COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS: PROGRAMS FOR SAFEGUARDING INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES AND METHODS; PERSONNEL SECURITY SCREENING AND CLEARANCE PROGRAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003100260011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 6, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
: Deputy Director (Support) 6 NOV 196,
THROUGH
SUBJECT : Counterintelligence Programs;
Programa for Safeguarding Intelligence and
Intelligence Techniques and Methods;
Personnel Security Screening and Clearance
Programs
REFERENCE : Memoranda to Secretary of Defense and
Chairman, USIB, from McGeorge Bundy,
dtd 20 Sept 63 and 14 Oct 63, subject as above
1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. Pursuant to your request, set forth below is a status report
on security studies listed as pending in the paper presented to the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as a result of
Mr. McGeorge Bundy's memorandum dated 20 September 1963.
I. Security Procedures for the Protection of Intelligence Information
Following the revelation of the case, the .DCI has hold
various discussions with senior officials within the community concerning
personnel security procedures. A review has been conducted of the per-
sonnel security procedures employed within CIA.
As a result of these reviews and discussions, certain conclusions
were reached regarding the basic requirements of a good security pro-
gram. One such conclusion stressed the need for uniform clearance and
scrc,:ning stand rds and practices for both military and civilian personnel
assigned to intelligence duties. A second conclusion emphasized that the
security control of such individuals should rest with senior security
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officials of the component where they are assigned. A third conclusion
identified the dimensions of an adequate screening program to be: full
field background investigation; voluntary use of the polygraph; and close
coordination and data exchange between medical, personnel, and security
components.
The DCI, in a letter to the Secretary of Defense dated 11 October
1963, enumerated these conclusions and identified the National Photo-
graphic Interpretation Center as illustrative of a site where these factors
should some into play. He Informed Secretary McNamara of his deter-
mination that all military and civilian employees of the Department of
Defense assigned to the National Photographic interpretation Center would
be security investigated and processed in the same manner as CIA per-
sonnel.
The DCI recommended that Secretary McNamara consider the above
security practices for application to intelligence activities and components
within Defense. Secretary McNamara, in a reply dated 25 October 1963,
advised the Director of Central Intelligence that he has directed a thorough
review of the personnel security procedures and practices of the Depart-
ment of Defense, including but not limited to individuals directly involved
in intelligence matters. The review is being undertaken by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Manpower). Mr. Robert L. Bannerman, Director
of Security, CIA, has been designated by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence to assist the Department of Defense in its study.
Commu i for the Control of Sanitization and Down radin of Sensitive
tntefnce
The Security Committee of the USIB has completed its comprehen-
sive review of the procedures for sanitteatton and downgrading of code
word materials. A proposed Committee report to USIB is now being
coordinated with the SIGINT Committee, the Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance (COMOR), and the Guided Missile and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) of the United States Intelligence Board.
Joint ad hoc working groups of the committees have been formed to con-
sider certain highly technical areas in greater detail. This review, of
necessity, involves extensive and tame-enonauming study since the princi-
ples are complex and the procedures finally approved will affect pro-
cedures which have been operative within the intelligence community for
years.
he Procedures and Standards Within the Intelli -erec
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