SOVIET STRATEGIC CONCEPTS BY MR. ALLEN DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001100160004-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 14, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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3OVET STRATEGIC CON PT3
By
? '. Allen Dulles
"this is an official document cat the National
War ai irccm, ;Abstract ou trom,
or iteprc i, ; 4 t c ,n cu
client is i1Ui s:eciiic permsssun
of thij Coiiime.,idant of fhe Niticfv:,l y"dar rCo ege."
Presented at
axe National War College
Wa8hington, D. C.
14 January 1955
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SOVIET STRATEGIC Ct (EPTS
By
Mr. Allen Dulles
(14 January 1955)
CMOs Every year about this time we always seem
to be fortunate enough to have the Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency to come down to the colleges and tabk to us about some
aspect of the threat to the security of our own country in the Free
threat; how strong is it; and what is its
discussion today we hays called this aspect of the
irategia Concepts*. Mr. Dullets is probably the beat
in the country, and perhaps the world, to discuss this
subject.
yes with it on a daily or perhaps on an hourly basis.
I know that what he has to tell us this morning is going to be both
valuable and interesting.
It is a very real pleasure for me to welaome back to our
1r. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and to introduce him to the members of both colleges.
M. DUI S a General Craig, Gentlemen: -
I always enjoy this annual meeting with you here. I don't
predict how much longer I will be making these annual pilgrimages,
but I have said that I would be in this job from now on as long as
will keep rye. So I may be with you for a year or two more,
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subject to the e ,.gencies of life, politics, health and a few other
E=ept for a bad cold, health is reasonably good at the
I find it hard to meet all the specifications which
has set forth. I approach this subject with a good
of modesty, in part because I find that every time I sit down
with a group of our own people there, that are fairly wise. I
on this subject a-- at least they are spending a lot of time
on it and a certain amount of "dough" -- that there are some differ-
ences of views among us. I asked them to give me a few notes as
for my talk this morning, and ao they game me some notes.
wen tore them up and then wrote my own notes. So that I
find s
go back this morning later to my own shop _- I may
lleaguea of mine, who - some of them.. I think -
dal - who listened to what I have to say, will tell
enjoy particularly the question period afterward.
I find that I get the most p stratinyg and sometimes the most dif-
ficult questions right here. And without giving away any secrets,
I east had a cup of coffee with General Craig and his associates
and they tell. me that this is about the most belligerent class they
have had for some time. So I am looking forward to the post-pran
question period.
find that when I come here you always give me a
nice easy subject to discuss, although I must say that this Year,
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for acne reason or other, in discussing the "Soviet Strategic Con
a-Otat,
be less divergence of opinion tl I have in the
cussed related subjects here and at other of
chools that I address from time to time d
I will start out by giving a certain number of principles
I would consider guiding for Soviet strategy, with certain ec-
menta; then I will indicate how I think they are going to apply this
on; and then a brief word at the conclusion as to its
impact on American strategy in various parts of the world and where
we stands
1. The Cc mu i.at leaders of the U. S. 3.R. consider their
basic objectives to be the consolidation and expansion of Soviet
power. (Nothing very new to you in that.)
Their goal is the ultimate elimination of any power centers
capable of cc peting with or threatening the U.S.S.R. Their objec-
d frog the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism, etrinea which they
based in large part upon their interpretation of history
used as a broad guide to their actions. The basic elements of this
interpretation area
(1) the belief that significant social
,developments result only from forces in con-
flict; and
(2) the belief that the final conflict
will occur between capitalism and ctvnism
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and vi l result in the world-vide collapse of
capitalism and its replacement by communism.
2. The key factor here is continuous conflict between
opposing social systems.
It has been made clear by the Soviet spokesmen that while
eventually take the form of open military war, there will
be long periods between military wars. These periods Lenin calls
This is no less war to them; it is just a different
It involves using means other than full-scale military
forces. Here is the area of operations to which they have devoted
most of their attention since 1917, except, of course, when they
were forced into war against their will in 1941. This is true be-
cause in their own view they have at no time possessed adequate
military strength to invite open world-wide conflict with a world
power, such as the United States is today and Germany was in 19,40-'41.
