CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) TRAINING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A048400150001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 11, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.B.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
SUBJECT Chemical Warfare (CW) Tr .inin,
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE,
report dealing with the trainin of
specialists for CW and defense against atomic warfare.
such training was very superficial up to 1956. Since then
such training is emphasized more, especially the latter. The training
seems designed primarily to create among the men the idea that some
measures are being taken for their protection, but it was clear to the
students that these were merely improvisations. It seemed that the
Soviets were not anxious to pass on data on atomic defense and passed
only general data. When students asked about the inadequacy of CW and
atomic defense preparations, the instructors said that much better counter-
measures existed but these were kept secret to prevent the West from learn-
ing of them. Defense measures were emphasized as far as could be ascer-
tained in CW units in the army. However, the three CW battalions, reformed
as brigades in 1958 were intended for offensive measures.
2. The report also discusses methods of training, types of equipment used, and
sketches of this equipment. With regard to defense against radioactivity,
it is stated that personnel would be inoculated with a special serum intended
to stop or slow down the disintegration of blood corpuscles caused by radio-
activity. A similar serum was to be available for bacteriological warfare.
STATE I X ARMY Ev X JNAVY
(NoN: Washington distribution indicated by "
I X AIR X FBI
X"; Field distribution by "#".)
REPORTI
DATE DISTR. g1 MAY 1959
NO. PAGES 1
REFERENCES RD
AEC
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I N FORMATION REPORT I N FORMATION REPORT
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/,` (,3,.
kej
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18. U.B.C. Seca. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
COUNTRY Czechoslovakia
SUBJECT Chemical Warfare (CW) Tr.inin-'
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
? are ort dealing with the training of
specialists for CW and defense against atomic warfare.
such training was very superficial up to 19 6 Since then
such training is emphasized more, especially the latter. The training
seems designed primarily to create among the men the idea that some
measures are being taken for their protection, but it was clear to the
students that these were merely improvisations. It seemed that the
Soviets were not anxious to pass on data on atomic defense and passed
only general data. When students asked about the inadequacy of CW and
atomic defense preparations, the instructors said that much better counter-
measures existed but these were kept secret to prevent the West from learn-
ing of them. Defense measures were emphasized as far as could be ascer-
tained in CW units in the army. However, the three CW battalions, reformed
as brigades in 1958 were intended for offensive measures.
2. The report also discusses methods of training, types of equipment used, and
sketches of this equipment. With regard to defense against radioactivity,
it is stated that personnel would be inoculated with a special serum intended
to stop or slow down the disintegration of blood corpuscles caused by radio-
activity. A similar serum was to be available for bacteriological warfare.
STATE X ARMY Ev x JNAVY X lAIR
Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X", Field distributi
REPORT
DATE DISTR. 11 MAY 1959
NO. PAGES 1
REFERENCES RD
AEC
LI
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0
N FORMATION REPORT I N FORMATION REPORT
x IFBI
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CZECH0S L0VAKIAl
Military
Training of specialists for chemical warfare in Czechoslovakl.G
General background
a) Trdning of officers for chemical warfare units of the
Czechoslovak army is very superficial, for it seeds proriable
that both chemical warfare and atomic defence are still only in
the first stages; up to 1956/57, more attention was given to
chemical warfa re, although this consisted of data already well
known, which were used by the German army. In 1956/57, however,
the Russians communicated some of their experience in training
for atomic warfare; and this latter, though still at the stage
of elementary improvisation, now receives greater emphasis than
chemical warfare.
b) When military training was introduced in universities and
co&leges, chemical warfare was introduced into departments of
chemistry,, and graduates were trained as reserve officers for
C/N units. The training for students was however found to be
unsuitable, as the elementary and often wholly inexpert
principles of chemical and atomic warfare gave them the
impression that the training was only carried out to prevent the
men from being frightened at the prospect of such-types. of
warfare, and to make them think that units engaged in defence
measures existed. During training held in their second and
fourth years at the military training area at CERVENA VODA, or
with the 1st C/1 Battalion, JAROMER or the 3rd Battalion,
SAF^RIKOVO, the students came into contact with officers from
the regular C/N units , and caused them considerable difficulty.
Apart from a few graduates from the BRNO Military Technical
Aca demy, the officers are of working class origin, and their
ma Fgltr ~i 3 g listed of only a two-year military academy
LajeQF)tX a few basic principles of chemistry, they
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/have........
