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August 19, 1957
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'may. a Army ,i.hrary The Adjutant General's Office 3 ep~rtrq. tt ,o ..the Amy ,. ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 ~e19 This bibliographic examination of thought expressed in American and foreign literature is presented in order to aid the professional soldier in his many-sided tasks. The problems facing the military today are of such magnitude and com- plexity that-there is a need of recapitulating some of the fundamentals of military power and national objectives. The question is often raised as to the relationship`'between military power and, national objectives and the overall military-and civilian policy in a democracy. This collection of materials abstracted by the research analysts of the Army Library endeavors to present the literature that points up some of the elements and the factors which affect these vital problems of national defense in the United States and Europe. I At this point it is fitting to state that this bibliography is not intended as a syllabus to a course of study or a textbook on military science. The main objective is to inform and arouse curiosity through a collection of diversified literature. Accordingly, some of the selected items are neither definitive nor en- tirely authoritative, but were primarily included because certain parts and chapters contain provocative ideas and constructive, relevant in- formation. The materials in this bibliography deal with three main areas which are pertinent to the study of military power and national objectives, and are arranged in three main chapters. However, similar themes in many papers appear in one or more of these chapters because their authors have stressed not one but several-aspects of military systems, defense problems,* and national history. For -the most part, the materials are limited to general studies deal- ing with the United States, Great Britain, France, NATO, and the U. S.S.R. The rise and fall of military systems in Asia, such as those of Japan and Communist China, were not considered because of limitations of time and personnel, although it is recognized that such an examination would have added to the overall evaluation. Germany, on the other hand,. was included for its historic value and for its 'de- velopmental influence on military systems. In general, only English language literature was included. However, because of unavailability of English language materials on France, some French `language literature has been added. ' ii;;~ 1111 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 This publication contains about 75.0 titles, selected from thousands ap- pearing in periodical, book, and document literature, and are arranged i subject n_alphabetical order by title within mayor and subordinate sub~ groups. Asmall number of materials has been included which is not in the hold- ings of the Army Library. The following symbols were used, to precede such titles in order to indicate their location: lc Library of Congress mh Office, Chief of Military History, Army n Not available at time of listing o Office of the originating agency we National War College Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 'B. Military y Doctrines And Operational Techniques . . . . .' . 14 1. Evolution....... .......?.?????.???? 14 2. Types Of Warfare ........ ........ . 18 3. Strategy ........................... 23 a. General Aspects . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 23 1 Historical Experience . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . 29 b. Germany - Historical Experience . . . .. . . . . . . 31 c. Great Britain .... . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . 34 . 37 d. NATO......... .............. e. United States ...................... 42 f. U.S.S.R......................... 46 4. Tactics . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. 48 a. General Aspects ..? 48 b. Germany - Historical Examples . .. . ... .'. . 52 c. United States ................... ? ? . 53 d. U.S.S.R. 57 ? 58 5. Logistics .............. a. Miscellaneous Aspects ................. 58 United States . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 60 .63 C. Defense Establishments And,Military Organizations . . . . . 1. General Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '. . 63 . ?. a~. Great Britain . . ..? . . . 64. . NATO .. 64 c United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 67 d. U.S.S.R. ......... ......... . 69 2. Evolution .......... . a, General Aspects . . . . . .. . .. . 69 b France . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 70 , c. Germany Historical Examples . . . . . .. . . . . . 70 d. Great Britain . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . 71 e United States . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 72 S.R. 73 f. U.S.S.R.......................... . S 3. Command And Staff . . . . .. . . . . . . 74 a. General Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . ... 75 b. Germany - Historical , Examples . . . . 76 c? United States ? . . ? ? ? ? . .. . ? . . ? 77 U S.S.R. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 CONTENTS MILITARY POWER AND NATIONAL' OBJECTIVES Page I. MILITARY SYSTEMS: SOME ELEMENTS .. . ,.... . 1 A. Military Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. ... ? ? . 1 1. France . . . . . . . .. . .. ... . . .... . . . . 1 2. Germany - Historical Examples . ?. . . ? . ? ? 1 3. Great Britain . . . . . '... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 4. NATO ............. ....... ..... . 5 5. United States ... . . . . . . , . . . . 12 6. U.S.S.R............................... Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 4. - Strength And Composition ..... ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ' a. General Aspects ... c . . . . . b. France ..:.............. . Germany - Historical Examples ... . . ..... . d. Great Britain ....... e. NATO .. . ..................... I.. United States ... .. , . . ... . . ' . . . . ... . U.S.S.R..................... 5. Missions ... .... . . . a: United States . ? ? ' ? . 6. Manpower ... . ......... . .. .. ? . . a. Miscellaneous Aspects ..... ? ? r . ? ? ? ? ? ' b. Procurement . ? _ ? . ? ? ? ? , ' ' ' ' ' ' c? Training And Education . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ' ). Weapons And Weapons Systems: - Trends And Their Employment ... . ... . . . .. . . . ? 1. General Aspects . .. . .. . . .. .. . . . . a. United States .. .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . b. U.S.S.R........................ 2. Conventional .... ... . . . . .. .. . . . . . . 3. Nuclear ....... . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Guided Missiles, Rockets, And Satellites . . . . . . ? 4. G a. Miscellaneous Aspects . .. . . ... . . . . . ? b. United States ????????? c. U.S.S.R....................... \ . . ~ATIONAL DEFENSE: SOME CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 9. General Aspects . . .. ... . . . . . ..` . . 1. France .. . . ... . .. .. . . . . . . 2. Great -Britain . . . . . ,. . . . .. , .. . . . . 3...- United States . . .. ... . . .. . . . . ..? . . . 4 U.S.S.R................. . B. Strategic . .. . .. . .... . . . .... . . . ... . And Aspirations . . .. . . . . 1. National Policy a. General"Aspects . ... . . . ? ? . ? , ? . ? b. France . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . c. Germany -.Historical Examples . . .. . . . . . . d. Great Britain . .. .. . . . . . . . .. . ?. ? ? e. NATO ...... f United States . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Historical Examples . . . .. .. . . . g. U.S.S.R......................... 2. Foreign Policy . . . . . ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? a. United States . . . . . . . ? ? , ? b, U.S.S.R. . . . . .. ' . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . C. Political ' ... . . . . ?' ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ' ? 1. Geopolitics ? ? ? ? ..' tic Politics 2. Domes .. .. .. . . . . .. . . 150 ' As ects tar l M il Ci . p y i i - v 3. a. United States, ... 151 154 b. Others ' ......... . Economic. ..??????????""'???? 155 155 1. General Aspects .???????????'?,""' 2. Human Resources .?????.?"""????' 15? 160 3. National Resources . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 4, Mobilization Capability- . ............ 161 16~ a, United States ..... ~ ~ b? Others ? ?? 16 16 ~ 5. Science And Technology ...... ? ? ? ? ? ? a. General Aspects ? . ? ? ........ .. 16 , 16E b. United States ................ ? . 17( c. U.,S. S, R. .... .... . Sociological .......??????????? . NATIONAL HISTOR IES ...... ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? A. General Aspects . .. . . . . . . . ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ' B. Military Heritage . , . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ' ? ' ' ' ' '. 1. Miscellaneous Aspects ......... ? ? ? ? ? 2. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? 3. U.S.S.R. ....... ....... ...... . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, ANTIAIRCRAFT CRUISERS'OR''SUB= MARINES. Porte-avions, croiseurs anti-aeriens ou sous-marins,, by May 1955) Camille Rougeron in Revue de Defense Nationale, v.11 (.r 614-622. In French. This discussion of the effects of thermonuclear bombs on surface ships concludes that the Navies' only chance of survival resides in the employment of submarines for both military an&commercial ? purposes. ATOMIC WARFARE AND THE CAPTURE OF TERRAIN:'-La guerre atomique et 1'occupation du terrain, by Gen. P: Gera`rdot, inRevue'de> , Defense Nationale v. 11 Apr 1955) 391-396., In French,' Since in modern, warfare with atomic' and thermonuclear weapons ground farces will no longer be able to win a decisive victory and exploit victory through occupation, France must .depend primarily , on the Air Force for-national defense'and must concentrate her militaryi . and technical effort on that arm. f + THE AXIS GRAND STRATEGY, BLUEPRINTS; FOR, THE..TOTA~_L WAR, compiled and edited by y Ladislas Farago.. New York,' 'Farrar Rinehart 1942, 614 , P? t- - "This book attempts to give comprehensive answers by com , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 .: UNITED,KIATGDOM'S? DEFENCE EFFORT, in An' Cosantoir, v. 16, no.4 (Apr 1956) 163-170. Shaping the British Army, Navy and Air Force to fit the re- quirements of the nuclear age. - WHAT SORT OF ARMY? by Lt. Col. L. H. Landon, in Journal of the Royal Artillery, v.82, no. 3 (July 1955) 213-218. To meet the needs of changed world conditions, Great Britain requires a small, highly disciplined, highly, trained, fully equipped; war- strength professional regular army, stationed partly in Germany and being ,partly available as air transportable formations within easy reach of West- ern Europe. This Army must be ready for instant action, and must have its reserves of equipment, ammunition, and men within immediate reach. It must be ready to fight at any time with what it has with it, and without relying on mobilization, reinforcement, or immediate supply., The air transportable formations will constitute the strategic reserves in the hands of the Supreme Commander in Western Europe. Great Britain also needs: an air transport logistic corps - using helicopters and conventional air- craft - to supply this Regular Army and be able to operate from dispersed bases at considerable distance from the troops; a Civil Defense Army, under military discipline, with military training as well as Civil Defense training, in the United Kingdom; and a Colonial Service Army for periph- eral wars - trained and equipped on conventional lines with conventional weapons. This could be partially a National Service Army with regular officers, partially an Army recruited in colonial territories, and the Gurkha Brigade. 4. NATO FOR ATOMIC DEFENSE; THE TACTICS, THE. WEAPONS AND THE MEN, in Newsweek, v.45, no: 1 (3 Jan 1955) 27-31. Recently the NATO Council had authorized ` the military com- mand to plan on the assumption that it would use atomic weapons if the Soviet Union would attack Western Europe. Evaluates the present capa- bility of NATO Forces and US Armed Forces in Europe of striking at .Soviet Forces, with atomic weapons. Types of atomic weapons available; , which they can be used; tactical considerations in their use; manpower needed for these atomic weapons; and the strategic significance of the fact that these atomic weapons are available for defense and are ready on the firing line if the need for their use ever arises. THE SHAPE OF WAR TO COME, by Marshal Arthur W. Tedder in Air Pictorial, v.15,. no. 11 (Nov 1953) 322-324. ' The free world can prevent another war if it shows to the would-be aggressor that real strength is available to deal with him. Such ?.-"9('?F R'M?=?:1 ,'... x...i. ~[a.. c.Y~v i^... . r..v u. ... .v a?.. . real strength can be obtained only in a. strong bomber force and the West must make the necessary provisions to obtain such a force. Passive de- fensive measures cannot prevent aggression. If Russia cannot be deterred from aggression and another war breaks out,' the bomber force will be the only weapon that can decisively hurt the Soviet Union. Russia is o erito air attack but naval or land P operations cannot defeat her. The West must recognize the fact that large fleets, armies, and weaPj oris cannot be built' and maintained indefinitely if the economy of the West is to remain un- shattered. On the other hand, the war at sea, on land, .and in the air must not be considered separately. The three must be united into one force it does not mean that Britain should leave this element of military power to the US alone. Britain must strive to obtain such a force of her own in order to maintain her position as. a great power in world political military affairs. and 5. United States AIR POWER IS THE DOMINANT FACTOR IN WAR, by Adm. Arthur Radford, in US Air Services, v.39, no. 11 (Nov 1954) 7-10. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discusses the part played by air power in US national security. Air power may not win b itself alone but n Y by no major war can be won without it. It is important to recognize the rapid increase in Soviet scientific, technological, and pro- duction skills; their capabilities are shown by the rapidity with which they developed their long-range jet bombers and atomic weapons. The US must make ever effort to maintain a technological lead over the USSR. AIRPOWER MAKES SEA MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER, by Adm. Robert B. Carney, in U. S. Air Service, v.39, no. 12 (Dec 1954) 7-8. The US Navy's Chief of Naval Operations states that technologi- , .cal developments in aircraft and submarines increase the importance of sea power in the present world situation, and that the US must keep pace with the expanding naval forces of the USSR. The shipbuilding' program , of the Soviets; excellent cruisers of the SVERDLOV class are being built, and the USSR efforts in this category exceed all of the cruiser building in the world. Russia is also building large and seaworthy destroyers that are the equal of those of the Western Powers. ' ARMIES ARE HERE TO STAY, by'James D. Atkinson, in Army, v. 7, no. 6 (Jan. 1957) 49-52. ' Warns against the'dan ers. of exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons which leads to formalism and freezes thinking about warfare Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 "' rigid a mould as the Maginot Line mentality." Shows that nuclear weapons have not eliminated the need for armies: "Armies today`-'and'in future - are not obsolete. Instead they are in"a period. of flux. From this present period of change will emerge 'armies as dif- ferent from their World War II prototypes as the World War II soldier was different from George Washington's Continentals. But whatever the form of the content, ARMIES will remain," ARMS AND POLICY, 1939-1944, by Hoffman Nickerson. New York, Putnam's, 1945. 356 p. Background, decisions, and lessons of World War II. ARMS VIGILANCE FOR PEACE, by Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, in Ordnance, v.39, no. 209 (Mar-Apr 1955) 716-719. US military policy in the atomic age must attempt to foster a healthy and expanding national economy while maintaining sufficient military strength to win any war that must be forced upon us. BRIEFING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE. Washington, 1955. 197-352. (84th Congress, 1st Session. House Armed Services Committee. Paper No. 3.) Statements and testimonies by the Secretaries of Defense, Air Force, Navy, and Army and by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force before a briefing of. the House Armed Services Committee. The briefing concerned the military aspects of the international situation, the military policies and programs of the Depart- ment of Defense, .and force levels 'which the US should maintain. THE CASE FOR NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS r bY Lt, Col Edward P.. Wynne, in Air Force, v. 40, no. 2 (Feb 1957) 78 plus. Study Of te great wars in the past shows that as new weapons are developed and placed in the military arsenal, the older weapons are not scrapped. As the types of nuclear weapons increase and our nuclear combat potential expands, we must employ this analysis capability to keep a proper balance between the old and the new. THE COLDEST COLD WAR, in Newsweek, v.44, no. 20 (15 Nov 1954 54-56'., The US and USSR p . Programs of military construction and research in the Arctic. The Soviets know mere about the Arctic .regions than the West does and are publicizing their "new offensive on ';.'~oaoi'~i?,:_,.~..d~..,...n~:~....,, ~e:.- .~.- '- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 rwirLL LL~' 3~d i~`?w Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 MILITAR.Y?FORCES AND NATIONAL OBJECTIVES, by Maj. Charles M.'?Eergusson,. Jr.' ,.in Militar Review, .v.35, no. 7 (Oct f955) 12=29,? =_..;.'Examines some:o the capabilities of military force (among them: offensive war capability, defense. capability, deterrent capability, commitment. capability, -military aid, organizational capabilities, admin- istrative? capability, guerrilla: capability, and civil war capability) and some 'of its limitations; and suggests implications for military policy based upon these capabilities and limitations, The US can afford to develop and maintain the military forces, both conventional and otherwise, that reason- ably?contribute to the attainment of national objectives. MILITARY NECESSITY VERSUS ECONOMY, by Capt. R. E. W. Harrison, :in American Society of Naval Engineers, Journal, v. 67, no. 1 (Feb 1955)=75- - History is replete with the wreckage of nations which have made the fatal=error of underestimating enemy potential. Therefore, it would be wise to evaluate (1) what the Armed Forces can achieve with their available resources, :(2) what the Armed Forces should have in order to achieve certain objectives; and (3) 'what the Armed Forces can obtain if time and cost elements are considered. With these blueprints the case should be presented to Congress so that Congress can act in common with those who foresee "the day," the need for speed when that day comes, and above all, the need for maximum "elbow room" for change and rapid type expansion in the Armed Forces and their logistical supporters, THE.MILITARY POLICY OF THE,UNITED STATES,_by Maj. Gen. Emory.Upton. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1917. 494 P. Deals with the military policies of all American military cam- paigns from the Revolutionary War through the Civil War, THE NATURE OF NUCLEAR WARFARE, by Edward Teller, in Air Force, v.40, no. 1 (Jan 1957) 43-47. "Is it proper now, or in the future, to use atomic weapons in war?" With a discussion of nuclear warfare in both defense and in offense. A 'NAVY SECOND TO NONE, by George T. Davis,., New York, Harcourt Brace, 1940. 508 p. Development of modern American naval policy. ' With bibliography. THE NEW DIMENSION, in Time, v. 63, no. 6 (8 Feb 1954) 18-25, The decision of the,JCS to base US strategy on atomic weapons . . , and long-range, .,strategic air'power;.and `thefAir; Ford& as' it: ernergesin` ' its new role. -USAF's functional=ability y to;strike=enemYFair bases and wart". potential in all parts of the world; post-war development and 'apabilities" of SAC; and SAC's heavy training requirements in all-weather flying, nav- igation, gunnery, radar deception, and bombing on target, The Air Force is still weak in fundamental doctrine and is lacking large numbers of of- ficers educated in military schools. A serious problem is the short tenure of enlisted personnel as compared to:the long. training required for A'ir Force specialties. Illustrations of:AF'aircraft: ', ? NEXT WAR: LONG OR SHORT AND HOW READY IS'h,S. ? U. S. News and World Report, v. 37, , no, 22 (26 Nov 1954) 71-73. E. Wilson, indicate that he agrees"with those military=strategists'wlio ` tha hold that the next war will be brief, that air:power "will-be paramount, the use of soldiers will be limited, and that the" need for' elaborate"in- questions are being dustrial mobilization will be reduced However , . , raised in Congress as to whether Mr. Wilson's,policies provide'enough defense for the nation and whether US can be sure of a'short war`. Reduc- tion in the Army budget since, June 1953 .as:compared to the Navy: and Air Force budget, some of Mr. Wilson's achievements since he; became`.,, SecretarY of Defense, and the relationship. of mutual. trust.,.and close . ..x friendship between the President and Mr. Wilson which shows that, the:. President knows what the Secretary is doing ` and is backing ,hirii:''`. THE ROLE OF TACTICAL AIR FORCES, by Brig. Gen. Janes- Ferguson, in Air University Quarterly Review, v. 7, no. 2 (Summer 1954) 29-4.1. Reviews the lessons learned about tactical air forces in.World War II and Korea; and evaluates othe role, the employment, and the com- position of tactical air forces 'in view of the '.'riew look' military ? olicY - and P. the increase in sizes -and types of nuclear weapons. - , SEA POWER IN THE NEXT WAR, by A. E. Sokol, in'U. S:>? Naval_, Institute Proceedin s, v.78, no. 5 (May 1952) 519-531. Definition, nature, and function of sea -power in-warfare;'role of sea power in World War II in foiling Germany's strategy based mainly:-: , on land and air operations; Korean War as a lesson of sea power's con- ,timed importance in any tYPa of warfare; limitations of air power in- general and in operations against a land power (such as the Soviet,Union) in particular; ? the role of logistics in modern warfare; and the part to be. played by the US naval forces in the next war.`.No`arm of service :can~ win a war individual) because all of them are mutually supplementary,: however, our best hope of winning a war against a country (strong on land and in the air like Russia, is in exploiting to'the'utmost our only' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 The military policies of the US Secretary of Defense;'; Charles . