SOVIET, CHINESE, FREE WORLD REACTIONS TO A US ATTEMPT TO DENY SEA ACCESS TO NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000300160001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 6, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For;Relea RDPB?SD.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
6 May 1972
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: SOVIET, CHIIIESE, FREE WORLD REACTIONS TO A US ATTEMPT
ETNAM
TO DENY SEA ACCESS TO NORTH VI
that the US might take i'an
ure
Assumption: The meas
N rth Vietnam could include
t
o 0
attempt to deny sea-borne imports
(a) mining the approaches to ports; (b) bombing-of ports to destroy.;
) naval blockade.
(
c
unloading and storage facilities;
1. These measures vary in the sharpness of confrontation,`
which might result. The reactions of the various parties would 1so
they would produce and therefore in the degree of tension and'a~#sk
vary accordingly.
2. For the Soviets and Chinese, the key questions_ .pose'WOuTd'
be the following:
(a) Would Hanoi's capacity to carry on its war effort
be significantly reduced?
(b) Would the US actions be sustained for a considerabi
d? t, a
i
o
per
(c) Would these portend other US escalatory steps'
GROUP 1
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(d) Would the countermeasures which might be .envisioPed.,
carry tolerable risks and be,sufficient.,to.upho1d the
prestige of the Communist powers?
3. It is conceivable, but we judge extremely un keiy that':{
Moscow and Peking or one of them would respond to the.US show,
determination by-moving to place Hanoi under genuine pressur tiff
reach a compromise settlement. While neither of the Communist grey
powers has a vital interest in the success of Hanoi's campaig
South Vietnam, they almost certainly could not agree on this cours'
each would fear to act unilaterally because of reactions anticipated
other Communist states and parties. Moreover, neither would wfi~s{h}
because ofconcern for its own standing as a great powerA
of yielding obviously under US pressure.
4. Thus we believe that Moscow and Peking wouldresortd lrritiai:ly
by joint measures to increase supplies to Hanoi via China
The capacity of the land routes from-China into North Vietriam;i
to supply Hanoi's needs over an indefinite period, and we have_
that the Soviets and Chinese could agree to cooperate in carrying,out
supply by these routes if they judged that necessary to sustain Hanoi
Finally, the ability to keep Hanoi going by land supply ,w?u1d giv+ T`Y
to consider other measures, and the broader costs and risks'which & hti'
emerge more clearly as the crisis developed.
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costs to Soviet-American relations generally.
Nevertheless they would consider that their standing as a great power
been directly challenged and would want to act to uphold their
On the political level, Moscow would feel that it had no
fce"but to react sharply. The machinery of propaganda-would be
he'Soviets would be primarily concerned to contain the crisis,
Having; decided on these measures to continue support for
with high intensity in order to maximize the pressure of
m ,441th%
#d domestic US opinion against the US administration. Unless
LS desisted. and the crisis seemed on the way to resolution within
lew days or so.,;the effect would be to make the May Summit impossible.
T a Soviets would. almost certainly move to cancel it. This step might
delred somewhat if the US measures were limited to mining, which
and to detente in Europe -- would be severe. But we believe
Sov ei"American relations generally -- to the SALT agreement, to trade
Tess direct challenge to the USSR, but would come in
if the.US persisted.
=: The' Soviets would be aware that the damage to the climate of
1#p
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that tie Kremlin consensus would come down on the side of paying this
than seeming to bow under US pressure. In doing so, there
probably be the intention to return to present lines of policy
orard the US as soon as circumstances permitted.
ThereIwould remain the question of what specific steps the USSR
should take.tocounter the US moves. While considering these, the Soviets
r u d. robably order their ships out of North Vietnamese waters. If the
li ited, tself to mining North Vietnam's sea approaches, the Soviets
:old probably give Hanoi technical assistance in sweeping operations.
bombing attacks on ports they would reply with additional measures
ren9then Noi~th Vietnam's air defenses, but would probably not take
JAK
yrrt?mea,sures such as sending Soviet aircraft and crews. (Sinking of
, W
i.et ships fluting such attacks would obviously place the Soviets under
r t pressgre to'react more sharply.) A blockade would pose a more
,r cha3lenge than bombing or mining. We believe that the Soviets
,udge,that the risks of an attempt to defy a blockade would be
o,' eat, and would avoid doing so. Before the world, they would
virtue of their restraint and point'to their continuing support
Hanoi ;:in other ways.
Throughout, the Soviets would be concerned to show an
oats response in. support of North Vietnam and in defense of their
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Ap
They would be equally concerned to keep the crisis
under control and to limit its damage to their wider interests, but would
nd.thi increasingly difficult if the crisis was prolonged. They
heavily on mounting pressures on the US administration at
pzne:,And abroad to deter further escalation and to force Washington to
des#t"eventually. And they would be prepared at a suitable moment to
*.ponsora new formula for resumption of negotiations, though still not
terms which Hanoi would judge prejudicial to its interests.
