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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 CP-tilllt\ " 11- ilgrir Ail ARO MeRtgell Volume H Cultural and Political Background ty Chih-tsing UJo, R ? -urch As,secicto inie 5 K. hit urn, A-.1istcra in Resee:ch C- -Tit jldr, r'...i.stcet in Research Loci ce Vi. Pyo, Re-scrch Associate Loulc,:.? C., Ass.stant in Research Stud/ or r? ^urcol, Yoh, Uliwasity Edited by Duvid Ncl-un Rowe, Director Study of fltp-ocn Rev:et-co:, Yals Uneicrsity and Willmoore Kendall Operotions Research Office, The Johns 1lopftins University Received- 21 4 :it 1953 STAT STAT ? STAT STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 0'1' ? . - . , Pto. At.74, ? ; ;7.>1 I ? Z.2.747t1 24 ? MID 4.;.* - - Atitt r ?????????,.. CANA: Ap Area Molovigid 'Volume II Cuittnial and PohtScal f3ackarouri by Chih-tsing lisia, Research Asso,..loto James K. !Aura, Assistant in Research Gerrit Mulder, Assiitant in Rese,arch Lucian W. Pye, Research Associate Louise C. Yang, Assistant in Research Study of Human Resources, Yale Universit; Edited by David Nelson Rowe, Director Study of Human Resources, Yale Univenity and Willmar? Kendall Operations Research Oilice, The Johns Hopkins Uni% ..sity OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICIR The Johns Hopkins University Chevy Chase, Mr.ryland STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Too g ? Published January 1955 by OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE The Johns Hopkins University 7100 Connecticut Avenue Chevy Chase, Md. Washington 15, D. C. 4. - ? - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 poo g Ogiai-NAL '1 PREFACE This is the cecond of three volumen of an area manual on China prepared by a group of scholars familiar with the Chinese language, geography, hiatoiy, and culture. It is intended to serve as a eompendium of general informat1^n for use by military personnel. Years of academic resear..h and study ant represented in this document which is, obviously, a dis- tillation of myriad sources available on the subject. So vast is the field of literature on China that .only selected reading lists ? for a reader interested in a specific aspect of the material ? are included at the ends of various chapters. As China is in the throes of rapid social, political, and economic changes, it is difficult to make any definitive observations and generalizations regarding her people. Also, the limitations and imperfections of research techniques, the geographical remoteness of the country, and language barriers combine to make it almost impossible to arrive at positive conclusions regarding the four-hundred-and-fifty million people who live in that vast country. So academ:c research can do little more than identify and explore certain problems that will confront the military. It would be wise to check against current intelligence data the statements and principles to which this type of study leads. The latter should be modified, or even cast aside, as and when these data render them suspect. Volume 1 deals with Chinese geography, provinces, history, military affairs, and Communist. leaders Volume 2 sur:eve the socio-political areas: traditional ideologies, social organization, government, politics, education, literature, mass communication, and such sketchy miscel- lany as humor, modes of dress, superstitions, etiquette, the traditional and modern calendar, and tcatl:l4snal personages. Volume 3 is a detailed analysis et Chinese attitudes and thought patterns. How and why the Chinese act in theirunique manner is systematically explained for the understand- ing of the uninformed Occidental who may one day have to deal with them. This volume is of partic.dar interest to psywar personnel since the emphasis is placed upon this phase of military operations. In the preparation of this Manual the following relcs have been adopted for the transliteration of Chinese words: I. For place names the NIS Gazetteer, February 103.?, is standard with the following exceptions: (a) Names of all provinces, provincial capitals, large 4nd/or well-known cities, rivers, canals and peninsulas are given conventional spelling (Chinese Postal Guide). An alphrbetical table of all such place names is provided below, giv;ng both the conventional spelling and the transliteration according to the NIS Gazettrsr. (b) When place name is not covered by NIS On ? Meer transliteration is according to the Wade-Giles system. (c) For non-Chinese place names not covered by the NIS Gazetteer (Mongolian, foreign, etc.) we use the Chinese Postal Guide's spelling as found in the National Geographic Society "Index to Map of China" (1045). ci o Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release -;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 'Pao g 0 gta t4 Le ? 2. Personal names are transliterated according to the Wade-Ciles system w;th the following eveertiona. (a) Names of v.ell-known Chinese persons are given conventional apaing. Fur the convenience of the reader such mum are hated below in an alphsbetical table giving both the conveliGunal spzIling and the Wade-Giles translitemtion. 3. All other Chinese words ar.. transliterated according to the Wade-Giles sy tem. LIST OF PLACE NAMES (CONVENTIONAL TRANSLITERATION) WITH NIS GAZETTEER EQUIVALENTS Conventional Transliteration Amoy (Seeming) Amur River Anhwei Anehan Antung Argun River Itrahrnapuus River Canton Chahar Changsha Chefoo Chekiang Meng River Chengteh Chengtu Chinghuai Rirvr Chinhsien (Chinehow) Choshui River Chungking Dairen NIS Caulker Trans:aeration II6a-men Ilei-lung Chiang An-hut Amahan An-ung 0-erh-1u-na Ho Ya-lu-t'sang-pu Chiang Kuang-chou Ch'a-hs-exh Chang-eha Yen-t'ai Che-chlang Cheng Shut Ch'eng-te Ch'eng-tu Ch'in-hual Ito Chin-haien (Chin-chou) Cho-ahuliI Ch'ung-ch'ssg Ta-lien Engteng (Yungting) River F-ng-teng (Yung-ting) lio Fen River Fen Ho Fuchun (Tsicn Tang) River Fu-ch'un (Chlen-t'ang) Chiang Fukien Fu-ehien Fushun Fu-shun Hai River Hailer River Ilan River Ilangelow Ilankow licilungkiang lintel Ronan Hong Kong Hai Ho liai-la-erh Ito lien Chiang lit g-chou lian-Vou I iri-lun g-chiang lio-nan Heiang-kang (lissang-chiang) vi Conventional NIS Gazetteer Tnansliteration Transliteration liokiang I lo-ehlang llopeh lio-pd Hain River Hain Ito (hissin-chui Ila) Ilcir 'tut using-en liulan liu-len Ito Hunan itu-nen iiupch liu-pel River Ito - ltd.,' 110 nwang (YL -014-River Huang Ho Ilwangfei, (Iihangpoo) River littang-i:u Chiang Ili River Jehol Kaifeng Kan River Kansu Kialing River Mengel Kiangsu Kirin Kiulung River Kowloon Kunming (Yunnan) Kwangehowan Kwangsi Kwangtung Kwei River Kweichow Kweisui Kv.eiyang Lanchow (Kaolan) Lei River Liao River 1.1aonIng I-Lsopeb Liana' Llaotung l-li Ho Jo-ho K'ai-feng Kan Chiang ICan-au Chia-ling Chiang Chiang-hal Chi:ant-au Chiu-lung Chiang Chlu-lung K'uc-ming (Ynn-nen) Chan-chiang Shih Kuang-hai Kuang-tung Kuei Chiang Kuel-chou ICuel-aui Kuci-yang Lan-chou (Kao-len) Lei Shut Liao lin Liao-ning Liao-pel Liao-hei liao-tung Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release .-;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 - 0,4 L :poog . . 1 ".... I,: .--- g ? - k-.1,{ 4, 4444:14:, ? .2?,,,????????????????? .. -/ ;-,iii- .: ,,,...q.4'.".0'.--;117-? ........... ,--... 1.:,- i. -- "......-.7-??:.>???????,t.:2-4;? - -- .:Vlkt.d,: ,...,:-,-44v4G,-.`i. . -? ?w ? u44-,1 ,4,1?. 1... . - ?? ,. ?0-.i' . n .....?. ? ,? .e ? :' .?.1 ,. ? .? -,:: .,....,.., tf....t.-.' ".. ; N. ....,. i g :444.*:L a.,,,,, ,07::1.,j? . .t. '..f1).i.. .1 . , '.. ? .*. .i - -. '? 41^:?. ./... ' I ^ I? .. ,.. .. 't? I. I f II I ? i;,......;'.: . 'tts:k. LIST OF PLACE NAltiES (CONVENTIONAL TRANSLITERATION) WITH NIS GAZETTEER EQUIVALENTS ?-? ille.-!.;'.:7-, ,? ? ?.? 4 L' Crow:alma! 4 . Trar.sliltrolion NIS Oa:Weer Trangs1.7dion Liaotung Peninsula Liaotung Pan-t no Lien River Lien Shui Linyu (Shanhaikwan) Lin-yn (Shan-hal-ktuus) Liu River Liu Chiang Lo River Lo Ho Loan Rivor Luan Ho bigk1aig(Tsitaihar) Lung-chi-us (Chi-chi-ha-erls) Macao Manchuria Mel River Mekong Rivet- Mi River Min River tklinhow (Foochow) hlukden Muting River Ildutan River Nanchang Nanking Ningela Ningnia (Yinchuan) Noli River Nonni (Nun) River Nunklang Pal River Pearl River Pelt (North) River Peking Penki Pinkiang (Harbin) Port Arthur Ao-men Tuug-nei (1.0-pin) Mei Chiang I-tin-tem& Chiang Mi Shui (Mi ChEng) Min Chiang Min-hou (Fn-chou) Shen-yang Mu-leng Ho Mu-tan Chiang Nan-eh'ang Nan-ching Ning-hsia Nitu Ia (Un-ch'uan) Neto-ti Ho Nen Chiang Nen-chLng Pal Ho Chu (s)".-aig Pei ang Pei-ping Pen-ch'i (11a-erh-bin) Ln-ahun Red River Yuan Chiang Saint an River Shanghai Shangtu (Pal) River Shansi Shanty.% Shen& Si (Wen) River Sian Siang River Sikang Eiaing Sinkiang . ? 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CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Nu Chiang Shang-hal Sha;.g-t 'Pai) Ho Shun-hal Shan-tung Shen-hal Hsi Chiang Hsi-an Iltriang Chiang Ilai-k'ang Itsi-ning ilain-chiang vii Cons sal Trroutiundion (Wuhsien) Suiten River Suiyuan Sungari River Sungkiang Swatow Szechwan Taching River Talpch Taitzu River Taiwan (Formosa) Tao River Tatu (Thug) River Tientain To River Minna Tainghal Taingshui River Taingtao Teineauan (Panting) Tumen River Tung (East) River Turfan Tzu River Urumebi (11hwa) Useuri Rive; Wanchutus (Kalgan) Wei River Wu River Wu River Wochang Vt usih NIS Gaateer nem:aeration Su-ehou (Wu-laden) Sui-fen Ito Sal-yuan Sung-leia Chiang Sung-chlang Shan-tou Sau-ch'uan 'N-els'ing Ito Tal-pel T'ai-tsu Ito Tal-wan ileiao Shui (Tao Chiang) Ta-chin Cleuan Tien-ching To Chian?, Ch'ing-hal Ching Ho Ch'ing-tao Cleing-yean (Pao-ling) Tu-men Chiang Tung Chiang Tu-lu-fan Tau Shui (Tau Chiang) Ururneld (TS-him) Wu-au-11 Chiang 'an-ch'Oan Wei Ito Wu Chiang Wu Chiang (Su-ehou Ho) Wu-hang Vann (Yachow) Yalu River Yangku (Taiyuan) Yangtze River Yellow Sea Yenan (Fushih) VI Ricer Yutta River Yun Ito (Orand Canal) Yun; River Yungki (Kiri; Yungkia (Wenchow) Yungning (Nanning; Yunnan Wa-an (Ya-chou) Yalu Chiang Yang-eh% (Tel-yuan) 'lh'ang Chiang Huang 114 Yen-an (Fu-ahih) I Ito '(flan Chiang Yon Ito Yung Chiang Yung-chi (Chi-lin) Yung-chia (Wen-chou) Yung-ning (Nan-ning) Ynn-nan .+. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Toog o_g1-44-44AL */:Linibi7TACE i(CONVENTIONAL TP.ANSLITERATION) 4c. 1. ? . WITLI NIS GAZETTEER EQUIVALENTS Contrnsigka? . fro/Alt/1mm ' Chen. K. P. Chiang Kai-shek KAI-eheic, Mine. Chou En-Lal Chu Teh Koo. V. K. Wellington Kung. II. II. Hung. II. II.. Mme. Wade-Giles Transliteration Ch'In Kuang-p'u Chiang (nee) Sung Mel-ling Chou fln-lai Chu Te Ku Wei-chtin (aro) Sung Ai-ling Con-maimed TronsIiiiroli%n Liu Sluto-chi ' Mao Tse-ting Soong. T. V. Sun Yat-&n Sun Yett-sen, Mine. Tan Kah-kee Than& T. F. Wade-011es Tr ansliteration Ian Shao-ch'i Mao T.6-Lung Sung, Ts5-tetn Sun Chung-ahan (n6e) Sung Ch'ing?ling Ch'en Chla-keng Chiang ring-fu Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 tif Poog oittai-t4 lk La - CONTEN1S PREFACE bp, Page CHAPTER 6?TRADITIONAL IDEOLOGIES 259 Introduction?Sinism (The Sinitic Religion)?Confucianism?Post- Confucianism- .Legalism?Han Confucianism?Taoist Religion? Buddhism?Neo-Confucianism?Other Religions?A Selected Reading List CHAPTER 7?SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL FORCES 306 Classes in Traditional Society?Family, Clan, and Village?Guilds and Secret Societies?Summry?The Transitional Social Order? The Rise of New Classes?Impact of Socio-Economic Change on Tra- ditional Society?Rise of the Chinese Cnmmunists--Summary?The Sino-Japanese War, 1938-1945?Postwar Development, 1945-1949? The Communist Social Order, 1949 to ? ?Social Order under the Nationalists, 1949 to ? ?A Selected Reading List rt;,63-;,..4, 3-4 *7, ? CHAPTER 8?GOVERNMENT AND;PoLITIX 44 366 Traditional System?Transition Period?The Nationalists?The Com- munists?A Selected Reading List CHAPTER 9?EDUCATION 408 Earliest Times to 221 B.C. (Ch'in Dynasty)?Ch'in to Sul Dynasty (A.D. 589)?Sui Dynasty to 1862-1862-1949 (P.emoval of National- ist Government)?A Selected Reading List CHAPTER 10?LITERATURE 445 Introduction?Tradition?Modern?Communism: Literary Theory and Practice?Summary?A Selected Reading List CHAPTER 11?COMMUNISM AND MASS COMMUNrATIONS Introduction?Communism and Comn.onication?Books?Newspapers Magazines?Drama?Radio Broaikisting?Fine /trts?Education and Propaganda?The New Regime: Problems and Solutions?Propa- ganda and Reality?A Selected Reading List ix 477 . ? . Declassified in *Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 - - _ ;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: kt CONTENTS (Coned) CHAPTER 12?HUMOR Introduction?The Universality of Humor /I - CHAPTER 13?MODES OF DRESS 1 Early Phase of the R.,public (1910-1930)-1910-1953. -Later Phase '1 of the Republic (1930 to ?)?Communist Role, 1949 to ? 1 Page 622 531 CHAPTER 14?ART MOTIFS 639 Introduction?Calligraphy?Figure Subjscts?Flora and Fauna?A Selected Reading List CHAPTER 15?ET1QUETTE The Patterns of Social Behavior?A Selected Reading List CHAPTER 16?SUPERSTITIONS Beliefs?A Selected Reading List CHAPTER 17?PROVERBS, AXIOMS, SAYINGS, AND SAWS Human Nature?Behavior?Philosophy of Life?A Selected Reading List 563 570 683 CHAPTER 18?TRADITIONAL CALENDAR 589 Introduction?Principal Festivals?A Selected Reading List CHAPTER 19?MODERN CALENDAR 598 Introduction?The Calendar Year CHAPTER 20?TRADITIONAL PERSONAGES: REAL AND IMAGINARY Good Rulers; Founders of Dynasties?Tyrants; Weak RulArs?Good Ministers; Counsellors?Bad Ministers; Usurpers?Famous Generals; Warriors?Rebels; Bandita?Good Outlaws?Women Rulers?Famous Beauties--Famous Female Characters in Fiction and Drama?Poets and Philosophers?Pilgrims and Travelers?Creatures of Fantasy; Taoist Magicians?Filial Sons and Daughters?Miscellaneous?A Se- lected Reading List 603 INDEX TO VOLUMES I AND II 623 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 CONTENTS (Coat'd) lf FIGURES 1. Organitaticn of the National Government, April 1947 387 2. Kuomintang Party Structure, 1251 390 3. Organization of the Communist Government (the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic) 399 4. Educational System proposed by ? -13 Commission 430 6. Literati, or Scholar-Official Class 532 6. Peasants' and ArtIspns' Dress 533 7. Merchant Class, Early Republic 634 8. The soldier Class 535 9. The Literati Class 635 10. Children 537 11. Merchant, Late Republican 637 12. :.;crnmunist Dress 538 13. Enamelled Porcelain Wine Jar In Shape of Shou Character 540 14. Korean Flag with T'al Chi Symbol and Four Trigrains 642 15. A Chinese Ancestral Portrait 544 16. Plaque with Eight Immortals 546 17. Pa Chi-Ifslang: the Eight Buddhist Emblems of Happy Augury 547 18. Porcelain Saucer Dish and Wine Cup 548 19. Lacquer Screen with Flower and Animal Motifs 549 20. Blue and White Ginger Jar with Prunus Blossoms 650 21. Fishing in an Obscure Retreat on a River in Autumn 552 22. A Chinese Embroidery with a Phoenix, Dragon, and Character 554 23. The Wu-Fu or Five Bats Emblem 555 24. Embroidery Picture with Swallows, Cranes, and Willow Tree 556 25. Boy Astride a Unicorn 658 26. Lion with Sphere under Paw in Porcelain 660 27. Painting of Deer under a Fine Tree 661 Page Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release -;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 xi 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 poog 10-6 CONTENTS (Coat'd) TABLES 1. Increase in Number of Schools (1905?.910) 2. Number of Institutions of Higher Learning in China,. 1934 and 1948 3. The Twenty-Four Sections 4. Concordance of Traditional and Western Calendars xii Pegs 431 438 590 591 Declassified in Fa?rt----Sanitized Copy Approved for Release -vr S 4/ 4/ 57111/281111" CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 - ;I 1. CHINA: AN AREA MANUAL _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Appr ved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 - r S 4/ 4 7 - I- 41 mai iv- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 g CHAPTER 6 TRADITIONAL IDEOLOGIES INTRODUCTION This section bears the subtitle "Philosophy and Religion," for which an initial word of explanation is in order. One often hears references to Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism as the three religions of China; often, too, ono hears hotly disputed the claims of Confucianism to be called a religion. However that may be, it is cer- tain that all three of these systems have in one way or another penetrated and affected every aspect of Chinese life, and that each of them has different types of appeal for different people. The latter point can perhaps best be made clear by reference to a phenomenon which is familiar in the West. Within a group of Christians one finds the saint, the in- tellectual who is well-grounded in theology, the minister with his sociological interests, and the Sunday school child, and his indifferent or church-soing parents. Christianity is a religion, but in any community those who have a genuine intellectual grasp of the religion, and live conscientiously "in the path of Christ," may be a very small minority. This is not surprising: tho behavior and beliefs of the nominally-believing Christian majority are determined primarily by their education and environment, which in the United States no longer reflect Christian doctrine, if indeed they ever did. The belief in progress, for example, and in the scientific ordering of society for maximum collective security and comfort have all but replaced the Christian emphasis on the fallen nature of man and the necessity of redemption. Until recently, the behavior of the Chinese conformed in large measure to the patterns and ideals of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. The number of pcople who had any intellectual grasp of each system, however, was necessarily a minority in every age. For the philos3phies and theologies, one mist turn to this minority, who tried to live accord- ing to the ideals of Confucianism, or Buddhism, or Taoism, and who tried to affirm or reinterpret it in changing social, political, arid intellectual conditions. To find the re- ligion, one must turn to the millions, and their behavior in the forms of worship, prayer, festivals, and holidays, their attitudes toward this-worldly activity and other-worldly retreat. For religions are complexea of attitudes and behavior drawing upon and partly distorting the intellectual system.. The Metaphysics of Oriental Religions The development of religions in China has been very different from thin the West, where formal philosophy very early broke away from religious tradition. In China, in the case both of Confucianism and Taoism, there is the curious phenomenon of religions being fathered by philosophies. The history of Chinese thought has always revealed intimate relationship between philosophy and religion. In this section there is an attempt to outline the course of Chinese thought and, at the same time, to describe the religions as they affect the daily life of the people. 259 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? ? CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release -2,IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 g ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 A L Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, though they are three distinct attitudes toward life, complcmeut one another in many ways. Each claims to be grounded in "reality," that is, in knowledge of reality, and each has shown great strength in persuading people to accept its view of real:ty and mold their lives in accordance with it. By reality, all mean the underlying principle or "stuff" of the universe. In China, this ultimate order- ing principle is called Tao, en Heaven, 53 in the West it is called God. The characteristic Chinese approach in philosophy is to pose and try to answer the question: How are we to live intelligently in conformity with Heaven, Tao, or God? The majority of Wmterners, whatever their nominal beliefs, are recognizably positivist, in their basic philosophy: they believe that, empirical, scientific truths are the only positive facts about, the universe; that reality, insofar as it is explainable, can be reduced to scientific terms; that the social order should be 60 patterned as to forward man's drive toward ever- increasing utilization and exploitation of nature; and that there is a force called Progress which assures man of ever-increasing comfort, power, and security. From the standpoint of Chinese thought, such a philosophy kills the mystery and sanctity of nature and, with- out intending to, degrades human nature by subordinating it, to thn smooth functioning of merely human schemes. Confucius, to be sure, hits been called a positivist by such authorities as Hu Shih. Ho was certainly something of an agnostic, in the sense that he refesed to answer questions about the unknowable, and directed his attention primarily to the ordering of human society. But he decidedly would not have gone along with the kind of positivism that is prepared to substitute a human way for the way of Heaven, or Tao. One major fact about Chinese philosophy and religion, then, is that caulk of its systems takes its departure front what, it claims to be contact with reality. The ordering of wciety and state to which it !cads is based on the conviction that human endeavor is beside the point unless it is in consonance with a nonhuman, divine purpose. Buddhism, an im- portation from India, is the most. radical of these systems: it sees the phenomenal, temporal world as a cycle of increasing desire and suffering. The intelligent man liberates himself from this cycle by ? there is no other way ? living without craving and with compassion for all sentient. beings. Taoist philosophy emphasizes the notion that the way of nature is something infinitely more grand than mere human endeavor, and that all human efforts not in conformity with Tao lead unavoidably to harm and stultification. Confucianism is the most this-worldly of the three, in the sense that its basic concern is with human nature, conduct, and society. But, as indicated already, the order it. envisages is not. merely human; the perfect government is perfect. by virtue of its conformity with the way of Heaven. All three see in the ruthless exploitation of nature and the quest for dominion over one's fellow men only arrogance or depravity, and all three seek to discourage both. Until the rise or positivism in the West in quite recent centuries, such ideas were by no means alien to the European tradition. The Renaissance conception of the "chain of being," which spelled out relationships involving angels, men, and beasts, is highly con- genial to the Confucian ideal. The conceptions of reality held in China and in the West may be contrasted in eeveral ways, even if one fixes attention only on that part. of the West that considers the ultimate reality as the Godhead. One may say categorically that the Chinese conception of the Godhead is impersonal: Heaven or the Tao. The Western conception of the Godhead is anthropomorphic, that of a Creator and superhuman being. The God of the Old Testa- ment is highly personal and has personal qualities: He is loving, vengeful, jealous. This trace of personality in the conception of God is never wholly absent from Western thought, even though Western theology, strictly speaking, does define God in tranacendental terms, 260 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ?bog Ogidi-t44L s that is, is, terms that transcend the merely human. It is the contention of the East, a con- tention echoed by some Western thin) :re and according to Christian, Buddhist, Taoist, and Hindu mystics alike, verifiable in experience, that the ultimate reality is not only transcendental but nonpemonal as well. The commitment to a personal God in the form of the Creator, the Father, and the Lord of Hosts has, in the Chinese view, left definite traces in the West's political and cultural history. The Chinese find in the Christian and Islamic nations a kind of militant spirit that they do not. find in themselves and their fellow Orientals, and attribute it, to some extent, to the cult of a personal God. The concept of a personal God appears, again from the Chinese point of view, to lend to a cult of personality. There is nothing in Chinese religious experience that is even remotely comparable to the dramatic intensity with -which the Christian believer medi- tates on the Passion of Christ. Christ, on the Cross is so rids a symbol thet its himu.n aspects may fill the mind of the believer, to the exclusion of the ultimate significance of God. Among "liberal" theologians, for example, one hears of the "personality" of Jesus, though it has been argued, from a strictly theological point of view, that the very notion is blasphemous. In China, by contrast, there is no cult of the personality, but Buddhism, which advocates the negation of personality: it, is only through emancipation from per- sonal craving and desire that one wins liberation. Taoism, similarly, advocates a way of life that is in harmony with nature, and that transcends merely human desires and ambitions. The Confucianists, similarly again, equate "manhood" with the precise ful- filment of and subordination to the duties inherent in one's basic human relations. All three tend to discourage the aggrandisement of personality, and the dominance of the will and instincts at, the expense of a certain harmonious development of reason and feeling. In .Chinese poetry, the poet serves as a mere catalyst of feeling. In Chinese landscape painting, man occupies a small and inconspicuous place against the vast background of nature. Chinese philosophy taught man to know his place in his society and in his uni- verse. As a consequence, compared with the Westerners, the Chinese are less daring in intellect and imagination, but more earthbound, sadistic, and patient. There are other interesting points for comparative study. In the West, the belief in the separate entity of each individual soul has made it incumbent upon every Christian to seek personal im- mortality after death in a determinate Heaven. In China, because the Chinese believe that man forms a part of the rhythm of life, of the very movement of the universe, per- sonal immortality is hardly an issue. Confucius defines immortality in terms of imperish- able virtue, deed, and word; the Taoist hedonist strives for longevity on earth, and looks down upon the seeking after immortality as naive. Such disregard for the future life has led the Chinese to cultivate the aesthetic gift of living gracefully in the present. For many scholars, indeed, this is a distinctive feature of Chinese culture, that, if the Weat could learn it, might be useful in remedying the utilitarian excesses of Western eulturc. Confucianism and Taoism, unlike some Western doctrines, do not have rigid dcgms. Even the positivist will find little in Confucianism with which to quarrel. Voltaire and the other philosophers of the Enlightenment, for example, were profoundly attracted to Confucius by his eminently rational and sensible attitude toward life. The Taoist doc- trine is so simple and so unburdened with historical irrelevancies that it serves as a per- manent check on human arrogance and folly, and a constant reminder of the necessity of sanity and naturalness. It is this aspect of Confucianism and Taoism, their rational in- sights into man's relation with nature and the universe, and not their frnciful, quasi- scientific cosmology, that entered into nod formed the character of traditional Chinese thought. As one will notice again and again in this study, modern Chinn, in its effort to imitate and acquire the West's kind of power and sfficiency, has, to sonic extent, turned 261 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03. ? ss Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 . Vo???';" .1?7**: ? ? ? - ? ? ? ? ?? ?'??' ? ? " ? ? '4.442.1?W 4.;,/ :???? . ? ? 1.??? p 60 0 gi4 1.14 - . ? . ?a? ,?- ????? ? k.L cm those insights in favor of tnnteris ends. Chir Communism, for exurnple,'nlyls'iystem that refuses to see man other than an economic and puliGual unit. haii)o vtiiical discipline other than blind toy lty to an impersennl cause. It views the traditional Chinese ideologies as "feudalistic" and "superstitious," two terms to which Communists gave a considerable vogue in Chin\l, even as long ago as ths days of the republic. By pausing to consider these terms, ono can gauge the radical change that has Come trier the mind of China. " 'Me Chinese terms for "feudalistic" and "superzSitious" are fung-ehien and mi-hsin. Mi-hsin carries with it a denial of everything not directly demonstrable by the canesl logic of science. Thus, to the Chinese school children who today use both terms to describe the religious practices and beliefs of the past, to believe in ghosts and spirits is mi-hsin, since their existence is not demonstrable. (Incidentally, the Christian missionaries in China have long used the term to describe faith in the worship of Buddha or in the social and familial amenities and ceremonies that have always bound the Chinese people together.) The issue at stake is by no means that of idolatry and stupidity. Those who use the term are attacking a certain frame of mind, which one may call "animism": that of belief that there are organic interrelations between the heavenly, human, and natural world. Until the universal adoption of the scientific habit, animism was the prevailing frame of mind among most peoples. It was the attitude mankind instinctively adopted in an attempt not only to t.ccure itself from harm but also to maintain a kind of equilibrium with celestial and natural forces. It was also a system of behavior, aimed at conciliating esture in expectation of nature's favor. It, was animism that was at the back of the Greek conception of hubris: if a man is too proud and domineering, he offends the gods and will be punished. And both the loftiest concepts in Chinos, thought and the everyday be- havior of the Chinese people have, traditionally, been based on premises that were ani- mistic. For example, the Chinese word for "revolution" means "changing the mandate." It implies that the invisible consent of heaven is a neccasnry sanction for a dynasty's rule over the people. The Emperor and his ministers have certain duties to fulfill; and when the Emperor and his government fail to perform these duties, end engage in despotism, license, and cruelty, Heaven's displeasure will be si:own in such natural phenomena as famine, flood, or popular distress and poverty. At sesh times, the right to revolt is invoked and the heavenly mandate has to be transferred. Again, for example, in the old-fashioned almanac, which the Chinese peasant used to regard as indispensable, one finds the animistic frame of mind in its most naive form. The almanac's tacit premise is that every human act may have weighty consequences, and that, therefore, no human act should be performed without making sure that the hour is auspicious. The almanac tells one what he is to do and what not to do on every day of the year. Certain days are good for taking a bath or getting a haircut. Certain days are auspicious for starting on a journey, certain days not.. The purpose of all these precautions is, of course, to see to it. that one always acts in harmony with natural forces. The Chinese used to have a special group of experts in Peng-rind (literally, wind and water), whom one consulted when one wished to choose a site fur a beilding or a tomb, the object being to avoid all risk of building at a spot not suitable to the person's calling in life or inauspicious for his offspring. Acting in harmony with natural forces is, to be sure, only one aspect of the matter: there is the further notion that when one acts other- wise than in harmony with these forces, one loses the implicit sanction of Heaven, of one's ancestors, and of one's fellow men, and that what one does will then rebound in some un- toward manner. Thus, to kill men or animals wantonly is to court the displeasure of Heaven; the all-out exploitation of nature, without regard tot the consequences, is like- 262 ??? STAT ? 3....., - - ? .3.4? '4%:* , 1 ^ ?.% - ' -lit8,4 oecifiy, r ? . )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 : - A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ,? tbqs, wise bad, and not to be justified by the simple contention that'it gosa-Pitiose. Westernera have no equivalent of this primitive check.'exeept perhaps ithIcsrQs the. survival of humanity. The twentieth century 'West *ries the depletton'gpat''? sources, partly but not exclusively for purpose of war,: to' an?orctie.nir .thaf.y".ae.tiever dreamed of in the earlier history of mankind, and which woultiocs.M.impinnito-eny mind retaining a sense of man's vulnerability to counterblows from natnra , In a word, in using the term t'superstition" to describe cerfninitaditional behavior patterns, people are discrediting, whether intentionally or not,. the whole animistic frame of mind to which countless generatioes.of Chinese owed their well-being and sanity. The charge of "feudalism" ? leveled against traditional Chinese thought from pro- gressive and Communist quartem, similerlyi puts undue emphasis upon environment as opposed to fundamental hum.m values. Thessnexpressed premise here is that the ideals underlying a specific set of rr..des cease?to be tenable once behavior patterns have changed. Confucianism is no longer tenable today;-Tor example, because it was the mainstay of a certain type of social order now disintegrating. Traditional Chine= thought would have made no sense of any such notion: it would have held that what happened to a social order (e.g., disintegration) had nothing to do -with 'whether its underlying values were or were not tenable. ????.. ? e The foregoing account should indicateIA-genera, what we may expect and what we may not expect from Chinese religion and philosophy. A word is now in order about the mode of philosophical writing in China..- - Anyone wholuilicad Plat...tin/0 Aristotle, Or the lucid prose of the English philosophers, will be inclined tri feel that Chinese philosophers represent a relatively low level of pro- fessional compettnee. They are signally deficient, for example, in the kind of sustained discursive power thskso,snany sWestern philosophers have possessed. This, like other kindred weattne.:zes one ;night mention', is due partly to the limitations of the Chine= language, which encourages a terse !Ind parsimonious style and does not lend itself to pre- cise distinctions, and. partly to. the .Chinese philosopher's stubborn insistence upon stick- ing to "essential*" Le to problems falling within the province of human life. The patternof Chineec philosophical writing was laid in the pre-Ch'in era when, with the decline of the feudal newer of the Chou dynasty and of the Sinitic religious traditions, scholars stepped forward toexpound various ethical positions and propose various schemes for the unification of China, choosing as their medium sayings and brief dialogues, stories, and anecdotes. The pattern has remained remarkably constant ever since. Few philoso- phers have appeared who were capable of sustained treatises upon self-imposed topics. (A chapter in Mo TzU or Ilsun Tel is not .nuch longer than an essay by Francis Bacon.) Philosophizing as to the nature of knowledge or the limitations of the human mind has continued to be neglected in favor of essentials, which themselves remain little changed. Every philosophy has its terminology. In the West, eves since the time of Plato, professional philosophy has been making itself more efficient by multiplying its concepts and terms. For. the- layman of ordinary educational achievements, the writings of a modern philosopher like Whitehead are barely comprehensible. The terminology of C:hineso philosophy, by contrast, is made up of words that arc common in everyday usage, and mean touch the same thing to the philosopher and the layman. (The exceptior. hero Is Boddhiaat 'Whe:oaidrze number of terms have been transliterated from the Sanskrit.) Two ram% ,conno& other things,. that in China the philosophical heritage of the nation 4-: is directly millabto to the people- and, at. least until the coming of the present Chinese - , ? . ECilEtt4 .M.13INVLItely go tu'rearairt. It also means that the native imprecision of the ;?": ? 7 lartgacto boa betztompoondea by -philosophical practice. The Chinese philosopher often ? , ? P12-*I'i ' ? 283 z.:1&? _ -? ?. ,. i', ?.', - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? - ? ' - - ? '''''' ..,.?....,.._-._-_,.,..,...,...i.,...4.-ger,....-.-- IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? , ? ????? ? - STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ?bog 0104IN redefines a familiar term to suit his,immediate purpose, rather than coin a new term, and this unavoidably contributes to the vaguen= of the redefined term. (A Westerner who wants to kn : something of Chinese philosophy should begin by saturating himself in the meanings of some dozen key terms; after that the reading of the philosophical works in translation milt be comparatively easy.) Another factor that helps account for the relatieely low level of strictly professioral competence among Chinese philosophers is the spirit of orthodoxy, which has dominated Chinese intellectuals ever since the Han dynasty. The classics and the pre-Ch'in philos- ophers have enjoyed a prestige that it would be impossible to exaggerate; the best thinkers of the later times, instead of fabricating new philosophies or ideas of their own, have been content to write commentaries on this or that masterpiece handed down from the past. These commentaries have often contained valuable reinterpretations and reevaluations but, at best, preoccupation with this kind of work tended to discourage independent think- ing, and, along with it, the methodological and terminological development that inde- pendent thinking might have rendered necessary. Chinese philosophy, in this regard, is somewhat more like Western theology than Western philosophy proper. Aside from commentaries, what, a Chinese philosopher has been most likely to leave behind him is a collection of random philosophical sayings, Yu-Io, cast in highly idiomatic style. (Both the 13eddhists and Nets-Confucianists have produced a great deal in the Yo-fit style.) The central point to grasp, however, is this: Chinese philosophy has never been sufficiently detached from the practical business of living to reach a high level of speculative purity and technical competence. This is at once its major merit and its most conspicuous drawback. alma! (Tna SINITIC RELIGION) Knowledge of the age preceding the Ch'in philosophers is confined to a mixture of legend and history concerning the dynasties of lIaia, Shang, and Chou. Of the culture of }fain dynasty, one has little on which to work. Recent excavations in An-yang, I lonan, however, have helped to define the Shang culture, art, and religion. The Chou people, who overcame the Shangs in the early twelfth century, n.c., seem to have had a distinct culture of their own, but arc known also to have incorporated much of the Shang civilization. Worship of Natural Objects The religion of the Shang and the Chou has often been called Sinism, or the Sinitic religion. In a sense, both Confucianism and Taoism are off-shoots of this ancient religion, many elements of which persist even today among the Chinese people. It conceived the world as alive with natural and spiritual forces. Most people today live relatively securely against the destructive fury of the elements, and find it hard to imagine a world in which men depended on the soil about them for food and clothing, and were, therefore, com- pletely dependent on the caprices of nature. The natural religion of such a world would take the form of worshipping natural objects in an attempt to forestall bad and insure good fortune. Thus it was in ancient China: men made sacrifices to the spirits of soil, grain, river, and mountain; on a more abstract level T'ien (Heaven) was paid homage in elaborate rituals. According to the ancient documents available, the worship of T'len was solely the duty of the king or Emperor; he, in a sense, was responsible for the welfare of his people. (This notion continued to he cherished until the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, and was part of the Confucian State religion. Any tourist who has been to Peking will remember the beautiful Altar of Heaven.) Later, Ti (Earth) was worshi ? ? I as a counter- 264 ? STAT , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy ApprOved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? P?malsahassotrwmeAr 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 16 (A) ? 1 'I I. Fog ogt4IN las part of Heaven. The feudal lords acted as priests on important festive occasions in their own districts, while the religious practices of the common people were connected with the important turning-points and events of the agricultural life: seedtirne, harvest. rain, drought. A itentOr Worship Inseparable from these rites were the rituals of ancestor worship: the highest god of the Shang people was Shang Ti, a term that was used in later times to designate the ChriaCan god but actually meant the Supreme Ancestor. The Chou people took over this concept and merged it. with T'ien. Though Shang Ti was, in a sense, a personal god, he lacked personal attributes like the Creek God Zeus' thunderbolt and amorous exploits, and the Jewish Yahweh's militant. jealousy. The power of Shang Ti or rim was primarily seen in the seasonal order. If there war a right distribution of rainfall and an abundant crop, it, was a sign of T'ien's approval of men. If there was flood or drought, it was taken as a sign of T'ien's displeasure. This simple, realistic religion expressed the tension of man's life on earth; and behind it one can discern definite traits of the elaborate fer Linty cults that arc known to have been popular among all the earlier Asiatic people. Sacrifice and Ritual By modern standards, the people of that early age were what might be called "pre- moral." Living sacrifices were offered up on all occasions; both human sacrifices and slavery were fairly common. Sex played a dominant role in all their religions cults. The word for "ancestor," for example, without its modern radical, is clearly a phallic symbol. Among commoners, niat'ing took place during the spring and autumn festivals. On these occasions, young men arid women began a ritualistic dance from opposite sides of a mound, approached one another as the dance continued, and performed the act of the flesh as the dare ended. Thus, the Chinese terms for the feminine and masculine principles of the universe, Yin and Yang, originally meant the north and south sides of the mound upon which primitive Chinese youths danced. The Es-is:eau of Spirits The Shang people believed in the existence of spirits, and believed further that human beings could communicate with them. Divination was widely practiced: questions were inscribed on tortoise shells or animal bones, which were then subjected to heat, and the cracks that appeared on the shell or bone as a result of the heat. were supposed to contain positive or negative answers to the questions. Especially in South Chinn, it was an age of sorcerers ? the um or shamans ? who could communicate with spirits by allowing them to enter their body. Ancestor worship, which always occupied pride of place in Chinese family life, was also a form of communication with spirits. Man, it was believed, has two souls, the animal . soul, p'o, which is created at the moment of conception, and the hun, the higher spiritual soul, which comas into existente at the momeot of birth At, death, the p'o continues to reside in the tomb with the corpse, and draws nourishment from the offerings brought to it, afterwards, upon the decay of the body, it sinks down into the Yellow Springs, the Chinese Ilarhei. The hun presumably ascends to Heaven. The object of ancestor worship was two-fold: to ensure, by appropriate sacrifices and rites (a) the continued existence of the ancestral spirits, and (b) the latter's protection and favor for their living descendants. This can be caricatured, of course, as a sensible business proposition for both the living and dead; that is, an exchange ot sorely needed services. This emphasis is certainly present, but even in very early times the basic motivation was genuine piety, which the Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release DIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? 265 STAT L.Julassitied in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: aog Ogidit4AL st Confucianists seized upon and developed into the principle of filial piety. Descendants were under an obligation to take care of their ancestors; this entailed an obligation to perpetuate the family line through male descendants, and this obligation was, and still is, an obsession with the Chinese. Mencius was repeating a time-honored sentiment when he said: "There ate three forms of filial impiety; not to have carried on the family line is the greatest." Cosmology The Sinitic religion still maintains its hold on the Chinese in the matter of cosmology an well as in that of ancestor worship.. The Yin-Yang concept in Chinese thought did not, to be sure, come into existence until quite late in the period of the Warring Kingdoms. But it seems fairly certain that its earliest exponents, e.g., TEOLI Yen, were drawing upon beliefs handed down from the remote past (the concept of Tao, similarly, long antedated Lao Tza and Confucius). In attempting to reconstruct the cosmology of ancient China one retire to a considerable extent upon materials of a later age, but can do so with a good deal of confidence that he is piecing together a fairly accurate picture. Principles of Yin-Yang Lying behind the physical universe is an impersonal First Cause or Prime Mover known as Tao, or the Way. From Tao, which is sometimes called Ch'i, or the Vital Force, all being has evolved. It manifests itself in two all-inclusive principles: Yang, the principle of activity, heat, light, dryness, hardness, masculinity; and Yui, the principle of quiescence, cold, darkness, humility, softness, femininity. These two principles constantly and eternally interact, and through their interaction there come into existence the five primary elements: fire, water, earth, wood, metal. These combine and recombine, in their turn, to form all things in the universe, including heaven and earth. The theory of the five elements (Wu hsing) appears to have been formulated for the first time by the pre-Ch'in philosophers, or, more precisely, during the Ilan dynasty. The concepts of the Yin and the Yang are much older, dating back to the time of the fertility cults. The I Ching or Book of Change-s, which is based on the ideas of Yin and Yang, was a Chou textbook of divination. Yang is represented by a horizontal line: ?; Yin is eeprelet ted by a broken line: - -. Six such linea constitute a hexagram, and there are sixty-four possible combina- tions of this type. In the Book of Changes, each hexagram is accompanied by a cryptic commentary, which explains its meaning. When a person wants to consult the Book of Changes, he goes through an established process of elimination, and arrives finally at that one of the hexagrams which contains what he needs to know about the state of his fortune and whether or not he should embark upon a particular course of action. Fortune-tellers using methods of divination of more or lesa.this type are still a common sight in the streets of Chinese cities. The Fire Elements The Chinese concepts of the Yin and the Yang and the Five Elements have obvious parallels in the history of Western thought. The pre-Socratic Greek philosophers postu- lated either water or fire as the basic substance of the universe; and four elements ? water, fire, metal, earth (the Chinese five minus only one, wood) ? were a stock Western cosmological notion from the time of ancient Greece until the advent of the modern age. The very dualism of Yin and Yang, similarly, calls to mind the dualism in many Western religions and philosophies (light and darkness, good and evil). The Chinese conception does appear to be unique ie one respect: in other systems of thought, the dualism tends 266 :lassified in Part - Sanitiz-d'art); Approved for Rel eas e 50-Yr 20. RDP81-01043R004000020007-4e -t ? _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? poog 0 RIG is A L to presuppose mutual antagonism between the two contrasting forces, and to postulat the superiority and future triumph of Celle over the other flight will drive out darkn good is superior to evil), but there is no such emphasis in the Yin Yang thirdism. It. presuir poses not mutt-al opposition but mutual harmony. The concepts one morally neutral. The maintenance of order on both the cosmic and the human plane is a matter of preserving th- harmonious interaction of Yin and Yang. The Chinese have never put this cosmology of their forefathers entirely aside. The Han scholars elaborated on it. Buddhism introduced a different world-view, but the neo-Confucianists returned to the old cosvcolov, however mt.+ they may have modified Confucianism on the ethical plane. The neo-Confucianist Chou for example, in his Explanation of the Dtograni of the Supreme l'Uimate (7"ai Chi T'u Shvo), puts forward a cosmology similar in all its essentials to that. in the Book of Changes. The following may be quoted because it shows how faithful this philosopher of the eleventh century was to the Sinitic precedents: The Ultimatcless! And yet the Supreme Ultimate! Tb.' Supreme Ultimate through movement pro- duces the Yang. This Movement. having reached its linut is followed by Quiescence, and by this Quiescence. it produces the Yin. When Quiescence has nruluslits limit there ins return to Movement. Thus Movement and Quiescence, in alternation, become each the source of the other Ths distinction between the Yin and Yang LS determined and the two Forms stand revealed. ily the transformations of the Yang and the union therewith of the Yin, Water, Fire. Wood. Metal. and Sail are produced. Them a Five Elements (Cfer) become diffused in harmonious order, and the four sea- sons proceed in their course. The Five Elements a:e the one Yin and Yang, the Yin and Yang are the one Suprema Ultimate, and the Supreme Ultimate is fundamentally the Ultimateless. The Fizz Elements come into being. each having its particular nature. The true substance of the liltima.eless and the essence of the Two and Five unite in mysterious union, so that Consolidation ensues. The principle of Ch'i'n [the Ingram symbolizing thu Yang] becomes the mate clement, and the principle of run (the trigram symbolizing the Yin) becomes the female element. The two Ch'i by theit interaction operate to produce all things, and they In their turn produce and reproduce, so that transformation and change continue without end. This passage is not, put forward as mere speculation; it purports to be a scientific description. Chinese thought continued, right down to the time when it. began to feel the impact of Western science, to base itself on these Sinitic assumptions. They underlay all traditional quam-scie- title thought in China, even in fields like physiology, medicine, alchemy, and geography. Philosophic Reaction The main features of the Sinitic religion and many elements in it continued to influ- ence Chinese thought, including strictly philosophical inquiry, over a long period. It is hardly too much to say that philosophical inquiry onginally arose partly as a con- tinuation of, partly as a reaction to, the Sinitic religion. A word of history is in order here. The (Thou dynasty, nominally at least, had a span of some (100 year (c. n e.1122 c. n.e.222). During the latter half of this period, the king was merely a figurehead, and a number of feudal states, having become strong and net, contended with one another for power and influence. The economic and social changes that accompanied this transformation of China's basic political situation raised unprecedented problems, and these, in turn, gave rise to a remarkable development on the level of reflective morality. In a sense, the latter was made possible by the fact that the rulers of the stronger states, seeking means to consoli- date their power and wealth in the face of keen competition, began to employ scholarly advisers in the art of government just as they employed mercenar:, soldiers to help them fight their battles. There came into existence an entire clam of such advisers, who traveled STAT 287 )eclassified in Part.- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? O Poog 0.010AL from state to state offering thel?ervices for hire. Thinking about current practical prob- lems was, for them, a full-time tivity; all the leaders of the schools of reflective moral thought of the late Chou peri including Confucius, arose from this body of itiiscrant politicians. \ cosructs LW The Founder Confucius (551-470 n.c.) was a traditionalists in thc sense that he favored the Chou feudal order that the new states were undermining, and disapproved of the new-tangled ideas and practices he saw on the horizon. But he was a critical tnelitionalist; he glorified the sage-kings and the early Chou rulers, but he was consciously reinterpreting for the bene- fit of his own times, and his message was not a plea for merely turning back the hands of the clock. In some respects, in his own time, his teaching was revolutionary rather than reac- tionary. Ilia mission was to causes certain way of life to prevail in China. One of his ambi- tions, it is interesting to note, was to be a practical ruirninistrritor, though he never pro- gres.sed in politics beyend the portfolio of Minister of Justice in his native state of Lu. In kites life he was primarily a teacher who gathered a group of disciples mid traveled from state to state. His actual achievement during his own lifetime was - or must have appeared to be at. the time of his death ? modest. But beyond any teacher the world has seen, Confucius succeeded in molding the life and thought of an entire nation. Confucius' teachings were so generally accepted in China up to the last three decades, that one must ask how it can be explained that over an long a period there was never any questian of putting them aside in favor of other doctrines? One answer is that these teach- ings ministered to the needs and dispositions of the practical, sensible, Chinese, so that they had no reason to seek other doctrines. Another answer is to be found in an essential charac- teristic of Chinese society through the period in question. It was a society that, over two thousand years, changed extremely little in basic structure, so that the fundamental human relationships within it were sufficiently constant to make possible continuous acceptance of a single doctrine. (Confucianism itself contributed greatly to its stability.) It was with the breakdown of monarchism and the gradual disintegration of the family system that the authority of Confucian teachings was at last visibly shaken. Confucius is often compared to the great teachers of other nations, but very seldom to Jesus Christ.. One possible stetson for this is that Confucius, urlike Jesus, made few demands on human nature. He conceived of human nature ass whole, which, with proper education of the will, emotion, and feeling, results as a matter of course in morally and aesthetically beautiful behavior. Jesus drc.. a distinction between the "regenerate" and the "unre- generate," and the notion that, short of intervention by the love of God, litunan nature is a poor thing has played a prominent role in Christian doctrine. For Confucius, the difference between the weed of ordinary affairs and ordinary people and the ideal world and ideal people was a deference in degree, not in kind. Concretely, it is a difference in degree of aesthetle and emotional purity and maturity. The personal struggle between doubt and faith, which figures so prominently in Christian teaching, has no place in Confucianism. Confucius is more frequently compared to Socrates. Both were men of extraordinary sanity, and both men of notable piety toward Heaven even in an age of intellectual confu- sion. Their teaching techniques, however, were ritute different, and the difference accounts, in part at least, for the differences between Western and philosophy. Socrates, as Plato desenbea him, was a relentless logician, who feigned ignorance while pressing every question as far as it could be pressed. Confucius would have regarded this as bad manners. 268 ? ? ? STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 (( p tog ogi41,14 _ His method of teaching depended not at all upon beating the %indent over the head with a legieal argument. "I won't teach a man who is not anxious to learn," he said, "and will not explain to one who is not trying to make things clear to himself. And if I explain one-fourth and the man dae*ii't go back and reflect and think out, the implications of tho remaining thrce-fouaths for himself, I won't bother to teach him again." The Philosophy As one reads the Anarees, the only took among the classics that 1)035C3SCS an authentic Confucian flavor, he finds that while Confucius sometimes interrogated his disciples, it was more often his diaciples who put questions to him. Confucius tried always to answer with an eye to the needs and understanding of the particular pupil, and in full recognition of the tentativetiosa of personal conversation, which excludes the finality and exhaus- tiveness of, for example, the lecture hall. His answers were brief, partly perhaps because of the inadequacy of the Chinese language of his day, but mostly because he relied mainly on suggestion, rather than saying things outright. Socrates reminds one at every turn that concepts muac be clearly defined, and that consistency is the primary virtue of philosophers. The result is that the Socratic type of discursive thinking proceeds according to its own laws, often at several steges removed from everyday reality. In the Socratic and Confucian methods one has, in other words, two sharply contrasting alternatives: the Western thinker would stick it out with his theory, even if it cuts him off from reality; the Chinese thinker tends to be realistic and faithful to experience, and is less concerned about logical inconsistency. That is one reason why formal philosophy, as understood in the West, has never made much headway in China. The All-Inclusive Virtue: Jiht One of tho key words in Confucianism is the word Rn, a homonym for the Chinese word for "man." The Christian counterpart of fist is "love" or "charity" without, how- ever, its evangelical connotations. It is usually translated, therefore, as "benevolence" or "human-heartedness," to denote the loving, sympathetic, unself-regarding aspect that Confucius regards as innate in man, and uses as the basis of his whole philosophy. As any student of Western philosophy will recognize, Socrates would never have been content until he had arrived at an unexceptional definition of the word, and rend out of it all of its implications and all of its possible applications to human conduct; the discussion would have run to the length of The Ban quct or even of The Republic. Not Confucius. In the Anakcts he answers several questions about the meaning and content of Rn, but each of his replian offers only a partial explanation of the concept, and it, is only as we bring them together ourselves and consider them in the total context of Confucius' sayings, that we come gradually at best, to grasp his meaning. The approach is concrete rather than system- atic, specific rather than exhaustive. The same technique governs Confucius' use of other key terms. Behind it one can discern the fear that if one exhausts the meaning of a term, one also weakens its potency in the world of practical conduct. From this point of view the paradoxes in the Sermon on the Mount will always remain pG?ent and evocative even in the face of tho intelleatualist approach in theology. Thus, though Confucius insists on cheng-ming, the precise use of terms when one is describing an actual state of affairs, his philosophical method is not that of logical determi- nation, particularly where concepts are concerned that have a hearing on one's thinking and conduct; then his emphasis is on moralistic and, more importantly, intuitive under- standing of terms. Pedagogically, the purpose is to teach the student to test slogans and ideas against the background of experience, and no detect the falsehood in them and escape 269 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: ,IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 L. POog OgIGINR - 1005??????,. 