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have no technical knowledge and no secondary education. The
presence of students specialising in chemistry led to either
disputes among experts on the nonsensical nature of some of the
principles, or to ridicule of primitive method:; used. In either
case, the students caused demoralisation. This was one re a son
for the liquidation of training in chemical warfare as part of
for
students' military training, and baking them do two Sear s'
national service after completing their course at technical
co liege .
c) The main intention of the C/W and atomic warf - e units is
to create among the men the idea that same measures are being
taken in their defence. It was clear to the students, for
instance, that many things were being improvised and many other
measures taken merely for the sage of doing something. One
example of procedure was that adopted with dosimeters for
ascertaining the intensity of a dose of radiation. At first
egch man was to have had one, but it was found later that if
each could find out for himself the strength of radio-activity,
this would cause panic, and it was decided that only the platoon
CO should have a dosimeter. Subsequently thisvas abandoned, an~,
two types of dosimeter were introduced, one showing the actual
intensity, for the unit CO, M.O. and C,A?I officer. COs of
smaller sections such as companies, etc., were to have 'blind"
dos.imete3xwith a numbered dial to which only the unit CO, M.O.
and C/VN officer have the key.
d) It was clear that the Russians were not anxious to pass to
the Czech army data on their experience in atomic defence, and
that what they handed over was general experience only. In
reply to questions from students about the inadequacy of C/W
and atomic defence preparations, the officers lecturing to them
said that much better countermeasures existed, but these were
kept secret to prevent the West from getting to know of them,
e) From the present position, it is clear that all measures
tend merely to reducWR--.o- chemical or atomic warfare.
The importance of some is the time factor in that they enable
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the men to continue fighting for a . sh.:.i't time, at the cost of
subsequent sacrifice of personnel; who are only given aid to
suffice over a short period. In the Czech arm--,. both C/W and
atomic warfare.-apparently concentrate on defensive aspects, as
far as C/W sections attached to army units were concerned;
the three special CAY battalions, reformed as brigades in 1958,
are intended for offensive measures. Instruction with the
present apparatus gives the impression that this is for defence
only, but it was stated that in emergency it could be used for
attack.
f) The following C/N materials are in use. Category I.
poison gas etd, category II, ;smoke-screer laying materials;
category III, incendiary materials. Category I includes:
i) pungent and tear gases: bromo-acetone, chloroaceto-
pheno l
"CLARK", "DICK", adamsite
ii) asphyxiating gases: chlorine, phosgene, di-phosgene
iii) blistering gases: mustard gas, N-yperite, lewisite.
iv) systematic poisons: "TABUN", "SARUN", "SO10..N"
v) special materials: hydrocyanic acid, carbon monoxide
2. Method of training and apparatus
a) Training, mainly defensive, concentrated largely on
decontamination of terrain, arms and equipment from substezces
such as mustard gas.
b) Four different methods are employed for decontaminating
terrain:
i) PDM apparatus (see sketch A) mounted on the rear side-
plate ; the decontamination cylinder drive is 50X1-HUM
attached by a chain to the rear wheel, on which a special
gear wheel is mounted. A lever at the side regulates
the size of the aperture through which chloride of lime is
scattered. The crew consists of a CO, a driver and 2 men
in charge of decontamination.
ii) "ACHR" a chemical spray tanker which can be 50X1-HUM
used for con am na ion, decontamination and smoke-screen
laying. TATRA Ills are mostly fitsed for thij purpose.
iii) improvised decontamination: burniang vegetation,
turning over the earth; covering with stones, F;ravel,
trees, etc.
iv) decontamination of small areas or buildings: with a
spray know8a~,~~ip,P - 4S_ which works on the principle
of the gard~ h a tank carried on the back.
/c).. .. .... 9811:1
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c) Decontamination of equipment is also carried out in four
ways, dry air, hot water, steam and str,am and ammonia.
i) dry air decontamination is done by placing a metal and
wooden grate over a hearth and building a but above it (see
sketches B and C). The walls are readymade and hooked
together, and o}~v as a window and door, ar~:i the front
and back siaea sma l openings in them at the base for
regulating the temperature. Clothes on hangers are hung
on a bar inside.
ii) For decontamination with hot water, the methods Irv.-2
and Bu-3 are used, consisting of a boiler with it& own
hf.arth. The boiler is also equipped with a spiral heating
coilfor supplying steam.
