POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 24, 1946
• Content Type: MEMO

 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CONFIDENTIAL
2L April 1946
COPY NO. 30
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL
FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946 charges the
National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central.
Intelligence with responsibility for fully protecting intelli-
gence sources and methods in connection with their activities.
2. The Central Intelligence Group should establish standards
and requirements with regard to clearance of personnel for
duties with the C.I.G. to assure the highest degree of security
to its operations.
3. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure
by which the necessary directive can be published and carried
out by unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, without action by the
National Intelligence Authority.
4. Enclosed is a draft directive, making necessary provisions
for establishing uniform clearance standards and procedures.
If all members of the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the
draft without substantial change, a meeting will not be neces-
sary. It is recommended that the directive be approved, and
that each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board arrange for
necessary implementation by his department.
SIDNEY W. SOUERS,
Director.
CON10 DENTIAL
C1G - 1 -
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CONFIDENTIAL
E NC L3 1J E
D R A F T
PROPOSED C.I.G. DIRECTIVE
POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
1. The President's letter of 22 January 1916, referring to
functions of the National Intelligence Authority and the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, stated: "In the conduct of their
acti viti,es the National Intelligence Authority and the Director
of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protect-
ing intolligoncc ,sources and methods."
2. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group require
constant handling of classified matter whose unauthorized dis-
closure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation.
It is imperative that the highest degree of security be main-
tained to prevent either unauthorized disclosures of classified
matter of any activity which would impede or impair the objec-
tives sought to be accomplished by the National Intelligence
Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. The accomplishment of the security objective requires that
personnel assigned to the Central Intelligence Group be
Individuals:
a. of excellent character who are native-born citizens of
the United States and who have no member of the immediate
family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power;
b. whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthi-
ness are unquestioned;'
c. whose financial status and habits are such as to render
unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from
these sources.
CONFIDENTIAL
Apo lease 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100 40008-2
Enclosure
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CONFIDENTIAL
)4 To assure the assignment to the Central Intelligence
Group of only those persons who meet the foregoing standards
the following policy will apply to investigations and clearance
of such individuals.
5. All military and civilian personnel now performing duties
with the Central Intelligence Group, or who are to be assigned
thereto, will be investigated to determine their qualifications
with respect to the standards set forth in paragraph 3 above,
and individuals qualifying thereunder will be cleared to handle
TOP SECRET information and be considered eligible for duties
with the Central Intelligence Group.
6. It is the responsibility of each department required, to
furnish personnel for duties with the Central Intelligence Group
to investigate and effect proper clearance for each individual
furnished by their service. Clearance shall include a certifi-
cation to the Central Intelligence Group to the effect that the
individual has been investigated pursuant to provisions of
C.I`.CT. Directive No. and is eligible for duty assignment
thereto. Certification of clearance will be retained permanent-
ly in the Central Intelligence Group file.
T. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in
each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., and final decision
as to acceptability of an individual for assignment to the
Central Intelligence Group will rest with the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence.
S. Investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to
enable a proper determination of an individual's eligibility in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. However, except
for those individuals covered by the provisions of paragraph
the minimum investigation of personnel as required under the
provisions of paragraph 6 will consist of:
25X1A
CONFIDENTIAL
CIG - 3 Enclosure
A roved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CONFIDENTIAL
a. Records check of the app?opriate office of each of the
following:
(1) Department of State.
(2) Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(3) Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
(4) Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
(5) Police Department in each city of employment and
residence.
(6) Credit agencies.
b. Verification of individuals' Personal History Statement
with respect to:
(1) Birth.
(2) Citizenship.
(3) Education.
(4) Employment for past fifteen years.
'c. Character investigation by interviews with personal
references of the individual and with a minimum of three
other. persons who have knowledge of his activities over
period of time sufficient to enable a determination as to
his character and integrity.
9. WWThoro thero has bocn a previous satisfactory character and
loyalty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department
of State, or other Government agency, or where there are other
available records of a minimum of ten years honorable Government
service and there is .no subsequent information creating a sus-
picion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, the informa-
tion derived therefrom may, at the option of the Department con-
cerned, constitute the basis for clearance of an individual, for
duties with the Central Intelligence Group. It is the responsi-
bility of the Department executing the clearance certificate to
assure that the information adequately establishes the i.ndi
va_dual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of para-
graph 3.
CONFIDENTIAL
CIG Ipproved For Release 2001/03/O'' CIA-RDP81-00728R000A-OOb402
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CONFIDENTIAL
10. The investigations required by paragraph 8 will be com-
pleted by the respective Departments prior to the assignment of
the personnel to the Central Intelligence Group whenever pos-
sible. However, in cases of personnel already assigned or
where the exigencies of the service are such that in the future
it is necessary to assign personnel without prior complete
invc,stigtztion, the Department responsible for the assignment
will, on the basis of a satisfactory preliminary investigation,
furnish an express authorization in writing permitting such
individual to have access to classified information pending
cuiir.)lotio.n of the full investigation. The authorization will
state the reasons for such action and will be retained per-
manently in the Central Intelligence Group file. The approval
of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized repipp-
resentative is a prerequisite to such an individual's perform-
ing duties with the Central Intelligence Group. The required
investigation will then be expedited and clearance effected
pursuant to provisions of paragraph 6.
11. All military and civilian personnel performing duties
with the Central Intelligence Group will,be required to execute
a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.
12. Upon termination of duties with the Central I.ntelligencc.
Group all military and civilian personnel will be given an exit
interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with
regard to maintaining the security of ,all matters pertaining to
Central Intelligence Group activities and provisions of the laws
and statutes which apply.
1.3. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require
the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence;
and all member Departments of the Central Intelligence Group.
~5X1A Such concurrence will be obtained through the Security Liaison
Officers of the agencies concerned.
LRelease 2001/03/30 CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CIG - 5 - Enclosure
 25X1A
:Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CONFIDENTIAL COPY NO. 30
8 May 1946
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
PO LIC3 ON CL ERANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
Memorandum by the Secretary
1. The act ions on C . I . G. lof the members of the Intelligence
Advisory Board after informal consideration are shown in
Enclosure "A" hereto.
2. The comments on C . I . G. I of the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation are contained in the letter in. Enclosure
"
Bn hereto.
3. The amendments in Enclosure "A" and the suggestion in
paragraph 2 of Enclosure; "B" are submitted herewith for con-
sideration at a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board
at 111.30 on Thursday, 9 May 1946
JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
Secretary, N.I.A.
CONFIDENTIAL
k For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE "A"
25X1A
ACTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON C. I. G.
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
in Charge of Research and Intelligence:
Approved, subject to the f'o'llowing minor amendment:
Paragraph 13 to read: Any exceptions to the fore-
going provisions shall require the e..nax=rle.e concurrence
of the Director of Central Inrolligonce and all-Departments
of the Department nominating the personnel for duty with
the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will
be obtained through the respective Security Liaison Officers
of the Central Intelligence Group and the ageneles agency
concerned.
The amendment recommended in paragraph 1 is necessary
to enable competent, highly qualified and experienced
personnel of the Department of State to servc on asei,;n-
ment to the Central Intelligence; Group and does riot exclude
such personnel because tiJ.e;y happened to have been born
abroad of American parents, or of foreign parents (including
citizens of such countries as Canada or Great Britain) and
came to the United. States as children. It is believed that
an arbitrary exclus:Lon of such persons is unroalistic and
undesirable. The amendment recommended provides a workable:
devise for clearance of such personnel.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, tiIDGS:
Approvod without change.