1 enslavement by them. (Any Confucianist would be aware of the distortion of truth in Communist propaganda today, and what it implies as regards the distortion of the life and thought of the nation.) The Confucian rhilosophy, therefore, postulates as an axiomatic fact the central qual- ity in man that. makes him human. The jan is the Tao on the human level, because the word Tao, used in reference to the comic order, always has nonhuman connotations. In an ideal society, the spirit of jIrt would pervade all ranged of human activity from everyday inter- course to statecraft. .1Zn, then, is the all-inclusive virtue, which comprehends but is not identical with the lesser virtues appropriate to particular human relationships. Them lesser virtues, e.g. loyalty, filial piety, good faith, and courage, are treated methodically by later Confucianists. The minister should be "loyal" to the king, but loyalty, chung, presup- poses integrity, so that the loyal minister's duty is to advise and remonstrate and not to flatter and be subservient. When, moreover, his allegiance to the king conflicts with his duty to Tao, it ia the latter duty that should take precedence. The son should be "filial" to his parents, but not to the point of blind love and groteame worship lauded by popular Chi- nese primers on filial piety. The duties of the parents to children are similarly specified by the writers. Ethics One general rule for Pa is shu or reciprocity: "What one deeti not want done to him- self one should not do to others." It bids one put a rein on self-love and make allowances for the foibles of other individuals. Another test of fan is i, often translated as "righteous- ness" or "right." I is the application of the principle of jen to all situations that have moral significance. One should constantly study his motives and actions, so as to be sure that what he does or thinks is fitting and proper and morally right. He must remember that no act that inflicts pain or disguises selfish motives behind ostensibly good intentions is i. The principle, i, which Mencius elevates to a position of equal importance with jen, is projected on all levels and rovers all situations; it is jan in action. It is cardinal, for example, that considerations relating to i should govern all transactions between state and state. When, therefore, one state attempts to expand its own territory and power at the expense of another, it demonstrates its lack of The principle, i, has two corollaries: yung, the cour- age to abide by one's decisions, and hsin, good faith and implicit trust in all dealings. It =net be overemphrisized that Confucianism, in basing its morality on the allegedly innate quality of fen, virtually ignores the need for any check against evil tendencies in man that might disrupt the kind of cosmic and human order which Confucius envisages; against these tendencies, insofar as they exist, the Christian religion certainly offers more realistic safeguards. Or, to put it a little differently: the Confucian ethic is fundamentally humanistic, it. puts its faith in education. If every individual Is to fulfill his manhood and his place in society?the king to be truly a king, tho minister truly a minister, the father truly a father ? then, Confucianism teaches, appropriate education must be devised. Place in Educe:ion Education in the Chinese sense, however, is never the acquisition or impartation of the skill and knowledge needed for the purpose of earning a livelihood. Even in the West, such training has come to be regarded as education, at least for the gentleman, only recently. In China it has always been taken for granted, and by no means entirely because of the backwardness of Chinese science and technology, that a man well grounded in the Confucian classics could take any kind of job. Education as such was education for the gentleman, which helps explain the importance Confucius attaches to Ii in the domain of behavior. IA 270 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release .7,1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 oiztait4 ??????41???:..A:' . . ?????? ? ? ? ' is trsuislated as "ceremonials," "rituals,'"'AirietY!%R.Ineittilr4eaglithejaiellitirclimore besides, for it is through li that ono attiittiptiteral grace lit t ,,e,e?&il-;4?4*rhefetheere?--k.'.?' ???.?el'ee: ? ? One can be.t appreciate the impertniire of If by ienlleios.tXpItAmrtistO eavureof the scant attention Confucianism gives to ev4;7,4f.iy.e.cinipariseriwNicliWiWtkPinNelaniam leans very heavily indeed on an idealistic feyst :exiueple, nothing in Confucianism remotely Like ValadkiSlitlietited the Sinitic belief that the condition of r:ce.idnt4sisiiiiitirOiiii; dritiiiiiiletibtsb plod Cm earth is achieved when Heaven, man, and nature rinf hertOtti Relletercen the-violative or dimi- nution of harmony among them. Violation eire/Leffettrui'merif hirtnoncyIntkreetiarefrom natu- ral causes, e.g., famine or flood, though ontivntist'settserriliarl.hati thn ahlnesolnentatity is inclined to see natural evils as primarily petite* reflection On intre'tt Lli1tlr0 tO.obstrve? the requirements for a harmonious order. The dieroptionof harmony Int the specifically human level can only mean that sonic individuals or groups. DI inelivichirds Leyte !intoned theirjen; i.e., they have acted in such manner as to exceed theieright, Tb.o inenevhotioes this wrongs himself, but he also wrongs the people with whtan he is in contact. Thus, the Chinese word for wrong is Alio, i.e. "excess," "going beyond." Chung Yung: The "Golden Mean" One doctrine Curt is implicit in Corded& teaching le fully enunciated only in the short classic "Chung Yung" ("The Doctrine of the Mean"), a chapter of the Li Chi. This chapter, supposedly written by Confucius' grandson, Tzii-as, became basic doctrine only with the rice of neo-Confucianism in the Sung dynasty. The attitudes toward life expressed in the "Chung Yung" are, nevertheless, genuinely Confucian; without this doctrine one cannot adequately account for Confucius' own concept. of Li, or his reiterated emphasis on music and poetry in the Analeets. What is meant by Chung Yung approximates the Aristotelian Golden Mean. If a man acts neither beyond nor short of his innate nature (hsin), his whole being is in a harmo- nious state, and his example is not only good for himself, but i? lious for the family and society of which he is a member. Tho emphasis, however, is on te humanly natural, and not, as in Christian asceticism, on a willful mortification of desire or on any notion that the good life is impossible for humanity in general. It is the Confucian, thus also the Chinese, belief that human nature (hem), quiescent and good by itself, manifests itself only through feeling, desire, and will, and that, moreover, it is only when feelings and desires receive proper expression that hsin remains good. Asceticism and indulgence are both bad, because if a man either represses or gratifies one aspect of his nature to an undue degree, his heirs becomes perverted, and this results in evil. Confucius' teaching, on the other hand, should not be confused with the sentimental naturalism one finds in some works of Rousseau. The kind of naturalness lie wanted is the natural reault of education in U. Li: Propriety in Behavior It is primarily Confucius' insistence on li that has earned for him, in Communist quer- ten, a reputation for having been a more traditionalist and stickler for form. No charge could be more untrue, because li is as much an attitude toward life as a recipe far civilized behav- ior; nothing could be further from the Confucian ideal of the educated man, for instance, than the man who follows ritual without the accompanying spirit of reverence and humility. Confucius said, "I cannot bear to see the forms of If gale thronit by those who have not reverence in their hearts." In mourning for the dead, for c;taIttpIe, it is mere important for Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ' e aurAre":41,e' 4' 4.4 *. ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: --r 4 STAT 271 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ?bog agiditsitRI., Ina ? 4. ? ? ? ? ? , .? ,.? one to feett".?*neere gritftharUo ct t'jl-,theeorrext rites with metietdouS tare, 'It _, they sak DON: zuiU nore than aibabty of jade and aiikr.r.L is it oCrelo'vatiViCiidiii441.g.iiW&iii-i:.;wi a it; imPortatit - ? riort:AQea1iyk-it,W,git1.t!ek,...eii,(14iSil4itifi4lirlaviiiiite. - and at ifitao40*ili 10116 htrtnarin&ttut . and tilicr attainitG tb?atalior.ehit:tifiTii/Ti;- 4:4`iiittt,^pt so4r4S;WiikritivplIgierrilk for, and The rulen propilet:Y.' The Con fu cia a. irleal?or ti1ettutirkt7IWtaOia*,,4144,-144(Vd*itut1403)Liare3.;. tation of the SOW' s " 'Truman. bell3tiorift ally` '00?Cdaty Ftt11ge:011vpsei:ggryTrt100?.i'xy041,nriges4, ylutpritAxt.3c:?.2. etiquette, for examPle'sliOniPTO4'i;VikAelt,!4P*..4:44:NIthlitiatir..i4?',33ait*tinttinita,--. a the Confncian elamies that. relst?. t4 the pn..ipee,:AnbsWitition.ntli!nrtil.licittAti; Tog parely historical inte-ixt today; some, indoe,,tomye reiraniclt:a.lutticitzukattitniti asoft1,4 emus' own time (e.g., mourning for we'. a father frprn,k0r.`41pttlireerenrs-rmittlatatiy Wt. to be wasteful). lie certainly navocated .the,v'ime that 00.t,houtliiThliasterto.oia6ta 4130.4. tors and spirits as if they were setnally present on citualtstirivettqlena;nnd nIptgiSed. the '- fear that abrogation of traditional /2' would bring sorIel dislutegratlort?in ii lh* ?atter notion has, however, bec-n wrongly interpreted ay planing artimth.16em1414ki$ Ott tht5 letter rather than the spirit, of the U. Sonic Confucians, 4al1e4 .ftt a Cltinete, invital thin misinterpretation by earning their living through their Imoailedgeoi statVassistnnto nt right performance of Ii; the popularity of the Mehists was pray due to their offectivo prop-. agrmda against such impractical, wasteful insistence on ceremOny mid !raisin; ' In point of actual fact, the Confucian li is not, open to that line Or critithim. '"The basic stuff of the character of a gentleman is i; he carries it out by meatts of /0 The Li, in other words, is the external manifestation of the "basic stuff" of the gentleman's character. The ritualistic and ceremonial note that became a standing feature of Confucianism in sue- ceeding ages turns back to what should and might have been a brief adjustment to an age of intellectual doubt and religious decay, through emphasis on U. The point am, however, be pressed too far: in any age Confucianism must and would insist that /i is important: The health of a state, for example, should be judged by the /i which, though external, provides an adequate index of the spiritual and emotional life of the people. Mate and Poetry Inseparable from li is the role of music. Since music consists of a rhythmical and harmo- nious system of relations between sounds, men have in many places and for a long time entertained the idea that it will be conducive to harmonious behavior. Confucius, like Plato, puts a high premium on music as a means of education. It is, par excellence, the disci- pline by which often emotions and feelings are held in a state of happy equilibrium. Poetry also has a function to serve with regard to maintenance of U. In Confucius' age, poetry primarily meant tho Book of Poetry, a collection of courtly and folk poems supposedly edited by Confucius himself. Said Confucius to his disciples, "My children, why do you' not iitudy the PAT? Poetry will stimulate your emotions, help yott be more observant,.entarge your sympathies; and moderate your resentment of injustice. It is uso- , ' fait hoMeinthe service of one's father, abroad in the service of one's prince, Further/nor% scquaintanjeewith 'the names of birds, lizasta,. plants, and trees." The .? ner.yire'd one's prince" refers. to the Mtn current practice of Ireta,the, Poetrir. a''-'Y? . ?, .e.c..*4 k ' i?-?.'sp,:?* -:4:?11:41- .X.4 k!zt;t er'44,,,a, .41 --.L,110:-.:.5 ?4 2 ::::,'.... ..... 7- . . ? ? ? ? ? P - .0,.., r 1 .16V ..i.:1 ?4 i---:,,,,rs.r tt? 14 STAT , , "IN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 4 4'fty; Fog ogiesibIRL ,Aretilifiyeici end the Six Closers ? Coduau.,' cosmology or metaphysics requital separate treatment becau in discuesion ,or thew sape,ets of hie thought one is treading on more uncertain ground than.hitherto. The tendency ameeg recent scholars has been to dissociate Confucius from Confucianism, and to attempt to disentangle Confucius' own, doctimented thought from the accretion of legend mut superstition That grew up about it in Inter ages. This is an aImitable objective, but that 341volves certain dangers. One result of it, for example, has been a body of !itera- tion that portrays Conine-ma as a purely humanistic and democratic thinker, and neglects OF ;loom any data that do not fit in with such a picture. Six classics are associated with the ;Inman' Confucius: Poet r, History, Music, Li, I Ching, and Ch'un-ch'its. One of these, the Book of Music; was lost. 'Even according to the traditional view Confucius merely edited the Poetry. end modern schohmhip questions whether Confucius, who certainly though; of himmlf as a transmitter of the old, would have permitted the many editorial liberties which have been taken with some of the contcnes. A similar question has arisen about the Ch'en-Ch'iu; Mencius tells us that it. made the bad ministers and villainous $0113 of the times tremble with fear? improbable in view of the bare chronicle of Lu in existence. Agior the //uteri, the Ancient Text and late Text Schools hotly debated its authenticity during the Ch'ing ciyilasty, and the prevailing opinion seems to he that the Ancient Text has large portions that are post-Confucian forgeries. As for the Book of Changes, Confucius' :elation to it is now believed to have been extremely tenuous, though the traditional view regards some of the Appendix to the f as Confucius' own work. Even the passages in the Anakcis in which Confucius speaks of the I China with great reverenca are now thought by some to be later interpolations, the argu- *Meat being that. Confucius, as a man of humanistic ideals, would have not been so attracted to an abstruse treatise on divination, like the I Ching. This leaves one with little to confi- dently attribute to Confucius as either author or editor. On the other hand, Confucius was certainly considered the great scholar of his age, and is known to have held in extremely high regard the books handed down from the past. The sounder view appears to be that any attempt to drive a wedge between Confucius and the pre-Confucian classics tears his thought out. of the rich complicated historian matrix in which it developed, and does demon- strable violence to it. In short, there is no reason to =Lime that the cosmology of I Ching is as foreign to Confucius as some would have one believe, or to infer from the empiricism of his ideas on knowledge and his relative silence about ghosts nod spirits that his attitude toward lice.ven was, for example, that of the modern positivist. Nor can the careful reader fail to recognize in him the piety, the sense of Heavenly direction in mundane affairs, the belief in the correspondence between the physical and spiritual universe that one would expect from a man who had taken to heart the contents of the I Moreover, one must not accept too readily the view that the Ching is a book of divination, despite its vogue among modern scholars. Learned Chinese of comparatively recent date regarded it as a book of truth, almost of revelation. Filially, in opposition to the modern attempt to make Confucius over into a modern man, one must not overlook the multiplicity of his interests. It can hardly have been coincidence that, after his death, several schools of Confucianism promptly sprang up, each emphasizing one aspect of his teaching. 1"081%?CONFLICIANIkilt Confucianism has not been without rivals in the history of Chinese thought and reli- gion. Of these, the most. notable have been the Molests, the Taoists, and the Legalists. Confucianism took as its point of departure a realistic acceptance of human nature, and relied.upon education for the building of a cooperative society that would enrich both indi- .. 273 STAT )eclassified in Part - Sanitized top-sy A-P?roved for Release ..? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: ? ? -- . A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Pala ogtait4RL vidual sad sociafllfe. The Taoist; Nfohists, and Legalists also envisaged a particular type of society to whi their teachings would lead, but each of them, in doing so, strayed (from the Confucian poi t of view) in greater or lesser degree from the path of wisdom. All relied, far more than ConActaniam. on expediency and method and all took issue with Confucius on the importance of education for the e.. ablishment of the truly cooperative society. Mo Trig' After the death of Confucius, Mo Tzu Witt; for a time Chin*' a most influential teacher. Unlike most great Chinese thinkers, he was something of an evangelist: he taught with burning mthusiasin, and his followers became, in the grip of his personal magnetism, a highly organisis-i and disciplined group, willing to accept a life of hardship and sacrifice as a clear personal duty. They were genuine activists with respect to their master's teachings, as one may ace not, only from their austere!) simple lives but also from their efforts to safe- guard the smaller Chinese states aeainst aggression. Even rival philosophers, whatever their ideological differences with Mo Tz6 praised without stint his unthing zeal and nobil- ity of character. Nevertheless, the Nfohist school, after a sudden blaze of glory, faded quickly into obscurity and almost disappeared under the Ran dynasty, while other schools were reviving. Research into the life and teachings of Mo Tza did not begin until late in the Ch'ing dynasty, and it was only as the teachings of Jesus became better known in China that the extravagant estimates of Mo Tzies impurtemx began to be made. The truth about Mo Tzu, despite these estimates, appears to be this. He was, far more than Confucius, a revolutionary. But he was also far more of an unrcflecting traditionalist. Ile taught two doctrines, one having to do with universal love and the other with offensive warfare. Great claims are made as regards their relevance in the world today, including the claim that Mo TzA was, so to speak, an oriental counterpart of Jesus. Nothing could be more unjustified. Mo Tzfl was strictly utilitarian in his outlook. What he means by uni- versal love is mutual benefit?good because it will be conducive to the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. War, similarly, is bad because when strong nations attack weak ones, big families oppress small ones, or rich men dominate poor ones, the world is plunged into contention and misery. In other words, Mo Tzu, though he undoubtedly advocated love and pacifism, did not go to the root, of the matter and strike at self-love, as Jests; did and as Confucius did (in his doctrine of Ast). Love evidently loses much of its ethical meaning when it becomes merely an instrument for combatting war, misery :ad poverty. Thc social order implicit in Mo TztVo teaching is one which recognizes mankind's aggressive and selfish instincts but which adopts measures to hold them in check. It is a socialist, even a totalitarian, welfare state where the people work hard and live austerely under an enlightened despotic government. Mo Tzu, then, depends not on love but on rtligious and political sanctions for the realization of his doctrine. This sometimes leads him into inconsistencies. Re believes in geds, ghosts, and spirits, and uses the fear of them to ensure the practice of all-embracing love. Logically, this should have led him to put great emphasis on ts.iseony and worship. But in practical affairs, Mo Tau thinks primarily in terms of austerity and economy of expenditure, and his attack on ceremony and ritual, especially that pious attention due the dead which the Confucianists appear to emphasize, is based in large part on grounds of expense. Similarly, he holds that music (and, by implication, all literature and the arts) has no utilitarian value, and is not to be tolerated. In politics, he advecatls the submission 214 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap -;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 9 Poog OggINA', "k"..""!""-',"2"?,11 of the people to the will of the state and its ruler who, in turn, represents the will of Heaven. Mo Tares utopia, like all blueprint systems to ensure security, is an uncomfortable one. Sensible Chinese WW1 drew away from it. Early Taoist Philosophy Another great influence on early Chinese thought and religion W13 the Taoist philoa- ophy, which taught that peace and security are not worth the effort if they are achieved through coercion and control. The Taoists opposed all forms of state intervention, 83 well as the Confucian program of humane education. They were mainly recluses, who believed that the world suffered greatly from man's meddlesomenem, and accordingly advocated nonaction, nonintetterence, and a life of simplicity and naturalness. through extreme laissez-faire toward one another could mem live in the ways of Tao, which, they believed, had been obscured by Confucianist and Alohist reform. Yang Chu By the time of Mencius, about two hundred years after the death of Confucius, the schools of Mo Tad and Yang Chu were at their peak of influence. To quote Mencius him- self, wile worth of Yang Chu and Mo Ted fill the world." Yang Chu was spokesman of one lino of development within Taoism: it strerstd cultivation of the self. Mencius, indeed, accused Yang Chu of such selfishness that he would not pluck a single hair from his body to benefit the world. Yang Chu's reply would probably have been two-fold: first, that, in turn, he expected no benefits from the world; and second, that plucking one hair from the body is indeed a small matter, but what one is for the most part called upon to do is not that, but to cut off a finger or limb to benefit the world. One must draw a line somewhere, and Yang Chu draws it at the level of complete self-sufficiency. The sayings of Yang Chu as they appear in Liels-tzie, a work which advocates an extreme form of hedonism, actually represent the cast of mind of a much later age. It offers no principle for the conduct of life except that of unlimited enjoyment of the body. In it Yang Chu is presented as drawing a comparison between the sage-kings, Yao and Shun, and the traditional tyrants, Chieh and Chou. The latter lived a life of unrestrained sensual pleasure, the former worked unceas- ingly for the good of the people, but death leveled all four, and the tyrants lived an infi- nitely richer life. Posthumous fame or obloquy, this philosophy holds, arc not important, because death is the end of life. Yang Chu could not possibly have accepted such a philos- ophy, because it ignores the fact that the pleasure of Chieh and Chou were gained at the cost of Buffering. In the absence of authentic writings from his pen, however, one can only guess at the metaphysical foundations of his epicureanism. Lao Tzis Taoism came to maturity with Lao Ted and Chuang Ted. Tradition regards Lao Ted as an elder contemporary of Confucius; hut the Book of Lao Tdi, known as the Tao Te Ching, is now generally regarded as a work of the Warring Kingdoms period. Chuang Ted was a contemporary of Mencius, and the names of both Lao Ted and Confucius appear fre- quently in his work. In the West, Taoism is generally thought of as a form of mysticism, or quietism, but this is inaccurate. The end of mysticism, as understood by mystics both in the West and in the East, is the immersion of the self in reality, or the Godhead: it spurns the practical ends of everyday life, and teis up for the individual the goal of contemplation of reality, which, it teaches, has its own rewards. Portions of the Tao T1 Ching and Chuang Tx; are mystical in that sense. But this is only one of several emphases in Taoism; on another side it. is a type of existentialism, a system of training for the attainment of maxi- STAT 275 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1760 g gic.r.14 L mum personal power, a system of realistic politics, and, finally, a popular religion. The later Taoists especially had moved very far from the original mystical position. Chuang Tz; and the Cultiration of Self One strain in Taoism that is highly mystical is its system of yoga for the cultivation of self; it is associated especially with Chuang Tza although there must have been practitioners of it before his time. The concept of WI (the vital spirit), for example, which figures prominently in the system, was one of the cardinal Sinitic beliefs: the universe is made of so is the human body. The emphasis of Taoism hero in question teaches the cult of ch'i to a spiritual regimen. Take, for example, one of the many passages on ch'i in Chuang Tza: "The philosopher ch'i sat propped upon a stool, his head thrown back, puffing out his breath very gently. He looked strangely dazed and inert, as though only part of him were there at all. 'What was happening to you?' asked his disciple Yen Clang, who had been standing at his side. 'You seem able to make your bod;, for the time being like a log of wood, your mind like dead timbers. What I have just seen leaning against this stool appeared to have no connection with the person who was sit Ling there before.' You have put it very well,' said Ch'; 'when you saw me just. now my "1" had lost its me'." In other words, the Taoist has a technique for lasing the self in reality, which most mystical systems regard as the ultimate test. Chuang Tzu, one might notice, records an imaginary interview between Lao Tel and Confucius. Confucius found Lao Tza "so inert I !I hardly to resemble a human being." Confucius waited for a while, but presently feeling that the moment had come for announc- ing himself, addressed Lao Tza as follows: "Did my eyes deceive me or can it really have been so? Just. now you appear to me to be a mere lifeless block, stark as a log of wood. It was as though you had no consciousness of outside things and were somewhere all by your- self." Lao Tza answered: "True. I was wandering in the Beginning of Things." This tech- nique was not exclusively Taoist. Mencius said of himself that he had cultivated the art of using his "flood-like breath-spirit." The cultivation of the self in neo-Confucianiain apparently stems from the bias of Mencius in this direction. The Tao Te Ching The Tao Ta Ching, a brief treatise in which the Taoist world-view is applied to the art, of ruling, is the main source for Taoist ideas on government and society. (It was written, according to the traditional view, by Lao Tza.) Look first at the key words in its title, Tao and Tit. Tao means "the Way," which is explained here in it manner very reminiscent of the Christian conception of the Logos as set forth in St. John's Gospel. One can only define it by saying what it is not, because like all eternal verities its meaning can only be grasped and understood, not set down in black and white: "The Tao that can be comprised in words is not the eternal Too; the name that can be named is not the abiding Name. unnam- able is the beginning of Herv,en and Earth; the namable the mother of all things." Or again, "The Tao is eternal, nameless, the Uncarved Block. . Once the block is carved, there are names." Taoism draws a distinction between ll'u (nonheing, nonhaving) and Yu (being, hav- ing), and Tao is at one and the same time nonbeing and the source of all being. "From Tao there comes one. From one there comes two. Film; two there comes three. From three there comes all things." This passage can be and has been interpreted 113 a historical descrip- tion of the Creation, but its metaphorical meaning is clearly that Tao is the transcendent and immanent source of all reality. It permeates all things and prompts all their movements. 276 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ogtexi 1 - _ T1, on the other hand, is that which makes a thing what it is; it is the thing's finite character, the closest translation for it being the Latinate word "virtue," especially in its nonmoral sense of "power." As Tao comprehends and is superior to T1, V comprehends and is :superior to specific virtues like jest and i. A man is near the Tao so long as he retains his unreflective, innate virtue and is unsiistyed by man-made ethical considerations, so tint, according to the Tao Tt Ching, the Confucian scheme of human virtues is a progressive retrogression from the Tao. "When the Tao is lost, there is the Te. When the Te is lost, there is Pa. When jen is lost there is i. When i is lost, there are the H. Ceremonies are the degeneration of loyalty and good faith, and are the beginning of disorder in the world." The foregoing is an extremely crucial passage for understanding the difference between l'aoism and Confucianism. For Confucius, Too can be manifested on the human plane only through On, and the other virtues, since Tao and T1 areloo plastic and vague to serve as the basis for order in society. Confucianism --a humanistic philosophy?assumes a basic parallelism of purpose between Heaven and Man. As one of the key sentences in the Appendix to the 1 Ching puts it: "The movement of Heaven is full of power; thus the superior man makes himself strong anti untiring." Lao Tel assumes no such parallelism, and would see here only a rationalization for the kind of untiring activity upon which, in the Taoist view, the Confucianists pride themselves. Since the Taoist. preoccupation is with the return of man to nature, it denies any purposeful direction to Tao. In the refinement of "the Way" into specific virtues and the imposition of distinctions and standards? both characteristic of Confucianism ?it sees a departure from, rather than a conformity to, Tao. Lao Tzfl's philosophy teaches that Heaven is not made in man's image. "Heaven and Earth are not Jan; to them the ten thousand things are hut as straw dogs." Many scholars have seen in this passage a deep-seated pessimism, and the political disorder in which the Tao Ta Ching was written (it belongs to the period of the Warring States) lends support to such an interpretation. The better view, however, seems to be that "are not jen" should he con- strued as "are not according to human standards of sympathy and kindness." The ways of Heaven are inscrutable: the man who conscientiously tries to impose order on society is not, therefore, promoting the cause of Tao; he may even be ot?structing it, by doing things that will render him incapable of living the spontaneous life. In the Taoist view, modern man is the victim of his own feelings of insecurity. He has to go through a long preparatory education in a trade, skill, or profession, and follow it through the years of his manhood. Ile has to protect himself against sickness and death. The very procurement of food and shelter has thus become a process so complicated that he can no longer think of himself as the master of it. In his overconcern with security, he loses touch with the First Principle. The Taoist injunction is similar to Christ's: never gain the world at. the expense of your soul, meaning by "soul" the innate capacity of man to live in conformity with Tao. MI velum except those abiding in 7'ao, Taoism tells us, are relative. Human standards and measurements are purely arbitrary: they presuppose con- siderations of utility that are irrelevant to the way of life according to Tao. The Taoist critique of life would fall with especial severity upon life as it is lived in modern society, where regimentation plays an ever greater role, and is always justified by appeal to its usefulness. According to Taoism, the very idea of use detracts from the "being" of the "useful" thing or person. When a dog becomes a domesticated pet, his dog nature is restricted, and he lives thereafter in conformity to his usefulness as a pet, not inconformity to his nature. When a man zealously pursues a career or "serves" his family or nation, he is forfeiting part of his innate Tao. Chuang Tel has many beautiful parables expressing this idea. In one of them there are two trees, one upright and tall, the other deformed, with twisted trunk and boughs. The first tree is cut down for its timber, the latter tree is left Declassified in in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 277 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1)00 g 0 10G=I t4 A La alone. From the strictly human point of view, the upright tree is "useful." But from the standpoint of the tree, is it a happier fate to be made into a pillar in a palace? Apparently the deformed tree still has its being, and can enjoy the rain, the sunshine, and the fresh air. Again, there is the Nimble of the two tortoises, one wallowing in mud and the other dead, sumptuously dressed and placed on a sacrificial altar. Evidently the dead tortoise would greatly prefer to he alive and wallowing in the mud. And, similarly, mar; would rather be left alone to live a simple life according to nature, than be subjected to rigid train- ing and discipline in the name of higher ideals like good government and progress Ideals are simply the uses to which man is put; and the part of wisdom is to recognize the basic: simplicity of man's needs and the falseness of the ideals for which men are everywhere being enslaved and indoctrinated. The utopia of Taoism is wu-wei, meaning nonaction, noninterference, and nongovernment. The question remains: Is wu-wei possible? Mention has been made of the Taoist tech- nique for cultivating the Tao. Only when society is corn's-sled of enlightened individuals, each following the way of Tao, can a genuine Taoist utopia come into existence. Meantime, very few individuals me capable of becoming enlightened, and the Taoist., realistically settle, for the moment, for something short of the utopia. Lao Tza makes much of the vari- ous conscious and unconscious levels upon which life can be lived according to Tao. The trees, birds, and fishes live according to Tao in an innocent fashion, without being aware of Tao as such. Most of mankind, similarly, live the life of Tao on the innocent level ? a life of basic needs, simple desires, and modest learning. Taoist political philosophy pre- supposes an enlightened sage-ruler whose policy is merely a matter of preserving the minimal humanity of his subjects on the level of eating, sleeping, and copulating, while diminishing all incitements to honor, luxury, and combativeness. The pursuit of these is discouraged because it results in unnecessary misery not merely for the human world but for the total sentient world as well. In the words of Lao Tza: "Do not exalt the worthies, and the people will no longer be contentious. Do not value treasures that are hard to get, and there will be no more thieves. If the people never see such things as excite desire, their mind will not be confused. Therefore the sag. rules the people by emptying their minds, filling their bellies, weakening their Wills, and toughening their sinews, ever making the people without knowl- edge and without desire." Tho Tao Ta Ching should be read in the context of the prevalence of the Legalist philos- ophy among the more powerful warring states of the period. The people were, as people today are in Communist countries, subject to rigorous training and servitude for the state, and it was the aggressive, utilitarian attitude that underlies such arrangements that Lao Tza thought of as being against Tao. "He who by Tao purposes to help a ruler of men will oppose all conquest by force of arras; for such things are wont to rebound." To Lao Tztl it is infinitely preferable for people to live a simple life, and forego the desire and knowledge that keep the nervous among us in a perpetual state of tension, worry, and aggressiveness The Tao Th Ching abounds in praise for the soft and pliant. Some of its paradoxes state that the soft is stronger than the hard, the meek stronger than the power- ful, silence stronger than speech, nonhaving stronger than having. Lao Tza's favorite sym- bol is water, because it is soft and "takes the low ground." Taoist Diagnosis of Soddy The Taoist diagnosis of society consists in exposing man's natural inclination toward the Yang, his delight in assertion and power, and his implicit faith in endeavor. It is Lao Tza's special forte to cultivate the Yin, the negative, passive, and "female" elements 278 STAT ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release :IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ?oog _ogtaiblata 1 in life. To he perfect is to invite diminution; to climb is to invite fall. The images of the Incomplete, the grotesque, the lowly fill the pages of Chuang TO., its spirit of nonassertion is unique among philosophies that are not expressly other-worldly. The Nature of Gorernment The nature of the government envisaged by Taoism is not set forth in detail. The sage-niter should not interfere with the rhythm of life of ordinary men, nor should he incite men to accomplish any utilitarian purposes except those that are involved as a matter of course in the simple business of living. Instead of attempting to define the responsi- bility of the individual toward society and state, the Taoist seeks to cultivate himself, with happiness and liberation as his objectives. Chuang 'rzfi offers abundant evenples of the sort of happiness the Titoises have in mind, and also expresses a good many things that arc not that sort of happiness. The average man's standard of happiness?keeping up with the Joneses ?is ipso facto wrong in the Taoist view because it. is measured by a man-mcdo criterion. (In Chuang Txe's parable, the roe eau cover vast distances in one flight sus- tained as he is by wind and cloud; the sparrow can only jump from tree to tree. But it is stupid of the roe to scorn the sparrow, and stupid of the sparrow to envy the roc. Each is capable of contentment and happiness within its own sphere.) Thu preliminary stage of happiness, indeed, comes precisely when one has learned to disregard not only man-made criteria but man-made rules of conduct as well, for the Taoist deplores the amount of human ensigy normally wasted on the attempt to conform. The Greatest Good The happiness achieved in the preliminary stage is, however, only "relative happi- ness." Absolute happiness is achieved only through liberation from self, that is, destroy- ing the final impediment to the knowledge of reality, of Tao. Chuang TO and :Aber Taoist mystics describe the process by which this knowledge is attained in terms of eliminating and iorgetting. The following dialogue between Confucius (whom Chuang Tza often causes to talk like a Taoist) and his beloved disciple Yen 11W is significant in this con- nection: Yen Hui said, "I have made some progress." "What do you mean?" asked Confucius. "I have for- gotten Pei and i," replied Yen Hui. "Very well, but that. is not enough," said Confucius. Another day Yen Iui spin raw Confucius and said. "I have made progress." "What do you mean?" asked Confucius. "I have forgotten rituals mil music," replied Yen I U. "Very well, but that is not enough," said Confucius. Another day Yen Hui again saw Confucius and said. "I have made tome progress." "What do you mean?" asked Confucius. "I sit in forgetfulness," replied Yen Hui. At this Confucius changed countenance and ni ked "What do you mean by sitting in forgetfulness?" To which Yen Iiui replied, "My limbs are nerveless and intelligence is dimmed. I have abandoned my body and discarded my knowledge. Thus I become one with the Infinite. This is what I mean by sitting in forget- fulness." Then Confucius said "If you have become one with the Infinite, you hair no personal likes and aolikes. If you have become one with the Great Evolution (of the universe), you are one who merely follows its changes. If you really have achieved this, I should like to follow your steps." In Taoism, then, the greatest good is intuitive knowledge of Tao. Thc techniques, e.g., breath-control, that it. teaches as a means of achieving such knowledge, have been men- tioned earlier. Sometimes, however, these techniques have led to strange by-products, and these, in turn, to the ultimate neglect of reality. The chief of these by-products is power, for there is reason to believe that the man who cultivates his ch'i by Taoist techniques can lengthen his life and prolong his capacity for sensual enjoyment. ? or even, some would say, develop the power of healing and performing miracles. Very cony there appeared a sect of Taoists who cultivated these by-products ? longevity, sexual potency, physical and AA, 279 ?????? STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release :IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 0 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 -a psychical p wer ? as the central objectives, leaving knowledge of ultimate reality almost entirely aut f their efforts. They were called Fang-shlls, and their special technique was called yang-s. tag, "nourishing the living" or "nourishing one's vital self." This deviation toward material ends is undoubtedly in sharp conflict with the bases of Taoist philosophy; but, undoubtedly, it explains much of the appeal of the Taoist rAigion. Titoism was a development out of the primitive Chinese religi.m. There has been no small amount of feedback from Taoism, as formulated by Chuang TO and Lao TO, into other Chinese schools of philosophy, including even the Legalist school. Thus Mencius, far more than Confucius, emphasized "the cultivation of self," and thus gave a twist to Confucianist thought that was later to prove very utrful when it came to combatting and absorbing Buddhism. Mencius taught, for example, that all things in Heaven and Earth are within one, which, since the Confucian conception of knowledge implies that the search for it is long and arduous, is more Taoist than Confucian. Mencius did, however, cling to the Confucian doctrine that fin is the manifestation of Tao on the ;swami level, and that so long as one keeps his innate atock of sympathy, of conscience, alive within him, he is not, far from Tao. Mencius was able, in defending his theory that human nature is originally good, to draw upon a remarkable amount of empiri- cal knowledge in the field of psychology. There are, he taught, four good beginnings or promptings in the breast of every man? the feeling of commiseration, the feeling of shame and dislike, the feeling of modesty and yielding, the sense of right and wrong. Each of these beginnings is related to an aspect of Confucian morality: the feeling of commiseration for fin, the feeling of shame and dislike for i, the feeling of modesty and yielding for li, the sense of right and wroag for chih (wisdom). Mencius may be said to have contributed both coherence and clarity to the Confucian system, although in doing so he undoubtedly gave great weight to some aspects of the Master's teaching at the expense of others. Both his ethics and his theory of politics were to become orthodox Confucianist doctrine. Nlencius' political philosophy is a logical extension of his ethics. Like the Taoist vision of government, it vigorously combats what one would today call utilitarian and totalitarian tendencies. The Book of Mencius begins with the following colloquy: "Mencius went to see King I luei of Mang. The King said, 'Venerable Sir, since you have not counted it far to come hen., a distance of a tl tousand Li, may I presume that you are likewise provided with (counsels) to profit my kingdom?* "Mencius replied, `Why must your Majesty use that ward "rmfit"? What I am likeuise provided with are counsels to jht and i, and these are my only topics?'" Mencius goes on to argue that if all individuals, families, and states seek their own profit, the unavoidable result will be that the stronger will oppress the weak and that con- flict will anse; but if all pattern their activities on fin and i, there will be peace and harmony in society. Putting his faith in the free development of man's innate goodness, Mencius visualizes a government that, with a minimum of coercion, might establish jtrt and i in the four corners of the earth He calls this government "The King's Way" (Wang Tao). The type of government that puts ulterior interests above fin and i and uses force to exact obedi- ence from its people, he calls "The Tyrant's Way" (Pao Tao). In other words, Mencius would distinguish between king and tyrant by judging the degree of fin and i; it is inter- esting to notice, in passing, that he defends the right of revolution against the tyrant. Many passages in Mencius, indeed, have encouraged Chinese democrats to see him as a forerunner of modern democratic thought. "The people are the most important element tin a coun- try]; the spirits of the land and grain are the next; the ruler is the least important." The 280 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007--4 ? 4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: ogidi fa. - ? 4-; ?': .? ? king who abuses his power technically ceases to be king because he is no longer entrusted with. the mandate of Heaven. The people have the right lode/sale hfni.? "When a ruler.' treatatissubjecta like grass and dirt;then it is right of his'iubjeets o tre.sthirrths aliandit and an enemy." These and similar sayings are phaverbial in China: They wire, for example, incorporated in Sun Yat?sen's San Min Chu I, Mencius advocated a system of government, based on. virtlie, eduration,:and persua- sion, which found little favor with the princes among whom 'Atencius moved. In tho princes' vietr,fia and had not yet justified themselves in terms of practical concrete results (even at that time, apparently, the terms jtri and i, had began to sawn! a little hackneyed and remote). The princes preferrod to fellow the more "efficient" methods taught by the Legal- ists. In time it was possible to say that one tribal state, the Ch'in,whicl- was untouched by the culture of Chou, had adopted Legalist teachings (those of Shang Yana and Li %a), beoune the strongest state. in China, and conquered all the other states one by c ..e. A word now abeitt the Legalists. 1.tantaNt Than Tell The architect of Legalism, Han Fel Tzii, was a disciple of the eminent Confucian phi- losopher, Man Tza, to whom, therefore, one must look for the beginnings of Legalist doc- trine. Hann Tza took as his point of departure Confucius' views on education and U, and developed a theory sharply contrary to that of Mencius, which taught that human nature is originally evil, and can be rectified only through education. One should not interpret evil as "sinful," as the Christiana use the term. Mein Tza's interpretation was that if human desires and instincts are given -free rein, that is, not disciplined by education and ii, mis- behavior will result. The good promptings in the human heart, as Mencius conceived them, Ifsan Tza regards as inadequate to keep people in line, though he does not deny their exist- ence. Nteneius stresses nature while Hann Tat stresses nurture, holding that everything that. is good and valuable is the product of deliberate human effort. Man TO, in other words, was what we today call a humanist. Mencius ami llslln Tel are interested in nue and the same question: What makes man human? I [sun Tza's theory of the evil in iiiiman nature is, its he develops it, merely a fur- ther argument in favor of the Confucian inks), that is, in favor of the View that gn and i should prevail in society. It is, however, only a brief step from his position to a position that regards humanity with contempt, and holds that the human passions are so unruly that they can be restrained only by law and forte, from whieh it follows that the best form of geve.rnment is that which succeeds in forcing people to obey the fate. The Legalists took that brief step, and hi doing so broke not only with Confucius but with I lain Tza As well. Item Tza, like Confucius, dwells upon man's potentialities for receiving education. The Legalists are saying, in effect, that. mxii is not worth the trouble it would take to try to edu- cate him. Nteuelus flatly assumes that everybody can become Yeo and Shun. Hann Tza is prepared to go along, with the proviso that firet each individual mind be thoroughly grounded in U and sincerity Hari Fel 'PLO holds that in give every individual his chance to cealize hi-s true manhood, to practice fin atul I, is impractical. Any way one looks at them, be insists, the masses simply do not love virtue and goodness, and the ruler must formulate hitt pulieles with that in mind. "Jo his rule of a State," rays Han Pei Tza, "the sage does not depend upon men doing good Ulm:Aver, but brings it about that they ean do no wrong. Within the frontiers of a State, there are no more than ten people whn,wrfl dogma! of them- ,,trt4:".F ? ? 981 eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release k-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 4 lin) 60 0 mails) L I. .1 ? - ' selves; nevertheless, if i)nePri.a.V. abeut t hat thn peeple can nci wro,ng. the- entire State can be kept, peaceful lqiyhr# toiekitioiiiitifraikof!thir riutlerityr?and neglects the few, and so does not coiceeiiIiing with; tztwrjr.',Z ? The Legalist positie..0.1."60440,4t cottellt10.1ttkaogt leachin4 that the people should live $,,ithout knotilt;t10.'initttlicnit'dmirefllot the Legorsttand the Taoist part company over the question of tho Taoist %vetch] hrote the peepitiliu4 In a state of ,sim phcity and (Ileitis; _the Ingeltiantish.ct; to tee toil that the people's Itcsuctnrn manpower be so channeled n$ fa:1art:4a the tfultref.thi Sudo.' Tlik-otOttm?ls,sjery remote indeed from Confuciaft. nOtiottS oliitotgOiletunteirt: !The ConfettaXtulet Ivi..sage relying upon his ,sagacity. TbothtediSt Mer I:sat-liable tor thejavt,.- H a.evclop tech- niqu?..s to ensure propor'ertfoibuitent of tevr.snit fair atilhotiOnottentatiht?end punish- ments. ?, :7 .4. - Iran Pri 1'4 , gen Vel Ta8. represents n close np.oroztikulon Vs The type of thinktugAnt underlies the modern tato8tatien etqte..- Ikeensu uIn iiLI irrhtf stql titan the tench for tech- p to snake pemde &elle tura giant by Ws, to the south tortterittiquea to manipulate people en oato further the potver=1,p0311.1t-tif the inlet..., In tb LaiI1u Fel Taaas fodoY$ the auditions ruler and his advisors ewe temPtcd to?concludzovith nrt eye to poasi- big conflict ocher Slaw; that aver, LitiNktast TIKtst be tIrrevit Into the service of the Rata and become a unit. in its eau-chi:ie. - In the Ch'io State, the ground fair totalitarian tuts suit1ulLySittttg?Yttng. Han Vd Tztt, it 18 Moodily; to mute, died inp 'risen in Me. USA onethet diselPle of Mao Ta0, was already piernler F C1314 when Mut reprta Mac them tOIZek office, and, recog- ithing him as Is pusible for pputiera presenftent, ktairAted mdzeutb.. Li's subsequent tercet wss brilliant. lYe stayed at Us adviser to Cblri thllt ITnang-tii the first Ch'in Emperor, who proceeded to eentyter the %viler Chinese itacet LtuctIO establish his own dynasty. Han rei Tzlmd written that "all $potelnua action ivhicit to not in accord with the laws alul,clecrees is to be plehlhitee for thew:m-4 orth *ate. The first Ch'in Emperor took this tr.-settles to hosr mut oneelte was inn positiOn to do so forbade free atiseussion awl the teaching.ofphilosuPhy.; ' - ? " The period from Confucius to Iflut Fel Toil istbe toost triftfant in Chinese philosophy. It was a period of viprous intenfteteal inquiry, mpecially Into tho nature of man and gov- ernment- In general, it was gia a period daring wItiell kings rind princes were eager to listen to philosophers. But the question they wanted answered was that pnt to Mencius by King Hui of Lien: flow shell TptOtiC say kluzions? nu being the cle3r, the foregoing turnouu-ica should explain why Lao Tzti aad Chung Tau were re-closes, why Confucius and Moncios were never entrouted with irstportant TM-WOO, and wily the influence of Mo Tza, despite his inuuenst kOwi-ngstltrringabriof petkx.1,, diod out. 'completely. The phIkvophy, that wen out In the end and that was pot into practice was the philoso- phy vitt: the lovre.,4 opinion of lemma nature, Le. Iran i Tta's. Among other things, he did much La estiode the Chinese myth or tho golden age of the sage-kings. Kingdoms in peat ages, he 'might, were ;relatively: matelot treauto there was little cause for contention: , iithere were -few people ixttts plenty Of *applies; and Therefore the people did not quarrel. ? - Out non adays people do hot. consider A family or flvoclii*n st law, and each child having . again live children, before the d'ezttt of the grandfather, there rosy be twenty-five grand- eltildren. The result is that there are sonny people hut few ,supplleg, and ooe tea to work Tuthi Torn meager return. 8o the people fall to quarreling." Not the lutet of Ilan Fri TzA's ' 4epnitues from the earlier thinkers was his terultoey to sco the prohleret of golanment in , .? 282 STAT ? ? . ? 1_4 ? - ? :14.44 )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 POO g RI a i_t4 L term of impersonal causes, history as a proems of change, and new problems as solvable only by new measures. In these respects, Han Fri Tzd can be called a "modern." Ins essays were written in beautiful prose, ar.d are executed in such fashion that the Western reader will find himself very much at home with them. HAN CONFIJCIAN1311 During the reign of Ch'in Shih Huang-ti Chinese r* s-ophical inquiry suffered a sets back from which it never fully recovered. reginie presents several interesting parallels with the present-day Communist regime. Chinese history has seen its share of tyrants, war lords, and bandits, who have killed many people and accomplished great destruction; but, except for the First Emperor of the Ch'in and the rulers of Red China, these influences have accomplished their mischief without imposing an ideology in the attempt to justify it. The pro-Ch'in era had certainly been glorious: it produced Confucius, Lao Tzd, Chuang Tad, Mo Tzd, Mencius, Ilsiin Tzd, Han Fel Tad, and several other interesting philosophers. The Ilan dynasty, which followed the Ch'in, cannot be spoken of as glorious, but it did much Lu undo the major reverses of the Ch'in period. Its scholars early made it their Inertness to recapture and synthesize the past achievements of Chinese thought. The traditions of Con- fucianism, Taoism, Legalism, and the Yin-yang School were recovered and reinterpreted, especially in identifying, cditing, and interpreting the pre-Confucian and Confucian clas- sics. Subsequent Chinese scholarship is deeply indebted to the Ilan scholars, despite the fact that the quality and depth of their work often left much to be desired. Tho Ancient Text School and New Text School of Confucianism, far example, both descended fre- quently to niggling pedantry, and classics like Ch'un Ch'iu and 1 Ching, though they embodied little Confucian thought, were used as sources of doctrine on an elaborate scale. (The New Text School accused the Old Text School of forgery, and the academie war between them raged with fury even as recently as the Ch'ing dynasty.) The root difficulty, however, was the currently accepted conception of orthodoxy: no philosopher dared to think for himself to the extent of venturing new propositions regarding the universe and the art of government. Confucianism was formally adopted as the State religion during the reign of the second Han Emperor, Wu Ti, and was soon made the basis of the famed Han examination system. The Emperor Wu Ti Wu Ti, a shrewd man, appears to have adopted Confucianism as a popular gesture to enhance his prestige, rather than out of genuine conviction. His own beliefs, like those of Shih iluang-ti, tended toward the ideas of the Taoist magicians who, instead of seeking liberation in the Tao, studied alchemy, magic, and sorcery to further worldly ends (indeed, his own quest for immortality finally resulted in his death). In politics, he was inclined toward Legalism, which he did not, lir:mei:es, dare to espouse openly. Confucianism as the State Religion The day came when only Cenfucians were appointed to official posts, and when the State was subsidizing the scholars to perform the tasks of Confucianist scholarship and research. At least two of the Confucianists patronized by Wu Ti who deserve mention here were ICung-sun flung and Tung Chung-shu. One of them, Kung-sun Hung, had Legalist leanings, and the other, Tung Chung-shu, had a deep affinity with the Yin-yang School, On is, with the school of thought that hewed closest to the line of the ancient Sinitic beliefs, Tarr' had, for this resson, deep roots among the Chinese people. The official Confu- 283 STAT , ;-; Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Poo?g ()ROAN Ria -a II cianism, in part through their influence, soon became a melting pot for various systems of thought. It is often said that, because of the State subsidy and other forms of official sup- port for Confucianism, thought was standardized along Confucianist lints under the Han. A more correct statement would he that as a result of the intervention Confucianism itself underwent a mtliml change under the Han dynasty. Most particularly, it acquired many of the characteristics of a religion: Confucius became in popular conception a king and the son of Heaven. Temples were erected in his honor. Once Confucianism became a form of ortho- doxy, it was natural that a great many students whose real interests lay elsewhere, became professional Confucians too and interpreted Confucianism in the light of their basic Taoist, Legalist, or other philosophy. Many elements of the ancient Sinitic religion, including its cosmology, were at the same time absorbed into Confucianist doctrine. As Hu Shih puts it, the kind of Confucianism developed under Emperor Wu was "a great synthetic religion into which were fused all the elements of popular superstition and state worship.. . thinly covered up under the dis- guise of Confucian and pre-Confucian classics in order to make them appear respectable and authoritative." And he adds that "this Confucianism was not at all what Confucius taught and Mencius philosophized about...." It has been stated that Confucius himself was more or less an agnostic in religious matters, anti that, while some of the pre-Confucian classics dealt with cosmology, a connec- tion between those classics and Confucius' own thought is difficult to demonstrate. An agnostic philosophy is difficult to make over into a religion, since a r5ligion must, as a matter of course, offer an explanation for every phenomenon in the universe. Tho Han Confucian- ists, bent as they were on making Confucianism a religion, had first to make it over into a coherent and comprehensive system. To that end, they supplemented the Confucian teach- ings in ethics and politics with an elaborate system of cosmology that, ultimately, became their well-nigh exclusive concern. There is, indeed, a special term, Wei Shu, for the typo of forgeries committed at this time to supplement the classics. (Wei literally means the woof of a fabric,, and is used in opposition to ching, a word which is usually translated as classic, but literally means the wasp of a fabric.) In these writings, Confucius became a superhuman being, the prophet of the Han dynasty. Tung Chung-shu The passion for giving Confucianism a cosmological twist was evident in the writings of Tung Chung-shu, the first systematiser of Confucian thought under Wu Ti. Tung's ethics were basically Confucian: his theory of the Three Kang and the Five Ch'ang was merely a codification of the teachings of Confucius and Mencius. The Three Kang are the three basic human relationships: sovereign-subject, father-son, husband-wife. The Five Ch'ang are the five norms in conduct: On, i, Ii, chili (wisdom), lain (good faith). The condi- tion of good individual and social life is the correct application of these five virtues in the three basic human situations. In ethics es such, in other words, Tung is on safe Confucian grounds. The Use of Analogy It is in his embroidering of the theory just summarized that Tung Chung-shu reveals the typical bias of Han thought first of all by his use of analogy, lie equates the Five Ch'ang with the five elements: wood, metal, fire, water, soil, lie then associates each of the three basic relationships with the principles of Yin and Yang. Thus the sovereign is Yang, the subject is Yin; the father is Yang, the son is Yin; the husband is Yang, the wife is Yin. Finally, be equates the four "ways" of government (beneficence, rewards, punishments, and executions), with the four seasons. Determined to explain human affairs in terms drawn 284 _ STAT )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: yao g 0 got 1-.0 A L CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 1-..c./ 4 1 from nature Tung puts great emphasis on natural calamities and abnormalities, which, in his view, necessarily reflect disorders and abnormalities lin the human world. Like the medieval theologians in their reading of the Bible and nature, Tur.3 Chung-shu bends everything to his central purpose. But it is easy to recognize, behind these naive views, the old Sinitic urge to keep human life in rhythmic relation with the broader harmonies of !leaven and Earth. Most recent Confucian scholars, as good rationalists, tend to deplore the superstitious elements in Han Confucianism, and point especially to analogies like those just considered as regrettable. This, however, is unhistorical. Until men learned, through scientific inves- tigation, to interpret events in terms of cause and effect, thinking by the method of analogy was universal. The European Renaissance books on alchemy, medicine, education, and government all have exhaustive classifications based on what we today regard as false anal- ogy. Some examples are the theory of the four Humours, and the Shakespearean notion that natural calamities reflect political di$order. in early Western theology the practice of straining for analogies is carried much further than in either the Han forgeries or the Han commentaries on the classics. Philosophy in the Ilan times may have lacked intellectual rigor, but it should not be dismissed, because the same lack would apply equally to highly respected ideas of the same period in other countries. It should be remembered also, in this connection, that the philosophers of the pre- Ch'in cm had addressed themselves to rulers, and that their thought had scarcely touched, much less undermined, the customs and beliefs of the general Chinese populace. In order to make Confucianism a religion that would conceivably be accepted by the populace, rit- ualistic and magical elements with mess appeal had to be incorporated in it, and 7"ien had to be invested with attributes of anger and pleasure; thus the emphasis in Han Confucian- ism, on ceremony in the performance of the rituals for worshipping Heaven and the basic elements (mountains, water, and grain). Nor, since Han Confucianism was state-supported, should one be surprised at its exalting loyalty to the king equally with that of filial piety toward parents as a stabilizer of social order. When a system of thought permeates the government and social life of a nation, it cannot hope to retain its pristine purity of doctrine. Sanctions and rules have to be called in to make it. work. The Examination System The important new contribution of Ilan Confucianism was, of course, the examination system, which early became the accepted means by which the Ilan regime recruited offi- cials (ruin among its subjects. The virtues of the system are well known: it enabled China to perpetuate a homogeneous Confucian culture and, at the same time, to retain a fairly democratic social structure ? so that aristocracy and caste have been virtually nonexistent in China for a very long while. Its defects lay in the exclusively literary emphasis of the examinations, and the resultant discouragement of specialized knowledge. In the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties, the system so degenerated that the composition of essays in n pre- scribed style became the unique test of merit. Cultivation of this style became the well-nigh exclusive preoccupation of the candidates, who consequently never had an opportunity to develop other than a superficial frame of mind about learning and scholarship. (The required readings in the Confucian canon did, however, give the Chinese officials a common attitude regarding individual responsibility to society and state, and so contributed over a long period to the stability of Chinese culture. Wang ('h'ung and the Rationalist Tradition The rationalist tradition within Confucianism was not without powerful spokesmen, even in Han times. One of them was Wang Ch'ung (27-(ca.)100 A n.), whose work, Lan ? , :) STAT 285 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 !Mg, or Critical Essays, is an important, expraziun of the rationalist temper in Chinese thougl t. Wang Ch'ung says of his book: "Though the Book of Poetry numbered three hun- dred (I ms), one phrase can cover them all, namely, With undepraved thoughts' (a say- ing of Cnfucius in the Ar.alcds). And though the chapters of my Lan Inn; may be num- bered (only) in the ten; ene phrase covers them all, namely, 'llatred of fictions and false- hoods.'" \ In essay after es-Nay Wang Ch'ung demolished the notion of the necessary inter- action between !leaven and man, which the Confucianists had defended ever since Tung Chung-shu. "In things there is nothing more manifest," he says, "than having results, and in argument there is nothing more decisive than having evidence." Ile strikes at each and every one of the alleged proofs of the intervention of Heaven in mundane affairs. Lan liOng is available in English translation. To read it is not only to meet a powerful mind, but to acquire a fascinating picture of the superstitions and myths of the author's time. Tamar RELIGION Transition from Philosophy Wang Ch'ung anticipated in some respects the spirit of the neo-Taoists who began to dominate the intellectual scene upon the fall of the Ilan dynasty. here a few words must be included about the submergence of Tnoism and occultism under thc Yin-yang School and the simultaneous rise of the Taoist religion, during the Ilan dynasty. Even more than Con- fucianism, Taoism came to be so weighted down with the superstitions and popular beliefs of the time as to lose its affinity with its founders (i.e., Lao TeA and Chuang Ted). Tao Chino (Tao religion) practically lost its connection with Tao Chia (Taoist philosophy), as the Taoist teaching was perverted to make room for the occult and magic arta. The mysti- cal sayings of Lao Tzil lent themselves, in considerable degree, to the kind of misinterpreta- tion they now suffered. The Tao TZ Ching, for instance, reads: He who contains within hirreelf richness of (Tao's) virtue Is like a babe. Poisonous insects do not sting him, Fierce beasts do not echo. him. Birds of prey do not etrike him Although his bones be weak and his sinews tender Yet his grip is strong. The purpose of the hyperbole here is to convey the notion of the invulnerability and innocence of the infant, a notion not without parallels in Western literature. But it waa now misconstrued as imputing miraculous powers to the adept Taoist and, in conjunction with similar passages, was used by the later Taoists to justify their pursuit of magic. Popular Taoism was both optimistic and this-worldly, and thus stood in sharp con- trast to the actual teachings of Lao Tau and Chuang Tea. Its magic and occultism were always cultivated as means of securing a happy life free from harm on this earth, and not for other-worldly purposes; the objective was to master the secrets of nature and thus be able to mollify the powers of death, disease, and accident. In the Han period, the adept Taoists became, accordingly, dabblers in alchemy, medicine, fclig-shui sorcery, and charms, all of which represent the quest for magical formulae capable of protecting and enriching life -- an elixir for iinmertality, or a way of producing gold by heating a mixture of sulfur and a mercury compound. (Chinese alchemy, however, differed from European in that its main purpose was not the creation of material wealth but the preparation of a gold elixir that would prolong life or confer immortality. The theory of the elixir was that gold is indestructible. and that by eating it one would incorporate indestructibility into one's body.) 286 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: .";IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? The art of alchemy, already well known in Chins as early a3 the second century a.c., went on intermittently througlout the Han dynasty, now with rind now without Imperial patron- age. After the fall of the (fan, Ko Hung wrote a treati.