TURKISH REACTION TO FAILURE TO LIFT US ARMS EMBARGO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01066A001100020007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 25, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved Fords ease 2004/10/28: CIA-RDP80MO106W01100020007-3
25 July 1975
SUBJECT: Turkish Reaction to Failure to Lift US Arms Embargo
1. Until the dust settles, it will be difficult to predict Turkey's
eventual reaction to the failure of attempts to end the arms embargo. For
the Turks, much is at stake, and if past experience is any guide, they
will weigh their interests carefully and avoid rash overreaction.
2. From the Turks' perspective, there is a significant change in
the situation in the wake of yesterday's vote in Congress. For the past
several months they have believed that the embargo could be reversed without
any prior Turkish concessions on Cyprus, that all they had to do was keep
their heads down and avoid excessive retaliation against the US for the arms
cutoff.
3. Now, for the first time, the Turks cannot escape the painful
conclusion that they will have to pay a high price for their actions a year
ago and their inaction since. The will be -m 'e sorely tempted to react
kind of reaction will not get them thes aid they need.
4. In.deciding on their future course, the Turkish leaders will be
mindful of various constraints on their behavior:
-- They have learned over the past few months that, as they
Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01066AO01100020007-3
 Approved For RJpase 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01066q,Qp1100020007-3
had feared, they have no feasible alcernative to US arms
supply, at least for the near term- -
-- There is no widespread sentiment in Turkey in. favor of
seriously damaging ties with the US, and the government
that could be accused of being at least partially responsible
for doing that would be vulnerable.
-- Turkey-'s economic situation, already deteriorating, would.-
be hurt badly if Ankara had to use its dwindling foreio
exchange reserves to purchase arms.
On the other hand, the Turkish leaders have the important matter
of face to consider; they are likely to feel obliged to do something
tangible -- probably some action against US installations in Turkey -- to
show their displeasure.
US intelligence 7facilities maybe the -first target.--
6. In sum, as bad as the situation is, it may not yet be at rock:
bottom. -Though many schemes for retaliatory action have been developed,
we suspect that Demirel, Caglayangil, and the military will want to
reexamine anew procedures and consequences of retaliatory steps. This
process will probably begin at the cabinet meeting this morning and continue
next week in the framework of joint Turkish-American negotiating tear that
met initially on 18 Jul' and "then adjourned sine die.
Early Press Reaction
7. The result of the House vote received banner headlines in today's
Turkish press but the story broke too late for editorial reaction or official
comment. The headline treatment was straightforward although one paper noted
that "Greek pressure groups had won." Heavy emphasis was given to the intense
efforts by the administration to obtain passage of the bill.
Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01066A001100020007-3
 Approved For RJase 2004/10/28: CIA-RDP80M01066A1100020007-3
DCI/DDCI
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO.
ACTION
INF .
1
DCI
11
LC
2
DDCI
12
IG
3
S/MC
13
Compt
4
DDS&T
14
Asst/DC]
5
DDI
15
AO/DCI
6
DD`
16
Ex/Sec
7
DDO
17
8
D/DCI/IC
18
9
D/DCI/NIO
1
19
10
GC
1
20
7t6;--~,
'L F, ~ (~Ze ;~t-
Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01066A001100020007-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01066AO01100020007-3
Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01066AO01100020007-3