CEP PRESENTATION FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RICHARDSON
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
17
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 2, 2002
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 15, 1973
Content Type:
SPEECH
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7
CEP PRESENTATION FOR
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
RICHARDSON
15 MARCH 1973
NAVY HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.
NAVY review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7
Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7
CEO PRESENTATIO
CDR
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
RICHARDSON
15 MARCH 1973
DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL
ON 1 MAR 78 TO UNCLASSIFIED
ON 1 MAR 83 SECRET
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ISSUE: HOW WELL DOES FORCE
PLANNING PROCESS RESPOND
TO STRATEGY GUIDANCE ?
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2L
SECRET
ESSENCE OF DOD POLICY GUIDANCE FOR
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
WITH OUR ALLIES, MAINTAIN FORCES
TO DETER A THEATER CONVENTIONAL WAR INVOLVING
THE USSR OR CHINA.
PRIMARY EMPHASIS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
EUROPEAN
DEFENSE.
SHIFT PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO ALLIES
FOR DETERRING OR FIGHTING SUB-THEATER
CON FLICTS.
SECRET
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GUIDANCE FOR SIZING GP FORCES
WITHIN FISCAL CONSTRAINTS
1. PLAN FORCES FOR A NATO CONFLICT (OR A
WAR AT SEA WITH THE SOVIETS) WHILE ASIA
IS QUIESCENT.
IN ADDITION, PLAN A RESERVE OF NOT MORE
THAN 2 DIVISIONS, 2 AIR WINGS, AND 2
CARRIER GROUPS.
IF, WHILE PROTECTING A MINIMUM NATO CAPABILITY
OF 10 DIVISIONS, MORE FORCES ARE NEEDED TO
AID AN ALLY VS A CPR OR NON-CPR ATTACK,
PROVIDE THOSE FORCES, IF THEY CAN BE
ACCOMMODATED IN A BALANCED PROGRAM.
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NET IMPACT OF GUIDANCE
SUBSTANCE:
1. DEFEND NATO
2. AVOID GROUND WARS IN ASIA
PROCEDURE
1. SPECIFIC,. PRESCRIPTIVE GUIDELINES
.. BASED ON WORST CASE
3. OTHER CASES FORCED TO "LESSER
INCLUDED" CATEGORY
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0/ MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF EQUAL COST SYSTEMS
IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
NATO
SCENAR 10
MIDEAST
CRISIS
SCENAR 10
CB ARACTERI
BUT NO SCEN
STICS
ARIOS
.SYSTEM A 70 ? 85 %
20-30 %
30-40%,
SYSTEM B 30 - 45 %
60-701%
70 - 85 %
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NATO-RELATED PROGRAM DECISION OPTIONS PROVIDED TO SECDEF
FY 74-78 ($ BILLIONS)
LARGEST ADDITION LARGEST DECREASE
TO PON TO POM
1. LAND FORCE ISSUES
(SUCH AS: SIZE OF MARINES,
TYPES OF ARMY DIVISIONS
SIZE OF.ARMY RESERVE, ETC: )
2. TACAIR ISSUES
(SUCH AS: NUMBER OF
CARRIERS, MUNITIONS
FUNDING, A-9/10 BUY, ETC.)
+3
3. NAVAL FORCE ISSUES
(SUCH AS: SURFACE ESCORT
BUYS, SONOBUOYS, PATROL
HYDROFOIL, ETC.)
+2
-3
TOTAL .
+12
-13
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IMPACT OF PL G PROCEDURES
DECENTRALIZATION MEANS MANAGEMENT BY EXCEPTION.
THROUGH ISSUE PAPER PROCESS, SECDEF FOCUSES ON
ABOUT 5% OF FORCES.
- PRESCRIPTIVE PLANNING CAN DISTORT FORCE
PLANNING.
NATO DOMINANCE CAUSES
- HIGH HARDWARE COSTS
- ADVERSE THIRD COUNTRY PERCEPTIONS
- SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT
- LOSS OF FLEI RILITY FOR. MORE PROBABLE
CONTINGENCIES
PRESCRIPTIVE GUIDANCE CAUSES:
FORECLOSED OPTIONS
- TACTICAL THINKING STEREOTYPED
- IMPEDIMENTS TO INNOVATION
VOYEURISM ENCOURAGED
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CEP GUESS
AS TO ENVIRONMENT
OF THE 190`S
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY ARE ENCOURAGING
SALT, MBFR, ETC.