Chief of Naval Intelligence:
Disapproved.. Request meeting of I .A .B . to consider paper.
Proposed amendments:
Page 3, paragraph 7, line; 2 of the Enclosure, - aftor
"by" insort "a screening committee consisting of one
representative each of the, State Department, Military;
- 1 Enclosure "A"
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CONFIDENTIAL
Intelligence Division (G-2), Office of Naval IntelliTencc:
(ONI) and the office of the Assistant Chief of Air ;",tiff'-2
(A-2), and then by". After C . I . G. , " change comma to a
period; delete "and" and capitalize "final".
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, I: t-11Ipe.lce:
Approved without change.
Enclosure "A"
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE "B"
LETTER TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE FROM THE DIRECTOR OF
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
l\p*.?il 29, 1946
Dear Admiral Sowers:
I havo reviewed the draft of a proposed CIG directive
concerning "policy on clearance of p?.rsonne1 for duties with
Central Intel:'.igence Group", enclosed with your letter of
April 25, 1946.
The minimum investigation of CIG personnel as set forth
in the directive would appear to be satisfactory from the
standpoint of determination of an individual's qualifications
in the light of the personnel standards from the security stand-
point set up in the directive. I would like to suggest that
the provision that a minimum of 1.0 years honorable government
service where there is no subsequent information creating a
suspicion of disloyalty or question as to discretion may con-
stitute the basis for c1c:G.rance: of an individual for duties
with the Central Intelligence Group may make possiblo thy;
entry of unsatisfactory persons into the employment of t},.(,
Central Intelligence Group.
It is believed that there are many persons in govurnnont
employment for a period of ton years or more: and who have
what appears to be unblemished records insofar as int(:grity and
loyalty is concerned who do not make satisfactor-x Employees
for the Central Intolligcnce Group from the security standpoint.
I would like to suggest that consideration be given to eliminating
this provision and that an investigation be required of all.
persons, or that they must have undergone a satisfactory
previous security investigation.
Since.rcly, yours,
/s/ J. EDGAR HOOVER
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 01A=RDP81-00728R0001
""B"
 Approved For Release 2001103/30 CiA.RQI?$1-0b728R000100040008-2
71
_-4 J 4 1, 14L.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING
21st and VIRGINIA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
PM,MOFANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
9 MAY 1946
Subject: C.I.G. Policy on Security Clearance of Personnel.
The following recommendations are submitted in connection
with comments received from the Department of State, Navy Department
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding suggested amend-
ments to C.I.G. M_
1. The Chief of Naval Intelligence recommends that paragraph
7, page 3, be amended to provide for a review of all reports of in-
vestigations by a screening committee to consist of one representative
each from the State Department; Military Intelligence Division, G-2;
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Office of the Assistant
Chief of Air Staff, A-2 and then the final review by the Security
Officer of the Central Intelligence Group. Paragraph 7 in its
original form provides for the review of investigative reports by
the Security Officer of C.I.G. It is believed that the proposed
additional review by a screening committee is neither necessary nor
desirable because:
a. Review of the investigative reports by the Security
Officer, C.I.G. will accomplish the primary purpose of the provision
in question, which is to permit of extraction from the reports of
certain pertinent information desired for C.I.G. files. It is for
the further purpose of enabling the Security Officer to familiarize
himself with the contents of the reports so that he will be in a
position to brief the Director of Central Intelligence regarding the
acceptability of nominees to the C.I.G.
b. The only reports in which all the departments have
an interest are those in which a nominee fails to meet the require-
ments of the directive and an exception is requested. Paragraph 13
of C.I.G. M provides that exceptions may be granted on the basis of
unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and
all member departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Thus, the
reports of investigations will be available to all departments in such
casese
co It is believed that the requirements set up in C.I.G
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
r t _ ,~l
??+"~~:lsm~SYl ----~-'i.~4Yx s~~~s?,~,_^~Okf.CfiLs"~Gt~.uw:~~JA{wx.~ '...u '~'""wau~ ~ y --- J ?+?,i.,isisA~:.1~'i',~ank,uil~',,.5td+aw.a.i ...
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
for the investigation and clearance of individuals for assignment
to the C.I.G. will permit each department to make the proper deter-
mination as to an individual's eligibility and that a review of
investigative reports of one department by the other departments
would result in delaying the clearance and would serve no useful
purpose. It is recommended that the suggested amendment, paragraph
7, not be concurred in and further, that paragraph 7 be retained
in its present form.
2. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Department
of State suggests that paragraph 13 be amended to require only the
concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and the depart-
ment nominating the person for duty with the Central Intelligence
Group in order to effect an exception to any of the provisions of
C.I.G.? Paragraph 13 in its original form required the unanimous
concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member
departments of the Central Intelligence Group to effect exceptions.
This provision is a saving clause that permits exceptions in cases
where extenuating circumstances may make it desirable to utilize an
individual's services even though the individual does not meet with
the set standards. It is believed that all member departments of
the Central Intelligence Group are entitled to knowledge of any
exceptions being made on individuals nominated for duty with the
Central Intelligence Group. It is, therefore, recommended that the
suggested amendment to paragraph 13 not be concurred in and further
that the provision in question be retained in its original form.
3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation suggests that the
provision that a minimum of ten (10) years honorable government
service, there being no subsequent information creating a suspicion
of disloyalty or question as to integrity, be accepted as a basis
for clearance may make possible the entry of unsatisfactory persons
into the employment of the Central Intelligence Group. It is stated
that there are many persons who have been in government employment
for a period of ten (10) years or more and have what appears to be
unblemished records insofar as integrity and loyalty are concerned
but who do not make satisfactory employees for the Central Intelli-
gence Group from the security standpoint. It is believed that there
is a security danger unless an adequate check is made to determine
the existence of any derogatory information that may have developed
subsequent to the date of any existent investigative report or during
the entire period of the individual's government employment. To
provide for an adequate check, it is recommended that there be in-
corporated in paragraph 9 a final sentence worded as follows:
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
25X1A
25X1A
"In each case of clearance based on a previous satisfactory character
and loyalty investigation or on the basis of a minimum of ten (10)
years honorable government service, a check of the appropriate records
in the Department of State; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Military
Intelligence Service, War Department and Office of Naval Intelligence,
Navy Department will be made prior to the issuance of a clearance
certificate."
4. As a result of further careful consideration of this
directive, it is recommended that two other minor changes be effected
which, it is believed, will clarify the intent of two particular
provisions thereof. The suggested changes are as follows:
a. Page 4, paragraph 8 a (2) include after "Federal
Bureau of Investigation" the words in parentheses "(to include finger-
print files)."
b. Page 5, paragraph 11, change lines 1 and 2 to read
"All military and civilian personnel assigned to or attached for duty
with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a
declaration of secrecy which will be adminis+A,ed by the Director of
Central Intelligence or his authorized representative."
The change suggested in a. above is believed necessary to insure that
all agencies will request the F.B.I. to effect a fingerprint check as
well as'the usual records check. The change recommended in b. above
is considered necessary to clearly indicate that the provisions of
C.I.G.? apply only to the personnel actually assigned to or attached
for duty with the C.I.G.
