SPECIAL GROUP MEETING ON 23 APRIL AND OTHER MATTERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001400040059-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: April 25, 1964
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 CIA-RDP80BO1676R001400040059-1
25 April 1964
ORANDUM FOR THr, RECORD
T: Special Group Meeting an 23 April and Other
1. 1 asked Mr. 'Vance if he had any knowledge of a plan
to surface the R?t2. He said he knew of none but would look
mate it and call me. '(Be subsequently called me and said that
&r. McNan era had directed Dr. F ibini, who in turn ha&
directed Dr. Nic lil.lan, to prepare such a plan. I imme lately
cranked DD/S&T into the act and the matter is now under
control.
2. General Carroll and of his shop briefed 25X1
the Special Group on the results of SAC reconnaissance of
Cambodia. put on quits a floor show and was
apparently reading a -rot out of the picture that did not seem to
be supported by collateral available to the Agency. Upon my
return I asked DD/I to look into this. I subsequently called
telling him that we had some additional film in and I
thought that before anybody went to press on this matter we ILLEGIB
should spend the weekend reading out the now film and compare
collateral. (lie was noncommittal but said he would take a look
at it.) The Carroll/l briefing paper is attached. q
3. I then took up xny proposal for assigning SAC total
responsibility for all Southeast Asia overflights on a purely
overt basis in military aircraft with military pilots flying out
of Saigon. I had previously, the day before, broken the ground
with Alexis Johnson and the staff had touched base with Vance
and Bundy. Thera was only minor discussion and the proposal
was approved in toto. The only caveat was that in overflying
Cambodia beyond the 30-toilet present authorization, Special
Group approval would be obtained for each flight. I subsequently
alerted Bundy to the fact that since higher authority had cleared
NRO, NSC and USAF review(s) completed.
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ILLEGIB
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r
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Southeast Asia area were frequent, unprogrammed flights for
my argument was that what was really ;required in the entire
the basic concept, I thought that higher authority should also
clear this new change. Bundy agreed and said he would take
care of it. As the matter now stands, SAC may fly all of Lao
all of South and North .'Vietnam up to the China border, and...
into Cambodia a distance of thirty miles from the border in
unlimited numbers of flights as may be locally required. If
i ar bodian, flights beyond the thirty des are required, each
such flight must be approved by Special Group. The basis of
.reconnaissance purposes and that this was really a
ter of war and the flights sherd be donee by the military.
4. The Special Group approved the overflying of Laos
for support o into N,rth Vietnam only for
item a, "Action No. 55, " and for item b, "Resupply Drops. "_.
I pressed for blanket approval for overflying Laos in these oper-
ations, but was not wholeheartedly supported by Mr. Vance.
Bundy pointed out that the political sensitivities of the Geneva
Accords mitigated against this type approval. I stated again that
we had a single war o:n our hands in they entire area and we should
not be so sensitive that we tied our own hands in fighting this war.
They all understand the problem but are, not prepared to open up
the gates at this stage of the game.
S. Special Group then approved coverage
as proposed in item 3.
There was some discussion of omitting that portion of the flight
and Alexis Johnson said that this was giviu
wonsiderable concern. After some argumentation. Johnson
ed to the total coverage. The cover plan was changed
originally proposed in the paper and will be based on the .
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This is the ear-Lit
idea that was used for the original test flights.
in fact did not seen ..ouch interested
7. The four items brought up by Peter Jessup were
handled as follows:
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b. ad not consider when to discuss policy
The Special Group was not prepared to , o overboard
overflights. (I think we have this well enough in hand
that we can let it lie dormant until SAC again rears its
ugly head. )
c. The whole question of
seems to .give : tate considerable trouble
and above a deterrrinatioa
should prepare a full paper for justification, pulling
out all the stops on COMOR and USU3, and clear it with
the DCI before moving outside of the building.
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There was rto other business discussed at 'Spec
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.
). I subsequently called Bundy and pointed out that I
had board rumors of proposals to. eurtace the R?l2 and also to
surface some of Greer's satellite activities on the West Coast.
1 :stated that both of these matters were of great concern to us
here in the Agency and I hoped that if the Department of Defense
brought either of these matters forward for approval by higher
authority, he, Bundy, would keep us in "mind so that we could
get in the act. Bundy stated that he felt curtain any such pro-
posals would be brought to the White House for clearance and
that he would certainly make sure that the Director's views were
co.,esiclered prior to a decision.
10. Bundy stated that the Director had asked him to con-
tact in e to develop all possible information and availabilities on
equipment which might be available to prevent Cuban action
against our U-2's. They were not considering the OX but were
bztereeted in all sorts of antiradar equipir,ent and electronic
countermeasures that could be used on an urgent basis to prevent
Cuban shootdown. In making our study we should not be bound
by any inhibitions presently placed on us by the Joint Chiefs and
we should consider SAC capabilities as well as our own. DD/S&T
is working on this..
IV/
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Actin? Director .
MS C: b1p
25X1 Orig & 5 - O/DCI w/paper referred to in pars 2.
1-DDCIffies
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 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001400040059-1
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001400040059-1