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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01389R000400110001-2
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• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 17, 1956
• Content Type: FORM

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
17 April 1956
PRESENTATION BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
FOR SYMINGTON COMMITTEE, 18 APRIL 1956
Communist Bloc Air Capabilities Through Mid-1959
In order to Give you as graphic a presentation as possible on
this very broad subject, I intend to follow the outline you see on
this slide. The strengths which enable the Communist Bloc to under-
take a wide variety of air actions against the US and its Allies can
best be examined in terms of three broad capabilities:
First, to undertake penetration of Western defended air space;
Second, to resist penetration of Bloc defended air space;
Third, to engage in fighter versus fighter contests for control
of air space.
I will discuss the first of these capabilities from the standpoint
of Bloc capability to undertake penetration of Western defended air space
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(i) Over North America
(2) Over Europe, North Africa and the Middle East,., and
(3) Over the Far East.
The second will be considered in terms of Bloc capability to resist
penetration of its own air space
(1) Over the Soviet Union
(2) Over the European Satellites, and
(3) Over Communist China and North Koroa?
The third will be considered in torrns of Bloc capability to engage
in fighter versus fighter contests for the control of air space.
Finally,$ I will summarize sore of the related Soviet capabilities
which suviport the air establishment or contribute to its effectiveness
in porforning assigned missions.
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I. B Leo Offon .. ve Air Caprabilities
In discussing Bloc offensive air capubilitics, it will first of all
be necessary to evaluate those capabilities =which could '-o de rotor- to
conducting initial attacks against the continental US and against her key
installations and forces In undertaking such attacks the S;,-ziot
leadership would most prob bly hove in mind three r a jar objectives. F: r st
of ally the S .gat loaders would ai,t to destroy or noutrclizo US caVa.hilitios
for nuclear warfare. L,. the s.cond place they would seek to prevent the
effoet3.vo operational enployuent of US -_ilit.r.r,; forces by attacking our
over seas forces and our linos of comunieetion with these forces. Thirdly,,
the Sea J.-t leads rsh .;-p woul aim to deliver such attacks on urban and indus-
trial t: rgets as would hanpcr, to the maxi Sul degree possible, the ne:ebiliza-
tien of US .ttlit..ry and industrial ctron;.-ths. T '.o ',e are the ob ectivos
which the S:>viet If-,-.ion would pursue in initial att? cks delivered against
us both nrw and in rid-1959,
(1) Ponotrrtion over North /L rica
Lot us consir)or, to be -in with, S:.:viet capabilities for och5oving those
objectives insofar as attack on the continental U*!ited St:_ tes is concerned.
Such an attack would be executed primarily by Soviet Lung Raa c A, i tiono
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TOP SW#WT
Currently we estimate that Soviet Long Range Aviation has at its
disposal about 1,250 bombers. Nearly two-thirds of these borabers (790)
are BULL piston medium bombers comparable to the US B-29, and are
incapable of reaching the continental United States on two-way missions,
unless modified to achieve maximum range by sacrificing equipment and
crew weight, in a manner similar to the US B29r3. In this event they
could reach the area of Seattle on two-wtty missions. Nearly one-third
(375) of the bombers currently available to Soviet Long Range Aviation
are BADGER jet medium bombers, roughly comparable to the B-47. The
speed and combat ceiling of the current BADGER represent a significant
advance over the BULL. Its range capabilities are approximately the
some as those of the DULL, however, and it is capable of reaching the
Seattle area of the United States on two-way missions. Both the BULL
and the current BADGER could cover most significant targets in the
United States providing: (a) they were refueled inflight and (b) they
were dispatched on one-way missions. We believe the Soviets are
psychologically capable of undertaking one-way missions if required.
There is thus far little evidence that inflit ht rt:fuelinC; laas gone
beyond the experimental stage in the USSR, although its development
is well within Soviet capabilities.
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There remain some 90 BISON and BEAR heavy bcamth rs which, we estimate
are currently operational. The DISON,whose perfcrr.:ance characteristics
are shown on this slide, is a jet heavy bomber roughly comparable to
the B-52. With single inflight refueling, the BISON if based on
Chukotski, could range over the US as far as Los Angeles and Detroit
on two-way missions. The DEAR, which is a turboprop heavy bot:hber,
is inferior to the BISON in speed and altitude capabilities, as
shown on this slide. With its superior range, however, it could
reach virtually any target in the United States on two-way missions
from forward bases without refueling.
