NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AGENDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000400040002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 6, 1955
• Content Type: AG

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Copy No. 32
NBC-251st Meetime
JUne 6, 1955
NATIONAL SNCURITY COUNCIL
AGNIME
ear the Meeting to be held in the
Conference Room of The White Rouse,
Thursday, JUme 9, 1955,
at 10:00 a.m.
ITEM FOR CONSIENRATION
ITCM 1 imm(X3CY frumccativroN MAR?RATIONAL mown cculEn
(fisc 5521)
11111111P
For consideration of the draft statement on the subject con-
tained in the reference report (NBC 5521). The Attorney
General, the Chairman, Atomic Nnergy Commission, and the
Federal Civil Defense Administrator are being invited to
participate with the Council in consideration of this it.
In* FCR DISCUSSION
ITER 2 -- SIGNIFICANT WORLD ENVELOPMENTS APVICTIRO U. S. SECURITY
For discussion in the light of an oral briefing on the sub-
ject by the Director of Central Intelligence.
ADDITIONAL rnim FOR CONBIDNRATION
ITsm 3 -- u. S. poucy as ALL-VIETNAM UNCTIONS
(incNSC 5519; NBC Action No. 13164; Memo for
NBC from buicutive Secretary, some subject, dated Ju M; 2, 1955)
For consideration of the draft statement of policy on the
subject contained in the reference report (ROC 5519) in the
light of the views of the Joint Chiefs at Staff transmitted
by the reference memorandum of ;Nam 2, 1955.
N8C-251st Meeting NNW
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O1
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4raucb will resupply rebels
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i I
? 1,
reduced five level of military to level of a
police problem
*ming question elsewhere os horizon is problem
165 talks with 'let Minh on all- Jetsam
pre
20 July sward as specified hiWeer*
d.c lar&tlea.
lasted a let*
topping op its
*tattoo of Gssev
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speech cit ng "sew plum*
neva agreement.
important problem to eight was to
r consultations to e held from
25X1 A9a
t to sabotage fiction
tialsed Defeats* Secretary
Osneva,bad made clear US intent to sake Mateo*
desarcat line permaneet, like Korea.
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. Olap praised Fresch spokesmen for their
assurance* that Geneva terms would be faith-
I *1.iy adhered to.
4. At press conference in ea U Viet
Tine Prowler (Phen Vas Deng) Azited Geneva term* in
hreshiag aside question whether consultation con
ference sight sot he held.
1. Boast put rrench on notice, stating 'the other
signatory of the Geneva agreement*, and the
interested parties must execute their
obligation.'
A. flirt Minh epekeenen always take care to *tate tuat
all guarastees neceseary will No given to insure
completely free electloas.
I. Modes belly Berber correepondest, tilfred
berehott, reliably reported to have stated
at Bandung is April that Viet-ass vas ose
place where elections could he held os dr t
model. since Consuniets sure of wishing.
as Oeneva signatory, &hewing coscern regarding
reeposelbiiitles oestraeted for.
k. rrisch see Dien** propeeed Saigon 4-Power conference
U good opportuaity to put Western pressure- on
Vietaaseee to tale initiative regardiag consultetionn
with Viet bleb.
b. lerench $uggest that Wester* OWOrs at 4aigon stmt.
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Cl'
tag to Roo
say talk*?
by its tor**
sly a popularly
sot come Aga.
b such vital *otter*.
.4 tao status et
tij et elections.
D. Si regard* it sesautiel that Vtitaaaoo iiivesignty tee
migimatiosed and couplet* bitter* any deciaretloa ou
free olectiess is *ado.
1. At that time Di whets to tally tsssist? bio
goveramomt troll Goseva aeoords
Me fool* this necessary to prom Co which ha
preheat.).y distrusts, from cooing Ia aad tablas over
election arrangements.
South Vietnemese point* will searc.iy isprsosViet
Slab or?perhaps afire impowtaatly?otio ladle**.
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A.
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*Milli.
*iip
port ot Polito
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SOUTH VIETNAM
I. Vietnamese Army apparently moving cautious-
ly against Hoa Hao rebels (7,6)0) under
General Soai.
A. No major fighting has yet developed;
att:204
Soai's troops apparently
To
tn. small quadrilateral between Bassac
and Mekong Rivers.