BUT INSTABILITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES PERSIST, 6
CHINESE SUCCESSION - - EXTRA LEGAL ACTIONS
YUGOSLAV SUCCESSION VIETNAM/SEASIA
SINO/SOVIET HOSTILITY - -~ INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT
NO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN SOVIET OR CHINESE OBJECTIVES
OR REDUCTIONS IN POWER
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USES OF MILITARY IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1970'S
FORCES SERVE BOTH AS AN INSURANCE POLICY
IN CASE OF WAR AND AS LEVERAGE IN FOREIGN POLICY.
INSURANCE:
NATO
LESSER INCLUDED CASES
LEVERAGE:
M
DANGER-OF FINLANDIZATJON
.FLEXIBILITY vs SOVIETS ON FLANKS
PACIFIC
BALANCE OF POWER AMONG FOUR COUNTRIES
MIDEAsr
-- ISRAEL
OIL'
L Tf 4 E /C
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SUMMARY
CURRENT PLANNING STILL EMPHASIZES
SINGLE 20 YEAR OLD NATO SCENARIO
SUDDEN EUROPEAN WAR FIGHTING
- LESSER INCLUDED CASE ASSUMPTIONS
CONSEQUENCES OF NATO CONFLICT ARE STILL MORE SERIOUS
THAN OTHER CONTINGENCIES:
HOWEVER:
- PROBABILITY OF NATO CONFLICT IS RELATIVELY LOW
PROBABILITY OF LOWER ORDER CONFLICT IS HIGHER
BUT FISCAL CONSTRAINTS LEGISLATE AGAINST
STRUCTURING FOR THAT
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ISSUE -WOW MUCH SHOULD NATO DOMINATE
FORCE PLANNING?
ALTERNATIVES:
SPECIFY SCENARIOS OTHER THAN FULL SCALE
NATO CONFLICT
AND/OR
SPECIFY GENERAL FORCE CHARACTERISTICS
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FORCE EVALUATION BY POTENTIAL SCENARIOS (RAN ORDERING)
Major Subversion or Great uncertainty
Wars wars supported w/major power
by USSR/CPR implications
FORCE
LAND BASED
GROUND FORCES
SEA BASED
GROUND FORCES
LAND BASED
TACAIR
CARRIER
TACAIR
SEA CONTROL
FORCES
LOWEST UTILITY
- HIGHEST UTILITY
Minor
3rd Power
Problems
Non-
Military
Actions
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A. LAND BASED
GROUND FORCES
B. SEA BASED
GROUND FORCES
C. LAND BASED
TACAIR
D. CARRIER TACAIR
E. SEA CONTROL
FORCES
FORCES EVALUATION BY CHARACTERISTICS
WHICH ENHANCE POL/MIL OBJECTIVES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
RANKING + IS POSITIVE
0 IS UNCERTAINTY
-- IS NEGATIVE
N/A MEANS DOES NOT APPLY
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UNDER EITHER ALTERNATIVE
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO FORCES?
NEED CONSIDERABLE ANALYSIS
PROBABLY PREMIUM ON:
NUMBERS vs QUALITY OF UNITS
MOBILITY
NOT A.PRECIPITATE CHANGE OF DIRECTION BUT MAKING
THE CHOICES AVAILABLE TO SECDEF WHICH ARE
SOMETIMES OBSCURED OR DISTORTED TODAY
? DISTINCTION BETWEEN CURRENT AND FUTURE FORCES
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HOW TO IMPLEMENT A CHANGE IN FORCE
PLANNING PROCESS I
CHOICE:
CONTINUE PRESCRIPTIVE PLANNING DOCTRINE
OR
ESTABLISH ROUGH, INDICATIVE PLANNING GUIDES
II. MEANS:
9 CONTINUE OLD DPPG IN FORCE
? REISSUE DPPG REAFFIRIMING NATO FOCUS
REISSUE DDPG WITHOUT FORCE SIZING APPROACH
? DEVELOP NEW DPPG
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