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 t'1 ~~ ~ey~aea e:J~f4w`~v: 2Ex i ~I ~~`ali`~.93e distinctive;advantage" over her: our sea power, If we make our navy stronger by, providing; it with large aircraft carriers, and if we employ our sea power properly, it will give us the ultimate success and victory. ..THE SECURITY OF THE NATION; A STUDY OF CURRENT PROB- LEMS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. Washington, Association'of the United States Army, 1957. 29 p. Views on some of the more important national defense issues of the moment, and the Army's mission and contributing role in maintain- ing the security of the United States, Among the subjects discussed: current strategic concepts; mobility; and the Army's requirement for guided missiles. Appended: The Key West Agreement; Functions of the Armed_Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff l October 1953); Memorandum of Understanding Relating to Army Organic Aviation (4. November 1952); and Memorandum, from Secretary of Defense: Clarification of Roles and Mis.sons (26 November 1956). THE SINGLE-WEAPON FALLACY, by James D. Atkinson, in Army, v.6, no. '1l (June 1956) 23.27. Historical examples to show that in the past, defeat has always come to those who became obsessed with a single weapon or strategy. Fortunately, General Eisenhower's view of warfare holds that the US can and must afford a readiness for all the likely types of war. War is waged in three elements, but there is no separate land, air, or naval war. Un- less all assets are efficiently combined and coordinated against a properly selected, common objective, their maximum potential power cannot be realized " "SQUEEZE 'EM AN' BLAST 'EM" by Lt. Col. George B. Pickett ' , Jr., in Militar Review, v.35, no. 6 (Sept 1955)56-60. With the tempo of change in the atomic age we must change our thinking and consider tactics, technique, and strategy as a continuing "oper- ational process" where process 1954 is not the same as process 1955 but is constantly being reviewed, revised, and adapted to keep , Pace with changes in weapons,. national culture, political concepts, production means, and the many other variables that affect both the delivery and use of weapons on a battlefield and the willingness of the public to permit the use of those wea- pons... STRATEGY ANYONE? b Lt. Col. Anthon Y y?L: Wermuth, in Army, v. 6,no. ?11 (June 1956).?28-29. --?, The capabilities of aircraft tremendous' as they ? are at the present time, cannot hope to do more than extend or complement the ca pa- 10 ~M-q~~~ ? 4 bilities of armies, and can never supplant them. There seems little logic in assigning a land-launched, unmanned weapon?to any other .force`thanthe -; Army, no matter what the range of the weapon may-be. _ - THE SYMINGTON SUBCOMMITTEE'.S AIRPOWER FINDINGS, in Air Force, v, 40, no. 2 (Feb 1957) .41-45. Findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the subcom- mittee on U. S. airpower forces in being, airpower forces for the future and for limited war, airpower preparedness and fiscal policy, and air- " power preparedness and an informed public opinion. J .'4".,?Yx"?1'-__ tt-" {tr et.;"< a.:,t T iiS`;~f.~:'~c'~?,sL":..,,42. -'t~.^~.Y.,1$i~??' ,ee TACTICS FOR ATOMIC WAR, by Col. George C. Reinhardt, in Ordnance, v. 38, no, 204 (May-June 1954) 936-938. The appearance of atomic missiles as tactical weapons dic- tates revision of the conduct of tactical operations. Hence' we must develop new type military organizations to be employed and to defend against nuclear weapons on the battlefield or we may be incapable of-j exploiting the scientific advantages we have gained: Recommended.or- ganizational changes: (1) increase the proportion of armored divisions to infantry divisions as fast as budgetary provisions will permit; (2) introduce changes in the infantry setup so that it approaches armored organization; (3) abolish the regiment, making infantry battalions as, independent as their artillery and engineer counterparts; (4) squeeze- some armored personnel carriers out of the budget for these battalions; and (5) unify the division's combat-logistics elements along the lines of ? armor's train command. THE THREE WARS THAT FACE US, by Comdr, Albert T.. Church, in U: S. Naval Institute Proceedi s, v. 82, no. 2 (Feb 1956 145-151. Outlines three military situations - three wars - for which the US needs plans: (1) all-out nuclear'war; '(2) non-atomic global war; and (3) peripheral war characterized by successive hot spots in the cold war. The difficulty of.determining the forces that will provide a reasonable se- curity for each of the three possibilities. - ? TIME FOR DECISION, by Lt. Commander Allan P. Slaff, 'in .13. S.' Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 82, no. 8 (Aug 1956) 809-813. ' Points out that the Navy must face up to the facts. that the guided missile is a distinct and important competitor of piloted naval; aircraft and that some important and far reaching decisions regarding the requirements of naval operating forces of the future, must be .made,. 'These decisions. will ? 438345 O-57-Z Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 tio~i !~ 3 llil ? ~~ $1. }' -r T~Wr ry ~ k.^a'iFc~ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 not;rule;out the:piloted aircraft and the aircraft carrier as a naval weapon, but they will force a shift in emphasis away from piloted aircraft and the aircraft carrier to the guided missile and the guided missile battleship. C S., U'. S?.' AIR POWER TODAY, in Air University Quarterly Review, v, 8, no.4 (Fall 1956) 61-78. A' digest of the testimony by USAF commanders before the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services, which in the spring of 1956 undertook a review of American air power, especially the capability of USAF to deter aggression. The, testimony revealed current key USAF Professional opinion, on mission capability., Includes description of how Soviet gains swell USAF requirements. A VITAL ELEMENT OF OUR NATIONAL STRENGTHrby Wilber M. Brucker, in Military Review, v. 36, no. 4 (July 1956) 3-7. The military threat of aggression - by land, sea; and air - we face today is-an-inclusive one and our ability to cope with it depends upon the combined strength of the defense team, not on any one part of it. WE MUST PUT WINGS ON THE INFANTRY, by John C. H. Lee, Jr., in Saturday Evening Post, v. 224, no.46 (17 May 1952) 42-43 plus. - The numerical superiority of the USSR and her satellites can be overcome by the mobility of airborne troops. Activities'of the Joint Airborne Troop Board in creating entire airborne armies as compared to the former concept of special parachute units. Tactical .possibilities of vertical envelopment; the, potentialities of airborne warfare demonstrated in. Korea; effectiveness of,helicopters, and other improvements in aerial supply. History of. the Joint Airborne Troop Board and its present pro- gram of developing transport aircraft, lighter equipment, and mobility in logistics. MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN THE. ARCTIC, in Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, Bulletin (Munich), v. 1, no. 8 (Nov 1954) 26-28'. In English. The Soviet leaders realize that the northwestern Arctic regions of th'e USSRrpresent a vulnerable sector in the Russian defense system. Describes the various political and military measures that are being taken to strengthen this sector. -..~,~ ~~ta'awlU~' .'~+7."d'./%gS~?S`a1s~,`"~w~,'r~a ~.~~~3"i5;..ja{. jyryJ.'~~4, MILITARY RECORD, OF ATOMIC HAPPENINGS.?,:195.5THEME; "NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PLENTY"; 5 - THE PRESENT SITUATION. Knightsbridge, England, Aviation Studies Limited, Special Weapons Study Unit, 1955. 33 p, US and Allied strategic capability in air, naval, and, ground warfare, and Russian preparations. In part the conclusions state: "In the pattern of Russian preparations the-build-up points to evolution of general purpose balanced forces... The Russian Army is the dynamic -: factor in an form of all-out struggle, and with over 100 Y divisions at the ready in Poland, East Germany and White Russia, the numerical superi- ority that could soon be brought to bear is sufficient to be decisive on all pre-atomic military calculations. 'The Reds believe that classic military doctrine of land campaigning is still as valid as it ever was..`.'' THE SOVIET TRIAL BY ARMS; JUNE TO DECEMBER 19.41, -by.' Raymond L. Garthoff, in Military Review, v.33, no. 3 (June 1953)23-31., The major causes o Soviet military reverses in the, second- half of 1941, and the reasons behind German victories during the. period. Hitler's plan for OPERATION BARBAROSSA; comparative strength of op- posing forces; equipment used by the Soviets; Soviet ground and air losses, and German casualties; weather during the period; and the shortcomings of the Soviet military doctrine. The major factor in the early Soviet, re- verses was insufficient planning and training for defense. However, German surprise, obsolescent Soviet equipment, and general unprepared- ness were also responsible for their early defeat on the ground. and in the air. THE THREAT: RUSSIA'S BOMBERS by William Green,, in RAF . Flying Review, v. 10, no.6 (Mar 1955) 17-21, An analysis of Russia's latest bombers and their operational; potential across the North Pole. Because the Soviets have established refuelling stops on the islands of Severnaya Zemlya and Frans Joseph Land, as well as bases_on the Taimyr peninsula and the New Siberian Islands, the new bombers of the Soviet Strategic Air Force (Aviatsiia . Dal'nego Deistviia) can attack targets in North America despite the great distance involved. The possibility of using drifting ice floes as refuelling,, points has also been investigated by the Russians refuelling techniques were perfected several years ago. Flying over the Arctic wastes at 50, 000 feet and at high sub-sonic speeds the chances of a pro- portion of the bombers reaching their targets in U are high. The question is no longer, "when will the Russians develop modern strategic bombers?" but "when will they possess them in sufficient numbers to constitute a serious threat." The conception of Russia as a land, possessing"air forces , solely for the purpose of tactical support will soon be outdated."' Includes description of the capabilities and characteristics of`Soviet Bombers`T' 'e YP 39 BADGER, Type 3.7 BISON, Type 31, and Type 35,BOSUN,('desi nated . (, g so by NATO force's for identification purposes). ' V . 13' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 ccyy A'3 w E Cr7~~C:.a.~1! pp tt~~,,C"'k'a -' 1 ~ a.~G ~..v m Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 B:-Military Doctrines And Operational Techniques r (- 1.a.. Evolution.. ` THEART OF MODERN WARFARE, by Herman Foertsch. New York, ?OskarJPiest, 1940. 273 p. (With an introduction by Maj. George Fielding Eliot.) '"Its (book's) greatest interest lies in its clear demonstration of the evolution of modern German military thought from the..formalism of the nineteenth century, which still to some extent constrained the German officer corps during the World War (I). While steadily based on the timeles`s:principles of-war, the book sweeps away any idea of set rules in the. application thereof to the variant exigencies of battle. It lays the greatest emphasis on the need for individual initiative on the part even of the private: soldier, but more especially of the subordinate `. leader: 1t ATOMIC WEAPONS AND ARMIES, by Lt. Col. F. 0. Miksche. London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1955. 222 p. Evolution of tactics and techniques during the two World Wars; the importance of fire and movement; analytical review of the German "Blitzkrieg" and of the Allied counter-blitz in World War II; and how tac- tics and organization will be affected if tactical A-weapons are used in any future war. The general pattern of the forces required by the West is al- most the opposite of the "New Look" strategy, because as long as Russia has the H-bomb 'and maintains large armies, we must stick to atomic wea- pons and maintain an'army which is able to fight conventional as well as atomic-typewars, as 'circumstances may dictate. " " CHANGES IN MILITARY DOCTRINE, by Fred B. Waters. Fort Belvoir; Va. Engineer School, 1949. 25 p. - 'A brief' review of the change that new weapons and concepts of war have 'effected 'on-fundamental military doctrine. DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE, by Col. Robert C. Cassibry, in Military 'Review, 'v. 36,, no. 2 (May \1956) 22=34. The Command and General Staff College is specifically charged ,. ~ 'o ment and revision of the tactical and logistical. doctrine for with the"develP 14 k'~44a1-. ~.' ~S?) t-+~'yi i ~ .1;' ""n.i';:' ?C (9R E ,C Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 all of the combined arms and services, ' including tactical emPtoYmen't of , ,. atomic and future weapons., With chart 'show'ing the'' organization'for devel- t opmen THE HERITAGE OF DOUHET bY'Bernard Brodie, in Air University Quarter/ Review, v:6r no.2 (Summer 1953)64=69 plu.,y. The influence exerted on air forces generally by. the Italian air strategist, and evaluation of his doctrine in the light of World War II. ? . Fundamentals of his basic theory. of" command:of-the.air";;soundness of. . some of his ideas; and instances from World War U which proved him wrong. The atomic bomb now gives his theories much support, and it is remarkable that he could create a framework of strategic 'thought that fits the atomic age. A HISTORY OF MILITARY AF_FAIRS.IWWES.TERN SOCIETY, SIIVCE . THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY _ ed, by,Gordon B... Turner.. ' NewYork, Harcourt, Brace and Co. , 1953: 776 p, of the-problems which~a' an understanding p A study to provide democratic society faces in preparing for and in waging total war. The principal developments in the art of war from the cabinet wars of the eighteenth century to the total war of the present; and the relationship be- tween the nature of a military establishment and the political, ; social, and economic character of the society of. which it'is` apart. Types of warfare, and the evolution of strategy, tactics, weapons, and logistics ;area,also =~ _ ...,,.. considered, however, not in the purely military nature but in their broad- est aspect. Emphasis is placed upon: the political and administrative problems incidental to raising and maintaining a'larg&military!establisli ment in a democratic society; Proper employment of manpower in modern war; and the role of the military in the formulation of foreign policy in peace and war, among others. Some of the subjects examined are: the eighteenth century military system in Europe and America; the French Revolution; the American Civil War; Civil-Military relations during World War I; coalition and global warfare during'World;War IL'and joint , . operations and politico-military relations; various lessons learned from World War II, US contemporary Problems of military. defense, and ;civil ,. and military elements o national security,,(including: national security;.. . and military policy, the political objectives of, war;.. democratic; control; of military Power; strategic implications of the North Atlantic Pact;' the. role . of the military in formulating the Japanese.Peace Treaty; the role of -Sea Power in global warfare of the future; and the influence of Air-Power, upon history). Maps. - ' ' ? ; ` A HUNDRED YEARS OF WAR, by Cyril Falls.,; 'London;-,Duck, worth, 9 - r-,_.. r ~;.~?,... 1953 41 Record of military events from, the, time. of the Crimean War., with comments on practically every war;-. great,and small,.-;iathe.past. hundred years. , ? 15- i i~.Y~4G'+3 Y1. ' "1VIE1V IN ARMS, by Richard A. Preston and others. New York, rae er 1956. 376 p. General survey of the history of warfare, partieularly'the interrelation of military techniques and social organization. - ~, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 ,? LANDINGOPERATIONS, by Alfred Vagts. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service Publishing Company, 1946. 831 p. om antiquity to fr olitics t MILITARY OPERATIONS by Lt. Gen. C. D. Eddleinan, in Arm' Information Digest, v. 12, no. 2 (Feb 1957) 16-23. New developments in firepower, mobility, and~communications step up the potential of military operations. The Deputy Chief of Staff for ,. ilitar Operations, takes a look at the changes that are taking place in M Y p- US ArmY's'firepower, mobility, communications, tactical concepts, and organization to prepare it to the needs of future warfare. THE NEW FACE OF WAR, by Hansen W. Baldwin, in Bulletin of the Atomic,Scientists, v, 12, no.5 (May 1956) 153-158. ng n naval taccs; meaning. New ways of usi ng ground forces; modifications i ti the h anges in progress in air tactics; and the strategy of US amidst the c ,. art of war, ? PROPI~ET .OF AIR POWER, by Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, 0, no. 2331 (4 May 1956) 342-343. Aeroplane, v.9 in -? Air power has exactly fulfilled the doctrine of Gen. Douhet written 35'years ago. 'Highlights of his doctrine and its-effect on the development of air power in US and other countries. - . REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARMOUR, by Brig. Gen. Beaufre, in Royal Armoured Corps Journal, v. 8, no. 4 (Oct 1954) 173-177. e.combination of heavy tanks, light tanks, and antiatomic mechanized infantry designed for all phases o combat a`s the three main trends in the 'evolution of French ideas in the field of armor, ics, p , Strategy, psychology, tac es in the art of war during the past 25 years and their Cha THE REVOLUTION IN WARFARE, by Liddell Hart. New'Haven, Yale UniversitY , Press,- 1947, 125'p. -" The future is moulded by -the past. The best promise for the future lies in understand' ing, and applying, the lessons of the past: For that reason, in discussing the problems created by the; cuir'rent war; "more ' . , light may come from tracing the whole course of the revolution of warfare than by dealing merely with the appearances of the moment. If we realize how the conditions of this war have come, about, there may be some pros- pect of averting a more deadly recurrence A STUDY OF WAR, by Quincy Wright. Chicago, Uriiver5ity'of Chicago Press, -1942. Vol. I, p. 1-678 Vol. II, p. 679-1552. Volume I traces the history of warfare from hostilities among animals, through primitive and historic civilizations, to modern 'times. Volume II analyzes the causes of war and discusses the practical problem of preventing war. . TRADITION VERSUS PROGRESS, by Field Marshal Montgomery, in Air Force, v.38, no, 11 (Nov 1955) 31-34 plus, Because air power is the dominant factor in modern war, pro- gress must give way to tradition in building-up an organization of the fight- ing forces for maximum strength within limits of economic possibilities. Air power must be released from its bondages and forged into one-mighty weapon, and the air forces of the western alliance should be organized and controlled as one single mighty weapon. Present organization of tactical air forces and logistics should be recast completely; and. the services should be brought more closely together even to the extent of combining them into one service. THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD SEA POWER, ed. by E. B. Potter. Englewood Cliffs, N. J. , Prentice-Hall, 1955. 963 p. A history of US and international sea power, developing six main themes: (1) the influence of sea power upon history; (2) the ration- ale of strategic decision, (3) the characteristics of successful leadership, (4) the development of naval weapons, (5) the evolution of naval tactics, and(6) the evolution of amphibious doctrine, Emphasis is. placed on the , problems posed in each period of history by new weapons and new condi- tions, and on the solutions worked out for each by the navies of the world: Among the chapters: the origins of Western sea power; the Seven Years' War; the American Revolution; the Trafalgar Campaign 1805; the Ameri- can Civil War; naval developments of the late 19th Century; the rise of sea power in the Far East; the naval battles of World War I; doctrinal evolution between World Wars; US and Allied naval battles and campaigns of World War II; defeat of Germany and the dissolution of, the Japanese Empire; -naval operations in the Korean War; and the political and mili- 17' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Airborne; operations of Germans and Allies during World War II; illustrating that airborne troops almost invariably captured their ob-jective,and 'that'all the operations, no matter how well planned or care- fully executed,a took a large toll of airborne troops. Due tq the-high cost of maintaining such troops, only nations with great industries and huge reserves of manpower can use them. The troops will be employed for :- specialmissions, which are enumerated. Varied opinions by military experts on. the value, future, and limitations of airborne troops are quoted, THE INDECISIVENESS OF. MODERN WAR AND OTHER ESSAYS, by J. Holland Rose; 'London, G. Bell and Sons 1927 20 - " ., 4 p, The first two essays contrast the prolonged deadlock in the North. Sea and on the Western Front in 1914-18 with wi what was -achieved by the'weak, slow fleets and small professional armies of earlier times The other essays 'deal with subjects bearing on national safety and expansion, the balance'of power in the 'Mediterranean the ultimate dependence of India on'sea power, `certain aspects of the careers of Na oleon and Nelson the'well-being of~th P ' ng e?fleet in 1805, British acquisition of Malta, and finally, the comparatively recent growth of the spirit of comradshiP at sea, MACHINE WARFARE, by J. F. C. Fuller, ss Washington, Infantry Journal Pre, 1943 :. 257 p, MISSIONS SAND ORGANIZATION OF SUBMARINE FORCES. Missions et organisation des forces sous-marines b Capt by . A. Traonmilin, in Revue Maritime, no, 110 (June 1955) 720-736, In French. Combat missions of submarines du .. ring the two World Wars; various reconnaissance missions for which submarines can be used; special missions such as the landi' of agents, commandos, and supplies; and the ideal theoretical submarine command - organization, Submarine warfare can inflict heavy losses upon enemy shipping at the beginning of hostilities. However, the submarine is still unable to: achieve system- atic destruction of naval forces transport troops, and conquer bases and territories. Therefore', submarine warfare must be integrated into the general conduct of operations together with surface and air forces. These conclusions will be subject to revision as soon as the atomic erier fives su employment of gy g? submarines: speed and s cruising range comparable to those of urface ships, adequate weapons against all types of enem forces, and a substantial trans ort y p anon capacity, ? PARA-_MILITARY WARFARE: THE KING ?b Wi NATION'S SECURITY PLAN- , y, , lliam R. Kintner, in Marine CorP s tte, -. , Gazev35no, 3 (Mar 1951 46-48, 20 Lenin, the master strategist of the Communist movement , has described has de c evolutionary type of , ,. oriie?so?sk? warfare the pled, as a m'elan at which Comm faist ' Sovieis=treat' ara- ge of war and olit'- to consider p military warfare e s, The'factuh "it in'our own as 'a prime:weapa' on`` s' view strategy ,` From , a pure/ P e:point f ? . , the military sh ? ~ould Instruct ` offices and , ;.Y men in defensive :point `of instruments used ; b "~~"~ 1 y the' Soviets in t the e re. ? a ogical' and guerrilla heir Para-militar '? q nd warfare metho Y:warfare'psy sor War II. should ~be - ds employed befog - y " ? ' Studied , since u e,arid,during ' Wor'1 military groups an J figment in theri h ' '?'