INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 29, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

AI}il0mMd For Rase 2004/12/22: CIA-RDP80T0094
Foreign
Assessment
Center
International
Issues Review
Secret
PA IIR 79-006
29 June 1979
Ca y
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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW
29 June 1979
CONTENTS
NUCLEAR POLITICS
SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FOR
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION . . . - . . 1 25X
The Soviet perception of the dangers of nuclear weap-
ons proliferation coincides in many instances with US
concerns, but reflects specific Soviet experiences
and fears. As a result, the Soviets approach nonpro-
liferation policy from the standpoint of their overall
foreign policy objectives rather than from a more ab-
stract concern about the global problems posed by 25X1
growing numbers of nuclear weapons states.
OECD POLITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
attack structural economic inefficiences.
different national positive adjustment policies to
POSITIVE ADJUSTMENT POLICIES IN
THE BIG SIX . . . . . . . . .
Different underlying political factors in the major
industrialized countries will continue to result in
HUMAN RIGHTS
ETHNIC MINORITY CLAIMS AS A HUMAN RIGHTS
ISSUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Increasing demands for ethnic self-determination are
raising complicated human rights issues for national
governments, international institutions and nongov-
ernmental agencies.
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Soviet Perception of the Global Environment for
Nuclear Proliferation
Concern over the significance and intricacy of
nuclear nonproliferation issues doubtless will in-
crease over the coming months as the International
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) draws to a
close and the June 1980 Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) Review Conference approaches.* The Soviet
Union clearly will be an important actor in deter-
mining the shape of the global nuclear environment
and the success of international efforts to control
the spread of nuclear weapons. Underlying Soviet
actions in multilateral nonproliferation forums is
a special appreciation that the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by additional states could pose
significant new dangers to the USSR.
The Soviet Union apparently views proliferation in
terms of the specific security implications for itself
of a given state's acquisition of nuclear weapons rather
than in terms of the increased global potential for
nuclear conflict inherent in growing numbers of nuclear
weapons states. The Soviets perceive most past and pro-
spective instances of nuclear proliferation as harmful
to their security or the security of their allies.
Factors shaping this perspective include:
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-- A world in which all other nuclear weapons
states--the United States, the United Kingdom,
France and China-target their weapons against
Soviet territory.
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-- Concerns, triggered by experience with the
Chinese nuclear program, about the acquisition
of nuclear weapons even by currently friendly
states. F7 I
The Soviet perception of the dangers of nuclear
weapons proliferation coincides in many instances. with
US concerns, a factor that has led the USSR to support
major aspects of US nonproliferation policy. Soviet
nuclear exports generally carry at least as stringent
controls as do US nuclear transfers. Since the mid-1960s,
the Soviets have supported the imposition of Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all
nuclear activity of nonnuclear weapons states (NNWS).
Further, the Soviets have urged signature of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Finally, they
have denied their Warsaw Pact allies opportunities for
developing nuclear technology that could lead to an
independent weapons capabilit and have required those
allies to sign the NPT.
Soviet and US nonproliferation policies do not
coincide at all points, however, since the USSR shapes
its nonproliferation policy to suit overall foreign and
national security goals rather than treating it as an
end in itself. During the Soviet campaign for NPT
ratification in the late 1960s, for example, the Soviets
tried to heighten suspicions within NATO on the issue of
potential West German acquisition of nuclear weapons.
More recently, however, growing Soviet interest in
nuclear exports--enriched uranium and research and power
reactors--and the desire to play on emerging strains
between the United States and its OECD partners on
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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW
29 June 1979
CONTENTS
NUCLEAR POLITICS
25X1
SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FOR
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION . . . . . 1 25X1
The Soviet perception of the dangers of nuclear weap-
ons proliferation coincides in many instances with US
concerns, but reflects specific Soviet experiences
and fears. As a result, the Soviets approach nonpro-
liferation policy from the standpoint of their overall
foreign policy objectives rather than from a more ab-
stract concern about the global problems posed by
growing numbers of nuclear weapons states. 25X1
OECD POLITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
POSITIVE ADJUSTMENT POLICIES IN
THE BIG SIX
Different underlying political factors in the major
industrialized countries will continue to result in
different national positive adjustment policies to
attack structural economic inefficiences.
HUMAN RIGHTS
ISSUE I I . . . . . . . . . 22
Increasing demands for ethnic self-determination are
raising complicated human rights issues for national
governments, international institutions, and nongov-
ernmental agencies.
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economic and some security issues have led the Soviets
to mute these public expressions of concern and to take
a tolerant attitude toward European nuclear energy de-
velopment programs. Indeed, the USSR now provides
significant amounts of enriched uranium to Western
Europe, including more than half of West Germany's re-
quirements. Additionally, at INFCE, the Soviets have
expressed sympathy for West European plans to pursue
national breeder-reactor and reprocessing programs in
the face of strong US objections that the plutonium
economy might encourage further weapons proliferation.
In their approach to the Third World, the Soviets
tailor their nuclear policy to fit their relations with
the individual country concerned. While they sharply
criticize the nuclear programs of such threshold states
Itney a so act as a
suppiler--aiDelt under sa eguar s--to the nuclear pro-
grams of Iraq, Libya, India, and Cuba. They have
accepted the proliferation risks inherent in supplying
nuclear technologies and material to friendly states
in order to receive immediate political and economic
benefits from these transfers, while gaining some
ability to prevent or delay acquisition of a nuclear
weapons capability by the states concerned.
The Soviets are sensitive to developing countries
criticisms of the superpowers for failing to reduce
their nuclear forces substantially, as required by
Article VI of the NPT.* To deflect this criticism, the
Soviets have partially acceded to the demands of the
NNWS for "negative security assurances," which prohibit
the use of nuclear weapons against NNWS. The proposed
Soviet draft convention on the subject also serves the
*Article VI of the NPT requires the signatories to negotiate in
good faith on "effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament"
leading to a "treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control."
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purpose of embarrassing the United States, and if adopted,
would undercut the US commitment to use nuclear weapons
to defend NATO against a conventional Warsaw Pact attack.*
This same selective approach is likely to continue
to characterize Soviet nonproliferation policy. Conse-
quently, the extent to which the USSR cooperates, rather
than competes, with the United States on the prolifera-
tion issue seems likely to depend largely on Soviet per-
ceptions of the global environment, including bilateral
and multilateral arms control negotiations and the status
of Moscow's relations with the United States and with in-
dividual developing nations. To the extent that the So-
viets judged that a cooperative Soviet-US approach to the
proliferation problem offered the best opportunities for
attaining their specific security goals, they would con-
tinue to emphasize nuclear safeguards and the institu-
tional and legal elements of the emerging nonprolifera-
tion regime. In this case, they would be likely to work
for increased joint efforts to block the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by threshold states in those cases where
both superpowers would regard this acquisition as pre-
senting a threat to their own interests and to regional
stability. At somewhat greater political costs to them-
selves, they could also exert pressure on their ally
Cuba to sign the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco (providing
for a Latin American Nuclear-free Zone) and could perhaps
join the United States in supporting a nuclear-weapons
free zone in South Asia despite India's objections.