B. Other rebel force (3,000) under Ba Cut,
--although given to tough talk--has
not moved to support Soai nor has
Vietnamese Army moved against it.
C. Anti-Soai campaign might end quickly
through large-scale rebel defections,
or could drag on for weeks as clearing
operation.
D. But Army's heavy superiority in numbers
and weapons leaves little doubt of
eventual outcome.
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horizon is problem of July '55 talks
with Viet Minh on '56 all-Vietnam elections.
A. Viet Minh stepping up campaign to put
over its own interpretation Geneva
terms.
B. C-in-C Giap, has made speech (22 May)
citing "new phase" in struggle to
implement Geneva agreement.
1. Said most improtant problem in
sight was to prepare for consulta-
tions to be held from 20 July
onward, as specified by Geneva
declarations.
C. Giap blasted alleged US effort to
sabotage election plans; c
Defense Secretary Wils 1 on eve of
Geneva, had mad ear US intent to
make Vie demarcation line permanent,
,,4afrii-terfrer.
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for their assurances that Geneva
terms would be faithfully adhered
to.
D. At press conference in Hanoi on 6 June,
Viet Minh Vice Premier (Phan Van Dong)
cited Geneva terms in brushing aside
question whether consultation confer-
ence might not be held.
1. Dong put French on notice, stating
"the other signatory of the Geneva
agreements, and the interested
parties must execute their obliga-
tion."
E. Viet Minh spokesmen taking care to
state they will give all guarantees
necessary to insure "completely free
elections."
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London aily
Wilfred Burchett, reliably reported
to have stated at Bandung in April
that Vietnam was one place where
elections could be held on British
model since Communists sure of
winning.
III. France, as Geneva signatory, showing con-
cern regarding responsibilities contracted
for.
A. French see Diem's proposed Saigon
4-Power Conference as chance to
pressure Vietnamese to take initiative
on pre-election consultations.
B. French suggest that Western powers
propose either that two Geneva presi-
dents (Eden and Molotov) make approach
to two Vietnam parties or that ICC do
so; French prefer former.
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C. French state they have information
India is preparing plan to get two
Vietnams to meet; they justifiably
fear adverse reaction of South Vietnam
authorities to any Indian initiative.
IV. Diem government, meanwhile apparently
planning to use two arguments as basis for
backing away from any talks with Viet
Minh, at least in July.
A. Main argument is that South Vietnam not
a signatory to Geneva agreement, thus
not bound by its terms.
B. Other argument--or stall--is that only
popularly elected National Assembly
(which will not come into existence
before fall) can deal with such vital
matters.
C. In addition, Diem has recently linked
the status of the French Expeditionary
Corps to subject of elections.
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t'Et4TET
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Vietnamese sovereignty be un-
questioned and complete before
any declaration on free elections
is made.
D. Diem also points out that his case
different from Adenauer and Rhee who
have full backing of Western powers;
he wants similar Western agreement
on his government.
E. When any declaration on elections
made, Diem wants to fully dissociate
his government from Geneva accords.
F. He feels this necessary to prevent
ICC, which he profoundly distrusts,
from coming in and taking over election
arrangements.
. These South Vietnamese points will scarcely
impress Viet Minh or--perhaps more im-
portantly--the Indians.
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SigigIfirmW
Agefter
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"if French had authority and its has
passed to Vietnamese, the latter are
responsible; but we do not know how
much has passed to Vietnamese."
B. Questioned on whether Vietnamese
"automatically inherit" responsibility
of Geneva signatory, Indian said that
is legal question to be studied when
it arises.
C. Canadians on ICC take position that
Commission members have no role re-
garding elections until both sides
agreed on all details.
D. But Indians, with support of Poles,
unlikely to accept so passive a role.
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A
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loltal *kick stwict:
kt23 base stout
ity,
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oleetteae by eeeret ballet. is *rdr thst t*
restoration of postee asy have made 4utfielent
amid tbet there hey b*0 promotet all the saeosaary
aoaditioa* to 'Await the free eavr-:111 ot
astioaal w111. general 41ostiono will tea:4p pleas
to July ? unaor the control of ea latersstiousl
01011.01u61012 401tvoea rwirviv011ail4 of the state*
iblehAtro mewheri. ok th, international commlasien
for wavervietoa *a4 coittrol t4ia the
IlWeta4f4'
th ti attt.Coo*ulto Sous
will tato ilascv oe thi* **bloot betweea olootelati,at
reprovoutUtivv suirhueiti404, ut, ttAv two suovA alter
;MI 4(6 1Vtg, -
Tiaw Iripach rtoreigs CUtcree'stiv stKtk,4 that M4
logsl office ha* isterproted thiu article so. aesalag
that yftetaameett -Viet Miab coateot abool-4 take olhOo
Jai 1944$ sea mot juot at 4iose tiae Avebeequeat
thereto.