.,, d , ( and in the reciprocal g t uses `of it of? conventional mil' con se uences regular nary forces can q of the emplo ent q ) only be ac ui ~ ? The basic foundati q red, from lon ac=uaintance5hip warfare must be la foundations warfare must be for the g id now, by men wh of of Para-b lis involved, o are familiar Y with the problems PERIPHERAL? WARS b Review by Brig, Gen, Pi 1'.M. Robin ett, in Militar v.35,. no,12 (Mar 1956 44- 47, The politico-military histories of the Roman E Germany, Soviet Union, Ja an m ire;?~Nazi~ p , and Great Brita' ~? accompanied by little war in show that. containment territory ~ s on the periphery'of enemy held ; is only a tactic and- Y d or dominated'? tion not a form of warfare, which cannot win a decision " It is a delaying:ac- PRIZE ESSAY, 1957, A PHI FARE' LOSOPHY FOR NAVAL ATOM by Comdr. Malcolm W. Cale IC WAR:- Proceedin s g in United States Naval. Institute g , v.83 no 3 (Ma 1 57 , . r 9 249-28. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE Washin ton , by Paul M. A. Linebar, er g, Combat Forces Press 1954 g 2d ed. Bas ~ 318 p, . ed on the experiences of the-author who worked-fqr five cal expert and as Army officer in'Amer.' warfare facilities - at every level scan psycChiefs-' of Staff lan ' from the Joint and, Combined ? P rang phase down to the Chiefs and histor of s ch preparation of spot leaflets. Definition y P Y ological warfar?e,.pro a anda an' organization for s cholo P g alysis 'and intelli-erica- P y. gical warfare; plans and la g ' civilians; operations a ainst tr p ~~'~ operations_for after g oops; and psychological warfar World War,II. Appended: milit e. operations Illustrations of th military psywar'operations l950-53'? _ e various types of propaganda.. With THE SEA HERITAGE; A STUDY OF W Frederic MARITIME WARFARE : b Ad C. Dreyer, London, Museum Press y m' The , 1955. 472 ,. ,. first thirty-two chapters of this book cover'the author's 21 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Ip~~ i/I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 career.;and,.e eriences-in the British Navy from 1891 through 'W,orld,War IL.. Then'foUows Addend um Ch t I , ap er ,. in which the author, starting with a br' "~ `.`... ? ief review of the 'ith ortan " p t events.and developments in naval warfare up;.to the `eiid `of - World'War I refl t h ec s on t e various aspects of,-naval during World War II - especially in the Pacific ject's discussed.- - Among-the sub- ., the Battle of Jutland, 1916; rebuilding of British ' - and US Naviesr.1933 =?1945 ? th s :- the Merchant Navy in World War II; Pearl Harbor some of th`e highlights of na ,and .; f ,, ...., val operations in the Pacific. Photos and maps. THE ?U. S. MARINES AND AMPHIBIOUS ITS-PRAC WAR: ITS THEORY, AND TICE IN THE PACIFIC, b Jeter A. Isel an Princeton `Princeton and A. University Press, 1951. 636 :~ '. A study of the. Marine Corps' development of the doctrine of P fighting in the period between the two Worl applications of-the ' doc d Wars; and of the trine in the Pacific. The events of the a attacks ,are' . described,in detaH mphibious th ~ - , but the emphasis is alwa s focussed e, theory, of practice. The evolution y ac duri ?the of an amphibious doctrine is traced ng . period.1901-1934, followed b a description training methods during 1934-1942, and finally, the actual o traced, beginning with Guadalcana perations are 1 and ending with Okinawa. Close amination of earlier amphibious landi ex- comings were not in doctrine, landings indicates that the chief short- ne, but rather in the means for utti existing doctrine into effect. Si P ng the conce t. Significant changes made in the on in p stemmed solely from technolo is g al of new am' hibiou g a1 innovations--the introduction A: s equipment such as the piques~included,the amphibian tractor. Better tech- improvement in coordination of su orti evolution of close air support, a pp ~ arms, the ort, and the perfection of naval p. After World War II, the Mari gun-fire sup- with novel' devic Marine Corps began again to ex eri es and ideas to improve old tech ' P nvent mques? ? ? WAR -LIMITED ORUNLIMITED? by Air Marshal R ower, v, 2, no. 2 (Jan 1955 100- obert Saundby, 102. Historical examples show th limited objective ha at wars fought in the ast f J ve often been successful P or a :limited objective have. se , if .wars having seldom if ever succeeded in g an un- a'world'situation more favorab the sense of creatin the have le, than if, there had not b g y always caused wide-spread een a war, T and h fore, if we should destruction and loss of lif ' become involved in a e. There- jective were the tom lete d war against Russia, and our ob- pestruction of Russian Po con ditional surrender - we sh wer - possibl because ould fail even if we Y unon - such a, victory would be gained the eventual victo worthless if in the tours rl we brought about the destr a of the stru Wester uction of almost ever gge n standards of living based, r 22 WHO SAID IMPOSSIBLE?'Col; .Geor e C G R . azette, .: v: 3 9, no. 1: g ? einhardt , inMarin (Jan 1955)10=16e - mphibious "' `~ ?' ~ o ? ? perations and f t ? . u compatible as ure atomic warfare " ' ' ar no ` in military writers have b ;su combining the two of ggested;-it'inay,be` that b types w b f . y ar are the US-will d Basic discover the, key to?victorY considerations of an amphibious . operation which atomic . wea pons of all types and at'th could employ, ., ,; " and , , e same time, :be?threatene ' - ' ~ . Although tactics-and 1 ogistics for th such an operation those would differ'from'-" ' P ce the' , mobility and flexibH movement and landing will not b it3.- of amphibious, , e radically changed. - . 3. Strate a. General Aspects THE ABC OF WAR b M y aj. Gen. H. Journal v W. Blakele .3, no. 11 (June 1953)36- . Y, in Combat-Forces 41 . Modern definition of the " ~~ .. ci le principles of wa p of the objective, the r, namely: the rin- prin r principle of simplicity, unit of c ,the p inciple of the offensi Y ommand ve, the principle of maneuver, the princi le of ma the to the principle of economy principle of force, surprise, and portance of y historical examples to e these principles, emphasize the im- THE ART OF WAR b A ' .. .' " 268 , Y Arthur Birnie. London, T. Nelson P , 1942. ":..Amid all the the changes in the material soldier, des ite means em to ed" b, continual improvements in p Y Y numbers, and transport, 'certain weapons, organization, stand permanent princi les out as applicable in ever ~~ P of the military art the application of every circumstance.. , Specific cases s bowing these principles throughout the hi tor s y A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MI Victor LITARY STRATEGY AND TA C. Muller. Rondebosch Uni CTI by; versity f ' o ; Cape Town, l951. - - 47 ' International, E lish-lap . p; ~ guage,biblio ra h?-of, book`'' strategy and. tactics, held g . P? Y son S by the Central Librar U S n y .. A. Military College Library, State, Libras tc' ) Johannesburg Public Y, Pre~ria;and,tlie":,.., g Library. Achro l no ogically Part I c th ithree oversen. arts: period prior to World :War I; Pa P'., -~ the two World Wars; a rt II, the period - ~. and Pa t I' " r ld II, Wor War II an d after 4 . ,; ... . 23 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 o CERTAIN ASPECTS OF BATTLE THEORY, by G. Gamow. Chevy Chase 'Md, Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office, 1953...(ORO-T-23Q,) . 'Classical Lanchester. equations, which were written originally to cover, the conflict between two stationary forces, are extended to- cover the case of moving units and changing conditions of battle. This opens the possibility of ?evaluating'the effectiveness of equipment and various tactics by "fighting" model battles on automatic analog computets with conditions and combinations varied through the feasible range; Hundreds of such model battles Can be fought within a few hours, CLAUSEWITZ AND DEMOCRACY'S MODERN WARS, by Lt, Col. Edward M. Collins, in Military Affairs, v, 19, no. l (Spring 1955) 15-20, Application o ausewitz concepts of war to modern wars of democratic nations, with particular emphasis on the thesis that all wars are fought for political reasons and that the military point of view must be subordinated to the political. The records of World Wars I and II and the Korean War indicate: that political aims have been sublimated to emo- tional and military objectives; that democracies tend to make war in the form described by Clausewitz as "struggles of life and death from pure hatred"; and that recent wars even if militarily successful, produce un- satisfactory political results. The need for military and political leaders to recognize the problem and to discover and apply measures to solve Y it. THE CONDUCT OF WAR: A BRIEF STUDY PORTANT PRI OF ITS MOST IM- NCIPLES AND FORMS, by Colmar, b Kansas City, Mo., Hudson-Kimberly, 1896. 217 p. Tra anslated German by 'Joseph T (T from Y .Dickman. ) DECISIVE BATTLE: CONTINUOUS F Bataille decisi ~ ? RONTS AND INTERVAL ve: fronts continus et interval S' Revue Militaire d' les, by Col. Ailleret i Information, no. 236 10-25 July 1954) ) 28, In Study of the pros and con continuous fr s of defense by continuo co - onts, especially in atomic warfare that and tinuous,fronts are no better suite , concluding that dison- fr d to this type of'warfa onts. The main problem is for, stra re than continuous atomic wea on tegists to decide whe pons permit the creation of Conte ' they or not very. different-.forms fr nuous fronts, roba from those of World War p bly in problem 'will then rovide th I? The solution oft p the answer .as to whet his nation should be adapted to her'the defense of a continuous defenses a decisive battle, - system or t a , n initial 24 - - I Declassified in DEFENSE OF THE FREE WORLD, by Capt; B. H. Liddell Hart, ; in Marine Corps Gazette, v.39, no. 9.(Sept' 1955) 36-41, For the continued provision of the "," a rela- tively small number of super-performance `aircraft 'should suffice to en-. sure the possibility of delivering enough H-bombs to destroy the vital` , centers of, any country. Thus a' great strategic bombing force of the; or-. denary kind becomes obsolete and superfluous;, Strategis .g forces of high mobility and highly trained skill are needed, They .'should . be airborne, so that they can be quickly switched anywhere an outbreak occurs. They should be given ample tactical air support"of a suitable" kind and means of air supply wherever it can be advantageous: They ,.. should be organized in small composite`combat teams, of 'a hand and., very flea~ible kind, so that they can grapple with 'guerrillas or strike , against larger invading bodies. Light armored fighting vehicles of high cross-country maneuverability would be' a valuable form of equipment but not cumbrous 50-ton tanks. The helicopter should be developed to' the fullest possible extent for such forces. With such a pattern the pros- pects of quenching the new communist strategy of "small aggressions" could be greatly increased. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF WAR, by Gen. John E. ? Hull, in Army Information Digest, v. 9, no.3 (Mar 1954) 3-7. Basic considerations in planning and executing military strategy and operations: (1) formulating and adhering to a sound strategic concept; (2) understanding the objective; (3) anticipating the demands of the future; (4) authority underlying command; (5) perfecting the organization for war; (6) keeping continually informed; (7) considering the human element; and (8) comprehending the means. Comments on each of these fundamentals. LAND POWER AS AN ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER:by Hanson W Baldwin in Arm Combat Forces Journal, v.6, no. 6 Jan 1956 ' 16-21. The limitations o atomic weapons; the roles of land power in limited war, in larger conflicts, and in atomic war; and the necessity for , our military planners to organize and maintain armed forces capable of fighting any kind of war anywhere. No matter what his instruments and weaPons it is. man, "with his feet in the mud, sweating, and,bleeding, " who fights land wars with the objective of dispossessing other men from{ a particular area of earth, to control 'and dominate the battlefield - the land itself. MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY; MILITARY THOUGHT FROM ELLI TO HITLER by ' Edward M. Earle. Princeton;`Princeton ' MACHIAV i , University Press, 1943. 553 p. ' ".. ,It is the purpose of this book... to explain the manner in' which the strategy of modern war ha's developed, 'in the conviction that a' knowledge of the best military thought will enable-Anglo-Saxon, readers to comprehend the causes of war and the fundamental principles which"govern the conduct of war. 25 Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 ' I j, ~P s; b MILITARY DECISION AND in?0 eraLL GAME THEORY, by 0. G. Maywood, J bons Research Society of America r'' 36 - 85, , Journal, v. 2, no.4 (Nov 1954 The' US military doctrine of decision prescribes that a c (Estimate-of the Situation commander select the c ) greatest promise of nurse of, action which offers the success in view of the enemy's cabilities him. This article analyzes of opposing the Pa two battle decisions of World War cific, the other in the European Theater), and develops an analo ng military doctrine and the 'theory - gy von Neumann- Current us doctrine is conservative, T Y game theory permit analYsi he techniques of via s of the risk involved if the com tes from current doctrine-to base mander de- his enem int his decision on his estimate of y ends to do rather than on what The idea of 'mixe , what his enemy is capable dng. d strategies presents more difficulties but oie- fu1, particular/ for command may use- decisions for sma Y 11 military organizations, NAPOLEON AND MODERN WAR; HIS MILITARY MA and annotated b MAXIMS, revised by Conrad H. Lanza. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service, 158 P, t _ Comments on the 115 maxims used frequently b by Napoleon, THE NATURE OF MODERN WARFA Oxford U ' RE, by Cyril Falls. New York mversity Press, 1941. 101 p. Contents: The Doctrine of Total War Tactics of Defense ,The Mechanized Attack, Notes on Mountain War, and Immutable While author's aim is to thr Realities. ow light upon modern land warfare th aircraft in cooperation with round for , e role of a consider g forces is also discussed, and .there i ation of, the influence of sea power upon s armies in the field. ON FUTURE WARFAREb y Col '1928 Y ? J. F. C. Fuller. London- Sif Praed ,, 390 p. ton Applies lesson f W s o orld War I to future warfare. ON MARITIME STRATEGY by ' " Naval In , Capt. J. C. Wylie, Jr, in U stitute Proceedi s, v, 79, no. 5 ' (May 1953) 467-47'x. '- ~ " maritime strategy is one in which the 'world s maritime communications systems are exploited as the me strength nia be applied main avenues by which may to establish control over one' strategy is a less inclusive term. A s enemies; naval historical ?theory of maritime strategy; example of its use by the British against om the technological factor Napoleon; some of s which complicate the use of this concept-at 26 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 present; and our contemporary use of military power with respect ,to maritime strategy. In the struggle between East and West, we are placing our faith in a concept of strategy that is basically maritime, PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR A CHART OF THE FUTURE, by Maj. Lamar McFadden Prosser, in Armor, v, 63, no. 5 (Sept-Oct 1954) 16-19. In order to remain ahead in the art and science of war, we must take into account the probable effect of atomic weapons and integrate our basic ideas with our proved methods, add certain assumptions, and then develop new equipment, techniques, and tactics accordingly. The precepts on which any exploring into the future must be based are: (1) successful operations by large scale ground forces are not now possible unless something approaching parity in the air is assured; (2) technical. developments and weapons of unusual destructiveness have increasingly forced ground troops to deploy, separate, and disperse; this dispersion can no longer be considered a passive defensive measure but is now a fundamental condition; (3) the capability of rapid movement must be built ' into every arm of the ground forces to make it possible to fight and move in a dispersed manner or to concentrate; (4) each unit of the ground force must be so designed as to permit the maximum flexibility in its employ- ment; (5) commanders must be prepared to operate without definite de- tailed orders but in conformance with a general overall plan; and (6) dispersion, mobility, and flexibility must also apply to administrative and logistical organizations. , 7 r . L PRINCIPLES OF SEA POWER, by Adm. Robert B. Carney, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v.,81, no. 9 (Sept 1955) 967-985. The former Chief of Naval Operations examines the pattern of sea power and the place of sea power in national policy and strategy and concludes that:. ".. until the seas dry up, man will be confronted with problems' of achieving?his own crossing and denying the crossing of his. enemy,' for nowhere in the future can be discerned any total substitute for . ~~ the great highways of the' seas. importance of sound principles underlying the use ?of weapons. How Mahan 's doctrine can be appliedto-present US strategy,. ,. PERIPHERAL STRATEGY -'MAHAN'S DOCTRINE TODAY, .by Capt. John D. Hayes, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 79; no. l1 (Nov 1953 1185-1193. , The strategy of Alfred Thayer Mahan is still sound and appli- cable today although new weapons and concepts must also be considered in 'strategic thinking. "Peripheral" should be substituted in the doctrine for ?maritimen or nsea power" because it is. more inclusive and more de- scriptive scriPtive of the present world situation. The emphasis that has been placed on weapons in the post-World War II period tends toobscure the , 438345 0-57-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 27 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR, by Marshal Ferdinand Foch. New York, Holt, 1920. 351 p, (Translated from French by Hilaire Belloc,= n Y ) .... Defines the principles of war; explains from what neces- sities they arise, to what results they lead; how, being unchangeable, they can be applied in practice, with the arms of today, to modern war, the new features of which have so profound an effect," ? RE-EXAMINE THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR b Ma' by ~. James A. Huston, in Military Review, v. 35, no. 2 (Feb 1956) 30-36. It ough the principles of war are still sound, it is doubtful whether they should be presented as unexceptionable principles, unalterable marims,. and established axioms. Exceptions, modifications or- improve-. nents ma Y .be found for every one of them. No idea should be too fantastic or:too.unorthodox to be rejected without a fair hearing. Any milita struction which cur military ro- bs the development of bold imagination should be modi- fied. That includes presentations of the principles of war. . THE REMAKING OF MODERN ARMIES by Liddell J. Murray, 1927. Y ll Hart. London, y, 27. 315 p. "The keynote of this book is MOBILITY - of m organization, and, not least of movement, action, thought. For mobility of thou ht im lies originality in conception and surprise in execution, p two essential qualities have been the hallmark of the Great Ca tains artists from the ? P ,distinguishing the artisans of warfare.. . USA COMMAND & GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FUTURE, KEEPS PACE WITH by Maj. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, no.1'(Apr 1957 3-13 in Military Review, v.37, The Commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff College describes how. Leavenworth is orienting on the future w taining:the sound experience of the a hale re- ?.leaders in p st to mold the minds of the Arm's the direction of progress.' With chart y of the College, an hart of the new or anizat>.o n g and description of the 1957 -58 cu rriculum, +1 + ~, i WAR IN THREE DIMENSI ONS, by E. J. Kin stop-Mc g Cloughry, London, Jonathan Cape, 1949. 159 Th ' e p 28 impact of air power upon the classi cal principles of war, ARE THE. LESSONS .OF,HISTOR;YNO:LONGER VALID?'.:by.Arthur:- A. Ageton, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings,; v. 78,.no. 6 (June'-1952. 624-633. Examples of naval World War=II which' illustrate'the effectiveness of the principles of warn of correct objective, .." security, = of fensive action, concentration, mobility, ,surprise, economy of force,"'co'. operation, and simplicity... These principles are still?a guide'for future military action, and the US should learn from history that control of the: seas is necessary for our national securit : - THE ART OF WAR b Sun Tzu, Harrisburg. "Militar` S'er"vice Publishing Co., 1944. 99 p. - '- THE ART OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES, A.D. 378-155; by, Charles William Chadwick Oman, rev. and ed, by John Beeler. Itliaca, Cornell University Press, 1953. 176 p. A revision of C. W. C. Oman's prize-winning essay published in 1885. THE BATTLES THAT CHANGED HISTORY by Fletcher Pratt. Garden City N Hanpver House 1958 348 r Y . ., sometimes-far-distant" results and policies rather than the importance: of the immediate field. THE DECISIVE WARS OF HISTORY, A STUDY IN STRATEGY; by. B. H. Liddell Hart. London, Bell, 1929. 242 p. A broad survey of war,, with the historical' effects' in a com- prehensive series of cases, and with the logistical or psychological moves ' ' which led up to them. c ~0 t. 'S OWN STORY OF THE WAR by Dwight D. Eisen EISENHOWER hoover. New York, Arco Publishing Co., 1946. 