THE DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200210001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

N8C BRIEFING ~A 1 April 1954
Approved For Release 2000/05/30: CFA-RDP30R01443R000200210001-7
THE DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT
After a month of feverish man uttering which began on 25 February
with the ouster of General Nagibiir
,^e"13olitical situation
two major aspectsA Colonel Nasr
and the Revolutionary Command Council are again back in top position,
with renewed determination to carry out their "Revolution" without
compromising with political factions. General Nagib is also back as
a figurehead for the regime. His prestige is less; his position
somewhat weakened. He is apparently ill. Nagib retains, however,
considerable popular following.
Three new factors have been introduced into the situation as a
result of the month-long struggle for power between NaJrYand Nagib
 . a
trqA F8F1WV?9e W5 b P TAJR? Ob92GO21OGE}1 garly return
to civil govern ent, and so e of their eaders who had been under arrest
were released -- Most f the leaders of the ultranationalistic Wafd and
A
the religious nationalistic Moslem Brotherhood are now at liberty.
an%"rilyy there has been a general increase of activity among both
civilian and'military extremists and opportunists,::; as a result of the
over-all loss of prestige by the RCC and by Nagib. And finally, more
popular frustration has been generated by the postponement of a return
to civil government.
Nagib-Ny&6r contest, rrpresen% the clash betwe
ionary Council an4)the popular forces dman'ing V/retu\n
poli cal stabili in t and no ho a or on v v lopments
Approved For Releas OOJOE/3 FtP
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possible. At the moment Nagib appears on the decline physically and
prestige-wise. Opposition elements, however, may continue to use him
as a rallying point.
The rise of Nasr poses all the problems inherent in a military
dictatorship. Nasr and the Revolutionary Council are unpopular and
lack widespread support. Even in the armed forces certain groups,
particularly among the cavalry and artillery, are believed opposed to
continuation of the Revolutionary Council's rule.
If Nasr succeeds in establishing himself firmly and absolutely
in power, he will make a concerted
effort to reach an agreement with Britain on the Suez base. With full
c%OW~PtR R'1 eM' 00 /3gOlA-R 3 ?1448R40W0I1k019dsation to
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order and permit Britain to approach the conference table. The latest
British proposals for a Suez settlement, full evacuation within two
years and maintenance of the-base by civilian contract labor, if
presented with some give and take, could probably be accepted by the
Revolutionary Council and sold to the Egyptian people as achieving
"unconditional evacuation" of the British forces.
Settlement of the Suez question would provide the Revolutionary
Council with an important political victory which it sorely needs.
Only then can the regime attempt to tackle the deep economic problems
which confront it.
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