,
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BACKGROUND--GENEVA REFERENCES
TO ALL-VIETNAM ELECTIONS
I. The agreement for the cessation of hostili-
ties in Vietnam, which is the document
actually signed at Geneva by representatives
of the commanders-in-chief of the Viet Minh
army and the French Union forces in Indo-
china, makes only one brief reference to
future elections.
A. This is contained in article 14(a)
which states: "Pending the general
elections which will bring about the
unification of Vietnam, the conduct of
civil administration in each regrouping
zone shall be in the hands of the party
whose forces are to be regrouped there
by virtue of this agreement."
II. The main Geneva reference to elections in
Vietnam is contained in the final declara-
tion issued by the Conference Secretariat,
the validity of which the South Vietnamese
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"The conference declares that, so far
as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement
of political problems, effected on the
basis of respect for the principles
of independence, unity and territorial
integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese
people to enjoy the fundamental freedom
guaranteed by democratic institutions
established as a result of free general
elections by secret ballot. In order
that the restoration of peace may have
made sufficient progress and that
there may be present all the necessary
conditions to permit the free expression
of the national will, general elections
will take place in July 1956, under the
control of an international commission
composed of representatives of the
states which are members of the inter-
national commission for uspervision and
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sultations will take place on this
subject between competent representa-
tive authorities of the two zones
after July 20, 1955."
B. The French Foreign Office recently
stated that legal office has inter-
preted this article as meaning that
Vietnamese-Viet Minh contact should
take place on 20 July 1955, and not
just at some time subsequent thereto.
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FRENCH NORTH AFRICA
/5
I. Although general tension4mounting throughout French North
Africa situationAdifferent in each of three political
divisions.
A. In "protectorate" of Tunisia, French have recently con-
cluded agreement with "native" Tunisian government,
granting limited home rule.
B. Haggling over interpretation of agreement, together with
local disorders, likely to complicate and delay transfer
of governmental functions from French to Tunisian control.
C. Prospect of more self-government for Tunisia encourages
nationalist campaign in "protectorate" of Morocco and
nominally "metropolitan" Algeria, where security situation
steadily deteriorating.
II. In Tunisia, which has been a French "protectorate" since 1881/3:
A. Ponderous series of conventions (signed Paris 3 June) define
extent of home rule.
I. Due for ratification by National Assembly in July;
Embassy Paris thinks chances good.
2. Tunisian approval (by Bey) expected to be automatic.
B. Under conventions, France will retain control over Tunisian
foreign affairs, defense; will begin to transfer police
services (after 5 years) judicial services (after 10 years)
to Tunisian control.
1. In interim, French interests to be protected by High
Commissioner's office.
01,Maimi?
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III. Proposed conventions opposed by:
A. Reactionary French settler element (principally French
members Tunisian civil service). Bureaucrats are
exerting maximum possible pressure prevent French Assembly
approval.
B. Extremist wing of otherwise moderate Tunisian Neo-Destour
("eonstitutioni)) party (under leadership Salah ben Youssef).
Extremists have strong ties with Arab League.
C. Other Tunisians in opposition include small but fanatic
Old Destour Party (8,000), and smaller (1,500) ineffective
Tunisian Communist Party.
IV. Conventions supported by:
A. Minority of unorganized French business and professional
residents Tunisia.
B. Majority of 800,000-strong Neo-Destour party, whose president
(Habib Bourghiba) has acted as behind-the-scenes guide of
compromise settlement. However, Bourghiba has clearly
stated conventions only first step toward full independence.
C. Many French officials privately admit inevitability of
Tunisian independence.
D. Implementation of conventions probably will be strife-ridden.
V. In Algeria, picture complicated by fact that three coastal
divisions (Constantine, Algiers and Oran) have been considered
departments of France (residents nominally voting citizens)
since 1848( /Our interior divisions are under military occupa-
tion).