122 p. The complete report by the Supreme European Commander 29 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 in the Second World War, The way in which they were employed "viol"ate oftle_war.:in Europe, .in which the follow' are presented: summary of operatioris:in Northwest Europe; planning and preparation; the assault; establishment of the lodgement area; the?break-through; the Battle of the :Falaise,'-Argentan Pocket; the advance to the Seine; the build-up and the Allied :navies; the advance from the Seine to the German border; consoli- ?datibn-on the frontier;,the.Ardennes counteroffensive; plans for the 1945 ;'campaign; operations to reach the Rhine; crossing the Rhine; the envel- . opment of the Ruhr: and the junction with the Russians; the final phase; "and"surrender . Maps are included of the important operations. A d V. ,.no. (11 lyov,195U) 5-6 plus. stu y of three battles the firstfhihd i , o wc occurren and the last in 1761. It is shown that the principles of war have not+~v changed' basically in time and that forms of attack and defense have re- mained practically the same. Morale then as now, is one of the most importarit.factors in war and what cannot be achieved by mere numbers is secured by better traimng, and discipline. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 *11 ? 30 The Allied strategic air forces were not. Pr.oPerlY.eiPloYed ?n OPERATION OVERLORD; DESIGN AND REALITY, by Albert Norman. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service Publishing Co., 1952. 230 p. History of the planning and preparation for the invasion of Western Europe, and of the staging of the operation from England in the Summer of 1944. ' The strategic problem and the controversies on it; com- mand organization for the invasion; assault on the Normand coast, ; fi - i for the expansion of'the beachhead; breakout and encirclement of the German forces in that area; and pursuit of the Germans to the Seine River, ROOTS OF STRATEGY, ed. by Maj. Thomas IL Phillips. Harris- burg, Pa., Military Service Publishing Company, 1940. 448 A'" c p' ollectibn of military classics Containing: WAR? byS~ THE ART OF .m Tzu, 500 B. C.; THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF THE ROMANS, by Vegetius,, 390 A.]).; MY REVERIES ON T b HE ART OF WAR, by Marshal Maurice de Saxe, 1732; THE INSTRUCTION OF THE GREAT FOR FREDERICK HIS GENERALS, 1747; and THE MILITARY MAXIMS OF' NAPOLEON. SEA, LAND, AND AIR STRATEGY,, b Sir Geor J. Murra 1914 30 Y ge Aston. London, y, 8 p. Lectures delivered at the Staff College at ' years 1904-07, Camberley in the 1943 attacks and were directed. primarily at,assembly:plants. Notwith= b. Germany - Historical Experience torical account that the essence.,of strategy is the ."indirect;-approach" The true aim of a strategist is to seek an advantageous 'strategic 'situation,, , and this is best achieved by dislocating the enemy!s balance'aind,takinthe;' " his- Strategy of the decisive war ea 4 s from 490 B:? C: to 1945, the Brea New York, Praeger, 1954, 420 p. :t. STRATEGY; THE INDIRECT APPROACH, by B..H:' :Liddell^Har witz;, and comments on present Russian and US strategies, power to resist. The strengths and weaknesses of some of the great , gen- erals in the light of this thesis. The'strategy of Hitler; he gave a new depth to the "indirect approach" and was successful until his strategy and tactics degenerated into direct and expected moves. , Criticism of lause- consolidates his physical and psychological balance and increases hIs' line of least expectation , in contrast, to move directly on an opponent. WRONG TARGET. A STUDY OF THE USE OF STRATEGICAL sec, l (Mar-Apr 1951) 471-478,. POWER IN WORLD WAR II, by S. iL Shaw, in Ordnance, tv.'35 no:1 five of the generally accepted principles of war: objective, mobility, 3 mass, coordination, and economy of force. Proof of this is containeddn the reports of the US Strategic Bombing Survey. A fair and objective, study of the facts and figures related in the reports of the survey show that the conclusions are supported by overwhelming evidence, Thehuge ; expenditure of planes, men, and gasoline in order to drop" one: and a;half y ll t f b ons o mi ion ombs on German industry was misdirectedFar from destroying the enemy's morale and reducing his war potental,~it s urged; h t h h o ever- im on ig er levels of production During th firsthalff 1944 .. ,eo attacks on aircraft lants _ rained t p were o twelve times the scale of doubled from December 1943 to, July 1944. It was the:attack; on trans' standing the heavy weight of these attacks, German, aircraft production-' u ,portation, however, That was the decisive blow which com letel ydi's- organized the German economy, The consequences, of the ?breakdown;in:r...;. the transportation system were probably greater than any other single ; ? factor in the final collapse of the economy. Had a strategic.;pattern'of,. attack been developed and applied immediately, more rapid economic results would undoubtedly have been secured. Using the available guided ?. bombs a monthly., tonnage of only 1, 300 tons would have resulted in com:- plete interdiction of Japan's railroads, Thus with or without atomic bombs, strategic air force wields great power, although its incorrect us.e causes waste or harmful results in the same measure as its . Power, BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMAN MILITARY LITERATURE, by Maj. 31 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Gen, Heinrich A'schenbrandt..Washington, Department of the Army, Office of the. Chief of Military History, 1953. 42 p, (.MS #P-150,) - A former general describes briefly the major German works on military science written prior to World War I and in the period between the two'.World Wars.. The development of German military literature, and its. influence on the. German Army. The basic ideas of such authors as Clausewitz, Schlieffen, and the elder Moltke. A brief bibliography lists only the German. military writings that are considered to be classics in the field, THE FATAL DECISIONS, ed, by Seymour Freldin and William. Richardson, New York, William Sloane Associates, 1956. 302 P. THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN, by the General of the Air Force, Werner Kreipe; THE BATTLE OF MOSCOW, by General Gunther Blumentritt;?EL ALAMEIN, by General Fritz Bayerlein; STALINGRAD, by ColoneLGeneral'Kurt Zeitzler; FRANCE, 1944, by Lt, General Bobo Zimmerman; THE ARDENNES, by General Hasso Von Manteuffel. An in- formed critique of failure in the boldest aggression of our times. Maps. GERMAN NAVAL STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR II, by Comdr. D. L. Kauffman, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v, 80, no. 1 Jan 1954 ( ) 1-12. Historical background of German naval strategy, and some of the 'important plans and policies between 1937 and 1941 which influenced the outcome of World War II. ? Hitler's lack of appreciation of the im ort- ance of naval warfare; Admiral P Raeder's background and excellent strate- gic concepts; and the failure of his plans from lack of ships and lack of cooperation from the German air arm. 'The German naval war plan as it was final/ put Thto operation, and h Y ow it violated the principles of war- fare. The proposed amphibious assault against England and its cancella- tion because Goering failed to win air supremacy over England. If Ger- man naval strategy had been more offensive, and if British imports had been selected 'as .the objective, Great Britain might have been defeated. THE GREAT ILLUSIONS OF 1939, 'b Capt by . B. H. Liddell Hart, in Military Review, v.36, no. 10 (Jan 1957) 3-11. The 1939 downfall of both France and Poland was not the result of a power imbalance, but can be directly attributed to reliance on. outmoded concepts in the face of Germany's effective armor employment. A review of the political and military factons which precipitated the 1939 defeats is presented. 32 GUIDE TO FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES, 1945-54. .Head q United States Arm Europe, Historical Division, 1954: 253 p:~..,, A catalog and index to the 'manuscripts produced under the Foreign Military Studies Program of the Historical ?Division' Division; UR, and of predecessor commands since 1945. Most of the manuscripts were ? prepared by former high-ranking officers of the German Armed;Forces Originally the mission of the Foreign Military tudies Program was only to obtain information on enemy operations in the European Theater for use in the preparation of an official history of the US Arm in World II, In 19 Y War 46 the program was broadened to include the Mediterranean and Russian theaters, In 1947 emphasis was placed on preparation of ? opera- ti l ona studies for use by US Alid t rmy pannng anraining agencies and service schools. Many of the more .reden studies have analyzed the German military experiences for their useful lessons. The guide con- tains three indexes - by topic, by military unit and by author Most entries include a short statement describing the contents and usefuln of the ess study. Appended: glossary of abbreviations and, foreign terms Charts: illustrate scope, status, and size of the various manuscripts ser ies give dates and physicl ltft ' ,aocaions o wriing, translating,an and administrative activity 1945-1954; list studies`that have been or rdill',beA ,, published as Department of the Army pamphlets; and list manuscripts pub- lished in the EUCOM-USAREU P ` R Foreign Military Studies series. HITLER AND THE GERMAN GENERALS, by Col, C. P. Stacey, in Canadian Arm Journal,. v. 7, no, l (Apr 1953) 45-50. Commentary on military memoirs published since World War II by former German generals. These memoirs generally highlight the feud between Hitler and his generals and advance two theses: (1) the German General Staff, far from being responsible for the outbreak of World War II, was opposed to it; and (2) the military defeat of Germany ..' was lar gely. due to Hitler's amateur strategy, and his disregard'ofro= ? fessional advice P Special attention is called to General Heinz, Guderian's. PANZER LEADER as one of sources on the war in Russia. HITLER' DEFEAT I S N RUSSIA, by Gen. Wladyslaw Anders:. ;Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1953. 267 p, ; An analytical study of 'the causes of. Nazi. catastrophe. in.Russia during World War II, The military and political reasons behind the defeat of German Armies, which, after easy victories elsewhere in Europe, came to a dead halt in Russia six months after they launched an all-out offensive on the Soviet Union, German and Soviet strategies in the various ,.cam- paigns; strength and types of forces employed by both sides; German poli- cies in the occupied regions of USSR; treatment of'Soviet PW's; strength and operations of anti- Soviet Russian Army units'which fought at the..side, of Germans; Soviet, partisan warfare; extent of aid given by the-West to ;the Soviets in military equipment; and the effects Produced?bY,West!s bombing.. . .. of the Reich on German military operations in Russia. Although, there were other factors which contributed to German.defeats,and Russian vic- ' .?33 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 U tories; the main one can be found in the strategies of the High Command of both countries. It was not so much Stalin's skill as a strategist-but Hitler's stupidy as the Supreme Commander of German Forces that ended in'their, overwhelming defeat. Includes a summary of the present strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union in which the author points out t _ that Russi' a s'weaknesses are than her strengths 'and that they will bear fruit if capably exploited by Russia's opponents, Maps. ? THROUGH RUSSIAN EYES, in Nom, v. 60, no. 9 (Sept 1955) 281- 283 plus. The article is based on a Soviet study of Germany's sea strategy of World War II.. The study, SOME ACCOUNTS OF CRUISER OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN FLEET FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, bY"Capt. L. M. Eremsev, rreviews the staff doctrine of the Nazi Navy and the prewar planning of the German Fleet and examines the actions of the war in which the German cruisers were involved. An analogy is drawn between the German prewar and World War II na val programs and the program pursued by the Soviet Navy, c. Great Britain AIR POWER AND SEA POWER, by Air Marshal Robert Saundb in Air,Pictorial v. 16, no.2 Feb 195 y' (Feb 1954) 34-36. , Defines the present. roles, of sea and air power in the defense of Britain; and examines the contributions which sea and air power should make in'safeguarding seaborne' supplies and trade and i ? in denying the 'Sea to an enemy.' This ability to use the sea depends prhnaril y on the capa- city to gain and hold the mastery of the air, not only over the sea bu the whole thea Y but over ter of war :. a task which belongs primarily to the-bomb force. While air power is the Y the-bomber first line of British defense, the Navy is still responsible for convoy ? escort and antisubmarine warfare? The Navy should control and operate all escort and antisubmarine vessels, all ship-borne aircraft, and the ships in which they are trans Y ported. ''4 1 AIR POWER AND THE FUTURE OF THE RO R,? Bric YA.L NAVY, by F /Lt. kwood in Air Power , v.1, no. 3 (Spring 1954) 289-292: The destruction of the US Pacific Fleet of Pearl Harbor demon- concentrated fleets are vulnerable to air attack and that only aircraft can give adequate protection from it. Atom bomb trials indicate that the conception of large- fleets must end and naval strategy and tactic must be planned on the action of small units d be Small and fast t shi s should built for the British Navy, P .34 AIR POWER AND THE FUTURE OF WAR, b Marshal Sir John' Slessor in Y Royal United. Service Institution Journal, v.99; no,'595(Aug . 1954) 343-3 , , .. - , The influence of the air weapon on the ossibilitie P s of 'a future war between the USSR and the West. It seems unlikely that any nation- . r would begin a war that would lead .to 'the, destruction of both sides; but we . must expect the Soviets to continue to cause local' conflicts. If a total war` does come, atomic air power will be employed immediately. Preparations which Great Britain should-make for this eventuality. 1956, 709 p, RAF) has seen and helped direct it, war, ii it snoula start. COMMONWEALTH AIR STRATEGY,, by John W. R. Taylor, in Flight, v.68, no. 2431 (26 Aug 1955) 313-316. A review of commitments, forces and deployment. The strate gY depends principally upon the use of air power and hinges on the Western phi- losophy that the deterrent power of USAF SAC and RAF Bomber Command might avert a major war. That deterrent is also the only hope of. winning the THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BRITISH AND AMERICAN AIR POLICY AND STRATEGY, by Capt. Norman Macmillan, in Aeronautics v. 31 no. 2 (Sept 1954) 57-65. ' The development of US and British air arms since World War I and a comparison of their present policies and strategies. British strategic, policy does not exhibit a full recognition of air power, but is still over- shadowed by the concept of a powerful navy based on battleship's.. ,.Aerial, , operations against ships during World War II demonstrated that, air.. ower, is superior to sea power; and n l, no nation can expect to be strong in all arms, ? ? British air policy should be altered so that. RAF can make full us e of the, . mobility of the airplane. - GREAT BRITAIN'S NAVY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, by J. P. L. Thomas, in Crowsnest, v. 7, no. 6 (Apr 1955) 7-8. TT e~Firt Lord of the Admiralty states: "whatever the scope of a future war and .whatever the nature of the weapons used, the task of the Navy will still be to control the seas, to assure the safe passage of supplies and to support the other armed forces," Air power at sea is-not, something which replaces the Navy, but is the instrument by which the 35 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 THE CENTRAL BLUE, by Marshal John Slessor. London, Casell Forty-year history of airpower as the author (Marshal of the Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Navy today so, largely exercises its a ' - se power. The aircraft today is both the striking power of the Fleet (largely replacing the 15-inch gun of the battleship) and the eyes of the Fleet (largely replacing the cruiser`in this respect). Dismissing nuclear war as improbable (mutually suicidal) he sees,a continuation of uneasy peace punctured with military act such as took lace in K action's today P orea anndochina,. The fleet Britain needs is one. required to meet her world-wide commitments in support of the Commonwealth interests and trade in such local wars as may occur'dur - ing the uneasy peace, and such ships and aircraf that t as are necessary to en- sure .Britain can play her part in NATO as a deterrent to nuc and in retaliation i Lear war if the deterrent fails. THE HIGH LEVEL CONDUCT AND DIRECTION OF WORLD b Lt. Gen I WAR II, by an Jacob, in Royal United Service Institution Journal.101 no. 6.03 (Aug 1956 364-375. Y ' The manner in which the war was conducted the the future in light of , present and our experience then, some of the principles that must underlie any successful organization for conducting war, how the British applied those principles in the past, nationally and international/ with the allies, and how the can be applied in Y Y the future, THE NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY b Ad William Rich , Y Adm. Herbert mond. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 19 Histor of the principal History strategy of naval warfare as by English ministers and kings from the time War s of the Tudors to'the Spanish s, 1718, and 1725. Bibliography. ANEW ORDER OF PRIORITIES, in Economisi;'(26 Feb 1955j' 723- 724 plus, These comments on the Defence . White Paper relate to the strategy: to,prepare for a fantastically destructive tionas the be war of very short dura- st means of ensuring that it will not happen; pared 'to fight eri heral limited wars over the next five or ten a new atomic situation emerges e. , the adve years until ( g nt of a ballistic roc meet this strategy Britain must establish a strict adherence to the orde to obtain maximum security out of the resourc r will be a cost/ es available in Britain. It y matter, but Britain is a world power and s her responsibilities. Buildin he cannot avoid Building a deterrent to a nuclear war is f than fighting a conventional one, ar better POLICY AND WEAPONS IN THE NUCLEAR A London .Fabian GE, by Michael Stewart, Society, 1955. 25 p. (Fabian Tract No. 296.) 11 The author is a a member of Parliament and was Under- ' Secretary for War 1947-1951. Following a discussion of the effe'c t of the H-bomb on warfare and the conduct of foreign he outlines for th policy, a plan the defense of Britain and the role to be played by his country's Army, Navy, and Air Force, . POLICY, GRAND STRATEGY, AND PRINCIPLES, in Royal United Service Institution Journal, v. 100, no. 600 (Nov 1955) 550-556, Study o war, especially in Gt. Britain, since 19th centur and how the stud of war influenced y' Y military policy, strategy, and prm-, ciples, PRINCIPLES OF BRITISH MILITARY THOUGHT, by Ian Jacob, in Foreign Affairs, v. 29, no. 2 (Jan 1951) 219-228. Up to 1914, Britain's strength resided in her navy, in her economic resources, and in the ability to take as much or as little of a continental war as she chose, World War I saw the end of limited land engagements and the steady maintenance of sea power. After World War I, Britain's horizon in defense matters was forcibly widened beyond Continental Europe by the rise of Japan, World War II saw the proximity of the main defense center to the European mainland and its' vulnerabilit to severe bombardment Y and the difficulty of concentrating potential strength at a distance from the main center. Since World War II, British strategic thinking has again undergone a change due to the rise of the USSR, to constitutional changes within the Commonwealth, and to the advance of Asia to a position of primary importance. The United King- dom, now carrying the main defense burden of the Empire, must now act in union with the other nations in the Atlantic Treaty, and its military policy must aim at security for the United Kingdom, maintenance of free communication throughout the world, the securit of the Middle E _ Y , ast and Africa, the destruction of Communism; and the contribution of force to secure respect for the decisions of the United Nations. d. NATO EAST VERSUS WEST, by Giffard Martel, London, Museum Press, 1952. 220 p.' The political and military aspects of the Cold War are dis- cussed by a British General who is' a specialist in armored warfare. The military lessons that should have been.l'earned from World War II: Great Britain should concentrate on the development of its Air 'Force, 'nava1. 37 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 strength, _ and armored divisions. The Russian Armed Forces during World,War II are judged from his experience as head of a military mis- sion to. the USSR during the war and from conferences with the R ussian General Staff. Plans of the Western Powers to defend Europe against communist aggression and, the military forces necessary to implement them; and communism in China and Korea, and the part of Asia in world affairs of the future. THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE, by Drew Middleton. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952. 313 p. The progress made by the US and other NATO powers toward the defense of Europe, alid the forces against which they would fight in a future emergency. Endurance and courage of the individual Russian soldier, and organization of the Russian Army. The armed forces now at the disposal of NATO; state of training and alertness of the US Seventh Army in Germany; attitudes and fighting capabilities of Great Britain and France; defense problems of the remainder of Europe; and possible courses of action if war breaks out. DEFENCE OF THE WEST; SOME RIDDLES OF WAR AND PEACE by Liddell Hart. London, Cassell, 1950. 