On the other hand, should the Soviets decide--
perhaps because of a deterioration in overall Soviet-US
relations--that a lessening of cooperation with the United
States in nonproliferation policy offered greater possi-
bilities for foreign policy gains, they might demand
that the United Sates take tougher action against Israel,
South Africa, and perhaps, Pakistan. In addition, they
could exploit emerging opportunities for influence in the
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Third World by increasing the level of nuclear exports to
favored and potentially anti-US developing countries,
while continuing to deny that their exports of nuclear
material contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons.
Even under these conditions, however, Soviet actions
would be moderated by their past experience with friendly
states that turn hostile--for example, Yugoslavia (1948),
Indonesia (1965-66), Egypt (1972), and China (1958-59).
In addition, Moscow's actions would reflect concern that,
should friendly threshold countries such as India and 25X1
Iraq acquire nuclear weapons, they might be inclined to
pursue a more independent policy, thus further reducing
the Soviet voice in regional security. 17
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Positive Adjustment Policies in the Big Six
Since the beginning of the current period of slow
growth, high inflation, and high unemployment, the
OECD countries have been confronted with a choice be-
tween two kinds of structural adjustment that have
fundamentally different political, economic, and so-
cial motives and impacts. Negative adjustment maxi-
mizes the short-term welfare of economically threat-
ened groups at the cost of increased inflation and re-
duced long-term growth in the society as a whole. Pos-
itive adjustment is designed to maximize noninfla-
tionary growth--and, therefore, the long-term welfare
of the majority--at the cost of at least some economic
and social harm to certain workers, industries, and
regions.
This paper analyzes the political factors under-
lying the choice of adjustment measures made by the
United States' key OECD partners (the Big Six--the
United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan,
and Canada) and describes the policies that they have
followed thus far. West Germany, Japan, Canada, and
France have all begun to pursue significant positive
adjustment policies; the first three countries seem
likely to continue to do so, while France's course is
more questionable. The new British Government will
probably try to introduce positive adjustment measures,
but its chances of success appear limited. Finally,
Italian policy probably will continue primarily to fit
a negative adjustment framework.
Response to Slow Growth: Positive
or Negative Adjustment
The initial response of most Big Six countries to
slow growth was to shore up welfare in the short term in
the hope that the economy world pick up, and the need for
difficult political and economic choices thus could be
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avoided. Governments strengthened restrictions on lay-
offs, established job maintenance and creation programs
with little concern for the productiveness of the employ-
ment created, and dramatically raised government unem-
ployment insurance payments. In addition, governments
increased subsidies and trade protection to particularly
threatened sectors, firms, and regions.
Such negative adjustment policies had damaging ef-
fects on growth, prices, and relations with trading
partners (especially the advanced developing countries
that have a comparative advantage in much traditional
manufacturing). At the same time, these policies did
not succeed in stemming the rise in unemployment. As
these adverse effects became evident, the Big Six grew
more interested in implementing positive adjustment
policies--measures that would facilitate the shift in
resources, as stated in a recent OECD study, "from pro-
ducing things in declining to increasing demand (that
is, from sectors and industries facing declining demand
to those facing increasing demand), from less to more
efficient production, and away from production in which
other countries have a comparative advantage."
By allowing much traditional manufacturing to shift
to the less developed countries (LDCs), a fully imple-
mented positive adjustment policy would help to improve
North-South political-economic relations. But it might
create new trade tensions among the industrial countries,
since it would encourage development of precisely those
sectors in which they are most directly competitive.
The concept of positive adjustment aims at preserv-
ing individual welfare to the extent compatible with.in-
creased efficiency and productivity. Thus, it basically
advocates the free play of market forces, but assumes at
least temporary government intervention to smooth the
transition and to maximize an economy's ability to bene-
fit from the market. Positive adjustment, therefore,
could include government assistance that would allow in-
efficient firms to phase out production gradually, sup-
port expanding sectors, and help displaced workers find
new employment.
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Such measures inevitably risk becoming a new form
of negative adjustment if they offer prolonged support
to new production and employment that never becomes fully
competitive. Nonetheless, such palliative measures are
a necessary part of positive adjustment for political,
social, and economic reasons. As long as slow growth
continues, government intervention is probably required
if major new economic activities are to develop. More-
over, by making the positive adjustment process more
acceptable politically and socially, the palliative
measures help guarantee that it will continue. They
cannot, of course, wholly eliminate the economic and
social pain resulting from shifting economic activity
from declining to expanding sectors.
The Political Environment
The economic and social costs associated with posi-
tive adjustment present political barriers to its imple-
mentation in all six countries, but the strength of those
barriers varies considerably from one state to another.
Positive adjustment politically appears most difficult
in the United Kingdom, Italy, and France, but much less
so in Japan, West Germany, and Canada.
Reliance on market forces is contrary to the French
tradition of government economic intervention, and thus
contrary to popular expectations as well. Because of
its fear of adverse political reaction, the Barre gov-
ernment did not implement its recent decision to allow
greater freedom for market forces until after it had
won the March 1978 legislative elections. The policy
has predictably met with considerable criticism from
both the French left and right. Although the major
leftist trade unions have relatively little influence
over government policy formulation, they have been able
to use strikes and demonstrations to disrupt the imple-
mentation of positive adjustment measures in the steel
sector, and could do so in others as well. The negative
reaction to positive adjustment by workers and political
leaders has been sufficiently severe that the government
is considering backing off as it looks toward President
Giscard's 1981 reelection campaign. The longevity of
the current French positive adjustment policy is, there-
fore, open to doubt.
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In Italy, as well, positive adjustment would repre-
sent a considerable change from former government prac-
tice and from popular and trade union expectations. It
would thus require a strong government to implement such
a policy, and it is questionable whether the new Italian
Cabinet will possess the requisite power and will. Some-
what paradoxically, if the Communist Party acquires an
increased role in government decisionmaking, it might
help to further the implementation of positive adjust-
ment, since it has a definite interest in increasing the
competitiveness of the Italian economy. That interest
would be balanced, however, against its desire to pro-
tect the work force and to advance the use of economic
planning.
In the United Kingdom the Thatcher government ap-
pears in a better political position to implement posi-
tive adjustment policies, having just won office for five
years on a conservative, heavily free-market platform.
Because of widespread economic inefficiency, however, the
economic and social costs of a positive adjustment program
would probably be higher in the United Kingdom than any-
where else in the Big Six (with the possible exception of
Italy). In addition, individual craft unions dedicated to
job protection in declining sectors wield considerable in-
fluence over policymaking within the government and within
the trade union federation (Trades Union Congress), and
especially over policy implementation at the individual
firm level. Although the craft unions' influence on
government policy formulation will be less under the
Conservative government than it was under Labor, the
Thatcher Cabinet will, nonetheless, probably be able to
implement a positive adjustment policy only gradually.
West Germany, Japan, and Canada have traditionally
pursued policies which, by comparison, fit the positive
adjustment framework fairly well, because they generally
allow the free play of market forces and/or put consider-
able emphasis on encouraging expanding sectors. In Japan
and West Germany positive adjustment generally has been
successful., It is supported by the population and con-
sequently seems likely to continue. The major West Ger-
man trade union federation, the Deutsche Gewerkschaft
Bund (DGB), has more influence over policy formulation
and implementation than do its component craft unions.