The ranges I have just given for the BULL, the BADGExR, and the
BISON are based or the assur
problez.s facing the Satellites will, of course, continue to
be ec:rplicatecl by their ee:.rra hie c.osition an the edge of Bloc-
controlled territory.
(3) Air Defense of China and North Korea
Turning now to the third area of air space to be defended by the
Bloc, we estivate that the Chinese Cer:iunists and. North tcxeaus have
about 11500 fighter aircraft (r ostly FAGOT NIG_l5 t s) and r ore than
200 airfields suitable for use by these aircraft. Anti-aircraft
artillery totals an estir-.ated 4,500 a ieces, r,..ostly cider Soviet r. c.'..ols.
No surface-to-air :uidled r.issiles have been identifi a in this area.
The siatic Ccr nunist forces now have about 200 o . erati anal aircraft
control and warning radar sites.
By r-~icl-1959, we ostinate that these forces will have about 1,650
jet -:lay fighters and about 400 all-weather fighters. However, the size
of the re ;ion rakes the developr.ent of an -Jr defense network an
extre:_ely difficult and costly undertaking.,'. Alt h u; h COr..;unist
capability to resist penetration of the air space over China will
gradually ir-prove, we expect it to rer: ain considerably inferior to
that attained within the USSR.
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III. 13LOC CAPABfl ITIES TO CONTEST COI TROL OF AIR SPACE
As mentioned at the outset, we are also concerned with the
Bloc capability to engage In fighter versus fighter contests for
control of air space.. A large portion of the-strengths which
support the Bloc capability to resist penetration also contribute
directly to this capability.
Depending upon the area of conflict, the airfields, associated
facilities, fuel, and logistic strengths available for resisting
penetration of Bloc defended air space would also be available for
use 1n. sunnort:
the Bloc capability to engage in fighter- contests.
Obviously many of these resources could. not be used simultaneously
for both purposes. Since these strengths and resources-,have pre-
viously been described in detail, at this point they need only be
noted as available to support this third Bloc capability.
The-great majority of Bloc aircraft suitable for resisting
penetration could also be used In fighter contests for control of
air space... However;, we believe that the Bloc would not employ its
all-weather types to engage enemy fighters. How the Bloc would
apportion Its day fighters between intercepting enemy bombers
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and engaging enemy fighters would depend uron a number of factors,
such as the number of enemy fighters and bombers involved, where
the Bloc fighters were based with reference to enemy fihters, the
availability of other Bloc weapons such as guided missilon, and how
the Bloc assessed the importance of intercepting enemy bombers as
opposed to engaging energy fighters. It is obviously impossible to
determine with any assurance of accuracy how the Bloc would make
such an apportionmdnt in a war occurring between now and 1959, beyond
,the generalization that defense against penetration of Bloc air space
would almost certainly have first priority. Nevertheless it is worth
noting the number of aircraft which could be available to the Bloc for
engaging in fighter versus fighter contests during this period.
The USSR currently has about 8,300 jot day fighters suitable for
engaging in fighter versus fighter contests. This number is made up of
more than 2,000 of the obsolescent FAGOTS, and more than 6,200 better
day fighter tyres. We believe that the older types will gradually be
phased out of fighter units and replaced by new types with greatly
improved performance. By m.id--1959 the Soviets will have an estimated
ZJ00 aircraft suitable for en{; .,inn in fighter versus f tghter contests.
This total will be made up of about 66.,002 modern and 3.mxtroved day
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fighters and about 1.300 aircraft which could be used as day fighters
or as all-weather fighters.
The European Satellite air forces at present have approximately
1, 500 day fighter aircraft suitable for use in fighter versus fighter
contests. Most of these aircraft are FAGOTS, although a few better
models have he;un to appear in these forces. The European Satellites
will have about 2,100 day fighters in :ii d-1959, and. most of the FAGOTS
will. have been nhasod out by that time.
The current est3.mated actUai strength of aircraft in the Chinese
Connunist and North Korean air forces suitable for use in fiZ;htor
verso fighter contests is almost 1)500, mostly FAGOTS, By mid-1959
these air forces will have an ost:imatod 1x650 better aircraft for use in
fighter versus fighter contests.
W. RELATED SOVIET CAPAF3ILITfS
Before I c?oMclude, I should like to com.-lont on soil of the
basic Soviet capabilities to support air delivery systems, as well
as several of the technological fields related to the achiovcment
of success of the Soviet air boss ions.