390 p. ".... This book deals with the immediate problems of an effective 'Defense of the West' and some basic problems of the human search for security against 'aggression... . DOES THE WEST POSSESS A DOCTRINE OF WAR? b Ma'. Gen. Emile Wanty, in Military Review, v.34, no. 12 (Mar 1955) 93 J 3-102. The present Western defense system is of nebulous character. There could result from it: a disassociation of the alliances, with each of the contracting parties assuming his liberty to act alone and to hasten to his destruction; a regroupment of the,peoples of the Western World into at least two associations; 'or a, decisive tightening of the existing bonds transposing to a worldwide scale what it has been possible to realize on the Atlantic level. The defense of Western civilization - on all free nation de pends s agreeing instead of following individually their own' particular and divergent interests. T Y To provide raped and effective intervention at whatever point of the globe this may he necessary would require: () a entirely clear, mutual understanding, not interests of each coun only the try but also of the various national mentalities; (2) a modus vivendi in the form of a general program; (3) an exact and complete definition of the purposes of a strictly defensive con- servatory aimi Y nsive and con- y peace through general Prosperity; com- mon pooling of economic and fina (4) ncial means for ameliorating the li conditions of the least favored elements of th ving tion and re the free world; (5) determina- spect of the zones of interest of the principal signatories or '?:4,.u..s?w+.v..ieLY=4..??. -wrw+y+nLV~4 the exercise of an influence in common in certain sectors; (6) the' defining of a stable strategy of policy accepted b all; (7) preparation arat' Y , () p p ion and pursuit of a single military strategy on a world scale; (8) close coordina ti on tion of ground, naval, and air forces permanently stationed in each:of.the large,. essential strategic zones; and (9) the () a reconstitution of coordinated general reserves through an effort at economy in the utilization of means. - an (Trans lated d digested from REVUE G); BALE BELLE - Belgium: - 15 A 1954, Aug IF ATOMIC WAR BROKE OUT TOMORROW? in Interavia v no. 8 500-531. ' 9' (1954) A series of articles on various aspects of an atomic, the war be- tween USSR and the NATO countries. The vulnerability y of cities an militar units to and the hydrogen bomb; the ''atomic sensitivity" of the US and Western?Europe; the organization, location and equipment of the air forces available to NATO; the mission and capabilities of the USAF Stra- tegic Air Command; the comparative performance of US and Soviet stra- tegic bombers; strength and organization of the USSR Air Force is known of its strategic bombers; the facilities and operation of US- Canadian air defense; the possibility of atomic attack Y from submarines; the training provided for NATO pilots and air crews 'Traini Command; and the contributions to aeronautical research made by NATO's Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development. A LOOK THROUGH A WINDOW AT WORLD WAR III by Field Marshal Montgomery, in Royal United Service Institution Journal v. 99 no. 596 (Nov 1954) 507-523. ' The strategy and organization which the NATO nations must prepare to win a future war against the East. The dominant factor in next war will be air the power, and command of the air; weapon must be cen- tralized on the highest level. The day of the large warship on the, surface of the sea is over because of the range and weapons of tho The ? derv aircraft. Western Powers require: (1) bigger air forces; (2) sma more ' ' , () leer and immediately-ready armies with great strategical and tactical mobility; (3) smaller Y, () navies; and (4) organization of the fighting services based on more atomic power and less manpower. .THE NAVY'S ROLE IN A LIMITED WAR: KOREA CLEAR EXAMPLE OF THE VALUE OF SEA POWER TODAY, in Crowsnest, v.8, no. 6 (Apr 1956 25-2 The question has been raised as to whether sea power would be equally effective in an atomic global war. First Lord of the Admiralty, Viscount Cilcennin has stated that whether we invest more heavily in a naval power for war purposes hinges in whether we envisage that a future Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 U [L Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 full-scale war would last beyond the stages of all-out thermo-nuclear ex- . . changes. - After the first stunning blows would fall, the navies alone might remain undamaged and able to carry on the battle. "As things 'stand today, if the navies lose control of the seas the Western Alliance would have to go.out of business." N. A. T. 0. AND ATOMIC STRATEGY; in Interavia, v. 9, no. 7 (1954) 415-446. The entire issue is devoted to various aspects of air power in atomic warfare, and the preparations of the NATO nations for adequate defense in case of attack.. Quotations from NATO's commanders and air force 'chief s of several countries on the changes in air arms as a result of the adoption of nuclear weapons; the. organization of NATO and SHAPE and the personnel who occupy the major commands in them; photographs and brief descriptions of military aircraft of 'the member countries; and the ,effectsof nuclear' weapons. Present and possible future methods of adapting airplanes and aircraft carriers to atomic warfare such as per- mitting dispersal by eliminating airfields through the use of vertic off fi ter.s and b designing take- off double-decker carriers. Considerations in designing and producing short-life aircraft" which could be constructed simply and quickly if nuclear weapons had destroyed the important air- craft factories of a country on the defensive. OCEAN STRATEGY WITH AUSTRALIA AS A BASE, by Norman Macmillan, in Aircraft, v. 30, no. 8 (May 1952) 16-19 plus. - If there is a war with Russia it will be a global war and the free nations will have to pursue an ocean strategy to protect their ship- ping and life-lines of supply from Soviet submarines and aircraft. Actions in Korea, Indo-China, and Malaya reveal the communist strategy to gain control of the South Pacific and Indian Oceans and disrupt both the supply lines ari and sources of supply, available to the Western Powers in the= coun- tries of South Pacific. The NATO powers would have to defend the Atlantic, while the US would have to defend the Pacific; and Australia if provided with the means, could become a base in the battle against Soviet submarines operating in the Indian Ocean in an attempt to destro the supply lines to Africa and Europe. Suggests that th Y the US provide Australia with B-29's which are now kept in mothball storage, and that practical tests be made_to determine whether or not the bomber would meet the requirements for patrol missions over the vast spaces of the Indian Ocean. THE'PERIPHERAL STRATEGY IN THE FACE OF THE, ATOMIC BOMB. La strategie peripherique devant la bombe atomique, b Gen. P. E: Jac uot. Paris Gallimard 195 Y q 5? 230 p. In French. 40 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 A French general questions the wisdom- of peripheral defense by the Western Powers, presenting arguments to show that `it"would favor the aggressor, and makes the following suggestions on how Western de- fense should be organized: (1) the land powers should defend their own territories with resolution, using new forms of fortifications the weapons of which are remote-controlled; and (2) the maritime powers should provide a ready force organized as air brigades with mobile bases to conduct airborne operations behind the enemy lines. REFLECTIONS ON STRATEGY IN LIGHT OF THE INDOCHINESE WAR. Reflexions strategiques sur la guerre d'Indochine,: by Gen. L. M. Chassin, in Revue de Defense Nationale, v..10 Dec 1954 507-522. In . French. The Indochinese War suggests general reflections on the. grand strategy of the. Western Powers. The principal of these reflections is that the atomic bomb reduces the risk of war. Therefore the high level policy of the West should be to avoid war and to await the development of disagreement in the enemy camp (between Russia and.Communist China). : On the other hand, the atomic bomb increases the risk of local ,.conflicts, . in regions where the Western Powers still hold key positions; To sur-?' _ vive, the latter must win such conflicts quickly, utilizing their scientific and technical superiority. If France wants to maintain her position among the great powers and preserve the French Union, she must not only possess the new weapons but must also adapt her army to their use. Above all France must possess a modern offensive air force: STRATEGY FOR THE WEST, by John Slessor. New York, W. Morrow, 1954. 180 p. Suggestions on how to assure the security of Western Europe against Russian aggression through reliance on atomic air power; how to establish unity with freedom in Germany and how to safeguard against renewed German military domination; and how'these aims might be achieved without giving reasonable grounds for Russian fears. WESTERN DEFENSE PLANNING, by Capt. B. H. Liddell'Hart, in Military Review, v.36, no..3 (June 1956) 3-10. The H-bomb is a weak-deterrent to small aggression. Its primary drawback is that if it-does not succeed as a deterrent, and if it is put into action, it automatically entails suicide for Western?civilization.' WHAT WOULD THE WORLD BE WITHOUT NATO? by Col. John E. Kelly, in Army, v. 7, no.1 (Aug 1956) 31-34. 41 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 full-scale war ' would last beyond the stages of all-out thermo-nuclear ex- changes.. :?After the first stunning blows would fall, the navies alone might remain undamaged and able to carry on the battle. "As things stand today, if the navies lose control' of the seas the Western Alliance Would-have to go out of business." N. A. T. 0. AND ATOMIC STRATEGY, in Interavia v. 9 no. 7 (1954) 1 ) 415-446 . The entire issue is devoted to various as ects of air p ower in atomic warfare and th P e preparations of the NATO nations for adequate defense in case of. attack. Quotations from NATO's commanders and air force chiefs of several countries on the changes in air arms as a result of the' adoption of nuclear weapons; the organization 'of and the NATO and SHAPE and who :occupy the major commands in them; "s photographs and brief decriPti??: ons of military aircraft of the member countries; and the effects of:nuclear weapons. Present Sand Pos ada ti '? ? sable future methods of p ng airplanes and aircraft carriers to atomic warfare such a mittin ' dispersal by eliminating as p off fighters Y g airfields through the use of vertical take- off 'and"by designing double-decker carriers. designing and 'short Considerations in producing -life aircraft? which could be constructed simply' and quickly if nuclear weapons had destroyed the important air- craft factories of a country on the defensive. OCEAN STRATEGY WITH AUSTRALIA AS A BASE, by Norman Macmillan, in Aircraft Y ., , v.30, no.8 (May 1952) 16-19 plus. If there is a war with Russia it will be a global war and the free nations will have to pursue an ocean strategy to protect their ship- ping and life-lines lines of supply from Soviet submarines and aircraft. Action in Korea; Indo-China, and Malaya reveal the s communist strategy to gain control of the. South Pacific and Indian Oceans and disrupt both the supply lines and sources of supply available to the. Western Powers in the coun- tries of South Pacific. The NATO Powers would have to defend the Atlantic, 'while the US would have to defend the Pacific; and Australia , if provided with the means, could'become a base in the battle against Soviet submarines operating in the Indian Oc in an attempt to_destro the su 1 g Ocean pp y lines to Africa and Europe. , Suggests that the U Y Australia with B- ' S provide 29 s which are now kept in mothball storage, practical tests be made to determine whether or not the .bomber would meet the requirements for patrol missions over the va Indian Ocean. st spaces of the - THE PERIPHERAL STRATEGY IN THE FACE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB. La strategie peripherique devant la bombe at P. E.'?Jac uot. Paris Galli o by Gen. q , ward, 1955? 230 p. In French. . 40 A French general questions the. wisdom. of era hera by. the Western P P 1 defense .. Powers, presenting arguments 'to show that it would favor the aggressor, and makes the following suggestions on how Western de- fense should be organized: (1) the land powers should defend their own territories with resolution, using new forms?of fortifications the we of which are remote-controlled; and weapons (2) the maritime, powers should provide a ready force organized as air brigades with m conduct mobile bases to airborne operations behind the enemy lines. REFLECTIONS ON STRATEGY IN LIGHT OF THE INDOCHINESE WAR Reflexions strategiques sur la guerre d'Indochine by Gen. Chassin in ., Y . L. M. Revue de Defense Nationale, v. 10 (Dec 1954 507-522. In French, , The Indochinese 'War suggests general reflections, on the grand strategy of the Western Powers. The principal of these reflections is that the atomic bomb reduces the risk of war. Therefore the high level policy of the West should be to avoid war and to await the development of disagreement in the enemy camp (between Russia and,Communist China). On the other hand, the atomic bomb, increases the risk of, local, conflicts ? . in regions where the Western Powers still hold key positions.- ? y A . To. sur-, . vive, the latter must win such conflicts quickly, utilizing their scientific and technical superiority. If France wants to maintain her position among the great powers and preserve the French Union, she must not only possess the new weapons but must also adapt her army to their use. Above all France must possess a modern offensive air force. STRATEGY FOR THE WEST, by John Slessor. New?York, W. Morrow, 1954. 180 p. Suggestions on how to assure the security of Western Europe against Russian aggression through reliance on atomic air power; how to establish unity with freedom in Germany and how to safeguard against. renewed German military domination; and how these aims might be achieved without-giving reasonable grounds for Russian fears. F WESTERN DEFENSE PLANNING, by.Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, in Military Review, v. 36, no...3 (June 1956) 3-10. .The H-bomb is a' weak deterrent to small aggression. Its primary drawback is that if it does not succeed as a deterrent, and if it is put into action, it automatically entails suicide for Western civilization. WHAT WOULD THE WORLD BE WITHOUT NATO? b..Col. John E. Kelly, in Army, v. , no. l (Aug 1956) 31-34, -. ? 41 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 ;~i'I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 P' i.a,~ d?w, r~'',~..i- ?'! ..:~:f::Ct+vuulurYjA S' The author is Chief of Staff of the US Element of the Standing Group; of NATO. He provides an answer to those who question the_NATO's validity in the Atomic Age and who wonder if there is need for NATO in view of the, so-called thermonuclear stalemate. - . e.. United States AIR DOCTRINE: THEATER AIR OPERATIONS: Washington, Department of the Air Force, 1954. 27 AFM 1-3. P ( ) Stresses the unity of air action and the implicit coordination of theater air forces with other air forces directly engaged in attack against the heartland of an enemy nation. Presents the doctrine pertinent to the employment of air forces as an entity in a theater of operations and their role in' accomplishing the theater mission. Written from the per- spective oVthe entire theater and with the objective in mind of coordinating and correlating the employment of theater air forces with the employment of all other theater forces. THE BRIDGES AT SINANJU AND YONGMIDONG, in Air University Quarter/ Review, v.7, no. 1 (Spring 1954) 15-34. The new concept of occupation and control of enemy territory by air forces is illustrated by the air envelopment and neutralization by UN air forces of a critically sensitive and heavily defended communication corridor across the Chongchon in North Korea. This 'air action proved a mighty new instrument of military force and persuasive pressure available to theater commanders. It could be .decisively employed in a combined air-ground- offensive strategy where isolation of the battlefield is followed by ground offensive, or it could be employed in its new' concept - as sole decisive pressure in the, attainment of theater objectives. EISENHOWER t5 SIX GREAT DECISIONS, by Gen, Walter Bedell Smith. New York, Longmans, 1956. 237 p. - Lists, describes, and approves six major decisions made bete wen A FORMULA FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING, by Brig. . Gen. L ) Hopwood in Air Universrt ' Y g Lloyd y Quarterly Review, V. 8, no, 3 (Summer 1956 2133. , 42 Soviet imprecation of the free world may diminish, but the, drive of the Reds for nuclear parity increases their potential menace to the Western alliance. As the United States thus experiences a period of quieter but unremitting tension, a confusion of many views, obscures the available guide lines for a practicable US posture. To develop a sound military strategy capable of supporting national objectives the author;. (Commandant, Air Command and Staff College), urges a return to the fundamentals of fact, reality, and logic. MOBILE CONCEPT, in Military Review, v, 34, no. 9 (Dec 1954 3-10. Our present ground formations are based largely upon infantry forces supported by tanks, artillery, and air.. The tempo and range of our operations are, therefore, geared in general to the infantry soldier. Since the important factor is relative mobility, it is obvious that if massed mechanized, and tank forces are met, they will possess the superior mobility. The solution lies, therefore, in the creation and training of large, highly mobile formations based upon the characteristics inherent in armored formations of corps and, perhaps, field army size. We should have available sufficient armored divisions and corps headquarters to pro- vide the training and nuclei around which large offensive ground formations can be built in time for a strategic offensive designed to bring any possible war forced upon us to a very rapid and successful conclusion. THE NAVAL GENIUS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, by Dudle W. Knox. Boston Houghton Y Mifflin, 1932. 138 p, Illustrates the fundamentals of the use of sea power and gives Washington full credit for his broad planning of grand strategy, NEEDED. - A MILITARY STRATEGY OF MOBILITY,. by Edgar A. Parsons,, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 82, no. 12 (Dec 1956) l23 -1269. The purpose of this article is' to stimulate the development, of a modern and satisfactory military strategy. The author stresses the con- cept that modern technology can be directed to insure our defense without millions of US casualties and without necessarily becoming committed to a war of indiscriminated thermonuclear. bombardment. He outlines a strategy of mobility that can be so exploited as to make war unacceptable' to an enemy. The article includes a discussion of the role to be played by guided missiles in such a strategy. ' READINESS FOR THE LITTLE WAR; OPTIMUM INTEGRATED STRATEGY, in Military Review, :v. 37, 'no. l (Apr 1957) 14-26. Small aggressions o not warrant big bombs. Our integrated strategy must include highly mobile military forces which are capable of supporting 'our national policy in all types of conflict short of general war. 438345 0 -57 -4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 43 141 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC, by J. C. Wylie, Jr., in U. S. NavaL Institute Proceedings, v. 78, no. 4 (Apr 1952) 351-361. Evaluation o World War II strategic decisions and actions. Based on:,events in the Pacific area, the study is concerned with the Japanese decisions on whether or not to start the war, how to start it, the selection of strategy by which the Japanese planned to fight the war, and the effect of their limited concept of war on their strategic decision. The strategic use of submarines by the Japanese and Americans, the two- pronged spear across the Pacific employed by the US Armed Forces (Central Pacific Forces and Southwest Pacific Forces), and the distinc- tion between sequential (or directive) and cumulative strategies are sub- jects of examination. Although all these'topics were developed from war events in the Pacific, it is stressed that they are not limited in their ap- plications. either in time or place. SEA POWER IN ITS RELATION TO THE WAR OF 1812, by Alfred T. Mahan. Boston, Little, Brown, 1905. 2 v. STRATEGIC AIR OPERATIONS. Washington, Department of the Air Force, 1954. 11 p. (AFM 1-8.) This manual, written from the viewpoint of global strategy, embraces the broad principles underlying the proper application of strategic air power and relates air operations to all other military actions. Task force characteristics, requirements, composition, and deployment. Target selection., effects on various target systems, and the dynamic nature of targets. Employment of strategic air forces, including control, interdePendence flexibility, compression, and readiness. Supporting functions and - relationships . to other forces.. ? STRATEGIC AIRBORNE NOT STRATEGIC AIR, by Arthur Y G. Volz, Jr., in Armor, v. 59, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 1950) 38-39. Since cities and industries actually form the Y basis of military power, the modern air force interpreters of Clausewitz? have tra the destruction of transferred the enemy army into destruction of enemy ec n The radical form of this idea has appeared in the ndestructi o omy. ion of the enemy industry by-atomic bombing, without land fighting" school. How- ever the question does not concern our capacity for destruction. The real problem facing American strategists today is whether or not suc a program of destruction is desirable, such In place of industrial destruction we ought to develop a strategy of industrial seizure and addition to replacing the paralysis. In function of the strategic ir force airborne, force would , the strategic also be the modern form of the second this the strategic airborne forces wo front. -In ? uld accomplish .a dual mission the strategic air force cannot accomplish. which It would accompany its eco-. nomic strangulation (not destruction) with a? truly strategic envelopment on. 44 STRATEGY AND ORGANIZATION. by Henry A. Kissinger, Foreign Affairs v.35, no.3 (Apr 1957) 379-394 ? . History demonstrates that superiority in strategic doctrine has at least as often been the cause of victory as has?'superiority in resources. An adequate strategic doctrine is therefore the basic require- ment of American security. Analyzes our military structure whether r n Y ture to 'see w , 4 of the U. S. possess a strategic doctrine concluding that there is a lack of doctrinal agreement among the services. Another in- hibiting factor in the development of strategic doctrine is the predomi- nance of fiscal considerations in our defense planning. Strategic doctrine can no longer confine itself to the problem of providing' the weapons for war; it must al so relate them to the purpose of war. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE BASIC DOCTRINE. Washington, Department of the Air Force, 1955. 10 p. (AFM 1-2. Basic doctrine of the US Air Force for employing the nation's air forces during all forms of international conflict. The various instru- ments of national policy in an international conflict; and the forces which comprise the military instrument of national policy. Characteristics of air forces and principles for their employment. Employment of air forces in peace and war; and timely provision of adequate air power as the para- mount consideration for the security and well-being of the US. UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; STRATEGIC PLA FOR COALITION WARFARE 1941-1942, by Maurice Matloff and Edwin M S l ne l Washington Dttf th A .,eparmen oermy, Office of the Chief Military History, 1953. 