CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) TRAINING

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80T00246A048400150001-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 28, 2010
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 11, 1959
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80T00246A048400150001-8.pdf544.54 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246A048400150001-8 50X1-HUM Z. , ? t ? a t . t ? A ? ? ? . CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.B.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. SUBJECT Chemical Warfare (CW) Tr .inin, DATE OF INFO. PLACE & DATE ACQ. SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE, report dealing with the trainin of specialists for CW and defense against atomic warfare. such training was very superficial up to 1956. Since then such training is emphasized more, especially the latter. The training seems designed primarily to create among the men the idea that some measures are being taken for their protection, but it was clear to the students that these were merely improvisations. It seemed that the Soviets were not anxious to pass on data on atomic defense and passed only general data. When students asked about the inadequacy of CW and atomic defense preparations, the instructors said that much better counter- measures existed but these were kept secret to prevent the West from learn- ing of them. Defense measures were emphasized as far as could be ascer- tained in CW units in the army. However, the three CW battalions, reformed as brigades in 1958 were intended for offensive measures. 2. The report also discusses methods of training, types of equipment used, and sketches of this equipment. With regard to defense against radioactivity, it is stated that personnel would be inoculated with a special serum intended to stop or slow down the disintegration of blood corpuscles caused by radio- activity. A similar serum was to be available for bacteriological warfare. STATE I X ARMY Ev X JNAVY (NoN: Washington distribution indicated by " I X AIR X FBI X"; Field distribution by "#".) REPORTI DATE DISTR. g1 MAY 1959 NO. PAGES 1 REFERENCES RD AEC _ \ 50X1-HUM I N FORMATION REPORT I N FORMATION REPORT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246A048400150001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246AO48400150001-8 /,` (,3,. kej CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18. U.B.C. Seca. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. COUNTRY Czechoslovakia SUBJECT Chemical Warfare (CW) Tr.inin-' DATE OF INFO. PLACE & DATE ACQ. ? are ort dealing with the training of specialists for CW and defense against atomic warfare. such training was very superficial up to 19 6 Since then such training is emphasized more, especially the latter. The training seems designed primarily to create among the men the idea that some measures are being taken for their protection, but it was clear to the students that these were merely improvisations. It seemed that the Soviets were not anxious to pass on data on atomic defense and passed only general data. When students asked about the inadequacy of CW and atomic defense preparations, the instructors said that much better counter- measures existed but these were kept secret to prevent the West from learn- ing of them. Defense measures were emphasized as far as could be ascer- tained in CW units in the army. However, the three CW battalions, reformed as brigades in 1958 were intended for offensive measures. 2. The report also discusses methods of training, types of equipment used, and sketches of this equipment. With regard to defense against radioactivity, it is stated that personnel would be inoculated with a special serum intended to stop or slow down the disintegration of blood corpuscles caused by radio- activity. A similar serum was to be available for bacteriological warfare. STATE X ARMY Ev x JNAVY X lAIR Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X", Field distributi REPORT DATE DISTR. 11 MAY 1959 NO. PAGES 1 REFERENCES RD AEC LI 50X1-HUM 0 N FORMATION REPORT I N FORMATION REPORT x IFBI Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246AO48400150001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246AO48400150001-8 SECRET CZECH0S L0VAKIAl Military Training of specialists for chemical warfare in Czechoslovakl.G General background a) Trdning of officers for chemical warfare units of the Czechoslovak army is very superficial, for it seeds proriable that both chemical warfare and atomic defence are still only in the first stages; up to 1956/57, more attention was given to chemical warfa re, although this consisted of data already well known, which were used by the German army. In 1956/57, however, the Russians communicated some of their experience in training for atomic warfare; and this latter, though still at the stage of elementary improvisation, now receives greater emphasis than chemical warfare. b) When military training was introduced in universities and co&leges, chemical warfare was introduced into departments of chemistry,, and graduates were trained as reserve officers for C/N units. The training for students was however found to be unsuitable, as the elementary and often wholly inexpert principles of chemical and atomic warfare gave them the impression that the training was only carried out to prevent the men from being frightened at the prospect of such-types. of warfare, and to make them think that units engaged in defence measures existed. During