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A. French had to impose state of emergency 7 April: since
then guerrilla attacks in eastern Algeria (Constantine)
stepped up drastically.
B. French have reinforced Algeria with more than 20,000 troops,
withdrawn from forces committed to NATO--total in Algeria
now more than 110,000.
C. US consul characterizes French security measures as inept,
unsuccessful. Army apparently guarding Europeans in towns,
while countryside Moslems unprotected against outlaws.
D. French-Moslem antagonism increasing steadily and North
African native troops can no longer be relied on.
1. Some "captures" of native units believed desertions.
2. Algerian light infantry units being rotated to Germany,
replaced by French units.
E. French government yielding to extremist settler demands,
allowing formation oi settler militia--essentially
vigilante gangs--to "aid" in police activities.
F. Essence of problem is that Algerians who seek independence
are considered de facto traitors, since French make
juridical claim that Algeria c'est la France.
VI. In Morocco, which has been a French "protectorate" since 1912:
A. Sharp upsurgelJast two years' terrorism, concentrated
Casablanca area, began late May '55. Moslem resentment
over heavy-handed French repressive measures now acute:
Europeans in Casablanca said to face danger of massacre.
of
B. Paris apparently at last convincedneed to solve burning
"dynastic issue" by replacing unpopular sultan (Ben Arafa--
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imposed by French,August 1953),
C. However, Paris rejects possibility re-enthroning French-
deposed Mohamed ben Youssef.
1. French can find no acceptable qualified candidate among
many Alaouite princes.
2. May resort to device of Regency Council.
D. No action to better Moroccan conditions probable until
after Tunisian conventions approved by French Assembly.
1. Protectorates Minister July, told Foreign Affairs
Commission of French Assembly: "Never has the maxim
'to govern is to choose the lesser evil' been more apt."
VII. North African Nationalists capabilities difficult to assess.
A. Almost no information available on quantity, type arms
available.
B. Weapons captured by French usually light, of World War II
or earlier vintage: very few automatic weapons discovered.
C. Nationalists probably doing some smuggling--by sea or
overland. Also probably Arab States collaboration.
1. Logistics problem involved makes massive overland supply
from Libya or Egypt improbable.
2. Most likely source--"private enterprise" gun-running by
sea.
D. Nationalists in different parts of French North Africa
probably do not now have sufficient military equipment to
launch coordinated rebellion.
1. However, can continue tie down significant portion
France's military strength.
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E. Inflammatory radio broadcasts from such disparate points
as Cairo, Damascus, Spanish Morocco and Budapest--all in
colloquial Arabic--are claimed by France to be major
factor in current unrest, disorders.
IX. Outlook colored by variety of factors:
A. More than 200,000 French troops and police in area give
reasonable assurance France can maintain some sort of
position in North Africa.
B. However, frustrations over course of events in Indochina
ArgeA
may make French exaggerate presentthreat, in hopes of
getting unqualified US support.
C. Problem further complicated by anti-Americanism, suspicion
US intentions prevalent among French settlers and officials
in North Africa who see US ousting French.
1. At same time, American popularity declining among natives;
Communists exploiting French use of American arms.
D. Meanwhile, rising terrorism poses threat to all Europeans,
including more than 15,000 Americans now in Morocco.
E. Only place where situation likely to improve is Tunisia,
where France may avert serious disorders by firm implemen-
tation agreed-upon autonomy.
F. Restoration of Algerian Moslem confidence--end to "second-
class citizenship" for natives--appears prerequisite to
restoration order there.
G. Unless essential dynastic change made in Morocco, there is
increased possibility organized guerrilla operations there.
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FRENCH NORTH AFRICA
I. Although general tension mounting throughout
French North Africa, situation different in
each of three major areas.
A. In Tunisia (a French "protectorate" since
1881/3) peadorees-series of "conventions"
(initialed Paris 3 June) now define extent
of "home rule."
B. France will control Tunisian foreign
affairs, defense, but will begin to
transfer police services (after 2 years),
judicial services (after 5 years) to
Tunisian control (full transfer will not
be completed for 20 years).
C. French High Commissioner (new post) will
be in charge foreign affairs, defense;
will also be watchdog over continuing
French economic, cultural "interests."
