1. STOCK BREEDING IN THE UZBEK SSR 2. THE LITHUANIAN MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A053000430001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 8, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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N FORMAT I ON R F PO RT I N F Ok) m 710N REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the spionage Laws, Title
18, U.B.C. Sees. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorised person is prohibited by law.
COUNTRY USSR (Uzbek SSR and Lithuanian SSR) REPORTI
SUBJECT 1. Stock Breeding in the Uzbek SSR DATE DISTR. 8 March 1960
NO. PAGES 1
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ
th+j.I+ithixa:cian
reports on stock breeding in the Uzbek SSR an. 0'a
Ministry of Agriculture
2 Y
Attachment 1: An eight-page report on stock breeding in the Uzbek SSR with
statistics from the Soviet Central Bureau of Statistics on the number of cattle
in the Namangan Oblast in 1953 and 1955. The report discusses the effects and
operation of Khrushchev's plans for agriculture after his 1953 spee:-h and the
subsequent conversion -T-Toui7 lkhozy to Sovkhozy.
Attachment 2: A five*-page report on the Lithuanian Ministry of Agriculture
indicating the six deputy ministers and their duties and the various directorates
with brief remarks about their functions.
STATE ARMY NAVY XJAIR X I NSA X FSI
NIC
'i t
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USSR (Lithuanian SSR)
The Lithuanian Ministry of Agriculture
1. The Lithuanian Ministry of Agriculture occupied a postwar,
four-story building at 19 Prospekt Stalina (formerly
Mickiewicza) in Vilnius. It constituted a merger, effected
in 1954, of the Ministry of Collection of Agricultural
Produce (Min. Zagotovok), the Ministry of State Farms
(Min. Sovkhosov), and the former Ministry of Agriculture
(Mix. Sol-Khozyaystva). The newly-formed ministry dealt
mostly with kolkhozy and MTS. It had operated by means of
provincial and district agricultural departments until 1956,
at which time the departments were abolished and their
tasks were assumed by the 135 MTS existing in the republic.
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2. Also in 1956, a Central Adeinistration for Collection of
Agricultural Produce, subordinate both to the Lithuanian
Council of Ministers and to Moscow, and a Ministry of
Sovkhozy were established. No further organizational
changes took place up to early 1957.
3. The Ministry of Agriculture was headed by Minister
Augustinaitis (fnu) and the following six deputy minters:
a. First Deputy Minister in charge of general
administration of the Ministry. He was a
Lithuanian and a "candidate of agricultural
sciences" (name unknown).
b. Deputy in charge of personnel, Grigenas (fnu),
a Lithuanian.
c. Deputy in charge of livestock, Glabay (fnu),
a Russian.
d. Deputy in charge of mechanization and MTS,
Konevshchinskiy (fnu), a Ukrainian.
e. Deputy in charge of industrial crops, a
Lithuanian (name unknown).
f. Deputy in charge of construction, a
Lithuanian (name unknown).
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4. Included among the administrations of the Ministry were the
following:
a. Administration of Propaganda and Agricultural
Sciences (Upravlsnye Propaganday i Sel-Khosnauk),
which came wader the first deputy minister. The
administration published and distributed litera-
ture on agricultural subjects, administrated
agricultural secondary schools (sel-khoz*
tekhnikuai), of which there were about ten
in the republic, including schools in Vilnius,
Kaunas, Klsypeda, Paneveshis, and Sb4yaulysyp
and five or six agricultural research stations
(locations unknown). The administration included
a propaganda and an agricultural exhibition
department.
b. Administration of Agricultural Mechanisation
(Upravle:ge Mekhanisataii Sol-Kohl), which
included departments of agricultural machinery
(Otdel Sal-Khos Machin), of fuel (Otdel Po
Nefte Khoshaystvu), andof tractor and agricul-
tural machinery repairs (Otdel Ramonta Traktorov
i Sel-Khos. Machin).
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a. The Finance Administration (Finansovoe Upr.),
which included a department for financing
MTS and another for financing agricultural
schools.
d. The Accounts Department (Tsentralnara Bukhal-
terya), which consisted of two sections: a
bookkeeping section (otdel ucheta i otchet-
nosty) and an auditing section (otdel
kontroli),
e. Administration of Livestock (Upr. Zhiv+otnov-
odstva), which included cattle, pig, and
horse-breeding sections, as wall as a poultry
section.
f. Administration of MTS (Upr. MTS).
g. Administration of Field Crops (Upr. Rastenyov-
odstva).
h. Administration of Planning (Planovoe Upr.).
i. Administration of Industrial Crops (Upr.