-e on Alchemy, in which he furnishes detailed ireitructions for the preparntion of the drugs menticnosl The results to be expected from taking these drugs are as follows? "White hair %rill become bla.-k, lost teeth will grow again, the strength of the body will be renewed. He who takes it will never grow old, an old man will become a youth once more, he vill live forever and not die." fly the end lir the Har, dynasty, Taoismposses.s.ed a venerated phila.ophy, a corpus of scientific truth, and a body of proles:Aim:11s practicing a variety of arts and sciences; follow- ing the example of Buddhism, it also had acquired it mythology an.1 a pantheon of gods. me time was ripe for Tsoisin to become a religion, It3 it finally did under the leadership of Chang Ling, later known as Chang Tao-ling,, in the second century A D.. Chang Ling stud- ied alchemy and sought the drug of immortality; modern rezearch also establishes his indebtednem to Persian zoroastrinnisin, then known as Mazdaisrn. He could, allegedly, cure diseases by having his patients confess their in and pray to the three divine powers, Heaven, Earth, and Water. The religion he founded,-which equated the monotheistic god of Nfazdaism with Tao, quickly att ram ed a largo following. Ileemisc converts wcre expected to pny five Ion (nrpeoximately nine quarts) of gram, it wits at. first c.dled the Religion of the Five 7'oti of Grain Tradition s:iys that Chang Ling, the first T'ten-shth (Heaven's Apostle) of the Taoist religion, ascended to Heaven upon a dragon. Spread of the Movement In the time of Cluing Ling's grandson, Chang Lu, the Taoist religion had spread to many parts of China, the social unrest preceding the fall of the Ilan providing a congenial context for the spread of a religion able to appeal to the Ma5SC3. In the course of time, it. became the rallying-poiet for a popular revolt led by Chang Chino, a kinsman of the Chang clan known as the Rebellion cf the Yellow Turbans. The latter anticipated, in some respecta, the T'ai-ping Rebellion of the Ch'ing dynasty under !Ong !15u-ch'iian The Yellow Tur- bans were crushed, but the Taoist movement itself continued to spread until, in 415, K'ou Chlen-ch'ih amalgamated the Religion of the Five Tou of Grain with certain native Taoist traditions. and took the title of ricn-siiih Tao Chino was thenceforth a firmly estab- lished religion, equal to Confucianism and Buddhism. The Seven Sages of the Rambo? Grove After the downfall of the Ilan, tl ere was a considerable resurgence of Taoism, entirely unrelated to tht Sprend of Troiist religion, in intellectual circle. The hitter re.hms of tho Eastern Iran dynnsty, uhen the actual powers of government were in the hands of eunuchs and of the ruling house. disillusioned many intellectuals, and some of them, in consequence, became curious about the teachings of Lao Tzu and Chuang TO. As a result, during the Wei and Chin dynasties there iiere numerous Taoist intellectuals who were independent critics of the mating governments and many who became recluses in the woods in iitiest of a life of freedom. Representntive of such men were, for example, the Seven Sages of tho Bamboo Grove, most of whom, e g., Yuan Chili, Ouch Kang, Liu Lin, and Shang Shou, left behind them some brilliant poetry nnd prose Their attitude toward life would today be called Existentialism, though they would have shrunk from asserting the final absurdity of the universe They despised social conventions and standards of decency, and interpreted Tao in terms of impulse and spontaneity: one reveals one's nature, they held, in impulse and not in blind compliance with established usage. Upon learning of the death of his mother, one Taoist would ',hack a harp and sing; another would get drunk for a few days, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 287 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ? and then weep aloud. They drank, took Taoist drugs, and ensaaged in conversation. Their mode of conversation was called "pure talk," a fad much indulged in at those times. Many examples of "pure talk" were gathered in the contemporary book Shilt-ahua Hain Yu (Con- temporarf Records of New Discourses). The fact that these undoubtedly brilliant men did not take positions of responsibility in the government reflected certain basic characteristics of Taoism. Taoism lacks the Con- fucian trust in the capacity of man to achieve peace and order through diratipline. Its ideal of society is predicated upon a complete denial of civilization, for all that one must admire its negative caution against human assertiveness. Meanwhile, the Taoist who is not in the position of a sage-king can do little except effect his own liberation, as did these men. Because of their love of nature and their spontaneity, however, they have left an indelible impress on subsequent Chinese art and poetry. Some of them attempted intellectual formu- lations of Taoism; Wang Mi left behind him the standard commentary on the Tao Ti! Ching; and Shang Shou left an unfinished commentary on Chuang Tzd, which was completed by Ito Hsiang, and is one of the great achievements of Taoist philosophy. What in Chuang Ted was aphonsm and parable is translated hero into philosophical terms with immeasurable gains in coherence and clarity. Since the period of iVei and Chin, Taoism has produced few distinguished thinkers, although many painters and poets have caught, the Taoist spirit, which gives their work a distinctive flavor. This is what one should expect. Philosophical Taoism is first and fore- most an attitude toward life, and does not lend itself to precise intellectual formulation. The Taoist religion became very popular; under the Tang dynasty it enjoyed patron- age by the Emperors. (The T'ang Emperors had the family name Li, and were persuaded to believe that, they were descended from Lao Tad or Li Erh.) However, after the Sung the Taoist religion suffered a gradual decline. Ontology The Taoist religion is, properly speaking, an "imitation" religion, which borrowed heav- ily from Buddhist and Sinitic beliefs and rituals. It took over, for example, the Sinitic belief in ghosts and spirits. Upon the model of Buddhism, it erected a pantheon of gods. (Lao Tad, as the founder of Titoism, was made the Supreme Deity, while the god in charge ri mundane affairs was the Jade Emperor. Sometimes the Jade Emperor, Lao Tad, and another god were conceived as a trinity.) To learn something of the free play of Taoist imagination in creating gods and super- human beings, one has only to read the popular literature in China. In the novel Flng SRn Pan, for example, one finds a fantastic account of a war between the true and the heretic Taoist gods and heroes, with the downfall of the Shang dynasty as its point of departure. The corruption and cruelty of Chic!' was due to the influence of his favorite mistrem, a malig- nant fox spirit. The heretical Taoist gods supported the corrapt regime; Lao Tad, the Jade Emperor, and their associates sated with King Wtn of Chou. In reading this literature today, one may easily get. the impression that. the spirits it refers to were not taken very seriously, or conceived of as actually existing. Tho historical evidence, however, points in the other direction. Even among Chinese illiterates, belief in spirits and ghosts has now, undoubtedly, ceased to be strong, but that is the result of a great change that has operated over the last forty years. If, for example, one turns to a Christian missionary's account of religious life during the Ch'ing dynasty, he sees at once that evil spirits and ghosts were taken very seriously and had to be placated and appeased from moment. to moment,. In case of an epidemic, famine, or flood, religious ceremonies and parades, the purrmee of which was to pacify the evil spirits, were held as a matter of cours:a The principles of Yin and STAT 288 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 PO 0-11 gta ft 14 Yang, which originally referred to merely complementary forces in nature, had come to be synonymous with the principles of evil and good. Kuei, or the ghosts, were Yin forces. Women and illiterates were thought of as especially subject to Yin influence, while the learned scholar, particularly one holding high rank in government, was safe from it beat= what predominated in him was Yang. Charms and spells, sometimes the Confucian clas- sics themselves, were used to ward off the evil spirits. Confucianist as well as Buddhist and Taoist elements were apparent in the popular animistic religion. But the Taoist religion was undoubtedly more responsible for the perpetuation of animistic nations than the other two. For example, the typical activities of Taoist priests concerned not devotion to or liv- ing in the way of Tao, but calling upon members of the divine hierarchy to defeat the machi- nations of devils. This naturally encouraged people to blame evils of all sorts pain, disease, plague, fire, flood, and drought ? on the actions of evil spirits. On the positive side, the Taoist religion continued to stress the cultivation of health, longevity, and sexual virility, and much of the folklore of the day was based on the notion that anything alive, a fox or even a tree, could through proper cultivation acquire spiritual powers (stories of animals manning human form were, for example, very common); the corollary of this notion was that ary man could through cultivation become a hsien (genie). A special branch of literature, stiU popular today, depicts the powers of Taoist recluses and priests over mun- dane affairs, e.g. their knowledge of drugs that increase sexual potency and cure venereal disease. (Advertisements for quack medicines still occupy a great deal of space in the Chi- nese-language newspapers published in the United States.) Good and Eva The Taoist religion had, like all popular religions, a mixture of positive moral princi- ple over and above tbe mere eschewing of evil and the cultivation of health and power. Its central doctrine of moral principle, with which it sanctioned virtuous living, is the doc- trine of Retribution, i.e. that good and evil deeds are duly repaid. This idea was doubtless indigenous to China, though probably it was reinforced by Buddhism. In any case, it has been for centuries one of the most firmly and widely held of Chinese beliefs. Taoism very early took it over and developed (or some would say (listorted) the Buddhist idea of Karma, into the materialist dogma of Pao Ying (retribution). This dogma holds that punishment may fall on the person who does a wicked deed either in this world or in the next, or it may fall upon his descendants. Similarly, the performance of good deeds will repay the indi- vidual in this or the other life, and will bless his descendants. The rewards and punishments are not necessarily forthcoming within the mortal life of an individual. The less educated Chinese tend to hold this degma wiih unquestioning faith. This raises the question of how the Taoist religion defines "good" and "wicked." Tao- ist philosophy held originally that, all moral values are relative; Taoist religion having long ago ceased to claim any genuine kinship with Taoist philosophy, simply took over the com- monly accepted standards of good and had conduct and made them its own. It. holds, with Buddhism, that wanton destruction of human and animal life is evil. Others of its stand- ards it has borrowed wholesale from Confucianism. The most popular classic of Taoist religion is perhaps Tai-hang Kan-ging P'ien, commonly translated as The Book of Rewards and Punishments, in which the virtues of filial piety and chastity arc extolled and the pun- ishments for impiety and adultery on the part of women are gravely set forth. (In latter- day China, when the spirit of Confucianism had been rigidly codified, chastity was erected into a cardinal virtue for women, though no such idea was emphasized by Confucius. Inci- dentally, the discredit into which Confucianism has fallen is partly due to the discrimina- tory treatment of women in Chinese society.) 280 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Historic Perspedive In short, Taoism maintained its vitality by assimilating animistic beliefs on the one hand and current ethical standards on the other. It fed the popular appetite for gods and spirits, and, at. the same time, offered people a perverted version of Buddhism and Confu- cianism. Taoist religion is undoubtedly, (rein some points of view, a "low-grade" religion; but one must not overlook the numerous ways in which it satisfied the material and spirit- ual needs of the Chinese people. When Western science and medicine were introduced into China they brought with them a new kind of magic, far more potent than Taoist spells and charms. The old animistic view of the world is, in consequence, dying out among the Chi- rese, and the Taoist religion is dying out with it. nunoutsst The rise of the Taoist religion and the resurgence of Taoist philosophy in the period of Wei and Chin had as its background the introduction into China of Buddhism. According to tradition, the Emperor Ming (s.o. 58-75) of the Eastern Han dynasty dreamed a dream of a new god in the West, and sent messengers to the West to seek the new religion. When they returned in A.D. 67, they brought back with them a Buddhist native of Central India by the name of Ka.shiapmadanga, and the literature of Buddhism. The story is apocryphal and, in any case, wrong about the date, since China's first contact with Buddhism must. have occurred well before 67. In any case, the translation of the I3uddliist sutras into Chi- nese was under way very soon after the first. contact., and Indian Buddhists did indeed come to China to help Chinese scholars understand and live the new faith. Buddhism's success in China is not easy to explain, since it was uncongenial to both traditional Chinese thought and traditional Chinese sensibility. It possesses, moreover, a comprehensive metaphysical structure, and is thus hard to communicate to the uniniti- ated. Readers of Western philosophy find the thought structure behind Confucianism and Taoism fairly simple; not so the various systems of Buddhist metaphysics. The "Creel Vehicle": Malmyana Buddhirn - The survey of Buddhism in China can begin by setting forth, in simple, untechuical terms, the gist of Mahayana Buddhism, the so-called "great vehicle" Buddhist branch that soread over China, Koren, and Japan. By comparison with Christianity, Buddhism is radical in outlook, which is to say that it. carries the fundamental Christian teachings about charity on out to their extreme logi- cal implications: one must. do hurt to no sentient. being, human, animal, or insect. God, according to Christian teaching, created man; man fell, and since his fall he requires the intercession of Christ in order to be saved. But Heaven and Earth will one day pans away. Cod will annihilate His own work and sit in final judgment, according justice to the quick and the dead. It is all very definite, and projected in time, with a beginning and an end. Buddhism, by contrast, puts little emphasis on God the Creator: its world is, so to speak, almost without a beginning and without. an end, and its time and space are conceived, by the Indians especially, in terms of infinity. The Christian religion tends to be anthropo- centric, and posits only one Incarnation of God on earth; in the Buddhist scheme there is a Cants= Buddha, the Savior, but millions of Buddhas ars possible, not merely theoreti- cally but in the actual unfolding of history, each with Buddha's enlightenment, and his love for and transcendency of the world of suffering. Though the Christian idea of charity is all-embracing, it primarily centers upon the world of man, as far as daily behavior is con- cerned. Exploitation of nature and other sentient beings to accommodate man's needs is taken as a matter of course, and is certainly not looked upon as evil; God gave Adam per- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: STAT _of Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 mission to exploit nature in the satisfaction of his needsIn Buddhism man must, to the i best of his ability, refrain from harming not only other, men but other sentient beings as well. The ideal for man is the total cessation of biological activity and complete absorp- tion in spiritual development: the development of Buddhahood. For the Buddhist, all bio- logical aetivity put forth in the struggle for existence is evil. In order to perpetuate the species, man and inscct alike are, no doubt, biologirally ^ompelled to eat, to kill, and to procreate. But the Buddhist views the whole process of proacation and destruction as an endless cyclical movement in time snil space, evil and illusory from the standpoint of ulti- mate reality; the first tank man must peiform in order to be saved is to see through, and detach himself from, this iUusory world. Given his higher organic endowment and develop- ment, man is not, like other sentient beings, bound to the einlIts round of birth, copula- tion, and death. Ile is capable of forming other modes of attachment, and the Buddhist is called upon to emancipate himself from all biological tmd emotional commitments: anger, sorrow, lust, craving of any kind. The second task is tc be pitiful toward all sentient, beings who are still blindly whirling around the wheel of Birth and Death. Buddhist Compassion is, therefore, more comprehensive than Christian Charity: it feels sorry for the very law and mechanism of existence. How then is the Buddhist to act and what is ho to do? It is evidently impossible for a man to refrain from all biological activity and still remain alive, and most Buddhists do com- promise: for most the way becomes a matter of taking only vegetarian food, and dedicat- ing one's self to one's own enlightenment and to the enlightenment of others; for others, it becomes a matter of leading a celibate life. By enlightenment is meant liberation through the knowledge that. the world of time and craving is an illusion, and that only as a man detaches himself from the world of time and craving can he realize his Buddhahood and come in contact with reality. The Hinayana Buddhism (the "small vehicle") originally taught the doctrine of indi- vidual salvation alone. Mahayana Buddhism differs from it in making it incumbent upon any individual who wants to realize his Buddhahood to save other beings as well. Definitions of Terms A few definitions of Buddhist terms are in order here. The total inheritance of man on the unenlightened biological and human level is Karma: whatever an individual thinks, speaks, and does, is part of his Karma. Buddhism assumes the transmigration of souls from one form of life to another, so that Karma does not terminate with the dissolution of the body. Rather, man inherits the Karma of his past lives: it conditions his present life, and the merits or &meets of his present, life will further condition the welfare of his soul in future existences. The idea of Karma is sometimes given a more worldly interpretation, so that it smacks of the notion of retribution; if a man is living a happy life it is on account of the accumulated merit of his past lives. In the strict Buddhist scheme, however, good and bad, fortune and misfortune, are irrelevant- the man who is not enlightened is still on the &unsure, the Wheel of Birth and, and is not free from the burden of Karma. An individual soul may go through transmigration after transmigration, accumulating his Karma, and still remain on the rack of Samara. The only hope of escape from Karma lies in replacing Ignorance, Avidyn, with Enlight- enment, which in Sanskrit is called Bodhi But every man, according to Buddhist teaching, has in him a. spark of Bodhi, so that the Buddhist religion is really less pessimistic than it is likely to seem at. first glance. The person who attains the state of Bodhi is called Buddha. Buddha lives in a state of Nirvana, which is to bay that he has completely extinguished his individuality and 4 1 ss, ?\? sat' a ? %rat; ? Iv ? "a?,- I ? %:i..Sr)4.42.;-'2E;.-:It!!'????? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? -;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 291 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 immersed his mind in Reality, or Cod. Historically, the Buddha was Ceuta= Sakyarnuni, who founded Buddhism in the sixth century n.e. (Per an account of his life, the poem The Light of Agin, by the Victorian poet Sir Edwin Arnold, is recommended.) Cautama, how- vcr, does not occupy the central position in Chinese Buddhism, for the principal object of contemplation and prayer in China is Amitahha, Buddha of the Western Paradise. \ Those who strive after Bodhi but have not yet attained Nirvana aro called Bodhis- attva. The most popular Bodhisattvas in China arc Kuan-yin, the Cod(tem of Mercy (whose position is similar to that of the Virgin Mary in the Catholic Church); Wtn-shu, the Lord of Wisdom; and Ti-tsang, who saves suffering spirits from hell. It is generally held that. these Bodhisallvas deliberately forego the bliss of Nirvana and stay in the Cycle of Trans- migration in order to save the sentient beings in this world. On a still lower stage toward Enlightenment are the Lohang. Despite the fact that Buddhism has a vast pantheon of superhuman beings that gives it the appearance of a polytheistic religion, Buddhist teaching actually assigns to the Bodhisattva a position comparable to that of the angels in Christianity, and to the Buddhas a position comparable to that of Christ; they are gods only by metaphorical extension or as presented in popular picture or popular fiction. On the other hand, Buddhism has no central figure comparable to the Christians' Cod, for the ultimate reality in Buddhism is impersonal. If everybody were to embrace Buddhism and fully practice its teachings, mankind would become extinct within a very few decades. To people brought up on the ethical and political wisdom of Confucius-- e.g., the duty to perpetuate the family, to practice filial piety the ideals of Buddhism (the sanctity of animal life, transmigration, the law of Karma, the value of asceticism) must have seemed very strange indeed. Nevertheless, Buddhism ,grew steadily in power and popularity and competed successfully with Con- fucianism soon after its introduction, from which one concludes that it must have appealed to deep spiritual needs of the Chinese people. In some areas it spread with astonishing rapidity: the nihilistic intellectual atmosphere of the post-Ilan period, for example, seems to have been highly congenial to its expansion; under the southern dynasties, also, the Chi- nese people seem to have found in Buddhism an escape from the stresses and strains of con- stant warfare and a source of spiritual consolation. Moreover, the barbaric tribes that entered North China at that time, perhaps because they had not been formed in a Con- fucian environment, eagerly took to Buddhism. Impact on China The impact of Buddhism upon China from the flan to the T'ang dynasty can conven- iently be divided under three headings: cultural, social, and political Culturally, this period was one of intensified exchange and mutual exploration between China and India. Eminent Buddhist monks came from India to translate the sutras and tench the Chinese: two of the most notable of these were the great translator Kumarajiva, who was in China from .101 to 113; and Bodliiilharma, the seventy-eighth patriarch after Buddha in India and the first on Chinese soil, who came to China around the year 527 (during the reign of Liang Wu Ti). Pilgrims also went from China to India, e.g., Fa lisien (603 to 661), lisOan Tsang (602 to 661), and I-ching (635 to 713), all of whom made the perilous journey over deserts and mountains to visit sanctuaries, to study, and to bring back sacred books in Sanskrit which they and other monks, Indian and Chinese, translated into Chinese. The introduction of Buddhism bad important results from a social point of view. Despite steady opposition from the Confucianists, Buddhism won over a large section of the Chinese population, many of whom adopted a way of Itfe hitherto unknown in China. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 They forsook the world and became monks and norm Like an epidemic, the Buddhist sum- mons to put by mundane pursuits struck king and peasant alike. The pious Liang Wu 'II abdicated his throne to devote himself to religion, and by doing so brought about the down- fall of his capital at Nanking and his dynasty. Large numbers of Buddhist, temples and pagodas arose, and gave a new impetus to such arts as architecture and sculpture. Most converts, of course, did not comprehend Buddhism in its philosophical aspect; they were attracted to it as a scheme of salvation and renunciation, to which the popular imagination reacted by visualizing Heaven and Hell in the most graphic terms conceivable, so that, the latter's horrors became a vivid reality to most people. This also tended to encourage asceti- cism and, along with it, personal sacrifice and disfiguration, e.g. the burning of a finger or a limb. Every monk and nun, before being confirmed, had to have marks branded on his or her shaved head. Buddhism naturally aroused opposition among those who wished to pinery? Chinese culture and the integrity of the Chinese nation. Among the Confucianists, Han Ye, the great Tang prose writer and poet, was an especially ardent opponent. lie argued the merit of the new movement on two levels, the philosophical and the sociological. Philosophically, he condemned Buddhism because of its heterodoxy vis-a-vis Confucianism, from which standpoint it was, he alleged, worse even than the philosophies of Yang Chu and Mo Ta because of the perversity of its attitude toward life. On the sociologiccl level, he insisted that the state can thrive only on the well-being of society as a whole, the family, and the individual, and that. if a large number of people were to renounce their duties toward (loci- ety and the family, as Buddhism bide them to do, the nation would have neither the resources nor the manpower to defend itself against foreign aggression and, ultimately, foreign conquest. In short, a government can survive only if its people are committed to a "this-worldly" philosophy. Opposilian The Taoists, by contrast with the Confucianists, did not. oppose Buddhism on the level of atgument and polemic. But they were keenly aware of the rivalry of Buddhism, and aought constantly to undermine its influence and power. Anyone acquainted with seventeenth century European history will necessarily find himself asking why the Confucianists did not take up arms against the Buddhists, as the Roundheads fought against the Royalists ? why, in other words, Chinese history at this juncture does not turn into a chronicle of religious wars. One reason is that, the religious wars in Europe were, on one side, economic struggles between different nations or different social strata within a nation. In England, for example, the triumph of Puritanism was also the triumph of middleclass business men over the aristocratic gentry. But in China tho lines between religious groups never coincided to any great extent with those between eco- nomic interests; Beildbist monks and Confucian officials differed sharply about religion and philosophy, but did so as men drawn (rem the same class of people. The fact that there were no religious wars in China does not mean that all was peace between the competing religions, for this would ignore the series of persecutions suffered by Buddhism, i.e. the series of situations in which a reigning king or Emperor, whether out of deep conviction or out of whim, either persecuted or patronized the Buddhist religion. The persecutors, AS one might expect, were usually abetted by Confucian or Taoist coun- sellors. The Buddhist monks speak to this day of the four great persecutions under the reigns of "three Wu and one '['sung": 1"ai-wu Ti of the Wei dynasty in 446, Wu Ti of the Northern Chou dynasty in 574, Wu Taxing of the T'ang dynasty in 845, and Shih Tsung of the Lino dynasty in 955, each of whom carried out a large-scale persecution of Buddhist believers. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: ;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 298 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 The Buddhist truppresscion campaign assumed its most terrible proportions under T'ang Wu 'rsung, when 4,600 large monasteries and more than 40,000 small ones were destroyed, upwards of 260,000 monks and nuns forced to return to lay life, and millions of acres of monastic land property confiscated. The effect of this repression was to break the back of Buddhist fanaticism but not, of the Buddhist religion, which had already become a pat t of the national heritage and continued, without interruption, to play an important ethical and esthetic role in Chinese life. In any mise, a free market in ideas cannot possibly be said to have determined the result of the competit,:on between Confucianism and Bud- dhism, because at the crucial moment the former used force and legal coercion. As of 1949, when the Communists took over in China, the male population tended to be Confucianist in outlook, while the female population tended to seek sustenance and co:mutation in Buddhism, which permitted their emotional nature, represss-d under the strict Confucian code of family life, to express itself in prayer, pilgrimage, and religious observance. Thus the stability of Chinese family and social life was maintained in part. through a family-to- family blending of the practical outlook of Confucianism with the retiring spiritual outlook of Buddhism. Brief Surrey of Historical Growth It would be beyond the scope of this study to trace the development of Buddhist philosophical thought in China in any great detail, for it has passed through many stages. During the first two centuries after Buddhism was introduced into China, the interest of its philosophers centered around a comparative study of the basic concepts of Taoism and Buddhism. The Buddhist concept Sunyata, which was rendered into Chinese as "K'ung," (emptiness, nothingness) early came to be equated with the Taoist idea of Wu. The great labor of translation carried out by Kumarajiva and his disciples made more Buddhist texts available in Chinese, one of them being the Saddharnia Punctarika Sidra, known in Chinese as the Lotus Sutra, upon which the Chinese Buddhist scholar 11tii-ss4 concentrated his effort. In the sixth century, the monk Chill-k'ai (522-597) made this Sutra the basis of a new school known as the T'ien T'ai School (nen T'ai was the name of the mountain atop which Chili-k'ai lived and taught). The metaphysical burden of the Lotus Sutra is to be found in the doctrine that phenomena themselves aro real although as they are perceived by the mind they are unreal. To put it more precisely, phenomena are real in the sense that reality manifests itself in them. The Buddhist, terminology is more complicated than that, but we have hero a good illustration of the extent to which Buddhist philosophy concentrated on metaphysics and epistemology, two branches of philosophy that hitherto had received little attention from Chinese philosophers. The T'ien T'ai School WM popu- lar up to the T'ang dynasty, but after that went into decline. In the T'ang dynasty, the famous pilgrim, IIstlan Tsang, was tho primary agent in the formation of another school of Buddhism. Ile revised and translated no less than seventy- five Buddhist works, the most notable of which was the Meng Wei-shih Lim, upon which the new movement, the Wei-shih or Only-Consciousness School, was to be based. It teaches that. all objects in the Universe are merely the manifestations of conscinusne-ss, a view very close to what the West calls Subjective Idealism. The school waned in popularity soon after the ninth century. Another highly metaphysical Buddhist philosophical tendency was that of the This-yen School, which claimed to preach the higher and more complete doctrine of Buddha. Its founders were Tii Fa-shun (557-610) and Fa-tsAng, and its basic text the Buddhaoalantsaka ntaha Voipuya Sutra, known in China as the flue Yen Sutra. 294 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? These schools, dealing with the interrelations between appearance and reality, attracted only seholara; their doctrines could not possibly have been communicated to the =saes. All the schools mentioned waned after the eighth or ninth century because they failed to provide ritual and religious formulae to accommodate tho simpler faith of the Buddhist layman, and because the Chinese mind, not being strong in abstruse speculation, soon wearies of it. The most. popular and enduring form of Buddhism in China has, therefore, been the Pure Land School, which because of the simplicity of its doctrine and its emphasis on salvation, gives even the illiterate something to lean on. The most typically Chinese form of Buddhism among intellectuals, similarly, has been Ch'anism, which reduces the apprehension of reality to a simple technique of contemplation. (Other nonspeculative schools worth mentioning are the Lu School, which believes in salvation through actions, and the Mi or Esoteric School, which puts great emphasis on magical formulae or on what is keown as Chtng Yea, i.e., true words. The latter survives now in Tibet as Lamaism.) The Pure Land School The Pure Land School, more than any other school, he.3 emphasized salvation through faith. It has had a long history. One of the first Buddhist texts to be translated into Chi- nese was the Mahayana Sraddatpadn, by the great expounder of Mahayana Buddhism, Asva- gliosa. The Chinese title is Ch'i Hein Lun, The Awakening of Faith. This book, which taught that. through faith in Arnitabha Buddha one could obtain salvation, greatly influ- enced the formation of the "Pure Land" School. The real founder of the school was Hui- yuan (333-116), a former Taoist philosopher who had abandoned Taoism because Buddhism seemed to him to penetrate more deeply into the nature of Tao. The basic texts of the school were three: the larger Sukhavati Vyuha Sutra (Wu-liang-shou Chin); the smaller Sukhaoati Vyuha Sutra (0-mi-Co thing); and the Antita Yurdhyana Sutra (Kuan-wu-liang- chou Ching). In the larger Sukhavaii Vyuha Sutra we learn that Amitahlia, before attain- ing Buddhahood, took 48 vows, one of which stipulated that he would not become a Buddha unless it was possible for all sentient beings except those who had committed a heinous sin to be reborn into his Buddhaland immediately after death. However, these sentient beings had to meet two conditions: they had to desire to be thus reborn, and they had to have turned to him in faith by reciting his Buddha name as many as ten times before death. Arnitabha's Buddhaland is the Pure Land, or the Western Paradise, not identical with iVireona because one still has to strive towards Buddhahood in the Pure Land, although, since here there is neither desire nor (listraction, one's attainment of Buddhahood is assured. The Pure Land School holds out to every believing man or woman the assurance of ultimate salvation In this regard, it is similar to Christianity; it cuts Buddhism loose from the deep-seated pessimism of the doctrine of Karma, which dooms most sentient beings to one earthly existence after another without hope of salvation It substitutes for salvation through enlightenment an easier, more certain salvation through faith in Amitahba. The words that are most constantly on the lips of Chinese Buddhists are "Nan-mo which mean "turning in faith to Amitahba." Most Chinese women, even illiterate ones, can recite a few short sutras from memory, e.g. the Diamond Sutra or the Wisdom Sutra; but as they count their beads in their devotions they merely mumble the words "Nan-mo 0-mi-Co-fu." Pure Land Buddhism further attenuates the rigor of other Buddhist doc- trines by providing for worship of Kuan Yin, the Goddess of Mercy, who is always ready to listen to the supplications of the faithful. She is the special favorite of Chinese women who turn to her for favors of all kinds. They ask her, for example, to relieve their pains during childbirth, or, even after long years of unfruitful marriage, to grant them a son. 235 STAT )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 v The Pure Land School eliminates the necessity for salvation through enlightenment just as the Taoist religion deemphasizes enlightenmest through Tao. Given a vast and illiterate population, religion must stoop if it is to succeed. The Buddhist believsr of the Pure Land School reads his prayers tind sutras, goes on pilgrimages, gives offerings to the poor, contributes to the temples, and limits himself to a vegetarian diet during stipulated periods each year. Ile observes those parts of Buddhist teaching that reinforce the paci- fist tendency in Chinese character; e.g., he holds the professions of killing (soldiery, butch- ery) in the lowest esteem. Ile is amenable to certain sanctions (the graphically imagined Hell mentioned above) that check any impulse he has, to evil. Ma Buddhism is linked up with the practice of ancestor worship, which gives him a further incentive to do good and so ensure the welfare of his family. If his motives for doing good are not always unselfish, his Buddhism does tench him to feel cempassion for all sentient beings and to resist sen- sual temptations, and reinforces these lessons with an admixture of the Taoist love of nature and the Confucian ethical ideals, all of which give a certain sanity to his outlook on life. Ch'anism Clean/am, the distinctively Chinese form of philosophical Buddhism, reduces the problem of enlightenment to a simple technique. Its success represents a triumph of the practical Chinese mind over the love for logical and metaphysical minutiae that is charac- teristic of the Indian mind. Enlightenment, in the Buddhist sense, is first and foremost a matter of "knowing" reality. The Chinese mind soon recognized that if the purpose is to achieve the mystical experience of reality, then philosophical studies that are primarily aids to understanding are superfluous. Ch'anist Buddhism, in accordance with this recog- nition, focuses attention on meditation, to the exclusion of metaphysics, deeds, and worship. Its history goes back to a moment very early in the history of Buddhism when certain Chinese monks who had once been Taoists, S6ng-chao and Tao-sh6ng in particular, saw the affinity between the Chinese conception of Tao and the Indian concept of reality. They knew that the perception of reality is radically different from ordinary sensory perceptions? that the external senses register the phenomenal world, and cannot so perceive the reality that is transcendent of, though immanent in, the phenomenal world. One must, they decided, leap over a chasm in order to perceive that reality, and for the man who has not, made the leap, good works and prayers are equally of no avail. What counts, they came to hold, is the mystical experience, the Sudden Enlightenment. Ch'anism is es.sentially a school of mystics. The traditional founder of Ch'anism was Bodliidharma, the great Patriarch. In the seventh century the philosophy split into two schools: the Northern, under Shen-ahui (d. 701), and the more popular Southern school, under Ilin-neng (638 to 713). In the course of the next two centuries two thinkers, Mu Ties (d. 738) and I Mean (d. 860), greatly enhanced its prestige among Chinese intellectuals. Ch'anism was primanly a monastic discipline intended for a very few psychologically and temperamentally equipped individuals in each generation, and unlikely to appeal to any who might find satisfaction in good works, prayer, and ritual. Its following was always drawn, for the most part, from among Chinese intellectuals. The methods of Ch'anist meditation were highly arbitrary and subjective. The final reality it held, cannot be ver- bally rendered, and there was, in consequence, little Ch'anist literature to which the unin- itiated might turn for help. Its tradition was always maintained, rather, through personal contact between master and disciple. Part of its purpose was to encourage spontaneity and suspension from the self. If one deliberately wills to reach Buddhahood, it contended, the very act will prove an impediment. to understanding; and it. ridiculed and discouraged 296 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Iundenstanding through intellett as well. It , novice asked his master what reality is, the latter not infrequently gave him a box on the ear, or shouted deafeningly at him, cr gave him some trivial, completely irrelevant answer ? on the theory this would induce in him an awareness of the futility of the rationalist approach. Unless and until he intuitively grasped the meaning of reality, he was likely to remain on the brink of despair, A meditative tech- nique called yoga was Ch'anism's chief means to Sudden Enlightenment. The yogi often sat for hours at. a stretch, year in and year out, contemplating his nose or his navel; by this process, according to Ch'nnism, he might reach the state of detachment that is necessary for salvation. Ch'anism was highly popular from the eighth to eleventh century, and even today meditation is an important exercise in the daffy life of the Chinese monks. The place of Cleanism in Buddhism was like that of monastic asceticism in ansr reli- gion ? it set an example of the contemplative life for men and women engaged in mundane affairs. Unlike the Christian monastic orders, it, was entirely devoid of charitable interests, and made no attempt at integration with everyday practical life through the contempla- tion of suffering or through prayer for the redemption of the world. Thus many Confucian schalars who by the time cf the Sung dynasty were dawn to Ch'anism and found its tech- nique of meditation useful, also regarded it, as inadequate because of its lack of concern with ordinary human life. As time passed, therefore, some of them fused Confucianism with the metaphysical basis of Ch'aniern, and sought to use the latter's knowledge of reality to fur- ther the political and ethical ideals of Confucius. The result of this fusion was known as neo-Confucianiam. NEO-CONFUCIANIBM Neo-Confucianism is a loose term used to refer to the development of Confucianism from the Sung dynasty to the Mi'ng dynasty. Like Ch'Imism, it was primarily philosophy rather than religion; it, emphasized the cultivation of the individual and neglected the ritu- alistic and formal elements in Confucianism. It represented a violent swing away from Han Confucianism, which emphasized form and ritual and had the status of a religion. It was Confucianism with deeper roots in metaphysics but still essentially this-worldly in outlook. To judge by the Anakris, Confucius was not much of a metaphysician. His defini- tion of knowledge was empirical: "To say that you know a thing when you know it, and to say that you do not know it when you really do not know it ? that is knowledge." The modern philosopher with some training in epistemology will promptly ask what. is meant by "knowing" and "not knowing" a thing. Is it mere registration of the sensory qualities and characteristics of a thing, or does it involve understanding the nature or essence of the thing? Does the object of knowledge exist solely ia the mind, or is it independent of any knowing mind? The neo-Confucianists were ready with answers to this kind of question, because they had been at great pains to replace the crude cosmology of Confucianism with a more adequate metaphysics. Taoism and Buddhism flourished mainly under the T'ang dynasty, when the vigor of Confucianism was in eclipse. Only when Confucianism's tradition had fallen into decay was it affirmed and defended as an orthodoxy. han YO, mentioned earlier for his attack on Buddhism, was a firm supporter of orthodoxy, and in his significant essay on the origin and nature of Too, he developed the idea that. the line by which Tao was transmitted went from the sage-kings to the founders of the Chou dynasty to Confucius. "Confucius trans- mitted it to Mencius. After Mencius, it, was no longer transmitted. Men (Tail) and Yang (Hsung) In Han Confucianist] selected from it, hut without reaching the essential position; they discussed it, but without sufficient clarity." Han Yil's ambition was to reaffirm the Confucian orthodoxy in an effective manner. Actual ..accomplishment of that ambition was, however, to await the Sung philosophers. leclasslied in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release k-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 207 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Because Han Ye had reappropriated the term Tao, the early neo-Confucianists were called the School of Tao Hsieh (the study of Tao). This remarkable group included Chou Tun-i (1017-73),Shao Yung (1011-77), Chang Tsai (1020-77), and the brothers Ch'eag Hao (1032 1036) and Clang 1(1033-1107). (It is interesting to note that they continued to use the terminology of the Taoist and Yin-yang School, but avoided Buddhist terms.) Their cosmology, in general, reaffirmed the Confucianist-Yin-yang tradition, but discarded its fanciful elaborations. They called the principle of reality, Tao, or the Great Ultimate, and ineisted, in violent opposition to the Cies...ass conception of the void, on the purposiveness of the universe. The Ch'eng brothers were responsible for the split of neo-Confucianism into two schools: the School of Reason (Li Hstieh) and the School of Mind (Hsin 'Web). Chu Hsi (1127-1200), following in the footsteps of Chlng I, interpreted the universe in terms of li (reason, this being a separate character from li, rituals); his contemporary Lu Sliang-shan and the Ming philosopher Wang Yang-ming (1472-1523), following in the footsteps of Hao, maintained the idealistic position that reality is Mind. The School of Reason and Chu Hai Chu Hai was the greatest of the nco-Confucianists; his position in the history of Con- fucianism is not unlike that of Thomas Aquinas in the history of Catholic Christianity. Part of his lasting contribution to Confucianism is his standard commentary on the Four Books, which is a sort of Summa. From Chu IIsi's time forward, the Four Books together with their commentaries were committed to memory by every school boy who aspired to pass the state examinations. The Confucian canon was huge and miscellaneous. Some of the pro-Confucian classics and post-Confucian forgeries actually had little bearing on Con- fucianism as a philosophy. Chu Hsi wisely picked as his four books the Ana/cc/3, the Men- cius, the Great Learning, and the "Book of the Mean" (two chapters from Li Chi, a book supposcd1/ written by Confucius' grandson TzA Ssti) and put them forward as the basic texts of Confucian teaching. The five classics have offered scholars a more fertile field for research, but to this day, the Four Books have a higher moral authority. And Chu Hsi's commentaries, from the standpoint of lucidity of definition, are an unparalleled achievement of Chinese philosophy. The basic metaphysical terms used by Chu Hsi are Ii (reason, law) and ch'i (spirit). These, he assumes, are the essence and at the same time the dynamics of the universe. Everything has its Ii, the reason or law that makes it what it is; its behavior, however, is partly determined by its eh's, its vital spirit. Li is the eternal principle inherent in it; ch'i gives it shape, motion, and direction The li of man is approximately what we have called above hsin, his essential human nature which is stable and eternal, and comes to much the same thing as the Confucian its. Through the operation of ch'i, hsin manifests itself in ching (feelings, emotions) and OA (desires), and according to neo-Confucianist theory (based on the doctrine of the Mean) the ch'i, unless it is in harmony with hsin, tends to obscure it The cultivation of self consists in learning to order one's emotions and feelings in closer accord with hsin; in this area the neo-Confucianists borrow much from Chianism. They tend, for example, to equate yaeh with evil, especially with selfish desire (ssu-yach). However, cultivation of the self with a view to reaching an understanding of ii and, in con- sequence of that understanding, eliminating Eelfish desires, is not for the neo-Confucians, as for the Chian monks, the ultimate end in life. Rather, it is a first step: it trains a man to take his part in the socio-political world. This is the essential difference between neo-Con- fucianism and Ch'anism. 298 )eclass fied in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/04/0-3 : A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 `?-? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 it The Great Learning The cornerstone of Chu II6's philosophy is the opening section in The Great Learning: The tesching of the Great learning is to manifest one's illustrious virtue, love the people, and satin the highest good. . The ancients who wished to manifest illustrious virtue throughout the world, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their own states, the; first regulated their own fem. dies. Wishing to regulate their own families, they first cultivated their own selves. Wishing to rectify their own solves, they first rectified their own minds. Wishing to rectify their own minds, they first sought for absolute sincerity in their thoughts. Wishing for absolute sincerity in their thoughts, they first extended their knowledge. This extension of knowledge rensists in the investigation of things. Things being investigated, only then did their knowledge become extended. Their knowledge being extended, only then did their thought become sincere Their thought being sincere, only then did their mind become rectified. Their mind being rectified, only then did their selves become cultivated. Their selves being cultivated, only then did their families become regulated. Their /milks being .egulated, only then did their States become rightly governed Their states being rightly governed, only then could the world be at peace. This progression from the well-ordered state to tho investigation of things of the world and back may seem curious, but the basic assumption throughout is merely that the "illus- trious virtue" can be manifested in every concrete relationship of human life. It is the Con- fucian criticism of Ch'anism that contemplation of reality by itself is not enough: one's actions should indeed be grounded in reality, but it is of the first unportance that one devote the knowledge emanating from that reality to the ordering of the world, and bees in mind that, the world includes many levels of human relations. To translate this into neo-Con- fucian terms, the "illustrious virtue" is the U. There is the U of man as well as the ii of family and state. The Ch'an technique places emphasis on the manifestation of U on the individual level: the Confucian ideal holds that U must be manifested in the more complex human relations as well. The hierarchy of objectives outlined in The Great Learning is: the investigation of things; the extension of knowledge; sincerity of thought; rectification of the mind; cultiva- tion of the self; regulation of families; ordering of the state; the peace of the world. It, is clear that achievement of the Confucian world order calls for an immense effort, since the welfare of the state depends on the welfare of every individual aud family in it, arid world peace an the proper ordering of each and every state. One readily grasps the importance of the rectification of the mind and cultivation of the self, and how they fit into the scheme of objectives. What still perplexes scholars is the initial stage, that of investigating things. The original Chinese phrase, Ko We, is rather ambiguous. The safest p,uess is that to the neo-Confucians it meant primarily the investigation of ii in things, animals, and plants in order to supplement the knowledge of li in the conduct of human affairs. They would, moreover, probably have meant by it intui- tive rather than scientific investigation Ever since flu Sliih's undies in Chinese philoso- phy, however, the phrase has been construed us meaning the scientific investigation of things. For, according to flu Shih, it was only the lack of the necessary equipment and methodology that kept science from developing in China as a § result. of the neo-Con- fucian emphasis on Ko-Wu. Chu fisi did make some shrewd observations on fossil formation, but his emphasis is clearly moralistic r.nd humanistic rather than scientific. "In every human mind," he wrote, "there is the kilos% log faculty; and in everything, there is its reason. The incompleteness of our knowledge is due to our insufficiency in investigating the reason of things. The stu- dent must go to all things under heaven, beginning with the known principles, and seeking to reach the uttermost. After sufficient labor has been devoted to it, the day will come when all things will suddenly become elm and intelligible." This statement would evidently 299 STAT 11111 - eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release -RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 201-4/04/03 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 cover such laws as the law of gravitation, but the preoccupation is the poet's rather than scientist's. What is beyond dispute is that scientific investigation, as one understands it today, did not make much headway among the neo-Confueinns. The attribute of li in man does not adequately account for his multiple desires and impulses, and neo-Confecianism does not take the position that the passions are illindons. It seeks rather a state of affairs within the individual where the emotions are !subordinate to, and thus regulated by, reason. This results from self-cultivation, and from purification of tbe mind and will, which the neo-Confucia, at felt required, above all, clang (reverence) and chtng (sincerity), which they believed capable of checking the aggressive, libidinous instincts in man. The School of Mind The problem of self-cultivation and the philosophical inquiry into the nature of man absorbed all the energies of the neo-Confueisnists. Although they professed to be concerned about the well-being of the state and society, their actual thought was about the individual, not about broader social groupings. When the great Confucian, Wang An-shih (1021-1080) attempted to bring about a radical reform of the Sung government, he won no support from individuals, and some of them attacked him vehemently. From a doctrinal point of view, this is perhaps less surp-ising than it looks; a possible inference from their general position is that these individuals ioit that any reforms not resulting from rectification of human relations would be short-lived and so, in the long run, futile. In short, the nee-Confucianists failed to provide any real grounds for participation in practical political activity. They had none of the Taoist or Legalist cynicism which strongly limits the capacity for moral improvement in must, men, so that individual effort, without supplementary effort by responsible men at the helm of government, cannot be counted on to produce the desired rectification of human relations. The neo-Confucianists, to put it a little differently, placed too great stress on self-cultivation to the neglect of family and state. Despite the nobility of their avowed intentions, they produced no convincing evi- dence that their teachings could bring about the peace of the world. The reversion to Cleanism and the exclusive preoccupation with the self is even more apparent in the School of Mind, led by Lu Chiu-yuan and Wang Yang-ming. For Chu Hsi, reality is independent of the mind; for Lu and Wang, the mind and the universe are syn- onymous. The School of Reason holds that since the mind is the impure embodiment of both ii and chl, it is capable of error, and can be kept in conformity with ii only through discipline. For the School of 'Mind, discipline is beside the point, since the mind is the solo percipient of reality, and it is both the arbiter of conduct and the instrument of knowledge. The School of Mind is characterized by a strong.t.endency to equate virtue with knowl- edge. Like certain Protestant sects, it dispenses with external authority and emphasizes "the Inner Light." Lu Chiu-yuan strikes this note when he says, "If in learning one gains a comprehension of what is fundamental, then the Six Classics become one's footnotes." Any theory that gives intuitive knowledge a place of cardind importance is open to the criticism that it. makes things too simple, and does not adequately account for the fact of evil in man and in the universe. The favorite simile for evil, with the Ch'anists and the School of Mind of neo-Confucianism, is the stains on the mirror. For both, the eight proc- esses of education outlined in The Great Learning become in fact one process: the removal of stains on the mirror of original illustrious virtue. Wang Yang-ming says: The mind of man is 'Heaven. There is nothing that is not included in the mind of man. All of us are this single Heaven, but because of the ohseurings caused by rdfiehneas, the original state of heaven :s not made manifest. Every time we extend our intuitive knowledge, we dear away the obscuring; and when all of them are cleared away, our original nature is restored, and we again become part of this heaven. The intuitive knowledge of the whole is the intuitive knowledge of the part. Everything is the single whole." SOO :te ? _ . STAT " )eclassified in Part - Sanitized C A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4opy F;;;;; 4, Approved for 50 -Yr 20 04 03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ^ In such radical simplicity lies the great defect of Wang Yang-ming's philosophy. The Christian and Buddhist ethics, which recognise ignorance and the inclination to evil 53 fundamental in the makeup of the human being, are undoubtedly closer to the facts on this point. Wang Yang-ming's philosophy, however, does supply a ground for action. A person, it holds, should abide by his intuitive knowledge of the good, and act accordingly. The failure to apply intuitive knowledge in everyday dealings is a failure of courage, and means ultimately the atrophy of the Heaven-nature in man. But it am Japan, not China, that benefited most from this emphasis on the unity of thought and action, for such philosoph- ical exiles from China as Chu Sh6n-chili made the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming popular in Japan at an early date. Reaction Against Areo-Confucianists By the end of the Ming dynasty, a reaction set in against neo-Confucianism. The new- style thinkers, notably Ku Yen-wu (16)3-1682), turned their backs on speculation in favor of rigorous scholarship and a philosophy that paid more attention than earlier- Chinese philosophies to empirically observed fact. The conditions at the end of the Ming dynasty, with its corruption and military weakness, seemed to them to demonstrate the futility of self-cultivation when it is not integrated with practical politics. AS great, Confucian schol- ars, they felt that the neo-Confucianista had construed the classics in line with their own moral ideas, and in doing so had both distorted Confucian ideas and done scant justice to the historical context in which they had emerged. In short, they rebelled both against the allegedly bad scholarship and against the individual perfectionism of nco-Confucianism. Their rebellion against the first produced three hundred years of distinguished Ch'ing scholarship; against the second it, produced a courageous effort to integrate moral ideas into the realm of practical affairs. The path of sincerity and reverence, they held, should not lead to a moral vacuum, nor should progress along it be achieved at the expense of human desires and emotions. Typical of this trend of thought was the Ch'ing philosopher Tai Chtn (1724-1777), who took sharp isaue with Chu distinction between Ii reason) and ch'i (spirit or emo- tion). In Tai ChO's opinion, cannot be inferior to Ii, since it is only in the operation of the vital force of desire and emotion that reason can be made manifest. "Man and crea- tures all have desires, and desires are the function of their nature. Men and creatures all have feelings, and feelings are the operations of their nature." Since feelings are inborn, they should not be violated. Thus Tai Chtn reasserted the wholeness of the human being, and held that reason and desire should be a single organic whole. Similarly, he proclaimed the necessity of supplementing intuitive knowledge by the empirical study of facts. Tai stresses practical applications, as does his fellow philosopher Yen Yuan Even so, Tai ClOn signally failed to integrate his philosophy with the issues of his times. Chinese philosophy never did live up to the brilliant promise of the pre-Ch'in era. The later philosophers reerc:ly elaborated on earlier insights, without really making any attempt to achieve a net philosophical advance over their predecessors. Except for those in the Buddhist tradition, with its more.elaborate metaphysics, most later Chinese philosophers were thus completely overshadowed by Confucius, Mencius, iisiin Tz6, 'N6, and Chuang Tz6. From Ilan to Sung to Ch'ing, to be sure, Confucianism underwent many changes, but they were changes in sensibility, involving no genuine progress toward greater precision of thought or toward the development of special techniques and vocabularies for particular fields of inquiry. The Chinese have never, for example, developed a system of logic, and even their excursions into the field of epistemology have always been projected on 301 STAT . . , ?f '',"????????,...:1?1....