit as carefully selected as a NID editor or a PD13
officer. But I suspect that PO slots are too often used
as positions for relatively senior people who don't seem
to fit in anywhere else, people who may have bounced around
on various jobs and now need a home. In short,_the PO is
not chosen, for the right reasoner that-E-5-is one hell of a
cood editor with a breadthof substantive experience as well.
The same
Tie cThesaame fcomplaint applies to branch chiefs. What are
or selecf"i3-h.1-., ,..there not a
tendency to advance the best analysts to those positions
whether or not they happen to be good managers and good
editors? The branch chief Ls--or should e--the sin le
iuo: t .i_mportan person in the whole
,. -are QC ucture. But. the
skills needed are not merely those of a first-rae analyst,
although certainly the analytical talent is essential to
a branch chief. If OCI is genuinely interested in turning
out the best product possible, I think that the front office
t_si~ould take? a_ .Q {_T ~d-- c, o,k at its resent crop of branch
chiefs and r u J, .,
hem and select the replacements with a critical,
demand inheeye.
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There are over-s imp lifications_.and. -arrors1in the report.
(1) II does no#""'take sufficient account of the fact
that the NID, with its round-the-clock schedule and its ri-
gid format and machine requirements, has necessitated a whole
new group to ready that publication for distribution.
(2) His model on the OCI production process is somewhat
misleading. On the NID, for instance, pieces written by
the analyst do go through a branch chief and a division pro-
duction officer. The division chief and/or his deputy do
not edit the piece as such but merely review it, often after
the piece has gone forward to the NID staff. The division
chief "layer," then, is one quite different from the "layer"
of a PO or a NID editor. In addition, the NID editor and
his associate do not always review the same piece (although
1 learned through personal experience that all NID teams work
differently and some may be more rigid about seeing every
last item). If both do look at the article, the second re-
viewer does only a quick scan normally and makes no changes
unless there are glaring errors. (3) Division chiefs for
the most part- are not under -eznploy_ethan at., st .visions _ do
ee_d a deputy or.4llt one mao willrelieve---tfte chime f.. of the
~umerousy administrative-su;)ervisory tasks. (4) 'rho report,
T--think, overemphasized the ext6ht t-o- ich analysts, frus-
trated by the bureaucratic superstructure, choose either not
to'write for high-level publications unless forced to do so
or do a shoddy job because they know the "chain of fixers"
will do it for them. There are some analysts, I know, who
don't write much but primarily because they work on countries
where the level of interest is low and sparking that interest
is difficult.
.specifically, turning to the recommendatj,Ls,,. I would
concur in some but-H' s-t -a'E'-'those having to do with a
reorganized production t-a-Lf:"?
1yc As recommended, each division should have only one
PO (a savings of -two GS-15 and one GS-14 slots).
B. I would not recom;nend the aboli_tjon of the deputy
division slot, a possibility II considers. 25X1
If a deputy is underemployed, he or she could work
more closely with the PO and share some of the pro-
duction responsibilities; could function as a
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,generalist for the division and do some writing
on broader, longer memos; and could more system-
atically plan career development and solve per-
sonnel problems. If the division had to eliminate
t e position I woul t en recommend that the di-
vision chief-_bd.ptOVided with a
for administration. That individual would not be
a substitute for the division chief in his absenic e
a branch chief would have to assume that responsi-
bility. Rather, the special assistant would con-
cern himself solely with administration, manac;e,.uent_,
and personnel duties. The job could then be filled,
I would think, by a GS-13 or, at most, a GS-14.
The rec_QJnmendations._fo.r.-a xe_ctzn _t ,lr t, d__rax.QCluct -on
sTa fg area I think wc).rkab-le?. The reorganized
staff would work only if some wholesale juggling
were done at the division level. Even then, the
plan would have to be modified. It's one thing
to recommend that "...the responsibility for pro-
duction review should be returned as much as pos-
sible to the Divisions and that the Staff positions
savings which result should be redistributed among
the Branches." It's another matter altogether to
be in a position to. implement such recommendations.
II see several-otential.problems. It may be that some
senior editors might no longer be good senior analysts. And
.hey might find the transition difficult and undesirable.