454 p. History of plans affecting the missions and dispositions of the US Army during the early part of World War II. The volume deals brief/ with the joint war plans of the Army and Navy up to the. Fall of 1938, when n the planners first explicitly took into. account the possibility that the US. might be drawn into a world-wide war between two coalitions.: From th Fall of 1938 it 'follows the story of plans as they directly -concerned the' Army until the beginning of 1943. From that point in World War II,- con- veniently marked by the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, of the Y ,? the role US Army in strategic planning changed. These developments will be the subject of further treatment in subsequent volumes. Appendixes show: (a) outline plan for the invasion of Western Europe; (b) War Depart- ment draft of instructions for London Conference; (c) monthly of ~ () distribution total Army strength in Continental- United States and. o November 1941 through December 1942; (d) geographic distribution of Army strength in overseas theaters in December 1942;. (e) shipment of divisions in 1942; (f)? dead-weight tonnage of vessels'under in Pacific Army control and Atlantic areas from November 1941 through December 1942? US Army overseas deployment in October 1941; (h) areas, of strategic responsibility and US Army overseas deployment in April 1942 and? (i ) US' Army overseas ?, deployment and theater boundaries in December 1942. 45 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 I WHY THE H-BOMB WIPES OFF THE "NEW LOOK," by B.. H. Liddell Hart, in World, v,1, no, 15 (1 June 1954) 12-14. Contends That the "new look" policy of massive retaliation was obsolete when it appeared. Flexible defense is the answer to the commu- nists' new strategy of infiltration. f. U.S.S.R. COMMUNISM AND AIR POWER; A SURVEY OF POSSIBLE COM- MUNIST AIR STRATEGIES, by Stefan T. Posson' in Y~ Air Universit Quarterly Review, v, 7, no. 3 (Winter 1954-55 43-54 pus. Three patterns of atomic war which may be considered b the Soviet Union: (1) an atomic blitz inevi Y tably provoking massive atomic retaliation and ending in mutual suicide for the nation lullin of the s involved; (2) the g West into disarmament, followed by an atomic blitz to finish off the West's weakened re nish taliatory capability and ending in victor for the Soviet Union; and (3) a series of local at Y the initiative omit wars, in which possession of would enable the Soviet Union to attrite the West's retaliatory capacity to a point where global atomic war could be launched ex- cessive risk to the without Soviet Union. JOHN BLOCH - - A NEGLECTED PROPHET b Adolph arten in ~ Y G. Rosen- g , .Tr., Military . Review, v. 37, no. l (Apr 1957 27-3.9. Attaching greater importance to the common man rise of the modern industrial state; John Bloch (advisor to the Russian - Czar); contradicted orthodox military doctrine in forecasting and the course consequences of World War I in his work THE ( FUTURE WAR IN IT TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS, published in 1898). This article resurrects?the book and indicates the military and , political, significance of it during the era in'which lessons it was written, and the which it provides for doctrines and policies of today. A MILITARY FORECAST, by Air Marshal Douglas Forces Magazine Colyer, in (Mar 1955) 13-14. Interpretation of the probable pattern of S in the opening Quiet military action stage of a future war. The Possibility that t develop into a hot war b he cold war may by a series"of almost imperceptible Y of the Soviet Navy's submarine fast destroyer, and cruiser fleet ? the Army and Air Force; and the be inni of sae of for g ~ a Western global strategy defense against communist aggression, 46 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 SOVIET BID FOR THE ,SEA, by Rear Adm. E. M. Eller, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 81, no. 6 June 1955 619-627. The Soviet coon is the world's second strongest seapower with the most modern navy afloat. It is constantly growing, and will someday challenge the US directly in a contest for the control of the seas. Applying the lessons of World War II the Soviet Union is avoiding the naval mistakes of Germany and Japan and is building the type of fleet and merchant marine to give it logistical support that will be able to carry out any of the opera- tions of modern naval combat, Admiral Eller evaluates the role and the place of the Soviet Navy in USSR's strategy for world conquest; its growth since 19 30 while the rest of the world paid no heed; and the challenge, and threat it presents to US where public opinion fails to comprehend that the destiny and security of America are inseparable from the sea and a strong Navy capable of protecting it. - THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF TAKES STOCK; CHANGES IN MILITARY DOCTRINE, in World Today, v, 11, no, 11 (Nov 1955 492-502. The adjustment o Soviet military doctrine to the new situation created by the Soviet Union's changed position in the world and b the de- velopment of at Y omit and thermonuclear weapons. Analysis of the four components of the old doctrine: party dogma, military ideology, military science, and military art. Changes which have taken place in the im- portant principles of encirclement, relative strength, and surprise ag- gression. Instructions which have been issued to the Armed Forces to conform with the changed meaning of these principles. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE by Raymond L Garthoff Glencoe , . . , Ill., The Free Press, 1953, 587 p. This study is a contribution to the research program conducted for USAF by the Rand Corporation. The pattern of this doctrine and some interpretations of its basis. The relation between Soviet military doctrine and Soviet political doctrine and,strategy. An analysis of the current' c; basic Soviet principles of war, Examination of the operational, tactical, y and organizational field doctrine of the various combat arms of the Soviet armed forces. The missions of land power, airpower, and sea power -in Soviet doctrine and the doctrine for implementing these missions - A a~ . p pendix includes: organization of the Soviet armed,forces; and a bibliog- raphy. ' SOVIET MILITARY THINKING SINCE STALIN, by N. Gala , in A Y rmY, v. 7, no. 2 (Sept 1956) 59-61. . In their diagnosis of Stalin's "constant factors," (of Soviet military theory) Soviet military theoreticians accept Western thought though twisting .it to fit the dogmas of Marx and Lenin,' 47 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 SUVOROV, by Brig. Gen. C. Mc; I. Delf, in Army Quarterly,. V. 69, no..l (Oct. 1954) 94-100. The personal characteristics and generalship of the Russian general, and,his strategy and tactics in fighting the French Revolutionary armies in Italy in, 1799.. His campaign demonstrated Russian capabilities and qualities-which are still applicable - a disregard for logistics, an Asiatic unconcern for human life and hardihood and fortitude of the indi- vidual soldier and his fanatical devotion to his leader. - SUVOROV; A RUSSIAN TRADITION, by Col. J. D. Hittle, in Marine Corps Gazette, v. 37, no. 8 (Aug 1953) 40-47. The career of and the command principles employed by this Russian general. His methods of training and commanding men; the modern concepts of his operations in the eighteenth century; and brief description of some of his campaigns. Excerpts from his work THE - SCIENCE OF VICTORY. 4. Tactics a. General Aspects CONSEQUENCES. OF PROGRESS IN ARMAMENT. Consequences des progres de l'armement, by Gen. Audet, in Revue de Defense ? Nationale, v.10 -(Oct 1954) 255-275. In French. A French Army general's concept of how future military _ . operations will be governed by the use of atomic weapons and the ?devel- bpment of. mobility, particularly the type of mobility Provided by aircraft .. . - DECISION IN THE FACE OF DEFEAT, by Col. Alexander. D. Surles, Jr., in Military Review, v. 34, no. 12 (Mar 1955) 24-34. Problems commanders will face in any future war, and - historical examples to justify the requirement of a, new doctrine. Inherent in this new doctrine must be more dispersion, more flexibility, additional and alternate channels of communication, greater decentralization of responsibility and initiative, a more streamlined organization and less concern with the loss of real estate,, as such. A sounder discipline is es- sential - a discipline which must be based on the increased effectiveness of our junior leaders, and an improved system of training must be evolved 48 which recognizes and includes the chaos and confusion of combat, .the loneliness of the battlefield, and the increasing requirement for tumor without comforting directives from above. FIRST BLUEPRINT FOR ATOMIC WAR, in U. S. News and Report, v 3 World _8, no. 8 (25 Feb 1955) 24-28 plus. The new concept of Allied tactics in Europe. Under this con- cept, NATO Forces will meet a Russian attack by using combined round- air operations on the threshold i of East Europe and seize the initiative with atomic firepower. The old concept of retreating behind the Rhine, then fighting back, is out., If the Russians choose war, their armies will be hit at the Iron Curtain. NATO's war plans; availability of manpower, planes, guns, and missiles to support the new strategy and tactics; and how manpower and weapons are to be used in case of a Russian attack. GRAND TACTICS IN MODERN WAR, by Ma'. Gen. B. T. Wilson in Army Quarterly, v. 69, no. 2 (Jan 1955) 185-193. Historical examples, especially from World War II of the application of grand tactics which are defined as the art of stringing ~ battles together and of fighting them to the best advantage. Such tactics are attributed to Moltke, Guderian, Montgomery, Rommel, and others GROUND DEFENSE IN THE ATOMIC ERA, in Tairiku Mondai (Mar 1956) 12-20. Translated from Japanese. Stenographic record of a. round-table conference held recently by the Asiatic Mainland Research Society.. It was noted that the introduc- tion of missiles into warfare is resulting in new tactics and requiring alteratIon in the organizatinfdit o o,groun uns. IMPACT OF ATOMIC WARFARE ON AIRBORNE OPERATIONS,' by lit. Col. Norman E. Martin, in Military Review, v.34, no. 10 (Jan 1955) 25-31, An appraisal of the effect of atomic weapons, employed both offensively and defensively, on airborne operations. The impact of atomic warfare on the following three principal phases of an airborne operation: marshalling, movement to the objective area, and operations in the airhead. The greatest threat to an airborne operation, from the. standpoint of enemy atomic capabilities, , occurs after the airborne force has- been delivered into the airhead, and not during the marshalling or movement phases. 49 i-I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 ON DEFENSE, by Lt, Col. Lewis IMPACT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS .. - C. Taynton,. in Military Review, v. 36, no. 6 (Sept 1956) 4957?, 've positions The?.t reat o an atomic attack against defense p laces additional emphasis on greater dispersion, passive protective : P measures, the employment of mobile reserves, and on active security measures. IMPACT OF MISSILES ON TACTICAL DOCTRINE, by Gen. W. G. - st v. l1, no.12 (Dec 1956) 114-124. W an; ~inArm .InformationDi e The doctrine to guide an Army equipped with guided missiles ? and nuclear warheads must match in scope and flexibility the war-making means now provided by atomic missiles. Of equal and vital importance, ~ s pos this new doctrine must consider the threat established by the enemy session-of a similar missile capability." INFANTRY IN MODERN BATTLE; ITS ORGANIZATION AND TRAIN- ING, by Gen. :Richand N. Gale, in Canadian Arm Journal, v. 9, no. l (Jan 1955) 52-53. How use of atomic weapons will affect the conduct of battle. Concealment discipline, cover, and sensible dispersion will be necessary. Air su eriorit is not indispensable, but available air resources should be p y put to skillful, economic, and worthwhile use. Scientific developments must be related to the, generally accepted order of battle and equipment of , divisions. Correct handling of tanks and tank-infantry cooperation should dominate tactical thought. Tactically, all resources must be exploited along with skillful use -of ground, surprise, - and use of cover, darkness, mist or fog, and smoke. Simple tactical exercises without troops should , be worked out to stimulate thought and develop technique, later to-be used with troops on battalion scale, THE MISSIONS OF TACTICAL AVIATION IN ATOMIC WARFARE. Les missions de?l'aviation tactique en erre atomique, by Camille Rbu8eron, -inForces Aeriennes F rancaises, no. 103 (Apr ,1955) 617- 631. In Frenc . The effects-of atomic and thermonuclear bombs and radio- activity;'the role of aircraft in direct support concentrated about fifty- kilometers behind the, front and with the mission of covering the sector with hundreds of radioactive craters; and responsible for indirect sup- port by means of strategic bombing with thermonuclear bombs delivered by guided missiles and heavy fighter-bombers. 50 "POINT OF NO RETURN" by Mai, F, Le. G. Whetting, in Journal of the Royal Artiller, v.82, no. 2. A r 1955 (P ) 81-94, , Characteristics and effects of the atomic bomb; deployment of infantry and armor on a wi de front in atomic war; -factors affecting artiller in defense; present artiller weapons y Y in the light of atomic warfare; recom- mended changes in the organization of infantry and deployment y nd armored divisions; acid ' of the artillery, incorporating recommended organizational' changes REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF AIR SUPPORT. Reflexions sur la notion d'appui aerien, by Lt, Col. J. L. ?Lecerf in Revue de Defense Nationale, v,10 (Oct 1954 286-297. In French: En view of recent progress in armament and the evolution of tactical operations, the concept of air support under French doctrine has recently been changed from "support of an-arm " to "participation- in a joint battle." Thi y J This provides a clearer distinction between the two types of action autonomous and ' ( point) which the French Air Force can imple- ment within the scope of a glven,mission involving all armed forces. THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF SIR FRANCIS' DRAKE, b Arthur Stanley Riggs, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 76, no. 12 (Dec ,1950) 1345-1359. A brief review of Drake's part in English history in which the thinking and action of this sailor, tactician, and father of amphibious war- fare are reviewed. Considered not from the historical point of view, 'but as patterns of thought and action applicable in the future as they were in the past. , TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN A FUTURE WAR; by. Group Capt. E. W,` Pinto, in Military Review, v. 35, no. l (Apr 1955) 89-95. Conclusions drawn from World War II experiences with respect to the employment of tactical airpower in the following missions:. (1) gain- ing and maintaining air superiority in the theater of operations; (2) interdic- tion -of the battle area to deny movement of enemy troops and supplies; (3) provision of close air support to the land forces in.the battle area; and (4), air reconnaissance (strategic reconnaissance for both ground and air force, needs, tactical reconnaissance mainly for the ground forces, and artillery reconnaissance). The integrated organization of the tactical air force (which will hold good in any future war). with its -own command and coequal with the ground forces has demonstrated the strength and versatility of air power. - -51 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 THE TACTICAL ORGANIZATION OF TROOPS, by Gen. Blumentrflt, in Military Review, v. 34, no. 5 (Aug 1954) 8-23. o enable the modern student to understand current military developments; and to sense future trends, it is essential that we have a- thorough knowledge. of,historY and understand the evolution of formations." , This, study is based upon recollections of the author's experience as a teacher:;of tactics at the Berlin Kriegsakademie from 1933 to 1935. He reviews the battle formations of the Greeks, Romans, during the Middle Ages and the early modern times, in the eighteen century, armies, and during both World Wars. THE TEAM OF MOBILE WARFARE: ARMOR AND AIRBORNE, by Capt. Everett C. Royal, in Armor, v. 64, no. 2 (Mar-Apr ' 1955) 4-6. - Armor and airborne forces are complementary forces which, ~f' united as an operational team under one .commander, form one of the most effective combinations it is possible to devise, because they possess the highly desirable characteristics of mobility, firepower, and shock action. ,:More combined arms training by these two forces is absolutely necessary. A VERIFICATION OF LANCHESTER'S LAW, by J. H. Engel, in Operations Research Society of America, Journal, v. 2, no. 2 (May 1954) 163_171. A mathematical technique for verifying the applicability of a certain type of generalized Lanchester equations. The law states that the strength of a combat force is proportional to the square of the number of combatants entering a battle. The technique is applied in an analysis of the battle for Iwo Jima, and it is found that. the equations did describe the situation. Such analyses will increase in value when repeated often enough to permit general conclusions to be drawn. WARFARE TODAY; HOW MODERN BATTLES ARE PLANNED AND FOUGHT ON LAND, AT SEA, AND IN THE AIR, ed. by Adm. Sir Reginald Bacon and others. London, Odhams Press, 1944. 256 p. Contents: Features of modern war; the war on land; develop- ment of armoured forces; the attack of' armoured forces; defense against armoured attack; how air power affects land warfare; fighter defense; fighter offense; bomber offense; air power at sea; fleet air arm; sea war- fare-offense; sea warfare defense; combined operations; airborne attack. b. Germany - Historical Examples 52 DEFEAT OF THE LUFTWAFFE: FUNDAMENTAL 'CAUSES, b Gen. ? Adolf Galland Y in Air University Quarterly Review, v; 6., ho: 1"? (Spring 1953) 18-36. " A former general of the German Air Force discusses 'the, " factors responsible for the decline and poor showing of the Luftwaffe dur- ing the later stages of World War II - factors which stemmed from: 1 deficiencies of organization and training; (2) internal influences, such as Hitler's stoppage order for research and development, the .lack of a clear operational plan for the offensive against England, technical inadequacies, the lack of q night fighter aircraft, and others; and (3) the effects of Allied strategic air attacks. GAS ATTACK AT YPRES; A STUDY IN MILITARY HISTORY, by. Rudolph Hanslian. Edgewood Arsenal, Md., Chemical Warfare School, 1940. 55 p. (Pamphlet No. 8. ) Account by a German authority of the first chemical warfare success in military history. Preparations for the attack, analysis of the military action, and French and British reactions as noted in their official reports. Eye-witness testimony and conclusions. HOW HITLER BROKE THROUGH IN THE WEST, by Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, in Military Review, v. 36, no. 12 (Mar 1957) 52-62. "The course o the world in our time was changed, with far- reaching effects on the future of all peoples, when Hitler's forces broke through the defense of the West in May 1940." The author feels that it was one of the most sweeping victories in modern history and although Germany was defeated in the end, it remains doubtful whether the con- sequences of the breakdown in West's defenses can ever be redeemed. SWORD OF SILK, by Capt. Boyd T. Bashore, in Infantry School. Quarterly, v. 46, no.4 Oct 1956 56-69; v. 47, no. 1 Jan 1 64-76. A two part article based on tape recorded interviews with German, General Kurt Student on how the Germans' developed and employed strategic airborne warfare, how Hitler failed to grasp its significance, and' how' we profited from German experience and, soon outstripped them. c. United States ADAPTABILITY: INDEX TO SURVNABILITY by Gen, W., G.. Wyman, in Arm Information Digest, v. 12, no. 61 (June 1957) 2-11..: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 I aj G 19. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 he Army's..program for tactical employment of mobile forces on the atomic battlefield is an-important transitional step, keeping the Army abreast of evolutionary ?changes in?technolo and materiel. Charts show gY organization of mobile forces. ~YZ p AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS, Washington, Department of the Ar Force 1954: 17 p. (AFM 1-4. Provides the basis for an understanding of the manner in which the air defense of the US is operated. Functions of air defense; and its utilization of basic Air Force units, Arm and Navy forces and civilians. Y ' Planning, command and organization, and training for air defense. Types of operations for air defense; and procedures and methods of air defense operations. ATOMIC DEFENSE RECONSIDERED, by Lt. ` Col. Seymour L. _ Goldberg, in Infantry School Quarterly, v.47, no, l (Jan 1957) 41-49. Another concept or defense against atomic weapons is pre- sented: linear defensive positions in great depth with dispersion at all echelons consistent with the mission as the answer to defense on the atomic battlefield. BATTLE REPORT; THE WAR IN KOREA, by Walter Kari Malcolm W. Cagle, and -Frank A. Manson g' New York, Rinehart, 1952. 520 p; History compiled from official records and accounts by combat correspondents of US Navy and Marine Corps actions in Korea from the outbreak of war through the evacuation at Hungnam. The beginning of hos- tilities;. Navy activity around the Pusan perimeter; employment of carrier- based planes; the preparation, and execution 'of the Inchon landing; the u to the Yalu River; and the hard-fought " push . advance in another direction" that ended in evacuation. CAVALRY, AND I DON'T MEAN HORSES, by Mai. Gen. Jam - Gavin, in Har er's, v. 208, no. 1247 (A p 195 es M. (p 4) 54-60. - The success- of future warfare will e de Pend on how well a nations forces arPrePaced for operations based on the concepts of and firepower, General Walker's forces were defeated mobility, shock, d in Korea in June 1950 because the factors of mobility, sur rise his dis osal P , and firepower were not p against the attacking North Koreans. E at p in World War II also indicate that whenever these factors were they spelled the difference between victory present or defeat. The advent of p special premium on top rate mobilit atomic combat. The US ;Arm is y and firepower in round y getting bogged down with heav g Y equipment, there- 54 fore, US military preparedness should be directed 'toward the classic con- cept of cavalry, whereby infantry, armor, and air will become give the US ~ a team to mobility and momentum over its otential adversaries and to. et there "fust " ~~ ' g est with the mostest and not lastest with the leastest." CAVALRY OF THE SKY; THE STORY OF U. S. MARINE COMBAT HELICOPTERS, by Lynn Montross. New York, Harper, 1954. 