II. Tunisian conventions opposed by:
A. Reactionary local French (principally
French members Tunisian civil service).
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Tunisiam Neo-Destour party, which has
ties with Arab League.
C. Small but fanatic Old Destour Party
(8,000), and smaller (1,500) ineffec-
tive Tunisian Communist Party.
D. Conventions supported by minority of
unorganized French business and pro-
fessional residents Tunisia and
majority of 800,000-strong Neo-Destour
party.
N e-o- 6-eo
E. Party president (Habib Bourghiba) has
k
acted as behind-scenes guide of com-
promise settlement.
F. However, Bourghiba has clearly stated
conventions only first step toward
full independence, and many French
officials privately admit its in-
evitability.
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by fact that three coastal divisions
(Constantine, Algiers, Oran) have been
considered "departments" of metropolitan
France since 1848 (four less populous
interior divisions are under French mili-
tary administration).
A. Thus French say "Algiers, c'est La
France", and consider all who seek
Algerian independence de facto traitors.
B. However, French law has effect of
dividing some 9 million Algerian popu-
lation into 10% "first-class," 90%
"second-class" citizens, largely along
racial/religious lines.
1. Although all "inhabitants" were
declared French "citizens" in '47,
only Europeans (plus Moslem favored
few) possess full French "civil
status."
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National Assembly and 120 to local
Assembly, but representation is split
50-50 into two "Colleges" so that half
the total is elected by only 350,000
voters (mostly French), and other half
by the Moslem electorate (some 800,000
"qualified" voters out of total
8 million).
1. Example--four interior districts
have total population of 800,000,
of which 12,000 "non-Moslem."
2. Area's "first-class" registered
voters (I College) total 12,000,
while "second-class" voters
(II College) total 110,000.
IV. Nationalist-inspired terrorism came to sur-
face in Algeria in late '54: by April this
year, French had to impose state of
emergency.
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A. Since April, guerrilla attacks in
eastern Algeria (Constantine) stepped
up drastically.
B. French are reinforcing Algeria with
more than 20,000 home troops withdrawn
from forces committed to NATO, also
calling up 9,000 resident reservists--
total in Algeria will be more than
110,000.
C. French-Moslem antagonism increasing
steadily and North African native
troops can no longer be relied on.
1. Some "captures" of native units
believed desertions.
2. Algerian light infantry units
being rotated to Germany, replaced
by French units.
0.2440A
D. US consulicharacterizes French security
measures as inept, unsuccessful. Army
apparently guarding gemod&ftg Europeans
in towns, while countryside Moslems
(neutral or friendly) are left unpro-
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V. In Morocco ( a French "protectorate"
'Wee
since 1912),4has been sharp upsurge in
two-year-old terrorism, concentrated
Casablanca area, since late May '55.
A. Moslem resentment over heavy-handed
French repressive measures now acute:
Europeans in Casablanca said to face
danger of massacre.
B. Paris apparently at last convinced
of need to solve burning "dynastic
issue" by replacing unpopular sultan
(Ben Arafa--imposed by French, Aug '53).
C. However, Paris rejects possibility re-
enthroning French-deposed Mohamed ben
Youssef.
1. French can find no acceptable
qualified candidate among many
Alaouite princes.
2. May resort to device of Regency
Council.
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probable until after Tunisian conven-
tions approved by French Assembly
(expected in July).
1. Protectorates Minister told
Foreign Affairs Commission of French
Assembly: "Never has the maxim 'to
govern is to choose the lesser
evil' been more apt."
VI. North African Nationalist's overall capa-
bilities difficult to assess.
A. As to military potentia almos4?ael?
Jo. Captured weapons usually light, of
World War II or earlier vintage:
very few automatic.
B. Nationalists probably doing some
smuggling--by sea or overland. Also
pasetalny Arab States collaboration.
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overland supply from Libya or
Egypt improbable.
2. Most likely source--"private
enterprise" gun-running by sea.
C. Nationalists in different parts of
French North Africa probably do not
now have sufficient military equip-
ment to launch coordinated rebellion.
1. However, can continue tie down
significant portion France's
military strength.
D. Meanwhile, inflammatory radio broad-
casts from such disparate points as
Cairo, Damascus, Spanish Morocco and
Budapest--all id colloquial Arabia--
are claimed by France to be major factor
in current unrest, disorders.