In my conversation I had just before I came here I was dia-
cuasing the interesting precedent of the Soviet-+err relations in
the period 1 39., 141, early 141, before the war. I imagine most of
you or a great many of you Agave read the secret German documents
and published covering that period. I think myself
that those documents are probably the most instructive papers that
we have as a guide to the interpretation of Soviet policy.
I don't say that Soviet policy today is necessarily eras
what it was in 1940. I think the Soviets feel that their power
position today is considerably better than it was in 19.40 and that
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therefore they could, if necessary, take risks that they would have
shied away from in 1940. But I think that the general pattern of
their policy of those days is reflected in many of their attitudes
y. And I certainly recc*i end that you study those documents.
Zink the State Department has published them. What are they
Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1940-141? So .ething of that kind.
If you haven't read them.. I think all of you ought to read them,
The U. S.. S. R., =mat 1939, concluded a treaty of non-
aggression with Nazi Germany to buy additional time to strengthen
their armed forces, and through the secret protocols with this
treaty they established certain territorial spheres of interest in
ic, Poland and Southeast Europa.
While the Soviets looked upon Germany as the extreme
capitalist or fascist state, with which war would be ultimately
unavoidable, they felt that by establishing a modus vivendi between
the U.S.S.R. and Germany they were in effect taking advantage of the
possibility that Germany would be seriously weakened in a war with
the other western capitalist powers. In this cause the U.S.S.R.
has shown itself willing to enter into spheres of interest ?cgree-
ments in order to avoid the risk of open military conflict.
In a recent statement, 10 January -- just about four or
Otto 1tuusiuen, a high ranking member of the CPSU
one t the present policy of the United States to that Of Hitler
; i., a,, he pointed out we were anti-Cap zunists; we were
building up our arr ments; we were, he mod, seeking world do .nation;
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and we hated the Soviet Union. In those respects he felt we were
comparable to Nazi, GexTaany.
This may be rather significant treatment of the U, S,
cos:
it contains certain clews to the present
ion,
Soviet attitude toward the U. S. It reflects the belief of the
eaders that the U. S. will become involved in capital
r at least in capitalist depressions and that by establish-
ine a modus vivendi with the United States for the short run the
U.S.S.R. will be able to legitimize its control over the satel-
lites and then take further advantage of wars and depressions of
-list states to increase its area of expansion.
". XJhen the Soviets speak of peace l coe istcance, to
theme. this is synaWous with partial war.
opite their recent protestations, there is no reason
that they actually accept a concept of par neat or
even continues coexistence. They regard coexistence only as a
on of equilibriuaa forced upon them, that is, upon the U.S.S.R.,
onal power balance which must eventually be replaced
by another situation in which they have developed a more favorable
power position.
I have a feeling that the Soviets' clever use of slogans
about as damaging to us as their use of guns and explos-
Of course,, they have taken our own symbols, words, such as
"denocra
"freedom", and "freedori loving", and so forth and so
on, and twi d and turned them., Now they are rasing "coexistence"
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It doesn't appeal so much on this side of the
has a tremendous appeal, as you all realise, in
Europe and in certain parts of Asia. Goodness
knows it is a very meaningless
As long as we are on the
same globe we have to be always fighting or always coexisting, and
even when we fight we have to coexist to some extent because we
push the other fellow off the globe.
But I don e t know what we can do to sort of blot the edge
apon of sloga izing us into a defensive position in that
Id of propaganda,.
action with this peaceful coexistence idea,. I
give you a little quote from a speech that Joe Stalin
in 1922--- Unis was at the 15th Party Congress --- which I
:s well to keep in mind so that you can quote back the
Soviets fr*m time to time as needed. Mere is what Stalin said on
that occasion:
We cannot forget the saying of Lenin to
the effect that a great deal in the matter of
our construction depends on whether we succeed
in delaying war with the capitalist countries,
which is inevitable, but vhioh may be delayed
either until the proletarian revolution ripens
in urope or until colonial: revolutions can
fully to a head or, finally, until the capital-
list countries fight among themselves over the
division of the colonies. Therefore,, the main-
tenance of peaceful relations with the capital-
ist countries is an obligatory task with us.