Although OCI stresses flexibility--and rightly so--the ii-
.ztant transformation of editor or supervisor into analyst
may not be -r-ea.lizable. Then, too, it is perhaps deceptive
o maintain that so many high-level slots will be available
a.mmediately for analyst use. The Oplan will in reality 25X1
open tip only a few new slots for analysts at the higher g_r_ades.
Many of the production people will keep their grade but under
a different title.
a:ven if many of the NID editors came down to the branches,
-clhey would handle only a small portion of the articles (and
they may or may not make good teachers for junior analysts).
The rest of the work will still be done by the present crop
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of analysts and reviewed by the same branch chiefs and POs.
Therefore, many of the problems that necessitate editors
above the division level will persist.
I
oreover I
vast , number of chores the NID ecx"i rsperform,
many of ~Whi oh ' are Ynot x d to-riz a __.a.
problem solvers ~ " ~-?"' _~...~_ ~'"`"~ They are e.~pedz~urs,
processors, proof-readers, analysts during
crisis periods, supervisors, headline writers, summary com-
pilers, PDB overseers, cable officers on occasion, and in
general men-and-women-of-all-work. Even if the NID night
editors did only a bare minimum of editing and reviewing,
they would be gainfully employed--both of them. During thn
day there is some slack time (it now seems to be more than
one person can handle but not enough for two) , and one of my
recommendations (in the following section) will give the 141-D
day editors some extra duties. Therefore, I don't think it's
possible to cut down on the number of NID editors, although
its a tempting target.
D. The PDB may be lei t ~vesfi but one person
a seven day work week and a 12-14 hour shift.
There must be enough people to cover that extended
period.
into two different branches people who aretperformingpwhat
are essentially service functions for all the publications.
There have been problems tinder the present sot-up between
those who work in the Publications Control Branch and those
in the Publications Su ort Branch, particularly during the
evening hours. iretains this separation by putting
;goof readers bo e Daily Publications Group he pro-
poses and in the Publications Support Group.
ecommE~ndationns
Dealing First with the NIB, and accepting that DIA and
iSA participation and coordination are necessary evils, my
proposal would be to
k
ma
e the NIB affh
n~c,
n
insofar as p mot`"
ossibl
f
e
or all CIA it Th
.ems.e CIA analyst
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would write a piece and, if intended for both publications,
would send it through the PO to the NID staff. Under this
scheme, there would be no panel chairman (thus eliminating
a slgt which appears on the chart in report as
Chief of Production Staff as GS-17) E 1 s>ecr_etary.
=i_- needed, and I think it would be, there could be a
special assistant to the NID staff during the day, perhaps
a person working a 10-6 or 11-7 shift. This person would
do some of the chores now handled by the early night editor
but would also help keep track of DIA and NSA items, of
classifications, coordination, contacts with analysts, and
so forth. The actual editing of pieces__intended. _or both
the NID and-NIB' would be done b one or the other of the "
,LS%!ID day editors', but both apu d not work on the
,s. ii c:4
The associate editor would be in general charge, especially
in terms of pieces from outside the Agency, but the senior-
.editor (with an assist from if he hits a real -nag)
would make the policy decisions as to whether DIA submissions
_aake the initial determination as to what in general would
be entertained from other agencies or what assigned to a
given agency if there are two pieces offered on the same
subject.
For the most part, an item? would be
ser ~ t ~ pr ,co_
ordination after theNID team had-s- but before it Baas
edited by for the HID. To wait for his chan ,es
tjould delay the process too much. The coordinated version
worked on b the NID editors would appear in the NID; the
version, with whatever coordinating changes
are acceptable, would run in the HID.
To ease the a--L42 d b the DIA sub-J-'
25X1
zones, I
propose M we send -.rl .P?.-to---III::1A.._ta-, s_?their
zi3CJ and review shop . Perhaps this could be only a
`c-nl ?ra Y s
iT"
'
rrt
DIA
s own editors have a better grasp
o::.' things. Or it could be a rotational slot. 25X1
Mentioned in an earlier memo that he thought 25X1
was ready for PO responsibii_ities. He might be a possible
choice). In addition, the DIA representative here should do
whatever polishing and chanting is necessary. If there are
still problems, the NID associate editor could help out. But
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the burden should fall on DIA, and if it's necessary to
have two DIA people here as well as one of our people there;
I think we should insist on it. We are now bearing too much
of the burden.
