LETTER TO ALLEN W. DULLES FROM CLARE BOOTHE LUCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A000500620009-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 22, 1959
• Content Type: LETTER

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP80M01009A000500620009-8
CANCEL eay
Dear Allen:
PulArreortot) ? 4
1 I 5 JAN 1360
St. John, Virgin Islands, U. S. A.
July 22, 1959
Many thanks - albeit belated - for your kind note of
May 25th, enclosing the cheerful earful from Brazilian
CP sources. Far from being merry about my failure to
show in Rio, I should think the CF's would be very sad?
It's going to be very hard for them to paint John Cabot
as the author of all Yankee sins and the exponent of
all Capitalist vices. I might have shoved them around
a bit, but think of the fun they would have had, with
the help of old oystereyed, coffin-headed Wayne Morse
.laying into me. Even Communists must occasionally enjoy
a colorful enemy!
In any event, in ietrospect, the decision still seems to
me to have been a prudent one from the point of view of
Uncle Sam's best interests. My only regret is that all
the Portuguese I learned is never going to be of any use
at all.
Allen, I've thought of you so many times since Foster's
death, and of what a cruel loss he is to you as well as
to the nation. There can be no doubt that his passing
will result in a change - and not for the better, I fear
- in the field of international diplomacy.
There were many who felt sincerely that his policy was
too rigid, too unyielding in face of the USSR's growing
economic, political and military power. But everyone
agrees that he was the greatest guarantor of our fixed
purpose to resist further Soviet conquest.
In any event, there seems to be a growing conviction that
the time has come really to negotiate with the Soviets.
No doubt that is the real significance of Chip Bohlen's
recall to the Department. His view-- at least as I
remember it --is that we must negotiate the end of the
stalemate. I remember well, in Tommy Thompson's embassy
in Austria in 1953, he was bitter because the White House
and State did not at that time see the absolute necessity
of securing a peaceful rollback of Soviet armies in Eastern
Germany, even if that were to mean that we would agree to
withdraw our forward bases on the Soviet perimeter. Bohlen
felt that this rollback was, in the end, the only hope of
'liberating' the Satellites, and that even the neutraliza-
tion of Germany, and the progressive withdrawal of U.S.
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CANCEL ea,v
2
PLaNTUTION
St. John, Virgin Islands, U. S. A.
forces from Europe would not be too high a price to pay.
He had little confidence in the military efficacy of
NATO in the event of war, and he believed that its very
existence tended to aggravate Russian aggressiveness
and justify it, too, in the eyes of Eastern nations.
I remember well the long conversation I had with him
that autumn night... (It was on the day Beria's disap-
pearance became known in the West.) Bohlen believed
that the greatest diplomatic victory the West could have
was to secure the withdrawal of Russia's armies behind
her own borders, and that almost any price which would
not leave the U.S. militarily naked was justified in
securing that. As a Russian student he kept insisting,*
the"inner contradictions of communism are worse than the
inner contradictions of capitalism," and that with a
real rollback of Soviet armies there would be slow but
certain interior changes in the USSR and in the Satellites
which would all be in the direction of peace and a more
prosperous and "open" world situation.
If this is. the policy which the White House and State are
now considering, they must realize it will impose great
difficulties for the President and Herter. They will
have to determine whether to pursue such a policy secretly,
by classic diplomatic methods - in direct contact with
Khrushchev - or whether to try to prepare our own public
opinion for it, and the public opinions of our allies.
It will not be easy to convince any large segment of the
Senate that such a policy may well be the only alternative
to maintaining the present state of perpetual crisis cum
stalemate. Such a policy will certainly be called by many
here and abroad capitulation and appeasement. And it would
be viewed as a sign of American weakness. Furthermore,
it could only hope to be effective if we made it clear at
the same time that if the rollback didn't stay rolled back,
we would take the initiative in imposing military sanctions,
i.e., go to war.
I foresee no circumstances in which, in our form of
democracy, we could ever hope to get any public agreement
or make the Soviets believe we would ever in any circum-
stances strike the first atomic blow.
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caNeert eav
3
PLaArraTION
St. John, Virgin Islands, U. S. A.
As a pure diplomatic concept, Bohlen's "rollback" goal
is sound as a bell. And certainly most of the European
nations, with the exception of Germany, could be
persuaded to go along with it. (I expect that Adenauer's
change of mind about being Chancellor was his fear that
Foster's death would clear the ground for just such an
idea?) Plainly the first victim, in case the rollback
didn't stick, would be "neutral Germany."
In many ways, the practical political difficulties of
getting a new policy - of real negotiation - off the
ground are infinitely greater than those of the sit-tight
containment policy we now have. At any rate, such seems
to me to be the meaning of Bohlen's recall. If the
President and Chris Herter are prepared to consider his
recommendations on how to secure the rollback (and"God.1
knows some new ideas would be welcome!) they have the
right man. But I foresee nothing but frustration and
bitterness for Bohlen and the Secretary if he is just being
called in as a highly trained diplomatic kibitzer on U.S.-
Kremlin affairs. If he's called back, and his ideas are
then kissed off, by 1960 he will be in a position to take
to the hustings and he will, you may be sure, give
unshirted hell to the entire policy of the last eight years.
Are you well? Are you going to get a good vacation? I'm
sorry you can't get a few days here. Caneel Bay is a
delicious place for swimming and snorkeling. There are
comfort, service, good food - and no telephones.
Will you give my most affectionate regards to the three
wonderful Dulles women - your sister, your wife, and
Janet.
The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
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ulare boothe Luce virN / ',4AiL
JUL ?r-s..?
53,41 ?
V. \.
PERSONAL
Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agenqy
Washington, D. C.
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caNEEL 2as'
PLaNtaTION
St. John, Vir mn4 U. S. A.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/11/13:
CIA-RDP80M01009A000500620009-8