270 p. The development of Marine helicopter combat tactics and tech- niques since 1947, and employment of combat helicopters in Marine opera- tions in Korea. Appended: US Marine Corps helicopter units and com- manding officers, and glossary of military and aeronautical terms. Bib- liography, photos, maps, sketches, charts, and diagrams. DEVELOPING TOMORROWS ARMY TODAY, by Brig, Gen. Frederick W. Gibb, in Army Information Digest, v. 12, no. 6 (June 1957) 24-33. At the US Army Combat Development Experimentation Center, Fort Ord, Calif., new concepts, organization, and doctrine are subjected to exhaustive tests to keep pace with advances in technology. LESSONS FROM KOREA, by Fridolin von Senger and Etterlin, in Cosantoir, The Irish Defence Journal, v. 11, no, l (Jan 1951) 2-7. In the Korean war, two main experiences of World Wars I and II have been reaffirmed: (1) occupation of territory in an initial phase of war does not pay if the territory occupied is only a fraction of thatbelong- ing to a world-wide belligerent coalition; and (2) manpower is indispensa- ble; and lack of manpower inevitably induces the nation affected to re- place-manpower by technique. Analogies are drawn between the 'Koren. campaigns and battles in World Wars I and II indicating the ?necessity for choosing ,a battlefield which by its lines of defense allows shortage of manpower to be made up by naval superiority, or, if manpower is abso-'. lutely inadequate for a defensive battle, for avoiding engagement and withdrawing in 'time in order to commence a war of maneuver in which mobile and armored divisions have' already scored successes. NOTES ON DEFENSE, by Maj. Melbourne. C. Chandler,. in Military Review, v. 34, no. 11 (Feb 1955) 38-49? Because the ideal conditions in defense have been overem- phasized in US training, the military student has a tendency to visualize all defense under ideal conditions with an almost flankless front. It, is not 'the intent of the author to propose changes in US Army's doctrine of , 55 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 command, Limited to a general summary of the princi les, doctrine tac- tics and techniques P ' of the combat phase of tactical air. operations as they affect surface operations. APpended: charts showing organization of USAF and major commands; World War II Army comments on the, effects of tac- tical air support; joint Army-Air Force agreement on air control teams; new terminology used in joint air-ground operations; numbers of aircraft . assigned to various types of. units (war strength); standardization factors for use in map maneuvers; guide to aircraft employment; ground target damage assessment chart; tactical air missions chart; and procedures for obtaining offensive air support and tactical air reconnaissance, defense, but rather :to indicate those fundamentals requiring greater em- phasis,.when conducting a: defense in the future. To this end he discusses: defense in depth; organization of the defense area; factors determining the size of,.units,needed for the defense of an area; conduct of the defense; artillery positions in defense areas and planning of artillery fires during .the conduct of the defense; defense against armored attacks; rear area security and reserves; and the role of mobility and speed in the defense of the future. Active and aggressive defense aimed at killing the enemy rather-than merely stopping or repelling him must be emphasized. A SEMINAR ON MOBILITY IN WARFARE, by 2nd Lt. David Drew Gilpatrick, in Armor,., v. 64, no. 4 (July-Aug 1955) 14-17. To asst US Military Academy cadets in developing a sound professional base, a group of officers at the Military Academy recently conducted a seminar at which the .following- areas were discussed: (.a) the development and progress of mobility in the employment of cavalry armor infantry, artillery, ? signal, and engineers; (b) the development and progress of mobility in the employment of the tactical air-ground team; (c) the devel- opment and requirements for staff action in mobile warfare and more spe- cifically, the development of th the mission-type order; and (d) possible char- acteristics'of the war of the future. The mechanics of the seminar, which are described, can be readily adapted to units in the field. Such a seminar can be held at company, battalion, or combat command level. A book bib- liography is appended to assist anyone interested in setting up a similar study group. TOMORROW'S INFANTRY TODAY, by Brig. Gen. Carl F. Fritzsche, in Arniy Cbmbat Forces Journal, v. 5, no. 9 (Apr 1955) 20-24. - Tactics of atomic war developed at the Infantry School are based on the, concepts of dispersion, mobility, and protection. The co' ncept of dis- persion requires?,independent and semi-independent operations by single e bat- talions and rapid concentration, ,when needed, near the enemy, which fn turn requires emphasis on communications and improvement of existing security means.. ;The concept of mobility requires modern types of round as well as development of air mobility through use of assault transports, helicopters, and parachutes. The cone t of p protection places greater em- phasis on movement and maneuver at night. -The new doctrine' of mobile de- fense is that of an offensive defense deploying battalion-size units of com- bined arms in positions of depth as strong-points or grouped on islands of resistance. Studies conducted by the Infantry School in fire- ordination and improved assault techniques. - support co- US AIR FORCE BASIC DATA. Fort Leavenworth Kans., and General Staff Colle a., 1954 Command g 65 p. (ST 31-35-i.). Organization and operation of theater air forces at all levels of d. U.S.S.R. IRON CURTAIN STRATEGY, in East and West, no.4 (1955) 16-19. The concept of double envelopment (obkhvat) is a favored move- ment in the Soviet strategic doctrine. It will, in all probability, be applied when the Soviet General Staff decides upon the 'H" hour, It is an axiom of Soviet strategy that successful land operations must be carried out on the largest possible territory with sufficient reserve of area in the rear to fall back upon in case they are attacked or for maneuvering in preparation for their own offensive of counter-offensive operations. In this light examines military and political aspects of the central part of the East-West Front in Europe where the Soviets on their side have an immense territory of more than 9 million square miles, and the Western Powers are badly squeezed into a narrow strip of round of just over 300, 000 square miles between the Iron Curtain and the Atlantic. OPERATIONS IN THE-TAIGA, by Lt. Col. Raymond L. V. Pearson, in Military Review, v. 37, no. 1 (Apr 1957) 40-52., -. Whether future wars are nuclear or nonnuclear, big or little, . or fought in the forest, bungle, mountain, ox plain area, our ground forces must -be equipped and trained to utilize climatic and terrain conditions. The lessons of the Finnish-Russian wars of 1939 and 1944 are evaluated. SOVIET ARMOURED PRINCIPLES, by Maj. ?M. F. Vassilieff, in An Cosantoir, v. 15, no. 10 (Oct 1955) 469-477. 'Experiences of World War II show that the Soviet Command massed tanks together in the decisive direction instead of dispersing them along a whole front. Beginning with Stalingrad,' the High Command put into effect new forms of attack operations, with groups of tanks in formation of many successive echelon's oriented in the direction of the decisive blow. This enabled penetrations of up to 300 miles at rates of fifteen -to twent Y miles in twenty-four hours. Organizational structure of a present Soviet`; tank corps. (Translated from Russian by Capt. D. N. Brunicardi. ) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 A SURVEY OF SOVIET ARMOR, by Michael S. Davison, in Armor, v.60, no. 2 (Mar-Apr 1951) ?34-40. The following conclusions are drawn after surveying tactics (pre-war concepts, World War II - offense, World War .11 - defense, operations at aught, and operations in winter), organization, training, and qualities of the Soviet soldier: offensive operations of Soviet armor are characterized by deliberation with emphasis on detailed planning and careful rehearsals; the motivating factor of the offense is the massive infantry assault, saturated with tanks and given violent artillery and air support;. the continuity of the attack is maintained by around-the-clock operations; the conduct of the defense is marked by great tenacity and by the employment of reserves in coordinated counterattack rather than in piece'-meal commitment; the organization appears to be flexible, adapted to the mission and the material available; training is intensive and- realistic and an eye on terrain and climate; the Soviet soldier is a -very capable fighting man with a strong sense of patriotism; and armor is an essential- component of the Soviet combined arms team. Its employment is tacticaiy sound and its material is of a high order. 5. Logistics a. \1IsceUaneous Aspects ? THE FUTURE OF MILITARY AIR LOGISTICS, in Interavia,- v. 11, no.4 (Apr 1956) 263-256. - The four ,jet transport formula which has just es just established itself in the ?id clvii market 'will also profoundly change military air logistics a moat all the ply of the military?staffs whose responsibilities have e~zasnied to an innterc onanent1 scale. In fact, since both the load ca a- 4laes:mod the c~ ~I-ing aneeds of the ne P ~ ; new your-jet transports are more than as m-e eni figs, their advent will enable the number of qI, ~"sf~ ~m Muir to more a siren load over long distances to be ~ divided by iZ. GLOB2.L I.t3tii~TIQ AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943 by Richard .~ ~ . ~. ~.-, . ~ ~ Y hard M. w. ley. Washinton, De artment of ~_. P the Army, ta~C' of i .y. syory, 1956. 'S0 p. ? IMPLICATIONS.OF THE MISSILE ERA, in Army, v.7, no. 4 (Nov' 1956) 22. ".... Our war power really is the means we have times its mobility. You can have everything in the world you might need to win a war but if you can't get it there, you get second prize, which means you have lost..." (Partial transcript of a,radio broadcast by Lt: Gen. James M. Gavin on "Survival in the Air Age? over MBS during which he de- scribed the strategic and tactical implications of the missile era. ) "THE INFLUENCE OF LOGISTICS ON MILITARY STRATEGY" ADAPTED FROM LECTURES TO THE CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE, by Mai. Gen. G. S. Hatton, in Army Quarterly, v. 72, no. 2 (July 1956) 173-181. With historical examples, the influence of maritime and air power, and in the atomic age. LOGISTICS IN WORLD WAR II; A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY, by Robert Greenhalgh Albion, in United States Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 83, no. l (Jan 1957) 97-102. A survey of published works (official and unofficial US and British histories) dealing with the various aspects of logistics in World War II. A NEW FIELD FOR LOGISTICS RESEARCH, by Rear Adm. Bern Anderson, in Naval Research Logistics Quarterly,, v,1, no. 2 (June 1954) 79-81. An intensive study'of the German logistics system during the Italian campaign would be a fruitful field of research. The German troop movements and concentrations were made. quickly and effectively, and they must have been backed by a smoothly functioning supply and administration system. The major moves made by German units to demon- strate their rapidity. The German supply. organization, planning factors, and requirements could be. studied 'with profit. PRACTICAL AIDS TO LOGISTIC PLANNING, by Herbert A. Jordan, in Military Review, v.32, no. 3 (June'1952) 34-48. Principles, short cuts, and time savers which were applied, successfully in the past and which may serve as a guide in developing similar aids to meet the requirements of a particular planning staff. 438345 0-57 -5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 59 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 TEN YEARS AGO... THE PREPARATION OF THE LANDING OPERATIONS. Voici dix ans... La preparation du debarquement, ) y Georges Blond, in Miroir de l'Histoire, v.5, no, 53 (1954) 666-680. In, French. The preparations for Allied landing operations in France in 1944, including: the construction of "prefabricated ports, " the designa- tion. of "blockships" destined to be sunk along the French coast to offer protection for the small landing operations, the construction of the in- vasion fleet, operation PLUTO (pipe-line-under-the-ocean), and the organization of the troop transports. b. United States ARMS: FOR OUR ALLIES, by Brig. Gen. Joseph M. Colby, in Qrdnance, v.40, no. 21.1 (July-Aug 1955) 49-53. An account of the Offshore Procurement Program which in addition_to,providing guns and ammunition for the NATO armies, has aided European economic recovery and helped' reestablish a dispersed munitions- pr-oduction:baae abroad. KQREA AND. LOGISTICS; by James A. Huston, in Military Review, v:36,,_ no-.11(Feb. 1.957) 18-32. United States. support in the conflict in Korea was one of the greatest logistical efforts in our history. The lessons learned and the procedures-developed there should prove of tremendous value in the- future. ('This article is, taken from a study on "Logistical Support for the Conflict . in.Korea, ;,, Dr. Huston: for' the Office of the Chief of Military History; D'eparrment bf the: Army.) KOREA: THE MILITARY LESSON, by Eric Larrabee, in Harper's Magazine, no. 1206 (Nov 1950) 51-57. The ability of Communist armies to 'live off the country, largely eliminating the lines of supply and communication which our air power intends to destroy, accounts for the failure of the North Koreans to collapse under our air attacks. If we are to be successful in. counter- ing Communist aggression wherever it occurs,, we must change our basic philosophy concerning the mountains of supplies necessary to support a field army. We can no longer" on afford the largesse that put 'ten. tons of supp v`behind everyman in the European theater; we are simply nAt that rich. '' R duci. g the non-essential supplies will allow a reduction in the' pxeaentl rwasted?manpower needed to handle these supplies in rear areas. .-...,~aaarC:;:,,s,ucE.iri.S n.' ;l': ~ ~pr;:,r?+.e wr;::~3?:r{~.~~~. - _ The author advocates a reduction in the size of our infantry division and the extension of airborne planning. He warns that w we must overcome our Present-disadvantages of an unwieldy Army and overtaxed supply if we are to successfully counter future Soviet moves in the Korean pattern. 17 LOGISTICAL MUSCLES BY MISSILES, by Lt. Col. Robert B. Ri in Arm , v. 6 no. 10 1956 28- gg' _~ ~ (May ) 29. Predicts that in the future - "perhaps in less than ten, years" the Army will have a family of guided missiles carrying supplies to units in combat. How such guided missile supply ships will be used,' and the impact they will have on ground warfare. LOGISTICS AND WORLD WAR II ARMY STRATEGY, by Col. 'H. F. Sykes, Jr., in Military Review, v.35, no.2 (Feb 1956) 47-54. Explores the interplay between the grand strategic and logistic decisions of the US Army during World War II and concludes that the pro- jection of military requirements must be on the broadest possible basis and must allow for flexibility and alternative courses of action. The idea that a single set of requirements tied to a single strategic plan furnishes a proper basis for wartime production should be shunned. What is needed is a pattern of production which can support many courses of action while precisely fitted to no one of them. LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY. PLANNING FOR BOTH MUST BE INTEGRATED AND CONCURRENT, by F. S. Low, in Ordnance, v. 35, no. 184 (Jan-Feb 1951) 302-304. Discussion, of the close relationship between strategy and logistics as demonstrated, by the instance of the Guadalcanal campaign in World War II. - In surveying Korean logistics, the author concludes that "w.e reacted surprisingly well militarily in the Korean operation" because' we had learned the basic necessity for relating strategy to logistics. Strategic plans for future warfare will not be able to contemplate any major operations during the first eighteen to twenty-four months of an emergency unless the necessary supplies are on hand at the start; or the production cycle is well started. ' LOGISTICS AND THE SUPERWEAPONS, by Maj. Thomas 'J. Mc- Donald, in Military Review, v. 35, no. 8 (Nov 1955) 39-46. ? Fighting forces are no better than the logistical system that supports them, and logistical planning must be oriented accordingly. How- ever, changes in organization for sake of change must be avoided., The - 61 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 author, asks -what course ,must the strategic commander and his to g istcian ? take in:planung ;during, a- cold war, to prepare for both nonnuclear and lim- ited nuclear,war,, or possibly:thermonuclear war, and then : .- proposes a new approach to logistics based on:. 1 careful screening of our equip- merit'needs, 2 full use of all applicable () developments in the field of com- munications, (3) more airlift fbr the support of ground force operations, (4) radical improvements in the overland capabilities of land transport, and 5 () logistical reorganization, designed to exploit all the possibilities which exist' from th e most modern to the most primitive, because both maybe required.' MODERN ARMY SUPPLY SYSTEM, by Joseph A. Bourdow, in - Army, v. 6,? no. 12 (July 195.6) 33-35, How data processing and computers are used by the US Army in PROJECT MASS (Modern Army Supply System) which was designed as a test, operation of the Army t, ogi. stcal system and its capabilities to - sup- port-the mobile; flexible field?Army?that is coming. MASS begins on 1, July 1956 with, the Seventh Army in the role of a guinea pig. Photo of a computer and a transceiver which?examplify the electronic equipment that will keep MASS going at full, speed. W .. . A "NEW LOOK" FOR ARMY LOGISTICS, by Lt, Col. Prentiss B. Reed, Jr., in Military Review, v. 35, no, 3 (June 1955 37-44. The actors to be considered if the US logistical system consist- ing the vast technolo is - ~ g al industrial complexes is to survive in atomic warfare. We must analyze the Zone of Interior logistical structure for over- concentrations, single-facility operations, and excessive) unified control of operations, and initiate an ' y a immediate program to correct these conditions in the ZI Field plant; steps must be taken to eliminate the dangerous vulnerabil- ity of the logistical structure of our existing overseas commands and bases; the new and forceful reasons for restoring a military charac ter to logistical operations must be clearly conveyed to the officer corps, and the trainin our? officers young must restore major-emphasis on .developing the desi seek and carry responsibility; US must never-again become involved in a theater of operations as it did in Korea, on an unplanned, conceived in shoestring basis, terms of the preatomic World War II :a logistical scheme of oper- ations; nd the greatest single lesson in logistics in Korea was that it dem- onstrated that the logistical' operations there were the la II t st of the World War YPe, endeavors of this nature. A long-range program, consistent with the needs of the countries involved, is required fo concerned for maximum effectiveness, It is with the introduction of US military equipment and supply, its. employment and maintenance with training and schooling - es ec'ally pertains to the employment, care a p r quip- nd maintenance of the American e ment furnished, - STRATEGIC MOBILITY, by Ma', Gen. Earle Informati G. ? Wheeler; in,Arm,; Information ~ Digest, v, 12, no, 1, (Jan 1957 3-12. ? ---~ Our deterrent capability for heading off local ability to win a wars .and our , general war depends in large measure on strategic mobility. Director of Plans Offic Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Militar Operations, Department' of the Arm defin Y mobility " ~~ Y, es the meaning of strategic y as getting there and describes how airlift and se the Army's capability f alift enhance or modern warfare. - C. Defense Establishments And Military Organizations 1, General Aspects REFLECTIONS ON MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, by Lt, Col. Daniel A. Raymond, in Military Review, v. 35, no. 5, (Aug 1955) 31-43,, , .Assesses the US Army implementation of the MDAP in one country and derives therefrom such "lessons" as maybe of benefit in future 62 THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF PRUSSIA A RECENT AND FRANCE, AND CHANGES IN THE ART OF WAR b Lt. C and Henr Reeve 7 Y . ol, C. C. Chesney y London, Longmans, 1870. 258 P Contents: RECENT CHANGES IN THE, ART OF-WAR.1~ MILITARY GROWTH OF PRUSSIA P ' p. 58; MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF " . FRANCE, p, 126; 1UFLED ORDNANCE IN E and FRE NGLAND,AND FRANCE, p, 170; NCH LAW ON-THE RECRUITMENT OF THE ARMY, p, 247.. THE OLD EUROPEAN ARMY, by W. F. Jackson Kni Ma ght, in Forces Magazine (Mar 1955) 8-10, . Characteristics of the Roman Arm whic order i Y h secured peace and in the vast territory of the Roman Empire and contributed to the longest ? period of peace mankind had ever experienced in historical times. Emphasis on the legions, or the regular branch of 'the Army and its standard of excellence in regard to organization; operational , capability, training, discipline, and esprit de corps. 63 M Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 a. Great 'Britain. . THE CASE FOR A ROYAL UNITED SERVICE, by T. D. Calnan;. 'in Ro al'Air Force Quarterly, v. 3, no. 1 Jan 1951 15-22. . The defects an imitations of the present organization of the British Armed' Forces are examined, and the effectiveness of the organ- ization in peace and war, together with the employment and efficiency of the forces themselves are analyzed. Based on this analysis, a reorgan- ization is ,proposed which is said to result in a thoroughly efficient national organization for the control and coordination of the Armed Forces, so as to make'their employment effective in war, and to make their administration, and training more efficient and economical in peace. [THE QUEEN'S AIR FORCES] in Flight, v. 63 no. 2314 (29 Maa Y 1953) 93 p. (Coronation issue.) Description and photographs on: mission, or g and aircraft personnel, of the various RAF commands; histories, resent status, and aircraft of the Air F P orces of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Ceylon, and India; British and Commonwealth naval air arms; and a chronological list of highlights in British Aviation since 1926 b. NATO ALLIED NAVAL, AND?A.IR COMMANDS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN by Adm. Earl Mountbatten, in Royal United Service Institution Journal v. 100, no. 598 (May 1955) 17 1-16. ' Steps leading to the formation of the Allied F - orces, Mediter- ranean Command (AFMED) on 15 March 1953. Organization and re - 'sibilities of air and naval forces of France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, _UK, and US. All-over strategy, chain of comm y' gY~ and, and division of responsi- bilities. Map. c. United States AMERICAN DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY by Timothy W. Stanley. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 156. 202 : 64 "....Tells the stor of the most significant developments in'. national security structure during the.past ten analyzes the years.. ? ?