Tekhnicheskikh Kultur).
J. Veterinary Administration (Veterinarnoe Upr.).
k. Administration of Agricultural Construction
(Upr. Sol-Khos. Stroitelatva).
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Pag? 5
1. Administration of Kolkhoz Organization
(Organ. Kolkhos. Upr.).
m. Administration of Personnel (Upr.
Kadrov).
n. Administration of Domestic Administra-
tion (Khosyaatvennoe Upr.).
o. Administration of Supplies (Upr. Sol-Khoz.
Snabshenya).
All of the above administration, with the exception of the
Ministration of Supplies, were housed in the main building
of the Ministry, on Prospekt Stalina. The Supply Administra-
tion was located at No. 3,5 Prospekt Stalina.
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'RT
SE
Stockbreeding in the Uzbek SSR
1. In the Uzbek SSR the breeding of livestock was limited almost
entirely to cattle and sheep. The livestock raised there were of
indigenous breeds exclusively, consisting of small-sized cattle of
low weight with poor milk yields and of inferior sheep yielding very
little wool. Furthermore, after World 'fear II the total number of
cattle and sheep in the republic was comparatively small. Until 1953
the emphasis in stockbreeding was placed on quantitative increases.
An oblast plan would call for a certain number of cattle and sheep,
and if this target were met, no one inquired about the yield of meat,
milk, or wool. As a consequence of the continued adherence to this
policy, the quality of cattle and sheep deteriorated further, and
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the sovkhozes and kolkhozes found they were unable to fulfill the
compulsory meat, milk and butter quotas.
2. This situation changed noticeably following Khrushchev's
speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee in September 1953.
Energetic steps were immediately taken in the Uzbek SSR to improve
local breeds of cattle and sheep. These included the following:
a. A considerable number of Dutch cows were procured for
cross-breeding.
b. Choice merino sheep were brought in from. other regions
of the USSR, in particular from the Caucasus Mountains, to
replace local breeds.
c. Strong pressure was exerted to improve feeding of
livestock.
d. An energetic campaign was launched to modernize cowsheds.
e. Changes were made in the wage calculations of persons
in charge of cattle and sheep in sovkhozes and kolkhozes:
instead of paying them according to head of cattle in their
care, rates were adapted to yields.
3. As early as 1955, results from these measures could be felt,
not only with regard to quality, the declared objective, but
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GAG!/
quantitatively as well. For example, in 1953 in the Namangan Oblast,
one of the largest of the republic's seven oblasts, had had no more
than 14,500 head of cattle, of which only 45 percent we-rre milk cows.
In x955 the oblzst had 18,500 head of cattle, 50 percent of which
were milk cows. The average live weight increased from 160-200 kg
per head to 300-350 kg. The average yield of milk per cow increased
from 500-600 liters to 1,800-2,000 liters. As for sheep, in 1953 the
Namangan Oblast had had 120,000 sheep with an average live weight of
35-40 kg and an average annual wool yield of 1.5-2.0 kg; in 1955 there
were 130,000 head with an average live weight of 50 kg and an average
annual wool yield of five to six kg.
It. The figures set forth in the preceding paragraph were taken
from official statistics, as published by the Soviet Central jureau
of Statistics. These figures, however, overstate the facts by at
least 10-15 percent, not through any action of the Bureau, but as
a result of falsification on the part of the sovkhozes and kolkhozes.
The reports submitted by the latter are deliberately distorted in
their favor because they are afraid of Party reprisals. It had
become routine to falsify figures on cattle end sheep mortality.
Such conduct, which was the rule in all branches of agriculture, was
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condoned by the local authorities who were also interested in
presenting a favorable picture to their superiors - they would
not even bother to verify the reports submitted to them.
5. There was, then, a considerable improvement in stockbreeding
after 1953, although not to the extent claimed by Khrushchev on
various occasions. The number of cattle and sheep had certainly
increased in the Uzbek SSR and, consequently, also the production of
meat and milk. (There was, how(-:ver, still a serious shortage of
meat, milk and butter, particularly in the small country towns.)
In the light of the rise in the number of cattle and sheep in such
a short time, it was decided at the end of 1955 to desist for the
time being from further numerical increases, and to concentrate on
consolidating the qualitative achievements by continued improvements
in feeding and further development of breeds.