Acting Chief, Central Planning Staff
h),r,3f 1r\," ^f" ~6
Lase 2001./03/30: CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
25X1A
CONFIDENTIAL
C.I.CT.
8 May 19116
COPY NO. 23
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
25X1A
POLIO ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
Reference C.7 . GTI
Memorandum by the Secretary
25X1A
25X1A
1 . The actions on C . I . G . E of the members of the Intelligence
Advisory Board after informal consideration are; shown in
Enclosure "A" hereto.
2. The comments on C.I.G. ? of the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation are contained in the letter in Enclosure
"B" hereto.
3. Tito amendments in Enclosure "A" and the suggestion in
paragraph 2 of Enclosure "B" are submitted herewith for con-
sideration at a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board
at 1430 on Thursday, 9 May 1946
JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
Secretary, N.I.A.
CONFIDENTIAL
C IC ved For Release 2001/03/30 CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
25X1A
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE "A"
ACTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR`. BOARD ON C. I. G.
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
in Charge of Research and Intelligence :
Approved, subject to the i'oliowing minor amendment:
Paragraph 13 to read: Any exceptions to the fore-
going provisions shall require: the .nan.ytte-.e concurrcnce;,
of the Director of Central Intel.ligcrnce and aid.-PepartmeHte
of the Department nominating; the personnel for duty with
the Central. Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will
be obtained through the respective Security Liaison Officers
of the Central Intelligence Group and the ageneiee agency
concerned.
The amendment recommended in paragraph 1 is necessary
to enable competent, highly qualified and exper. ienccd
personnel of the Department of State to serve.; on astia_t'n-,
mont to the Central Intelligence Group and does not eexclude
such personnel because they happened to have been born
abroad of American parents, or of foreign parents (including
citizens of such countries as Canada or Great Britain) and
came to the United States as children. It is believed that
an arbitrary exclusion of such persons is unrealistic and
undesirable, The amendment recommended provides a workablo
devise for clearance of such personnel.
Assistant Chief' of Staff, G-2, WDGS:
Approved without change.
Chief of Naval Intelligence:
Disapproved, Request meeting of I.A.B. to consider paper.
Proposed amendments:
Page 3, paragraph. 7, line 2 of the Enclosure - after
"by" insort "a screening committee consisting of one
representative each of the State Department, Military;
- 1 - Enclosure 'An
A?proved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 CIA-RDP81-00728,R000100040008-2
CONFIDENTIAL
Intolligonce Division (G-2), Office of Naval Intelligcncc;
(ONI) and the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff'-2
(A-2), and then by". After "C.I.G.," change comma to a
period; delete "and" and capitalize "final".
Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Approved without change;.
2 - Enclosure, "A"
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE "B"
LETTER TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE FROM THE DIRECTOR OF
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Apc>il 2;, 1946
Dear Admiral. Souers
I have reviewed the draft of a proposed CIG directive
concerning "policy on clcarancc of p rsonnel for duties with
Central Intelligence Group", enclosed with your letter of
April 25, 1946.
The minimum :Investigation of CIG personnel as set forth
in tho directive would appear to be satisfactory from the
standpoint of determination of an individual's qualifications
in the light of the personnel standards from the security stand-
point sot up in the directive. I would like to suggest that
the provision that a minimum of 1.0 years honorable government
service where there is no subsequent information creating a
suspicion of disloyalty or question as to discretion may con-
stituto the basis for clearance- of an individual for duties
with the Central Intelligence Group may make possible: thcc
entry of unsatisfactory persons into the employment of th.e
Central Intelligence Group.
It is believed that there are many persons in govL,rnmcnt
employment for a period of ten years or more; and who have
what appears to be unblemished records insofar as integrity and
loyalty is concerned who do not make satisfactory umployecs
for the Central Intollignce Group from the, security standpoint.
I would like, to suggest that consideration be given to eliminating
this provision and that an investigation be required of all.
persons, or that they must have undergone a satisfactory
previous security investigation.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ J. EDGAR HOOVER
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : clA-RDP81-00728R000i00040008, 2118 11
_ ~ _
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
23 April , 1946
STATINTL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:
Subject: C.I.G. .
1. It is requested that the individual members of the
Intelligence Advisory Board return tie attached memorandum to
the Secretary by ____1630, Monday, 29 Ap l 19L6 , after
making appropriate entry in the space provided.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Secretary, N.I.A.
STATINTL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:
rn
N
t7
Subject: I. G.
.
1. The subject paper is
a. Approved without change
b. Approved, subjoct to the minor
amendments sot out below X
c. Disapproved. Request meeting
of I.A.B. to consider paper
2. Suggestions or amendments .....
Paragraph 13 to read: Any exceptions to -the foregoing provisions shall
require the unae&e*e concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and 914
Repsr"eA e e the Department nominating the personnel for duty with the Central
Intelligence Group. Such concurrence w lT be o a ne trouug %Fe respective
Security Liaison Offi'lers of the Central Intelligence Group and the egeaei:ea agency
concerned.
The amendment recommended in paragraph 1 is necessary to enable competent,
highly qualified and experienced personnel of the Department of State to serve on
assignment to the Central Intelligence Group and does not exclude such personnel
because they happened to have been born abroad of American parents, or of foreign
parents (including citizens of such countries as Canada or Great Britain) and came
to the United States as children. It is believed that an arbitrary exclusion of
such persons is unrealistic and undesirable. The amendment recommended provides
a workable device for clearance of such personnel.
May 1, 1946
(Date)
Return to: Room 4254
New War Dept. Bldg.
Inclusion of suggestions or amendments may require
security classification of this paper.
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, NATIONr.IL INTE"LIGENCE
STATINTL Subject: C.I.G. ^
1. The subject paper is
a. Approved without change
b.
Approved, subject to the minor
amendments set out below
c, Disapproved. Request meeting
of I.A.B. to consider paper
2. Suggestions or amendments *.....
APR 2 G 1946 .
AUTHORITY:
SIT S.
laYU7. 'GEpT..J~1 GSC
Date
Return to: Room 4254
New War Dept. Bldg.
Inc usion of suggestions or amendments may require
security classification of this paper.
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:
Subject: C.I.C~
1. The subject paper is
a. Approved without change
b.
Approved, subject to the minor
amendments set out below
c. Disapproved. Request meeting
of I.A.B. to considor paper
2. Suggestions or amendments .,...
.Proposed amendments;
Page 3, paragraph 7, line 2 of the enclosure -
after "by" insert "a screening committee consisting of
one representative each of the State Department,
Military Intelligence Division (G-2), Office of Naval
Intelligence,.(ONI) and the office of the Assistant Chief
of Air Staff - 2 (A-2), and then by". After"C.I.G.,"
change comma to period; delete "and" and capitalize "final".
Sig ture
THOS. . ITIGLIS
Chief of Naval Int;ellicence
AAAY 1046
~' - Datd
Return to: Room 425+
New War Dept. Bldg.
Inclusion of suggestions or amendments may require
security classification of this paper.
r 11"~,~It rll li`r'q o r -iti
Approved.. For~Release 2001/03/30`: CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
MEMORANDUM FOR E SECRETARY, NATIONAL INT' TJIGENCE AUTHORITY:
Subject: C.I.G.^
1. The 'subjoct paper is
a. Approved without change
b. Approved, subjact to the minor
amendments set out below
c. Disapproved. Request meeting
of I . A . B. to consider paper
Suggestions or amendments *.....
tAQAt A C1,,., i bn turei
Brig. General, U. S. Army
Dsputy,Aosi tint eulex o har $tMff
$8 PRYA,
Return to: Room 4254
New War Dept. Bldg.