%:;`',?4;????? ...ANNY'l? ? ? ? n eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy -RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 proved for Release Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 a modest scale. The most favorable and generous way of expressing this is to say that the Chinese are interested in philosophy only insofar as it deals concretely with life on both the ethical and the political planes. What Chinese pl?ilosophy has to offer to the world are, in consequenee, a few insights into reality and the application of these insights to the problem of living. The philosophers' task seems to be merely that of comerving these insights from generation to generation. Their role is in the defense and maintenance of orthodoxy in the face of changing situations. The major premises are accepted by all; each philosopher merely reaffirms these old truths with slightly different emphasis. Influence from the West With the influx el new ideas from the West, this kind of traditionalism began to dis- appear, vs may he seen from, for example, K'ang Yu-wei's daring reinterpretation of Con- fucianism. Clearly reflecting Western influences, K'ang Yu-wei treated Confucius as a great revolutionary and reformer, and tried in that way to strengthen his own plea for radi- cal contemporary reform in China, lie did retain one of the old insights, however?that the mission of Confucius' followers is to bring about, in the long run, the great common- wealth of nations on earth. Moreover, he recognized the inferiority of modern ideologies to Confucianism, but recognized also that China must imitate the West if it, were to survive. Later, having failed to achieve his reforms, Wang became a bitter ultraconservative, and became a spokesman fur a Confucian rearguard action against the Western ideologies. With the new ideas came exposure of the abuses and injustices of the social system that had been built and maintained in the name of Confucius, and this tended to bring the Confucian ideals themselves into discredit. Recent important political leaders, like Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, have tried to wed a modern temper of mind to the basic Confucian ideals, but their efforts in this direction have not been successful. Confucianism is no longer a vital force among China's youth. Buddhism and Taoism have fared even worse through the last forty years. Taoism has borne the main brunt of attack on superstition that has resulted from the introduction of Western ideas, and stands discredited in consequence. Buddhism, with its other-worldly teachings, appears to have little appeal for the younger generation, even though there has been a considerable revival of Buddhist studies among Chinese scholars. Under the leader- ship of the Buddhist abbot T'ai-hse, new Buddhist colleges have been founded, and new Buddhist magazines launched In the big cities, there were even, until the Communist take- over, Buddhist broadcasting stations. But this means merely that its hold is still fairly strong on the older generation, especially the women (just as in the United States, women are more faithful churchgoers than men). OTIIF.R RELIGIONS Mohammedanism Two other forms of world religion remain to be fitted into our picture of China: Moham- medanism and Christianity. There are over ten million Moslems in Chinn, some in sepa- rate religious communities, the rest scattered among the cities of China. Mohammedanism first entered China at the time of the Tang dynasty, but attracted little attention and won few converts until an influx of foreign Moslem soldiers occurred under the Yuan dynasty. The Moslem groups in Sinkiang and Northwestern China retain to this day their peculiar customs, and are bound together by a strong sense of solidarity. Most particularly, they retain their peculiar religious practices which set them off sharply from the Chinese among whom they live and give them it way of life far more sitsilar to that of their fellow believers in other lands. In the large cities like Peking and Shanghai, however, they now can hardly 302 s STAT --!, - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 *Ilil.??????? be distinguished from the rest of the Chinese except perhaps by the fact. that they do not eat pork, which is China's favorite/ meat. Every large Chinese city has its special restau- rants catering to Moslems which do not servo pork. Christianity Until the Communist take-over, Christianity was the only religion that was actually gaining adherents in China. It had great influence in educational, governmental, and busi- ness circles. Because of its connection with Western culture, it was not reganks1 as open to the charge of feeding on superstition, though it tV113, from an early moment, accused of be- ing an adjunct of Western imperialism. Because it had missionaries and clergymen who gave large amounts of time to spreading its teachings in the churches, the schools, and the college; it was able to keep in touch with the younger generation at a time when Buddhism and Taoism were without any comparable contacts with it. Tho Christian churches had financial resources (largely from abroad) not only to maintain thenuclves but to found hospitals and charity and recreational centers. Most indigenous believers received higher education, and entered respectable professions, whereas the Taoist, and Buddhist groups represented the old-fashioned business and farming interests. It remains to be seen, now that its foreign funds and personnel have withdrawn or been expelled, whether the Christian faith can continue to thnve in China. The available evi- dence suggests that the believers have compromised with the Communist regime, and that, such mission schools as are still operating have ceased to be centers of Christian education. Christianity first reached China in the seventh century, during the reign of Tang T'ai-ttning, when some Central Asian Christians, mostly Nesterians, made trade trips to China over the caravan routes. Nestorianism was called in Chinese Ch'ing Chico, that is, the Luminous Religion. It died out temporarily at the end of the T'ang dynasty, in part because of government-directed persecution, but returned, and extended deep into China proper, when the Mongols conquered China and Central Asia. This time, also, the Nests- dans of Central Asia weee among its bearefs, but. so were Roman Catholic missionaries. When the Yuan dynasty entered into decline, Christianity virtually disappeared again, and did not come back until the latter half of the sixteenth century, during the Ming dynasty. It came this time as one phase of a muitifront European penetration of China. The first missionaries were Jesuits, tactful and learned men who studied the Chinese clas- sics, gladly associated themselves with scholars, and won the confidence even of the Court, which MIS much impressed by the Western-type science they brooslit with them. The most famous Jesuit at court was Matteo Ricci, who as well as being a Allied mathema- tician and sotronomer, was thoroughly versed in Chinese classics. Christianity's spirit of tolerance and curiosity had, at this time, a profound impact on Chinese scholars. Ti Ch'ing dyna. followed the Ming's example with respect to the Catholic mis- sionarn , and held tilde in high esteem. Before long, several Catholic orders and soci- eties were represented in the provinces, and might well have continued to spread over the face of China had not the Papacy, in the eighteenth century, reversed itself in the attitude Catholic missionaries were to adopt on the observance 1-y converts of the Confucian rites of ancestor worship. Ancestor worship by converts had previously been allowed; it was now forbidden. Missionaries sent to China after this reversal tended to emphasize the mutual exclusiveness of Christianity and Confucianism, and this resulted in failure to make allow- ances for traditional Chinese culture. The friendly relations between the missionaries and Chinese scholars did not long survive this change; by the time Protestant missionaries began to arrive in the nineteenth century, theconry enterprise becameassociated with the 303 STAT Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/04/03 _ IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 v., , C" .?????.?.??????? European nations' mercantile nnd imperialistic objectives in China. While the missionaries I preached, the Westen: governments were busy exacting trade concessions in, and terri- torial rights knit), China. Both tha Catholic and Protestant churches, however, :mule slow but steady progress among ordinary Chinese. But the intellectual leaders of China, not only under the Mat,chus but under the republia as well, concluded that Christianity was no longer a vital factor in Western civilization, and that the Western nations, with their ruthless expansionist policy, were motivated not by the Christianity they professed to believe in, but by self-interest. The direct mutt was that in the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty even those who wished to imitate the West were encoui aging students to study the West's science, technology, and positivistic philosophy rather than the alleged Christian tradition of its culture. The teach- ing of Christianity mums neither encouraged nor discouraged. The Chinese were bent on rebuilding their nation upon a firm modern basis, and regarded as dispensable everything, teligion especially, that did not directly contribute to national reconstruction. In view of the general decny of religious feeling in China, it, seems unlikely that the spiritual roots of Christianity are deeply implanted there, or that the doctrine of the fall and of the necessity of redemption through Christ have come to occupy a permanent and =sire place in China's thinking. This is not to deny that there are many pious Christians in China, both Protestant and Catholic, whc are, at present, standing up against Communist tyranny with fortitude and faith. But the fact is that the environment of modern China, both intellectual and moral, is too materialistic to be congenial to religion. Moreover, many foreign observers have posed the question whether the Chinese are capable of genuine religious faith, espe- cially in view of their long record of eclecticism vis-.-vis Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Christianity, behind winch it is possible to see a profound indifference to religion as a system of revelation or truth. Nor is this disproved by the fanaticism with which Chinese believers in nationalism, science, and Communism have advocated their respective causes. What is happening in China, as in other Es-stein nations, is the simultaneous growth of short-range fanaticism and of indifference to problems touching on man's relation with Cod or reality. China is losing its insight into reality and its long-range view of man in the scheme of the un's,erse ? the two things that have made Chinese civilization, by and large, so very stable. For it WO not philosophy or religion but axiomatic truths handed down from generation to generation, century to century, that gave continuity and stability to Chinese civilization. Nationalism and the Decay of Religious Feeling With the coming of the Western powers to China the problem of national security came to outweigh everything else in the minds of thinking Chinese. Mars education, mili- tary strength, and the development of natural resources seemed, therefore, to have become major necessities, to which all else must be subordinated The educational system of the past few decades thus gave rise to shallow, ardent, practical-minded Chinese who were impatient of the country's traditional wisdom and proved, when the moment came, highly susceptible to Communist propaganda. The extent of damage done to the Chinese mind during the present Communist regime cannot be gauged. Certainly, however, tradition is not. so strong a barrier against it as many would like to believe. Aiong with the task of material reconstruction, China's future leaders mull inherit that of recovering insight into the art of government which links the individual, the family, the state, and all states into a single cooperative world society. 1 304 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 A SELECTED READING LIST BroomItall, Marshall, /slam in China, pp. xx, Morgan and Scott.. Ltd., London, China Inland Mission, Philadelphia, 1910. Clinn, Wing-Wt, "Trend. in Contemporary Philosophy," in II. F. MneNair (ed.), China, pp. 312-330, University of California Press, fte:keley and Los Angeles, 1946. Clennell, W J., The nixtoricol Derlopment of Religunt in China, 2d ed., pp. xv, The Theosophical Publishing Holm, Ltd., Loieloo, 1926. Creel, IlerrIce, G., Chinese Thought front Confucius to Mao Tse-turig, pp. ix, Unlversity of Chicago l'rmat, Chicago, 1953. Dubs, Homer IL, "Recent Chinese Philosophy," Journal of Philoscphy, vol. XXYV: No. 13, 345-355 (1938). Fung, Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Dark Bodde, pp. xx, Macmillan Company, New York, 1948. Granet, Marcel, La Prnsre Chinoise, pp. xxiii, La Renaissance du livre, Paris, 1934. , La Religion des Chinas, pp. :cid, Cauthier-Villars etc., Paris, 1922. Latourette, Kenneth S., A History of Christian 3lissions /n China, pp. xii, Macmillan Company, New York, 1929. Mao Tri-tung, "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," trans. in Otto winder Sprenkel (ed.), Meta China: Three Views, pp. ISO-197, John Day Company, New York, 1950. Sun Yat-xcn, San Min Chu i, the Three Principb,s of the People, trans. by Frank W. Price, pp. nil. China, Miniatri of Information, Institute of PacOic Relations, Chungking, 1927. Wieger, Leon, A History of the Religious Reliefs and Philosophical Opinions in China from the Begin- ning to the Present Time, trans. by E. T. C. Werner, pp. 774, lisien Haien Press, lIsien Haien, 1927. Wittfogel, Karl A., "Toe influence of Leninism-Stalinism on China," The Annals of the Anuricass Academy of Political and .Social Science, vol. 277: 22 -34 (September 1951). 305 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 CHAPTER 7 SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL FORCES The basic pattern of China's social order remained highly stable for more than two thousand years: it can be traced back as far its the Han dynasty in the third century n.c., and had undergone little fundamental change as late as the heyday of the Ch'ing dynasty ? in the nineteenth century. Herein that basic pattern is called the "traditional social order." ? The Ch'ing dynasty was brought to an end by a revolution, which gave birth to the republic of China. Simultaneously, the traditional social order underwent drastic changes. The main reason for the stability of the traditional social order was the unchanging character of China's agrarian economy, in which land has always been the limiting factor. Human labor was always in abundant supply, so that there was little incentive to change 1111?? the existing technology, which was based on human labor. The same farming implements and methods continued to be used on the same limited quantity of land, so that China had a closed economy with little room for expansion. The social teachings of Confucius pre- supposed this type of productive system, and in turn reinforced the economic stagnation it entailed; ideologically speaking, they thus bound the social order together through the centuries. It was a social order in which every person had a role that was clearly defined in terms of both behavior and attitudes. The various roles were based upon the kinship system. 41.1 CLASSES IN TRADITIONAL SOCIETY Scholars The traditional social order involved four traditional classes. The highest echelon were the scholars, or literati, trained in Chinese classics and literature with a view to passing the state examinations, through which one became an official. The Chinese empire was large and its communications poor. For both reasons the imperial regime early came to depend upon the scholar-officials, the bureaucratic elite, to conduct local administration and maintain order throughout its domains. Local officials were allowed to govern their areas with a minimum of interference from above, provided only that they maintained peace snd order and contributed their share to the national treasury. Through the state examinations lay the road to power, social recognition, and wealth. Theoretically, almost any Chinese subject had the right to become an official if only he passed the examination. Actually, the majority of those who took the examinations came from well-to-do families who could afford to master such learning. Most were descendants of officials. The latter were free to levy taxes, make grain assessments, and demand favors. They were variously tyrants and enlightened rulers, and collectively and individually they had every reason to resist revolts against the imperial order they represented, since a revolt might mean their downfall as well as that of the regime. They were, according to the blueprint drawn up by Confucius, distinguished by their love of humanity. 308 STAT ? _ _ _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 The qualifications required of the official were two: knowledge of the classics, and skill at manipulating verbal symbols. The examinations wete open to all people of all classes, and people of all classes cherished the ideal on which they were based: that China was not a feudal society of closed classes. It was not easy to move from one class to another. But it was possible. It was common practice for the scholar-bureaucrats to accumulate savings during their career, and invest them in land. When they retired, they became the gentry of their home towns, living off the land they owned. Some scholars, of course, failed the state examina- tions. They became teachers in rich homes, or retired into religious solitude, or returned home to live off such hind as their families possessed. Peasants Next to the top were the peasants. They made up the bulk (probably 80 percent) of the population. The majority were free, land-owning, farmers, or tenants with permanent leases to the land Hwy farmed. The former paid taxes to the government; the latter, rent to the absentee landlords. Actual cultivation of the land remained in the same hands even ? if the land itself changed hands. Only a small percentage were laborers with only their Inv labor to sell. The peasants were the wealth-producers of the nation. The primary imperial tax was the land tax, and its proceeds, together with the rent paid by the tenants, represented a very large share of the peasants' tiny income. The main characteristic of the Chinese agrarian system was that the farms were small, having been parcelled out and subdivided into more and more units through the cen- turies. An aerial view of the Chinese countryside still looks like a minutely pieced patchwork quilt. Cultivation, based on time-honored methods, was intensive and pains- taking. The plentiful supply of labor tended to inhibit the search for new methods of cultivation. Living standards were low by any criterion, and the notion of an expanding economy was not even present to people's minds. The peasant was largely self-sufficient. Ile ate the produce of his land, and wore what - N he wove with his own hands. He carried some of his produce to the local market, and thus 1111?. acquired what little cash he needed for salt, iron, and other things. his family's only means of escape from this way of life was to accumulate enough savings and enough land to be able to educate a son who, having passed the state examinations, could raise the status of the whole family to that of the scholar. After his retirement, the scholar-son could return home to a life of honorable leisure and willingly-accorded prestige, respectability, and admiration. Artisans The third class were the artisans or craftsmen, who used their hands to gain a livelihood. They performed personal services for the scholars and gentry. They were the barbers who carried their barber chairs and basins over their shoulders. They were the carpenters, blacksmiths, knife sharpeners, and china-ware menders. They were the oil pressers, who made oil from beans and sesame seeds. They were the rug makers, furniture makers, and masons. Some of them had land to cultivate, and engaged in one of the services mentioned a.T. a subsidiary occupation. Since physical labor was held in disdain by the Confucian school of thought, their status was a low one. ORO-T-220 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release -;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 l? - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Merchants The lowest rung on the social ladder was occupied by the merchants, or tmdesmen, who made their living by exchanging the fruits of other men's toil. Despite their low prestige, they were essential to the functioning of society. For one thing, they were the bridge between the artisans, peasants, and the scholar-officials, all of whom, especially the first and last of the three, depended on the process of exchange. The more succealful merchant had, because of his wealth, a good deal of influence. One passibility always more or Irv; open to him was that of buying an office and thus forcing his way into the ruling class. however, they representsd no threat to the elite; they never acted collectively, there were no legitimate channels through which they 'could go to expand their influence, and they had no great amount of capital or wealth to manipulate. All large-scale enterprises, e.g., salt and mining, were government monopolies. There uas, indeed. no great surplus anywhere, for money was nut thought of as a good form in which to hold wealth ? one got money in order to buy land. Even the merchants had no desire to retain money. Like the peasants, their only hope of changing their low status was to educate their sons to pass the state examinations, and in the long run this celled for land. The merchants had no legal protection, e.g., no contractual arrangements under which to operate their businem As the centuries passed, however, they became very group conscious, and organized themselves into guilds for purposes of market control and mutual protection. Even the guilds reflected the Confucian idea of human relations. Relatives and friends and "old customers" received fair deals, while strangers might be cheated with- out moral compunction of any kind. FAMILY, CLAN, AND VILLAGE Importance of the Family In speaking of a country or nation, the Chinese use the term kuo-chia, the literal transla- tion of which is "nation-family." The analogy rif the family, in other words, dominates even the idea of country. "Wishing to order well their states," wrote Confucius, "they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons." There is reason to believe that loyalty to family RA it exises in China tends to weaken ? or at least is competitive with ? loyalty to the Ntate. But this is not the intent of Confucian doctrine. Confueius taught that strong family and kinship groups were indispensable to the healthy state; perfect fanuly loyalty implied n perfect family, and no perfect family would ever permit its members to Fl igh t the state. "If everybody is filial and brotherly, nobody will oppose the law." In reply to a niter's boast, that in his state a on would inform on his father if the latter committed a crime, Confucius replied that in his state no son would ever be folind accusing his father of n crime. Ile meant that a proper family could never produce a crime-committing member! It was to the family, not to the state, that the individual Chinese always looked for economic and social security. It was the family on which he relied for education. The family supervised his moral and political behavior The F. tate, for example, dealt exclusively with the head of each family for such purposes as registration, taxation, and compulsory labor service. What is meant by the traditional Chinese family? Two ideal examples in Chinese history are the Chang family in the T'ang dynasty and the Chen family in the Sung dynasty. In the Chang family, six generations lived together in a single household, and for nine genemtions there was no division of property. In the Ch'en family, 700 persons lived under the same roof as a single hcuschold. How could this be possible? 308 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 4,f ? Var. t. ?????????? The traditional family in its ideal form was not, like the usual Western family, confined to a man, his wife, and tlieir children. Its vertical axis at any given moment could extend through nine generations, and its horizontal axis through five collate:al grades. There were 21 categories of relativei, including lineal ascendants and lineal descendants, brothers and their wives, unmarried sisters, cousins, and their wives. There were more than 300 kinship terms. When the entire family, so defined, lived harmoniously under one and the same roof, the ultimate ideal was regarded as achieved. In the actuality, even in the scholar or gentry class, which Caine nearer to the ideal than any other clam:, three or four entire generations, but rarely more, were held together in the desired manner. In most families, only one of the sons could marry and continue to live with his parents; the other sons and all the daughters, if they married, went out of the family unit, so that the typical family hardly ever exceeded six to eight persons ? a great many less than in the scholar class, where economic iz sources were less strained and where, in any ease, the mortality rate was lower. Even the members of these relatively small families, however, clung to the traditional "large family" as the ideal, strove constantly to achieve it, and imitated its pattern of living, however simply and however small a scale. Whatever its size, the Chinese family was an economic unit. It consisted of persons related to each other (by blood, marline, and adoption) and it had a common budget and common property. Its members produced and consumed goods, as much as possible, within the family This was especially true in the peasant families, where each member of the family was fitted into a general scheme for providing food, shelter, clothing, and even shoes for the entire group. In the artisan and merchant families members cooperated in production and shared in consumption (apprentices were treated as members of the family, occupying a position similar to that of an adopted son). While members of the typical family among the gentry had many things made and done for it by persons not of the family group, even they simulated self-sufficiency as much as possible, and their servants were made to feel as if they belonged to the family. In a word, the traditional Chinese family was characterized by a high degree of self-sufficiency, both economically and socially, since there was little occasion for members of a family except the chia chang, or family head, to have any outside contacts. In general, the division of labor in the family was along the following lines: The men did the nonhousehold work; they plowed the fields, made and sold their handicrafts, or performed their functions as officials. The women were responsible for the household work. In peasant families, they cooked and washed, wove cloth, and made shoes. In upper-class families, perhaps the women did not actually do these chores, but did manage and supervise them. The smooth functioning of the group was made possible by assigning each member of the family a specific and understood role to perform, which was determined with an eye to his or her blood relationship to the family. This relationship varied with generation, age, and sex. Authority The eldest male member of the oldest generation was the chin .thong (family head). He was usually the father. He was the highest authority in the family, held title to all family property, and disposed of all the family's earning; and savings (thus of the earnings and savings of each member). He officiated at nil such ceremonies as nuirringes, funerals, and ancestor worship, and at the three big festivals of the year: New Year's, Tuan Wu (in the spring), and Cluing Ch'iu (the midautumn harvest festival). He arranged his 309 STAT Declassified in in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 -,s1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 !I children's marriages and exacted strict obedience from all junior members of the family. The young learned subordination to the old, in accordance with Confucius' saying, "Filial piety is the root of all virtue." Filial piety was not confined to father-son relationships, or even to relationships with the We c.hang. The latter was not regarded as an authority unto himself end in his own right, but as an agent of his and his son's ancestors, with whose spirits it was the family's duty to keep in consta4 communieat ion. They must, for example, be informed and consulted before every imminent event of any importance, the informing and consulting taking place at the family shrine where the ancestor's spirits were believed to be represented The ancestral spirits, it was further believed, watched over their de. , I scendants, kept the family free from disease and want, and gave it heirs and prosperity. Finally, the living were thought of as being able by making offerings of incense, food, and paper money to their ancestors, to better the lot of the ancestral spirits. The chia chang officiated at all the ceremonies. Upon his death, the father became one of the ancestors, to whom the young man of filial piety could add weight and respect by his personal achievements. In the same way, bad deeds gave his ancestors a had name. In short, the family not only exercised economic and social control over its members; its moral influence continuously penetrated every corner of their actions and even their thoughts. f.; Continuity One concrete expression of filial piety was the perpetuation of the family line. Failure to produce offspring meant the end not only of the living family, but of the entire family line, and so involved hurt to the ancestors as well. The desire for male descendants was, therefore, universal and well-nigh obsessive. According to Mencius, "Of three unfilial acts, lack of posterity is the greatest." For one's sons to marry was not so much good as neces- sary, and necessary not so much for the eon's sake as for the sake of the family, which must have descendants. Marriage was a family, aot a personal, affair and the choice of mates was the parents' concern. It. was arranged through an agent, a matchmaker. Acting out of intimate knowledge of the families involved, he (or she) first carried a gift from the boy's family to the girl's. Be then took to the fortune-teller the eight characters standing for the girl's name, and the hour, day, month, and year of her birth, to be compared with tho corresponding characters for the boy. If the comparison was favorable and auspicious, the match would be full of harmony and !sappiness. Not the least of the matchmaker's function was that of advising about the betrothal gift. The bride's family very naturally, since their daughter, in becoming a member of a new household, would have her very fate decided for her, demanded assurances as to what kind of fate awaited her. This meant an adequate gift from the boy's family, and evidence of his family's economic status, normally judged by the amount of land it owned. After the two family heads had approved everything and signed the marriage contract, the bride made the journey to the groom's family in a completely curtained, suffocating, red (as a symbol for joy) sedan chair. She was clothed for the occasion in a red satin gown, with a red scarf completely covering her head and a heavily ornamented headdress. The marriage ceremony was a family ritual, at which the chic chang officiated in the presence of kinfolk and relatives. At this ceremony, for the first time, the bride and groom laid eyes upon one another. Through the good offices of a hired "master of ceremonies," and in a deafening fanfare of gongs, cymbals, and flutes, they went through the ritual of being presented to each other, to the various members of the family, and to the ancestors at the ancestral shrine. It was not, however, until the 310 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I ? ? ? ? Ojel ? ? ? get I new wife had borne a son that her position was fully stabilized. If she did not have a son, there were two alternatives open to her husband: he could take a concubine, or he could adopt a son. The social und economic relationship of all kinfolk were extensions of this basic pattern. A man's relationship to his father's brother followed the father-son pattern. The relation- chip between cousins of the same sex followed the brothel ly pattern. The intensity of each relationship varied with the closeness of the blood tie. (Only the husband-wife pattern had no extension in the wider kinship system.) This called, of course, for an extremely elaborate kinship terminology. There was the father's elder brother, the father's second younger brother, the father's second elder brother's wife, and so on. (The terminology for maternal relatives was less specific: they had a different surname, and were thought of as belonging to another family.) As a concrete illustration of how the kinship system penetrated every phase of life, one may note the rules for mourning as stated in the Rook of Rituals (Li The length of mourning for blood relations varied with the closeness of the blood tie, ranging from three years for one's father and mother to three months for one's remote cousins. The more prosperous a family became, the better were its chances to expand and be- come the ideal (large) family; and once a family had so expanded, it was obliged, with so many people to support, to maintain a broad economic base. The latter was hard to do, so that the usual course of events was for a family's wealth to beeotne somewhat depleted after three or four generations, and relations within it became, in consequence, strained and unstable. According to the Chinese principle of inheritance, each son then inherited equal shares of the family property, and the family ceased to be an economic unit. Although economically separated, kinship ties between the new distinct units were strong and bind- ing; but taken together they were thought of not as a family but as a Tau, or clan. The Clan In ancient times, to be sure, the one-household family and the clan had probably been identical. But as time passed and ancestors inevitably became more numerous, the elan expanded until the only link between its constituents was a single surname and a common ancestor. In the central and southern parts of China, there are whole villages in which one finds only one surname. The clan always maintained a common ancestral temple and common burial grounds. It, preserved the elaborate kinship terminology, scheme of rights, and dutica of the kinship system, and continued to observe the rules of mourning. A single clan might have members from all social classes, from merchant to scholar. It held property as an organiration, exercised certain broad judicial functions, and arranged for ancestral worship at proper time. Although economically di fided, the clansmen felt bound by a strong sense of obligation. If prosperous, the clan had large reserves for relief and education, and sup- ported a school. Its wealthy members felt obliged to help their noor relatives, either by giving them direct assistance or by providing them with employment. Often some of the evils of nepotism presented themselves: relatives were employed regardless of their fitness (or need) for the job, and poor relatives became parasites. Each clan maintained its own genealogical records, in which its members were registered and their more illustrious deeds recorded. It even had a role to play in the social control of marriage; namely, that of seeing to it that its members did not intermarry. 311 STAT >eclassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 8k-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Village Organization A number of economic families, sometimes of different clans, semetimea all of the same clan, constituted a village, their life and property being made safer by their living together. In the rural village, the fields usually lay beyond the cluster of houses. Each family's field was a distinct patch of ground, so marked as to leave no doubt about its boundaries. Proximity, not kinship, was the essential tie between the constituent families, but even here kietship terms were used to establish and reinforce social relations. The terms appropriate to paternal relations were used in addressing one'a father's friends. Terms appropriate to maternal relations were used in addressing one's mother's friends. Terms uscsi with grand- parents were used in addressing one's grandparents' friends. This defined all social rela- tions. The younger generations were taught to address correctly a person belonging to an older generation. Failuie on their part to use correct forms of address showed lack of proper upbringing and resulted in loss of face for the entire family. Although there was no formal village organization, there were univerbally recognized and respected village heads, usually the heads of the larger clans and families. Often the village head was a man who had in the past performed some social services for the village as a whole. He was either a retired scholar, a member of the village gentry, or the former village teacher. Ile was assumed, both because of his age and education, to possess wisdom. The government, when issuing orders to the populace, dealt with and through these already accepted village heads; in strict theory they were "appointed" village heads by the govern- ment. F.ach village had its ti-pan, whom the government recognized as the responsible representative of the village, and who was held answerable for peace and good order in the village and for the collection and payment of taxes. If he reported a crime, it was he who was made responsible and he who received the punishment. The li-pao, naturally enough, tried to settle all village problems directly with the people so that most disputes were settled locally, without resort to any court. The village heads looked after public property, took the CellaUs, arranreed market days with the heads of other villages, transmitted official orders, wrote people's letteri for them, and even managed marriage ceremonies. Though not formally elected, their authority was unquestionably accepted by all. So long as land taxes were paid and no criminal cases arose, the villagers were hardly aware of the govern- ment's existence. The village heads always played, politically and socially, a fundamen- tally conservative role, and never attempted to change or destroy the existing order. Sometimes the village acted collectively. The inhabitants organized themselliI5, for example, into village defense-brigades, set up village schools, and made arrangements for collective protection of crops by hiring n watchman who patrolled the fields at night. The villagers also Performed common rites and ceremonies in case of drought, flood, or locust plagues. Most villages had village temples for the local deity, the i'u Ii lao !ph, which, it was believed, was able to give protection and peace to the locality, lie also protected the spirits of dead members of the village in the world beyond. Eaeh village had its tea house ? a combined club house, newspaper, and entertain- ment center for its male members and, be..ause it NV :LS here that, opinions were ventilated and formed, an instrument of social control as well. Within each distinct, neighborhood of the village, people had certain recognized mutual obligations ? for example, announcements and gifts in connection with births, weddings, and funerals; mutual aid at planting and harvest time, and in the execution of irrigation projects. Village solidarity was manifested in every department of life, from the cultivation of clops to the preparation of food. But there are several points about it. that cannot be overemphasized. It perpetuated itself without formal organization for the most part, i.e , as a series of interpersonal relations. And it was not in any sense imposed from without the village boundaries. 312 STAT _ _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Several villages would meet together on certain days and at a common market place for the exchange of their gotxls. The date and place were both specified by arrangement among the village heads. From such market places most Chinese towns and cities grew, the transi- tion from enlarged trading center to a town being accomplished when the former was designated the seat of a government official. The smallest political unit was the hsien, or prefecture, which was the seat of a county magistrate who was charged with respiaisibility for collecting taxes, recording land deeds, handling government funds; and serving us ibefiti of police. The larger towns and cities were, so to speak, collections of villages, and were divided into wards organized much like the villages (i.e , with heads and a 1i-pao), though " in the cities the mutual aid and solidarity aspects of the village were apt to be overshadowed by the activities of the police and the yamen (magistrate's office). GUILDS AND SECRET SOCIETIES Croft Guilds Outside the family and the village, artisans', merchants', and some farmers' guilds were the major traditional social organizations. A craft guild included all the practitioners of a single :raft, masters as well as workmen, within a certain district. (It was not uncommon for a man to be a farmer and an artisan at the same time; not a few guild members, therefore, were, farmers.) Within the guilds no sharp line was drawn between employer and employee, since, as far as guild matters were concerned, members were all on an equal footing, each of them having, for example, an equal voice in the selection of officers and the framing of regulations. The manner of electing officers differed greatly from guild to guild. The usual practice was to have at, the helm a committee made up of men of experience and prestige who were generally known and respected by the members and who took turns as chairmen. The guilds financed themselves by taxes levied on their members. The guild made it its business to see to it that no one could afford not to belong, since the primary purpose of the guild was to control and divide the market for the goods or services and, to that end, control production with an eye to the state of the market. Muchanl Guilds The merchants were organized in merchant guilds. The line between these guilds and the craft guilds is not a sharp one, since some craftsmen were merchants as well. The druggists' guild and the tea guild were two conspicuous borderline cases. The merchants' guilds followed the same general plan of organization as the craft guilds. 'Unlike the latter, which were primarily interested in production or service and only secondanly interested in their distribution, the merchant guilds existed primarily, as their names suggest, for the exchange of goods. As an example of the merchants' guild one might cite the bankers' guild, which had branches all over the country engaged in the exAange of coins and bills of exchange. In general, both types of guild were democratic, both in the conduct of their affairs and in the sharing of benefits. Both existed for the sole purpose of protecting their members and promoting their interests. If, for example, a guild member had a MSC in a court of law, the guild helped him see it through. They did not attempt to work through or manipulate the government. They were not licensed, although the state fully recognized their power and rights. They tended, indeed, to avoid relations with he government. They sought to 6-4 318 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? . control the particular market in which they were interested with a view to discouraging competition and stabilizing businw, their tacit premise being that competition is hazardous. They regulated wages and apprenticeship training, and the craft guilds fixed the weights and measurts standards used by their members in all their dealings. Provincial Clubs The provincial clubs, which were like guilds in many respects, began As organizations of people from n single province, i.e, candidates for the state examinations or merchants engaged in trade, who found themselves residenta of one and the ssme city a considerable distance from home. Their primary function, like that of the guilds, was mutual protection. Ary repuutble native of the province was eligible. Each club had its club house, where the members congregated or -yen resided. Like the guile's, they went into action especially when a member was taken into court or got into some other kind of trouble. If a member died, the club saw to his proper burial. All the organizations mentioned had religious functions. They had patron saints or special gods upon whom they counted for protection. The carpenters and masons had Lu Pan. Others had the Goddess of Mercy. The guilds and clubs were centers of social activities, and celebrated certain annual occasions with feasts, entertainment, and religious ceremonies. Secret Saddles No one can say exactly how much the secret societies have influenced Chinese history. Certainly, however, they have often played an important role even in the fate of dynasties, to say nothing of their continuing function of providing socially significant satisfactions for their members. Because of the secret nature of these bodies, information about them has always been difficult to uncover. Each, it, seems certain, was a secret fraternity with its own binding vows and its own rigid code of honor and chivalry. Many were affiliated with religious sects, and had rituals of a religious character. Their membership policy largely ignored dividing lines between strata of society. In time of peace, their primary function was that of providing protection and aid for their members, who paid dues, and owed certain types oi obedience to a leader selected by themselves. On one side, membership was a sort of insurance policy against, for example, hard times, or crop failures, or even death (if a member died, his society even took care of his family). During times of unrest and popular dissatis- faction, the secret societies have often emerged into the open and revealed their strength, sometimes through their weight on the side of revolution. The first known instance of this sort of thing was a revolt against the government by the Ch'ih Mei, or Carnation Eyeltrow Rebels, toward the close of the earlier Han dynasty (202 D.C. to A.D. 0). When the government replied with measures of persecution, the members sought safety in monasteries (for the most part Taoist). The most powerful of all secret societies berme and during the Ch'ing dynasty was the White Lotus Society, the founder of which was a Buddhist teacher who lived in the fourth century. Ills original eightesn disciples or Lohan r?ere deified. White Lotus monks traveled far and wide to spread his teachings. It was originally a religious sect, and became an underground secret society only in the thirteenth century, when it, joined in the rebellion against the Mongols and helped end the Ytlan dynasty. 314 ,..?????????????? STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: ;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 When the Tartars swept over China and overthrew the Ming dynasty, there was bitter resentment among the Ming patriots, many of whom were relentlessly persecuted. Many secret societies cam i into being at that time, e.g., the "White Feather Sect," the "Three Incense Sticks," and "The Eight Diagrams." They participated in many of the uprisings of the ensuing period, and often, especially under the Manchus, were hard driven by the government. The most powerful of the secret societies, "The Triad Society" (San Ito appears to have been founded during the reign of the second Manchu Emperor (1062-1723), when five monks who were also trained soldiers barely escaped with their lives from a monastery besieged by imperial forces. It took its name from the fact that. it was the "society of Heaven, Earth, and Man." The founders' aim was to "Overthrow Ch'ini, Restore Ming," and they seem to have carried their cause into every town and village in the land in their attempt to mobilize all types of mutual aid organisstions against the existing regime. The organization, in any case, spread throughout China, and more and more leaders were brought into it. In traditional Chinese society, there WM no cli:ctive central organ of political authority. Local officials ministered the local governments, this being mainly a matter of collecting taxes and maintaining the status quo; and there was no sharp dividing-line between these officials and the "people." After retiring from their posts, they took their place among the landowning gentry, and continued to exercise power as they discharged their obligations as family heads, clan patriarchs, and village leadc.s. It was the organized groups ? the family, the clan, the village, the guild, the secret sicietics, the provincial clubs, all of them private and essentially local in origin ? and not the central government that kept things running and so perpetuated the traditional social order. The latter was undoubtedly attended by considerable evils, mainly those of nepotism and corruption, but. within the orbit of its control the individual enjoyed a considerable area of freedom in which to think and live his life. SUMMARY' The characteristic traits of traditional Chinese society were: (1) It was a family- oriented ss.,*- :iety, in which age and seniority among one's kin gave one such respect, prestige, and power as one enjoyed. Youth was subordinate and insignificant. (2, It was a man's society, where women occupied a subordinate position as a matter of course. Marriage was arranged primarily for the purpose of producing a male descendant for the husband's family. (3) It was a society that presupposed mutual aid and elefirly-understots1 moral standards throughout. Neither involved much in the way of external apparatus; there were, for example, no old people's homes, no poor houses, and no reform schools. (4) It was a society in which initiative, competition, and departures from the existing way of doing things brought defeat to the individual Conformity AVM indispenssble to survival. (5) It was a society in which a classical education was the only pathway to high social distinction. It held technical skill, physical labor, and military prowess in disdain. (6) It was a society based upon land, and a society in which ownership of land was the best form of investment. There was little capital invested in business, and rash was not in great demand. (7) It was a society which, despite its bureaucratic character, was essentially democratic. There were no closed classes. The individual could always, though with (lifficulty, raise himself into a higher elses and take his family with him. It was a society in which Confucius' teaching concerning the golden mean, the avoidance of extremes, was 816 STAT )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ???????mels???? ? generally observed. The main obligation imposed upon the people by the state was that of paying their taxes. Taxes apart, they lived in a democratic society built upon tolerance, rationality, and candid realism. TDE TRANSITIONAL SOCIAL ORDER Effects of Relations with the West China's relations with the West, which were destined to undermine the traditional social order in the long run, were sporadic and of a highly limited charazter. From the second century n.e., when the first contact occurred, to the early sixteenth century A 0., there was sonic trade with the Romans, the Arabs, with India, and milt the Moslems. A famous visitor from the West, Marco Polo, reached China .cross Asia in the thirteenth cent ury, then returned home. At no time, in other words, were Sino-Western relations intensified or permitted by the Chinese to be other than marginal and superficial. The West was eager to acquire Chinese silks, porcelain, and tea, but China, with her self- sufficient economy and conservatism, did not need foreign trade and thus did not encourage it China's traditional social order was unalTeeted. It functioned, century after century, just as it. would have if the \Vest had not existed. The West's discovery of the sea route to the East initiated a new phase in China's history, during which the West did at hist begin to have an impact on Chinese society. The following paragraphs are a brief review of the main events of the next four centuries. The Portuguese, the first Westerners to use the route, arrived in Canton in 1517. hard on their heels came the Dutch and Spanish. Chinese authorities, however, continued to discourage trade with them, partly by restricting their activities to Canton. Even as late as 1793, i'then the Emperor Ch'ien Lung received a British diplomatic mission whose purpose WIIR to intensify trade 'elation. between China and Great Britain, China was flatly refusing to alter its traditional policy, and seemed unlikely to do so in the absence of drastic political change within its frontiers. It was not until the middle of thc nineteenth century that such a change finally took place, in the form of a sharp decline in the power of the Ch'ing government. When it did come, however, it came at a time when the West was ready and able to make the most of it. Its industrial revolution had greatly increased its pro- ductivity and thus its appetite for new markets, and given it new, well-nigh irresistible military weapons. Therefore, over the next decades it was corsistently able to translate the growing weakness of China's government into intensified trade and contact between China and Europe'. At first, the swelling stream of Western traders continued to be restricted to Canton. The Chinese thought poorly of merchants and the Western merchants represented a double evil ? covetousness and barbarism. For a long while, the Westerners were not permitted to carry on any direct trade with Chinese dealers and consumers. A specific group of middle-men, called compradores, were authorized by the go' Trunent to conduct all transac- tions involving Sino-Western trade, and all other Chinese were strictly forbidden to touch them. England, implanted in India and more eager than ever to tap China's huge market, was to take the lead in toppling oyet the barriers between China and the outside world. India produced large quantitics of opium. England, itself lacking that which could be ex- changed for China's rich cargoes, discovered that the otherwise wantless Chinese would buy opium, which hitherto China had consented in only moderate quantities (chiefly for medici- nal purposes). As early its the end of the eighteenth century opium was entering China, 3-16 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ueclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 7'. through Canton, in such quantities that the Chinese government sau twilling for it but to forbid the sale of opium altogether, which it attempted to do by means of an Imperial decree. Despite. the &erre, the opium trade continued to prosper and the day finally came when the Chinese government confi4cated a huge stock of British opium it had discovered in warehouses in Fukien. The British declared war, won hands down, and in 1812. forced on China the t mat). of Nanking, which, so to speak, underlined China's weaknem by imposing on the Chinese government certain disaiulities and restiictions that were without precedent in international affairs. Other rountries, over the next years, tirmanded similar treaties, and got them In 1895, Japan inflicted a further humiliating defeat upon China, and further tied the hands of the Chinese government in the policies it was to apply m dealings with the outside world. Events moved swiftly in the ensuing years. In 1899, on the initiative of the US, the Western powers adopted the so-called Open Door policy, which, though designed to prevent the final partition of China on the basis of already-existing spheres of influence, left China in a warse position than ever to stave off the impact of the West upon its life and institutions. One result of it. was to hasten the decline of the Ntanehu government, by lo-ng it the con- fidence of the Chinese people Another was to create within China a wave of antiforeign feeling that led, in 1001, to the famous Boxer Rebellion, which forced all Westerners, missionaries and merchants alike, to flee China for their lives. The response of the Western powers was to crush the rebellion out of hand, and to impose a new set of humiliating demands on the Chinese government, most particularly the opening of Chinese ports, once and for all, to foreign trade. In the big treaty ports such as Shanghai, hong Kong, Tientsin, and 11ankow, large teriitories were leased to foreigners, and were made subject to foreign admmist ration and law. Huge indemnit:es were demanded, and their payment ensured by arrangements for foreign supervision of Chinese maritime and internal customs and by restrictions on China's capacity to set its own tariffs In short, within half a century, a great Oriental empire was reduced to the status of a semieolony or, as Sun Yat-sen put. it, to a country nominally independent but for all practical purposes under foreign control. Within China, the impact of these events was profound and far-reaching. The coun- try's traditionally self-sufficient, self-complacent social order was zhaken to its very roots. For China's contact with the West, though it was established through trade, was by no means confined to the economic sphere. Missinnaries ? both Protestant and Catholic ? appeared on the scene and opened churches, schools, and hospitals. The modern school, with its emphasis on practical subjects, was introduced. In the 70s, a first group of 30 young Chinese were sent abroad to study, a step that would have been unthinkable 50 years earlier Peasants and businessmen from South China began to emigrate to America and the South Seas in search of wealth ? another sharp break with traditional Chinese patterns of behavior Perhaps most important of all, Cl?nese politics began to reflect the new age. The Chinese people, &illusionist with their government, expressed Omit confusion and resentment at what was happening to them in a series of revolts. The most important of these was the T'at-p'ing Rebellion, which was led by a few pe:?ants and schtlar officials .nspired by a 1,ehef in a homemade brand of Christianity Capitalizing upon the prevailing discontent, they were able to make their movement nationwide in :,cope, and powerful enough to disturb the equilibrium of the whole existing social and ecenomie order. The military operations in ronneetion with it went on for 13 years (1351 01), and involved almost all the provinces along the Yangtze River More than a million men were mobilized on each side, and the government's expenditures on the suppression of the rebellion were so large as to exhaust the national treasury Some twenty million persons lost their lives in the fighting or as a result of the accompanying pi-ztiltnees The people, in larger and larger 317 STAT RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ?classified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: 11 1 4 ' ? ...??????????????????????? numbers and more and more vocally, demanded radical reforms in government and in the educational system. The Boxer Rebellion and its humiliating consequences further in- creased the pressure upon the Ch'ing regime, which finally, but far too late, made some desperate gestures in the direztion of meeting the popular demands of the day. In 1905, for example, the traditional civil service examiaations were abolished, and a comir.ision was rent to Japan and England to study governmental practices with an eye to their possible inti raluctien in China. But the time when hi (-measures might have saved the regime was already long past. The Republic of Sun Yet-sen In the late nineties, a young medical doctor by the name of Sun Yat-sen, who had re- ceived his education in Honolulu and at Queens College in Hong Kong, organized th.