TURKISH REACTION TO FAILURE TO LIFT US ARMS EMBARGO

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80M01066A001100020007-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 15, 2004
Sequence Number: 
7
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 25, 1975
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80M01066A001100020007-3.pdf139.7 KB
Body: 
Approved Fords ease 2004/10/28: CIA-RDP80MO106W01100020007-3 25 July 1975 SUBJECT: Turkish Reaction to Failure to Lift US Arms Embargo 1. Until the dust settles, it will be difficult to predict Turkey's eventual reaction to the failure of attempts to end the arms embargo. For the Turks, much is at stake, and if past experience is any guide, they will weigh their interests carefully and avoid rash overreaction. 2. From the Turks' perspective, there is a significant change in the situation in the wake of yesterday's vote in Congress. For the past several months they have believed that the embargo could be reversed without any prior Turkish concessions on Cyprus, that all they had to do was keep their heads down and avoid excessive retaliation against the US for the arms cutoff. 3. Now, for the first time, the Turks cannot escape the painful conclusion that they will have to pay a high price for their actions a year ago and their inaction since. The will be -m 'e sorely tempted to react kind of reaction will not get them thes aid they need. 4. In.deciding on their future course, the Turkish leaders will be mindful of various constraints on their behavior: -- They have learned over the past few months that, as they Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01066AO01100020007-3 Approved For RJpase 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01066q,Qp1100020007-3 had feared, they have no feasible alcernative to US arms supply, at least for the near term- - -- There is no widespread sentiment in Turkey in. favor of seriously damaging ties with the US, and the government that could be accused of being at least partially responsible for doing that would be vulnerable. -- Turkey-'s economic situation, already deteriorating, would.- be hurt badly if Ankara had to use its dwindling foreio exchange reserves to purchase arms. On the other hand, the Turkish leaders have the important matter of face to consider; they are likely to feel obliged to do something tangible -- probably some action against US installations in Turkey -- to show their displeasure. US intelligence 7facilities maybe the -first target.-- 6. In sum, as bad as the situation is, it may not yet be at rock: bottom. -Though many schemes for retaliatory action have been developed, we suspect that Demirel, Caglayangil, and the military will want to reexamine anew procedures and consequences of retaliatory steps. This process will probably begin at the cabinet meeting this morning and continue next week in the framework of joint Turkish-American negotiating tear that met initially on 18 Jul' and "then adjourned sine die. Early Press Reaction 7. The result of the House vote received banner headlines in today's Turkish press but the story broke too late for editorial reaction or official comment. The headline treatment was straightforward although one paper noted that "Greek pressure groups had won." Heavy emphasis was given to the intense efforts by the administration to obtain passage of the bill. Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01066A001100020007-3 Approved For RJase 2004/10/28: CIA-RDP80M01066A1100020007-3 DCI/DDCI Routing Slip ACTION INFO. ACTION INF . 1 DCI 11 LC 2 DDCI 12 IG 3 S/MC 13 Compt 4 DDS&T 14 Asst/DC] 5 DDI 15 AO/DCI 6 DD` 16 Ex/Sec 7 DDO 17 8 D/DCI/IC 18 9 D/DCI/NIO 1 19 10 GC 1 20 7t6;--~, 'L F, ~ (~Ze ;~t- Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01066A001100020007-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01066AO01100020007-3 Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01066AO01100020007-3