Inclusion of suggestions or amendments may require
security classification of this paper.
Approved For Release 2001103/30 CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
STATINTL
 ved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R0001
Near Ad ii.ral Sich:ey 14. Souers
Director
Central Intelligence Group
Room 4253
Pew :'far Department E~uilding
21st and vIrginia Avenue
..ashington, D. C.
Dear Admiral Souers:
I have reviewed the draft of a proposed CIG directive
concerning, "policy on clearance of personnel for duties with
Central I ntell i. (fence Group", enclosed with your letter of April 25,
1946.
The minimum investigation of CIG personnel as set forth
in the directive w would appear to be satisfactory from the standpoint
of determination of an individual's qualifications in the light of
the personnel standards from the security standpoint set up in the
directive. I would like to suGL;est that the provision that a minimum
of 10 years honorable government service where there is no subsequent
information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to dis-
cretion may constitute the basis for clearance of an in~ivi_dual for
duties with the Central Intelligence Group may make possible the
entry of unsatisfactory persons into the employment of the Central
Intelligence Group.
It is believed that there are many persons in ' c;overnmert
employment for a period of ten years or more and who have what
appears to be unblemished records insofar as iand loyalty
is concerned who do not make satisfactory integrity '
Intelligence Group from the security standpoint. I wouldlllilcentoa~
su;-;gest that consideration be given to eliminating this provision
and that an investigation be required of all persons, or that they
must have undergone a satisfactory previous security investigation.
Sincerely yours,
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
STATINTL
ifeberu4 t' urrau of futtestigatiort
Uititt 3tatrs epartiurut of Justine
Wttailriugtout 25, I1. (f?
April 29, 1946
PEISSON/ L AND C0r!FTD~,1 TiAL
BY SPECIAL MT,SS.E GER
Fl MJ'C~i3V/~L,~.LFfYW.SariL'r5::;~r..
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CONFiDENTIAL
Aft 25 3 itti PH '46
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United Staten Department of Justice
Dear Mr. Hoover:
I as enclosing herewith a copy of a "Proposed Policy on
Clearance of Personnel for Duties with the Central Intelligence
Group". This proposal has 'been referred for concurrence or com-
ment to the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board from the
State, War, and Navy Departments, since they will he responsible
for conducting the investigations prescribed therein.
Before issuing; this policy, however, I i+ould ;rrea.tly ap-
preciate any comments or suggestions which you might have concern-
ing it, either from a general viewpoint or as regards the specific
provisions with .r. eforenco to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sincerely,
"'SIGNED"
SIDNEY W. SOUERS
Director
25X1A
Enclosures
C.I.G. a Copy No. 21
JSLay: IH
CONFIDO'HAL
Approved ` For Rel-eaae 2001/03/30 CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
23 April , 1946
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Secretary, N.I.A.
STATINTL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:
Subject: C.I.G.0
1. The subject paper is
a. Approved without change
b. Approved, subject to the minor
amendments set out below
c. Disapproved. Request meeting
of I.A.B. to consider paper
2. Suggestions or amendments *.?...
(Signature)
Date
Subject: C.T.G. ^
1. It is requested thr:.ct tho individual members of the
Intelligence Advisory Board return the attached memorandum to
the Secretary by 1630, Modday1 29 April 194 .after
making appropriate entry in the space provided.
Return to: Room 4254
New War Dept. Bldg.
Inclusion of suggestions or amendments may require
security classification of this paper.
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
25X1A
CONFIDENTIAL
C..I C.-.
21E April 1916
COPY No. 22
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
POLICY ON CLEARANCg OF PERSONNEL
FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
25X1A
Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
1. The President's letter of 22 January 19+6 charges the
National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central
Intelligence with responsibility for fully protecting intelli-
gence sources and methods in connection with their activities.
2. The Central Intelligence Group should establish standards
and requirements with regard to clearance of personnel for
duties with the C.I.G. to assure the highest degree of security
to its operations.
3. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure
by which the necessary directive can be published and carried
out by unanimous approval of the Director of Central I.ntelli-
,pence and the Intelligence Advisor;- "loard, without action by the
National Intelligence Authority.
4. Enclosed is a draft directive, making necessary provisions
for establishing uniform clearance standards and procedures.
If all members of the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the
draft without substantial change, a meeting will not be neces-
sary. It is recommended that the directive be approved, and
that each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board arrange for
necessary implementation by his department.
SIDNEY W. SOUERS,
Director.
C ON.1 IDENTIAL
CI Ued For Release 2001/03/30: GlA RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
25X1A
CONFIDENTIAL
EN CL O SURE
D R A F T
PROPOSED C.I.G. DIRECTIVE
POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
1. The President's letter of 22 January 19116, referring to
functions of the National Intelligence Authority and the Direc--
top of Central Intelligence, stated: "In the conduct of their
activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director
of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protect-
ing intolligonco oouros and methods."
2. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group require
constant handling ' classified matter whose unauthorized dis-
closure would cause b..ceptionally grave damage to the nation.
It is imperative that the highest degree of security be main-
tained to prevent either unauthorized disclosures of classified
matter of any activity which would impede or impair the objec-
tives sought to be accomplished by the National Intelligence
Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. The accomplishment of the security objective requires that
personnel assigned to the Central Intelligence Group be
individuals:
a. of excellent character who are native-born citizens of
the United States and who have no member of the immediate
family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power;
b. whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthi-
ness are unquestioned;
c. whose financial status and habits are such as to render
unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from
these sources.
CONFIDENTIAL
CIG - 2 - Enclosure
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
C ONFIDE~NTIAL
?I., To assure the assignment to the Central Intelligence
Group of only those persons who meet the foregoing standards
the following policy will apply to investigations and clearance
of such individuals.
5. All min';ary and civilian personnel now performing duties
with the Central Intelligence Group, or who are to be assigned
thereto, will be investigated to determine their qualifications
with respect to the standards set forth in paragraph 3 above,
and individuals qualifying thereunder will be cleared to handle
TOP SECRET information and be considered eligible for duties
with the Central Intelligence Group.
6. It is the responsibility of each department required to
furnish personnel for duties with the Central Intelligence Group
to investigate and effect proper clearance for each individual
furnished by their service. Clearance shall include a certifi-.
cation to the Central Intelligence Group to the effect that the
individual has been investigated pursuant to provisions of
C.I-,C7. Directive No._ and is eligible for duty assignment
thereto. Certification of clearance will be retained permanent-
ly in the Central Intelligence Group file.
7. Reports of investigations will be subject to.review in
each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., and final decision
as to acceptability of an individual for assignment to the
Central Intelligence Group will rest with the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence.
8. Investigation will be conducted to the extent. necessary to
enable a proper determination of an individual's eligibility in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. However, except
for those individuals covered by the provisions of paragraph 9,
the minimum investigation of personnel as required under the
provisions of paragraph 6 will consist of:
CONI''IDENTIAL
CIG
A roved For Release 2001/03/310 :3CCA-RDP81-00728R0001 0040M8r2-;
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CONFIDENTIAL
a. Records check of the appropriate office of each of the
following:
(1) Department of State.
(2) Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(3)-Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
(4) Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
(5) Police Department in each city of employment and
residence.