Since the DGB's wide sphere of responsibility gives it
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a greater interest in the health of the economy as a
whole than in the preservation of any one sector, it
generally supports positive adjustment. The major Japa-
nese trade union federations are not as well disposed
to the policy, but their impact is relatively limited.
Positive adjustment has had less obvious beneficial
economic impact in Canada, but there is probably little
the government can do to implement major negative adjust-
ment measures. It has relatively little control over the
large numbers of American branch plants in its industrial
sector, and it is too dependent on foreign trade to create
major new trade barriers. In addition, the newly elected
Progressive Conservative government will probably be in-
clined toward a free-market industrial policy, although
its minority status places constraints on how effectively
it can act.
Although the political environment for implementing
positive adjustment policies varies considerably from
one country to another, they all perceive some common
political obstacles to the policy. The most effective
opposition comes from workers and political leaders in
severely affected regions. Most traditional industries
tend to be geographically concentrated. Entire electoral
regions depend for their livelihood on steel or ship-
building or textiles. Plant cutbacks or closures in
such regions threaten to take away the jobs not just of
the industrial workers concerned but also of employees
in the local service sectors. The common interest of
the populations of those regions in preserving tradi-
tional industries can be effectively expressed at the
ballot box.
Generally, most Big six governments fear that the
plight of workers and regions hurt by positive adjustment
will generate considerable sympathy among the voting
public. Yet the broad consequences of negative adjust-
ment policies are not politically popular. Since these
policies retard economic growth and exacerbate inflation,
they reduce the potential welfare level of most of the
population even as they maintain that of the protected
groups. Popular unwillingness to accept that situation
may help to explain the recent electoral victories of the
conservative parties in the United Kingdom, Canada, and last
year in France. The West German Social Democratic Party
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(SPD) may soon be the only leftist party in power in the
Big Six, but it has pursued a fairly conservative, free-
market - oriented economic policy.
This is not to argue that most, or even many, voters
would vote against a government only because it pursued
a negative adjustment policy. It is questionable whether
voters make the connection between the perceived reduction
in their own welfare and negative adjustment policies
per se. Indeed, many voters, especially in France, Italy,
and the United Kingdom, might oppose positive adjustment
measures during the period when the social costs of these
measures were more apparent than their economic benefits
and when they were met with disruptive worker reaction.
Ideally, voters would probably want both rapid noninfla-
tionary growth and negative adjustment policies, which
would make everyone happy both in the short and long runs.
Unfortunately, that combination does not seem possible.
It is unclear how much political risk the Big Six
governments run in pursuing a positive adjustment policy,
but the uncertainty adds to the perception of risk. The
political costs associated with positive adjustment have
limited its implementation in the six countries. But
variations in perceived risks and/or government attitudes
have made some governments go much farther than others.
The Adjustment Measures Taken by the Big Six
Support for Declining Sectors
Of the Big Six, West Germany has always been the
most firmly committed to allowing the market to determine
economic activity. The government is actively helping
the steel industry, but only while it reduces capacity.
The government has also intervened to support major firms
in other sectors, but usually only when it expects them
to regain economic health or when national security con-
siderations seem to be at stake.
The Japanese Government intervenes continually in
the management of the economy, but aims primarily at
making it more efficient and competitive. In May 1978,
it passed a "Law on Extraordinary Measures for the Stabi-
lization of Designated Depressed Industries," under which
capacity will be reduced over five years in steel,
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aluminum, synthetic fibers, shipbuilding, chemical fer-
tilizer, spinning, and ferro-silicon industries. The
law is an important first element of an overall Japanese
plan to phase out production in traditional industries
like clothing and instead concentrate on newer sectors
in which Japan has a comparative advantage.
The phasing out of uncompetitive production has
caused considerably more political difficulty in France.
In the past year, the government has tried to make the
economy more responsive to market forces, downplaying
(if not renouncing) its earlier calls for protectionism,
and phasing out subsidies to declining firms. A few
major sectors, such as steel, are to be temporarily as-
sisted to allow for gradual cutbacks in production, but
they will not be permitted to exist indefinitely on an
uneconomic basis. The government's plans for production
and employment reductions in the steel industry have
produced violent reactions in the two regions concerned.
Although the opposition has quieted somewhat, the govern-
ment is now treading more warily, and is less vocal about
its shift to "organized liberalism."
Positive adjustment is probably more necessary--and
consequently more difficult--in the United Kingdom. Prob-
lem firms are located not just in the sectors that are de-
clining throughout the OECD--like steel and textiles--but
also in industries that elsewhere are fairly healthy--
motor vehicles are the most important example. Since an
unusually high percentage of industrial production and
employment is concentrated in declining firms, freeing
market forces in the United Kingdom would carry tremen-
dous short-term social and economic costs, and even the
best conceived positive adjustment policy might not suc-
ceed in making the British economy efficient and compet-
itive.
The Labor government, therefore, diverted more re-
sources than did any of the other-Big Six governments
to keep uncompetitive firms afloat. Although the
Thatcher government is committed to phasing out such
support, it seems unlikely that it could actually let
major companies like British Leyland disappear in the
absence of alternative employment--and. it is question-
able whether enough new productive jobs could be created.
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The Italian Government has made an attempt to re-
duce production costs in inefficient industries, but not
to decrease their capacity. The attempt has not been
successful even in its limited aim. The 1977 "Act for
the Coordination of Industrial Policy, and the Restruc-
turing, Conversion, and Development of the Industrial
Sector" calls for the submission of plans to cut energy,
ecological, and other production costs in the chemical,
steel, paper, and textile industries. Once approved
by the government, the plans would benefit from the var-
ious public assistance measures envisaged in the act.
Only the steel plan has been approved. Although the new
government may advance the implementation of the act, it
will probably not go beyond it and make any real effort
to shift economic activity from declining sectors.
Domestically owned declining industries are rela-
tively less important in the Canadian economy than in
those of the other Big six countries. There are conse-
quent limits on both the scope and the significance of
protective measures that the federal government has in-
troduced. The Canadian steel'industry is comparatively
healthy. The textile industry is protected by trade
barriers, but it is too small for those measures to have
much international or national political or economic im-
pact. The federal government has recently introduced a
loan guarantee program designed to hold off bankruptcies
by small and medium firms until mergers or takeovers
can be arranged; the funds involved are small--around
$20 million per year. Of the provinces, Quebec has been
most active in trying to shore up inefficient firms.
Nevertheless, both it and the other provincial and fed-
eral authorities have put greater stress on encouraging
the development of expanding sectors than on protecting
uncompetitive companies.