training held in their second and fourth years at the military training area at CERVENA VODA, or with the 1st C/1 Battalion, JAROMER or the 3rd Battalion, SAF^RIKOVO, the students came into contact with officers from the regular C/N units , and caused them considerable difficulty. Apart from a few graduates from the BRNO Military Technical Aca demy, the officers are of working class origin, and their ma Fgltr ~i 3 g listed of only a two-year military academy LajeQF)tX a few basic principles of chemistry, they SECRET /have........ 50X1-HUM Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246AO48400150001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246A048400150001-8 SECRET have no technical knowledge and no secondary education. The presence of students specialising in chemistry led to either disputes among experts on the nonsensical nature of some of the principles, or to ridicule of primitive method:; used. In either case, the students caused demoralisation. This was one re a son for the liquidation of training in chemical warfare as part of for students' military training, and baking them do two Sear s' national service after completing their course at technical co liege . c) The main intention of the C/W and atomic warf - e units is to create among the men the idea that same measures are being taken in their defence. It was clear to the students, for instance, that many things were being improvised and many other measures taken merely for the sage of doing something. One example of procedure was that adopted with dosimeters for ascertaining the intensity of a dose of radiation. At first egch man was to have had one, but it was found later that if each could find out for himself the strength of radio-activity, this would cause panic, and it was decided that only the platoon CO should have a dosimeter. Subsequently thisvas abandoned, an~, two types of dosimeter were introduced, one showing the actual intensity, for the unit CO, M.O. and C,A?I officer. COs of smaller sections such as companies, etc., were to have 'blind" dos.imete3xwith a numbered dial to which only the unit CO, M.O. and C/VN officer have the key. d) It was clear that the Russians were not anxious to pass to the Czech army data on their experience in atomic defence, and that what they handed over was general experience only. In reply to questions from students about the inadequacy of C/W and atomic defence preparations, the officers lecturing to them said that much better countermeasures existed, but these were kept secret to prevent the West from getting to know of them, e) From the present position, it is clear that all measures tend merely to reducWR--.o- chemical or atomic warfare. The importance of some is the time factor in that they enable /~hQ mQr 50X1 -HUM Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246A048400150001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246AO48400150001-8 SECRET the men to continue fighting for a . sh.:.i't time, at the cost of subsequent sacrifice of personnel; who are only given aid to suffice over a short period. In the Czech arm--,. both C/W and atomic warfare.-apparently concentrate on defensive aspects, as far as C/W sections attached to army units were concerned; the three special CAY battalions, reformed as brigades in 1958, are intended for offensive measures. Instruction with the present apparatus gives the impression that this is for defence only, but it was stated that in emergency it could be used for attack. f) The following C/N materials are in use. Category I. poison gas etd, category II, ;smoke-screer laying materials; category III, incendiary materials. Category I includes: i) pungent and tear gases: bromo-acetone, chloroaceto- pheno l "CLARK", "DICK", adamsite ii) asphyxiating gases: chlorine, phosgene, di-phosgene iii) blistering gases: mustard gas, N-yperite, lewisite. iv) systematic poisons: "TABUN", "SARUN", "SO10..N" v) special materials: hydrocyanic acid, carbon monoxide 2. Method of training and apparatus a) Training, mainly defensive, concentrated largely on decontamination of terrain, arms and equipment from substezces such as mustard gas. b) Four different methods are employed for decontaminating terrain: i) PDM apparatus (see sketch A) mounted on the rear side- plate ; the decontamination cylinder drive is 50X1-HUM attached by a chain to the rear wheel, on which a special gear wheel is mounted. A lever at the side regulates the size of the aperture through which chloride of lime is scattered. The crew consists of a CO, a driver and 2 men in charge of decontamination. ii) "ACHR" a chemical spray tanker which can be 50X1-HUM used for con am na ion, decontamination and smoke-screen laying. TATRA Ills are mostly fitsed for thij purpose. iii) improvised decontamination: burniang vegetation, turning over the earth; covering with stones, F;ravel, trees, etc. iv) decontamination of small areas or buildings: with a spray know8a~,~~ip,P - 4S_ which works on the principle of the gard~ h a tank carried on the back. /c).. .. .... 9811:1 50X1-HUM Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246AO48400150001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246AO48400150001-8 SECRET. c) Decontamination of equipment is also carried out in four ways, dry air, hot water, steam and str,am and ammonia. i) dry air decontamination is done by placing a metal and wooden grate over a hearth and building a but above it (see sketches B and C). The walls are readymade and hooked together, and o}~v as a window and door, ar~:i the front and back siaea sma l openings in them at the base for regulating the temperature. Clothes on hangers are hung on a bar inside. ii) For decontamination with hot water, the methods Irv.