(6) Credit agencies.
b. Verification of individuals' Personal History Statement
with respect to:
(1) Birth.
(2) Citizenship.
(3) Education.
(4) Employment for past fifteen years.
c. Character investigation by interviews with personal
references of the individual and with a minimum of three
other persons who have knowledge of his activities over a
period of time sufficient to enable a determination as' to
his character and integrity.
9. Whore thero has been a previous satisfactory character and
loyalty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department
of State, or other Government agency, or where there are other
available records of a minimum of ten years honorable Government-
service and there is no subsequent information creating a sus-
picion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, the informa-
tion derived therefrom may, at the option of the Department con-
cerned, constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for
duties with the Central Intelligence Group. It is the respo.nsi
b:i.l.ity of the Department executing the clearance certificate to
assure that the information adequately establishes the indi-
vi_dual' s eligibility in accordance with the provisions of para-
graph 3.
CONFIDENTIAL
C I G0
Approved For Release 2001 /03/30 A-RDP81-0072880001 ooo o ..lure
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
25X1A
CONFIDENTIAL
10. The investigations required by paragraph 8 will be com-
pleted by the respective Departments prior to the assignment o:L
the personnel to the Central Intelligence Group whenever pos-
sible. However, in cases of personnel already assigned or
where the exigencies of the service are such that in the future
it is necessary to assign personnel without prior complete
:L.nvc stigation, the Department responsible for the assignment
will, on the basis of a satisfactory preliminary investigation,
furnish an express authorization in writing permitting such
individual to have access to classified information pending
completion of the full investigation. The authorization will
state the reasons for such action and will be retained per-
manently in the Central Intelligence Group file. The approval
of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized rep-
resentative is a prerequisite to such an individual's perform-
i.n[.duties with the Central Intelligence Group. The required
investigation will then be expedited and clearance effected
pursuant to provisions of paragraph 6.
11. All military and civilian personnel performing duties
with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute
a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.
12. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligen.cc.
Group all military and civilian personnel will be given an exit
interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with
regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to
Central Intelligence Group activities and provisions of the laws
and statutes which apply.
13. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require
the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence
and all member Departments of the Central Intelligence Group.
Such concurrence will be obtained through the Security Liaison
Officers of the agencies concerned.
AgMpjD,gmReIease 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
IG
- 5 - Enclosure
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R0100100040008-2
25X1A
CONFIDENTIAL
C.I.G.
23 April 1946
A.) 0 .
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL
FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946 charges the National
Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence with re-
sponsibility for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods in
connection with their activities.
2. The Central Intelligence Group should establish standards and
requirements with regard to clearance of personnel for duties with the
C.T.G. to assure the highest degree of security to its operations.
3. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure by
which the necessary directive can be published and carried out by unani-
mous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence
Advisory Board, without action by the National Intelligence Authority.
4. Enclosed is a draft directive, making necessary provisions for
establishing uniform clearance standards and procedures. If all members
of the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the draft without substantial
change, a meeting will not be necessary. It is recommended that the direct-
ive be approved, and that each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board
arrange for necessary implementation by his department.
SIDNEY W. SOUERS,
25X1A
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE
D RAF T
PROPOSED C.I.G. DIRECTIVE
POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, referring to functions
of the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, stated: "In the conduct of their activities the National Intelli-
gence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be respons-
ible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods."
2. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group require constant
handling of classified matter whose unauthorized disclosure would cause ex-
ceptionally grave damage to the nation. It is imperative that the highest
degree of security be maintained to prevent either unauthorized disclosures
of classified matter or any activity which would impede or impair the ob-
jectives sought to be accomplished by the National Intelligence Authority
and the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. The accomplishment of the security objective requires that per-
sonnel assigned to the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:
a. of excellent character who are native-born citizens of the
United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of
kin thereof subject to a foreign power;
b. whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness
are unquestioned;
c. whose financial status and habits are such as to render
unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from these sources.
4. To assure the assignment to the Central Intelligence Group of
only those persons who meet the foregoing standards the following policy
will apply to investigations and clearance of such individuals.
5. All military and civilian personnel now performing duties with
the Central Intelligence Group, or who are to be assigned thereto, will
be investigated to determine their qualifications with respect to the
For Release 2001/03/30 CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
ApprovedTIAL
CONFIDEN
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
standards set forth in paragraph 3 above, and individuals qualifying
thereunder will be cleared to handle TOP SECRET information and be con-
sidered eligible for duties with the Central Intelligence Group.
6. It is the responsibility of each department required to furnish
personnel for duties with the Central Intelligence Group to investigate
and effect proper clearance for each individual furnished by their service.
Clearance shall include a certification to the Central Intelligence Group
to the effect that the individual has been investigated pursuant to provi-
sions of C.I.G. Directive No. and is eligible for duty assignment
thereto. Certification of clearance will be retained permanently in the
Q~Pu
Central Intelligent e file.
A
7. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in each case
by the Security Officer, C.I.G., and final decision as to acceptability of
an individual for assignment to^. will rest v, th th Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence.
8. Investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to en-
able a proper determination of an individual's eligibility in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 3. However, except for those individu-
als covered by the provisions of paragraph 9, the minimum investigation
of personnel as required under the provisidns of paragraph 6 will consist of:
a. Records check of the appropriate office of each of the fol-
(1) Department of State.
(2) Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(3) Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
(4) Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
(5) Police Department in each city of employment and residence.
(6) Credit agencies.
b. Verification of individualst Personal History Statement with
respect to:
se 1UU'I N3ISU : C:IA-KUI-t$I -UU /1t$K000 IU U Utf:r
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CONFIDENTIAL
C.
(3) Education.
(4) Employment for past fifteen years.
Character investigation by interviews with personal refer
ences of the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who
have knowledge of his activities over a period of time sufficient to en-
able a determination as to his character and integrity.
9. Where there has been a previous satisfactory character and loy-
alty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department of State, or
other Government agency, or where there are other available records of a
minimum of ten years honorable Government service and there is no subse-
quent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question M
as to integrity, the information derived there-
from may, at the option of the Department concerned, constitute the basis
for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence
Group. It is the responsibility of the Department executing the clear-
ance certificate to assure that the information adequately establishes
the individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of para-
graph 3.
10. The investigations required by paragraph 8 will be completed by
the respective Departments prior to the assignment of the personnel to the
Central Intelligence Group whenever possible. However, in cases of per-
sonnel already assigned or where the exigencies of the service are such
that in the future it is necessary to assign personnel without prior com-
plete investigation, the Department responsible for the assignment will,
on the basis of a satisfactory preliminary investigation, furnish an ex-
press authorization in writing permitting such individual to have access
to classified information pending completion of the full investigation.
The authorization will state the reasons forsusuch - action and will be re-
tained permanently in the Central Intelligent" e frie. The approval of the
n
Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative is a
prerequisite to such an individual's performing duties with the Central
Intelligence Group. The required investigation will then be expedited
and clearance effected pursuant to provisions of paragraph 6.
Ap$KpFt4fM Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
C.I.C.;`}. Enclosure
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
25X1A
CONFIDENTIAL
U. All military and civilian personnel performing duties with the
Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of
secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence
or his authorized representative.
12. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group
all military and civilian personnel will be given an exit interview de-
signed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining
the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence a tivitie s
A
and provisions of the laws and statutes which apply.
13. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the
unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all
member Departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence
will be obtained through the Security Liaison Officers of the agencies
CONFIDENTIAL
C.I.G.
Enclosure
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2.
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL +
:RESTRICTED
ADM] AL SOUERS :
For your approval
For your signature
For your information
Deputy Director CIG
Asst-to the Director
Secretary, NIA
Chief of Oberational Services
Chief, Central Planning Staff
Chief, Contr&1 Repprto Staff.
Administrative Officer
REMARKS :
Prepared Coordinated
by With
r
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Secretary, N,.I.A.
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING
21st and VIRGINIA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
22 April 1946
MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Souers
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Proposed Policy on Clearance of
personnel for Duties with C.I.G.
ENCLOSURE: Memo for Director of Central Intelligence from
Acting Chief, Central Planning Staff, same sub-
ject, dated 11 April (received by Secretary,
N.T.A., on 15 April)
1. At the C.I.G. Council meeting this morning the following ques-
tions were raised with reference to the enclosures
a. Should the responsibility for security clearance rest with
the departments, as provided in paragraph 6 of the proposed directive,
or with the C.I.G.?
b. Is it necessary that the proposed directive be approved by
the I.A.B., or should it be issued individually by the Director of
Central Intelligence?
c. Should exceptions require concurrence by member departments
of C.I.G., as provided in paragraph 12 of the proposed directive, or
should the Director of Central Intelligence be authorized to make ex-
ceptions as he sees fit?
2. With reference to 1-a above, it was agreed that in any case re-
sponsibility for the security of C.I.G. rests with the Director, re-
gardless of the arrangements for investigation and clearance of indi-
viduals. Central Planning Staff feels that security clearance should
be done by the departments as part of their responsibility for furnish-
ing C.I.G. personnel, since the individuals are employees of the various
departments. It was pointed out, however, that the proposed directive
does not provide for mandatory review by C.I.G. It was also stated that
investigation and clearance by the departments might take a considerable
length of time (90 to 120 days in the case of war). Placing the re-
sponsibility for investigation and clearance in C.I.G. rather than the
departments would have the following effects:
CON FIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R00010004"D TML
. A larger security office in C.I.G. probably would be re-
quired .
b. Security checks would be expedited.
c. Final clearance would be performed in C.I.G. where the
ultimate responsibility resides in any case.
3. It was believed that the answer to 1-b above depends on the
answer to 1-a. If the departments are to be responsible for inves-
tigation and clearance, it appears appropriate to obtain the concur-
rence of the I.A.B. to the proposed directive. If C.I.G. is to con-
duct the investigation and clearance, the directive might be issued
by the Director without reference to the I.A.B.
4. With reference to 1-c, one viewpoint was that the Director
should be authorized to grant exceptions without further concurrences
and their resultant delay. The other viewpoint was that the security
representatives of the permanent I.A.B. members should concur in ex-
ceptions since C.I.G. personnel will be handling highly classified
material from all departments.
5. The C.S.G. Council agreed that paragraph 3-a of the proposed
directive should be re-worded as follows:
"of excellent character who are native-born citizens
of the United States and who have no member of the
immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a
foreign power."
25X1A
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved, For. Release 200.11.03/30: CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
C CONF~ REST
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
CENTRAL PLANNING ST?L'F
ROUTING SL]:P
. From :
TOP SEC SECRET
Enclosure:
Planning-
Chief
Deputy
Policy & Rev.
Tn fF
Intell,
Security
Support
Steno
___,_~.,_Secy, NZ?i
--Reports Staff
!'dm. Officer
Datee
Note
Note and Return
Inf ormat ion
Recommend routing, or
reference
~Necossary Action
_~_Com meant
Recommendation
Preps re CIG Action
--Rev _Rev iew
_ Suspense File
_Signature
Dispatch
File
Deadline :
Remarks :
REST
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release b"I~~~/34A- 81-00728R000100040008-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
WASHINGTON, D. C.
11 April 19L1.6
I1-"1 ORANDU ri FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Proposed Policy on Clearance of Personnel for
Duties vith Central Intelligence Group.
1. The Acting Administrative Officer, C.I.C.., prepared a draft
letter dated 21 March, subject, "Clearance of Personnel", which was
designed to clarify procedures for security clearance of personnel
assigned for duties ni.th Central Intelligence. At the Staff meeting
of 26 March the proposed letter was referred to the Planning Staff
for consideration.
2. The Planning Staff has prepared a draft of proposed action
by C.I.G. It consists of a memorandum from the Director of Central
intelligence to the members of the Advisory Board, forwarding a draft
directive making provision for uniform clearance standards in the
Departments furnishing personnel to the C.I.C.
3. The security officers of the ',Tar, Navy and State Departments,
and the Arnrf Air Forces have concurred informally in the proposed
directive.
L~. Action recom:mended.:
That the memorandum be approved and dispatched to the
Advisory Board.
25X1A
Acting Chief, Central Planning Staff
CO H DE9 "L
ApproVed,'For Release 2001403/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001 1 : W~"o 00728R000100040008-2
DRAIs::C
TO: Mr. Alfred. IM eCormack
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USA
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, USN
.,Brig. General George C. LcDonald., USA
f iBJECT ' Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties with Central
Intelligence (croup.
1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946 charges the National
Intelligence Authority and. the Director of Central Intelligence with
responsibility for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods in
connection with their activities.
2. The Central Intelligence Group should establish standards and
requirements with regard to clearance of personnel for duties with the
C.I.G. to assure the highest degree of security to its operations.
3. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure by
w ich the necessary directive can be published and carried out by
unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Intelligence Advisory Board, without action by the National Intelligence
Authority.
Li. Inclosed is a draft directive, making necessary provisions for
establishing uniform clearance standards and procedures. If all members
of the Advisory Board concur in the draft 1?rithout substantial change,
a meeting will not be necessary. It is recommended that the directive
be approved, and that each member of the Advisory Board arrange for
necessary implementation by his department.
SIDNEY V% SQUERS
Director
Incl: Draft of Directive.
? EN IAL
Approved For Release 2001103130 91A-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/3911&jIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
CENTRAL II11T '1i IGI:d'ICE, GROUP
0.1.0. DIRECT iV:e, IQ:
POLICY ON CLEARA1, CJE OF Ph1.M]_k,10,L FOR
DUTIES '1'1111.111 CEIN'TIIAL GhOUP
li ;rnce, vri th the
Memorandum by the Director of Central Intel
Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board
1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, referring; to functions of
the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence
stated: "In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence
Authority and he Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible
for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods."
2. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group require constant
handling of classified matter whose unauthorized disclosure would cause
exceptionally grave daiiiage to the nation. It is imperative that the
highest degree of security be maintained to prevent either unauthorized
disclosures of classified matter or any activity which would impede or
impair the objectives sought to be accomplished by the National Intelligence
Authority and the Director of Central.. Intelligence.
3. The accomplishment of the security objective requires that personnel
assigned to the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:
a. of excellent character who are native born citizens of the
United States;
b. whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness are
unquestioned;
c. whose financial status and habits are such as to render unlikely
their succumbing to any temptation arising from these sources.
14. To assure the assignment -to the Central Intelligence Group of only
those persons who meet the foregoing standards the following policy will
apply to investigations and clearance of such individuals.