The basis of our relations with capitalist
countries consists of admitting the coexistence
of the two opposing systens.
So that this teams is a very old one and the idea is dragged
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out from time to tine as gaits their theory.
4. while the Soviets have couched their program in the
.litary terminology of strategy and tactics, they have always
neigh'
in much broader terms than the use of this terminology
o indicate.
Strategy has represented for them the general program of
development of Communist power. Their study of tactics
+ei with the Greene for extending their power. song
military action has been only one among many tactics,
and evidently a less desirable one as long as a formidable apposing
power center exists, This is as true today as it was under Stalin,
despite the rmy surface changes in the U.S.S.R. since the beginning
of the :i? en ov regiiaa.
5. Neither their view of strategy or of tactics provide
the Soviet leaders with any detailed blueprint for inmodiate policy
decisions. They have to improvise on details, just as everyone
else d.
y have had their reverses -- Korea, Tito, Iran,
Greece, and others. But they do have guidelines to influence the
shaping of general strategic planning and are ready to change their
tactics as the power situation or the risks of war dictate.
I think we are far too inclined to attribute a kind of
infallibility to the Soviet planners that they don't have. I think
they have just about as much clay in their feet as our own planners
do. In facet, I think if one looks over the past, it is hard to
ealain the stupidity of certain actions that they have taken --
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why, for example,. Stalin lashed out against Yugoslav _a -- I think it
t488 -- is almost inconn hensible. People talk today about
Yugoslavia having left t ze Soviet Urnion. They didn't leave the
t Union; they were thrown out of the Soviet Union, And for a
time they plead against the treatment that Stalin and Molotov were
meting out to them. I don't see that they are going back; I don't
think they are.
There was a mistake of policy, probably due to the vagaries
of a stubborn old man who wouldn't be talked to, that is, Stalin
himself. Obviously, they made a miscalculation in Korea. They
were certain ate wouldn't fight. May misjudged the Iranian situ-
ation, and, to some extent? the situation in Greece. They followed
a technique with regard to the Marshall Flan which insured. its pas-
adopted a
they ht
ad States, when, I have ? lways felt, if they had
cooperative seemingly cooperative -- policy.,
gone far toward defeating it,
e present time I think that the Soviet uversp
their notes, the pressures they have put on have been our greatest
aid in helpingto push co the work of ratification of the Paris
. I think if the Soviet had kept quiet we would have had
a much harder time. So that I don't think we need to get too dis-
couraged on this business of the Soviet blueprint, if it exists.
I think they have, as I have indicated, them tactics under
oular tactics they are applying to reach their and
airkk maybe their overall strategy is sounder maybe than
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objec
6. By and large, the broad airs of consolidation and ex-
pansion of Soviet power dictate at pre sit a policy o perpetual
probing to find weak spots its the non-Cc zuni?at world and to exploit
t by means short of general wax, any we?akne s se s dis-
This policy includes, as I have just indicated, a willing-
ness,, when they meet stiff opposition, to engage in tactical retreats,
7. As indicated, Soviet policy is tempered by the view
that
n.t yet ready to take on the United States and its
in general war.
They recognize our nuclear superiority, as well as the
fact that we have metre effective means of delivering atomic attack.
They have a healthy respect for our industrial capacity. They are
to initiate any venture which might jeopardize their con-
-1trol over their own and the satellite ;rovvernmental apparatus. I
think that is very 'bass to Soviet policy. I may exaggerate, but
it sew to no if we look at the course of their deve to x;tent in the
field of aircraft production,, parti culsrl.; , that they started out
eeo aizing the lord,; load that we had, they started out with a
,ype of plane, if one can call any plane defensive.
