CEP PRESENTATION FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RICHARDSON

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
17
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 2, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 15, 1973
Content Type: 
SPEECH
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7.pdf543.04 KB
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Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7 CEP PRESENTATION FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RICHARDSON 15 MARCH 1973 NAVY HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE. NAVY review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7 CEO PRESENTATIO CDR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RICHARDSON 15 MARCH 1973 DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL ON 1 MAR 78 TO UNCLASSIFIED ON 1 MAR 83 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 ISSUE: HOW WELL DOES FORCE PLANNING PROCESS RESPOND TO STRATEGY GUIDANCE ? Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03/02: CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 2L SECRET ESSENCE OF DOD POLICY GUIDANCE FOR GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES WITH OUR ALLIES, MAINTAIN FORCES TO DETER A THEATER CONVENTIONAL WAR INVOLVING THE USSR OR CHINA. PRIMARY EMPHASIS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE. SHIFT PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO ALLIES FOR DETERRING OR FIGHTING SUB-THEATER CON FLICTS. SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 GUIDANCE FOR SIZING GP FORCES WITHIN FISCAL CONSTRAINTS 1. PLAN FORCES FOR A NATO CONFLICT (OR A WAR AT SEA WITH THE SOVIETS) WHILE ASIA IS QUIESCENT. IN ADDITION, PLAN A RESERVE OF NOT MORE THAN 2 DIVISIONS, 2 AIR WINGS, AND 2 CARRIER GROUPS. IF, WHILE PROTECTING A MINIMUM NATO CAPABILITY OF 10 DIVISIONS, MORE FORCES ARE NEEDED TO AID AN ALLY VS A CPR OR NON-CPR ATTACK, PROVIDE THOSE FORCES, IF THEY CAN BE ACCOMMODATED IN A BALANCED PROGRAM. Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 NET IMPACT OF GUIDANCE SUBSTANCE: 1. DEFEND NATO 2. AVOID GROUND WARS IN ASIA PROCEDURE 1. SPECIFIC,. PRESCRIPTIVE GUIDELINES .. BASED ON WORST CASE 3. OTHER CASES FORCED TO "LESSER INCLUDED" CATEGORY Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 0/ MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF EQUAL COST SYSTEMS IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS NATO SCENAR 10 MIDEAST CRISIS SCENAR 10 CB ARACTERI BUT NO SCEN STICS ARIOS .SYSTEM A 70 ? 85 % 20-30 % 30-40%, SYSTEM B 30 - 45 % 60-701% 70 - 85 % Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03/02: CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 NATO-RELATED PROGRAM DECISION OPTIONS PROVIDED TO SECDEF FY 74-78 ($ BILLIONS) LARGEST ADDITION LARGEST DECREASE TO PON TO POM 1. LAND FORCE ISSUES (SUCH AS: SIZE OF MARINES, TYPES OF ARMY DIVISIONS SIZE OF.ARMY RESERVE, ETC: ) 2. TACAIR ISSUES (SUCH AS: NUMBER OF CARRIERS, MUNITIONS FUNDING, A-9/10 BUY, ETC.) +3 3. NAVAL FORCE ISSUES (SUCH AS: SURFACE ESCORT BUYS, SONOBUOYS, PATROL HYDROFOIL, ETC.) +2 -3 TOTAL . +12 -13 Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 IMPACT OF PL G PROCEDURES DECENTRALIZATION MEANS MANAGEMENT BY EXCEPTION. THROUGH ISSUE PAPER PROCESS, SECDEF FOCUSES ON ABOUT 5% OF FORCES. - PRESCRIPTIVE PLANNING CAN DISTORT FORCE PLANNING. NATO DOMINANCE CAUSES - HIGH HARDWARE COSTS - ADVERSE THIRD COUNTRY PERCEPTIONS - SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT - LOSS OF FLEI RILITY FOR. MORE PROBABLE CONTINGENCIES PRESCRIPTIVE GUIDANCE CAUSES: FORECLOSED OPTIONS - TACTICAL THINKING STEREOTYPED - IMPEDIMENTS TO INNOVATION VOYEURISM