Approvedo:r Release 2001/03130 CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 o J [ J
Approved For Release 2 0 0 1 / 66 00 1 7288000100040008-2
Department of State.
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
~.iilitary Intelligence Division, War Department.
Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
Police Department in each city of employment and residence.
Credit Agencies
b. Verification of individuals' Personal history Statement with
respect to:
(1) Birth.
(2) Citizenship.
(3) Education.
(4) Employment for past fifteen years.
5. All military and civilian personnel now l:~er:Cpr,n:i_iz dut_ie ; -~iith the
Central Intelligence Group, or :iho are to be assigned thereto, v~ill be
investigated to determine their qualifications with respect to the
standards set forth in paragraph 3 above, and individuals qualifying
thereunder will be cleared to handle TOP SIE;CNET information and be
considered eligible for duties with the Central Intelligence Group.
6. It is the responsibility of each department required to furnish
personnel for duties with the Central Intelligence Group to investigate
and effect proper clearance for each individual furnished by their service.
Clearance shall include a certification to the Central Intelligence Group
to the effect that the individual has been investigated pursuant to
provisions of C.I.G. Directive No. and is eligible for duty assignment
thereto. Certification of clearance :sill be retained. permanently in the
Central Intelligence file.
7. Investigation will be conducted to the e:,-tent necessary to enable a
proper determination of an individual's eligibility in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 3. However, except for those individuals covered
by the provisions of paragraph 3, the minimum investigation of personnel
as required under the provisions of paragraph 6 will consist of:
a. Records check of the appropriate off ice of each of the following:
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2010M.)
I a -00728R000100040008-2
c. Character investigation by interviews with personal references of
the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who have knowledge
of his activities over a period of time sufficient to enable a deternm:i nation
as to his character and integrity.
8. ;!here there has been a previous satisfactory character and loyalty
investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department of State or other
Government, agency, or where there are other available records of a minimum
of ten years honorable Government service and there is no subsequent infor-
mation creating a suspic:ion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, the
information derived therefrom may, at the option of the Department concerned,
constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the
Central Intelligence Group. It is the responsibility of the Department
executing the clearance certificate to assure that the information adequately
establishes the individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph 3.
9. The investigations required by paragraph 7 will be completed by the
respective departments prior to the assignment of the personnel to the
Central Int,__ligence Group whenever possible. However, in cases of personnel
already assigned or where the exigencies of the service are such that in the
future it is necessary to assign personnel without prior complete investig-
ation the Department responsible for the assignment All, on the basis of
a satisfactory preliminary investigation, furnish an express authorization
in writing permitting such individual to have access to classified infor-
mation pending completion of the full investigation. The authorization
will state the reasons for such action and will be retained permanently in
the Central Intelligence file. The approval of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his authorized representative is a prerequisite to such an
individual's performing duties ijJLth the Central Intelligence Group. The
required investigation All then be expedited and clearance effected pursuant
to provisions of paragraph 6.
Approved .F.or Release 20G1103/30 : CIA-RQP81-00728R0001-00040008-2
 Approved For Release 200 F IBC '-00728R000100040008-2
10. All military and civilian personnel performing; duties v:i th the Central
Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy
which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his
authorized representative.
11. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group all
military and civilian personnel vrill be given an exit interview designed
bo impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the
security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence activities and
provisions of the laws and statutes which apply.
12. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous
concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and, all member depart-
ments of the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrences will be obtained
through the Security Liaison Officers of the Agencies concerned.
Mdse 2011030 C1A-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
1toportj of ix vt StUi tions tVill. bay Oub ectt to rovtew
in each, caoa by the So aurity Offic are G,I.t., MMM 11nmi decision
as to acoeptability of an individual. for assignment to C.I.G. win
rest with the Director of Central Intelligence.
ILLEGIB
Approved For Release 20.01/03/30; CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
.v', ..,.....e,4 .aSVe,auow.i, r.;;.wi?,..a~~.~'.i,.NMaw 'L i;a~'.:'.~: iii'~.er~..,~u:'f.''ni.LLn,.?i~ r i' : ^iz : ?' :#..?.3.ku tiri~4r,
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2 ONF D 1
CJ LV
22 April 1946
MEMORANDUM FORz Achniral Souero
SUBJECT: Proposed Policy on Clearance of
personnel for Duties with C.I.G.
ENCLOSURE Memo for Director of Central Intelligence from
Acting Chief, Central Planning Staff, same sub-
ject, dated 11 April (received by Secretary,
N.I.A., on 15 April)
1. At the C.I.G. Council meeting this morning the following ques-
tions were raised with reference to the enclosure;
a. Should the responsibility for security clearance rest with
the departments, as provided in paragraph 6 of the proposed directive,
or with the C.1.G.?
b? Is it necessary that the proposed directive be approved by
the I.A.B., or should it be issued individually by the Director of
Central Intelligence?
a. Should exceptions require concurrence by member departments
of O.I.G., as provided. in paragraph 12 of the proposed directive, or
should the Director of Central Intelligence be authorized to make ex-
ceptions as he sees fit?
2. With reference to 1-a above, it was agreed that in any case re-
sponsibility for the security of C.I.G. rests with the Director, re-
gardless of the. arrangements for investigation and clearance of indi-
viduals. Central Planning Staff feels that security clearance should
be done by the departments as past of their responsibility for furnish-
ing C.I.G. personnel, since the individuals are employees of the various
departments. It was pointed out, however, that the proposed directive
does not provide for mandatory review by C.I.G. It was also stated that
Investigation and clearance by the departments might take a considerable
length of time (90 to 120 days in the dace of War) . Placing the re-
sponsibility for investigation and clearance in C.I.G. rather than the
departments would have the following effectss
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
55~u1ilii;imSl[ea~nk as.~i `'..u'. ,~veM~.!`~fd~ltA ~Jlu:.xiemel'f.;eYe~ir3c~to:hi
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
.. 2 _ CONFWENTAL
.a. A larger security office in C.I.G. probably would be re-
quired.
b. Security cheeks would be expedited.
c. Final clearance would be performed in C.S.G. where the
ultimate responsibility resides in any case.
3. It was believed that the answer to 1-b above depends on the
answer to 1-a. If the departments are to be responsible for inves-
tigation and clearance, it appears appropriate to obtain the concur-
rence of the I.A.B. to the proposed directive. If C.Y.G. to to con-
duct the investigation and clearance, the directive might be issued
by the Director without reference, to the I. A.B .
4. With reference to 1-0, one viewpoint was that the Director
thould be authorized to grant exceptions without further concurrences
and their resultant delay. The other viewpoint was that the security
representatives of the permanent I.A.B. members should concur in ex-
ceptions since C.I.G. personnel will be handling highly classified
material from all departments.
of the proposed
5. The C.I.G. Council agreed that paragraph 3--S
directive should be re-worded as followat
"of excellent character who are native-born citizens
of the United States and who have no member of the
immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a
foreign powers
JAM S. LAY, JR.
Secretary, N.I.A.
Url 0 N 1`1 ONE]".1 1"'I A
Approved For Release 20,01/03/30.: CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
C'i-~a`
A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING
21st and VIRGINIA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
19 April 1946
25X1A
a,i[ I [OrANDUIvt FOR: The Secretary, NIA
Et1P1~RENCE; Draft Directive
Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duty with CIG
1. Reference Directive has been received and is recommehded
for approval subject to the comments set forth below.