VII. Outlook for future colored by variety of
factors:
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police in area give reasonable assur-
ance France can hold on to some sort
of position in North Africa.
B. However, frustrations over course
of events in Indochina may make French
exaggerate present threat, in hopes of
getting unqualified US support.
C. Problem further complicated by anti-
Americanism, suspicion US intentions
prevalent among French in North Africa
who see US ousting French.
1. At same time, American popularity
declining among natives; Communists
exploiting French use of American
arms.
D. Meanwhile, rising terrorism poses
threat to all Europeans, including more
than 20,000 Americans now in Morocco.
1. US personnel number 13,689 military,
plus 4,718 dependents; 4,700 other
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improve is Tunisia, where France may
avert serious disorders by firm imple-
mentations agreed-upon autonomy.
F. Restoration of Algerian Moslem confi-
dence--end to "second-class" citizen-
ship for natives--appears prerequisite
to restoration order there.
G. Unless essential dynastic change made
in Morocco, there is increased possi-
bility organized guerrilla operations
--like Algeria's--there.
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NSC BRIEFING 7 June 1955
SOVIET BLOC'S FACSIMILE NATO
I. The "Treaty of Cooperation, Mutual Assistance and Defense,"
signed in Warsaw on 14 May by the USSR and all 7 Eastern
European Satellites marked the culmination of a drive to
erect a facsimile NATO that had begun with the incalling
of Satellite bigwigs to Moscow in Dec '54.
A. The treaty provides for the establishment of two
organizations: a combined military command and a
political consultative committee.
II. Comparison of the Warsaw Treaty with NATO shows how
closely the Soviet instrument is modelled after the West's.
A few clauses even appear to be almost direct translations.
A. Both agreements provide for "joint measures" in case
one of the signatories is attacked.
B. Both recognize the ultimate authority of the UN.
C. Both pledge the contracting parties to seek to settle
all disputes "without use or threat of force" and
not to join any "contradictory" alliances.
III. As the overall agreement mirrors NATO, so the combined
military command is facsimile of SHAPE.
A. A unified headquarters will be established in Moscow,
with Soviet Marshal Konev as Commander-in-Chief.
Each Satellite defense minister, or his appointee,
will serve with the rank of deputy to Konev,
efti.1464-
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B. A permanent staff, composed of representatives of the
General Staffs of each participating country, will
also be located in Moscow.
C. Not all Satellites countries will have their military
units included in"the complement of the joint armed
forces."
1. Specifically, participation of East German forces
was deferred to a later date.
2. Also, it is not known what proportion of existing
Satellite forces will be assigned to the "joint
forces."
IV. From a military standpoint, creation of this combined com-
mand is largely a formalization of existing Soviet-Satellite
relationships, although the new machinery may make things
work better.
ra
A. Interesting to note that a-I-to-up Satellite ground. force
strength totals slightly over 80 divisions (not in-
cluding USSR.
B. This is almost exactly equal to NATO members' total
ground divisions (not including US).
V. The political consultative committee will be composed of
political representatives of each signatory country
(thereby creating a facsimile of the Atlantic Council).
A. This Committee will "effect the consultations envisaged
in the treaty...sand examine other questions arising in
connection with the implementation of the present treaty."
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B. With such broad powers, the political consultative
committee could logically be made responsible for
planning and coordination of political and economic--
as well as military--policies of the Satellites,
1. There has been speculation that the Committee
would have such broad powers.
VI. Although creation of this elaborate counterpart to NATO
have been inspired in part by military considerations,
there is substance for speculations that the USSR has
broader aims,
A. Ambassador Bohlen has suggested that the USSRts
public confession of error during the Belgrade
pilgrimage was in part designed to permit a new sort
of relation with its Satellites.
VII. This broader Soviet aim may be brought into open at time of
Summit meet,
A. Alterations of Soviet control mechanism in the Satel-
lites might be designed to parry any Western efforts
to make the status of the Satellites a subject of
Big Four negotiations.
B. Soviet troops stationed as "joint armed forces" in
the Satellites can no longer be called occupying
forces, which would tend to offset Western objections
that the Satellites ate not independent.
may
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VIII. Indeed, the whole "fascimile NATO" is expendable, and, at the
Summit, the USSR might offer to abolish its new organization
in exchange for the disbandment of NATO, or even go so far
as to offer to withdraw Soviet troops from some Satellites
in exchange for similar US troop withdrawals from Western
Europe,
A. The fact that East German participation was deferred
to a later date strengthens the Soviet position in
demanding West Germany's withdrawal from its NATO
commitments.