~ It.carefully policies and operations of the National Security Council and - the role of the Department of Defense Y t as the instrument of unification of he services....' THE CANADIAN-AMERICAN PERMANENT . DEFENCE JOINT BOARD OF 1940-1945, by Col. C. P. Stacey, in International Journal, no. Z (Spring 1954) 107-124. The Board was an experiment in I' and an inn nternational organization ovation in both 'Canadian and American external policy. Founded fourteen years ago,' it developed through the years into an imp ortant element of Canadian-American relations ' of the and in the defensive organization West. Events that led to the formation of th ization a Board, and its organ- , mission, and achievements during World War II. Includ of the Board's recommendations d es a lest Se to wring the period August 1940 through p tuber 1944, . CHANGES INSIDE THE PENTAGON, by H. Struve Hensel in Harvard Business Review, v. 32, no. l (Jan-Feb 1954 98-108. The organizational philosophy behind the recent changes in the Department of Defense. Decentralization of operations; civilian con- trol and military decisions; powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and management of the Joint Staff, among others. COMMAND AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, b Lt. Col. Kyle Davis In Military F. Review, v.34, no. 1.1 (Feb 1955) 24-33. If future commanders are to know the proper acceptance of ,responsibility and application of authority, the principles of command and other degrees of authority must be established. Neither the , US statutes nor US Army regulations define the elements of ?command.." The lack of adequate definition has not constituted a serious problem in subtle a - mental levels, , p rt but it continues to be a handicap at national level and places an unnecessary burden upon the leaders of the US defense establistiment.~ For instance, the- National Security Act of 1947 failed to establish-clearly the Secretary of Defense as head of the Department of Defense with . h com- plete authority, over its activities. Failure to state that the 'Secretary of . Defense was a commander subordinate to the Presiden Y t, or a deputy com- mander to the President, precluded the establishment of a clearly defined chain of command and severely affected the efficiency of the entir Establishment. Reviews the 1949 findings of the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government the 195 ? 3 findings ? of the Rockefeller Committee, and the President's ,Reorgamzation Plan. Number 6, which he prepared and presented to. Con gre'ss following the. Rockefeller report. The need for definition remains, because somehow 65 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Lii Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 these studies have translated into words the concept they wished to es- tablish.. The author, in his search for adequate means of describing the relationships that exist and should exist at all levels of command and authority, presents his definitions for: command, direction, control; staff supervision, and coordination. DEVELOPMENT OF UNIFICATION, b Dudley W. Knox in Naval Institute U.S. Proceedings, v. 76, no. 12 (Dec 1950) 1309-1315. cardinal problem that now confronts us in the development of true unification consists of the chasm separating Army and Nav Y con- cepts. of organization,. administration th and operations. From the outset the Navy had unity within itself. However the Arm unification ~ y has never had true being an organization of loosely knit, semi-independent Corps. Another conflicting concept is that of overseas air bases Air Force contends that long-range airplanes diminish the need of ad- vanced air bases, whereas the Navy supports the u This use of the carrier. brings up the controversy of the carrier versus such air the B-36. These and planes as other concepts require clarification in many minds to the end that more genuine unification of thinking among the Armed Services may be achieved. MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES. Fort Leavenworth, Kan., Command and General Staff School, 1923. 58 "The pamphlet presents a brief outline of the general organ- ization of the land forces of the United States, including a theater of It resents in considerably more detail the projected war organization of tactical formations, the functions of commanders and staffs an system of ad U and the ministration. NAVAL"PREPAREDNESS, b Vice Adm. F. Y S. Low,, in Ordnance, v40, no.211 (July-Aug 1955) 34-36. - The US Navy is keeping abreast of the enormous tec advances in armament and equipment in order to increase its striking power and mobility and maintain control of th g e seas for national defense. Reorganization of the-Department of Defense following the recommendations Rockefeller Committee. The organizational concept of Photographs. the Navy. PENTAGON REORGANIZATION: PHASE THREE in U. S. Naval Instit , by John R. ?Probert, ute Proceedin s, v: 81, no, l (Jan 1955 51-6 T The ) 2' proposals or reorganization of the US Department Defense made b the President's Reorganization by Plan No. 6, the changes 66. made by implementation of the Plan, and the changes during the last year which ? make up the third and last phase of the reorganization. The DePartment, of Defense has become more like the other executive depart- ments of the Government and authority and responsibility have been more precisely located in the Secretary of Defense. Though the Ch Joint Chiefs has received airman of the the responsibility to manage the Joint Staff and to approve the selection and tenure of the Joint Staff the lost , members have power, but they have not been submerged or subordinated. Plans to be formulated for the approval. of the Secretary, member and any individual can appeal to Congress any decision of the Joint Chiefs. REPORT OF THE ROCKEFELLER COMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION. Washington, 1953. 25 P (US Senate , 83d Congress, 1st Session, Committee on Armed Services, Committee Print.) The Committee investigated the basic organization and pro cedures of the Department of Defense, especially the position of the Secretary of Defense and his relationships with his principal civilian and military officials, and recommended: (1) clarification of the authority of the Secretary of Defense 2 clarification , () of the command channels within the Department; (3) increase in the ability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as the top military planning and advisory group; (4) abolishment of a number of statutory boards which have proved too unwieldy and rigid and which could be administered by Assistant Secretaries; and (5) authori- ty for the Secretary of Defense to safeguard the promotional prospects of officers who serve in his office. d. U.S.S.R. HANDfOOK ON THE SOVIET AND SATELLITE ARMIES. PART I: THE SOVIET ARMY. Washington,, Department of the Army, 1953. 172 .. DA Pamphlet No. 30-50-1 P ( .) The military system; military doctrine; organization of the field forces; personnel and training; logistics; weapons; equipment; uni- forms, insignia, decorations, and awards; the Red Navy; the Red Air Force'; and the quasi-military organizations of the Soviet Union, Charts diagrams, photos, and other illustrations. THE SOVIET ARMY, ed, by B. H. Liddell Hart. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956. 480 P. " ... The aim of this book is to provide a reliable account, and 67 Lii Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 comprehensive picture, of the So'viet Army in all its aspects - by drawing on and piecing together the knowledge of a wide range of experts in vario us countries who have made a special study, or have had direct experience, of particular aspects and organs of this Army." THE SOVIET ARMY; ITS SOLDIERS AND TACTICS. Fort Lee Va. Q t ' uar ermaster School 1954 24 . , p. (Student Workbook 151.46. ) A synopsis of the'pamphlets of the SOVIET ARMY series fro m which the most pertinent and significant facts have been extracted For more complete details reference should be made to the the MANUAL pamphlets and to . OF CURRENT SOVIET ARMY WEAPONS, prepared b the Office of the.Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Third Army. Characteristics of the Soviet soldier; training in the Soviet Army; weapons and logistics; organization of small and medium infantry units;' offensive and defensive doctrine; execution of the attack and conduct of defense; and employment of tactics in special operations (assault of a fortified area, and combat in cities and towns). Appended: a list of Soviet military "Artillery is the quotations (e, g. Y God of War"). Photos of various Soviet weaPonsu organ- izational charts of Soviet units and illustrations showing the layout of Soviet antitank obstacles. THE RED ARMY TODAY, by Col. Louis B. Ely. Harrisbur Militar Service P Harrisburg, Pa., y ubkshing Co., 1953. 272 p. Organization, tactics, and personnel of the Soviet Arm chief/ on up-to-date based chiefly information from soldiers who left Russia to take u life in the Western world. With chapters discussing: Soviet infantry; armor; artillery and its weapons; cavalry commands and Cossack services and engineers; air support and airborne forces; Soviet partisan capabilities, including partisan tactics in World War make the II, the people wkio Army; quality and combat ability y of the Red Arm of th Y; comparison the Soviet Army with the armies of the Western potential of the European powers; satellites; Soviet Army 'capabilities and objectives; and current trends with possible equip ment respect to capabilities of Soviet officers, P techniques, and tactics. Appendixes on: how the Soviet compares with Western divisions; Red Army organization and weapons; recommended collateral readin ? and illustrat' g f i ons o Soviet uniforms 'and ! g insignia. SOVIET IMPERIALISM, by G. A. Tokaev. London Gerald Duck- worth, 1954.? 73 p. Political strategy and tactics of the Soviet Union,Soviet-military- political' and military-philosophical doctrine; and organization and strength of Soviet Armed Forces The author, formerly an engineer colonel of the he Soviet Army, assisted for nearly fifteen 'ears in the formulation rears and prac- pplication of most of the fundamental military and military-technical 68 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 doctrines of the USSR. Since 1940 Col. Tokaev occupied a series of in- creasingly important technical posts in Soviet aircraft production, and in 1948 was serving in Berlin as Soviet expert on jet and rocket problems. He and his family crossed over to the West in 1948. The military aspects of the book include information (mostly of fragmentary nature) on: Soviet military science, artillery, armor, paratroops, mechanized troops, 'cur- rent types of Soviet aircraft, guided missiles and atomic weapons; Soviet Navy, stockpiling of supplies, equipment research, standardization staff and military education, and morale and welfare of the Soviet Forces. 2. Evolution a. General Aspects THE ARMED HORDE, 1793-1939; A STUDY OF THE RISE, SURVIVAL AND DECLINE OF THE MASS ARMY, by Hoffman Nickerson. New York Putnam's, 1942. 427 p. ' "This book traces the origin, survival culmination and recent decline of the mass army recruited by universal, compulsory service which , with its corollaries of unlimited taxation and governmental control over -the governed, has so evilly transformed warfare during the last hundred and fifty years.. . ancient armies; and the impetus given to military arts and sciences in the twentieth century. MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, by Capt. Ambrosio. P. Pena, in Military Historical Review, v.2, no. 2 (Dec 1954) 13-17 plus. /though history does not record just when and how the first form of military organization originated, it is known that formation of armies followed closely the progress of nations. A well-geared military organization is often the yardstick of the degree of progress of 'a nation. The basis for military organization during the early developmental stages of society; formation of armies among the nations of ancient world; the early tactical set-up; degeneration of the military art following the fall of the Roman Empire; rebirth of military art with the era of Rennaissance at the turn of the fourteenth century; employment of mercenaries by the 69 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Jill Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS UNTIL 1940. Le genie jusqu'en 1940, by Col. de Lesquen, in Revue Historique de L'Armee, v. 11, no, 4 Nov - 1955) 67-88, In French. History and various stages of evolution of the French Corps of Engineers from its establishment through the Napoleonic Wars, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, World War I, and the 1939'-1940 campaign of World War II. , Brussac. Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1955. In French, History of the Legion from its creation in 1792 through the many campaigns fought by its members up to the end of the Indochinese Revolutionary War, including also particulars on the Legion's structure , its renowned esprit de corps, and the recruitment and train of its members. NAVAL AVIATION 1915-1954. Aeronavale 1915-1954 Vulliez, Paris , by Capt. Amiot-Dumont, 1955? In French. Evolution and activities of French naval aviati battles of Dunkirk ' on from the in 1915, through the French Campaign of 1940, the Syrian raids, and the Indoch inese War, to the collapse of Dien Bien Phu. c, 'Germany - Historical Examples PANZER DIVISIONS,, by R, M. Ogorkiewicz in Arm v. 70 . no, 1 195 Y Quarterly, (Apr 5) 44-52, Review of the development of German armored uni particular reference to: ts, with (1) the original armored division which.wa created in 1935;,(2) changes prior to 1940 s (3) light divisions which evolved in 1937; (4) the 1940 reorganization; 5 German armored divisions in the Russian and North African campaigns of 1941-42; (6) the 1943 and 1944 di- visions; (7.). armored infantry divisions; and 8 trends in organization and employment during the latter part of World War II. THE FOREIGN LEGION, La legion etrangere by Philippe de d, Great Britain , ARMOURED FORMATIONS, b Lt. Col, C Quarter/ Y .Paddock, in Army v. 74, no. l (Apr 1957) 63-68, Traces the development of armored formati World War I to the ons in Britain from . present. , ARMS AND THE MEN, by Ian Hay. London 19 Brit, H. M , 50. 330 p, (Gt. M. Govt,, The Second World War, 1939-1945 series.) One of eight volumes of a popular history of World War II This volume tells the story of the art played by the British Army during war, giving the internal history of events - of th the growth. and develop- ment citizen Army, the changes brought about in its composition, training, leadership, , and administration by the introduction of tot mechanized warfare. Also discussed is the revolution, effected Burin these years in certain army traditions. The g early chapters deal with the.. inception and growth of the Arm from the in- cluding time of the New Model, the sweeping reforms of Cardwell and Haldane. GOOD-BYE TO BOOT AND SADDLE, OR THE TRAGIC PASSING OF BRITISH CAVALRY, by E, G. French. London, Hutchison 195 283 p. 1. , History of the British cavalry and its re g from Ei hteenth Century to September 1939, when the last two regiments were abolished. The traditions life, uniforms, and some of the battles the fought and won. The concluding chapter they questions the wisdom of the abolition, because there, are tactical situations in modern warfare, where cavalry, and not armor and aircraft, can affect the decisive results. THE GROWTH OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE, by Ca pt, Norman Macmillan in Aeronautics, v. 28, no, 6 (July 1953) 60-62 plus, Traces the growth of the RAF as a fi htin ? service Inception in 19 g? g from its 18 to its present size which, in peacetime, is limited b the current high cost of air ?materiel, With by h a comparative table showing 'rise in cost of British fighters and bombers since 1914 and a , listing of past and present Marshals of the Royal Air Force, THE THIRD SERVICE; THE STORY BEHIND THE ROYAL AIR FOR CE, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte. London, 71 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 Thames and Hudson, 1955. 274 p. The development of the RAF emphasizing forces behind the scenes that affected policies, and individuals who influenced these policies. Operations of the Royal Flying Corps (the predecessor of RAF), the Royal Naval Air Service, and RAF. e. United States AIRPOWER'S HOLLOW SHELL, by Gill Robb Wilson, in Air Force, v.38, no,11 (Nov 1955) 21. Although the military air establishment of the US is excellent, there is no hard core or foundation behind it.' There is a lack of: air concepts, aviation education, and of interest in air power. How we solve these problems is going to make or break the power of the Free World and the exercise of democratic government in a period as short as twenty- five years. THE ARMY'S PREPARATION FOR ATOMIC WARFARE, by Lt. Col. Jack J. Wagstaff, 'in Military Review, v.35, no. 2 (May 1955) 3-6. Steps taken by the US Army to develop atomic capabilities (atomic guns, guided missiles, the teaching of atomic tactics, and certain technical and scientific schools for the further education of qualified atomic technicians and scientists) in keeping with the "new look" strategy. How- ever, since it seems possible that there will never be an atomic war, tthe Army must also be ready to fulfill its mission by conventional means and to do so with a minimum 'of reconversions, rearfning, retraining' and re- tooling. We will not have two separate armies, one for atomic warfare and a?second to fulfill conventional requirements. HISTORY AND ROLE OF ARMOR.. Fort Knox, Ky., Armored School 1955. 41, p. ' .Background of armor, its capabilities, and its, current role in the present US Army. Early history; use and development during World War I? development and role, 1919-1939; armor in World War II and Korea. armor developments, World War- II to the resent; and arm field army.. present; .or in the type Photos of various tanks 1918-1953. HISTORY OF UNITED -STATES NAVAL AVIATION, by Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1949. 345 p. The story .of 'the development of Naval Aviation to its .present advanced state, illuminating the means by which we have retained control of the world's seas over which must pass the raw materials of our indus- trial strength. MILITARY AVIATION - THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS, 1y Owen J. Remington, in Arm Information Digest, v. 8, no. 9 (Sept 1953) 9-39. Role played by the US Armed Forces in developing aviation in the past fifty years. US Army's early interest in accomplishments of initial aircraft of Professor S. P. Langley and Wright brothers; specifi- cations of the first military airplane contracted by the Army Air Service in 1908; establishment of the first US military aviation school; -Navy's initial experiments with flights from the deck of a battleship in 1910; first participation of airplanes in a maneuver with US Army ground troops in 1912; adoption of the Lewis machine gun as a standard weapon for US' military aircraft; impact of World War I on airplane development, and activities of the American Air Service against the German Air Force; historic flights and speed records in the post-World War I era; growth of commercial uses of aircraft; passage of legislation and establishment of aeronautical agencies which contributed to the growth and development of US civil and military aviation; impact of World War II on further growth of military aviation, and the emergence of new tactical and strate- gic concepts in the use of military aircraft; progress of research and de- velopment and design of aircraft after World War II and the fruition of the effort in the performance of American military aircraft over Korea. SEAPOWER IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, by Donald W. Mitchell, in Current History, v. 26, no. 152 (May 1.954) 271-276: Development of the US Navy during the past 160 years, and its role in future warfare. As long as transportation is vital to war, and until the time when air, transport replaces sea transport for bulk cargoes, command of the sea by naval forces will remain of vital importance. The US Navy stands ready to maintain command of the sea, but it also realizes that it will be challenged in the future by new conditions and by improved or new weapons (Mines, submarines, land-based aircraft). How the US Navy in recognition of the challenge is preparing itself for the conditions of future warfare and is utilizing naval air power to strengthen US in offense and defense. 73 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 .... A study of the organizational growth of the armed forces of the Soviets, of the component groups within them, and of the conflicts and conflict situations among these groups. " s; Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/11: CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6 111 THE BACKGROUND OF RUSSIAN SEAPOWER, by Comdr. Anthony Courtney,' in International Affairs, v.30, no. 1 (Jan 1954) 13-23. ? History o the Russian Navy and naval operations since the early eighteenth century when the Baltic fleet was built by Peter the Great. The destruction of Russian naval ships in the Russo-Japanese war. and the absence of a fleet from 1921 to 1934. The development of an ocean going fleet since 1934, and the expansion of this program since 1945 including quantity production of modern submarines. The development of the Northern Sea Route which links the Northern and Pacific fleets some months of the year, and the construction of the Volga-Don canal which solves the problem of internal communication. Lack of seamanship has been evident in the Russian Navy throughout its history. - THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVIET AIR POWER: A HISTORICAL AND MANAGERIAL INTERPRETATION, by Ramsay D. Potts, Jr., in American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals, v. 299 (May 195 -41: Evolution o Soviet air power during the years between World War I and the political purge in the thirties, the period of 1938-45, includ- ing the climatic experiences of World War II, and the period after 1945; Soviet progress in the field of aircraft engines; Soviet doctrine on the use of air power; Soviet aeronautical designers and engineers (IlYushin , Gurevich, Lavochkin, and Yakovlev); and progress in Soviet aeronautical engineering training. THE GROWTH OF THE RED ARMY, by D. Fedotoff. White. Princeton,. Princeton University Press, 1944. 486 p. SOVIET AIR POWER, by Richard E. Stockwell. New York pageant. Press, 1957. 238 p. "The author traces the amazing progress of Soviet military airpower from its crude beginnings to its resent position present of eminence in the world, and in the process points out the tremendous strides that the USSR has made in production, both industrially and education-wise " 3. Command And Staff ? 74 - e::,.i~S:~;J+~,i::,i ~rss'W~'`,,.--.T.;_' ~.:.~~~`.F~?-Y~`~