6. Until 1953 the stockbreeding plans had been worked out at
high. levels, and the sovkhozes and kolkhozes had to carry them out
unquestioningly. Upon Khrushchevts rise to power it was announced
that this method would be changed, and there was talk that from then
on every sovkhoz and kolkhoz would work out its own stockbreeding
plan, exactly as it would draw up its general farming plan. Printed
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forms for planning according to the new method were sent to the
collectives, but it soon became apparent that no genuine decentra-
lization was intended. Almost all the kolkhozes in the Uzbek SSR
submitted plans which completely ignored pig raising, limited cattle
breeding to a bare minimum, and concentrated instead on sheep which
are the easiest to raise under the geographic conditions of the
region and therefore the most profitable. The Party immediately
stepped in with the argument that to leave planning to the sovkhozes
and kolkhozes would damage the interests of the state, thereby making
it impossible to catch up with the United States; the collectives had
demonstrated their lack of maturity and they therefore had to be
guided. In the end, centralized planning was resumed and nothing at
all was changed.
7. In the Uzbek SSR, only a. all number of the total livestock
were owned by individual holders; in the Namangan Oblast, the number
did not exceed 10-15 percent of the total. Those who had their own
livestock were workers on sovkhozes or members of kolkhozes. They
were permitted to own one cow, one calf, and up to four sheep.
Following Khrushchev's appeals that the collectives purchase cattle
privately owned by their members, the sovkhozes and kolkhozes tried
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to comply, but with little success. Instead of delivering their cow
for half its worth to the collectives, members preferred to slaughter
it, and the occasional sale of a cow was due to pressure. It is
believed that the whole campaign for the acquisition of cattle from
private owners did not spring so much from Khrushchev's intention to
prevent profiteering, as from anxiety about the precarious state of
stockbreeding which resulted from the high delivery quotas. In 1956,
for instance, the district of Uch-Kurgan in the Namangan Oblast had
to sell to the state 360 tons of meat - 180 tons as "compulsory
delivery" (Goszagotovka) and 180 tons as "purchase quota" (Goszakup).
At that time the district had a total of 3,200 head of cattle. In
order to comply with this demand, the stock of cattle had to be
depleted by some 500 head in this one year, an amount which could
hardly be replenished by natural increases in the course of the next
year.
8. In 1950 a kolkhoz merging drive (Ukrupnienie Kolkhozov) had
been undertaken in the Uzbek SSR, aimed at eliminating small and
unprofitable collectives. Most kolkhozes fell into this category,
since they had been unable to deliver their quotas or to support
their members. After years of work the members were receiving little
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9r-
more than 300 grams of wheat and 30-50 kopeks per working day (Trud-
oden). The establishment of the large kolkhozes did not bring about
any improvement. On the contrary, the organization or work in large
kolkhozes was more inefficient than it had been before, while the
granting of loans - actually subsidies - which had previously been
given to small, poor kolkhozes was stopped. Moreover, the amalga-
mation did not improve the cultivation methods and accordingly the
fields did not yield more, while depreciation of equipment was even
more rapid than on a small kolkhoz. The creation of large kolkhozes
was admittedly advantageous to the government inasmuch as it facili-
tated quota collection, but not to the collectives or their members.
9. In 1956 it was decided to convert many kolkhozes into
sovkhozes, probably because of the failure to improve the situation
by means of the "Ukrupnienie". In the Uzbek SSR this conversion was
carried out on a. large scale. In the Namangan Oblast, for example,
most kolkhozes were liquidated and transformed into sovkhozes in
1956 and 1957. In the Uch-Kurgan District, which had had 56 kolkhozes
in 1943, only eleven remained by 1957.
10. In the Uzbek SSR kolkhoz members do not like the sov1dioz
any more than they did the kolkhoz. In f act, they even pr e'Lerred
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F_ P?ET
the kolkhoz because it left them a larger plot of land for their
personal use, and this constituted practically their only source
of support. Notwithstanding the long years of Communist rule, the
Uzbeks have retained a strong sense of private ownership. Although
they have lost all hope of recovering their land, they are still
unwilling to work in a sovkhoz or kolkhoz. They do so because they
have no choice, but it is only their private plot which they work
with care and devotion. Collective activities are so inefficient
that, during the two months of the cotton-picking season, part of
the urban population must be mobilized for work, and all elementary,
secondary and high-level schools in the Uzbek SSR are closed down,
with the exception of the lower grades of elementary schools.
S[' ..FT
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