I don e t believe much in the disarraamen t field. I am try-
ro separate arms into defensive and offensive. But certainly
a 9'I.G--15 is probably .pore defensive, except in tactical warfare,
boyaber. in any event, it was scmewbat surprising
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to us that they did concentrate on the fighter interceptor and that
type of plane for so long, until relatively recently -- the last two
or three years -- they really turned to develop the long-range bomber.
ey were very worried about the possibility of an attack
from the United States and consequently therefore in that type of
weapon, as well as on radar, anti-aircraft and reams to defend their
old centers of power, political and industrial.
As I said before, I think that the Soviets probably consid*r
that today they are relatively stronger than they have ever been at
time in their history --- in modern times, that is -- and that
over the years will give them maybe a little more freedom and elbow
rooza in their selection of policy.
In our own work and in our estimating the future we have
carefully, of course, what will be the trend over
or four years with the possibility that the Soviets
s the united States and our allies, than they are even today.
That brings up the whole question of a situation of when
be at the and of that tine relatively in a better position,
we have atomic plenty on both sides of the ideological world and
one will do when that situation arises. But I thins, at least
our shop we have reached the conclusion, that the Soviet Union
shooting war at this tip.
8. Since the death of Stalin, the day-by-day details of
of the Soviet strategy within the general framework I have
described are influenced additionally by internal. Soviet factors.
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The factors I have been discussing before have been largely
of a general nature. Among these factors are these: The develop-
ment of the new collective leadership, the need for bringing to
focus a more than one point of view in policy decisions, the possi-
bility that a struggle for power within the oligarchy might break
over some major issues of economic or foreign policy.
I have never felt that this committee form of government
that was established after Stalin died was likely to be a permanent
form of government in the Soviet Union. On that I think some of my
observers differ from me. It may last some years.
ie committee form of governa'srent was smiewhat rudely
the Beria incident and ber.a found himself no longer a
mfr of the eoi ittee.
We have a good deal of speculation going, on today as to
the relative position of 14lenkov and Ehrushchev, It is one of
the most interesting studies. M .enkov has been quiet for.a long
while and allowed Khrushchev to do the talking. hrushohev has
also been signing a number of decrees, where one would expect to
find the signature of Maleukov there also. How significant that is
very hard to tell. In the reports that we have had of eanver-
sations, where both Malenkov and ]Sbirushchev have been present, it
looks as though Malenkov was willing to let Khrushchev play the
part of maybe Peck's Bad Boy and do the needling and the talkinc ,
quite benevolently, quite happy, according to
these reports, letting Ehrushohev make . little bit of a fool of
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f from time to time and not worry:i n too nuch about it. That
.may the case - it .y be that Khrushchov, w' _o i e a pretty dynamic
fell o z, isn't afraid to rake rz Este :ers, isn't afraid to say things,
ri ybe pushing
That seems to be the possible center of friction insofar
internal Soviet nuichine is concer3ed.
And then you have the problem as to what part the army
play in the event there is a conflict between these two ua j or
:Leaders, Malen ;ov axid Khrusi c rev. So that whole picture, t 7e
internal political picture, may be one of the breaks upon the
developueut of their foreign policy. They have to keep that always
U1 ?trod.
I pexhaps should mention Molotov. The impression we get
t Molotov is not takirz a very active part in the domestic
`i.2 at he is given within limits quite a few h?a;.ds in
developing hiss own foreign polic_.oa -- T say "wit in limits"
and that he is content with that. There are c uoationa from time
to time as to his he ltiz. He doesn't seem to have quite the vigor
he had ten years ago, but that is true of some of the rest of us
too probably.
Word that has reached us has indicated that conferences
the Berlin Conference and the Geneva Conference, and sartie
ol..c?tov's attitude was very different than t used to be
old days of Stalin. In the old. days of Stain he would
debate and de'ate, avoid reaching decisions .nt.-'4-1 he could get
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a clear-cut cable from Joe Stalin In Moscow. Now he is perfectly
ready, without referring to Moscow, to reach decisions on relatively
important points that concern the Soviet 'Onion. If the issue con-
Com=unist China, then he is pretty careful.