-?. Hiring Chung Hui (Itotore China Society) in Macao. Branches of this society soon sprang up among the Chinese living in Honolulu, the US, Japan ? wherever there were Chinese who for one reason or another were beyond the reach of the Manchus. Working through this society, which Inter began to call itself the 7"ung Albtg Hui, Dr. Sun set out to marshal support for a "people's revolution" among Chinese both within and without the country. His creed was simple. Ile believed that a Chinese absolute monarchy must give way to a democratic republic, and that extensive social reforms had to be undertaken on behalf of what he called the "people's livelihood!" He further believed that China could cope with Western and Japanese imperialism only by frankly imitating Western nationalism. The T'ung Mtng Hui fanned the flames of revolutionary feeling within China through the age-old device of secret societies. China was ready for its message, and the revolution, heralded by a series of uprisings and assassinations, occurred with unexpected suddenness on 10 October 1911. The Manchu emperor was deposed, and Dr. Sun became President of the Provisional Gov- ernment of the Chinese Republic. The republic produced a new regime, but it did not bring China internal peace; it. auun became evident, for example, that the postrevolutionary government could not extend its power over the entire country. By 1915, again for example, 'Yuan Shih-kai, the republic's first President, was attempting to restore a monarchy; and his failure to do so, followed hard by his death, initiated what is called the war-lord period, during which political power in China was shared out, on a crazy-quilt pattern, among a never-constant number of military men with armies at their disposal, and as much territory to govern as they could conquer and hold. Sun Yat-sen's influence was confined to the south ? in Shanghai orti in Canton ? where he sought to maintain a parliamentary regime. From without, the Western powers and Japan continued to press demands on the Chinese government, but there was at least one startling new development: the new Russian government renounced all the conquests and special privileges the Czarist govern- ment had acquired in China. By 1923, partly because of that gesture hut moFtly because he had developed personally satisfactory reasons for trusting the US.SII, Dr. Sun was accepting the help of Russian advisors in a drive to reorganize the Kuomintang party. Within the party, meantime, the left wing was gaining the advantage over the right wing, which greatly alarmed the merchants and gentry of the south, who were supporting Sun. A reckoning between left and right was postponed for a time as all groups joined forces behind a military expedition that marched North to try to unite China under it single government. STAT eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release k-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 r ? 11 Chiang Kai-shek vs the Communists At this crucial moment Dr. Sun died, but Chiang Kai-ehek, the leader of the southern armies, fortified by Russian aid and help both from the secret societies and the students and industrial worker), gained victory after victory. During his absence in the North, however, the Leftist group sought to oust him as leader, and when documents were discovered in the Peking Soviet Embassy that revealed Russia's designs for world conquest, a real split took place within the party. Chiang initiated a purge of all radical elements both from the party and the government. The northern expedition was successful, but Chiang continued to have to base his leadership on alliances and political intriguca with the country's still numerous war lords. He was able to drive the Communist Party underground, some of its members withdrawing to remain as the left wing of the Kuomintang. The party as a whole suffered a distinct decline in membership, though not, or not at least for very long, in popular following. Its closely knit organization and the appealing character of its prop- aganda continued to win it sympathizers, especially among the new classes, the students and professors, and the factory workers. The Communist leaders, concentrating their remaining forces first in Hankow and ICiangsi, and later in Kwangtung, Hunan, and Anhwei, advocated a society patterned after that of Russia, and were soon calling themselves the First Soviet Republic of China. Before long also, by conscripting manpower in the localities they occupied, they were able to build a large army and, Chiang having diverted his military strength to the North, force attention to themselves as a major military threat. In 1032 and 1933, the Soviet areas comprised an estimated 330,000 square miles, one-sixth of China proper, and ninety million people. Not until 1031 after his sixth campaign, did Chiang succeed in driving them from their Central China stronghold and forcing them to take up their Long March to the Northwest, in the course of which they burned or destroyed every- thing they could not take with them. Pressures from Japan Externally, Jew was the most immediate threat to republican China. The settlement among the powers following World War I gave the Japanese Shantung Province. In 1931, they took Manchuria. In 1932, they made an unsuccessful attempt on Shanghai, which, however, netted them a sphere of influence in one section of the city. In 1035, they further encroached upon China's northern boundaries by carving a so-called autonomous area out of Eastern lIopeh Province. Such was the turbulent political background in which the forces making for the transformation of traditional China worked themselves out through this transitional period. The major characteristic of the period was the overlapping and coexistence of tho disappearing social order and the emergent social order. A familiar scene in Shanghai in the latter part of this period was the spectacle of wheelbarrows and rickshaws, drawn by men just as they had been in past centuries, in and out among formidable busses and clanging street cars ? or, on another level, the funeral procession, with paper effigies for the coula of the dead and mourners in white hemp robes, moving along to the strains of "Yankee Doodle" or "Marching throLgh Georgia." TUE RISE OF NEW CLASS Business Class The most conspicuous change taking place in China through the transitional period had to do-with the rise of new social classes. First of these is the new business class. In 1863, the official and military commander Tstng Kuo-fan supervised the establishment of an 319 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ironworks at Shanghai. In 1SGS, the first Chinese-built stcainship was launched in that same city. In 1801 the official and military commander Tso Tsung-t'ang oversaw the building of a navy yard in Foochow. In 1883, Western-style arsenals were built at. An-yang. All the' projects looked to the production of munitions and war supplies. All of them were initiated by seholar-officials who had beeome aware of China's urgent need for better military defense, and what it implied with respect to the state of China's industry. It was such men who fostered, and themselves became members of, the new business class. There was also Li Ilung-chang, who with the aid of foreign forces helped. to the rai-ping Rebellion and, having come to understand what Western-type arms and technology could contribute to China's security, became a patron not oely of industry but of communications as well, lie helped to found the China Merchant's Shipping Line and the Shanghai- Woosung Railway, and went ahead to build telegraph lines and a cotton-mill at Shanghai. Chang Chih-tung, governor first of one Chinese piovince and then of another, started the project for a Peliing-Ilankow raila ay, helped establish the Han Yell Ping Iron and Steel Works, and interested himself in cotton mins, silk factories, and tanneries. All of these men, however, were promoters, not managers, of industry and/or communications. The better-known industrial executives of this beginning phase were also scholar- officials. There was, for instance, Shtlig listian-hual, who had clearly grasped the relation between modern communications and national strength; backed by Li Hung-shang he became the first general manager of the Tientsin-Shanghai telegraph lines, was in charge of national railway affairs, managed the China Merchants Line (which he also reorganized), managed a cotton mill in Shanghai, and the Han Yell Ping Iron and Steel Works, became Minister of Commerce, organized a national bank, and founded the Chinese Red Cross. There was the disillusioned scholar-official, Chang Ch'ien, who %%WI the help of Chang Chih-tung started China's first cotton mill, Ta Sun, and organized a shipping company in protest against the favored foreign shipping companies. Ile also took a hand in civic improvements in his hometown of Ta-t'ung, Kiangsu, where he established a museum, a library, a public park, a weather station, and a normal school. Both these men, incidentally, were conscious of the need for legal protection of invest- ments and favored the introduction of contractual arrangements into Chinese enterprise. Neither, on the other hand, was by any means the prototype of the modern Chinese business executive. They were, by contemporary standards, relative novices, who never really put, nside their essentially Confucianistic outlook, with its emphasis upon personal relations. Nevertheless, it was their activities that got business enterprise under way in China; they openly engaged in business enterprise despite being scholar-officials. Certain scholar-officials participated in building the foundations of Chinese business enterprise in still another way, namely, by facing up to the inadequacy of the type of edu- cation they had themselves received, and giving their sons a "Western-style" or "modern" education. This they did either by sending them to a modern school in Chinn, which in most cat's meant a mission school, or ? what called for an even sharper break with tradi- tion ? by sending them to be trained in America, Europe, or Japan. As business matured in China, it was this new student group, together with the Chinese who had emigrated and learned modern business practices abroad, that was to be a major source of management personnel for business enterprises. t".nother source of such personnel was the traditional merchant class whose activities had given them better preparation than other Chinese could po.s.sibly have for successful business enterprise. There were, for example, the compradores, the first Chinese merchants to have direct contact with Western traders. The compradore was not merely a go-between; from an early date he performed several important business functions ? accounting, 320 li?V????? STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 jewirg,mm.m.......14",??????????=4. / cashiernig, brokerage, etc. The foreigners paid him, in general, extremely well, and he soon learned to rely on them rather than Chinese officials fur his protection. If, moreover, he was on his toes, he not infrequently had opportunities to make profits "on the side" out. of the foreigners he dealt with, and could, as time passed, acquire capital of his own ? indeed, the compreulores were among the fiist Chinese to acquire great wealth through business activity. After restrictions on foreign trade were removed, many of them went into trade for themselves. The new business class drew many of its recruits from their ranks, and many others from among merchants who had not been compradores, but had known how to make the most of the growing freedom and gradually improving social pixithin of persons engaged in trade. This newfound freedom was the consequence of a changed attitude toward the mer- chants on the part of officials who, in coping with the problems posyl by the decay of the Ch'ing government and the rising tide of internal warfare, feund that they could "cooper- ate with merchants more often than they had found it advisable to do in the past." Such cooperation was profitable both to the merchants and themselves. In this survey of the sources of the new business class and the factors that contributed to its rise, the increasing role of money in the Chinese economy through the period must be noted. The two major commodities traded during this period, opium and textiles, came to be in such demand that many people found themselves wanting money who had previ- ously had no use for it. In short, there gradually grew up a class of business men. The trend toward industry was initiated by the scholar-officials as promoters and executives, but it involved compm- dores, trained in Western business methods, native merchants, who found themselves handling a large volume of trade, and, at a later date, a new scholar or student class, that. had received a Western-style education in mission schools or in schools abroad. There were, finally, the Chinese emigr6s, who despite their low ties to their native land, despite also their broadened outlook, remained interested in the progress of China. In general, one may speak of four stages in the development of Chinese industry. (1) The period 1862-1877, when industry got off to a slow start with the building of some munitions factories, at the stimulus from Chinese officialdom China got its start in industry through ordinary commercial incentives, particularly in the textile field, with the lead being taken by new-style entrepreneurs. (2) The years 1895 to 1902, when foreign mereaants were given certain rights looking to the encouragement of private enterprise. (3) The years 1903 to 1910, when Chinese banks, commercial associations, and official agencies for commercial control were firs' organized (4) The years 1911 to 1928, when Chinese domestic enterprise, especially in the cotton industry, boomed as a result of the outbreak of World War 1. It was in this period that the modern business corporation made its appearance, and began to play a role comparable to that which it plays in other countries. A further word as to why the officials and the gentry took the lend in these develop- ments for a long period, curing which the people generally, including even the merchants, viewed them with indifference. There were several masons for this: In the first place, the officials and gentry were a "protected" class, and did not need special legislation redefining their rights in order to become active in building the new enterprises. They, more easily than others, could counter resistance in the name of traditionalism, because they were recognized as representing the traditional order. Secondly, the industries launched in the early years were largely financed with public funds, derived either from new taxes or from loans and investments from abroad that only the government was in position to arrange, and the officials and gentry were in a better position than others to levy on such funds. 321. STAT eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release -RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1(0 it 1 I, (According to one estimate, half the textile mills, half the coal mines, and two-thirds of the stearn.powered coastal and inland shipping developed before 1000 were made possible by investments from abroad) Attempts were made, to he sure, to recruit capital from the merrhants, compradores, and overrx:aa Chinese tradesmen, but mostly without success, because there elements fought shy of the idea of government sponeorship, and did not wish it known that they had capital in any such quantities. By 1903, spurred on by the example uf the factories set up by foreigners, the Chinese government became eager for its own people to take a hand in industry, and set out to encourage private enterprise. As a result of the uncertainty of the times, however, the chief developments were in trade rather than in general indastrinlization, which called for long-term investment and held out scant prospect of the quick profits for which most people with capital were looking. By 102S, the growing unification of the country and the decreasing threat of war helped China's industrialization to make real progress. A modern business class was taking shape, but, it had to overcome formidable political obstacles, and had to fight against constant resistance on the part of the traditionalist forces. Political influence thus con- tinued to be an important asset, and it was still beneficial to know the right people. Laboring Class There arose a new laboring ChM With the development of factories and industry, there was a sudden demand for industrial workers. The introduction of machine-made products, especially textiles, which were cheaper and better than the homemade products the Chinese had traditionally used, condemned the traditional, self-sufficient Chinese family to gradual extinction. People began to rely for part of what, they consumed on transactions that teak place outside the home and called for cash. Peasants and artisans in ever-growing numbers sought employment in industry leause the wrege.s offered had become nevesary in a way in whieh they could not have been necessary a few years earlier. The new factories were destroying the artisans' market, and there was a surplus of labor in rural areas; neither group was able to support itself as it had in the past. Prom the employer's point of view, the low living standards or the Chinese and the abundance of cheap labor, which together meant that wages could be kept low, provided an incentive for continuous expansion which in turn made room for still more workers. The factories tended to concentrate in a few cities, chiefly Shanghai, Wusils, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Hankow, Canton, Hong Kong, Dairen, and certain cities in Manchuria. How rapidly the demand for labor increased is made abundantly clear by the statistics of the textile industry alone. There were 417,000 cotton spindles in 1896; 1,210,000 in 1913; and 4,223,000 in 1030. By 1030, the total number of industrial workers in 30 industrial cities was 1,251,915 ? 47 percent of them (more than half women) were in textiles, 14.7 percent in food factories, 6.6 percent in clothing, 6.5 percent in building, 6 percent in chemicals, 5.4 percent in machinery, and 4 9 percent in the printing business. Lebor was recruited for the most part by the contract or Pao t'ou system, under which employers delegated the hiring and even the paying of workers to a middleman, who provided a constant supply of workers, particularly women, drawn primarily from the countryside. The Pao shang, or foreman, would make a contract, usually for three years, with the prospective employee's family, and take her away to the city where she would live in a factory dormitory and work at a nominal wage, the remainder of her remuneration going to her parents. 322 ???????1 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? ;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 The factory system, with all its attendant problems and evils, was confined chiefly to six provinces, comprising 10 percent of China's total area and 35 percent of its total population (Even in these provinces the traditional craft shops, where artisans and their Families worked together as one economic unit, hung on for a long while. Home industries, in which peasant families engaged as a sideline also survived, and ir the more remote areas of China, the handicraft system went on just as it bad before ) But industrialization in China did not, at first anyway, create exactly the same problems and evils it was creating elsewhere in the world: The factories remained small. From 1912 to 1920, 34.5 percent of China's industrial .vorLers were employed in factories of front 7 to 30 workers, and less than 1 percent in factories of more than 500 workers. In the small-scale Chinese factory, the owner was likely to be an artisan or master craftsman who started out with a small workshop. Having acquired a little capital, he rented looms and began to like other people, apprentices mostly, to work lot him. There was corriderable mobility of labor among enterprises of this character, and both for this reason and because on-the-job activities tended to be more specialized than formerly, rein- tiona between employer and employee were much less personal and family-like than in traditional China. The typical factory sold a! ts products to one or more merchants, who supplied the raw materials. Later, this master craftsman, as he piespered, became the factory manager. Many such enterprisers had "outworkers,' for example, the employee of a match factory who took away material for matchboxes to work on at home, probably with the amistance of his family. Even the worker employed within the shop might bring a member of his family along every day to help him do his job. The little boy pulling a laden wheel- barrow pushed by his father was a common sight in the mines in those days. In other words, the personal and family element stubbornly persisted, despite the factory system. The category of industrial workers thus included not only women and men, but children as well. One reason for this was ths predominance of light industry. But this only made it possible for women and children to do the jobs; what made it necessary were the low wages and the high costs, by peasant standards of the day, of urban living. In any case, from 1914 to 1920, 47 percent to 65 percent of the workers in the textile industry, and 31 to 43 percent in the food industries, were women In 1930, a survey by the Ministry of Industry of 799,912 workers in 23 cities showed that 10.6 percent were women, 46 percent were men, and 6 percent were children. All this meant that a large number of individuals who had been reared in pea.sant homes and artisan families bad to adjust to an entirely new way of life, from which the personal ..nd human elements that had characterized their roles in traditional society were almost completely absent. They did not know their employer, and he did not know them. his only interest in them was the profit he could make from what they produced, and he cared little whether the profit was earned at the expense of their health and welfare. There were no labor laws to protect them, no standard wage rates, no ceilings over working hours, no minimum wages. In most shops, they spent their hours on the job endlessly repeating one and the same operation which called for the kind of discipline and continuous attention that nothing in their background had prepared them for. Their lot was by no means a happy one. The first Chinese labor union was the Tongshan Labor Union, which was organized among the Tongshan miners in North China in 1911 In general, however, China's indus- trial workers remained unorganized until 1919 and 1020. The earliest strike reported in a modem Chinese industry did not occur until 1912, on the Lung-hal Railway. 323 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ranks and counsels. For when the split in the goveinment took place, end the Communist, party was driven underground, the labor movement found itself immea.trably weakened. In an attempt to get it hack on its feet, the central government now created the Association of Worker's Delegates, to consolidate the principal unions. A Central Executive Committee was termed. to promote programs for cduention, publication, political education, and military training for union members. In 1929, the Labor Union Law W VI promulgated, stipulating that only labor unions approved by the I3ureau of Social Affairs under the central government would henceforth be regaoled as legal. By 1936, the government reports put the total number of labor unions in China at 872, aid estimatell their member- ship at 713,764. Sltuleni Class There arose a new student class. A new type of education was introduced during this period which replaced the classical training that had for centuries been the backbone of China's educational system. The lead here came from the inksions, China's first Cluistian college having been founded as early as 1861, but there were soon modern schools under other auspices as well which offered Western-type training, with emphasis on practical subjects, including the social sciences, the natural sciences, and mathematics. In 1912, the republic officially adopted a new school system, modeled on that of the West, and included normal schools and technical training echools. By 1019, 117,501 primary schools were already functioning, national and provincial universities were gradually being estab- lished, and school facilities were, for the first time, being provided for girls. The enthusiasm for modern education was fed and given direction by a growing body of translated Western philosophical and scientific works, including those of Darwin, Spencer, Montesquieu, J. S. Mill, and Adam Smith, and, among fiction writers, Dickens, Scott, Lamb, Goldsmith, Dumns, Ibsen, and Tolstoy. After Jr.pan's victory over China in 1896, large numbers of students went to Japan, many of them to study military science, and, as time passed, more and more students went to America and Europe for advanced training. In 1918, a group of National Peking University students started a magazine called The Renaissance, as part of a movement whose purpose was to promote a new literature, to be written and read in pa: hue, China's spoken language. Unavoidably, given the forces mobilized behind the classical literature, it became a movement for the emancipation of the individual from tradition and authority, and soon captured the imagination of China's youth. Slogans like "equality for women" began to make their appearance, and the movement's targets came to include, along with the classical litumture, Confucianism and traditional Chinese culture, the movement and those whom it influenced biicame com- mitted to what might be called "whole hog" importation of new Western ideas, with no questions asked as to their validity or their possible effects. A common joke WM that even the moon shone brighter in the Westein Hemisphere. In 1915, Japan took advantage of the fact that the Western powers had their hands full in Europe and helped itself to Shantung Province. When World War I hostilities ceased, the day was celebrated with a gigantic student(' parade in Peking, international justice, it was believed, would now be meted out, and Tsingtao and the other German concesdons in Shantung would be returned to their rightful owner. When, therefore, the Versailles decision went in favor of Japan, the students were bitterly disillusioned, and on I May 1919, staged a demonstration against the Vemulles settlement. The police intervencil, and arrested 32 students. The Peking student population protested energet- ieally, and the protest was echoed by students out over the nation. The government 325 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ....,?.0.11-.4????,????????, 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 was showered with telegrams from merchants, newspapers, and professors expressing solidarity with the demonstrators who had been jailed, until finally it had no alternative but to release them. The Minister of Education and the Chancellor of Peking University promptly resigned, and the students were able to chalk up their first victory. From then on, the students as a class were more or lees regular participants in the national political scene, and exercised a profound influeiree upon the subsequent course of events. There were several reasons why the students were able to do this: To begin with, they enjoyed the social prestige and respect inherited from the traditional literati or scholar clam. In China, the educated men had always been respected, regardless of what he really knew. Students reterned from study abroad enjoyed a prestige of their own, although often what they had learned was, in many ewes, quite without application in China. Second, perhaps because of their youth, they were more daring and idealistic, more ready to strtiegle for freedom and justice than other people; because of their daring the initiative came to lie with them, and many who were less tiering could at least recognize in what they did an espression of their own aspirations. Third, the student demonstrations were an impressive spectacle, and thus a dramatic means cf making public opinion articulate, especially since the Chinese press WM still relatively undeveloped (The reading public at that time comprised not more than five percent of the total population.) Fourth, because they were concentrated in the colleges and schools, the students were in a better position than others to organize and develop collective strength. After their first victory, a marked change came over the students: a great surge of patriotism and nationalism swept over them, and, at the same time, their antiforeign resentments were transferred from the Manchus to the Japanese and the Western imperial- ists. Instead of uncritically accepting the West, many of them began to view Western practices and ideas with great skepticism, especially as they became more conscious of their own power. This skepticism was fed by two famous scholars, Liang Chi-chao and Liang Sou-ming, both of whom, in their writings, expressed grave doubts about Western civiliza- tion. Their long-term influence upon the Chinese student was tremendous, and there was widespread study and discussion of the pros and cons of Eastern and Western civiliza- tion. The dislike the students had felt toward Confucianism was translated into dislike of Christianity and, in the end, all religions and all mission schools. More and more of the students came to believe devoutly in modern science as the source of all good and the source of all power; more and more of them came to regard Western imperialism as the source of all evil. In short, they adopted a general intellectual position in the context of which the Russian Revolution of 1017 was to have a very special meaning for them. Both Ch'e.n Tu-lisiu, the Peking University professor, and Li Ta-ehao argued, con- vincingly from the students' point of view, that World War I marked the failure of capitalism and hailed the victory of the "proletariat" in Russia and Germany. Bolshevism, they held, would triumph over capitalism and imperialism. Soon many students were speaking of bolshevism as the answer to China's problems. The first recruits of the Chinese Communist Party were these students and some of their professors. Only gradually were they able to attract labor and the peasants to their fold. Dr. Sun also viewed Russia with a certain approval, and sought its help in uniting the ceuntry In 1023 he sent Chiang Hai-shek to Russia to study Soviet military organiza- tion. (Later Chiang was to head the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton, where students from every part of the country were sent for military training.) The traditional attitude of the educated class (and of many other Chinese as well) toward military prowess gradually changed as military strength and physical force became accepted as necessary for the expression of patriotism. 326 ??? STAT . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ....,.r..F.-"+.rv????????.,????.??? ge. ???????16 In 1025, on 30 May, the students again showed their strength by a strike and mass demonstration in sympathy with a labor strike in a Japanese-owned mill, only to be flied upon by the British police in the Shanghai British concession. In four or five days Shanghai was paralyzed by a city-wide strike involving 200,060 workers. The whole nation became indignant, and parades were staged in almost all die important cities. The ground was thus laid for the successful uniting of China by the Nationalist government in 1927, with the battle song of "Down with the powers! Eliminate the war lords! Success to the national revolution!" There teems no doubt, in retrespect, that the Communist ideology gained adherents among the students fairly rapidly through the 20s, and that a major mason for this was that the Communists' propaganda was tailored to the students' mood Even after the split in the government during 1927-192S, when the Communist student organisations were driven underground, such Communist propaganda plus the secrecy and discipline of the Com- munist movement, continued to attract China's frustrated and confused youth. The social sciences were much in vogue among them, and this also !tided in their Communization because of the vigor with which the Communists fed their interest in social questions with books on Marxism and dialectic methods, and with new translations of Communist authors like Marc, Engels, Lenin, and Bukharin. When the Japanese seized Manchuria in 1931, the students again expressed indignation by organizing parades and strikes, and commandeering trains bound for Nanking, where they could present their protests against Japan to the centre! government itself. Although the government did what it could to repress these activities, they continued through the next four years. The students, in general, showed little interest in the government's counter-propaganda campaign, the so-called New Life Movement, the purpose of which was to persuade individuals to revive the Confucianist virtues in their daily lives. When Japan invaded the five North China provinces i0-1035, the student movement exploded into the massive demonstration of 0 December. The following year, an all-China student union was inaugurated in Shanghai, with representatives from 16 cities representing 200,000 students at universities and middle schools. A Students' National Salvation Union was organized, and later integrated into the People's National Salvation Front. Teachers and students began to carry their message into the countryside anethe industrial centers. By 1937, one could speak of a resistance movement that was nation-wide. The govern- ment's declaration of war on 7 July 1937 was at least in part a product of the students' efforts. While-Collar Class There arose a new class corresponding to the white-collar class in Western industrial society. It included that body of business personnel which kept track of the commitments involved in everyday business and which operated all of the new technical paraphernalia: bank clerks, accountants, stenographers, and secretaries, and, along with them, the teacher in the modern primary or high schools, and the rank-and-file civil servants. Most people in the categories mentioned were people born into the scholar class, and most of them were products of modern education; they had gone at least through a modern high school, the course of doing so had lost their faith in traditional practices and ideas at a time when, for other reasons, they were losing their traditional economic base (i.e., land ownership). Professional elms There arose a new claw of specialists (doctors, lawyers, engineers, and architects), and professional military men who had studied at the Whampoa Academy or gone to Japan, Russia, or Germany for military training. The traditional notion that "good iron is not Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 327 ,g,???????????????10..{...60...wtril, STAT 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Aoki. used for nails and good men are not soldiers" gradually lost ground as this class won recog- nition. Fighting fer one's country became, to the minds of many people, an honorable or even glorious professional activity. IMPACT OF SOCIO-ECONOule rilANOF ON TRADMONAL soeterv The transitional period in the class structure of Chinese society just described was paralleled by a transitional period in Chinese family organization, whirls became, among other things, a major preoccupation on the part of Chinese writers. The traditional family did not completely disintegrate or disappear any more than the traditional social classes. In the interior sections of China, especially, marriage still remained the affair of the young couple's parents, not of the principal them.selves. The combination of old and new that characterized the transitional period was, if anything, more striking within the family than elsewhere, if for np other reason than because of the sheer variety of the modifications and compromises that individual family units worked out for themselves. The Family The family was rapidly lasing the self-sufficiency that it at least approximated in the past, and had always striven for as an ideal. Coal quality, cheaply priced textiles appear to have played an important role here, in the sense that it was these that first attracted the peasant.- to the idea of meeting come of their needs outside the family, and thus to the idea of earning cash with which to pay the price. Opportunities for earning cash outside of the family were etpanding rapidly, and were open to men, women, and children. The fact that labor was to some extent redundant on the farms hastened the peasants' adjust- meet to the new state of affairs. Some peasants sent their sons to the cities and hired the sons of neighbors to do their farm-work. Younger sons were especially likely, along with daughters, to be urged to seek urban employment., and simultaneously decrease the family's needs and add to its income. The fact that individual members of the family were less directly under the supervision of the family head also speeded the adjustment, as did improved transportation facilities, which tended to encourage migration. The chin cluing ceased to be the chief provider for the family and the chief authority on how to gain one's livelihood; and as his economic functions thus became more restricted, he lost also in power and authority in general. Young people, by contrast, simply because young and thus more daring and adaptable, learned the new ways quickly, and gained rapidly in economic function; many found themselves, overnight, earning more than their parents had ever dreamed of. In the eyes of those who did make the adjustment, the "old man" ceased to represent wisdom am'! virtue and became a symbol of outworn tradi- tion. The chia cluing, to be sure, remained nominal head of the family, and most of the younger members of the family who went out to earn a living sent home part of their earnings. But they were none the less obviously in a new bargaining position, and the hold the;r families had over them unavoidably became less and less strong. Yet even this state- ment must not be pressed too far: the old values were not snuffed out, and Chinese society, by comparison with other societies, remained one in which respect for and coartcay to the older generation were universal. The size of the family, similarly, continued to vary with economic status. Indeed, the major change here had to do with the large-family system among the well-to:lo, which disintegrated rapidly as young couples went off to the city, leavirg the older generation behind on the farm because of the high cast of urban living and the housing shortage in the cities. 328 ? STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 3IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Individual loyalties began to shift to broader groupings than the family. Modern education, the new ideologies, the encroachment of foreign powers and the feeling of injustice and indignity that it produced -- all these made the individual aware of his identity as a Chinese and gave him a common bond with all other Chinese. The surge of nationalism, predominant among the students, spread over the entire country. Young people of nil classes argued about politics and Westernization The family remained an important factor in people's lives, but they :eased to weigh their actions as if they had no kng-term significance save to cast glory or dishonor upon ancestors; indeed, many youths became willing to forfeit their family life in order to join the struggle for national freedom. A third conspieuous development was the changing role of women. Attention has been paid to the high percentage of women among the new industrial workers, but that is only part of the picture A stialy of factory girls in Shanghai, made in 1937, showed 12.4 percent of them to be between 18 and 21 years of age, 83 percent of them single, ntul 16 5 percent married. This meant that the time had eeme in China when a woman could establish her identity es an individual apart from her family Far from her being economically dependent upon it, the family had come to depend in greater or Termr degree upon her Daughters ceased to be regarded as liabilities, to be gotten rid of through marriage at an early age, but rather as economic assets as more and more women were drawn into textile factories, match factories, and electric appliance shops, or became waitresses, barbers, shop assistants, and beauty technicians. Marriage, though still regarded as a woman's ultimate destiny, tended to be postponed to a later moment in life than formerly (In the more well-to-do families marriage tended now to he postponed, but for a different reason, namely, the number of years required to complete a modern education.) The daughter who left home to work was thrown on her own resources. She made new contacts outside of the home. Usually these first experiences of freedom resulted in her demanding more of it, and soon she ms wishing to choore her own mate, rather than spend her life under the domination of some male she had never seen before the day of her mar- riage. A husband of her own choosing would be more likely to show her respect as a person. The day came when women suffragettes made their voices heard Educated women penetrated all fields of work, and began to feel themselves equals of the men with whom they worked and competed. Women succeeded as lawyers, doctors, social woitters, radio announcers, dentists, nurses, government officials, bankers, police officers, and even agri- cultural specialists and engineers. They participated in the protest movements and in the demonstrations. They joined national athletic meets and established new records. They became movie stars and jazz singers. They entered the literary field and the educational field as professors or as directors of schools or academies A women's bank was launched. Some women adopted the practice of maintaining their maiden names even after marriage, to emphasize their indiN iduality. Grandparents still wanted grandsons, but a daughter-in- law was no longer judged solely according to her ability to produce male heirs (childless marriages, however, were still frowned upon, and a baby boy was still much preferred to a baby girl, and the wish for continuity of the family was still deeply rooted). Ancestor worship, without by any means dying out, became less formal and less elaborate, end the feeling of absolute obligation to one's ancestors was less intense than formerly even in those families in which the formalities were most scrupulously observed. Ancestor worship became more and more a mere memorial ceremony, like the Western custom of putting flowers on the graves of one's grandparents, and more and more was valued primarily as an occasion for getting all the family together for a good feast Gradually bowing took the place of "kowtowing." "1 kowtow to my ancestors' tablets to make my parents happy," became a common saying. 329 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release -2,IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 STAT ` ? r? ? ? ? ? ? ? dp ? ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Youth's demand to be heard about the choice of marriage partners produced many conflicts and many compromises, with not a few tragedies and disasters. Some young people, having made their stand, discovered that they were not prepared to give up their family inheritance, and backed down, i.e. acquiesced in their parents' wishes as to whom they should marry In some families, the parents drew up a list of possible candidates, and allowed the Eon or daughter to choose from among the names on it. Many young people chose for themselves, but left the final decision uo to their parents. But there were also extreme individualists, mho completely ignored their parents' wishes. One result of all this, and the confusion it produced, was that there were numerous fumes of bigamy, the typical ease being that of the young student who left behind him, while he pursued his studies, a wife chosen by his parents, fell in love with a girl of his own choosing at school or in the context of this or that urban contact, and ended up "marry- ing" her Engagements, especially childhood betrothals, could be broken, but divorce was possible only by mutual consent, and the wife would nut be likely to agree to it Usually, therefore, she was left in ignorance of her husband's new attachment, to live off her hus- band's family land and hope for the best as to what he might do in the city. In this period, there were no set standards, and sharply differing opinions 43 to what was right and what was wrong. Among the wealthy, there was a good deel of ol,en concubinage. Another int:Testing phenomenen of the transitional period was the glorification of romanti. love The writers dealing m ith the family attacked the old system, and chronicled the frustrations and trageiies of contemporary youth. A translation of Dumas' story of Camille became a "best seller." In the wedding ceremony itself there ---e numerous compromises. The bride no longer covered her head with a scarf, and her wettuing gown might well be of pink satin ? not red, as in the old fashioned family-arranged wedding, nor white, the color of the modern Western-styled bridal costume, but the color worn, in traditional China at funerals. The bridal couple did not always kowtow (k'o-t'ou), but as often as not merely bowed to their elders and to the ancestral tablets. The bride did not necessarily come in a sedan chair; a borrowed automobile with red and green streamers and, as likely as not, a cupid fastened to the hood, was a common substitute for it. The marriage broker had pretty much disap- peared from the scene, but men and women and boys and girls often were without the up- bringing they needed in order to do without him; they were not used to being together, and felt ill at ease in each other's presence. There ver s not many mixed social oceasiona, so that the typical young man had to rely on friends, friends' wives, or his own sisters to introduce him to girls. (Newspaper ads for "lifelong mates" often appeared in the press.) At the wedding ceremony, which was the traditional ceremony only slightly modified, the friends who first introduced the couple to each other were often invited to take the role of the middleman. Not infrequently, couples would decide to get married, and then invite some common friend to take the role of middleman at their wedding, so that there came to be a popular joke about the "middleman" who became a middleman just after his clients decided to get married. As for the ceremony itself (few weddinga were held in churches) some person of reputa- tion and high social standing was usually invited to be "(linkman." The wedding march would start, and the bnde, in her semi-modern bridal costume, veil and all, would walk in on the groom's arm. Two middlemen (representing bride and groom), the bride's father and the grocm's father would take their places with the chairman on the platform in front of the bride. Each would make a short speech followed by a long speech from the chairman, full of wishes for luck, prosperity, and, invariably, for offspring. After the exchanging of rings, and after everyone (middleman, father, chairman, bride, and groom) had fixed his 330 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 )1 ) ..,,,,?????????????????????? ? seal to the marriage certificate, the bridal couple bowed to each other, bowed to the per- sonages on the stage, and bowed to the guests. Finally, there was a feast, or perhaps only a tea, in the course of which the newlyweds would tout all the guests and thank them for being present. There existed the ultra-modern, free-love contingent, not large in numbers but highly symptomatic of the times. The newspapers often, for example, carried an announcement that such and such a man and woman had mutually agreed to "cease CollSbit trig," and that "the marriage of either party will be of no concern to the other." A new legal code was finally promulgated in 1930, in the attempt to impose some order on all this confusion. Its provisions were based on an essentially Western concept of marriage: marriage is a civil contract, and the only way agreement to marry can be made is "by male and female of their own accord." Engagements can be broken with legal impunity it they are family-arranged. Marriage vows must be assumed in an open ceremony and in the presence of two "introducers" (usually friends, not prdessional middlemen). No registration is necessary in order for a marriage to be legal. Divorce is like the breaking of any civil contract, and is thus permitted by mutual consent, given in the presence of two witnesies. (The breaking of childhoixl betrothals and engagements were numerous after the new code was promulgated, and were frequently mentioned in the press.) The new code contemplates that the wife will reside in her husband's home and assume his surname, but otherwise recognizes the equality of women. They can choose their mates as freely as men, and retain their property rights after marriap. (The inheritance laws of the period also put the daughters on an equal footing with aons.) The code makes adultery a punishable offense without regard to whether it is com- mitted by a man or a woman, and does not mention coneubinnge. (The children of con- cubines, although illegal, can easily acquire legal status.) Public opinion on these questions moved less rapidly than the law, and continued to apply a double standard. Women were more readily condemned than tnen. In the vast hinterland, especially the rural areas, traditional marriage customs changed much less drastically than the new code would suggest. The kinship grou during the transitional period tended, generally speaking, to be restricted to a narrower circle of relations, i.e. to the persons who might fall within the category of the large family in any country: parents, sons and their families, paternal uncles and their offspring, married aisters and paternal aunts, maternal grandparents and maternal uncles, fathers-in-law and their married daughters and their families. However, the differences here from group to group were quite arbitrary, and the size of the kinship group, like that of the family, continued to depend upon economic considerations. The poor had fewer relatives than the well-to-do, partly because they were more shin t-lived than the rich, and partly because their limited resources made it more difficult for them to keep in touch with all eligibles. The notion that relatives are obliged to WI) one another did not, however, disappear, nor was it necessaiily circumscribed at an equal pace with the shrinking of the day-to-day kinship group For example, it was still customary for the well-to-do to assist their needy relations with money, and for the poor to help them as they could in other ways; the only change was that the public opinion pres.lure was leas insistent than before. In the villages, the lending of tools and mutual assistance continued to be common practices. The cele- bration of festivals continued to enjoy a high priority and, at least at New Year's and the mid-Autumn Festival, the traditional concept that people who were akin shopld he united, and that gifts shnuld be given on such occasions, still held strong ? for all that the govern- ment, in connection with the New Life Movement, was denouncing feasts and gift-giving at feasts as "extravagant," and was promoting mass weddings, i.e simultaneous weddings Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 331 STAT 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ii ? ? of a number of pei,ple, who pooled expenes. The government's ons!aught against the traditional New Year Festival of the Lunar Calendar, and its simultaneous nttempt to "sell" China on the Western New Year, also failed of their purpose Far from eliminating New Year feasting, they ended up giving the Chinese two New Year feasts instead of one: first the skflivial national holiday on 1 January, and then, lati r, the tiaditional New Year's, i%ith all shops closed and no one appearing for work largely by tacit anal wholly unofficial common understanding. The Clan System The elan system declined through the transitional period In the South, where it had been strongest, sine continued to see evidences of its operation, particalarly in the villages. eie ancestral temples, the vell-kept graveyards, the clan schools, and clan lands. Most of the clans had always drawn their income from land, which they leased out either to members or to outsiders, and from money-lending operations. It Was on this income that clans hail relied for financing their defense, their celebrations, and their sehools, which simply could not have been maintained without it The clearest indication of the clan's decline dunng the transitional period was the falling off of such income, which wits in turn largely the result of an increase in privete land-ownership at the expense of Han land-ownership. (Many of the socially prominent, and economically powerful members of the clan hail used their position to conch their immediate families at the expense of other clan membere..) In Central and North Chinn, where the elan had never been very strong, it now ceased to show any strength at all. Temples fell into decay, or disappeared. The clan heads became mere figureheads, who held office for life. Clan ceremonies often failed to be held, and clan ancestor worship was neglected. Even here, however, the well-to-do continued to recognize responsibilities toward clan relatives who were in distress, and the powerful continued to give preference to and do favors for fellow clansmen, both in filling jobs and in transacting business. Indeed, such nepotism now became, for the first time, n problem; the traditional order could function normally with pretty much any amount of it, but from the standpoint of the industrialization and modernization of China, it was distinctly a handicap. Town and Village In traditional China, there had been no urban areas. There were towns, of course, but these weie not centers of production; rather they were the seats of the local govern- ments and the dwelling-places of the gentry In the transitional period, the towns under- went little change The riceshops, pawnshoos, tea houses, tailors, carpenters, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, and other craftsmen carried on pretty much as usual. The tailor might now have a Singer sen mg machine, and the tea shops might have Standard Oil lamps. Flash- light beams might cut through the night in the dark streets, and one might see an occasional bicycle In general, there were more workshops and small-scale factories for making cigarettes or =tiles or weaving and spinning Rut the general pattern of town life remained the same ? In the village, the class structure ci mained urchnnged: peasants, landlords, and hired laborers. Absentee landlords, however, became more numerous as a result of a general movement of wi II-4 landowners to the prefectural towns. Despite the periodic re-emergence of a reasonably strong central government, the fundnmental unit of government continued to he the town or county (hsien). One widespread phenomenon of the times was the abuse 332 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 of power by the gentry and/or local officials at the expense of fellow villagers ami nearby farmers, usually with a view to acquiring increased income a ith which to buy more land, and further monopolize the numey-lending business and local trade. For the peasants, this meant excessive taxes and exorbitant interest rates and prices. Land oanership was, :is it always had been, very unevenly distributed. In 1935, the National Land Com- mission investigated 1545 large landowning families and 752,895 peasant families in 87 dis- triets scattered over 11 provinces. The average size of the former's holdings was 2930 mow, and that of the latter's holdings 15.8 mow. Both rents matrixes remained high, so that the peasants were constantly borroaing money at a high rate of interest. The National Agri- cultural Research Bureau's 1933 reports, bared on data from S59 hsten in 22 provinces, indicated that 52 ?Jercent of the farmers had had to borrow money in that year Nor did the peasants' difficulties end there; every civil war, every flood, drought, and famine brought further hardships, as did the world depression following World War I and the decay of Cluoese home industry as a result of the introduction or manufactured goods. Village economic activity in general had, however, broadened With the improvement of river, railroad, and highway eommunications, internal trade expanded with great rapidity. Localities began to specialize in the production of particular commodities that they might sell over the entire country, although the still prohibitive cost of transportation service placed sharp upper limits on how far this trend could go. More and more village youths went off to the cities Greater mobility was partly possible due to the improved transportation facilities, but partly to the currency of new ideas and new ways of doing things. Before 1931, mall attempts as were made at reforms in the rural areas were made, in the main, by pnvate organizations such as the Chine International Famine Relief Organiza- tion, by the mass education centers such as the Ting-hsien Experiment, and by extension projects at several colleges. Active government work in rural reconstruction did not begin until 1033, when the National Economic Council and the Rural Rehabilitation Commission came into being, and the National Agricultural Research Bureau of the Ministry of Industry undertook a number of surveys and projects. These resulted in technical improvements in plant and animal breeding, in soil improvement, in insect control, and in the introduction of veterinary medicine ? all, however, on a comparatively small scale. But there was a decided increase in crop prodoction, and significant progress was made in the building of dikes and irrigation canals. Highway And public health programs were also developed. With a view to correcting existing inequities in land ownership, the Land Law of 1030 (revised in 1936) cleated arrangements under which tillers of the soil might become miners of the land or, failing that, ha iv their rent reduced. A moven,-nt for a 25 percent reduction in land rent had, indeed, gotten under way in 1929 Reform of the land tax was undertaken at the National Financial Crnference in 1031, hut the resulting measures were carried out ith varying degrees of suceess in different provinces. As a reaction against high interest rates, there finally arose a credit cooperative move- ment. Beginning in I lopeli, it spread to 16 provinces and three cities until there were, by the end of 1935, 20,221 cooperatives with 1,001;102 members. Only 59 percent of these were credit cooperatives, the remainder being marketing cooperatives, producers' cooper- atives, and consumers' cooperatives. Some 51 percent were organized by the hsten govern- ments, 27 percent by cooperative organizing offices, 7 percent by the China International Famine Relief Commission, 4 percent by n provincial cooperative committee, and 11 per- cent under other institutions (e g., colleges and banks). The first national law on cooper- eratives was passed in 1931, and a Department of Cooperatives %Mg set up in the Ministry of Industries in 1935. The government encouraged the Luilding of fanners' unions and fanners' self-aid ()ionizations, as-lsting them with lecture groups and winter 333 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release .