JEWISH PURGE IN POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80S01540R005000080005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 22, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/27: CIA-RDP80501540R005000080005-9
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
sEcErriconsor, U.S.OFFICIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION
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COUNTRY Poland
REPORT
SUBJECT Jewish Purge in Poland
DATE DISTR.
22 Msrch 1954
NO. OF PAGES 2
DATE OF INFO.
REQUIREMENT NO, RD
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PLACE ACQUIRED
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
HOE KEY SEE REVERSE)
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1. Official consciousness of impending anti-Semitic Activities in
Poland was aroused during the SLANSKY trial; in Czeohoslovakia.
At that time, a fact-finding dommittee of three Polith UB
(Security Police) ?Meals was gent to Prapue to renOrt +0,a
trial, and the effect lot; motilit have on Communist Party policy
towards Jews in Poland. The committee oonsisted pi tximund
PSZCZOLKOWSKI, Secretary of the Central Committee of the PZPR,
ColOnel SIEDLECKI, and Colonel MICHALAK of the MBP (Ministry
of POlis . ?
4; The committee witnessed the SLANSKY trial, and its report was
highly oritioal of the Czech handling of the affair. They
said the triallOeked like a put-up job and the accused bungled
their roles so badly that the proceedings took on a farcial as-
pect. Also, it was stated that the Czechs deliberately inflated
the role of the Jews in the whole affair. The committee, how-
ever, did not criticize the basis of the trial (anti-Semitism),
which was interpreted by Jews in Polish officialdom as a bad
omen presaging Jewish persecution in Poland.
3. Before the SLANSIff trial sentences were passed, General Roman
ROMKOWSE/ was sent to Prague to assist Polish witnesses in
giving their testimony* When ROMKOWSK/ came
back from Prague, he was visibly disturbed because of the
purposeful Czech slanting of the trial.. ROMKOWSKI said that
many non..Jews deeply involved in the STANSKY affair were not
brought before the court, thus making it appear that the Jews
SWIM/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/27: CIA-RDP80501540R005000080005-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/27: CIA-RDP80501540R005000080005-9
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were the culprits. He particularly cited the case of ZAVODSKY.
ROMKOWSKI also called attention to the fact that,while in Czech-
oslovakia in connection with the RAJK affair, he learned that
Czeoh Communist officials were called to Moscov 9nd were in-
struoted to proceed more cautiously in the Jew ien affair in
their country but the Czechs strongly opposed this.
4. ROMKOWSKI feared that repercussions from the strong Czech anti-
Jewish stand would be felt in Poland. After the arrest and trial
of Jewish doctors in Moscow, Jewish Uommunists were convinced among
themselves that MosooW had given the signal for a universal per-
aeoution of Jews occupying Party posts.
5. It was at this time that the Soviet advisor to Department X of
the Rial SIGACHOi began making inquiries as to Iow the Zionist
affair stood in Poland'. This wee the Soviet way
of saline that some notion had to be taken against the Jews.
BIERUT1 ion Ms tett ?toMeeemp which corresponded with the date of
official J'oviet interest in Polish Jews, was to receive inetruo-
tions for the forthcoming purges. STALIN allegedly told BIERUT
that a better balance was necessary and that the Jews whom
BIERUT would release as a oonsequenae should be given correspon-
ding posts in other government departments. The purges were to
be effected so as not to lose the loyalty of those removed in
order that the UB could re-employ them if the need arose.
6. Shortly after BIERUTfs return from Moscow, Colonel KRADKO was
given another post (UB schools), Colonel CZAPLICKI was demoted,
and Colonel BRYSTYGIER was tentatively seheduled for removal.
All are Jews. A general UB reorganization followed (two new
departments were added), until the percentage of people occupying
high UB posts favored the Gentiles.. COncurrently, promotions of
Jews in the army and the UB were held up and lesser purges were
effected on other levels.
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7. The chief of Department X was given Instructions to formulate a
project against Jews in the Party and Zionists. Shortly after--
wards, a raid was conducted against the Joint Distribution
Committee and on the basis of documents uncovered, the first
Jewish arrests began. The earlyvictims were Jakub EGIT, leader
of AJAP? a Jewish Communist organization in Lodz; Gitel BARSKI?
secretary-general of the Joint Distribution ComMittee; and
General KOMAR, chief of 0-2. EGIT and BARSKIewere released in a
few weeks on orders from Moscow. The KOMAR case was given special
handling. The affair did not quiet down until widespread purges
were completed, especially in the Pelish-grmy. Other victims
included: Leon GEHORSAM, Vice-Minister of Railways; (fnu)
FED, Department VII.; (dB* employee; (fnu) GORDUN of the Minis-
try of Communications; (fnu) AKIERMAN, a chemieal specialist in
the employ of the government; (fnu) GRANOWSKA, Personnel Director
at the Ministry of mines; (fnu) KAMINSKY, Vibe-Director of De-
partment VII (MBP); (fnu) WERNER, Polish Army Press Chief;.
Leon PENNER4eDirector of the General Prosecutors Office. Jakun
BERMAN himself was accused of Pro-Zionist tendencies, and it was
at this time that he suffered two heart attacks which kept him
out of public life.
Be the Soviets had two basic aims in their anti-
Jewish drive: .1) to endear themselves to the Arab world and
raise their political stock in the Mediterraneen area and pos-
sibly to eMbarrass the U.S. in Palestine and the British in
North Africa (especially Egypt and Sudan); and (2) to settle
the Jewish issue in the Party ranks by means of purges which were
considered long overdue.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/27: CIA-RDP80501540R005000080005-9