2. It is understood that paragraph 3a will be re-written to
read in substance as follows: "of excellent character who are
native born citizens of the United States and who have no next of kin
by blood or marriage subject to a foreign power."
3. It should be noted that under the proposed directive the
Administrative Division will not be in a position to assume respon-
sibility for prompt security clearances. The speed with which these
clearances are obtained rests wholly with the interested department.
Administrative Officer
Approved For Release 2001103/3.0 CIA-RDP81-00728R0001 Q0040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040
25X1A
19 April 191.6
? MORA.NDUM FOR: The Secretary, 1141A
REFERENCE, Draft Directive
Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duty with CIG
25X1A
1. Reference Directive has been received and is recommended
for approval subject to the comments set forth below.
2? It is understood that paragraph 3a wlU be re-written
read in substance as follows;
native born citizens or "of excellent character who are
the United States and who have no next of 1
by blood or marriage subject to a foreign power." ca.n
3. It should be noted that under the proposed directive
Administrative Division will not be in a position to assume respon-
sibility for prompt security clearances. clearances are obtained rests who , The speed with which these
113 with the interested department.
Approved For Release 200,1/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
ILLEGIB
U April 19146
It tRANDUM 'OR,; The I f recto K of Ctntirul X atollig +nce
.5UD s S.xcc;osed 'P O cy an of Penio-, n.01 for
t)Rtttes with .Ce trr 1 int-0' 1. wra o C+-up.
1., The ,' ctii74?i A dad xiivtT'ative *,~ftica,r!` C,14,0 pre.-pared a draft
lettirr ;tte : 21 zt;zrc i, ~xa~~ c 170w-:it< .t ca of Sa : w r ir.= + ."p Nehieh 'w i
a at,gr d .') c1ri ' pr oc dta ' u # r .;* i .y clearance, of : r. aonuo1
ae signed or dutios -d?3. , C z t,:rr . ~:rz .1?~;,e ac . ?- r to he b t T ::, ~r ti ;
26 3-'4mroh the gr ;+ sod letter was 'e ` zx'. ~ed to . e. Plan '$irw, t
-fo ' ccnafder .tion.
2,. The .112 Staff hao r F 'arrr . a draft of prod action.
by CJ;E.(, I.ec lat.tto of a m:9wr 3',td .. from he, "V .root; r of c ntr&1
xt et . 13r,~ to Ii .esMr~~{s al er? of ty o. Iyris no y~yroard,,y yo ~7y~rz +.1 nL! a.~~ draft
f l .b ec dJ.i Ye m?, tn; p \i'` ial on 'oz Ni41'4? T ~~.I. M'N a.u ~nS.eYil,i -ri a,nce a i.~."~.b' ~Mb~.a0.ds. ~1 m
)e rt> xxta r ain a1il g pr onno3. to w, C41.0.
3. The accurity of'1'icoru of too iaarj, Navy u4 SA ate Departrnannta,,
and the hz Air Forms have co=ur d Inforn . ' in thi proposed
direeti'itea
ho Action raccm,,zondt t
That the a,wrzitta: be approved and s,'I:t. ,tLnho to the
,Ad'e f5at7 Board.
25X1A
"pa ins UZ
. ct%.i : Ch? f, C tr :P ns ' s3ta
Approved For Release 2001/03130 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2
 Approved For Release 2001/0li/ t C' - r P81-00728R000100040008-2
I'*'. I 11'rol
.....lrwr..Yr.
1,ii .If rod .I Y( , 'I ?~Il,?k
t. r l:.'t"';,R+`.tw"ir, h .idyl:: '. \ al:A3.`.?~t""1! 7:ta'r: s: k>
ea ~^py~ ~1` yt yyt F: r
(i4~:iy~,x? ! :.~.E.~'>~ '~'~OX.iA 'f
W ~Ia... ~-1 , `~ rr11 [ { s~ f 'y . . v x.o., Ia:t.It,.M1 J..i.. ^ nyy
?lb
i t' .r,t, tiyi . r. s.1i n..~.y.~~V~ r? 1, V'hr ;;~1:k.M1..tx..J'" SI':..A. t.v ~~~. 41. it. E~.~ ?~.l t'. Vl rv~.A,~ ~??~.,. '~J t:?."w '?1 Xo ~ ? .!w. i
~'~".~..h~.~ .~f:..cv'?~~.'ti+wr ~''l:i..}t~,i,. 7''l.;'w';,t71~f.,t a:^J .7.{,:. .1 ,.~~.G't'.'? L,'t;t T'
4:Fsx;;e
?..~ L~t-'~ ~:f,? Ia ItSi?' n1`?;~wT ~s '.~lti?F~r tli.,1''`k?F'~ EY GSA?C'Lk`.l. ;~ v~.r ~'~;" (:: l~l Al
. a''.':dz.'dJyeT 1'x~:?~~ 3 CJ:P. ,,,.,.,~.s.~ ~..:,,7 f. ~rl.~ (.. r:C.?.
t,31,l+' t'i 3 i! a k:"isw"u *yj:"`.. y (ydo r` {7 ~?r+, ~~lG?5:,".C ! `.i t"., rt r+ y'~*'~`Z. ?:;t o S
(~ d:Yl Lr/ Y} ~? . -1 w.?4 kY~ 7 4'J \.. ~iL+~r L!'`.' F +i .;t 1 ~~~j
`~++'~`tI
41 /~7 1.f i ! 1A:r.?~.:'.L Wf i?{.1,~k.. of ?S!y.: 4f uL S.,x q... ~a~ A ~, a.:;.l '. ..j:~.,J.?G.? iiYCa +1'~.fil~~t.~tntr CC,(r4i. .y"i?7 ~~Y'", ?tt$:. ~,.4:ry:iS.~. .~' t !~'..A.9.. ~,kl: ~~~ir
t r ~ 1. r? ;~,A.~ t ,_ d. r _rm 1. ~ ':1~
:.?~.w??lS'~'~i 1.v'.~ c: i.l,{'~!'vr ~'{::iru.fr? M yrf w' ` ?, :R:~.',~. Lam.' '~ w"'Y'4 y';~~..ii?;.1 or
,s. 1,1. 9.~t a,+ , yyiw?t yM1 y?r y q ` i yvrt( t x:.,^~Ir, y~a 7y':?.:x 1t ('M ^{ iS'k nl;Z l:} '[ D
l;?xi bplfl lr.S,.~MT':!t':l.w7C:1 'INM;S ~: {, VJn LIJ 1..,,.),":>Ut.1"wt7.?f~~ ,fir 4+':)~w~.4r ~1. 11. i.f,C .v$5Z4.L :. f.. C~~'M 4.r'x.i }.7.~?it.f.rU f.,h+ti~..f C kL JrM1 YW
1Y' `, 1.',Y.ly Gr'ry r C: .~rrwer' ~f xr w r~ A I ~St a ~,1 ''(.aira:l t'u i%4 o) tar", 'bJ,? $.~.1 .~ J tdS :.~r '7'.i+ ~r ,~f~>'~~.i~.v .v 4r4`i l;. i,~ ~'JII.11 4? Z':J ~ ~4~ r ~ ~ ~ 'r 0f
a miaaest1uf -41.11 not, R,-Y'! `,' ~i "Y IFY~ w 'w t d.ii: 3,`f";"E1 ,:;'5::14tP?: ~;}; ^' }~ .'? !w~~aa"G)