-;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 The Guild The guild also entered into decline during the period of transition. The strengths of the traditional guild had been its control of n local market, its simplicity, and its tight organization. As broader markets, including some abroad, were developed, the guild could no longer control the merket in which its goods were sold. Incosised mobility of labor and the attractions factories were able to hold cat to nrtisans hastened the day when the guild would aim lose control of its members. The apprenticeship system languished; apprentice- ship was unnecessary in order to become an industrial worker in a factory, and the trades that required apprentices were not always able to compete with the factories for recruits. When China's first big strike occurred, in 1919, some of the merchants' guilds took part, and there was a beginning period in the history of the labor movement when many guilds called themselves unions. Furthermore, many early labor unions developed out of guilds as the split between employer and employee became evident in the factories and labor looked around for means of protecting itself against exploitation. When this happened, the new organization did not bid for control of markets, but for better wages rind better working conditions. In 1930, the employers organized a Chinese Chamber of Commerce, modeled upon the foreign Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai and Tientsin. Actually an interguild organiza- tion (i.e intermerchant guild), its purpose was to integrate China's now sprawling business community. It was similar to the guilds in that it could, by sitting much like a court, settle indostiial disputes. The Secret Societies The secret societies became more active than ever during the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty. In 1899, the long dormant White Lotus Society took part in the Boxer Rebellion. The Hung (Red) League joined the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, but withdrew its support before the latter had run its course. As the confusion of the times increased, the flung League grew in size and power, and became an organization with various branches. Both the Ch'ing government and, later, the Western powers who were concerned about its activities in their colonies, did what they could to suppress it, but it flourished not only within China but among the Chinese rnigr6s in the US, Canada, South America, and the British colonies. In 1809, other secret societies joined forces with it, and its power was thenceforth able to make itself felt in those provinces far in the interior such as Szechwan, Shensi, and Shansi. Sun Yat-sen was deeply aware of its power resources, and whenever possible had his own revolutionary societies work with it. In 1905 Sun founded the T'ung Mtng Hui, one purpose of which was to unify China's secret societies. He paid personal visits to the various branches of the flung League, persuaded them, for immediate political purposes, to function as branches of the T'ung M2ng Hui, and then went abroad to raise funds for financing the revolution from their members. In the October 10th Revolution, it was the members of the flung League who took control of the cities in the name of the revolutionary movement. Another secret society that deserves mention is the Ch'ing Pang or Green League which operated mainly in Shanghai and is said, along with the flung, to have dominated Shanghai's underground (often the societies helped the Shanghai police apprehend murderers and other criminals). It is estimated that the Ch'ing Pang had more than 100,000 members in the late 20s: shopkeepers, merchants, coolies, bankers, ricksha boys, restaurant owners, policimen, gamblers, and lawyers. 334 STAT ???????????????????????????????????????????????? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: 3IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 e."????????66.66..^6,6666 6 In 1932, when the Japanese warships and army invaded Shanghai, the Red and Green Leagues took responsibility for the defense of the city. Eventually the Japanese withdrew their warships. In 1037 they again tried to defend the city; having faled, they fled in large numbers to Chungking. But thrsce of their members who stayed behind became the main- stay of the underground behind the Japanese lines. Mention must be made in passing of the emergence during the transitional period of modern organizations comparable to those of other countries, e.g., the YMCA, the YWCA, the Banker's Club, the Boy and Girl Scouts, and alumni and alumnae tmociations. 1 , 1 RISE CO, TIlE CIIINL5E COMMUNISTS China had progressed during the transitional period. At the end of it, it once more had a central government. By 1936, it had 10,000 miles of railroad and 60,000 miles of highways (10,000 more miles were inder construction). It had a telegraph network and a telephone network. Airlines linked major cities. It had an efficient postal service that was paying its own way. It had a modern banking ?system and a class of modern businessmen. Ita tariff autonomy had been regained The number of students in its primary schools was 21.4 million ? as against 1,500,000 in 1009-10. The basic policy of the Chinese government as of 1936 was to create a stable new social system that would be a synthesis of traditional Chinese and Western ideas. To this end, the revolutionary renovation of traditional Chinese society was to go on, by peaceful and controlled means if possible, for many years. Much remained to be done. Administra- tion on the higher echelons of national and provincial government had been modernized and improved, but little or nothing had been accomplished in this regard on the prefectural level. For one thing, the constant threat of domestic Communism and the continuous pressure from Japan had encouraged the government to emphasize administration from above, so that it. had viewed prefectural problems with indifference, and had not even attempted to mobilize local initiative behind the general objectives. For another thing, the old-style war lords and gentry, unable to defeat the national party, had joined it, and had reasons of their own for using their influence to prevent both the renovation of local government, and the reform of agriculture. Life for the common man had not become any easier: revolution and war and famines and floods continued to be his lot. First Soviet Republic of China A small group of Communists that had taken refuge in the southeast provinces set up the First Soviet Republic of China. It declared itself, and remained, independent of the national government, and very early began to conscript an army from among the peasants in the districts it governed. It expropriated the property of the rich, and divided the land thus acquired among landless farmers. It destroyed land deeds, promissory notes, and mortgages, and prosecuted such usurers and landlords and tax gatherers as it could lay hands on. It called itself, incidentally, the peasant movement, and proclaimed its devotion to freedom of assembly and freedom of elections. Women, it maintained, are the equals of men, and it created a new association to protect women's rights. It advocated new labor laws to protect "the workers." It opened "Lenin schools" to indoctnnate the public with its ideas. Most of all, it seized every opportunity afforded by the confusion of the times to undermine the existing order and the existing government of China, on the evident theory that the way to win power is to create chaos. Its technique was to work, as Marx had put it, "with the natural forces." It appealed to the idealistic and patriotic student and professor 335 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? by denouncing imperialism; it appealed to the peasant by taking sides with him against the landlonl and the gentry; it appealed to the industrial worker by taking sides with him against his employer. Kuomintang Actions When he took over the areas laid waste by the Cominumsts during their withdrawal to the Northwest, General Chiang attempted an extensive rural welfare program, with improved public health standards, an amended land law, reduced taxation, and improved agricultural methods as its objectives. Ile also sought to bring about a return to the Confucianist virtues in daily living: good manners, justice, integrity, self-respect, austerity. (Confucius' birthday, for example, was declared a national holiday.) This was the "New Life Movement" which now spread to (Alfa wrta of the country that it had never reached before. Had it succeeded, it might have done much to counteract the maladjostments caused by what might be called the lack of fixed standards of behavior at the end of the transitional period But it did not succeed, in part because it was impwed from above. Later, the Communists would make the ma,t of this lack of standards, as of Chiang's other failures. However, Chiang's record was by no means one of failure in all directions. By 1937, China was united as it never had been since well before the fall of the Manchu dynasty. The government, moreover, was presiding over an expanding economy, and 'as beginning to solve its revenue problem Given time, it might have made great strides toward a new and stable society, but time ran out when the first shots were exchanged between Japan and China at Lu-koloch'iao in North China in 1937, and started hostilities between the two countries. Chiang finally acceded to popular pressure and declared war. SUMMARY To summarize, the great changes that took place during the transition were: (1) The emergence of a new attitude toward age; the aged continued to be held in high regard, but the young were no longer prepared to submit to the command of a family patriarch. (2) The emergence of a new conception of the scholar and education: classical knowledge was gradually abandoned in favor of practical knowledge and the study of contemporary prob- lems. (3) The emergence of a new relation between the sexes: the double standard did not disappear, but women acquired rights they had never enjoyed in traditional Chinese society, among others the right to compete with men in the professions. (4) The emergence of a new attitude toward land: land ceased to be the orly or even the predominant form of wealth. (5) The emergence of a new loyalty, above that to the family, namely: loyalty to one's country. THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR, 1933 TO 1945 Gencral Effcas The Sino-Japanese War, though it was to go on for a long while, brought major disaster to China even during 1938, the first year of the hostilities. Peking, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow all fell into enemy hands, and gigantic mass migration had to be undertaken if China was to survive. Millions of people had no realistic course upen to them but to leave the coastal areas: their homes hail been destroyed, their land could not be tilled, and they could expect no mercy from the Japanese. The number of refugees has been estimated as having risen, at various stages as high as sixty million. 336 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release DIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Le The disruption of China's normal life, and the loss of lives and property were vast because the country's great industrial and cultural centers fell to the enemy very early in the war. Private organizations promptly rallied behind the government, however, to effect the necessary migration and accomplish certain things that had to be done before it could take place on the senle contemplated. Even with the war in progress., for example, China actually expanded its highway system, opened new air routes, anti built bridges and ferries. More than GOO factories were moved inland, involving some 116,000 tons of equip- ment and some 12,000 skilled workers and their families. Of China's 103 institutions of higher learning, 91 either moved or suspended operations Museums and libraries were transplanted ? by truck, rail, steamer, junk, sampan, raft, pushcart, rickshn, or wheel- barrow. Where there were railways, people perched on top of boxcars; where there were highways, they hitched rides on trucks. The rest walked, or were trundled on wheelbarrows, or moved along in ricksnas. The refugees underwent incredible privations. Zslany of them were obliged to relearn from natives of the interior areas to which they fled practices that their ancestors had put by generations earlier: how to make oil wicks fabricated out of reeds do the work of Standard Oil lamps, how to live with paper in lieu of glass window panes, how to build and live in houses of bamboo frame plastered with mud instead of bricks and concrete. But the Chinese appear to have accepted all this with little complaint. Tho world has rarely seen such a surge of spontaneous nationalist sentiment or such a display of unified, unshakable will to resist an external enemy. The war and the migration together ushered in a new period of rapid social change. The big, all prevailing fact of the period was the sheer impossibility of maintaining industrial and agricultural production at a level capable of meeting the needs of a suddenly displaced population plus a fighting army, and the growing difficulties in which the government, found itself as a result. Many of the government's tamporters, the business class in the industrial centers in particular, had lost their economic base and were unable to come to its assistance. The Japanese had occupied the consent areas which meant among other things that the government received no customs revenue, and had to rely for its income almost exclusively on the land tax from, of course, a territory greatly reduced in size. Yet the demands upon the resources were unavoidably greater than ever. Displaced persons turned to it, insisting that they not be left to starve. So did the civil servants who had held posts in what aas now occupied territory. So, finally, did the students who had left their homes in thousands to pursue their studies in Free China. One of the most remarkable phenomena of the period is that all the students in national universities were given free tuition and their room and board. With the government supporting more persons than ever on a sharply reduced income, and with the cost of living soaring from week to week, it was clearly impossible to maintain the government's charges in the style to which, respectively, they were accustomed The civil servants and the professors in the national universities and institutions, for example, were, in real income terms, paid a mere pittance, and showed little understanding of the government's predicament. They became, in consequence, discontented and sharply critical. There was, on the other hand, a small minority who were able to make a good thing, via hoarding and speculation, out of the new state of affairs, and this served to enhance the sense of injustice and the dissatisfaction on the part of others. The govern- rnent's attempts to deal with this situation, e.g., by it program of price control and a ration- ing system, were failures, in part no doubt because of the complexity and confusion of the problems iffvolved. Prices continued to rise, and the government, to meet, its obligations printed more banknotes, which only sent prices still higher The masses of the people lived from hand to mouth. Budgeting was out of the question, as were all kinds of fiscal and 337 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/04/03 IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 monetary planning. The government's difficulties more and more acute as the inflation proceeded; as supplies of goods, food especially, became progressively short of the demand, the general flight from currency into goods became more pronounced. The spirit of pelf-sacrifice and common purpose characteristic of the early days of the war gave way to anarchic pursuit of self-interest. The slogan of the day came to be "every man for himself." The Industrial 'Yorkers So effective was the Japanese coastal blockade that China's industry found itself completely cut off from foreign imports and any contribution they might make to its developmert It was, therefore, forced back upon native materials and upon such ingenuity as it could muster in the use of them. Aside from the Ilan-Yeh-Ping Steel and Iron Works, which had besn salvaged and transported, none of China's large-scale enterprises was left. The mines, electrical plants, and transportation facilities in Free China, however, the government took control of and kept, for the most part, in operation. Small-scale machine shops were set up to make native lathes, looms, steam turbines, oil burners, automobile spare parts, and light armaments such as rifles, machine guns, mortars, and hand grenades. Other types of industrial enterprise which were able to keep going were chemical plants, leather tanneries, and paper and alcohol factories. The number of Free China's industrial enterprises at the end of the war has been estimated at 5266, which presupposes a considerable number of industrial workers. The unskilled workers among them were mostly recruited in the locality in which the particular enterprise had come to rest at the end of the migration; the skilled workers and foremen were refugees, some of whom had brought their families with them, while others had not. They lived in congested makeshift quarters, and as the war went on suffered great privation because of the rising cost of living. Many positions in industry were filled by women, now more eager to work than ever because their families needed the extra income. Wages, of course, were able to rise some as the war progressed because, as a result of the inflation, manufactured goods could command progressively higher prices. Wages always lagged behind the rise in prices and, in any case, the industrial workers fared badly in this respect as compared to the traditional artisans and peddlers, who did business on a day-to-day basis and trafficked in necessities, or even as compared to such independent unskilled workers as the ricksha puller and hired coolie. In fact, one of the big changes in this period wits the general improvement of the lot of workers used to a relatively low standard of living received at, so to speak, the expense of that of workers who had been used to a relatively high standard. One interesting development of this period was the organization, festered both by the government and private industry, of producers' cooperatives as an alternative to the strictly capitalistic form of enterprise that had always been found in China in the past. Most of these cooperatives were established in villages, where they esrved both to meet local demand for their products and to contribute to the maintenance, safe from Japan's military and economic offensive, of a certain modest level of industrial production. They were established in such diverse fields as iron and coal mining, textiles, paper, printing, tobacco, building and building materials, flour and rice milling, dying and bleaching, pottery and porcelain, and machine works. Many of them Came to grief because of inadequate capital. Strikes were rare in Free China's industrial enterprises because with most people patriotism remained at a high pitch throughout the war. For the same reason Communism made scant headway among the workers, particularly during the early years. 338 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 41.???????????._____7? 4r. The Students A large number of students migrated with the universities and colleges when they were forced out of the coastal areas. Others came later, as enemy control tightened in occupied China. Many lost everything, including their credentials (transcripts and identi- fication papers) on the way to the interior. Many made a considerable part of the journey on foot. Arrising at their destination in Free China, they were crowded into improvised school dormitories, mostly in dilapidated, floorless local temples or in temporary shacks. Cold, malnutrition, and disease were their tinily lot. The support they received from the beleagured Nationalist government, though generous by comparison with the resources at its disposal, was always inadequate to meet their barest needs. Their lessons were constantly interrupted by bombings, or, worse still, by the recurrent need to move on as the Japanese Army advanced. Block prints on grayish brittle paper served them in lieu of textbooks. Laboratory equipment was seldom available, even for courses in which it is usually regarded as indispensable. When the students were obliged to study at night, they pored over their badly printed leaflets as often as not, under candlelight. Free China's educational institutions were scattered about over the hinterland, with a considerable concentration in three centers: Chungking, Chengtu, and Kunming. In spite of all these physical privations, the students' spirit and interest in national and international affairs continued. By 1939, astonishing as this may seem, there were 40,000 students enrolled in refugee colleges, as against only 32,000 in all institutions before the war. To be sure, this expansion took place to some extent at the expense of the colleges' standards especially because of the bombings and the inadequate equipment ? at least in the strict academic sense, because in other respects the colleges thrived as never before. Many students for the first time came into direct contact with the peasants, and saw how the majority of their fellow countrymen lived and toiled. Because of their poverty, more- over, they were forced to move closer to practical living than, they ever woisd have, had the colleges never migrated. They grew their own victory gardens. They learned the value of labor. They produced new types of poetry, and a new kind of drama, modeled on that of the West and emphasizing such new themes as nationalism, individualism, and freedom. They made agricultural and sociological surveys of hitherto little known parts of China's vast, undeveloped hinterland. As times became harder the Communists, capitalizing upon the injustices the students saw about them and the hardship they were suffering under the existing social order, were increasingly successful in winning converts among them. The Farmers Few peasants moved into Free China. It was not easy for them, tied as they were to the land, to join the migration. Those who remained in occupied territory, especially those who remained in the areas of battle, suffered intermly. The Japanese Army lived off the food they grew, and kept them terrorized by its foraging and its disregard for the law and for normal standards of justice. Most of the landlords and local gentry moved, fairly early in the war, into the towns and cities. The pensants, in consequence, enjoyed more freedom than they ever had before, and had a relatively free hand in supporting, or even participating in, guerrilla activities calculated to harms the thinly-spread Japanese troops. The peasants in the hinterland fared somewhat better. They still had their high rents and taxes to pay, but soon after the war began agricultural products were commanding unprecedented prices. Because the government could not do without their produce, it 339 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1 went to great lengths with assistance measures for them. It sponsored the kxtension of credits through variou0 banks. It made soil surveys and conducted novel sricultuml experiments; it, introduced new foods and new methods of cultivation. Colticription, however, impoverished the farming areas by draining off tens of thousaads of e-hodied men, and the landlords, by successfully evading taxes, shifted much of the war :!'mo tax burden onto the backs of the peasants. Early in the war, when taxes and rents xvre still being paid in cash, this added burden was not intolerably heavy. But by 10.11, taxes were being collected in kind rather than in cash, and the peasants' lot became harder, though it was at no time the clam upon which the war levies fell heaviest. Salaried Class The Chinese upon whom the war inflicted its wounds most savagely and directly were those of the salaried class: the professors, the civil servants, the clerk; and the teachers. Their income, despite a series of upward adjustments, always lagged far behind the rapidly rising price level In order to survive, they were obliged to htrip themselves of possessions, send their wives out to work, hold down several jobs simultaneously, seek jobs as manual laborers (which they would never have considered doing in the past), and learn to perform for themselves the manual tasks that they would normally have had performed for them by servants. The government, was not unaware of or indifferent to their predicament: be- sides increasing their pay, it sought to help them by rationing such staples as cooking oil or cloth, and, in the end, tied their wages directly to the cost of living as is done in some contemporary labor agreements. As these measures proved cumulatively inadequate, salaried people, making perhaps the most difficult adjustment of all (given their back- grounds and upbringing), began to protect themselves by "playing" the market for goods ? getting their current resources out of cash into goods, especially goods whose prices might surely be expected to go up. This, of course, merely increased inflation, which in turn forced them into further operations of the same kind. Nor was that all: this dab- bling in the functions of the "lowly merchant," in a context in which others were playing the market more successfully and on a much larger scale, did much to undermine their ca- pacity to give to Chinese society the chief contribution it needed from them, namely, that of maintaining high professional and patriotic ideals in such fashion as to serve as an example to others. Speculators and Racketeers There was, as has been intimated, one group that profited enormously from the war ? the speculators and racketeers. This group recruited itself, as the war proceeded, from several major sources: former gentry who had become government grain assessors and tax collectors, military officers handling army payroll funds, covetous merchants who knew a good thing when they saw it ? all people who either because of their official position or because of their accumulated capital were in a position either to outguess or manipulate the market. As the scale of their operations increased, and the inflation itself soared to greater heights, they became increasingly daring and ruthless, and more and more often crossed the line that divides shady business transactions from out-and-out crime. The government, in part because many of them were among its supporters, never dealt with them with the firm hand that. would have been needed if the inflation were to be stopped. The Family A vast number of families were broken up by the mass migration. The pattern, insofar as there was one, was for the grandparents to go back where they came from and live off the land, and for the younger members of the family to try their luck in unoccupied China. 340 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 But bombings and the hazards of wartime travel drove the members of particular families every which way, and once a family's members were separated them was little likelihood of their getting back together. Thousands of the industrial workers and government employes who followed the government into the hinterland left their wives and children behind them, many of them because their wives refused to venture into the unknown hardships ahead The resulting separations lasted for many years, and created great problems of their own, not the least of which was that of the "war-of-resistance wife," who became a still greater problem if the "war-of-resistance husband's" first wife finally got through the lines to join him. After the war, a law was passed giving "resistance wives" legal status, and the problems, in consequence, mounted still further. In Free China, family life went forward in conditions of greet economic stringency. Most families were cut off from any economic base they had had in the land. and thus could not fall back on it. in a pinch as they had done in the post. Most were progressively impoverished by the inflation; and because of inflation and overcrowding even the most elementary hygienic precautions went by the board. Women, in much larger numbers than in the past found it necesetry to find some way of supplementing their families' incomes. Many launched small businesses: little tea shops, for example, or second-hand clothes stalls in street markets ? anything that did not call for a large amount of capital. Many sought jobs as teachers, clerks, and office managers. The People's Political Council, highest advisory organ in the government, had its complement of women members. Nurseries staffed by women were organized for the children of employed mothers, as were the orphanages and Red Cross organizations launched in connection with the war. Some women joined the army, rad served in various military capacities. The famous guerrilla leader, Madame Chao, was only the mast famous of Free China's women soldiers. Austerity was the dominant note in the family ceremonies of Free China. Marriages were solemnized en masse instead of in the traditional separate ceremony for each couple, or were regarded as solemnized once they had been announced in a newspaper. What with the breakdown of normal local community restraints, sexual morels became unprecedentedly lax. Divorces, like marriages, often took the form of a mere newspaper announcement. One important development brought about by the war was that different classes of people ? students, laboreia, government off:cials, families, and individuals alike ? shared the same hardships in one and tie same cause, and thus were thrown together as they never had been before. They undoubtedly emerged from the experience with a new under- standing for each other, and a new kind of mutual respect and affection. Some other changes that occurred during this period can be mentioned here, despite the fact that they do not. concern the family as such. The isolated, conservative hinterland, where modem ideas and methods, especially in industry, had never before penetrated, became overnight a fist laboratory of social and economic change. The vital importance of agricultural products in the imports-starved wartime economy of Free China was reflected in a whole series of measures by which the government tried to promote the welfare of the farmer, particularly by reducing his rent and the rate of interest at which he could borrow money. Over against the rapprochement between classes must be set the fact, that as the infla- tion made living conditions more and more difficult, the law-abiding enslaved classes deeply resented the sudden wealth and privileges of the speculators. Their disillusionment and discontent on this score were aggravated by the unhappy course of the war itself, which finally shook many people's faith in the inevitability of victory and the future independence 341 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ..,???=????PM????????????? - OW. of China. Many developed a kind of cynicism that made them fertile ground for the seeds of Communist ideology. This tendency in turn WM aggravated by the government's perse- cution of the more radical elements, which seemed to many of them to confirm the Marxist dogma as to the relation between poverty and freedom under capitalism. Problems of the Nationalist Government The difficulty and complexity of the problem! faced by the government of Free China cannot be exaggerated. It had to create, out of extremely limited resources, an entire new economy, and make the latter meet the needs of a population being constantly expanded by the migration. It had to support a huge army, and provide facilities foe its cominunica- tions and logistics in a vast uhtleveloped area. Many critics believe. that the government's greatest error lay iz the policy of moderation it. adopted throughout the war It never succeeded, these critics allege, .n shaking off the traditional Confucian emphaqis on the "human factor" and on tolemnee. It was motivated by a deep sense of obligation toward its people, and hesitated to adopt the drastic and ruthlem policies that might have strengthened its hand in the Avar. It tried to assist every- one and, consequently, it is further alleged, pleased no one. Another mistake with which the government is often charged is that of failing to put down roots in the Chinese mase s with which to capture their imngination and support. This it probably could have done only at. the price of giving attention to and acting upon some of the current popular demands for reform, which would have called for very con- siderable change of basic political philosophy on its part. The whole regime, m started by Dr. Sun and continued by Chiang, was based on the notion of authority and direction from above ? on the notion of having government serve the needs of the people as inter- preted not by themselves but by higher authority. This failure had at least three important consequences: first, the government was never as effective as it might have been had it onjoyed enthusiastic popular support; second, its cumulative ineffectiveness drove it to tighter and tighter contrcls of a emitotalitarian character (e.g., its seeret police force became increasingly active as the war years passed) ?or, to put it a little differently, because it did not move closer to the people, it found itself obliged to move away from them; and third, by not reaching for mam support it gave the Communists an enormous strategic opportunity to do just that ? to cultivate the masses to espouse programs calculated to please them and to argue plausibly that. Communist objectives and popular nspimtions slweys coincided. They developed local units which concerned themselves, not always unsuccemfully, with local problems. They encouraged focal meetings at. which ordinary people were encouraged to speak their minds. They fostered cooperatives. They worked courageously with the pea.sants behind the Japanese lines, and themselves engnged in extensive guerrilla activities. And all this gave them a certain rapport with the IMISSCS that was to pay huge dividends at. a later date. Alliance with the Communists In 1937, at the beginning of the War, the Communists and Nationalists had agreed to a united front. At that time, the Communists already had their own autonomous regime on the Shensi-Kansu border, with some three million people subject. to its control. Militarily they concentrated on guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, and thus had none of the problems of supply and transportation that the Nationalists had to face. 1'hey were able to give to political agitation a kind of attention that the Nationalists reserved only for the 342 ? T STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 War. That is, they never forgot that they were engaged in a struggle for power that. would go on after the War. To this end they poured great energies (as more and more evidence that has come to light clearly shows to developing a program of land reform, to improving local administration, to perfecting their party organizations, and to lathling up an army for future use rather than for deployment against the Japanese. There are now available numerous eye-witness accounts of how they sought to undermine rather than forward the Nationalist war effort, both by skillful plopaganda exploitation of conditions in Free China and by seeing to it that it was their influence, not the Nationalists', that extended to the rural areas of occupied China. It was, therefore, the Nationalist Army that bore the brunt of the Japanese fighting. Late in the war, when the national government's forces were greatly reduced and weakened, the Communists became openly militant and aggressive toward them, with the result that an increasing number of armed clashes took place even while both were supposed to be fighting the Japanese. The Communist Army, only 8.5,000 strong in 1937, had expanded to over a million by the end of the War. The population the Communists governed had grown, meantime, from three million to sixty to eighty million people covering not less than eight provinces of North China. Party membership had grown from one hundred thousand in 1937 to one million two hundred thousand in 1945. POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT, 1945 To 1949. Internal Problems When the War finally ended, the weary Chinese were 'quite eager to put all thoughts of it. out of their minds except their resentment or the Japanese. Chinn had won, and now everything would be all right. Most of a11, everyone began to think about reversing the flow of the migration and going home. Every conceivable mode of transportation was pressed into service, so that soon all shipping space was booked for six months ahead. Believing that there would be better and cheaper goods at hcmc, families set up roadside booths and offered for sale the possessions that they did not need immediately and that would take up space on the return trip. Most of what they sold went for a song because of the limited purchasing power of the local population. The problems the Nationalist government was now called on to solve were staggering, and out of all proportion greater than those the Communists had to deal with in the territory they governed. It had to provide at least the equivalent of the prewar communications system of its hrea. It had to get the economy and social order of complex urban com- munities back on their feet. It had to take over the administration of Manchuria and Taiwan (Formosa). It had to set up arrangements for disposing of enemy property and for relocating millions of displaced people from both Free and Occupied China. Communi4 Duplicity These problems were eased somewhat by assistance of various kinds from the govern- ment of the United States. But Chiang paid dearly for this assistance as far as his domestic political position was concerned. For the Communists seized on the continued presence of US troops as a means of whipping up anti-imperialist, anti-American feelings, especially among the students and professors, and of identifying Chiang with American imperialism. This was the period when Chiang was often criticised abroad, even by nations allied to Chira, for his "refusal" to "cooperate" with the Communists. Was not even Communist Russia an ally and friend now? And were not the Chinese Communists, unlike Chiang, 843 STAT , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A JA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ti showing every willingness to cooperate? Such criticisms, which, reported lack to China, further weakened Chiang's hand politically, overlooked the fact that the Communists had nothing to lore by cooperating, especially since they were able to handle their negotiations with Chiang in such a fashion as to ranke it appear that he was determined to destroy them They did this so ouccessfully, indeed, that soon they were able to abandon even the pretense of a united front and, having progressively built themselves up into a well-organized, well- indoctrinated force, to become openly defiant. Thanks to their Russian neighbors in Man- churia, they were able to provide themselves with n huge supply of captive Japanese arms and equipment. When the Russians withdrew from most of Manchuria, they were able to consolidate their position there, thus not. only adding to their own strength but also, by the mere denial of Manchuria's resources to China, preventing the restoration of the rail network in eastern China and dealing a severe blow to China's entire economy. Instead of cooperating in the reconstruction of China, they made it their major business to farther discredit the national government. The threat of civil war loomed ever larger in people's minds, and created a state of uncertainty that helped the Communists if only by making Chiang look as if he were unable to govern China. This was especially true in economics, where the uncertainty, combined with the galloping inflation, discouraged investment and thus indefinitely postponed recovery. But it was true in other areas as well. Just as during the War, tlere were repressive measures, corruption, and thriving racketeers, all of which the Communists made the most of in their propaganda. Open Warfare By the middle of 1947, a full-scale civil war was indeed under way. It began, by Communist choice, of course, not in China proper but in Manchuria, where they were able, because of the Nationalists' long, stretched-out lines, to put to good use the guerrilla tactics in which they had gained so much experience during the preceding years. For the second time in a decade, the Chinese people found themselves fleeing before an army sweeping down from the North. Again trains and highways were jammed an, in area after area, the Communists' approach created general panic, with everyone eager to get away but with no clear notion as to where to go. Most people's first impulse was to go to whatever place in Chinn they had originally come from where there was family land that might keep them from starving, and where they could stay at least until they had some good reason for going elsewhere. For a time there was utter confusion, in many towns, with some people struggling to reach a given spot as a place of refuge while others were Itaving it. because it had become too dangerous. Finally, however, the strong traditional Chinese tendency to accept whatever conies fatalistically asserted itself, and people decided that escape was futile "Anyway," they reasoned, "we shrli have peace Thz. Communists are Chinese 1 change might be good. Could we be worse off than we are' After all, have not our former friends and allies also denounced the government?" Communist Victory The national government finally abandoned the mainland, and took refuge on the island of Formosa (Taiwan). The Communists marched successively into Peking, Nanking, Shanghai, Canton, and, finally, Szechwan. The whole of the vast mainland was theirs at last. 344 STAT : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ???,? 1. t I 1* 1( ? I. In September 10-19, the Communist Party convened the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference mule up of representatives of the various regions, of the army, of certain political organizations, and of a number of specified social groupings. This con- ference set up a central state structure, called the Chinese People's Republic. On 1 October 19.19, the new structure was officially inaugurated. TRE COMMUNIST SOCIAL ORDER, 1949 TO ? The Communists brought with them a new social order, developed and then tested under conditions of civil warfare. They have taken over, largely intact, the dynamic program of the C,onununist Party in the USSR, and adopted as its philosophy the doctrine of Leninism-Stalinism. By way of making sure that their will shall not be challenged, they maintain a well-disciplined and experienced army, four to five million strong. The backbone of the regime, however, is a highly disciplined Communist Party, which now has more than three million members, which, though it has always called itself the "party of the working class," does not, in fact, represent either China's workers nor its peasants. It has always shouted anti-imperialist slogans but that does not make it nationalistic. It originated ? and has remained ? a small group of professional revolutionaries, whose objective was the seizure and maintem.nee of power. It had a highly selected membership, and is regularly purged of its unworthy and doubting elements. The Communist Party is, in a word, a bureaucratic elite, whose object is total control, political, economic, and social, of the Chinese people. It makes no secret of the fact that, the Chinese People's Republic is merely a convenient instrument for accomplishing the eventual transition to n classless society in which its leadership will be undisputed. The ultimate aim, to which it, ruthlessly subordi- nates all else, is "a socialist and eventually Communist society, eliminating classes and realizing universal harmony." The social order that the Communists have built, and are continuing to build, has been planned at every point with an eye to a carefully formuLtted political goal. This is true in two senses. The social order, and the social program that underlies it, are calculated to translate into reality a political philosophy, and, meantime, to keep political power ex- clusively in the hands of those who accept that philosophy. When, with the passing of the year 1027, the Chinese Communist Party found itself driven from the cities and obliged to settle in the rural areas, Party strategy gave top priority to gaining the support of the peasant. Having grasped the enormous revolutionary potential of rural China, it saw to it that its army and the organizations it built and controlled were, for the most part, made up of peasants and dependent primarily on pealant support. Naturally enough, therefore, it emphasized a vigorous program of agrarian reform, and carried it out relentlessly. The "New Democracy" When, however, years later, it approached the conquest of the whole of Chinn, it remade its program, tailoring it to the preferences of city dwellers, especially industrial workers and intellectuals. At this time, therefore, one finds Mao formulating his concept of the "New Democracy," that is, "a new type ef revolution wholly or partly led by the proletariat, the first stage of which aims at setting up a new democratic society, a new state of the combined dictatorship of all revolutionary clas.sses." By 1919 he is saying: "The center of gravity has now shifted to the cities and the Party must do its utmost to learn how to administer and build up the city." To this end, he adds, the Party must not rely merely upon the working class, but mast "win over the intelligentsia and win over as 345 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 much as possible the petty bourgeoisie and their representative pc -onages to cooperate." More specifically, the New Democracy is "a people's democratIc dictatorship" ? an ailiance of four claws: labor, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoise, and the national bourgeoisie (meaning all merchants and industrialists untainted by foreign imperialism). Under the leadership of the working class (and Communist Party), thek four classes are to unite together, form their own state, and elect their own government whose task it will be to exercise dictatorship over the "lackeys of imperialism," the "landlord clam," the "bureau- cratic capitallq class," and the "Kuomintang reactionaries and their henchmen." The appanttus of the army, the police, and the courts, will one day wither away, but. will continue to he necessary as long as reactionaries anti imperialism are present on the scene. The classes hostile to the coming of Communism must somehow be deprived of their capacity to affect events, which means first of all cutting them off from political power by reserving to the "people" the right to vote anti to voice opinions. Even the "people," of course, base within them the vestiges of reactionary influences; they must be persuaded "to reform their bad habits and thoughts derived from the old society." In the case of the reaction- aries, more drastic measures will be used if they are needed to defend the people's interest. Thus the Communist Party justifies the liquidation of the undesirable elements in its social order. The People's Republic The People's Republic of China was launched as a "united front" of "the people." By "people," the Communists mean only "those who agree to support the New Democracy, oppose imperialism, feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism, and agree to overthrow the Kuo- mintang reactionary regime." There were 662 delegates at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference that created the republic. They represented, according to Com- munist claims, a broqd cross section of the people ? the reactionaries excluded. The avanic Late of the CPPCC The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference officially adopted an Organic Law of the new Central People's Government of the People's Republic of Chinn. This "Government," the supreme organ of the new state, has, as its executive head, a Central People's Government Council, of which Mao Tse-tung is President (he is also Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council, which controls all the country's armed forces). The conference also adopted a new capital ? Peking ? a new flag, and a new national anthem ? the simple and familiar battle song which had electrified the whole country dur- ing the first days of patriotic fervor after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War: "Arise, yc who would not be bond slaves!" The Central People's Government The Central People's Government, viewed as a political system, is an ascending hierarchy of people's congresses on several levels- hsien, county, province, and administra- tive area, with the All-China People's Congress at the top. Each congress elects the people's government at its level (e.g., the All-China People's Congress elects the Central People's Government). In practice, however, because of what is known as "democratic centralism," the system does not operate in the manner this description would suggest. For the people's government at the lower level is in fact confirmed by the people's govern- 346 .11??,????????????????????????????????????.???, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? rnent at the higher level, and it is clearly understood by all concerned that the people's government at the lower level obeys the people's government of the higher level (thus the smallest local people's government, any place in the country is a subject to the will of the Central People's Government on all matters in which it chooses to intervene). This "vertical" democratic centralism is supplemented by a horizontal device that helps to maintain control by a small group at the top and center: the same personnel, i.e., the Communist Party leaders Pre the highest officers of the People's Isberatien Army, and the highest officials of the goecinment, not only on the highest level but also on the regional, provincial, and municipal levels. kfloctrindion of the People In the present initial "revolutionary stage," the first task of the political machine just descnbed, and of the social order it controls, is "the mobilization of revolutionary forces." This the Communist Party accomplishes by sending well-indoctrinated and trusted Party executives or cadres out, among "the people" to rally them around some interest or program that will carry China a step farther toward the classless so c iety, or, what mounts to the same thing, will further undermine some traditional sorisl force that stands in the way of such a society -- if only by obstructing total Communist control. Each of these interests or programs thus becomes the raison d'Itre for a new institution, carefully devised so fit into the future fully totalitarian state. Always, however, these programs take the form of a mass organization of one kind or another. For example: the Communists identify a group of discontented people, and go to work to persuade them that they should demand such and such rights, or such and such a reform, which, whatever their or its merits would never have been conceded by the old order in China. Having persuaded them, the next step is to induce them to organize themselves for the express purpose of securing those rights or that reform. The common characteristic of its members may be social, economic, or professional, or it may he a matter merely of sex or age. It may be the Peasant's Association, or a Democratic Women's Federation, or a Federation of Democratic Youth, or an Association of Writers and Artists, or a Children's Corps or a Young Pioneers' Corps, or a Students' Federation. It might have as its base of operations a factory, a shop, a school, a company, or a government office. Its members might be the carpenters, or butchers, or artists. Every member of "the people's" society ? and nobody else is eligible ? sooner or later finds himself caught up in one of these "grass-roots" organizations, which really are grass- roots organizations except that the original impulse comes from elsewhere; most individuals will find themselves, sooner not later, in more than one. By controlling and guiding thesse organized protest groups, the Party can "coordinate directly and indirectly the armed struggle ? the principal form of struggle - - with many other necessary struggles, the struggle of the workers, the struggle of the peasants, the struggle of youth, of women and of all the people with the struggle for political power." The last five words of the passage quoted are the significant ones, for they say 69 clearly as possible that the Communists ultimately use these organizations for purposes entirely unrelated to the program or issue that brings them into being. Women's organizations or even children's organizations find themselves promoting land reform peasants' aociations, become centers for adult education, which turns out to be merely Communist induct rination. In Southern and Eastern China the peasants' associations became devices for, among other things, "registering" the peasants' weapons. Most mass organizations have a pyramidal structure like that of the political system, extending into every part of the country from the prefecture to the county to the province to the administrative area to the nation. Each has its congress and its executive committee 347 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 A01?1.1.. ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: z Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 " at each administrative and geographic level. Each applies the principle of "democratic centralism"; the congress at each level is "elected" by the organizational units at a lower level, but in fact is appointed from above. The apparently continuous link from the people to the top of the hierarchy enables the central authorities not only to keep a finger on the pulse of the organization as it whole, but to make the pulse behave as they wish. As in the political system, the real chain of command runs from the top downward. mostly via a hierarchy of committees The executive committee at each level is the actual directing body, and is, in theory, elected by the congress. Actually, the committee membership must be approved by the executive committee of the next higher level, and is subject to its discipline and orders. Every major "deeision," "order," "program," and "policy" thus originates with the central committee, and is passed down through the regional coal mittees to the grass roots, where it is seen to that the mass membership follows and imple- ments it. At the top of each organization is the inevitable national congress and the inevitable central committee. The Communist Party The Chinese Communist Party is specifically designated tho "highest command for the leadership of all organizations." Every organization is understood to be subordinate to the Party, is expected to look to the Party for leadership and direction, and is kept constantly reminded that "one may always appeal up." In each, a nucleus of Communist Party cadres call the tricks ? as the official literature puts it, "for the purpose of strengthen- ing the Party's influence and carrying out the Party's program and work." And, as indi- cated previously, the mass organizations are woven together into a complicated network the function of which is to produce mutual support for carrying out the Party's program. Communists in the political and military set-up often, to this end, are named to the executive committees of the most important mass organizations. In October 1950, according to official Communist statistics, the All-China Federation of Labor had over four million members, the MI-China Democratic Women's Federation over thirty million, and the Federation of Democratic Youth over seven million. In mid- 1951, according to the same source, the peasant's associations in four of China's six Admin- istrative Areas had a membership totalling over eighty-foot million. Making a generous allowance for exaggeration, one must still think of these mass organizations as gigantic. There is, moreover, every reason to think that they are still growing. The Family In the early days of their regime the Communists, as expected, found in the family the most stubborn and entrenched stronghold of China's traditional social order. This was especially true in the rural areas, where the Communists achieved their first great successes. From a very early moment, therefore, Communist propaganda denounced the traditional family system as "feudalistic and barbarous," and sought to expose its injustices and short- comings. The Marriage bow of 1950 The first law enacted following the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, accordingly, wits a new "Marriage Law" (1 May 1950). It purported, above all, to vouch- safe to women the rights they had been denied by the traditional order Its basic prin- ciples were individual rights and interests are to take precedence over th of the family; 348 STAT )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? _ proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 111 !. marriage is to take place only by mutual consent, and thus becomes a matter of individual preference; coercion of either bride or groom, intervention by a middleman, and payment of a dowry ? all typical features of traditional Chinese marriages ? bre prohibited under penalty of law; the family is the nuclear conjugal family; in order to contract marriage, a man and woman have merely to register in person with the people's government in the locality in which they reside, a husband and wife who wish a divorce may, similatly, obtain one merely by registering, though this step should, in the view of the law, be taken only after efforts have been made to preserve the marriage; in the absence of mutual consent to divorce, either party to a marriage may apply for a divorce on the grounds that continuation of the marriage will lead only to continued strife and to reduced productive capacity; within a going marriage, husband and wife are companions, and enjoy equal status in the home; each has the right to choose his or her occupation, to engage in work, and to partici- pate in social and political activities without interference from the other; husband and wife should engage in emulation contests of their own, and should review their achievements together; they have the same property rights, and each has the right to use his r? her surname; children boin out of wedlock can easily be legitimized by legal action "Husband and wife are in duty bound . . to live in harmony, to engage in production, to care for th.: children, and to strive jointly for the welfare of the family and for the build:ng up of a new society." Thus the duties and privileges of each member of the conjugal family, husband and wife, children and parents, are removed from private jurisdiction, to be defined by the state. Any violation of the Marriage Law is declared subject to punishment. Neither filial piety nor ancestors, both pillars of the traditional family system, are mentioned. The family is divested of all collective responsibility for its members' actions, and members of the family are no longer expected to put filial piety and duties to the family head first. Women under the new law, enjoy equal rights with men. (For example, widows are en- couraged to remarry, and to make their own decision as to what suename to use.) Equal rights, however, e.g., the equal right to own land, carry with them equal responsibilities. Women are expected to be equally productive with men; they are, for example, to till the fields not as a part-time job but as a major activity. By throwing the weight of the regime behind individual economic rights and claims (the wife's equal right to own land), the Communists weaken the traditional family and clan: families end up owning less land and individual dependence on them is reduced. The regime does, to be sure, encourage family councils, but the theory is that they will make for more rational division of labor and thus increase production, and that they will give the young a chance to express opinions on an equal basis with their elders. This, of course, is far from the traditional family and its practices. The regime has consistently urged women to seek assistance from the All-China Demo- cratic Women's Federation, and it appears that many of the women who have benefited as individuals, from the Federation's efforts, have become ardent members. There has been a marked increase in the number of cases involving marriage disputes that are heard by the courts, especially in the large cities, where such cases have accounted for half of all civil suits. The regime's intended substitutes for the family arc such organiza- tions us the Democratic Women's Federation, the peasant's associations, the Democratic Youth Corps (for youths 14 to 25), the Children's Corps, and the Young Pioneers Corps (for boy.; and girls 9 to 14). Each of these organizations attempts to protect the rights of its individual members, and thus performs many functions that, the family performed traditionally. Each, like the old family, demands the highest loyalty on the part, of its individual members. 