Support for Expansion
Generally, governmental efforts to encourage the
development of new, competitive firms are politically
acceptable in all Big Six countries. But at least two
factors limit governmental freedom in pursuing such
policies. First, they make governments vulnerable to
charges of favoritism to business. Second, and more
important, they conflict with other, more immediate de-
mands on government resources. The ultimate impact of
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such measures as support for research and development
is often difficult to predict. Most of the six govern-
ments, therefore, were initially wary of pursuing sizable
programs of this type which would divert resources from
other ends whose economic, social, or political outcome
was more predictable. In the past year or two, however,
as the governments have become more convinced of the
need for positive adjustment, most have significantly
increased their promotion of new or expanding firms and
shifts among sectors. Many of the measures used, such
as investment tax incentives, are available to all in-
dustries, but it is assumed that they will be used mainly
by more efficient, growing firms, while they help increase
the competitiveness of others.
The French and the Japanese are probably the most
active in encouraging the development of economically
promising industries. The French have instituted a
number of measures to stimulate investment. They have
introduced several new tax incentives, including exempt-
ing new firms from income or corporate taxes on profits
during their first three years of operation. New low-
interest loans are given to a variety of investment
projects. Finally, in what may be the farthest reach-
ing measure, the government has started gradually free-
ing prices.
The French Government is also overseeing and finan-
cially assisting the restructuring of several sectors
deemed to be actually or potentially profitable; motor
vehicles, data processing, and machine tools are the
most important ones. In addition, it has increased its
efforts to help establish new firms in depressed regions.
Public research and development expenditures have re-
cently risen, after several years of relative decline.
Whereas French research and development was once heavily
directed toward national defense, the current emphasis
is on short-term projects that are most likely to be
commercially successful.
Although not as far reaching as those in France,
Japan also has introduced several new tax incentives for
industrial investment, but the continuation of high Japa-
nese investment levels lessens their need. In addition,
Japan has increased loans and grants to small and medium
businesses and to firms located in depressed regions.
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Finally, it has significantly raised its expenditures on
publicly and privately conducted research and develop-
ment. In the commercial sector, most government re-
search and development funds are allocated to a few in-
dustries, such as---computers and consumer electronics,
which have been marked by the government for growth and
export potential.
Thus, the research and development system is part of
the much broader system of "administrative guidance" em-
ployed by the Ministry of International Trade and Indus-
try (MITI) to channel economic activity, which is the
major means by which the Japanese Government encourages
new production. It relies for its considerable effec-
tiveness on a number of formal and informal mechanisms,
ranging from habit, expectation, and personal networks,
through manipulation of domestic demand, to direct
funding of favored ? indus-tr-i-al-projects.
By comparison, the West German Government relies
more heavily on market forces to shift resources to ex-
panding sectors. Like most of the other Big Six govern-
ments, it has increased investment tax incentives, but
only to a limited extent. The main West German efforts
have consisted of: increased public support for indus-
trial research and development, especially in small and
medium firms; a program introduced in February 1979 to
provide long-term start-up loans to new small and medium
businesses; and greater assistance to new enterprises
in depressed regions, especially in the coal- and steel-
producing Saarland and. Palatinate.
The United Kingdom has devoted more effort to shoring
up existing industry than to encouraging new productive
activities. The Thatcher government will try to redress
that situation, at least initially, through indirect more
than direct means. The major existing investment tax in-
centives effectively eliminate corporate tax on reinvested
profits. The recently proposed reduction in personal in-
come taxes aims at encouraging increased savings and in-
vestment.
Substantial financial assistance available under
the Industry Act of 1972 was designed to increase the
international competitiveness of British firms; however,
it was used to support investment projects in traditional
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sectors more than in new or expanding ones. An exception
is the $32 million Microelectronics Support Program intro-
duced in 1978. Although it is not yet known what projects
will be affected, the Thatcher budget provides for a de-
crease in the support available under the Industry Act.
Throughout the postwar period, the percentage of GNP
devoted to industrial research and development has been
higher in the United Kingdom than in any other OECD coun-
try except the United States. Research and development
funds, however, have been heavily devoted to defense and
aerospace and have not had any obvious beneficial effect
on growth and productivity. Partly because of the disap-
pointing economic effect of expenditures for research and
development, a few years ago,the Labor government decided
to dramatically scale down its effort in this area. Later
it changed course, planning to raise relative research and
development expenditures, but to concentrate significantly
more on commercial product development and less on defense
and aerospace.
Italy is the only member of the Big Six not to have
introduced new tax incentives for investment. It has
taken a more direct route by providing sizable interest
subsidies and grants to selected investment projects.
Generally speaking, enterprises in new sectors benefit
from government assistance only if they locate in the
economically less developed southern part of the country.
The 1977 Restructuring Act explicitly states that the
creation of employment in the south has priority over
any other industrial policy objective. Although the act
concentrates on preserving declining industries, it does
include provision for development of two sectors with
significant growth potential--electronics and machine
tools.
Canada has introduced several measures designed to
encourage expanding Canadian-owned firms. New tax incen-
tives for investment include accelerated depreciation, a
5-percent credit on plant and equipment investment, and
substantial (up to 150 percent) deductions for increased
research and development expenditures. In addition,
small and medium firms benefit from deferral of capital
gains tax on reinvested profits and exemption for the cost
of new production machinery. Small and medium enterprises
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are also the chief beneficiaries of a major increase in
industrial research and development support that was de-
cided upon in 1978.
Policy Toward Labor
At the beginning of the period of slow growth, the
labor policies of most of the Big Six governments were
designed primarily to maintain income. All countries
raised unemployment compensation and most implemented job
retention schemes that would protect workers employed in
declining firms. In the past few years, a greater effort
has been made to permit and encourage workers to move
into more profitable jobs. Several problems, however,
confront policymakers as they try to devise effective
positive adjustment policies in the labor area.
The success of such policies depends on the willing-
ness of displaced workers to change occupation or resi-
dence, and on the provision of enough new employment
possibilities to absorb both the displaced workers and
the new entrants into the labor force. Although inter-
sectoral mobility has traditionally been low in Western
Europe and Japan, retraining should help to increase it.
However, it is difficult to devise industrial training
programs that will definitely prepare workers for future
jobs, since governments cannot generally predict what
sectors will expand. France and Japan are partial, but
not complete, exceptions to this rule because of their
governments' comparatively important role in determining
the direction of economic activity. Because geographi-
cal mobility-cannot be easily induced, there is a high
premium on locating new, productive industries in regions
that have been hit by restructuring. Finally, the in-
evitable time lag between labor force reduction in de-
clining sectors and job availability in expanding ones
means that there is strong pressure on governments to
continue income maintenance programs, especially unem-
ployment compensation.
In keeping with their industrial policies, West Ger-
many, Japan, Canada, and France all pursue active posi-
tive adjustment policies in the labor field. Each has
significantly expanded its retraining and job creation
efforts and has worked to improve the functioning of its
labor exchange. Japan, Canada, and France also offer
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subsidies to employers who hire unemployed workers.
Negative adjustment measures, such as subsidies for part-
time employment, are being gradually phased out.
Although the Labor government in the United Kingdom
introduced many of the same positive adjustment measures,
it continued to stress negative adjustment in its manpower
policy. Its main effort was in job maintenance, primarily
through,the Temporary Employment Subsidy (TES), granted
for a maximum of one year to employers who would otherwise
be forced to declare workers redundant. In the fall of
1978, the government announced that the TES would end in
1980; whether and how it will be replaced has not yet
been decided. The Conservative government will probably
devote fewer resources than its predecessor to negative
adjustment policies in this area, and it remains to be
seen what type of positive measures it might implement.