Going back now to the inte=.al. framework and its effect
.~-- I have mentioned briefly the :.eternal con-
one of the breaks on policy. I thine. there are certain
problems too, the necossity for a new look --- eco
ich will give =ore reco alti on to consumer demand, the
need for a better development of their agricultural pron. And,
of course, this new economic policy has some influence upon their
I don.; t think it has a great deal, however. It
suit in a kind of leveling off, diversion of some steel maybe
other things from the military to the internal domestic
program. I doubt that it will have a very, drastic effect in this
:tiield. But, however,, this whole internal economic situation, plus
their agricultural situation, which is one of their most serious
problems, is another factor to be taken into account in the over-
all developnent of - o-c met strategy.
I suggest, that, if you haven't already done so, one of
the interesting 111.01d: of study would be the agricultural situation --
a study of the Soviets' agricultural situation. They are making
to dev+olop new areas of grain production, and
their whole food situation will dep:nd to extent on th
cess of thoseefforts. A really serious crop failure in the Ukraine
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would confront them with some pretty difficult problems. They haven= t
had any serious crop failures recently, however.
9.
Soviet leaders will, continue to emphasize all other
conducting what they regard as inevitable conflict with the
non Coriauniat world; that is, all other means than of open warfare.
These other means may perhaps be labeled subversive
ties, although many of them are carried in overt rather than
clrnade5tine fashion. This is an area of activity in which they have
numerous tactical directions from Lenin and Stalin w -dch they have
need and have had considerable success.
successes in this area may in tact further sup-
oart a decision on their part to make those, that i.-s, the cold war
lquea, subversive techniques; to make these the continuing keMy
of Soviet a ,noion, always firmly backdropped, of course,
by this threat inherent in as strong military posture.
Those are the nine principles of Soviet strategy as I see
briefly I would like to go into some of the
their arsenal to carry gut this strategic con-
and to use the weapons of their choice in this period of what
you call either coexistence or partial warfare.
urse, as I have just indicated, will maintain
a strong military posture. They will continue to cco ontrate on
the defense of the homeland in every possible way and to protect
the hzoland against the potential danger of nuclear attack on our
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10 They
of course, continue now to build up their long-
gth as a potential counter weapon against us,
and they will try to reach that situation of nuclear enoughnesa or
ency which they believe would give them a further elbow ro
in policy.
Of course, this strong military base for carrying
old war activities is of a tremendous help to theist, It is
this which keeps the satellites in order, both through direct
patien in the case of countries like Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary.
of Czechoslovakia it is the threat of Soviet power
which helps to keep then in order. Tese, however, are the weapons
they hope they will not have to use at the moment. They will
o the increased , e of their cold war weapons.
I have mentioned their propaganda machine. This is well
coordinated, and they select from time to time long-range objectives
in the propaganda field which we have sometimes mistaken as stylitic,
and I think in the future we will have to take some of them more
to their bacteriological warfare charge against
us in the Korean war -- when that first came out I think a good many
of us were inclined to think t Well, this is of no inport once, and
so forth, and so on, and laughed it off. It would have been much
better if we had hit it right from the beginning. And I think we
,cat to watch the Soviet propaganda machine and their theses and
not lot them start to run away around the right end with a propaganda
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weapon of this kind. They got the bacteriological campaign pretty
going in many parts of the world before we woke up to the fact
Occasionally I think, as I mentioned before, their propa-
chine goes wrong. I think their whole attitude toward the
danger. That is just an eaple.
s I mentioned I think they were very foolish
own point of view. I think that _ - _ _ played their
d in connection with the Paris agreements and the regent of
Oerfaaany. We, of course, know that the opposition to the rearma-
ment of Germany is the one thing they want to block. I don't think
their propaganda is directed to doing just that. I think, one the
other hand, it is directed towards helping us and the world to get
that particular thing through.