At present, two nic~ht_o. 7itors-_workk .on the -itfB axid ho, Lp
out on the NID._~ane is on a 4 P.M.-i A.M. shift and the
othei= works from 10 P.M. until 7 A.M. I would cut thi:,
~(
down to one person who would work a shirom T,)Pu11t:-1
A4M.._-. or . t'1e:-reabouts--hours could- kie settled on exactly
wh n the needs of the pa6lications under the new scheme
determined. The duties the ase
present early night editor r,a~;
(reviewing NIB drafts an:-1 graphics; checking for content,
grammar and security; preparing the cable, etc.) could be
done by the special assistant to the 14ID team. Cons id,,ra-
tion should be given to having this person drawn fr_on the
ranks of the production end of things rather than from the
analytical ranks because the functions would be more those
or a processor and copy editor than of a substantive editor.
The early morning chores of the late night editor could be
handled by the NID team, which usually has a slack time after
the paper is put to bed.
would head up a unified oductiontaf f
-__ p
with as~iis deut ,-'
-
6 y and res onsiT~le for the acl-
rninistrative end f`tings) . Rather than have a special
assistant at the GS-14 level (the position
holds), I think it would be possible--base on conversai_ior.s 25X1
with 0--to have that position filled by a GS-11.
believes he could teach someone the essentials of that 25X1
now that the birth pangs of the newspaper are over. job
ale ocJ
p -__ cQn.__.p.eop ~.'., uld be consz_dered a ser-
vicce unit for all publications and would nctionas part of
Su
wo separate branches as is the case now. Group--rather i:ha7 in
, ublications Control Branch makes one GS-14 (slot--thej1chi(-!F-
-available) . There would be a second group labeled an 11di4-o.-ia1
Group. This group would have the NID/NIB editors, the spceec.i_al
assistant to those editors, and the lay-out officers and wee
supervisor Tay-out people could just as easily be in the kly
Publications Support Group, but I'm told it would be fca:,ib'i-e
to have those who work on lay-out also be responsible for tt;n
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Weekly.
I L] who now does lay-out, has worked on
the Weekly an the other lay-out person could be trained).
At present, there are two lay-out editors and several who
rotate as Weekly supervisors. My proposal would be to have
only three people assigned to that dual task on a rotating
basis.
The informationcontcal officer and his ass_istiant-, Prose who
ntly arc assigned to the ould be moved to Rc ubla caton.~ontr_ol Lrancl~
'9ist~='Y. The cable officer, a also once
n that branch, has alreaay been moved to the Liaison Office.
'Yhe. White >Io.,,~~__s.up rt -Staff y,Ip d be renamed the
White louse Support Group and would, bo.. asked to fund ion
with one less person There would then be' a chief and two
intelligence officers assigned to him. I'm told that in
mid-week that they are definitely over-staffed, and I suspect
-aat the present shifts could be modified to cover the loss
of one intelligence officer. A staffer now comes in at
3 A.M. and yet there is very little to do until much later
in the morning. The occasional telephone calls from the
White House could be referred elsewhere.
i'~aere are several other questions you raised, one deal--
ing with the need for office- el review of th iVIO output.
I think this
am'- b , .
the Productio .,,_S af_f, which under the new scheme is not
substantively oriented. I would also think that the kind
of overview that is needed--given the variety of subjects
to be covered--could best be done by someone in the DD/OCI's
position.
A to staff functions that could be transferred else-
where, I have no suggestions. Although 'I talked to many
people about what they did and how they did it, my unfamil-
with some of the more esoteric tasks that the office
ulidertakes made it difficu=_t for me to think of any more
rational way of dealing with these chores.
?? talked with about the nPPrlfnr ; -, 25X1
iaa.rnin pieco?s_ _n._ cludi_n_
We agreed that the NIB
probably run a summary of the material put out by could
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Strategic Warning Staff and could also run "small warnings "
tagged as such. The exact formula could be worked out later.
A chart of the proposed new staffing is attached. It's
a bit sketchy and for the most part I have attached no
names. Nor ~_s the exact ;lumber of people needed in each
case spelled out except in a general way. I would suggest
i-hat two-three persons from the present editorial and pro-
c;uction staffs get together to work out the details (po>;,;_i_
bly people like ---
pu y Chief
Western Europe Division
Office of Current Intelligence
25X1
25X1
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