Italy appears to have the most limited labor adjust-
ment program of the Big Six. The government offers some
financial assistance to firms that hire young people and
has also reduced employer social security contributions
for low-wage workers; that measure benefits primarily
low-productivity sectors like textiles. While the 1977
Restructuring Act provides for assisting the relocation
of workers displaced by restructuring, it does not spell
out how that will be accomplished.
Outlook
The recent record of most of the Big Six countries
in introducing positive adjustment measures has been quite
good--the United Kingdom and Italy have been two exceptions.
None of the policies have been in effect long enough or
on a large enough scale, however, to provide a firm basis
for judging their long-term viability.
At this stage, West Germany, Japan, and Canada. in
about that order, seem to have the best chance of con-
tinuing and deepening their positive adjustment policies.
The political and economic environment is especially
favorable in Japan and West Germany. France is more
questionable, since the government is under severe pres-
sure from both the political left and right to return to
more traditional forms of government intervention.
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The outlook for Italy remains basically negative.
The new British Government has already announced a major
change in approach, but in practice the economic and so-
cial barriers to positive adjustment will probably allow
only a gradual shift in policy.
The four governments that have embarked on the posi-
tive adjustment process have passed only the first and
easiest stage in that process. They have decided to
phase out inefficient production, but they have not yet
had to pay most of the political and economic costs of
doing so. Relatively few workers have been displaced,
and many of those are still enjoying the benefits of
their severance pay.
As more jobs are lost, the governments will have to
rapidly accelerate their efforts to retrain workers,
create jobs in expanding sectors, and devise adequate
welfare systems for the permanently unemployed. This
will cost money and require sacrifices from the employed
population that it will not readily make and could also
create unacceptable inflationary pressures, unless growth
accelerates enough to generate sufficient government
revenues.
If the governments indeed take the risk of implement-
ing a more fully developed positive adjustment program,
growth will have to pick up and inflation slow down during
the implementation period for the program to remain po-
litically, economically, and socially acceptable. Posi-
tive adjustment policies can do something to encourage
the needed increase in industrial investment. Broader
factors, however, will probably be more important in
determining investor decisions--price and exchange rate
stability, energy supply and cost, and prospects for
national and international expansion. Those factors ex-
tend well beyond the reach of positive adjustment policy
and are only partially subject to government control and
influence.
The prospects for OECD-wide action in positive ad-
justment are limited to joint discussion and technical,
relatively apolitical projects like r'search and develop-
ment devoted to reducing production cos`.s. All govern-
ments are determined to retain national control of the
positive adjustment process, in part because of the eco-
nomic, political, and social uncertainties surrounding
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that process. Governments want the freedom to shift
policies as they see fit. Perhaps more important, the
social and economic measures associated with positive
adjustment lie at the core of national sovereignty, of
a government's rights and responsibilities relative to
its citizens. Finally, the expanding sectors which posi-
tive adjustment is designed to promote are the very ones
in which the OECD countries are actually or potentially
most directly competitive with one another.
Prospects are better for joint action among members
of the European Community. Chances are only slight, how-
ever, for a.common EC positive adjustment policy that
would cover several industries. Recent efforts by EC
Commissioner Etienne Davignon to devise an overall Com-
munity textile policy failed dismally. He was more suc-
cessful in winning acceptance by member countries of
a plan for the steel industry. The "Davignon Plan,"
however, is only in its first stage, involving agreements
on trade and price levels. The second stage--restruc-
turing--will touch national sensitivities much more and
will be correspondingly more difficult to implement.
The second stage of the Davignon Plan will be particularly
complicated by the fact that national governments are
already devising and executing their own steel restruc-
turing plans, often with little prior consultation with
the EC Commission.
In the case of France, at least, national sensitivi-
ties in regard to positive adjustment extend to an un-
willingness even to discuss specific national policies
within the OECD. Part of the reason undoubtedly lies in
traditional French reserve toward international organiza-
tions, especially those that group the advanced industrial
countries. A more important reason, however, probably is
that France is under such domestic attack for its policies
that it cannot risk their being criticized within the OECD,
or, conversely, letting itself open to the charge at home
that its policies were being dictated by the other OECD
members.
Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made
within the OECD in discussing structural adjustment as
a problem common to all members, and, in many cases, of
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informally discussing the specific policies pursued by
individual states. Although there is little chance for
joint action, the fact of common consideration of the
issues does at least allow the possibility of some de
facto policy coordination and cooperation.
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Ethnic Minority Claims As A Human Rights Issue
The increasingly assertive political demands of
ethnic minority groups against their national govern-
ments raise particularly nettlesome human rights issues
not only for state-dominated organizations such as the
UN, but also for nongovernmental organizations such as
Amnesty International (Al). This is especially the
case when the claims and governmental reactions to
them spawn violence and international publicity. The
UN largely ducks the issue of ethnic minority claims
and rights, reflecting both the sensitivities of mem-
ber governments and institutional concerns about en-
couragement of still greater violence and of the re-
gional and international consequences of possible
fracturing of countries. AI, the largest and most
prestigious nongovernmental human rights organization,
has paid only grudging attention to ethnic minority
problems. Al tends to emphasize individual as opposed
to group rights, to see some contradiction between the
two, and to regard the use of violence by minorities
as undercutting their case for greater self-determina-
tion. The response of the United States to minority
group claims is complicated by concerns similar to
those of both the UN and AI, as well as by evidence
that foreign governments tend to react even more nega-
tively to criticism of their performance regarding
ethnic groups than regarding individuals.
Yet, ethnic minority problems seem almost certain
to grow worse--attended by greater violence, more pub-
licity, and perhaps more difficult choices for the
United States. This message is strongly if implicitly
reflected in the work of an international organization
called the Minority Rights Group (MRG) that operates
on the premise that national and international atten-
tion to the demands of ethnic minorities is much more
likely, in the words of an MRG report, to "seed disas-
ters" than are significant concessions to greater
self-determination.
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This article represents a first attempt to define
the character, dimensions, and implication of ethnic
minority claims as a human rights issue. The author
will be addressing this and other aspects of ethnic
divisions and tensions in subsequent articles and
would welcome critical comments.