-2 and Bu-3 are used, consisting of a boiler with it& own hf.arth. The boiler is also equipped with a spiral heating coilfor supplying steam. iii) Decontamination by steam and ammonia is done with tvD vats and a pit 100 cm square, into which first small boards, and then the oc ipment to be decontr inated are put. The steam is brought by a metal pipe from two barrQls holding about 100 lit As, above a hearth; they have dr,in valves, manometensand escape valves. Ammonium carbonate can also be used, dissolving in heat and carried by the steam. d) Decontamination of weapons; each man attends to his own weapons . Complete decontamination is carried out by the C/P! sections in specially reserved areas, by the followt ng means: i) ACHR tankers filled with a 10 % solution of dichlora- mine and dichlor ethane sprayed over contaminated weapons with a hose. ii) DK-`1 apparatus, Soviet makes, consistsn~ of three crates containing a pump with branch pipes for attaching hoses, protective clothing, rubber boots, indicator flags, notices, spray nozzles and jets, oil lamps for lighting working sites, rifle stands and a bench for decontaminating sights. Layout of DK-1 in use (see sketch E) 1 - 2 Decontamination of vehicles, tanks, guns, motor cycles. 3,4,5,6, weapons (rifles, machine carbines, M.Gs and mortars) 7 Decontamination of optical instruments , such as telescopes., measuring instruments, compasses, in alcohol solution 8 barrel of decontamination material 9 crate containing pump and piping e) Method of ascerta,Jning presence of poisonous materials in terrain: 1) by means of detection powder which turns red in contact with the material. ii) by testing apparatus (see sketch F) 1) battery 2) piston rod 3) pistcn 4) body of pump 5) suction aperture 6) holes in point on which the glass investigation tube is 1tRET a 9H.i3 /Glass tube...... 50X1-HUM Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246AO48400150001-8 50X1-HUM Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246A048400150001-8 SECRET Glass tube (see sketch G) (a) Thin-walled glass balls filled with some liquid reactor (b) "s iliko el" (c) F_ I bands marking t; .e tube for a riven substance 50X1-HUM The glass tube fits on to the end of the sm,All pump, (a large number of points make testing of aevdral materials possible.) As it strikes the point, the glass balls break and the liquid _flows into the "si..likagel" (sic) The tube, which is open at both ends, fit.- into the suction hole of the pump, which pumps a certa in number of times; if poisonous material is present in the atmosphere, the "silikogel" turns with mustard gas red) 50X1-HUM Detection of poisonous material in the ground (see sketch H) This is done by means of a funnel, small end made of plastic material, lined with filter paper, into which earth is put; it is then fixed into the glass tube ins' es ;:igLtor (a) funnel (b) neck of funnel (c) testing tube e) C f1N reconnaissance Reconnaissance for indicating contaminated areas and ascertaining the kind of poison gas, is 50X1-HUM carried out in heavy protective clothing with gas masks. Th5 clothes hitherto available are rubber, heavy end unwearable in summer. The new ones are to be lighter, and made of polythene. Recce is also carried out in HACKEL German vehicles , 50X1-HUM which are to be replaced by new Czech ones, When details have been ascertained, a report is made with suggestions for decontamination methods . 3. Method of training for atomic warfare a) Since 1957, greater emphasis has been laid on this than on chemical warfare , but instruction is given in a still more elementary manner than for the latter. The effects of atomic explosion and radioactive radiation have been generally minimised, and countermeasures were restricted, for personnel, to to putting on protective capes and lying on the ground with the feet towards the explosion. Removal of radio- 50X1-HUM active powder was simply to be done by dusting. b) After an atomic explosion the C/fi~ units are to construct so-called "hygiene staff'"' Imova1 of radioactivity b 98 y 9' /dusting.......e 50X1-HUM Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246AO48400150001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80TOO246AO I SECRET .. 6 .0 dusting and showers, for personnel decontamination. 111hen an atomic attack is expected the men have to be inoculated with a special serum intended to stop, or slow up the disintegration of blood corpuscles caused by radioactivity. A s1milar serum is to be available for bacteriological warfare. c) For officers, atomic warfare training is limited to the ability to handle instruments for ascertaining the intensity o radioactivity. These have been developed from ordinary apparatus used in medicine, and include: i) Roerenometer, for measuring the intensity of terrain contamination ((see sketch J) ii) Radiometer, for measuring intensity over small.areas iii) Dosimeter , for measuring dodea cf radiation (as already stated, there are two types) Key to sketch J 1) switch 2) voltage control 3) neutral position 4) range 5) operating switch SECRET 8400150001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246AO48400150001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246AO48400150001-8 300c~-- cm e 100cm+ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/28: CIA-RDP80T00246AO48400150001-8