349 STAT Declassified in Part: Sanitized Copy Ap IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 An early piece of Communist literature ? one which found its way into thousands of Chinese villages well ahead of the Red Army during the civil war ? throws interesting light cn the Communist attitude toward the traditional family and its relationships. It. was entitled "Don't Kill Him" and told the story of an oid mother who actually begs the Communists to spare tho life of the Red soldier who has killed her son. "Ile was only an opium smoker," she pleads, "so why kill a good soldier for him." Wives who criticize their husbands, children who inform on their parents, are put forward in such literature as examples of progressiveness and patriotism. The man and woman who have married for love and are careful not to neglect their work for the Party symbolize the happy Communist family. "They were able to reconcile their marriage and work." "I shall always," says the wife, "make work come first. I shall eradicate the little irritations in my private life, so that we shall have unity of purpose and thought and harmony in love." One story offers an account of a family of four sons. The eldest, an ardent Communist who serves in the army, tries to persuade his parents to let one or two of his brothers join up. "Are you no longer a member of our household?" the father accusingly demands, "Are you owned by the state?" The parents' "feudal ideas" are eventually changed, and they happily watch their sons go forth to do battle. No other blow that the family has sustained from the regime has been so damaging to it as the emphasis it puts on continuous attendance at long-drawn-out meetings within the organizations mentioned, with no ostensible reference to the family. Because of it, children spend little or no time with their parents: on many days they are away from home from early morning until time to go to bed, with every minute taken up with school and organiza- tion activities. Similarly, because of their jobs and their organizations, husband and wife II roe mu211 less of one another than would be the case if the regime did not make such a point of attendance at the latter. The Communists encourage openness and frankness in the expression of one's thoughts, among other things about relations between persons of opposite sex. This also helps to break clown the beliefs and attitudes clustered about the traditional family. The manifest ultimate aim of the Communist Party, in short, is the complete liquidation of the family system which China had known in the past. The regime attaches great value to having children under state care and protection from an early moment in their lives. By 1951 the number of nurseries had increased nine- fold as compared to the "preliberation" periods. Nurseries have been organized, for example, for children of working mothers, with such organizations as the women's federa- tions, peasant associations, and mutual aid groups taking the lead A mid-1951 directive of the Northeast Administrative Area stipulates that "Every factory or mine where there are women workers who have children must set up a creche or a kindergarten or both." Nor does the People's Government leave any doubts in anyone's mind that these are only the beginnings of a large and ambitious program in this area. Youth Groups The main organizations for children are the Children's Corps and the Young Pioneers' Corps. The Childrer's Corps has its far-reaching "Little Teachers" program, i.e., its mem- bers teaching adults in their home or village what they have learned in school, and helping peasant women keep in touch with their soldier husbands by mail The Young Pioneers' Corps, a rapidly growing organization of boys and girls from 9 to it, are taught Five Loves ? love of mother land, love of the people, love of labor, love of science, and love of public property ? not, be it noted, love of parents or home. The bases for these groups are schools, children's institutions, or residential areas (e g., an entire street or a village). Eight 350 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Ap ? roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? to fifteen children constitute a platoon, three to five platoons a company, and three to five companies a "detachment." The impelling force behind the program is the New Demo- cratic Youth Corps, whose members, together with a large number of school teachers, act as leaders and instructors of the various Pioneers' groupings (i.e., Part:, indoctrination). "Public activities" are their major concerns. Three all-China youth organizations ? the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, the All-China Student's Federation, and the New Democratic Youth Corps ? have been functioning since 1949. They were formed by merging all existing youth groups. The Farmers (or Peasants) and Agrarian Reform Another strong social force with which the Communists have had to reckon is the rural gentry. This class, even as recently as the time of the Communist. take-over, con- stituted a concentration of power which, clearly, the Communist could not have contented themselves with merely capturing. Besides owning much of the nation's land, it dominated finance in the rural areas and regarded local government and administration as, so to speak, sirup./ belonging to it. Here, as with the family, the Communiat objective has always been complete liquidation. The second law passed after the Communists came to power in 1949 was the Agrarian Reform Law which was primarily n measure for the redistribution of land. At one and the same time this took away the source of the gentry's wealth and power and mobilized the peasants' deep desire to own land. The basic concept of the Agrarian Reform Law is the right of every farmer to own land; the strategy against gentry, like that of the Communist offensive against the family, is to build up an individual right which the condemned traditional social force impedes. The law provides that every individual, man and woman, shall have a portion of land. But here, as in most matters, the major reliance has been placed in the hands of a mass organiza- tion whose technique and proceuure one may take as illustrative of the techniques and procedures of all Communist mass organizations. (It should be borne in mind, however, that one reason for the success of these huge programs is the realism and practicality of the Communist approach. The cadres are constantly reminded that they must not alienate themselves frorn the people; that they must set an example; that they must adapt to local conditions. The program of agrarian reform thus varies slightly from locality to locality, though not so much as to break the general pattern.) As the Communist Army liberated each new village, the first task to be undertaken was the suppression of bandits, i.e., the elunination of the remaining ICuomintang troops and any other identifiable anti-Communist forces. It was usually undertaken by the Red Army unit that had liberated the village, but in cooperation with a locally organized defense corps. When this operation was aell under way, party cadres or work teams arrived in the village to get propaganda activities started to collect n first land-tax. The teams usually included either a political worker from the People's Liberation Army or a member of one of the cultural work camps which trained specialists in all kinds of propa- ganda work. They preferred to put in their appearance at harvest time, so that the cadres might join in the work, gain the peasants' confidence, and gradually gather data about their grievances. They literally flooded the village with propaganda stories, plays, ballads, posters, and yangko dances. Personal interviews and informal group discussions figured prominently in their activities, as did "welfare programs" (eliminating insects, teaching illiterate adults to read). As time passed, the cadres were able to identify the "positive elements" and mobilize them, at which point the emphasis shifted from general propaganda to indoctrination of these elements. Conferences of peasant representatives would then be held at various 351 STAT eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? \-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 levels, beginning with the prefecture, then the cou ty, then the village, with a view to setting up "preparatory committees" for local pea-Rama' associations, which finally formally launched these associations. A system of "people's dtlinocratic political machinery," with the continuing function to recruit and train new cadres from among the more promising vil'Agers, soon replaced the old pao-citia system. The stage WAS then considered ready for the crucial "agraiian reform committees," which again were set up at various levels, and assigned the threefold function of gathering local population and crop statistic; surveying the land, and uncovering concealed land holdings. The peasant associations, meantime, would he expanding their membership and, a function of equal importance, learning to keep their leadership "purified" of any remnants or agents of the gentry class. The central task of each peasant association a as to carry out a program focusing on the local "tyrants" and "despots," i.e., the larger local landlords, who were pretty certain to have been also local officials. This involved, first ef all, drastic rent reduction, which the peasant had by now been taught to regard as merely taking away from the landlord what had never rightfully belonged to him. So-called "speak bitterness" or "truth-telling" meetings were held, at which the peasants ver urged to air their grievances, and at which, in open disemsion, the class status of the local inhabitants was determined Since a man's class status determined his fate, this was a matter of great importance. If, for example, peasant X ended up being classified as a landlord, his land, draft animals, farm implements, surplus grain, and surplus house in the countryside were forthwith confiscated. If he was classified as a rich peasant the land he owned, even if it were cultivated by hired labor, and his other properties as well thereby became protected against encroachment. (The distinc- tion between landlord and iich peasant is, accordingly, fairly arbitrary, and has caused no end of difficulty ? all the more because there was also a "middle peasant" classification, which carried with it. protection of land ownership and other types of property.) If he was classified a poor peasant or a farm laborer, he would be given land and other properties (farm implements, draught animals) expropriated from the landlords. His classification also determined both his rate of taxation and his eligibility to join the various mass organiza- tions. No one status was regarded as fixed until it had been confirmed from a superior echelon of the hierarchy of control. Another aspect of the associations' activities was the holding of carefully prearranged "accusation meetings," at which a handful of the allegedly worst local despots would be publicly tried. The idea was to do all that was necessary to stir up the hate and anger of the masse-s, and let it gain momentum and fury as the proceedings continued. This ac- complished several Communist objectives: it intensified class consciousees.s; it released the pent-up energy of the masses in a direction congenial to Communist purposes; and it enhanced the authority of the top local Communists by reminding possible future victims where power now lay in the community and how far it extended In many localities mob fury reached stash a pitch of intensity on occasion that the necuged had to be spirited away to prevent his being torn to pieces. The actual sentences were pronounced at a later date by a "People's Tribunal," i.e., one of the special courts created at this time to handle agrarian reform problems on the bases of evidence collected at the areti.ntion meeting ? at whirh, incidentally, emotions were further aroused by the yangko dancing in vogue at this time. The nntidespot movement gradually widened in scope to include landlords who had in any way showed their resentment of the reform, or had allegedly participated in secret society activities. The usual penalty, even in these cases, was death. After the surplus properties of the landlords had been duly registered and divided among peasants, whether at public meetings or by committee action on individual requests, the final victory of the association was consummated at a "celebration meeting." Old 352 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr '2014/04/03 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 y?-r% title deeds were burned and new ones given out.. The peasants' feeling of triumph was now deliberately intensified by various propaganda devices, just as, at an earlier stage, their fury had been stirred up, the idea being to make them, as tt e new masters of China, feel deeply their responsibility to step up agricultural production. By November 1951, accord- ing to Chinese Communist Party sources, three hundred ten million peasants throughout China had been "freed from feudal bondage," and thus been made eligible to participate in a "celebration meeting." The peasant association established itself in each village as the effective and continuous decision-making authority, with the power to punish and the power to reward. For the associations by no means lapsed when the land reform was completed; they kept right on functioning, with the avowed two-faced purpose of protecting "the interests of the peasants" and "organizing their production," which should be understood to mean steering it toward the Soviet-type state farm or collective farm. This shift from individual to collectivized labor, is being accomplished in two ways: (1) The peasant associaticns, in conjunction with the All-China Federation of Cooperatives (another mass organization with the usual hierarchal structure), are organizing vast numbers of rural cooperatives, both of the producer-marketing and the consumer type The consumer cooperatives offer their members low-priced consumption goods from the state-owned, trading organizations and loans at a lower rate of interest. The marketing cooperatives are the channel by which agricultural produce reaches the state trading organizations and, ultimately, the consumer. By the end of September 1950 there were 4.5,090 cooperatives, of which four-fifths were in villages. (2) The associations organize mutual aid teams, some of which are permanent and others set up merely to meet an immediate situation or problem. The most usual type is the team of 1 to 10 peasants who work their lands in common on a division ot labor basis, and pool their draft animals and tools. The mutual aid teams, in particular, have had to make way against the psychological aversion of the Chinese peasant toward any form of agricultural production that is not individualistic. The regime has, therefore, been obliged to develop incentives for participa- tion in mutual aid teams, e.g., by offering their members an inside run on loans, both of cash and of agricultural implements owned by the government. There are, to date, only a few collective farms. The Communist principle of "democratic centralism" is at work in the peasant associations just as it is in the other mass organizations. It employs "a method of persua- sion" with great emphasis on indoctrination, propaganda, and education, which take primarily the form of "learning serssions." The slogan is "Learn, learn, and learn again," with "learning" being equated with understanding the necessity of eradicating all "reac- tionary and feudal" ideas, of becoming a devout believer in Marxism-Leninism, of hating the Kuomintang and "Imperialist America," and of appreciating the "greatness" of the Soviet Union. The man who has "learned" well can, above all, be counted on to pitch in and help with whatever task the People's Government sets for the moment as the important goal, whether it be the purchase of victory bonds, the emulation drives in donations of cash or grain, or the emulation contests relating to production and/or volunteering for the army. Criticism Meetings Another aspect of "deitiVeratie centralism," closely related to learning, and previously mentioned only briefly, is the practice of "criticism and self-criticism," especially at the numerous meetings held for this purpose. At such meetings the individuals present are supposed to point ourrelentlessly their own and each other's errors in thought nail action. 353 STAT T.? avec Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ^ 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 :1 Each person is called upon to accept humbly and gracefully the criticisms directed at him by others, and to acknowledge in a public confession the error of his ways. While nominally calculated to give t verybody an opportunity to express his ideas and point out the mistakes of cadres, Communist Party members, and government personnel, these meetings are in point of fact an important part of the apparatus by which the Communist Party disciplines and controls the rank-and-file of the population. The meetings lay bare "deviations," whether of thought or action, and enables them to be dealt with promptly. It. offers the ordinary person not so much a chance to speak his mind as a situation in which he must speak it, since to remain silent is to "isolate oneself from the group," to be uncooperative, and virtually plead oneself guilty to the suspicion of harboring "reactionary" thoughts. Its business, moreover, is carefully supervised by Party cadres, so that nothing is likely to be said that displeases the Coniniunist Party. Its chief utility to the regime lies, however, in the fact that once a person has confessed to such and such past mistakes and publicly declared his intention to follow the ways of the New Democracy, it is easy, by putting pressure on him, to keep his subsequently overt actions in line with his declarations. Watelifol neighbors and co-workers are thus made to perform a function which the secret police would otherwise have to perform by itself, and one which the secret police, in any case, cannot do as well. The indirect pressure of the group accomplishes the regime's purpose and, better still, does it in the name of democracy and public opinion. Coercion by state power in, of course, always available as a last resort in dealing with the recalcitrant individual, and, at the margin, the Party certainly does not hesitate to use it. Those who are found guilty of harboring "feudal reactionary" thoughts are first put through a process of reindoctrinatron or relearning. If this does not do the job, they go to the forced labor camps; if they remain untouched there, they are executed. Communist Difficulties The Communist regime admits that it. EU run into genuine difficulties with both the major programs surrounding the Marriage Law and the Agrarian Reform Law. The difficulties do not, however, appear to have been of the same character in the two cases. The Marriage Law, obliged as it was to make headway against the deeply rooted family system, seems to have suffered from the fact that it has had too little to offer to anybody in the way of immediate benefits, and thus has been widely ignored or even disregarded. The blame, according to the regime, belongs to the Party cadres, who allegedly still cling to "feudal ideologies" and have not insisted on thorough enforcement. By September 1951, in any case, the People's Government. Administrative Council was directing all local authorities to conduct a general investigation of conditions pertaining to the Marriage Law in their respective areas, and the five leading mass organizations (the All-China Democratic Women's Federation, the MI-China Federation of Labor, the Central Committee of the New Democratic Youth Corps, the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, and the All-China Students' Federation) were issuing a joint statement on the question to all their local units. The difficulties the agrarian reform program has run up against have been of a different and, from the regime's point of view, more serious character. In widespread areas of China, the forces of "resistance" appear to have rallied around the secret societies, and to have had some little success in infiltrating and manipulating the peasants' associations. Local people's militia units and local people's tribunals have been sent into extensive action repeatedly to deal with such situations through severe repressive mer-sures, although even here the emphasis is on mass persuasion and indoctrination plus the offering of special privileges to the strategically situated. 354 ' STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1 Resistance to the reform appears to have been strongest in the villages of South China, where consciousness of the clan and the family are most deeply rooted. The Land Reform Committee of the Military and Political Committee in Central-South China is known, for example, to have conducted a spot check in December 1950, and to have reported that only twenty percent of the land reform program in the various districts of its area were considered "successful," as against 30 percent that were considered "unsuccessful" and 50 percent somewhere in between. The same area has been the source of numerous reports alleging that persoos accused of counterrevolutionary activities have been subjected to this or that type of violence, and some actually put to death at mass meetings. One evidence of the concern with which the regime views its agrarian reform programs, despite the impressive statistics with which it documents the programs' effectiveness, is speedins-up of the actual Sovietization of Chinese agriculture. On 1 January 1952 the ..'eking People's Daily, the leading Chinese Communist organ, called for much more rapid and large-scale development of state farms on the regional, the provincial, the county, and even the eubcounty levels. Even according to Communist sources, China proper has, at. present, only 15 "comparatively large" state farms with a "sufficient number of tractors, combines, and other mechanical contrivances": ten in North China, three in East China, and one each in Central-South and Northwest China. Fifteen together are said to cover 92,500 acres, of which 27,500 acres are actually being worked, and to have a etaff of 4200 workers and laborers, many of whom are levolutionaries who have been sentenced to fumed labor. The number will presumably rise rapidly over the next months and years. The Workers The Communist Party defines itself as the organized vanguard of the Chinese working class or proletariat, and the People's Government claims to represent the best interests of labor. Since the taking over of the cities in 1949 increased stress has been placed on bringing the working class (as opposed to the peasants) into a position of greater leadership in both Party and regime. In August 1019, the National Trade Union Worker's Conference of the All-China Federation of Labor laid down a plan for organizing workers of all types over the entire nation, and intensified its efforts to bring all local trade unions into the national organization. Labor Union Law of 1050 In April 1950, a new Labor Union Law was promulgated, the avowed objective of which was that the working class "may better organize itself" for participation in the new regime. It applies to all "physical and mental laborers" for hire in China, i.c , all those who depend upon wages, including technicians and administrative personnel (whose status however, remains well above that. of the ordinary worker). a requires every labor union, as soon as it is organized, to report to and associate itself with the All-China Federation of Labor as the supreme guiding agency of the working class. It forbids any working class organization that is found riot to meet the Federa ? rules and standards to call itself a labor union, and it expressly prohibits strikes for any purpose whatever. The purposes of labor unions, according to this law, arc "to protect the fundamental interests of the working class, to educate and organize the workers and employees so as to support the law and ordinances of the People's Government as well as to implement the policy of the People's Government, to educate and organize the workers and empleyees for the establishment of 355 STAT Jeclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ;1 a new attitude of labor for the strict observance of labor discipline, and for the organization of production emulation together with other production movements." Union members are given benefits, under a labor insurance law, that are not available to nonmembers. By 1951, there were seven national industrial unions, covering railnays, posts and telecommunications, transport, textiles, electric power, munitions, and education. No distinction is drawn, either by the regime or by the labor leaders, between "protecting the fundamental interests of the working class," and 'increasing production." Since the out- break of the Korean War, the pressure on the norkera to step up production has steadily twasnited. Several devices are called into play to make this pressure effective: (1) Con- Lnuous indoctrination of the workers, in small discussion meetings and in mom meetings, with strong emphasis on "the glory of labor," "the task of leadership belongs to the work- ers," and other themes of similar character. Prssa articles, plsys, and stories written by workers are mixed with the propaganda output of the professionals to build up worker mo-ale and self-confidence. (2) "Democratization of management," via the creation of a factory administrative committee in each state-owned factory. Such a committee, though headed by the director of the factory, is otherwise made up of representatives of the workers and the administrative staff. It operates with the advice of the People's Government's Industrial Administrative Bureau, and is convened by the head of the trade union to which the factory's workers happen to belong. There is no evidence, as yet, that any such com- mittee has brought about great changes in the management of its factory. (3) Emulation campaigns among workers, which have become increasingly common as more and mere woikers are organized and thus categorized. These take several forms. Individuals who have demonstrated outstanding skill and energy are made "labor heroes." A team of factory workers challenges another to a production race or contest. The man or team that sets a record of output in a particular production process is singled out for honors and publicity. The new record also becomes the topic for widespread negotiations and dis- cussions, conducted with a view to establishing a new national standard for the production process in question (usually it is a compromise between the, old standard and the new record). The relevant trade union, the Party, and the administrative authorities are all brought into the negotiations. This is good reasoning since the new production standard will be inserted in all future collective contracts between the workers and the factory authorities. (4) The opening of new educational opportunities for loyal and productive workers, and the offering of assurances that the education will lead to promotion, perhaps even to a government position. There is, for example, a three-year short-term middle school for workers and peasants, whose graduates may go to college. Also, there are spare-time schools and reading classes. (Workers in private industry are by no means exempt from these programs looking to greater productivity, but their main emphasis is on state industries.) These programs have not met with uniform or unqualified enthusiasm, especially when first launched "Some workers," says a Communist writer, regarded . . . the movement as another government plot to squeeze more labor from them. But were convincingly shown that the state-run factory now belonged to them; that while increased production still meant increased profits, this money no longer went into the pockets of capitalists or bureaucrats but would serve to aticngthen the workers' can government and build up the national economy. There would then be more workers and to a certain extent, profits would go toward improving the immediate wage scale of the factory involved. Once this new attitude to lobar was established, all skepticism gave way to productive enthusiasm. The wage of the industrial worker has remair.ed low. But he is told that his low wages will soon be a thing of the past, and the government is determined to speed the day 868 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 :11 ^ when they can be raised. Welfare, he is told, cannot be discussad until the problem of increasing production has been solved. Current reports do point to higher industrial output than in the past. Reliable figures are hard to come by, but there is evidence that the program as It whole may not come off: data have come to light about factories that have not responded to the speed-up, and about resentment at the simultaneous speed-up and the low wages. The Merchants and Private Industrialists The Chinese Communists, unlike, for example, the Czech Communists, did not when they none to power find waiting for them a highly developed industrial system which they had merely to take over. They have thus felt obliged to maintain a semblance of cooperation with private capitalists, in the hope that the capitalists, out of their private capital accumulation, will expand the nation's in(iitstrial resources far beyond their present low level of adequacy. Thus Mao, to the surprise of many doctrinaire Communists, included merchants and private industrialists as one of the four classes constituting "the people" of the New Democracy. "For now," he wrote, "capitalism is to be controlled, not eliminated. When the time comes to realize socialism, private enterprise will be nationalized " In general, private ins estment has not, sine the take-over, occurred on any such scale as the Communists appear to have expected. There are two self-evident reasons for this. The regime's actual day-to-day policies ? high taxes, forced savings, and "voluntary contributions" ? have greatly reduced the Chinese capitalistic ability to invest. And the known intentions of the regime as to the long-term future of private investments have greatly diminished the capitalist's disposition to invest. Nor has public investment taken place on a scale capable of affecting greatly the level of the nation's productive capital, for at least one self-evident reason: the Communists need personnel capable of taking over management and operation cf factories, in part because their best managers had for many years before the take-over devoted their well-nigh exclusive attention to agricultural enterprise. The government's chief impact upon business enterprise, has been via the state trading organizations, the nationalized banks, and the machinery for regulating, directly and indirectly, various prices. These three weapons have given it a high degree of control over the merchants and other private businessmen, and there is considerable evidence that this control has recently been used, more openly and on a larger scale than formerly, to put pressure on them The reason, as put by a leading Communist in a speech in January 1952, is that the best way to prevent the middle classes from increasing in strength, is to "restrict capital" "Some muddle-headed comrades," he said, "have proceeded on the false assump- tion that the patty had to depend upon capitalists because of their business know-how." The time had come, he added, to stop "permitting private merchants to compete against state trusts." The merchants, in spite of the present restrictions on their activities and power, remain a formidable menace to Communist rule, in the Communists' own view at least. The gov- ernment's recent "four anti" movement, makes this abundantly clear (The four slogans of the movement are "antibribery," "antifraud," "antiprofiteering," and "antitax evasion.") Both merchants and private industrialists are accused of subverting backsliding members of the Communist Party with "sugar coated capitalist bullets." In this connection, private industrialists are being subjected to an intensified program of "ideological remould- ing," and have been warned that unless they change their ways they cannot hope to save either themselves or their factories or etores. Concretely, they must stand ready to make 857 STAT _ . )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ? roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 sacrifises on orders placed by state trusts, pay their tapi promptly and in full, and eliminate "squeezes" and graft. They are organized for ind trination purposes in small study groups and expected to go through the standard purge rocedere of confession and mutual denunciation. The government, meantime, is known to be planning a new MI-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, whose task it will be to give he "right" direction to private industrialists. If the incentives offered to merchants and tradesmen continue to be shaved down, and the day comes when the state must take over all distribution and merchandising, the new Federation may well prove to be the instiument, it will employ. One further reason for the tightening of control is, undoubtedly, the heavy fiscal and economic cost of the Korean War. The jtn min p'face the Communist currency, has been kept remarkably stable by an effective rationing system, currency stabilization measures, and the drive against speculation. Industrial prices, however, have risen steadily, and, with the state claiming an ever higher share of the national income, the trend is naturally toward a lower standard of living, especially for the middle chi The poor are not better off than before, by any means, their presumptive gains from rent reduction and increased land holdings have been wiped out by the large "voluntary" contributions exacted from them, by high taxes, and by rising industrial prices. Education The Communists have a new concept of education. The traditional ideal of the "ivory tower" literati has been abandoned. The aim of the new education is "to produce the personnel, the readiness and the desired attitude to aid in the economic and material development of China" (i.e, technical and scientific knowledge), and to "eradicate reac- tionary ideas and to indoctrinate a new ideology based on Marxism-Leninism" ? political education. Like other programs, the educational program shifts with and is closely coordi- nated with the policies of the state. In the Communist social order, education is indoctrination and propaganda. Ide- ological indoctrination includes dialectical materialism, the ideology of the class struggle, the study of human evolution, and instruction concerning the advanced culture of the Soviet Union and the "decedent capitalism of imperialist America." The new education is highly utilitarian. The student must be so educated that he can make a direct contribution to the material and economic reconstruction of the nation, lie must learn by participating in labor and production activities. Classroom study must, be linked with the actual conditions, problems, and tasks in the contemporary world. Science and technology are not only given precedence over other studies; there are no liberal arts as such. In the schools, as elsewhere, the emphasis is on collective activity. Both teachers and students regularly attend learning sessions and criticism meetings. "Democratic adminis- tration" of schools, that is, having students and janitors represented in the formulation of academic policies is much in vogue The Communists, determined to make education available to the marnea, devote great energier to the drive against illiteracy If indoctrination and propaganda are to have their full effect, everyone must know how to rend, and to feel at home with the vocabulary of the New Democracy. The whole trend is towards a more extensive, and consequently less intensive, educational program. There is a similar development in literatuie, at least in the sense that quality is being more and more subordinated to the need for drawing literary 358 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A JA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 output from numerous sources. Laborers and peasants are encouraged to write accounts of their experientes. Much of the new "literature" is valued because it is written in the dialect of particular local areas. Abbreviated middle school courses are available to workers and peassnta. The Chinese People's Univereity offers complete courses of as 'little as six months" duration. New schools have also been organized to meet certain needs of the state for personnel for various programs, e.g., land reform or the collection of taxes. The Chinese Communists have always given special attention to youth and to student groups. The students have, consequently, always been one of their main sources of support- When they came to power in China, the Communists launched three powerful, nationwide masa organisations for youth: the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, the Students' Federation, end the New Democratic Youth Corps. All are built in accordance with the principles oi democratic centralism, although the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth and the Students' Federation are both loosely knit when compared to the Youth Corps, because they are composed of youth organizations rather than individuals. New Democratic Youth Corps The most important is the New Democratic Youth Corps which is directly linked to the Communist Party. Its members, boys and gi:ls beiseeen 14 and 25 years of age, are under tight, diseipline, occupy key positions in all other youth groups, and, under the direction of the Party, exercise "leadership and control over all youth." The purpose of the Youth Corps is to "organize youth to positively accomplish the various important work and missions determined by the Communist Party of China, the People's Democratic Govern- ment of China." It. works in the cities, among young factory workers. It works in the country, with the "liberated young farmers," and participates in their mutual aid programs and their coopsmtive movements. It. works in the schools, with the student associations. The Youth Corps runs a cadre training school, manages an Arts College for Chinese Youth, and leads the Young Pioneers' Corps. The placing of young and relatively inex- perienced boys and girls in positions of power and leadership undoubtedly has been a source of friction between the state and the common people, most of whom still hold age, seniority, and experience in deep reverence and respect. Evaluation of Communist Achicrtments The Chinese Communist regime has taken on a tremendous task by attempting to categorize and control some four hundred fifty million individuals about. whom, hitherto, there were not even accurate census data. Its business is "revolution," i.e., the complete destruction of a social order of two thousand years' heritage. The mood of moderation, compromise, and tolerance that had dominated Chinese life in the past is corelemned along with that social order. Until recently, the Communists had proceeded with relative caution. But the pressure of the Korean War has led to a general speed-up of the pace of the "revolution." It has also led to a general tightening up within the Party itself, which is no more immune than other organizations to external strains and problems. The most important development here is the "triple opposition" movement now in progress in the Party's ranks, that is, the movement against "corruption, waste, and buresuerntism." In addressing top-ranking members of the Communist Patty's North-East Bureau on 10 January 1052, their leader unloosed a strong attack on "bourgeois collusion" and "rightist tendencie.s" within the Party. More and more backsliding Party members are being dismissed. 359 STAT )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Although reliable statistics and a full picture of what is happening behind the Bamboo Curtain is difficult to piece together, it seems probable that the nation's real national income has increarA under the Communist regime. This gain, however, must, be tet off against the drain upon the national economy occasioned by the Korean War, so that benefits that might have accrued to the average man have not, with the higher taxes and the emula- tion "contributions," been forthcoming. Whether he is a farmer, an industrial worker, or a merchant, the average man is beginning to realize that his actual lot, is not what he was promil before the Communion came to power. Instead of living better, he finds himself tightening his belt ? in a situation in which he dares not complain about it. Even pmive resistance has ceased to be a realistic alternative, because it will be punished just as relent- lessly when it is discovered as the more active types of oppositionist activity; and, under ;. present conditiens of surveillance and general lack of privacy, it will be discovered. 'Ile fact that the average Chinese still has some spirit left, despite these grievances, is evidenced by the anecdotes and ,okes which continuo to filter throtinh the Bamboo Curtain. Says one industrial worker to another, with a sad smile: "In past days, everybody exploited everybody. Nowadays, one man does all the exploiting." A ricksha coolie remarked, "In former clays, we were torto1,es, slow perhaps but rtill able to advance. Nowadays, the tortoise has turned over [fan shrug, a Communist evression for taking over leadership], and he can no longer budge." SOCIAL ORDER UNDER TIIE NATIONALISTS 1949 Evacuation to Formosa Some two million Chinese who felt they could not accept Communism fled to Taiwan (Formosa) with the Nationalist government before the onslaught of the Communist Army in 19.10. Many others have since followed. A small number of these were close associates of President Chiang Kai-shek. Some were private busines.1 men who believed that state Commun:sm and private enterprise are incompatible. Some were men and women who, because of their personal experience or knowledge of Communism, were afraid to remain inside the Bamboo Curtain. There is a strong presumption that most if not all of them value freedom and democracy. The present population of Taiwan is approximately nine million, some seven million of whom are Taiwanese natives of pure Chinese descent. (There are a few non-Chinese aborigines.) Effect of Japanese Occupation To appreciate fully what the National government has accomplished in Taiwan, a word should be said about the state of affairs there just after the Second World War. As of V-J Day, Taiwan's economy was in full chaos. Its industrial plant had been bombed out. The Taiwanese, after 50 years of subjugation by the Japanese, haul neither the training nor the experienee they needed in order to take over from the Japanese. The island's currency was inflated. Its normal trade was geared to that of Japan, where SCAP was prohibiting the resumption or normal operations. Japan had taken great pains to teach the Taiwanese to regard their struggling compa- triots on the mainland with contempt and disdain. They did not, therefore, expect much help from the Chinese government, and the latter, weakened by eight years of continuous war and thrown off balance by the onslaught of Chinese Communism, could indeed do little to help the once well-off Taiwanese get back on their feet. A further important complication 360 )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ......?????*???? .....????????????????=*. (IS ,) was that the Taiwanese were accustomed to the peace and order of a country under a foreigti tyranny, and could not, at first, unclenitand the "lack of uniformity" and "the complexi- ties" of democratic rule (thanks to thr Japanese, on the other hand, they had no illusions about or yearning, after Communizni.. Finally, the men who governed Taiwan immedi- ately after the retrocession gave every evidence of being more interested in increasing their power rind lining their pockets than in providing good management. When, therefore, the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan in 1049, it found that it had taken on numerous grave local problems in addition to those it had brought with it from the mainland. ii Political Reform The Kuomintang, the leading political party, prepared itself to deal with these prob- lems by putting itself through a reorganization. Its younger, more liberal leaders were, to this end, appointed to a Central Reform Committee, the main task of which was to strengthen and tighten party organizntion and eliminate coriupt elements, opportunists, and bureaucratic politicians. On 1 September 1950, the Nationalist government was ready to announce a new political program. Its objectives were to encourage private enterprise to the extent of avoiding monopolistic combinaticns and to transfer government-operated light industrie:3 to private ownerbhip; to establish a democratic industrial sys- tern in s hich the workers' welfare is safeguarded by allowing them a slum and a voice in the owner- ship and management of private enterprise; to promote the interests of tenant farmers and farmers through land reform, water conservancy, and land reclamation; to carry out local self-government and to protect civil rights. Local self-government and land reform were the ficicLs in which the government brought about the most spectacular changes. It first removed all the social barriers and segregation measures that had been created and maintained by the Japanese. The native Taiwanese were no longer barred from institutions of higher learning, or from the worth- while positions in commerce and politics. They were encouraged to participate in local self-government, and to think for themselves. By 6 May 1951, 21 mayors and magistrates in 16 counties and 5 municipalities had been elected to their respective offices by popular vote. There are now 0304 village and Ii (comparable to urban wards) assemblies, in which the Taiwanese are learning the art of self-government. Representing them in town and district assemblies are S024 village and Ii delegates. On the county and municipal levels, there are about 541 popularly elected councilmen. Of ao estimated 2,650,000 qualified men and women voters, some 2,416,072 are registered. In keeping with the government's policy of economy, the total number of government employees was reduced in June, 1950 to 81,C00. The percentage of indigenous citizens in the government service rose to 65.46 per- cent. There has also been it marked change in the importance and responsibility of the posts held by Tatwanese. In the category of first class officials, indigenous personnel have increased from 0.92 percent under Japanese rule to 17.45 percent in the present govern- ment. In the category of second class officials, indigenous personnel retie from 1.29 percent to 25 percent Land Reform The other outstanding reform accomplislid by the government has been the carrying out of a new land reform program, which has greatly benefited the lot of the farmers, who are no less than GO percent of the population. Fur the 70 percent of the farmers who are 361 STAT leclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: k-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 tenants there has been a rent reform program, which went into effect in 1949 and set a maximum rental ceiling of 37.5 percent of the tote! yield (average rental had theretofore ranged from 46 to 62.5 percent of the total yield). The income of tenant farmers has, in consequence of the program, risen by an average of 30 percent. The reform legislation provides that where the main crop yields are less than 20 percent of normal the tenant shall not be required to pay any rent at all. It also gives the farmer security of tenure (landlords may no longer refuse to renew contracts in order to re-rent OD mem favorable terms), and it restricts landlords' right to dispossess tenants. By 1951, 97.51 percent of the tenant farmers had completed new contracts under the new law, and the landlord problem had been brought, for the most part, under control. The price of land has steadily declined, which, of course, enables more and more tenant farmers to buy land to own. The rent reduction program has been carried out in cooperation with a Chinese-American ozganization, the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, which is responsible for a program of general agricultural improvement: the constructiun of irrigation dams and canals, reclamation projects, the making available of better seeds and fertilizers, animal disease control, the organization of farmer associations and rural cooperatives, and rural health measures. By the end of the period 1950-1051, the use of US-financed fertilizer had brought rice production to the highest peak in the history of Taiwan. In exchange for much-needed foreign currency, twenty-two thousand, five hundred eighty-seven metrie tons of Taiwan's surplus were exported to Japan and South Korea. Other foods basic to local consumption were also above peak prewar production levels. Sweet potatoes were up ?A percent, wheat 16.5 percent, and peanuts 89 percent. Considering the handicaps under which the government started, the economy of Taiwan is now surprisingly stable, largely because of the increased agricultural productivity reflected in the foregoing statistics. Economic Reform In 1949, to meet the economic crisis precipitated by the soaring inflation of the Chinese National currency, to which the Taiwan dollar was then linked, a fresh start was made by introducing a new currency, linked to the US dollar and backed by gold bullion brought over from the mainland. At the same time, a series of deflationary measures were enlisted The government's expenditures, for example, were curtailed by reducing its personnel and cutting back certain of its activities; at, the same time, its resources were increased by means of a new luxury tax (based upon ownership of property, including cars and refriger- ators), a defense tax, the floating of bonds, and the sale of government, assets. The program, as a whole, had the effect of encouraging private enterprise, so that the usual sources of revenue (customs receipts, returns from the salt, monopoly, the postal services, and assorted government enterprises in fields like telecommunication, air transport, navigation, petro- leum, aluminum, gold, coal, copper, and steel) became more productive. Industrial Recovery In industry, Taiwan's return to prosperity has been extremely rapid. At the time of Japan's surrender, the annual coal production had dropped to 776,000 metric tons (as com- pared to peak production of 1,182,635 in 1941); electric power had fallen off to 52,646 KW (as compared to the peak load of 152,355 KW in 1943); the production of sugar (the chief product for export) had declined to 86,073 metric tons (as compared to 1,418,000 metric tons before WW II), that of cement to 78,000 metric tons (a.s compared to peak production 362 1) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: of 303,400 metric tons) and that of industrial salt to 67,000 metric tons (as compared to peak production of 465,000 metric tons). The production of chemical fertilizer (33,S00 metric tons before the war) had come to a halt. Tea processing plants and pineapple packing plants stood deserted. In short, by V-J Day the ravages of ivar, materials short- ages, slid lack of maintenance hail almost paralyzed the industry of Taiwan. The railroads had worn out ro kiss than 1400 steel bridges which had to be classified as unsafe to use After V-J Day, rehabilitation work on the railroads was given a high priority. Eroded steel bridge spans were removed, worn-out slerpen: and rails were replaced, road beds were reconditioned Today, passenger traffic exceeds the peak load of the prewar period; freight traffic, after tripling itself in one year, is approaching prewar peak. Rehabilitation of the power system made great demands on the ingenuity of the available Chinese engineers. Little foreign exchnnge was available with which to buy needed replacements, so that the repairs had to be accomplished by reworking obsolete and broken equipment scattered about over the island. Through tedious patching and repairing operations, and the acquisition of a few spare parts that could not be improved, they tripled generating capacity in two years. By 1951, capacity had reached an all time high of 217,000 KW. Today coal (1,451,000 metric tons in 1052), cement (389,000 tors in 1051), chemical fertilizers (more than three times prewar production), petroleum, cotton yarn (three times Japanese peak production) and cotton picce goods (four times Japanese peak production) have all surpimed prewar production figures. The sugar industry, which, as in the past, is Taiwan's most important source of foreign exchange, has done less well by comparison with prewar standards, but not, or at least not primarily, because rehabilitation operations failed to be carried out. In 1945, 27 of 36 plants stood seriously damaged. By 1948, all the factories and plantation railways had been completely rehabilitated, and by 1950 sugar production had climbed back to 630,000 metric tons. The Taiwan Sugar Corporation's capacity is now over one million tons a year. In 1949-50, however, sugar dropped in price on the world market, and farmers turned from sugar to rice. In 1951-52, the world market price began to rise, and sugar production is gradually returning to its previous high levels. Paper and pulp mills, machinery shops, shipbuilding, and aluminum works have, likewise, been gradually restored. Another worthwhile project has been the development of a fishery industry which has improved the Taiwanese diet (including that of the Nationalist Army) without great expenditures. American economic aid has played an important role in the rehabilitation and development of ail these industries. A labor insurance policy was put into effect on I March 1950. Its object is described as "safeguarding the livelihood of the workers and promoting harmonioes relations between labor and management so as to ensure social security and high production." According to the Labor Insurance Regulations, all workers employed in public and private factories, mines, salt fields, communications, and public utilities in Taiwan shall be insured. It is compulsory labor insurance on a limited scale. The benefits are insurance against injury, death, maternity, disability, and old age. It also has provision for free medical clinics. This new system of social insurance was put into effect with the cooperation of the Chinese Federation of Labor, the Free China 1ebor League, and the Provincial General Labor Union. Their delegates also sit as members of the legislature of the provincial government. The government has also carried out a tax ieforni and ovei hauled the tax collection system. The reform program went into effect on 1 January 1951. The number of distinct taxes was reduced from 20 to 11, leaving the income, inheritance, stamp, commodity, land, business, slaughter-house, entertainment and amusement, vehicle license, and household taxes. 363 STAT )eclassified in Part -Sanitized Copy A A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ? roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release 50-Yr 2014/04/03 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Education Free primary school education is now a milable to everyone, and the average number of children attending school is SO percent. (\l'he Japanese had restricted the education of the Taiwanese, with few exceptior.s, to a certain level and to certain schools). All Taiwanese are free to attend any school or college. In 1050, there were 121 middle schools in Taiwan. Of these 31 were provincial schools, 7-1 established by hien or municipalities, and 13 private schools. In 1050, there were eight normal schools, as compared to three on V-J Day, several vocational schools, and six institutions of higher learning, including a national university with a total enrollment of 6573 students. Since most of the institutions of higher learning are run by the government with a view to keeping costa down, a Taiwanese may obtain a high school or college education with only a small outlay of money. However, the demand for education far exceeds the opportunities because educational facilities are still in short supply. Thus the schools are overcrowded and competition for admission to them is keen. Education remains a major unsolved problem. Evaluation of Nalionalisl Achievements The Taiwanese economy today supports a considerably larger population than in the past. It also supports an army, which though it has itself cultivated land and increased other types of production in an attempt to provide in part for its own consumption, still creates a heavy drain upon the government treasury. By Western standards government employees are poorly paid; an army officer, for example, earns less than a storekeeper or peddler. The cost of living ree aims high in relation to average income, despite the fact that the currency is more stable than it has been for over a decade. There is some unemploy- ment (though no beggars). In general, however, the island's postwar record of internal peace, order, and achieve- ment is impressive. The police force and loud administration arc efficient and reasonably free from corruption. Crime is at a low level. For the first time in many oenturimg, the government has taken an accurate census. The government gives every evidence of sin- cerely respecting the wishes and opinions of the people. To be sure, a permit is required for entenng and leaving the island, nod all residents carry identification cards. Panne would attribute such measures to an overzealous secret police, but the alleged reason for them, military security, appears to be the real one. It must be remembered that a government constantly on the defensive against a merciless enemy, must take extensive precautions. The important point is that despite these precautions, and the presence of five hundred thousand exiled troops on the island, the Taiwanese who keeps within the law is not likely to be deprived of life, liberty, or property. This is rather confirmed than disproved by the considerable amount of grumbling in which they indulge. At any Taiwanese newstand one may purchase magazines and papers critical of the existing regime as well as those favorable to it, and there are no restrictions on listening in on the short-wave radio. There is, on the other howl, no mercy shown genuine political offenders. 'Me Communists employ every method in the book in their attempt to recruit Tula anese. including blackmail and threats of harm to relatives on the mainland. The Communist slogan, familiar to everyone on the mainland, is: "We will use blood to wash Taiwan clean!" The secret police in Taiwan have good reason, therefore, to keep on the alert, and the government good reason to mete out swift justice to the proven spy or traitor. It is the general opinion 364 STAT )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 01. 0 000. ? among foreign observers that in Taiwan there are fewer Communist; lex% unrest, and more PTurity of the person than in any other country in the Far East. except poasibly Japan. Taiwan is indisputnbly a thorn in the side of the Chin:sr. Communist Party. It pro- vides every Chinese malcontent a in.ltying ground on which he will be welcomed It channels into a national force what would otherwise be the suppressed discontent of a weak and divided people. As in the Chungking days, the exiles think of thenvelves as occupying a temporary refuge, wide)) they intend to maintain as n symbol of the hopes of MI freedom- loving Chinese As long as Taiwan remains outside the finmlvoo Curtain, they insist, the hopes will not die. A SELECTED READING LIST Mick, Pearl S,, The Good Earth, pp. 375, John Day Company, New York, 1031. Gamble, Sidney D., and John S. flurget:s, Peking: A Social Surrey, pp. xxiii, 24-538, pl. 31, George Doran Company, New York, 1921. Kulp, Dftn;" IL, "Country Life in South China." The Sociology Pamilism, pp. xxx, Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1925. tang. Olga, Chinese Faintly and Somity, pp. xv, Yale University Pfluki, New !raven and London, 1046. Latourctte, Kenneth S., The Chinese. 