The Growing Problem
The potential of ethnic minorities to provoke (or
at least to be involved in). political turbulence is con-
siderable, in view of their size, distribution, and re-
cent history. According to available data, of some 90
minority groups outside the United States each numbers
at least one million people and together total nearly
700 million. While most states have a dominant ethnic
group forming 50 to 90 percent of the population, barely
a dozen can be described as ethnically homogenous and
in only twice that number does the largest ethnic group
comprise more than 90 percent of the population. In
nearly 40 states, the largest ethnic group accounts for
less than half of the state's population. Within the
past 30 years, 25 minority groups have warred against
their governments, and the level of violence and po-
tentially disruptive political tensions involving ethnic
minority claims appear to be on the increase. Several
possibly volatile instances flow from the Islamic Re-
vival. It should be a matter of concern to many govern-
ments that 30 ethnic minority groups, comprising some
200 million people, are Muslims living in either sec-
ular or non-Islamic states.*
Among the numerous factors stimulating worldwide
impulses toward minority self-determination over the past
decade, two general ones are worth noting. First, it has
become clear with regard to the less developed states that
the transfer of sovereignty from a colonial regime to an
See chart for a list of selected significant ethnic minorities
outside the United States. Religious minorities are included only
if they have a widely recognized ethnic identity as well, and if
their ethnic identity is the primary basis for distinguishing them
from other groups. Thus, Palestinians, Tamils, and Kurds are in-
cluded; Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and Muslim sects as such are
not.
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independent one has been more than a mere shift of power
from alien hands to native ones. In most states it
gradually transforms the whole pattern of political life.
Whereas the colonial governments stood outside the socie-
ties they ruled, and acted upon them arbitrarily, the gov-
ernments of new states, even authoritarian ones, have
usually sought to be popular and attentive because they
are, after all, located in the midst of the societies they
rule. over time, they have acted upon-those societies
in a progressively more continuous, comprehensive, and
purposeful manner, and have increased their political
consciousness. The members. of such societies, however,
have tended to behave politically not only as individuals
but as groups. Some of these groups are ethnic or reli-
gious minorities that were cleaved by the original state
boundaries, or incorporated with traditional rivals.
As the self-identity of such groups within the state
has become more pronounced, the sense of being politically
suffocated by the dominant ethnic group has increased.
Government interference that was bearable during periods of
repression by the colonial regime gradually becomes in-
tolerable after independence has been achieved.
The second factor operates in states with a relatively
high level of development, where central governments in-
creasingly intervene in local affairs and are thus held
responsible even for problems which they have only a
limited capacity to solve. This results in a backlash
of demands for decentralization from regional ethnic groups
who not only can marshal evidence of discrimination in the
distribution of benefits but also fear the loss of their
own identity.
As ethnic minority claims have been pressed more
broadly and frequently, parties more disinterested than
the targeted governments have begun to consider the merits
of these claims in general terms, that is, as a human rights
issue.
The more the UN has focused on the issue the more it
has qualified its earlier endorsements of self-determina-
tion. For example, two UN covenants issued in 1966 posi-
ted that "all peoples" were entitled to self-determina-
tion, by which they were entitled to "freely determine
their political status" and pursue their economic, social,
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and cultural development. The majority of UN delegations
made clear, however, that this wording was intended to
apply only to the liberation of colonial peoples and ter-
ritories. Four years later, both the UN Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the UN Declaration on Friendly
Relations not only excluded secession as an option for
"ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities" but also
implicitly denied their right to any political change,
for example, to new federal arrangements. Since the
mid-1970s, when the UN Economic and Social Council's
(ECOSOC) Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities began to focus on the
human rights aspects of its agenda, considerable atten-
tion has been given to those cases where ethnic differ-
entiation seems to thwart "legitimate" human rights
aspirations. Thus, the South African Government has been
accused in UN forums of making artificial ethnic distinc-
tions in order to divide the black majority and thereby
perpetuate white rule. UN treatment of human rights in
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia has been along the same lines.
The UN position on ethnic self-determination has be-
come less supportive and more critical in recent years.
This position ultimately reflects the consensus of its
member states who are willing to endorse self-determina-
tion selectively, that is, with regard to "pariahs"
such as South Africa and then only in terms of replacing
minority with majority rule. They fear the application
of the principle to their own territories, and the UN has
at least informally embodied this concern as a ground rule
for discussion of the subject. These factors become
clearer when measured against the views of nongovernmental
organizations which are not obliged, when considering
ethnic minorities, to protect the interests of a particu-
lar state or group of states.
Amnesty International and the Minority Rights Group,
each based in London, and each possessing consultative
status with the UN ECOSOC since the mid-1970s, are the two
main organizations that fit into this category.
The Role of Amnesty International
Amnesty International's endorsement of minority
rights has been cautious and selective. Its basic
statute pledges to defend those deprived of human rights
because of their "ethnic origin" or "religious beliefs,"
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among other reasons. There are more minorities mentioned
in AZ's Annual Report for 1978 than in previous editions,
perhaps indicating increased AI concern on this score.
It is AI's policy, however, not to endorse separatist
demands and to withhold support from individuals who
have used or even advocated violence for any reason.
This makes many ethnic organizations permanently in-
eligible for AI support. Except for the Basques and
Catalans in Spain, AI refuses to support demands of
minorities for increased political autonomy. Even in the
case of the Basques and Catalans, AI commends the Spanish
Government for offering autonomy rather than the minorities
for seeking it.
In presenting the cases for the Tamil in"Sri Lanka and
the Kurds in the Middle East, Al does not fault the respec-
tive governments for resisting demands for autonomy or even
meting out some punishment to the autonomists. AI's criti-
cism is that those governments have resorted to methods
which the organization condemns under any circumstances,
whether or not ethnic demands are involved---notably the
death penalty, torture, detention without trial, and
trial without jury.
Moreover, where ethnic issues are considered, AI's
judgment on behalf of persecuted minorities is at times
remarkably lacking in vigor. For example, in commenting
on the massacre of up to 1,400 Comorian migrants in
Madagascar in December 1976 followed by the hasty repatria-
tion of 60,000 Comorians, AI simply notes that "human
rights were severely infringed for a time."
In an increasing number of recent cases, however, AI
describes the predicament of minorities in a way suggesting
that they need protection as groups rather than as indivi-
duals. For example:
-- Albania is scored for singling out Turkish,
Greek, and Montenegrin minorities for im-
prisonment.
-- Romania is accused of attempting forcible assimi-
lation of the Hungarian minority and of perse-
cuting ethnic Germans for seeking to emigrate
to West Germany (emigration in this instance
being a form of self-determination).
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-- Within the USSR, Al singles out the Lithuanians
and Ukrainians as groups liable to reprisals
for expressing national sentiments and Germans
imprisoned for trying to emigrate. Other nation-
alities are mentioned mainly in identifying in-
dividuals associated with more general human
rights activities (for example, dissidents
monitoring the Helsinki Accords).
-- AI alleges that judicial discrimination is ap-
plied by central governments against such
minorities as Tuaregs in Mali, Lunda in Zaire,
and Muslims in Burma (in the case of Burma, AI
omits mention of Shan, Karens, and Katchins).
--AI reports that Indians in Colombia and Guatemala
are particularly liable to be cheated out of land
ownership.
-- Considerable weight is accorded the proposition
that American Indians particularly are subject
to criminal prosecution because of their ethnic
origin. AI describes this as currently the main
human rights problem within the United States.
Blacks in the United States are given less at-
tention in this regard than Indians.
Al probably will identify other ethnic minorities
sympathetically in the near future and is likely to ex-
pand somewhat the discussion of each case. The rights of
ethnic minorities, however, are not likely to become as
fundamental a concern for the organization as its other
human rights interests. Of the 70 or so international
news releases AI publishes annually, 10 percent, at most,
have a marked ethnic dimension.