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First let rte poan_t out that the USSR is technologically and
economically capable of supporting an increasingly powerful ostab-
lishnont to carry out the three rill- jor objectives outlined at the
beginning of this discussion. ?,Je believe that the USSR recognizes
Its mounting demands for complex industrial products and basic
materials needed to produce and support extensive complex weapons
systo-ms. ,Moreover, it is actually taking srocific economic measures
to assure the capabilities of fulfilling the anticipated industrial
demand of such weapon systems. For example Iwo note in the Soviet
Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-1960), that sectors of industry critical
to the Production of complex modern weapons are to increase output
by as much as 200 to 400 rercent over their current rates, while
critical
industrial output as a whole will increase by 65 percent. Those/
sectors include (a) instruments for automation, to be increased 3.5
times; (J,) control and automatic regulating instruments., 4 tires;
(a) optical instruments, 3 times; (d) capacity for producing heat-
resistant alloys, 6 times; (a) radio measuring instruments, 3 tines;
and (f) comnutors and calculators, 4.5 ti::es.
Some of the basic materials used in the production or operation
of aircraft and guided missiles are expected to increase at much
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higher rates than the whole industrial sector of the Soviet economy.
For example, the 1960 output of alurainura and petroleum is planned to
be double that of 1955 and the output of electronics is planned to
be three times that of current levels.
These planned goals are to develop further an economy which has
already reached rather high levels of performance. The 1955 Soviet
gross national product was about 130 billion 1951 dollars,or approxi-
riately one-third of that of the US. According to some preliminary
results of a study now in progress (and. as yet not coordinated through-
out the Intelligence Community), Soviet military expenditures in
dollar terns, were equal to some 90 percent of US military expenditures.
Of the Soviet military expenditures of some 30 billion dollars
in 1955, almost seven billion was spent to purchase over 5,400 congat
aircraft with airframe weight totalling 70 million pounds. The
slide shows the production of airframes by weight for the period
1947 through 1955. before 1952 the USSR was producing combat
aircraft at a very high rate in an effort to overcome its postwar
deficit in modern military aircraft. The decreased Soviet pro-
duction in 1953 was primarily due to a change-over to the medium
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and heavy jet bombers. The build-up following this change-over
resulted in increasing output which has not yet reached its pc ak.
I have already mentioned nuclear weapons several times dlhere they
were appropriate to individual -portions of this briefing, but T would
like to slunmarize the Soviet position with regard to this vital element
in air warfare. At the present time we estimate that the ??S'M has a
significant number of large-yield nuclear weapons. ~''e estimate that
sufficient large-yield nuclear weapons will m on be available to furnish
at least one weapon each for the estimated 90 heavy bombers currently
available. In addition a small number of the medium bombers could have
available medium-yield (less than 100 kilotons) nuclear weapons. By
mid-1959 we estimate that all the estimated 700 heavy bombers could be
equipped with large-yield nuclear weapons. In addition, by this da.te,,
some large-yield warheads would be available for use in ballistic missiles
and some surface-to-air missiles could be equipped with small-yield
nuclear warheads.
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'I Ur 01771 M I
Bloc ca.rabilities for :loctror.iagnetic warfare are also an
irmnortant addition to both offensive and. defensive air capabilities.
As a base for oloctroi: agnotic warfare, the USSR and ite Satellites
have an act ive, large, and well--orgr_~..nized radio jaririing system con-
sisting of several thousand radio jarring transmitters. We estivate
this jamming; system has a capability to interfere sori( sly with
radio coinunication between the US and Its overseas bases and forces.
It can also soriously interfere with US long; range mobile connuniea-
tions and radio navigational aids. The USSR has had access to several
tyres of. World War II US defensivo radar and to so'ie US jai::ming equip-
-zont. Since 1950, a number of instances of Soviot use of CH/FF have
been observed, and recently the use of active airborne jcinncrs has
been noted. We ost:Uriate that the USSR now has at least limited quanti-
ties of both ground and airborne equ?ri ont for jrxr.Ang radar. Such
equipment w >uld include active, passive, and confusion devices. We
have no evidence of Soviet use of decoys, but consider their use to be
within Soviet ca abilities. Over the next several years, the USSR
will -1robably continue to improve its jax.ming capability by the
developrient of equipiont covering a wider range of frequencies and
by increased effectiveness of jaing operations,
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Finally, notice that the development of Sovif t air canabiliti :s
I have outlire,d is based on our estivate that the Soviet leaders will
devote a substantial effort to i;:r-'roving their air capabilities within
the 11 "Its of fairly steady technolopic,-,.l progress. Our estimates
are bawd on the assumption that neither domestic and international
rolitica7 factors nor unexpected technological breakthroughs will
alter the general nature of Soviet weapons progr