I think we have quite a lot of work to do to study more
Soviet propaganda machine and to be a little more
agile ourselves in meeting their propaganda drives right at the
boginning
Their second weapon in the cold war that I have listed
is their satellites. As you know, they use the satellite organi.-
zationa throughout the world very largely for their own ends. I
not including China here as a satellite. The Czech; Polish,
and other diplttic and consular installations are at the bock
of the Kremlin. And the satellite armies, of course,
.ble, as well as the satellite internal security
forces and others. Despite that fact, I am personally more encouraged
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by developments in the satellites in the last year than I have been
I have been in Washington.
sad of finding the satellites easier to ha.e in the
satellites, particularly in Poland and Hungary, and
1954, I think it has been one of the worst years for the
to sc extent in Czechoslovakia. However, they have them as
weapons and allies in the cold war, as yet.
China, as I say, is a junior partner, is not used, and
cannot be directly used as a satellite. And one of the most inter-
questions, I think, to follow will bet How far can the
Soviets control Communist gnats actions in Southeast Asia? Will
it be possible. for the Soviets to work out., in developing their
cold war techniques, a common line of action in Indo-China, in
d, in Burma? How far would the Soviets like to see Cau-
ina go there? How much restraining influence will they
I just throw that out from the point of view of
the tactics of the immediate future as a problem that deserves o
a in the Free World. These parties are the strongest
Another inpartant weapon in their arsenal. is the C==-
Italy. They are very influential, in Indonesia,
dangerously so. The coming elections in Japan are going to raise
questions as to what progress the Caamuniet PhrtY
e, and other parts of the world, including various
in America,, particularly Brasil and Chile.
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asee parties are extraordinarily useful to the Soviets,
and the Free World has nothin really cor~.zparable to them, because
here you have what ptorts to be a doestic political organi ,
?d core of which is really run from 1?Sosoaw.
I have felt right along that in ordor to defeat Soviet
we ? houl.d direct our attention to doing everything we Can
mun .st Parties. Of course, that has to be done
working with and through the local political leadars in countries
France and Italy. I personally third that today We have a
chance to move in on the Communist Party in Italy than we
are; the Party seems to be split. And it would be a
major step forward for the Free World and a major blow to Soviet
strategy if that Party could be seriously weakened. And I hope
that next year, when the French elections acme along, similar steps
can be taken with regard to the French Camm ist Party. But today
those Parties are strong weapons in their hands in developing their
cold war techniques.
Goparable to them are the Coirnist trade unions and the
entral organization of the Cuni st trade unions. Here
is an t'saer major target, just as it is from the Soviet point of view
?a major asset in developing tlhe3 r subversive techniques.
They have in addition, of course, a wide variety of front
organizations -- the, world Peace 1v+ea-aent that deceived a lot of
people in the United States with the Stockholm Petition. There
are various youth groups, women's organizations, lawyers' organiaations,
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artistic organizations, and the like. They have dozens of front
organizations with beautiful names that operate throughout the Free
World, particularly at the present time in western ,urope, and which
at subversive apparatus.
learning more about all these front organizations
a great deal more about the hard core of the
so. I think the time is coning when we ought to find some
xom the defectors tat have cone over in the last
ways of publicizing fax more than we do today just what these fro it
ganizations are, just how the Soviet apparatus works. They will
m time to time in their techniques, but I think there is
quite a lot of educational work to be done t ere and that it would
throw the Soviet off balance if we did more of this.
We are working now to get out a good deal of publicity
be the Soviet penetration of the Iranian military forces.
apparatus has been uncovered and the details of it ought to be
made available,, I think, over the next six months. That is just
to debt
think we can go around the world and begin
d disclose the nature of the Soviet ma hine.
Now assume that our analysis, or n analysis, so far is
reasonably correct as to the overall strategy, as to the fact that
they will rove in the field of subvars ve warfare, I think the next
question. -- and this I will leave with you more as a
question -- i.s: Where is this strategy going to be developed? That
;ore are they going to atteiVt to use all these subversive
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and cold war means of warfare.