The Minority Rights Group
Less than a decade in existence, with no formal member-
ship and only a small staff and budget, MRG's prestige',
though not nearly as great as AI's, continues to grow. Its
present director, Ben Whitaker, became the senior British
member of the UN Human Rights commission in 1975. At about
the same time both Al and MRG were given consultative status
with UN ECOSOC. MRG's sponsors and council include past
and present British Members of Parliament, Swedish so-
cialist Gunnar Myrdal, Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas,
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and veteran human rights activists from Ireland (Sean
McBride, one of the founders of AI) and India (Jayaprakash
Narayan). It has produced 40 well-researched monographs
on various minority groups; its material is circulated
in more than 100 countries and has been cited in most
major newspapers in the West and the Third World.
MRG prefers not to acknowledge that its general
approach to the problem of ethnic minorities differs
significantly from that of recent UN discussions or the
bulk of AI publicity on human rights, but the differences
nevertheless exist. As its name implies, MRG operates
on the premise that minority problems in themselves are
among the gravest and most widespread in the world today.
It quotes with approval Gandhi's dictum that "civiliza-
tion is to be judged by the treatment that is shown to
minorities." MRG characterizes the problems of minorities
as "violations of human rights," and sets forth its goal
of increasing "international understanding" of these
problems in order to promote "the growth of a world con-
science regarding human rights."
In nearly all of its published monographs, MRG
presents certain general propositions about ethnic mi-
norities that most UN spokesmen on human rights and many
AI activists would dispute. First, MRG tends to regard
ethnic minorities as impervious to assimilation. In the
MRG's view, this is because they almost always do not wish
to be assimilated, but when they do, sometimes their efforts
are rejected by other ethnic groups within a given country
(for example, India). Secondly, ethnic minorities are as
eager to assert their self-identity in developed as in less
developed countries. Moreover, as MRG appraises the ulti-
mate goals of most ethnic minorities, peaceful outcomes
more often than not will require political rearrangements:
either a considerable increase of autonomy; or, as implied
in MRG's exposition of the Kurdish case, a redrawing of
existing state boundaries to establish a new state. The
MRG contends that cultural and economic concessions in most
cases would not ultimately solve the problem, and in others
would only stimulate political demands. Finally, in human
rights terms, nearly all minority claims for self-determina-
tion are justified in MRG's view, and the political authori-
ties are therefore at fault for resisting these claims and
are mainly to blame for whatever violence occurs. On this
point in particular the MRG differs with the present con-
sensus in the UN and with Al.
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So strongly does MRG press this view that the three
clear exceptions, involving Asians in sub-Saharan Africa,
seem all the more striking. In these exceptions MRG ex-
horts the Asians to resist their (unfortunate) "predilec-
tions for communal exclusiveness"; to be "seen to be
participating in the liberation struggle" as the "only
way by which they can safeguard their future"; and, over
the long term, to strive "to disintegrate as a distinct
racial minority."
Implications
over the next several years the subject of ethnic
minorities is likely to earn wider attention and call for
more definite policy choices. The increased demands for
ethnic self-determination may force the UN to reconsider
its position on minority rights as a human rights issue.
As a rule, however, the peaceful resolution of minority
demands through UN mediation is not to be expected.
The fact that the UN and central governments are be-
coming more aware of minority group claims does not imply
that, either singly or collectively, they are likely to em-
brace these claims as worthy human rights issues. Many
governments are likely to become more repressive than they
have been in this regard. Governments not willing to make
political accommodations (for example, federalism, devolu-
tion) to ethnic minority demands are left with few options
other than repression.
Governmental concessions to minority demands at the
expense of majority groups may excite new tensions among
both minority and majority groups. Governments of states
with more than one ethnic croup will be afraid of setting
precedents. For example, if the Spanish Government con-
cedes to Basque demands, can it do less for the Catalans?*
Can the French Government ignore the Corsicans while
placating the Bretons? If the Kurds gain autonomy in
Iran, can other minorities there be made to settle for
less?
* MRG quotes a Spanish official as warning: "Give the Basques
an inch and the Catalans would take several miles."
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Governments attempting to accommodate ethnic demands
will also have to face the problem of large minorities
within minorities, such as the non-Basque population of
the Basque provinces.
Moreover, in some states where minorities are rela-
tively small, governments may seek "final" solutions. One
factor underlying the current plight of refugees worldwide
is the desire of some governments to preserve or enhance
internal ethnic homogeneity as an essential element of po-
litical stability. The Vietnamese and Cambodian regimes
are thus "encouraging" ethnic Chinese to leave, and other
Southeast Asian governments with ethnic Chinese minorities
of their own resist accepting them.
The rise of ethnicity and of international attention
to it may have some aspects that governments would con-
sider benign. Contrary to the general contention of the
MRG presentations, not all ethnic groups insist on major
political rearrangements. The Welsh and Scots, for ex-
ample, having fully and publicly discussed the issues
affecting their ethnic identity, seem to have decided
that their present political configuration within the
United Kingdom is satisfactory. These cases may, how-
ever, be the exception.
For US human rights policy, which is based essentially
on regard for individual rather than group rights, the de-
mands of ethnic minorities are likely to pose further com-
plications. As conflicts between minorities and their
respective central governments become more frequent, and
both sides use violence--or otherwise commit human rights
violations--to solve their differences, the issues of
the validity of ethnic demands will be difficult to
ignore. Other governments will be far more resentful of
US efforts to judge their performance in this category of
human rights than they are of US attention to individuals
who do not pose the same threat as ethnic groups to the
integrity of the state's territory. One likely response
of these states to such US judgments will be an attempt
to focus much greater international attention than has
been given to date to the status of ethnic minorities in
the United States.
29 June 1979
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Name
Number
Percent of
Total
Population
Country
Degree
of Self-
Determination
Comment
Achehnese
2 million
1
Indonesia
high
Armed separatist movement.
Arabs
1.5 million
30
Chad
high
Involved in civil war.
Armenians
2 million
less than 1
USSR
high
AI/MRG reporting?
Assamese
10 million
1.5
India
medium
No strong sense of being
oppressed.
Aymara
1 million
20
Bolivia
medium
Minority Rights Group reporting-
Azerbaijani
4 million
5 million
1.5
14
USSR
Iran
medium
high
Trying to protect their language;
Recent friction with Kurds.
Baluchi
2 million
1
Pakistan, India
high
Separatist movement, not well
armed.
Bamileke
1.5 million
22
Cameroon
medium
Not likely to be troublesome in
near term.
Bantu
14 million
69.9
South Africa
medium
AI/MRG reporting.
Bashkir
I million
less than 1
USSR
low
Quiet, but resisting assimilation.
Basques
3 million +
9
Spain
high
Armed separatist
movement/terrorism.
Batak
2.5 million
1.9
Indonesia
medium
Divided along religious lines.
Berbers
5 million
5 million
28
28
Algeria
Morocco
low
low
Tribal rather than ethnic
loyalties-
Tribal rather than ethnic
loyalties.
Biharis
2 million +
2.6
Bangladesh
medium
MRG reporting.
