THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010030-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
20
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 18, 2005
Sequence Number: 
30
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 30, 1962
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010030-1.pdf452.73 KB
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TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ~MLPL---l THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA Information as of 0600 30 October 1962 NGA Review Completed. DIA, NRO, NAVY and USAF review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 STAT Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676R00180001003Q-1.w j, Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 LAOS -- Situation more or less on dead center. Pathet Lao still very sticky on ICC inspection -- kwarn= latest hooker is to insist on being provided with exact location, unit designation and name of commanding officer before letting ICC team in. Fr,-,nch military advisory role still in negotiation stage. Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 SQUTH VIETNAM No sign that enemy is being seriously hurt, despite heavy casualties. Organized Viet Cong strength now 23,000. Support fro4i north continues -- Viet Cong are losing fear of government aircraft and improving their antiaircraft capab-_lity. Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 SINO*INDIAN WAR Temporary lull in action -- Indians have admitted 2500 ------------ dead or m3ssing -- Looks pretty clear that Sovs will not come thrDugt with MIG 21's and may not deliver helicopters. Moscow also taking, public line more favorable to China. Despite India's need for Western support' 'sign that Nehru will fall very far off his 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Approved For Rel`eaQse A0" 10030-1 The central theme of Moscow's propaganda commentary for the last 24 hours has been to portray Khrushchev's 28 October letter to the President as a new peace initiative by the Soviet leader. Specific indications as to which areas of international dispute may become the subject of new Soviet initiatives for negotiations are lacking, how- ever, The USSR is still attempting to broaden the President's commitment not to invade Cuba. Talk of the alleged anti- Castro activities of Cuban "counterrevolutionaries" contin- ues to appear in bloc broadcasts, with a Soviet commentator asking whether President Kennedy, in permitting the "shady maneuverings" of these counterrevolutionaries to continue, is living up to his guarantee that Cuba will, not be invaded. Reaction from Peiping continues to be at variance with the propaganda from Moscow and Eastern Europe. Peiping yes- terday carried an extensive TASS item on Khrushchev's 27 October offer to swap missiles'in Cuba for US missiles in Turkey, but has played down the final agreement. An NCNA review of the October 30 Peiping press says that "top promi- nence" is given to Castro's "important" statement of Sunday upholding Cuba's independence and sovereignty. A Western news agency in Peiping reports that news of Khrushchev's Oc- tober 28 letter was received with "surprise and disapproval, and that the highest political circles in Peiping are talk- ing of a "Soviet Munich."' SOVIET MILITARY STATUS No major changes have been detected in the past 24 hours in the disposition or readiness posture of the major Soviet and satellite military forces. Surveys of rail yards, highways and airfields in the Moscow area on 28 and 29 October revealed no indication of unusual military activity. Police surveillance of the attaches was reported to be normal. The army and air attaches in Warsaw report no evidence of unusual movement by air or ground units in Poland, and have heard no rumors of troop movements as had been the case during the Berlin crisis of 1961. There has been a relaxation of Soviet restrictions on travel by western attaches. On 29 October the Soviets tele- phoned permission for a trip by auto from Moscow to Lenin- grad the same day the request was made; such speed in granting a request is highly unusual. Approved For Rele tggg4 4J- DP80B01676R0 1800010030-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Approved For Re ase 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676 001800010030-1 25X1 4. Restrictions on travel of Western attaches in the USSR were at least partial'v lifted on 29 October, but we have as yet no first-hand observations of the si?ruatia n outside Moscow. No unusual activity has been observed in Moscow. Our attaches in Eastern Europe generally have not been restricted from travel, and, except in Hungary, d' d I. I cap= obse t' h rv ro 25X1 a a ns ve n it a training or troop activity outside garrison a Checks of several rail lines in Poland have revealed no increase in rail traffic. 5. In East Germany, there are signs of some Soviet field training, including the probable movement of elements of one division Into the temporary restricted areas in southwest East Germany. Portions of one of the Sovi ipelines into this general area were reported removed on 25 October. We h-owe oted no significant civil defense preparations in the Soviet Bloc. Critical Areas 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 5X1 25X1 Approved For Wlease 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676F1001800010030-1 Approved For 4elease 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676R00 800010030-1 25X1 2. Berlin and Gem: A pending change in procedures regarding rail freight traffic between West Berlin and West Germany, including that of the Allies, Es suggested by the recently reported East German construction of new barbed wire train enclosures and custom barriers at two East German railroad stations The re- ported newly constructed arrangements for processing at passenger crossing paints at two other stations ma also indicate forthcoming changes in rail passenger pro- cessing at those points. 25X1 4. Sino-Indian Border: Further military action is believed impending in the Nt.l i, area, w ie in lad kh the Chinese have now seized virtually all the territory- which they had claimed < Ill. Bloc International Position 2. A "high" Soviet military source is quoted in the press as saying on 2V October that Castro would have to accommodate himself to Soviet-US ar ongemen-~ for settling the Cuban crisis. In this connection, it is noted that Peiping h08 giver some prominence to Cuban demands that the US must withdraw from Guantanamo, while Moscow merely printed but gave no further dissemination to Castro's 2d Octobe statement containing this demand. Castro and Soviet Ambassador Alekseyev reportedly r- I held a "long" conference the night of 28-29 October. The some source also reportedly said that Moscow will ship no arms to India a d su rts Peiping`s territorial claims in the Sinn-Indian border dispute. o n p he Soviet delivery of MIG-21s to India, scheduled for December, is off, and that the supply of Soviet HOUND helicopters may also have been held up. This further Soviet shift in favor of Communist China follows Peiping"i sharp expression of dissatisfaction on 27 October over inadequate Bloc support in site Sino-Indion border dispute. Approved For Rllease 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676RQ01800010030-1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE CY OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR 'i-x-40 AP 7-4 ft UStr A c L)1-010 VS3 0 l M U*JlM r i C44. p. Mwo.;, 2q err trarcnndJ~.~ s '31 wSo3y zg211 60 ;10~ fivz-4u cweA" Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010030-1 30 October 1962 1. The following information obtained entirely from Lundahl and Scoville. 2. Missions are established by NRO and directed by the JRC. Naval planes fly out of Jacksonville and films are processed there. Air Force planes fly out of McDill and films are processed there. (Cap 3. Clear-cut DOD instructio - to both Jacksonville and McDill require the immediate production at "`e r photo labs of an original negative, a duplicate positive, and a duplicate negative. The fi rst two are transmitted urgently to NPIC via Andrews Air Force Base. They are delivered to the NPIC courier at Andrews. The third (duplicate negative) is delivered directly to .iitland to NAVPIC and NAVPIC is charged with production and wholesale distribution to whomever is authorized the product. `e"AC dots te Aawe. , iv* O. MtriU1. 4. It was reported that General Sweeney saw the wet negatives of Mission 29211, noted information of interest, alerted General LeMa, who in turn apparently alerted the Joint Chiefs anc others. The film from this mission arrived at NPIC at 0530 this me rnin#; and went immediately into processing by our PI's. 5. There were also some Navy films delivered yesterday. The Air Force film was grainy and very poorly processed. Some of this could be from the rainy conditions at exposure but probably considerable of it occurred in the developing. This, however, can only be tied dc-Nn exactly by careful chemical analysis. The film delivered to NPIC was not boxed and was not titled -- both of these actions should have been don