Peking would see the US move as more directly challenging,
o the USSR than to China. Indeed, for the Chinese, the situation
Would hold some promise of political gain as Soviet-US relations
a
l :
came under heavy strain, and as the prospective shift to land routes
emphasized China's status as "the great rear area of the Indochinese
But the Chinese would have to do more than contemplate
their:pot.ential gains. They would feel. compelled to demonstrate to
and to the world -- their continued devotion to the North
' tnamese cause and their outrage at US actions. This could probably
eaccomplished primarily by words and diplomatic gestures. China
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 ~r+o#;?F~br:eese '1'999/d W TV T01719R000300160001-4
,Wouidnot necessarily have to take the sort of action that might
.oyslyriskfuture progress in the rapprochement with Washington.
would certainly cooperate fully with North Vietnamese and
Elviet efforts, to redirect shipments -- including
probabl
,
y,
ermltt,jng the use of South China ports for offloading Soviet vessels.
Inherent in the proposed US action, nonetheless, would be
t e4rea1 problems for the Chinese. Like Moscow and Hanoi, Peking
-9v4 probably foresee the possibility of further US action against
North Vjetnemese supply lines if the attempt to deny sea access failed
ochieve important US purposes within a few weeks or months. Thus,
n:Cina must thin~ ahead to a time when US bombing might focus on Hanoi's
Ond- road links to China. Such action, while not posing any direct
iallenge'to,China (so long as the bombs rln not fall on Chinese mill
:would bring'Peking's role in the war into greater prominence and raise
itself, Premier Chou En-lai's policies?vis-a -vis the US might
beo"e the subject of high-level debate with Chou -- who asserts that
flight well decide to act sooner rather than later to demonstrate his
US is on-.,the way out of Asia -- on the defensive. In prudence,
r; i3
ispleasure with the US.
sgs.2n 1966-1968 -- to assist North Vietnan's logistic effort.
'' engineer, construction, and AAA units into the Tonkin region
hd.prvblem would be exacerbated if Peking felt compelled to deplou
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Whatever the strength of China's desires to limit the conflict
. FK.
Indochina, we see no evidence that Peking is prepared to undermine
anoi.'s basic capacities or to pressure the North Vietnamese in the
~d#1^ection of major concessions. We doubt that the proposed US action
;could_alter:.Peking's posture in this respect.
the 0-move was an ill-advised escalation of a struggle which
14. Predominant reaction in the non-Communist world would be
ha cerise to be worth additional costs and risks. In Western Europe
sentiment would no doubt be louder and clearer in the
;pubilc media and among articulate citizen groups than in official
circles. 1But most of these governments, though quite aware of the
NprthV.ietnamese provocation and sympathetic to the US in the dilemma
fear that the US was embarking on a course of questionable
outcome in which the political price and dangers outweighed the possible
reaction would be more pronounced, than would have been
the case two or three years'ago because time has raised hopes -- among
i1Sriends and others alike --that the US was on the way to extricating
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This kind of response would not be confined to those
governments which are on record with disapproval or
isbelief'in the US war effort in Vietnam; it would also be
reflected, in.the attitudes of those who have been most sympathetic
have hoped or believed that through gradual withdrawal and the
Yletnalnization approach, the US had found a tolerable prospect for
nding Its role in the war. Our friends would be particularly con-
the move presaged a period of high tensions between the
super-;powers, one.which promised, at worst great danger, and at
best great uncertainties -- e.g., an end to the Sino-US detente,
to the'p.rospect of a SALT agreement, developments approved by
X91
most US allies. So far as distinctions can be made in this respect,
tthe West'European allies would be most apprehensive about adverse
ffects..,on US-Soviet relations; Japan about the effects on China and
the latter's policy toward both the US and Japan.
16.. Certain lesser US allies in Asia would react differently
an those ,3ust discussed. Thailand and South Korea, for example,
(being involved in the war and still having hopes of some kind of
,tisfactory?outcome, would probably find the US move an appropriate
response to North Vietnam's invasion and would hope that it proved
'effective. If it did not, they would probably favor even more drastic
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fromindica?tions of US readiness to act forcefully in Asia; on the
prehensive ambivalence: on the one hand, they would derive comfort
lie su"eS.. Sut even these "pro" responses would be tempered by some
mindful of the history of the war and of US domestic war
they would fear that if this US effort failed to achieve
!esults, the eventual upshot would be greater American disillusionment
readiness to cut commitments in Asia -- including commitments to
themselves.
It can be argued that certain other non-Communist states
Wha look to the US would be heartened by this demonstration of
And it is possible that, for example, Israel or Pakistan
tnight'derive,a certain comfort of this sort. On the whole, however,
such reactions would probably be quite transitory, unless the operation
'prd.ved dramatically successful. And in the meantime, local adversaries
of such'states (e.g., Egypt and India) would be more disposed to re-
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in,re further with the Soviets.