SALT/CCD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300090001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MEMO

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State Department review
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SECF.ET/EXDIS SALT TWO
SESSION I
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
. GENEVA. SWITZERLAND
SUBJECT: SALT/CCD
PARTICIPANTS: US . .
-DATE: December 20, 1972
TIME: 7:30--11:00 PM
PLACE: Restaurant Mere
Royaume
USSR
Lawrence D. Weiler 0. A. Grinevsky
V.-V. Smolin
Grinevsky called in the afternoon and asked my wife and me
to have dinner %-v-I Lh hiiil that evening. During the course of the
evening, which was mostly filled with social conversation, the
following items of interest were discussed.
1. NON-SALT
CCD
Grinevsky commented that he did not see much of interest
developing in the CCD during the next year unless the US changed
its position on verification for a comprehensive test ban. He
asked if this were likely. I said the US position rem-ained
unchanged. Grinevsky said some progress might be made on a
chemical warfare treaty but that this would mostly be for the
purpose of keeping the rest of the CCD happy and he did not regard
it as a very important'matter. He commented that when the CCD
was in session, members of both SALT Delegations would probably
be bothered by CCD Delegations seeking information since many of
them regarded SALT as a legitimate subject of their interest. We
agreed that it was important for both SALT Delegations to keep
CCD delegation members at arms length and maintain the privacy of
..SALT. ...
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W'arPromacianda Convention and Zorin
Grinevsky remarked that US-Soviet disarmament negotia-
tions were in a different stage now than in the early
1960's, with careful steady progress being made, noting
that this was much different from the times when "poor
Zarin" had to repudiate the agreed US-Soviet text of the
draft convention on war propaganda in the early days of
the ENDC. I said I had always wondered what had happened
on that occasion and had assumed that the agreed text
negotiated by Zarin and Authur Dean had been focused on
by the Soviet leaders after it had been tabled in the
ENDC.- Grinevsky said I was wrong about this, that the
turn-around occurred because in those days one man could
make policy by himself. He said l 4hrushchev had personally
approved the text of the convention the week before but
in the following week had changed his mind and ordered
Zarin to repudiate his own words of praise for the convention.
.I said that personally I had-had misgivings about the
entire effort because it could have raised questions
about freedom of expression in the US. Grinevsky observed
that no one but Zorin and the Soviet Delegation had really
surfered from the Soviet turn-around.
Grinevsky then commented that it was interesting that
Zorin had a reputation in western countries as a somewhat
disagreeable hardliner but that this reputation was not
deserved. He said that Zorin's reputation was the result
of his having been involved in a number of "unfortunate
situations" where he had had to do and say things that had
created a bad impression in the Hest but that Zorin, in
addition to being very able, was a soft and considerate
man and very different from the reputation he had acquired.
II. SALT
During the evening, Grinevsky drew me aside and
raised the following SALT matters.
Qualitative Limitations
Grinevsky asked if I were aware of his conversation
with Garthoff the previous evening. I said I was. He
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Afte
said he wished to-re-emphasize his hope that the US would
during the recess study very hard the-question of qualita-
tive limitations, particularly those relating to MIRVs,
and he repeated his ccmu.:ent to Garth-off that he regretted
that there had not been more discussion of this area during
the current session. I noted that the subject of qualita-
tive limitations %?.,as held open and that the US Delegation
had indicated willingness to hear any Soviet views, but
that we had no considerations to advance at this session.
He replied that it was too bad Ambassador Smith or the
other Delegates had not, even in mini-plenaries or pri-
vately, offered some personal suggestions. I said this
would not be helpful since such a procedure could end up
being misleading and was not a professional way of conducting
negotiations. He said I was probably right but that the
Soviet Delegation had been prepared to discuss this area
further if the US Delegation had been able to do so at
..this session, adding that frankly the.Soviets o:ere
themselves still searching for the best solution, regarding
which there were differing views in Moscow.
Grincvsky said that in any c ent he hcpca '-`'- U2 .. L study the implications of the three possibilities he and
Shchukin had indicated, no MIRY limitation, a complete ban
and limitations short of a complete ban. H.o said the first
alternative would have unfortunate implications for SALT
arms control efforts. (He did not elaborate.) He said
the second, which should not be ruled out for consideration,
did not seem as likely because the US probably wanted to
keep MIRVs and the Soviets could not through national means
of verification be sure the US had removed and destroyed its
MIRVs. He continued, saying that the third possibility
could be explored along the lines of banning I.IIRVs on
certain systems like "the big ones." I asked if he meant
~,IISS-9s. He replied that he thought this could be considered
but that this was his personal view since many things had
not been definitely decided in Moscow.
'Grinevsky concluded by saying that while initially
he had thought the US Delegation was teriporarily holding
back on discussion, of qualitative limitations, he had
concluded that all we were authorized to do was listen
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and that he=therefore could only urge that we report
what had been said by members of the Soviet Delegation.
I said the US Delegation would of course report
Soviet views and noted that it was equally important that
the Soviet Delegation report fully the views, and the
reasonings, submitted by the US Delegation.
Obligations of Restraint
Grinevsky said he would like to raise one more matter
of equal importance, the Soviet proposal that.both sides
undertake certain obligations of restraint. He remarked
--that he was not sure the US Delegation regarded this
proposal as a serious one and he hoped we had reported
it fully so that it could be studied during the recess.
I "said I could not comment on -how -serious it was but I
could say it had, of course, been reported. I said that,
aside frcm other problems I could foresee, it was hard
to know how to consider a proposal as serious when the
Snvic't. Delrciatinn slid not suguest any limitations on
Soviet programs but had listed, as Shchukin and General
Trusov had, practically all. on-going US strategic programs
including even Minuteman III and Poseidon. Grinevsky said
he was aware of what US programs ha. been listed by the
Soviet Delegation. He said the US knew which programs
the Soviet Union had underway and that the US should tell
the Soviet Government what programs it wished to see
stopped and this could be a proper subject for discussion
by the two sides.
SCC
During the course of the dinner, Smolin repeatedly
looked at his watch, crossed his fingers and commented
to Grinevsky on the time remaining before midnight.
Grinevsky kept telling Smolin he was too pessimistic
and that he re: wine : an optirm.ist. After dinner, I asked
Grinevsky what all the finger crossing was about. He
said Smolin and others were worried that because of US
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bombing in North Vietnam they would-receive instructions
not to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on the SCC.
Grinevsky said that if no instructions were received
by midnight they would be in the clear. Grinevsky commented
that he personally thought everything would turn out
all right since both-sides had gone to great lengths
in the past to avoid letting outside matters interfere
with SALT.
LDWeiler:vls 0r `z/
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