Bosnian Muslims
I million
4.5
Yugoslavia
medium
Relatively protected by central
government vis-a-vis other ethnic
groups.
Bretons
I million
1.9
France
high
Armed separatist
movement/terrorism.
Buginese
3 million
2.2
Indonesia
low
Very little information at present-
Burakumin
2 million
1.8
Japan
high
MRG reporting.
Byelo-Russians
7 million
3
USSR
low
Apparently not resisting assimila-
tion with Russians.
Catalans
5 million
14
Spain
high
AI/MRG reporting.
Ethnic Chinese
3.3 million
2.8 million
26
2
Malaysia
Indonesia
high
high
AI/MRG reporting.
MRG reporting.
Chuang
8 million
less than I
PRC
low
Post-Mao regime less aggressive
in promoting assimilation.
Croats
4.5 million
23
Yugoslavia
high
AI/MRG reporting; some
terrorism.
Edo
3 million
4.5
Nigeria
medium
Fear being drawn into conflict
between larger ethnic groups.
Eritreans
1.5 million
5.8
Ethiopia
high
Armed separatist movement;
Al/MRG reporting.
Retain feelings of cultural superi-
ority to Russians, but violence
unlikely.
Ganda
2 million
16
Uganda
high
Status should improve under post-
Amin regime.
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Selected Ethnic Minorities' (Continued)
Percent of Country
Total
Population
Georgians
3 million
1.2 USSR
Guierati
__ uW India
India
Hungarians
1.7 million
8
Ibibio
3.5 million
5.2
Kannada
25 million
4
India
Kanuri
4 million
6
Nigeria
Karens
3 million
9.4
Burma
Kazakh
4.5 million
2
USSR
12
Angola
2 million
2 million
3 million
18.3
Iraq
1.5 million
less than I
USSR
Lithuanians
2.5 million
less than l
USSR
Luo
I million
7
Kenya
Makassarese
2 million
1.5
Indonesia
Mayans
3 million
41
Guatemala
I million
37
Degree
of Self-
Determination
medium
AI/MRG reporting.
high
Recent communal tensions.
low
MRG reporting; aspire to escape
"untouchable" stigma.
high
-.
-.~Y.._.~.
..~.
Resisting assimilation.
high
_
AI/MRG reporting.
Fear being drawn into conflict
with larger ethnic groups.
Recent secessionist movement;
unless integrated, will remain
threat for disunity of Nigeria.
Very little outside attention to
date-
medium
Strong sense of past glory.
high
Armed separatist movement.
medium
May be influenced by Islamic
Revival-
May be influenced by Islamic
Revival.
high
Most politically conscious group
in Zaire aside from Shabans; a
key threat to Mobutu.
Separatist movement (FNLA).
high
high
Separatist movement; AI/MRG
reporting.
Separatist movement; AI/MRG
reporting.
Separatist movement; AI/MRG
reporting.
high
Quiescent.
high
Al reporting.
medium
Vocal and oppressed.
low
Very little information on
attitudes.
-
No strong sense of being
oppressed.
No strong sense of being
oppressed.
Potential for trouble based on
size.
Government is emphasizing
ethnic heritage of even this small
group.
Some antipathy to central
government.
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Selected Ethnic Minorities I (Continued)
Name Number Percent of Country Degree Comment
Total of Self-
Population Determination
Minangkabu 5 million 3.6 Indonesia high Highly individualistic/ resent out-
side control.
Moluccans 1 million less than 1 Indonesia high Terrorist movement in
Netherlands.
Montagnards 1 million 2 Vietnam high MRG reporting.
Nilotics 4 million 21 Sudan medium AI/MRG reporting.
Nkole 1 million 8 Uganda low New regime may improve status.
Nupe 1 million 1.5 Nigeria medium Try to avoid entanglements with
larger ethnic groups.
Oriyan 20 million 3 India medium Not likely to cause problems in
near future.
Ovimbundo 2.3 million 36 Angola high Armed separatist movement. _
Palestinians I million 32 Israel high Terrorism AI/MRG reporting.
1 million 33 Jordan high Terrorism AI/MRG reporting.
250,000 10 Lebanon high Terrorism AI/MRG reporting.
150,000 2 Syria high Terrorism AI/MRG reporting.
Pampangans 1.5 million 4.4 Philippines medium Very little information on their
attitudes.
Papuans 1 million less than 1 Indonesia high Armed separatist movement.
Punjabi 17 million 2.7 India low Sense of group superiority.
Quebecois 5 million 22 Canada high Separatist movement; Al
reporting.
Quechua 6 million 21 Peru, Bolivia, low AI/MRG reporting.
Ecuador
Scots 5 million 9 United Kingdom high Rejected offer for more home
rule.
Shan 1.5 million 6 Burma high Armed separatist movement.
Sidamo 2.5 million 9 Ethiopia low v MRG reporting-
9 million 14 Pakistan medium May cause problems for central
Sindhis
government.
Slovaks 4.5 million 30 Czechoslovakia high Greater hostility toward central
government than toward Czechs.
Slovenes 2 million 8.2 Yugoslavia high Al reporting.
Soga 1 million 8 Uganda low New regime may improve group
status.
Sundanese 16 million 14 Indonesia medium Group size may pose problem over
long term.
Tamil 40 million 6.1 India high Some communal tensions, stimu-
lated to some degree by situation
in Sri Lanka.
2.5 million 21 Sri Lanka high Communal tension AI/MRG
reporting.
4 million 1.6 USSR medium MRG reporting.
50 million 7.7 India high Very little outside information to
date.
New regime may improve group
status.
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Selected Ethnic Minorities' (Continued)
Name Number Percent of
Total
Population
Tibetans 3 million less than 1
2 million less than 1
Tigrinya 3 million 10
Timorese 2 million I.6
Tiv 8 million 12
Turkmen 1-5 million less than 1
Uighur 4 million less than 1
Ukrainians 35-40 million 16
Ulster Irish 1 million 2
Uzbek 9 million 3.5
1 million 9
Visayans 10 million 22
Welsh 2.5 million 5
Country
Degree
of Self-
Determination
Comment
PRC
India, Pakistan,
Nepal
high
high
May cause problems in near
future.
Potential for renewed violence
against PRC.
Ethiopia
high
Separatist movement; AI/MRG
reporting-
Indonesia
medium
Separatist movement.
Nigeria
medium
Some involvement in Biafran civil
war.
USSR
medium
Nomadism causes problems for
government.
USSR
medium
Group divided between PRC &
USSR_
USSR
high
Al reporting.
United Kingdom
high
Terrorism AI/MRG reporting.
USSR
Afghanistan
high
high
Muslim group experiencing popu-
lation growth; probably most
assertive ethnic group in Central
Asia.
Involved in current revolt.
Philippines
low
Fear loss of language.
United Kingdom
high
Rejected offer of more home rule.
'Includes groups over I million which are not the dominant ethnic
group in their country. Does not include religious groups per se.
Thus, Palestinians, Tamils, and Kurds are included; Protestants,
Catholics, Jews, and Muslim sects as such are not.
2 Al (Amnesty International); MRG (Minority Rights Group)
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