B. A further indication of such possible bargain offers
at the Summit came when the Soviet pilgrims at Belgrade
asked how the Yugos would feel about Bulgaria joining
the Balkan Alliance.
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SOVIET BLOC'S FACSIMILE NATO
I. The Warsaw "Treaty of Cooperation, Mutual
Assistance and Defense" (signed 14 May by
USSR, all 7 Satellites) was culmination
of Soviet campaign to erect "facsimile
NATO" which had started with in-gathering
of Satellite bigwigs at Moscow (Dec '54).
A. Treaty provides for two organizations:
combined military command, and politi-
cal consultative committee.
ALtto D . Lo?e_ox evt_
II. Comparison of Warsaw Treaty with NATO
shows Soviet instrument closely modelled
after the West's, with some clauses almost
direct translations.
A. Both agreements provide for "joint
measures" in case one of signatories
is attacked.
B. Both recognize ultimate authority of UN.
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seek settlement all disputes "without
use or threat of force," and not to
join "contradictory" alliances.
III. As Warsaw Treaty mirrors NATO, so the
combined military command is parallel
to SHAPE.
A. Unified headquarters will be in Moscow,
under Soviet Marshal Honey (C-in-C).
Defense minister in each Satellite,
or his appointee, will hold rank of
deputy to Konev.
B. Treaty does not create special role
for Soviet Marshal Rokossovski (Polish
Defense Minister and only Soviet
officer who holds such a post in any
Satellite).
I. Early rumors held that Rokossovski
would get some sort of NATO-like
"regional command," but Treaty
provides for no such commands.
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staff," composed of representatives
from General Staffs of each participat-
ing country.
D. Not all Satellites military units will
be included in the "United Armed Forces":
to date, no allocations have been
announced.
1. Additionally, participation of East
German forces has been deferred to
aulater" date.
F. Soviet "line of communication" troops
(now in Hungary and Rumania with total
ground strength: 59,000) are nominally
stationed there by treaty only while
USSR maintains Austrian "occupation zone."
1. Troops could now remain indefinite-
ly, and new Soviet forces could
enter any other Satellite under
Warsaw Treaty terms, as matter of
"sovereign" agreement that such
"United Armed Forces" were required
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this combined command is largely a formali-
zation of existing Soviet-Satellite re-
lationships (chart), although the new
machinery may make things work better.
A. Interesting to note that Satellite
ground force strength (not including
USSR) totals slightly over SO divisions
B. This almost exactly equal to NATO mem-
bers' total paper ground strength (not
including US).
V. Although this elaborate "facsimile NATO"
possesses military utility, there is sub-
stance for speculations that the USSR has
broader than merely military aims.
A. Political consultative committee, for
example, will be composed of political
representatives from each signatory
(i.e.: facsimile of Atlantic Council).
B. Committee will "effect the consultations
envisaged in the treaty...and examine
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could plan and coordinate political
and economic--as well as military--
policies of all Satellites.
D. Ambassador Bohlen has suggested that
public Soviet confession of error
during Belgrade pilgrimage was in part
designed to permit a new sort of re-
lation with its Satellites.
VI. This broader Soviet aim may be brought
into open at time of Summit meet.
A. Alterations ofSoviet control mechanism
in Eastern Europe might be designed to
parry any Western efforts at Summit to
negotiate on status of Satellites.
B. Soviet troops stationed in Satellites
as "United Armed Forces" could not be
called occupying forces: Warsaw Treaty
emphasis on "sovereignty" of signatories
would tend to offset Western charges
that Satellites not independent.
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be used at Summit as expendable bargaining
point.
A. USSR might offer to abolish new organi-
zation in exchange for the disbandment
of NATO.
B. Might even go so far as to offer with-
draw Soviet troops from some Satellites
in exchange for similar US troop with-
drawals from Western Europe.
C. Fact of deferred East German partici-
pation strengthens Soviet position for
demanding West Germany's withdrawal
from NATO commitments.
D. Indication of such possible bargain
offers at Summit came when Soviet
pilgrims at Belgrade asked Yugos if
they would favor Bulgaria's joining
Balkan Alliance.