ENCOURAGED Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03/02-: CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 CEP GUESS AS TO ENVIRONMENT OF THE 190`S FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY ARE ENCOURAGING SALT, MBFR, ETC. BUT INSTABILITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES PERSIST, 6 CHINESE SUCCESSION - - EXTRA LEGAL ACTIONS YUGOSLAV SUCCESSION VIETNAM/SEASIA SINO/SOVIET HOSTILITY - -~ INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT NO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN SOVIET OR CHINESE OBJECTIVES OR REDUCTIONS IN POWER Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03102-.. CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7 USES OF MILITARY IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1970'S FORCES SERVE BOTH AS AN INSURANCE POLICY IN CASE OF WAR AND AS LEVERAGE IN FOREIGN POLICY. INSURANCE: NATO LESSER INCLUDED CASES LEVERAGE: M DANGER-OF FINLANDIZATJON .FLEXIBILITY vs SOVIETS ON FLANKS PACIFIC BALANCE OF POWER AMONG FOUR COUNTRIES MIDEAsr -- ISRAEL OIL' L Tf 4 E /C Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03102 CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 SUMMARY CURRENT PLANNING STILL EMPHASIZES SINGLE 20 YEAR OLD NATO SCENARIO SUDDEN EUROPEAN WAR FIGHTING - LESSER INCLUDED CASE ASSUMPTIONS CONSEQUENCES OF NATO CONFLICT ARE STILL MORE SERIOUS THAN OTHER CONTINGENCIES: HOWEVER: - PROBABILITY OF NATO CONFLICT IS RELATIVELY LOW PROBABILITY OF LOWER ORDER CONFLICT IS HIGHER BUT FISCAL CONSTRAINTS LEGISLATE AGAINST STRUCTURING FOR THAT Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03/02- CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 ISSUE -WOW MUCH SHOULD NATO DOMINATE FORCE PLANNING? ALTERNATIVES: SPECIFY SCENARIOS OTHER THAN FULL SCALE NATO CONFLICT AND/OR SPECIFY GENERAL FORCE CHARACTERISTICS Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03/02-: CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 FORCE EVALUATION BY POTENTIAL SCENARIOS (RAN ORDERING) Major Subversion or Great uncertainty Wars wars supported w/major power by USSR/CPR implications FORCE LAND BASED GROUND FORCES SEA BASED GROUND FORCES LAND BASED TACAIR CARRIER TACAIR SEA CONTROL FORCES LOWEST UTILITY - HIGHEST UTILITY Minor 3rd Power Problems Non- Military Actions Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007103/02- CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 A. LAND BASED GROUND FORCES B. SEA BASED GROUND FORCES C. LAND BASED TACAIR D. CARRIER TACAIR E. SEA CONTROL FORCES FORCES EVALUATION BY CHARACTERISTICS WHICH ENHANCE POL/MIL OBJECTIVES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 RANKING + IS POSITIVE 0 IS UNCERTAINTY -- IS NEGATIVE N/A MEANS DOES NOT APPLY Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03/02- CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 UNDER EITHER ALTERNATIVE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO FORCES? NEED CONSIDERABLE ANALYSIS PROBABLY PREMIUM ON: NUMBERS vs QUALITY OF UNITS MOBILITY NOT A.PRECIPITATE CHANGE OF DIRECTION BUT MAKING THE CHOICES AVAILABLE TO SECDEF WHICH ARE SOMETIMES OBSCURED OR DISTORTED TODAY ? DISTINCTION BETWEEN CURRENT AND FUTURE FORCES Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 Approved For Release 2007/03102- CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7 HOW TO IMPLEMENT A CHANGE IN FORCE PLANNING PROCESS I CHOICE: CONTINUE PRESCRIPTIVE PLANNING DOCTRINE OR ESTABLISH ROUGH, INDICATIVE PLANNING GUIDES II. MEANS: 9 CONTINUE OLD DPPG IN FORCE ? REISSUE DPPG REAFFIRIMING NATO FOCUS REISSUE DDPG WITHOUT FORCE SIZING APPROACH ? DEVELOP NEW DPPG Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500270001-7