MEETING OF THE DIRECTOR WITH HARRISON E. SALISBURY, OF THE NEW YORK TIMES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01048A001500100106-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 106
• Publication Date: May 11, 1962
• Content Type: MFR

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EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM No. 1
DATE 11 May
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT)
COMPTROLLER
INSPECTOR GENERAL
GENERAL COUNSEL
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR NATIONAL ESTIMATES
AD CI
ERR
AD/SI
C/FI Staff
C/CI Staff
C/CA Staff
C/SR
This memorandum con ains In orma Ion or e a essees. Ad-
dressees may give this memorandum additional circulation within
their components as required. All copies should be destroyed not
filed, upon completion of circulation. A master file will be kept in
the Executive Director's Office and will be available upon request.
^ (CLASSIFICATION)
1962
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t% 1"A V11 F7. 77 ^
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting of the Directorf
1. This afternoon, the Director spent an hour with
the Soviet switch to a tough line regarding disarmament
and nuclear controls, and continued Soviet insistence
on the utmost secrecy. In-reply said that:
a. Khrushchev?s reasons for pressing his military
program are not unlike our own, He is determined
not to take second place in the arms race,
b. Soviet tactics in disarmament and related nego-
tiations have followed a familiar pattern.
Once a basis for agreement appears to have
been reached, the Soviets often like to proceed
from there to tack on four or five additional
conditions, thereby destroying chances for any
firm understanding.
co Khrushchev considers secrecy a major strategic
weapon. He feels that by learning as much as he
can about his adversary, and keeping his adversary
in the dark about Soviet conditions, he achieves sub-
stantial advantage, While Soviet secrecy may be
designed to conceal certain weaknesses, it is only
safe to assume-that it is primarily intended to
protect major elements of Soviet strength,
3, Mr, McCone recalled a letter that Khrushchev wrote
to the President and Prime Minister MacMillan in 1960
expressing the view that a completely effective control
pion gained during his visit earlier this year.
2, The Director began by asking how he
reconciled his apparent feeling that rus c ev seeks
some measure of relaxation and peaceful co-existence with
the obvious evidence of a vigorous Soviet arms program,
who reviewed his impressions of the Soviet
0
2 May 1962
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system could be devised. Soon thereafter, this attitude
was apparently reversed,
46 commented that in his view something
happened in the spring of 1960, before the U-2 incident,
which brought a sharp change in Soviet policy. He
speculated that this occurred in March, and that it might
have resulted from certain unidentifiable internal pres-
did not believe that the Chinese Communists were a primary
factor in any such shift in Soviet policy.
sures--perhaps from the military leadership.
S. I (went on to comment that there were
also pressures within Soviet society for a more moderate
foreign policy and for a reduction in internal tension.
6, Mr. McCone asked whether increasing affluence, in
the form of more plentiful consumer goods and better living
conditions might have a moderating effect on Soviet policy.
7. replied that this was indeed a factor,
but perhaps more important was the growing intellectual
ferment of the younger Russian generation,, He noted the
long history of soul-searching and dissent among Russian
intellectuals, going back to the 19th century, He said
the younger generation, thoroughly bored and disillusioned
with Communism, were now groping for new ideas and ideals.
He said they were not sure what they were looking for, but
they definitely looked toward the West rather than the East
for intellectual nourishment,
8. Mr. McCone inquired about religious movement in
Russia, replied that the Russians continue
to be basically religious people and noted that despite
forty-five years of anti-religious propaganda not only
the Orthodox Church, but the Baptists, the Roman Catholics,
and in some areas, the Jews were still active,
9. Turning to the Soviet economy, spoke
of the plight of agriculture and said this problem ob-
viously could not be solved except through incentives--
particularly in the form of private land--for the peasants,
He recalled that during his visit Ignatov [Deputy Chariman
SEC
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said that if we make allowance for the absence o automobiles
in the Soviet Union--with all the steel consumed in their
less than 20 million were available.
10. Commenting on Soviet steel production,
of the Council of Ministers] conceded that Khrushchev's
goals would require 40 million tons of fertilizer, whereas
a, The split has already gone beyond repair, although
the intensity of Sino-Soviet hostility will
fluctuate within limits,
the following points:
manufacture and the construction of highways, etc,, for their
use--the Soviets are probably as well off in steel as we are--
especially in regard to strategic requirements,
11, felt that there was a keen desire for
material goods and better'living conditions among the great
majority of Soviet citizens. However, he did not believe
that many of them would favor a return to the free enterprise
system. What they want, he said, is to own homes, personal
property and, in agricultural areas, farming land. They
also want greater personal and intellectual freedom,
12, emphasized the evolutionary nature of
Soviet society and said he was much impressed with the
extent of gradual but continuing change in the system and
among the population,
13, On the question of whether an intensified Sino-
Soviet split would serve US interests, made
b. Looking far ahead, Sino-Soviet differences will
almost certainly be to the advantage of the US,
c, More immediate manifestations of the conflict,
however, may create certain difficulties for the
West, In particular, Sino-Soviet rivalry is
likely to spur the two contenders into competition
in stimulating and exploiting revolutionary move-
ments in various unstable areas,
14. On the subject of the Soviet attitude toward China,
Mr. McCone recalled the remark Yemelyanov, Chief of the
Soviet Nuclear Energy Program, to the effect that the
SECRET
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reason the Soviets were developing resources in Siberia
was to keep the Chinese from overflowing into the open
spaces of the Soviet East.
15. commented that this was indeed
a most signs scan and thoroughly valid reflection of
Soviet attitudes toward the Chinese, adding that for
generations the Russians have considered the-Chinese--
whom they tend to identify with the Mongol invaders of
centuries past--as natural enemies.
16. In evaluating overall Soviet strategy,
had the impression that the Soviets had slowed down noticeably
in recent months and appeared to be drifting. He speculated
that Khrushchev might now feel a strong need for some tangible
evidence of accomplishment. This need might be filled by
some sort of agreement with the West that Khrushchev could
point to as proof of the success of his foreign policy.
also thought Khrushchev?s recent decision
cultivate arm land more intensively might stem from a
desire to show short-term gains in agriculture, even
though serious long-term problems will inevitably result.
17. Mr. McCone inquired whether would have
any suggestions regarding US policy in dealing with the
Soviets. F L] replied that he had no suggestions
regarding the asic direction of our policy, pointing out
that it had been consistent throughout the past two adminis-
trations, However, he said he thought the current adminis-
tration had been more effective in explaining the American
viewpoint in language which the Russians and others could
understand. He said that the US Trade Fair in Moscow and
the Kennedy-Adzhubei debate were very effective in getting
the American message to the Russian people.
Chief, SR Division
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