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ApprovaiT&RMaidice 1999/09761MWDP801*14113R01664)0040002-3
ICFTU CONG ESS
\At F T J- FnmA.A. 4S7
- u FtsuA.4.4 c-F- I)
I. Most significant development at last
month's ICFTU Congress at Vienna was
decision to establish a Director of Organ-
ization med step-up ICFTU anti-Communist
activities.
A. Since organization, ICFTU has made
substantial progress in uniting free
trade unions of world.
1. Today, has 109 affiliates in 75
countries (combined membership--
54,500,000).
B. However, resources have not been ade-
quate to fight Communist infiltration,
manipulation of world labor movements
(especially in underdeveloped areas).
II. Some members have insisted that ICFTU could
best meet Communist threat by concentrating
on improvement of workers' social, economic
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established trade union centers have
been captured by Communists and
fellow-travelers.
B. This demonstration of inadequacy in
approach gives particular significance
to ICFTU's creation of Director of
Organization.
III. This new official will have the dual job
of organizing and strengthening trade
unions (particularly in underdeveloped
areas) and also directing more aggressive
anti-Communist campaign.
FunCommit_t_ff_jjiskeited)
B. Director will be selected by committee
of three (Meany, Geddes, and Khatib of
Pakistan), which is expected to announce
choice in Sep '55.
C. Among candidates are Becu, and Pat
Conroy (Canadian labor attache in
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lateral foreign operations when new arrange-
ments go into effect.
A. New system will be financed by increase
in annual dues of ICFTU affiliates.
B. Meany has informally agreed to con-
tribute substantial part of fund.
1. For both AF of L and CIO, amount
would total $150,000.
V. Other actions at Vienna Congress included:
A. Acceptance into ICFTU membership of
the Union Marocaine du Travail
(organized in defiance of French law
prohibiting indigenous trade unions
in Morocco).
1. Under this law, native workers
must join existing French unions
which, in many cases, forced them
into Communist-controlled CGT.
2. Action is significant since it lends_
support to nationalist aspirations
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for allegedly supporting
colonialism.
B. ICFTU rebuke of two international
trade secretariats (Miners' Inter-
national Federation and International
Federation of Building and Woodworkers)
for accepting Tito-controlled affiliates
into their membership.
C. Summary rejection of WFTU invitation
for "unity of action" by all inter-
national labor organizations.
1. ICFTU Secretary General suggested
that WFTU's affiliates make a
genuine effort to introduce free
trade unionism in their own
countries before making further
overtures.
VI. One of most noteworthy aspects of Vienna
Congress was emergence of US leadership in
ICFTU affairs. Factors contributing to
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gations of intention to remain in 'crew,
make it a more effective organization.
B. Forthcoming merger between AF of L and
CIO.
C. Delegates' awareness of heavy US
financial contributions.
D. Atmosphere of unity among US and
Canadian delegations and lack of
friction between US and UK delegations.
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agiarriCw'r
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CIO and TUC withdrew from the WFTU on
18 January 1949. The ICFTU was officially
established at a Congress in London on 7 Dec. 1949.
The main AFofL & CIO delegates were as
follows to the Vienna Conference of the ICFTU:
AFofL:
George Meany
Irving Brown
David Dubin.sky
Jay Lovestone
CIO
James Carey
Jacob Potof sky
0. A. Knight
Victor Reuther
Michael Ross
/fld Pevva/c/
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NSC BRIEFING tee& 8 June 1955
E. Finally, American influence shown in
meeting of challenge from both German and
Jap delegations. Germans came to Vienna under
mandate to resist rearmament proposal prior to
unification. Jap delegation proposed resolution
calling for ban on mass destruction of weapons.
F. US delegation proposed alternative
resolution calling on democracies to "improve their
efforts to obtain collective security to strengthen
their capacity to deter and prevent aggression
and war through adequate defense measures."
Resolution also called for system of enforceable
international control and inspection of atomic
b61- 04>
resources and denounced Soviet Union
such a system.
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NSC 8 June 1955
0 u.k VSA iiktt44td f
G. Zianr1 resolution supported both German
and Jap delegations. Also as result American
proposal, tentative plans being made for a Labor
Conference On Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
to precede UN general conference 4 August.
UM-
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