I have listed what seemed to me to be the soft spots as
far as this technique is concerned. This is, however, subject to
debate. I have put down firsts Southeast . sit,; and in that area in
order: Indo-mina,, Indonesia, and Burma. Obviously, Southern
the most difficult situation we have to face today and
the most critical from the point of view of maintaining, it for the
Free World. Indonesin follows it a little ways off, and Bura is
of the Sino-Soviet strate r,
I have put down next: Japan as a problem child because of
a that must be regarded an scenewh t soft from the point of
very difficult economic situation, because of t1e over-*population
of the country, because of the great difficulty of finding outlets
for that dynamic people, who can hardly be held on those small
can open up, or there can be opened up, soae
trade outlets. And while the Communist menace there is not serious,
I think over the next five or ten years it is an area of critical
importance.
I have listed next t the Middle East, particularly because
of the .Arabic-Tsraeiic situation and because of certain soft spots,
particularly' Syria. I think that overall we have made quite a little
n the Middle East. The situation there is lod1ting -up, but
still you couldn't telto it entirely off the danger list.
I have put doom next: frio#. This whole ,^rea t area of
ica will prey it for the Co innists a fertile area of
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s. In my opinion they have not gone in there to any great
up to the present tine because they have not trained up the
apparatus to do it.
Soviets are fairly careful in their tactics. They
don't send bubble puppies into these areas dam there. They try to
train people fairly carefully so that when they go in they will do
3onable job. If they are not ready to do a reasonable job,
they don't attack the particular area. We nay have a few years
before that will, bee ore ;serious, but I think we have to watch that
very carefully, and we ought to get going on it now.
I have mentioned ,South M3ericaa. There are certain areas
of 3out a America that are dJ.sturbin , p. rticularly Brazil and Chile,
at the moment from the point of view of the growth of the Communist
Influences I put it fairly low on the list of :rzediate dangers,
and I do not think it is yet one of the main targets of the Soviet
covert apparatus. We must remember that these people aren't twelve
feet tall. They train a great am y workers. They have excellent
as, but it isn't easy to get a lot of people very
quickly. When you go into this type of work, as I say,, you have got
to send carefully trained people, I can assure you that a few badly
trained agents in a critical situation can do you an awful lot of
ham. The Soviets know that very well, and so before they go into
a country of Latin America they want to be sure that they have got
some very able people to do it, caref lly trained, who are not likely
to defect or stub heir toes and fall into the hands of the local
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police. zInd in some parts of South America the local police are
getting a little bit better than they were.
;o your surprise I put Europe last on this list of
soft spots. I think the situation over the last three or four
years has been steadily improving. The economic situation of
some of the countries of Europe is better than it has been for
several decades. While I think the Communist Parties of Prance,
Italy, and the C+aaranunist trade unions in those two countries are
as I stated, menaces, I think they are menaces that could with
courage and vigor be handled. Arid I put it rather low on the
list because I think the mechanisms for handling the Com uni t
subversive apparatus are being developed, and what our Gruenther
and others are doing through NATO hale had a great part in that
happy development.
I have exceeded my tie hero and your subject didn't
call for concltisions; I was merely asked to indicate what
I thought the Soveit strategy was going to be. But despite my
cold and a. few other things, I feel pretty optimistic as I look
at this situation. We have made real progress.
ink there is far too much of a tendency to indicate
we are on the defensive everywhere. We have got a hard fight in
Southern VietNam; but taking the world as a whole, I think we are
relatively in a better position in meeting the cold war techniques
olding our own and holding back in certain areas the Communist
menace than we have been at almost any other time in the last few
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yews. And I think we are developing techniques, developing knowledge
of what they are tr - , to do. I think wit i courage and vigor we
can look to the Luture with a good deals of hope.
Thank vP ou Y Qir/ 1 ouch, gentler:.>en.
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