iii) Decontamination by steam and ammonia is done with tvD
vats and a pit 100 cm square, into which first small boards,
and then the oc ipment to be decontr inated are put. The
steam is brought by a metal pipe from two barrQls holding
about 100 lit As, above a hearth; they have dr,in valves,
manometensand escape valves. Ammonium carbonate can also
be used, dissolving in heat and carried by the steam.
d) Decontamination of weapons; each man attends to his own
weapons . Complete decontamination is carried out by the C/P!
sections in specially reserved areas, by the followt ng means:
i) ACHR tankers filled with a 10 % solution of dichlora-
mine and dichlor ethane sprayed over contaminated weapons
with a hose.
ii) DK-`1 apparatus, Soviet makes, consistsn~ of three crates
containing a pump with branch pipes for attaching hoses,
protective clothing, rubber boots, indicator flags,
notices, spray nozzles and jets, oil lamps for lighting
working sites, rifle stands and a bench for decontaminating
sights.
Layout of DK-1 in use (see sketch E)
1 - 2 Decontamination of vehicles, tanks, guns, motor
cycles.
3,4,5,6, weapons (rifles, machine carbines,
M.Gs and mortars)
7 Decontamination of optical instruments , such as
telescopes., measuring instruments, compasses, in
alcohol solution
8 barrel of decontamination material
9 crate containing pump and piping
e) Method of ascerta,Jning presence of poisonous materials in
terrain:
1) by means of detection powder which turns red in contact
with the material.
ii) by testing apparatus (see sketch F)
1) battery
2) piston rod
3) pistcn
4) body of pump
5) suction aperture
6) holes in point on which the glass investigation
tube is 1tRET
a
9H.i3
/Glass tube...... 50X1-HUM
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Glass tube (see sketch G)
(a) Thin-walled glass balls filled with some liquid
reactor
(b) "s iliko el"
(c) F_ I bands marking t; .e tube for a riven substance 50X1-HUM
The glass tube fits on to the end of the sm,All pump,
(a large number of points make testing of aevdral
materials possible.) As it strikes the point, the glass
balls break and the liquid _flows into the "si..likagel" (sic)
The tube, which is open at both ends, fit.- into the suction
hole of the pump, which pumps a certa in number of times;
if poisonous material is present in the atmosphere, the
"silikogel" turns with mustard gas
red) 50X1-HUM
Detection of poisonous material in the ground (see sketch
H)
This is done by means of a funnel, small end made of
plastic material, lined with filter paper, into which earth
is put; it is then fixed into the glass tube ins' es ;:igLtor
(a) funnel
(b) neck of funnel
(c) testing tube
e) C f1N reconnaissance
Reconnaissance for indicating contaminated areas and
ascertaining the kind of poison gas, is 50X1-HUM
carried out in heavy protective clothing with gas masks. Th5
clothes hitherto available are rubber, heavy end unwearable in
summer. The new ones are to be lighter, and made of polythene.
Recce is also carried out in HACKEL German vehicles , 50X1-HUM
which are to be replaced by new Czech ones, When details have
been ascertained, a report is made with suggestions for
decontamination methods .
3. Method of training for atomic warfare
a) Since 1957, greater emphasis has been laid on this than on
chemical warfare , but instruction is given in a still more
elementary manner than for the latter. The effects of atomic
explosion and radioactive radiation have been generally
minimised, and countermeasures were restricted, for personnel,
to to putting on protective capes and lying on the ground with
the feet towards the explosion. Removal of radio- 50X1-HUM
active powder was simply to be done by dusting.
b) After an atomic explosion the C/fi~ units are to construct
so-called "hygiene staff'"' Imova1 of radioactivity b 98
y 9'
/dusting.......e 50X1-HUM
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.. 6 .0
dusting and showers, for personnel decontamination. 111hen an
atomic attack is expected the men have to be inoculated with a
special serum intended to stop, or slow up the disintegration of
blood corpuscles caused by radioactivity. A s1milar serum is
to be available for bacteriological warfare.
c) For officers, atomic warfare training is limited to the
ability to handle instruments for ascertaining the intensity o
radioactivity. These have been developed from ordinary
apparatus used in medicine, and include:
i) Roerenometer, for measuring the intensity of terrain
contamination ((see sketch J)
ii) Radiometer, for measuring intensity over small.areas
iii) Dosimeter , for measuring dodea cf radiation (as
already stated, there are two types)
Key to sketch J
1) switch
2) voltage control
3) neutral position
4) range
5) operating switch
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300c~-- cm
e
100cm+
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