7'hrir history and Culture, 2d rev. ed., vol. 11 pp. 182-242, Macmillan Company, New York, 1943. Lin, Y0141-hua, The Golden Wiry, a Sociological Study of Chinese Pomiliam, pp. xv, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, K Mil, Trench, Tnibner, London, 1048. Lin, Yir.t'ang, Moment in Peking; A Nord of Contemporary Chinese Life, pp. 813, John Day Company, New York, 1939. Arrnoirea concernant Phistorie, les sciences, les arts, les mocurs, les usages, etc., des Chinois, par les las- sionnires de Plkin, 10 vols., Nyou, Paris, 1776-1791. Morse, [Insert II., The Gilds of China, with an Account of the Gild Merchant or Co-hong of Canton, 2d ed., pp. ix, Longmans, Green, and Company, London, New York, 1032. Ross, Eduard A., The Changing Chinese. the Conflict of Oriental and Western Cultures in China, pp. vri, The Century Company, New York, 1911 Smith, Arthur IL, Village Life in China: A Study in Sociology, pp. 360, F. IL Revell Company, Chi- cago, New York, 1809. ?.Chinese Charneteridics, pp. 342,F' If Revell Company, Chicago, New York, 1894. Ward, John S. M , and W. 0 Stirling, The Bung Society, or the Society of Heaven and Earth, 3 vols., pp. xv, viii, ISO, 104, el, 148, The Baskerville Press, Ltd., London, 1925. IV Minims, Samuel W., The Middle Kingeloni, n Surrey of the Geography, Gnrernrnent, Literature, Social Life, Ads, and history of the Chinese Empire, 2 vols., pp. are, 836; xiii, 775, Wiley and Putnam, New York, London, 1848. 365 eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 -RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT_ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ?????????????????MM 50-Yr 2014/04/03: ClIAPTER 8 GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS TRADITIONAL SYSTEM Through the centuries of their history the Chinese developed a unique and to them satisfying systent of government. Although modifications and adaptations did occur, the Chinese relied upon an impetial pattern of government. from the time of the elimination of formal feudalism in the third century a c until the Revolution in 1911. One of the most striking qualities of this traditional system was the amazing stability of its institutions. l'his stability is easier to understand if one remembers that the Chinese system of govern- ment was far more than the formal organization of government offices. The Chinese lived primarily under the domination of nonpolitical agencies, and their strong cultural tradition MIS the main force behind popular conformity to a set pattern of behavior. Although the formal system of government %vas elaborate, many of the primary functions of government were performed by informal institutions. It war thus pawible for the Chinese to be fully conscious of their identity with a great tradition and culture without at the same time developing a sense of nationalism tt.ssoc1ated with the state as an institution. The Chinese believed that they were the center of the world, that their culture was superior to all others, and that other people would readily recognize this fact once they came in contact with China. Through most of their history, moreover, the Chinese found little reason to question their superiority. China was the most developed area of Asia, and most of the surrounding peoples came to recognize many of the virtues of Chinese culture. The formal system of government in China was adapted to a belief in and reliance upon cultural traditions. The government rarely assumed the role of making policies that would alter the traditional patterns of the people's lives. Rather, it sought to reinforce these patterns, and to meet any crisis wtth a pragmatic solution that would not disturb the old values. The government relied heavily upon indoctrination of the people in tradi- tional values and attitudes, and tried to interfere as little as possible with the day-to-day life of the masses. In short, the people were taught to accept and conform to n pattern of rule that did not necessitate constant and overt control by recognized government author- ities. The important role of tradition and cultural values should be kept in mind in dim-aiming the formal organs of Chinese government. Many of the latter were carefully defined and were recognized as pos-As&,ing great power. But it was primarily the informal pattern of behavior that actually controlled the masses of the people. This is not to say that the formal structure of government was unimportant, since it maintained and strengthened the tiaditional values and attitudes. Thus, what is significant in the formal ordering of ths government was the way in which the Chinese succeeded in developing institutions that supported the basic attitudes of the people and ensured their conformity with these patterns of behavior. 806 STAT classified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 -RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ...?.????? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 The Emperor - - The imperial system of China was a monarchy in which the Emperor and his court was the central institution. In theory the Emperor was supreme, and there were no established bounds to his power. lie was an "oriental potentate," and no written rules or constitution prescribed his authority. In actual practice, however, there were many institutions and traditions that put, restraints upon his behavior and authority, lie was called upon to represent the traditional ideal of what a leader should be. Ile was, therefore, expected to embody in his behavior the traditional Chinese concepts of the good and virtuous man. It is difficult to imagine a culture in which the leaders do not appear to represent in their actions what that culture considers to be good and upright. In Chinese culture, how- ever, it vas particularly important for the leaders to appear in such a light, because of .ne explicit recognition the Chinese gave to the theory of "rule by example." According to this theory, the most effective method of ruling men is to set an example to be followed by government officials and then by the general population. The Emperor was supposed to achieve an ideal: that of a highly humanistic leader who is also an authoritarian father for his people, lie was thought to possess the highest virtues and skills important in governing men. In theory be was the best scholar in the bind, and capable of examining the candidates for the highest government posts. Not only was the institution of the Throne devised to uphold the Confucian tradition; the individual members of the bureaucracy had a personal tic to the Emperor, since all commissions down to the level of local magistrate were, in form, the appointments of the Emperor. As the personal load of the bureaucracy, the Emperor was portrayed as exemplifying all the bettor qualities of the scholar and literati class. The Emperor also had to symbolize moral rectitude, since he had certain semireligious functions to perform. It would be too much to characterize the Chinese system of govern- ment as being a form of theocracy, since it did not rest upon a purely religious theme. Nevertheless, the Emperor did perform activities characteristic of high priests. He was deemed to be the Son of Heaven. As such, he had the responsibility of mediating between Heaven and man. Ile was called upon to carry out specific rituals, which would guarantee that lleavea would look with pleasure upon the Chinese people. Moreover, his personal behavior and the policies of the government were expected to be in accordance with the wishes of Heaven. The great stress placed upon the moral actions of both the Emperor and the leaders of the government was reflected in the traditional Chinese interpretation of history. This interpretation assumed that it was possible to explain good and bad political and social developments in terms of the morality of the leaders. This tendency to interpret broad dewelopments in terms of the morality of a few individuals was further reinforced by the Chinese concept of the Mandate of Hearen. This theory, which emerged early in China, held that, the Emperor could rule in the name of Heaven so long as he adhered to the precepts of Heaven and good government. When he faithfully carried out the Mandate, Heaven could be expected tc support the activities of man. Acts of nature such as floods, droughts, and famines were interpreted as expressions of displeasure at the personal or public actions of the Emperor, and of the failure of the Son of heaven to mediate suc- cessfully between Heaven and his people. In the mind of the public, therefore, the govern- ment could properly be held responsible for untoward acts of nature, partly because it had presumably failed to devise policies that would cope with those acts, but also because it had presumably failed to adhere closely to the moral precepts of good conduct. 367 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: S TAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ^ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: The theory of the Mandate of licaeen was applied especially during periods of revolt, when the groups seeking to depose the ruling dynasty would assert that the Emperor Lad lost the Mandate to rule in the nume of Heaven. The very presence of a revolt was often sufficient to raise in the public mind the question whether the government might not have lost its claim to legitimacy. It has been argued thet the concept of tho Mandate of Heaven was a theory that justified revolution and the ?vet throw of the Imperial family if and when the Emperor failed to fulfill his function, e , to rule according to the demends of good government. However, it is doubtful -.vliether the Chinese were over tnught by their official ideology that revolution was permissible. Rather, it nppenrs that the theory was used to justify the actions of leaders of revolts retrospectively: to explain how it was posible for the suc- ceeding dynasty to chum that it, too, had the mtnrtion of Heaven behind its rule. All changes from Imperial family to Imperial family came its the mult of violence and conflict., but it was always possible to claim that the new group had obtained power because of the displeasure of Heaven %%ith the nctions of the previous Emperor. Once the new rlymaaty was established, it claimed that its ieadem would faithfully follow the trnditions of good government nnd described itsvlf as morally accour table to Heaven. Thus the Chinese Emperors despotic gonlities were tempered by both ethical and religious considerations. At the same time, howeeer, the Chinese for the most part expected (and accepted) much in the way o arbitrary acts of authority by their governments. The Chinese did not develop institutions that. could effectively cheek or challelige the nrbitmry authority of the Emperor except at times when the court itself was politically weak. Administration Administration, in traditional Chinese government, depended upon a remarkably well organized bureaucracy whose leading officials were the immediate advisors to the Emperor. At. the apex of the bureaucracy was the Grand Council, which was roponsible for making policy and advising the Emperor. The principal administrative functions of the govern- ment were carried on by six boirds or ministrio: civil office (appointment of officials), finance, rites or ceremonies, war, justice, and public works. In addition there were a number of minor offices, including the censorate, the historiographer's office, and the Im- penal academy of literature. Most of the business of government, ns conducted by the bureaucracy, went forward in terms of written records, so that a tremendous flow of documents from all the offices, departments, and bureaus was the lifeblood of the bureaucracy. As a result, the Chinese developed a special style for the writing of documents: each document had to be couched in special terms, according to whether it was intended for a superior, an inferior, or an equal in government hierarchy. The development of and reliance upon written records and communications made it possible, from a quite early date, for Chincee administration to be effective over a large territory and a huge population, and profoundly influenced the type of man used in ad- ministration. The prerequisite for entering government service was a thorough command of the difficult Chinese written language, which could be obtained only through extensive training and education Appointees rose to the higher positions by developing special and distinctive skills that were based upon the content of classical education. Thus the hallmark of the Chinese officials became educetion, and the concept was developed that the educated man possesses the qualities for being a leader of men. In theory, at least, Chine,se officials did not hold their posts because of personal connections, wealth, heredity, or claims 308 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: r.l A _RnPs1-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 to mystic powers like these associated with priests. Chinese officials were recognimlias deserving their posts because of their skill in handling certain tools regarded as n ry in government- This basic skill was a fundamental factor in upholding the prestige of the official clam. The Chinese bureaucrats were not mere administrators. As a group they represented a way of life based upon the concepts of the, gentleman, and connoisseur of the arts. They were thought of, and thought of themselves, ELI embodying the ideal of the higher culture of traditional China. For this rea.son it is perhaps preferable to refer to Chinose traditional officials as scholar-officials, mandarins, or literati, and not employ the narrowly functional term of bureaucrats. The relation of the mandarins to the rest of the population was not simply that of rulers to subjects. They were recognized as upholding a philosophy and a system of values which were considered to be valid for and acceptable to the entire population. They were regarded as individuals who mere superior in terms of values that the people not only believed in but also considered to be the best test of a man's worth. Thus the status of a member of the mandarin class was not limited by the legal definition of his office in the government; it included all the prestige associated with the scholar and the refined gentleman. This meant, among other things, that the actions of officials could not be effectively restrained by legal means and that, in their relations with the people, the manda- rins could be highly arbitrary and authoritarian. The individual citizen could not be assured that if he carefully followed any particular pattern of rules he would be able to avoid interference on the part of officials. There was no clear demarcation of the rights, duties, and obligations of either officials or private parties. Irdividunl security and well-being could therefore best be guaranteed by obtaining the personal confidence and support of individual mandarins. Ordinary people negotiated for such confidence and support on a personal basis, with officials, but the officials clearly occupied the position of advantage and superior power in such negotiations. Recourse was had, therefore, to means that might be considered devious, since they gener- ally included various forms of payments to the personal accounts of the official, and this helped to contribute to what has been called a system of "rule by corruption." (It should be noted that the saLries of officials were far from adequate to cover the costs they were expected to incur. Thus many payments to officials, although not sanctioned by law in any way, were generally recognized as being standard procedure.) In any ease, the art of successfully seeking favors came to be highly prized. The tremendous prestige of the mandarin class in Chinese society was further ac- centuated by the fact that leaders in most forms of endeavor sought to obtain government posts. Most cut the honors open to individuals could best be sought by following the path of government service. These included the obtaining of wealth, of social prestige, of respect- ability, and of recognition for such skills as writing and painting. Thus most of the famous writers and artists of traditional China were members of the mandarin clam and held government posts. The result was that the governing class almost automatically included most of the recognized leaders in most fields of endeavor. This tended not only to give a common background and attitude toward life to the more prominent men in the society, but also to minimize competition or tension among them. The general stability of the total society was greatly enhanced by the fact that the ruling group included the leaders and experts in all the more highly recognized fields of activity. All groups that had any form of power recognized by the culture were, so to speak, represented in the government, and there could be little in the way of competition between government and private activities. 869 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1 ? - ,...........?.??????????????.?????????? The bureaucracy, as the ce tml core of both the government and society, was expected kJ perform unmet-tam public ru ciions. In general, these activities further strengthened the essential status of the mend 'n class and minimized any radical changes that might threaten the traditional values of he society. A large number of these activities were of a kind usually associated with government- The civil bureaucracy had, for example, primary responsibility for providink for the defense of China and even for the planning and conduct of military operations. It was also called upon to reaolve internal conflicts and tensions, and maintain order in the society. The loeal officials not only had the task of detecting any violations of the general peace, but also that of serving as judges and mediators in nil disputes. The mandarins were also charged with responsibility for certain activities unique to the Chinese system of rule. They performed certain rituals and ceremonies that were felt to guarantee supernatural assistance to the people ? for example, during the New Year season, and in connection with planting and harvesting. Although the Chinese never developed a precise theory of the government's role in the economic life of the society, the government did, both directly and indirectly, influence economic development. The most extreme examples of this were the monopolies the govern- ment maintained in certain activities such as the production and sale of minerals, wine, and salt. Moreover, many taxes were collected in kind, so the government played an important economic role in the acquisi'ion, transporting, and distributing of certain goods, and thereby well-nigh dominated certain markets. In order to transport such items, operate the administrative system, and maintain defense communications, the government was obliged to develop an extensive network of roads and waterways. Financing such activities resulted in the levying of taxes on goods in transit, and put the government in position to further control and influence the develop- ment of private trade and commerce. The fact that the government often engaged in such economic activities helps to explain the failure of capitalism to develop in traditional China. Large-scale economic enterprises were invariably controlled by the government, anti even small private traders found they could best carry on their activities by obtaining personal support from officials or by themselves seeking appointment in the government service. Since the economy of traditional China was of a relatively simple agrarian order, the government could deeply affect the activities of the farming masses by its twofold function of maintaining the irrigation system and collecting taxes on agricultural produce. (In some areas of the country over 50 percent of the farm land depended upon irrigation.) Examination System The key to the bureaucracy's ability to hold its central position in the society was its method of recruiting new members. The Chinese were the first to develop an elaborate and formal system of recruiting governmental officials on the basis of merit and open competition. This was accomplished through a system of formal written examinations, in which the candidates had to compete successfully if they were to find employment in the bureaucracy. Although the system did not function at all times entirely upon the basis of the merit of the candidates, the important point to grasp is that the ideal of open and free competition was generally accepted. This meant, as pointed out previously, that those who held government posts were recognized its possessing skills that could be acquired only through training, power being acquired through merit and not as the result of wealth, heredity, or personal inffitence That these other factors often entered into the awarding of posts is 870 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1; ? not to be doubted, but not in such fashion as to keep the mandarins from maintaining the general impression that merit WM the colt standard for realizing official status. The very fact that the mandarins sought to maintain it obliged them to avoid being openly cynical about the proem of recruiting and promoting officials. Thus even during periods of wide- spread corruption genuine efforts were made to maintain the fiction of impartial examina- tions. Preparing for the entrance examination required, as already noted, extensive training, which only the more fortunate could afford. This greatly restricted the number of persons who could expect to become candidates, although in many CAMS the exceptional sons of poorer families were lulped to finance their education ? the clan or even the village pro- viding the funds in the hope that they could, if auccessful, bring honor and material advan- tage to their sponsors. Such cases, of course, helped to keep ali ve the notion that any bright and capable young man could hope to enter the mandarin class. The content of the examinations was such as to require the successful candidate to have a full command of the traditional corpus of knowledge. In particular, he was required to be well versed in the Chinese classics and in Confucian doctrine. Although much of the known:de. required had little relation to the problems of administration and government, it provided some guarantee that all officials would hold the traditional values in high regard, and any tendency toward unorthodox behavior would be restrained by their common background. Education thus became a force that lead to orthodoxy in society as, for other but similar reasons, it preserved the purity of the Chinese language. The traditional Chinese notion that any man who is well educated can, regardless of what his special training may have been, turn his hand to anything and do it well deserves mention here. The classical education was regarded as making a men et.- .-petent to solve any and all problems that might appear, and it so regarded itself. Reliance upon it for purposes of recruitment helped, therefore, to incorporate this view of the matter in Chinese culture. When it came to solving actual problems, the officials were, to be sure, expected to proceed in a pragmatic and commonsense manner. So long as radically new problems did not appear, the government found little difficulty in operating on the basis just described. It was only in modern times, with the advent of the West, that the Chinese mandarin's traditional answers proved clearly incapable of meeting China's needs. Law The Chinese pattern of law illustrates the extent to which Chinese political and govern- mental institutions and practices, while presupposing a generally accepted pattern of values, permit a pragmatic approach to problems. From one point of view Chinese law is an extensive body of moral precepts and ethical principles paralleling the basic concepts of Confucianism. From another point of view it is a body of precedural rules and practices attaching great value to recorded precedents. To a considerable degree, therefore, the Chinese system of law is based on custom, by no means all of which has been set forth in rules cf law. Nor is this surprising. Through much of Chinese history there has been no formal legislative body responsible for enacting laws of general applicability, so most of the rules and regulations that have been promulgated have appeared in administrative decrees, issued in response to specific practical problems. Judges are expected to canvass the merits of the case before them in terms of the generally accepted values of Chinese society, and then seek a solution that will strike a balance between abstract justice and whatever is needed to achieve a compromise between ' 371 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 .01A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 I' the parties. Law has always been thought of as a type of mediation between individuals, and not as primarily a means of upholding abstract principles of justice. The wisdom of the judge and his appreciation of the traditions of Chinese have not, in other words, been expected to subordinate themselves to the detailed provisions of written enactments ? to the rule of law as the West understands it. The assumption is, rather, that if the judges and government officials are good and if they understand and make wise application of Confucian principles, they will be able to reach humane solutions of any conflists that arise, and that these solutions will be better than any that might be gotten out of abstract rules and regulations. The fundamental concept of Chinese legal thought has been, then, the need for harmony in the relations between men living together in society. Chinese legal theory does not assume that the law either can or should be used to protect the interests of the individual against others or even against the government. Rather, law is a tool of the state, which the latter utilizes in performing its duty to maintain harmony among the populace and support the authority and prestige of the government. But, it, and the penalties it imposes, are not. the state's major tool for this purpose: punishments are valued primarily as reminders to the public of the importance of being influenced by the moral example of the officials, and not for what they accomplish directly. The Chinese often quote Confucius in this con- nection: "If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given by punishment, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given to them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover they will become good." Thus there has never developed in China a body of legal experts, whose task it is to advise either the government or private persons as to the role and nature of law and the duties and limitations it imposes. The government has never been thought of as limited by purely statutory considerations, or the individual as entitled to protection and redress in strict accordance with written rules. Political Proms Political life in the old China, as indicated, revolved around the bureaucracy, and took its tone from, the attitudes and behavior of the mandarins. One consequence of this was a marked orientation toward tradition, which was visible in all phases of politics and govern- ment. Not only WM the behavior of individual officials dictated by tradition; the very process of formulating policies for the government faithfully followed patterns derived front tradition and precedent, those policy alternatives that. appeared to hug the path of tradition being always those most likely to be adopted by the decision-makers. Oral debates among officials, equally with the memoranda they exchanged, were matters of marshaling historical examples for and against the policy proposal in hand. The traditional way of doing things was, of course, also the way of least resistance; hut as a point of positive doctrine the mandarins held that it was, as it matter of course, the best way. This remained true even after China had had time to develop so great a body of tradition that, it was often possible to claim the sanction of orthodoxy for each of two contradictory policies. For the main body of tradition was always held to be that of Confucianism, and, when contradic- tions appeared, appeal could be taken to the spirit rather than the word of the Confucian tradition. The close association of politics and Confucian philosophy had no one of its results politics and ethics becoming synonymous for the Chinese mind. Political behavior MIS regularly tested by ethical standards, and the best official was =aimed to be the pro- 372 STAT ??????? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 roundest student of ethics. All policies and actions of the government had to rest upon ethical principles and address themselves, at least in appearance, to the support of moral goals. One of the central themes of Confucian thought WAS that which put a high value on the search, by individuals and by government, for linrmony in human relaeons. It was this emphasis on harmony which imparted to the traditional ideology its orientation toward humanistic values, and led it to in.3ist the best state was one in which all elements of society were in harmony with each other and with nature. The correct method of achieving harmony in human affairs was to make sure each individual had a clearly understood station in life, and fulfilled the functions and duties attaching to that station. Disharmony and confusion could arise only if individuals and groups behaved in a manner contrary or unappropriate to their recognized status. Thus the power of morality was mobilized on behalf of order and stability in society, this being the very heart of the authoritarian ideology that, dominated traditional Chinese society. Conformity and orthodoxy, demanded in the name of ethics and morality, protected the existing political order and the mandarins' status within it. It follows that, there was no place in traditional Chinese social and political life for the advocate of change. Even those who championed what were demonstrably proposals for reform did so in the name of sound orthodoxy; the stifling of doubt about traditional values was regarded as an essential function of political authority. Confucianism undoubtedly had its pragmatic side, but this was not permitted to get in the way of upholding and perpetuating the basic values of Chinese society And on the other side, the declaration of Confucius that he could not be concerned with metaphysical questions was quoted against. those who sought to influence government policy by raising questions about basic values. Another aspect of the humanistic emphasis in Confucianism was its insistence on government by men rather than government by laws. Only human attitudes and feelings, it was assumed, could adequately guarantee just and effective government; or, to put this a little differently, abstract rules and regulations were assumed to he too harsh and im- personal to be relied on for the effective regulation of human relations. The process of good government was thus indistinguishable from the process of recruiting good officials. The natural leader was the upright man, and moral uprightness was achieved through education. But being upright was not a matter merely of behaving in an approved manner: the upright man possessed a quality that the Chinese called "inner sincerity" that permeated all his relations with others. According to strict Cenfucian theory this quality of inner sincerity was the only truly effective check on the actions of government officials, and the ultimate test of an official's behavior was whether or not he had shown himself to possess this quality. In actual practice, however, the reliance upon "inner sincerity" as a check on the behavior of offic tals meant that Chinese government could devclop no effective techniques for holding its officials fully accountable for their actions. There being no objective test of sincerity, it was always easy enough for n mandarin to confess his mistakes and ask and receive indulgence; it was recognized that to err was humnn and that, for small errors at least, a man's superiors should bear with him. This gave rise to the political technique of playing the role of the minceie official, i.e., pleading that one was sincerely and deeply committed to the principles of good conduct, regardless of whatever particular acts one might have been guilty. The issue of sincerity reappeared ad nauseam in public statements, private memorials, and arguments, and the sincerity of individuals was hotly debated. The absence of techniques for holding officials strictly accountable was paralleled by a persistent. refusal to make use of precise directives and orders in controlling lesser officials. The usual practice was to direct an official's attention to a problPm, and leave him to devise 373 STAT 1) " ??=1._ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 s his own plan for dealing with it. Officials thus enjoyed great freedom of action, which was not likely to be restricted unless and until something unfavorable to a given official W as brought to the attention of his superiors, and even then the restriction was not likely to take the fcrm of instructions to do such and such in this manner rather than that one. All 'his had, unavoidably, the effect of actually encouraging officials to act in a highly independent manner On the other hand, custom, usage, and the test of "reason" definitely kept their independence within practical bounds. The Confucian emphasis upon the concept of propriety permeated the entire govern- mental process. The fact that the "upright," "noble," end "correct" man was thought of as the man with a highly developed sense of propriety made for continuous preoccupation with manners and ritual. The official was expected to behave in accordance with the correct patterns in all situations, and others made careful note of how successfully he followed the prescribed formalities. This led to a state of etTans in which the form of an action often took precedence over its content. In the writing of official reports and documents, for example, strict care was taken to ensure that every detail was in accordance with the established standards, and the fate of a given proposal was likely to be more deeply influ- enced by the form in which it was set forth than by facts or logic. Another dominant feature of Chinese politics was the constant search for compromise solutions. For one thing, Confucianism put great emphasis on the concept of the Golden Mean in human relations, and the general disinclination to hold people strictly to the letter of any rule or regulatkm further encouraged the tendency to find some middle ground in any issue that would leave as many people happy as possible, or at least minimize dis- satisfaction on the part of all concerned. The ideal solution was bot that which adhered to any concept of abstract justice, but rather one that would mediate between the conflicting peints of view. Thus issues among officials tended not to be pushed to a point that might be embarrassing to somebody, or place him in an exposed position. The recognized method for resolving conflict was to Meliorate a compromise solution that would not result in lessened prestige for anybody. This feature of Chinese politics is tied up intimately with the importance that the Chinese, especially perhaps Chinese officialdom, have always attached to not "lasing face." Most cultures encourage the individual to seek prestige, and not shame or embarrass himself, but the Chinese undoubtedly are far more preoccupied with this matter than most other people This point can hardly be overemphasized. One way to wit it is that the Chinese have made the role of "face" explicit, while other cultures have not In any case, the fact that everyone was concerned to save face encouraged the search for compromise, i.e., face-saving solutions, and the constant emphasis on compromise solutions tended to re-enforce the tendency to put face-saving considerations above all others. The fact that the political process went forward within a bureaucratic framework had certain demonstrable effects on Chinese political thought and behavior. For one thing, it minimized group competition for power, so that through many centuries the Chinese never developed any institution remotely comparable to the political party or to the pres- sure groups 'which in some countries have always attempted to affect government policy from outside the latter's own ranks The competition for political power in China, in other words, took place within the government, and revolved it, mind individuals, not organized groups. There was little in the way of competition even between different departments of the government; officials were transferred freely from office to office, and no department was staffed with specialists who had a vested interest in its bureaucratic future In a word, political competition in China was between individuals and/or the personal but, at most, loosely organized follow- ings of individuals. There was a great deal of "palace politics" and "office politics," 374 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 it but the issues were personal, and not political in the usual sense of the word. lot mattered most, as shall be seen again and again, was whom one knew, and who were one's friends and champions. And this tended to re-enforce the identification between political and personal morality. Since the politics mandarins engaged in were personal politics, they could readily appreciate the focus of Confucianism upon the moral qualities of rulers. Informal Patterns As has been indicated, traditional Chinese society was not ruled by the formal institu- tions of the Imperial government exclusively. To a considerable extent, the day-to-day life of the majority of the people, their conduct and their personal relations, were regulated by institutions the reverse of formal. The pattern of that phase of social control is the subject matter of a later section. It is neezssary to discuss here certain institutions which, though not themselves governmental, affected or were in one way or another geared into the process of formal government. Secret Societies From the earliest times secret societies and orders played an important role in China. Many of them possessed the major charicteristics of local governments, even claiming and exercising the power of life and death over their members; and most of them discharged, at one and the same time, functions that Westerners would associate with, variously, the religious orders, the social fraternities, the benevolent associations, and the locally oriented political pressure groups. They did not, during periods of relative political and social stability, have much impact on the over-all political life of the nation as a whole; insofar as they were political pressure groups, they were not only locally oriented, but confined themselves, for the most part, to merely protecting their members against possible loss or injury from the policies and actions of local officials, and thus did not seek to influence government policy and decisions. More concretely, the secret societies concerned, them- selves with obtaining for their members special favors from and special treatment by lo- cal officials. Instead of seeking to bring about a change in a government policy regarded as detrimental to the interests of their members, they sought to induce local officials to exempt their members from the execution of such a policy. The societies thus operated at the level of the application of policies rather than at the level of formulating policies. They often expended quite considerable sums on influencing favorably local officials. During periods of general political crisis, however (when the power of the central bureaucracy was in decline), the secret soc;eties often assumed a more aggressive role, and on more than one occasion were instrumental in overthrowing one dynasty and replac- ing it with another. Once an effective bureaucratic machinery had been set in maim, however, they were always content to fall back into their less active role. At no time did they attempt to "follow through" and control the polieics of the new regime. Because of their record of political intervention during periods of revolt, the secret societies were officially regarded as suspect by whatever regime happened to be in power, and were carefully watched as potential sources of revolutionary activity. Some dynasties sought to control or eliminate them. Trade Guilds Another institution which brought people together to forward limited and specific objectives not of a specifically political character was the trade guild or association. Like the secret society, the trade guild (lid not attempt. to influence the government policy, but did attempt to protect its members from injury by it. 375 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: (ST Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 The guilds mainta ned strict discipline over their members. They laid down directives on such matters as the liring of apprentices, the length of service, and the type of training to be required of an al prentice ic order for him to become a journeyman. They also controlled market prices;\ imposed standards for quality, and determined who could enter shat markets. They were generally soccessful in causing compliance throughout each trade or industry. Most of them operated in terms of an economic philosophy that looked with favor on monopoly, and tended to ihscotnage competition. To some extent the trade guilds did influence the noneconomic activities of their members. Many, for -sample, had their own special gods and ceremonial rituals. And '1 it is interesting to note that the kind of discipline they exercised over their members gave them a further though unintended political function over and above that of influencing local officials ? they were ready-made instruments for government regulation of production and commerce, and Chiricse governments often made use of them for this purpose. Provincial Clubs The provincial clubs, of which there were examples in most of the large cities of China, were protective societies organized by people from one and the same pros ince living in one and the same city, and thus reflected the strong sectional loyalties that have always char- acterized the Chinese. They also tended to re-enforce these sectional loyalties, by reminding individuals of their identification with a particular region. In general, the provincial clubs operated like the other societies mentioned here, porely defensively as far as their relations with government were concerned, at most attompting to influence the appointment of local officials and local policies affecting their members. Clan and Family In all cultures, the family performs important functions in the social control of indi- viduals. In China, however, family early assumed an importance from this point of view that it has never enjoyed in any Western society. The general functions of the Chinese family are treated in another section; herein is a consideration of a few of its political and social implications. The crucial role of the family involved, among other things, its performing functions that would otherwise have had to be performed by public institutions, especially govern- ment Above all, the fact that members of one and the same family felt, and acted in terms of, a sense of family unity in their dealings with one another, made it possible for the family to resolve (or prevent) disputes by informal and ad hoc methods, and thus to take part of the burden of preserving order from the shoulders of the government. It meant also that the individual's first loyalty belonged to a group present and visible, which could materially influence his well-being, so that he had little reason to develop a fei ling of loyalty or obliga- tion to such remote groups as, e.g., and most particularly, the nation (It is not surprising therefore, that the most effective nationalistic appeals in China have always run in terms of the Chinese people being one great family, and the Emperor as its father.) The fact. that the demands of family loyalty militated against the development of a sense of nationalism on the part of the Chinese did not set the govt?ritment, as the rallying point for nationalism, against the family. On the contrary, the government always gave its support to the traditional view of the family's proper role. It early learned to use people's loyalty to their family units as a means cf making the power of government effec- tive, so that it did not need to try to replace family loyalty with loyalty to the nation and its governing institutions. It did this by holding the family accountable for any violation 376 STAT ?,???????????????, 41}................."????????"..T.???????????????.???????.n...??????.??????????????????????-?.0.00. ,Ar Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 of regulations by their members, and giving official support to the view that the individuals were responsible to the family. Under traditional Chinese law, for example, it did not matter whether the particular individual who had violated a regulation was arrested; some other member of the family would do equally well, since it was in any case the family itself that would he held responsible. And, this being the ease, the family had to regulate the behavior of its members, and perform many of the chores of social discipline usually associated with governments. The rule of the family in regulating individual behavior was formalized, on a higher level of generality, in the pao-chta system Under this system, which dates hack to the formative period of Chinese history, six to fifteen families were brought together to form a chin. Above the chin stood the pao, uhich consisted of about six to ten chin. Both selected the elders, i.e., leaders, who were to act for them. The pao was held responsible for the actions of the individual members of its constituent families, and the chin was held respon- sible for the actions of the lenders of its constituent. pao. Each pao-dlia system was, on the one hand, a mutual aid society that protected the interests of the families concerned and worked out informally any problems that might arise between families. It was, on the other hand, an instrument that the government, in the strict and formal sense of the term, could use to maintain strict control over the people without having to resoa L to the police power and the apparatus of administration. Village Government The family and the pao-cliia system enabled the Imperial government to leave local affairs to themselves, so that in the typical Chinese village there WM almost no evidence of external control of any kind. The village, either through pao-chia or through elders of its own, not only carried on local government but also did most of the local chores connected with the functions of provincial and county government. They received orders and regula- tions from the provincial or county officials and saw to it that they were complied with; so long as they were complied with, the provincial and county officials had no need to act locally, and, for the most part, did not. in taxation, for example, the procedure was to inform the village leaders what the quota for their village would be for the coming year, and leave the elders to raise the required sum in their own way. Concept of Authority The traditional system of government by bureaucracy and informal institutions produced in the Chinese a distinctive attitude toward authority, and with it a Nhole set of assumptions concerning the nature of authority, how it snould behave, and how it was likely to net. These became basic to Chinese thinking about government and politics, and conditioned the actions of both rulers and subjects. Although Chinese governmental institutions have undergone profound changea in recent decades, there is reason to believe that mast Chinese continue to hold the traditional attitude toward authority, with slight modification Now, as in the past, most Chinese have developed their concept of authority through experience in the family, and the Chinese family has only recently, much too recently to have affected the attitudes of any adults, entered a period of fundamental change. Thus even the most "modernized" Chinese, who consciously disavow the okl attitude on rational grounds, probably continue, in greater or leaser degree, to act and, on the unconscious level, feel in terms of it. The moment is still far away in Chinn, assuming it will ever come, when it has 'eased to he an important factor in Chinese politics. 377 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release .-;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ?Li The following is a summary of the traditional attitude toward authority. (1) Official authority is omnipotent.: (a) there is no recognized and approved method of questioning and/or expressing doubt about authority; (b) authority cannot admit to mistakes or failures ? it can modify or even reverse its policies without giving reasons for doing so. (2) Authority is stern, strict, and exacting, but not inhuman: it is the strict, demanding, and unemotional father, who nevertheless has the best int:rests ol man and soci.:y at heart. (3) Authority plays favorites: (a) authority operates in teras of rewards and punishments ? naturally, the rewards go for the most part to its favorites; (b) it is always advisable to seek the favor of authority, since, in the future, authority may have an oppor- tunity to do one a hurt cr a service; (c) authority cannot be expected to be impartial and impersonal ? it is highly sen.3itive to favorable treatment, and has a lung memory. (I) Authority is corruptible: (a) it is possible to negotiate with authority, but one negotiates with it on its terms; (b) authority knows how to appreciate material things ? it is not offended by "gifts" if they are proffered tactfully. (5) Authority is civilized; but it can be roused to anger: (a) authority has all the qualities of the cultured person ? it can nevertheless be brutal when it, is irritated; (b) it is best never to act in a manner that might offend or rouse the anger of officials, for many of them have quick tempers; (c) when it is untlisturlvd, authority can be counted on for dignified and civil behavior. (6) Authority has mystical qualities, but is fundamentally of this world: (a) it can perform rituals that can appease and gratify supramundane powers; (b) it. does not operate through magic, and is not endowed with supernatural powers ? but. it is responsible to the supernatural. (7) Authority is pompous, majestic, and haughty without being considered hollow: (a) it is luxury-loving, and surrounds itself with opulence; (b) it does not have to be retiring or modest? on the other hand, it is expected not to be boastful; (c) splendor on the part, of officials is a part of the nature of things, and is not, evidence of corruption. (8) Authority is not heroic or martial: (a) the qualities asv3ciated with military leadership and the "man on horseback" are not cultivated by the literati, and thus are not to be associated with real authority; (b) bravery, in the sense of reckless daring, is not for the bearers of authority, but for the foolhardy; (c) courage, as evidenced in the patient, long-suffering, and virtuous officeholder, is associated with authority. (9) Authority and morality are intimately associated: (a) authority is responsible for the morality of the people, and thus attempts, quite properly, to uphold general moral standards; (b) it claims the prestige that attaches to moral rectitude, and, quite properly, applies sanctions on behalf of morality; (c) any violation of general moral staadards is the rightful concern of public officials ? they have the obligation to punish the violators. (10) The standards governing the conduct of authority are of a general and imprecise character: (a) public officials are expected to be morally correct in all their behavior, but correct behavior on their part is not a matter of obeying exact rules or regulations; (b) ad- herence to ritual and correct form are indications of correct ethical behavior ? the only precise test for official conduct, therefore, is the ability to adhere to ritual and form. (II) Au- thority is traditional yet pragmatic in its thinking. The apparent contradiction between adherence to tradition and a pragmatic attitude toward problems is resolved in the following manner: (a) all solutions are to be found within a framework of tradition, but. the particular solution selected must be satisfactory from a pragmatic point of view; (b) all pragmatic solutions must be rationalized in traditional terms; (c) tradition, although it possesses mystical qualities, is itself fundamentally pragmatic, since it is the product of extremely wise and practical men. (12) Authority is omnicompetent and wise: (a) he who has authority may be assumed to possess skill in handling problems in any and all fields; (b) wisdom and authority are synonomous. Individual men in places of authority may 378 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ....,1,????????????,...????????? ^ appear to be lacking in intelligence, but their very status is a guarantee of wise decisions; (c) no detail is too small for authocity to concern itself with ? in giving attention to small details authority gives evidence of its omnicompetence and profound wisdom. (13) Authority is supremely endowed with Oa. powers of "common sense" ? (a) officials are entitled to operate in terms of n common sense fonn of empiricism, and in doing so they arrive at "reason:dile" solutions and decisions, (b) the coneept of "reason" does not include systematic and logical formulation of rational theories of a general nature. On the contrary, ,1 theory, if it were relied on, might lead to conclusions that would threaten the traditional 1 values. (II) Authority has continuity, is stable: (a) all offices and posts have the prestige 1 of age, and changes in officeholders do not affect the stability of the pasts they hold Emper- ors and dynasties come and go, for example, but the Dragon Throne has a permanent ., quality; (b) fathers have the power of authority because they are a link between a continu- ous past and a continuing future for the family. (15) Authority has no objection to privacy !? so long as it does not lead to action: (a) the individual can enjoy privacy and indulge in r- 1 contemplation ? authority can interfere with this freedom only when it thres tens to lead ! to action detrimental to the authority; (b) authority recognizes the rights to leisure and to entertainment, and even supports leisurely and entertaining activities. Patterns of Loyally 1The traditional culture of China put great emphasis upon considerations of personal allegiance and loyalty as opposed to considerations of an impersonal character. In general, ,? however, considerations of loyalty were expected to affect only those relations that were immediate and a part of everyday life. Abstract relations were not thought of as involving considerations of loyalty or obligation at all. The traditional pattern of allegiance in China can hut be understood by fixing attention on what persons an individual was expected to be loyal to. The following outline should make this clear. Objects of Allegiance I. Family: (a) all considerations of loyalty begin in the family, and the members of a family are expected to put their loyalty to each other above other loyalties and obligations. Only in the most unusual circumstances is it permissible for outside loyalty to take prece dence over that within the family; (b) within the family the quality of allegiance varies ? there is a culturally imposed correct form for each particular relationship. Thus, the obligation of the children to the father ;s the highest loyalty, and the ties between two brothers impose greater obligations than those between a brother and a sister; (c) any act that violates the bonds of family unity can bring shame to all the members of the family. One refrains from committing such an act, whatever the personal cost this involves. 2. Teachers and Mentors: (a) the relation of teacher and student is a basic human relation, involving loyalties that can, on occasion, supersede certain family loyalties; (b) the relation is reciprocal- the student owes a life-long debt to his instructor ? the master is expected to further the interests of all his students whenever he is in a position to do so; (c) although originally developed out of the relation between the classical scholar and his teacher, the pattern of student-teacher ties applies to all situations in which one man instructs or imparts skills to another Thus, in the field of military affairs an officer is expected to have a life-long sense of obligation to his first tutor and instructor. 3. Friends: (a) the ties of friendship carry with them profound mutual loyalties, which any act of friendship is expected to intensify; (b) the older the acquaintanceship the stronger the obligations of loyalty ? older friendships are never to be subordinated to 379 STAT .1 )eclass fied in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 more recent ones; (c) the fact of sharing experiences develops obligations of mutual loyalty. In particular, classmates have an obligation to each other that does not diminish with time; (d) the demands of loyalty that friendships entail include the obligation to make personal sacrifices for one another, even when these are highly distasteful and/or damaging. 4. Coprarincials: (a) the individual is expected to feel a deep cente of belonging to a province, section, and city, and thus of loyalty thereto; (h) the individuara loyalty to his province, etc., is also a loyalty to other pcmons Who "belong" to it. He is expected to give them preferential treatment, and can expect the same from them. 5. Superiors and leaders: (a) allegiance to one's official superiors is personal, and extends beyead the realm of official functions; (b) loyalty to one's superiors is not cotermi- nous with thc superordination-subordmation relation. If the superior is transferred, his immediate sobordinatea are expected to remain loyal to him (thus it was often necessary to change r oat of the members of a staff when there was a new chief official appointed); (e) leaders can expect their subordinates to be loyal to them throughout their life time. A relevant consideration in the appointment of a civil or military leader is, to whom does he owe allegiance, and who owes allegiance to him? (Thus officials were known and evalu- ated in terms of the personal cliques to which they belong, and it was taken for granted that they would not violate these personal bonds.) O. Office but not government: (a) one does not owe a deep loyalty to the state or its symbols. However, one is expected to feel loyalty to particular offices or posts with which one is concerned; (b) an official is expected to develop a loyalty to his office. This includes loyalty to the tradition of the office. Subordinate officials are expected to be loyal both to their superiors and to the particular office or post those superiors occupy; (e) in military organizations, the individual's primary loyalty is to superior officers, hut a man also develops a loyalty to the particular unit to which he belongs. The following general statements about loyalty, as traditional Chinese culture con- ceived it, will further clarify the pattern of allegiance previously outlined. I. Loyally was in the main loyally to people: (a) situations demanding sentiments of loyalty usually involved personal relationships. One could face loyalty only where it could be reciprocated in terms of positive feelings or acts; (b) the culture did not demand loyalty to such things as flags, banners, or other symbols. Symbols as such did not have to be treated with reverence, although there was an obligation not to damage them; (c) a man was not expected to be personally committed to any particular ideal. One could defend the intellectual views of, for instance, one's master, hut this was a demonstration of loyalty to him, nut to the ideas themselves; (d) such symbols as were recognized were, for the most part, associated with a personage, not some abstract concept. 2. Obligations of loyalty were permanent. Once an individurd recognized an obligation to be loyal he was expected to remain faithful to it throughout his life. One did not outgrow such an obligation either with the passing of time or with change of status. 3. Loyally patterns had continuity: (a) some loyalties were actually handed down from generation to generation. A father's obligation to be loyal in certain circumstances was assnmed by a son upon the father's death. A son was expected, in any case, to respect his father's loyalties; (b) one WU expected to respect the ties one's family had recognized in earlier generations. Thus one had a sense of loyalty to one's ancestral home even if one had never even visited it. 4 Loyally was closely associated with status: (a) the loyalty pattern aas highly strati- fied, i.e , it ran in terms of relations between superiors and inferiors, not of relations between equals; (b) the inferior was expected to show devotion ? the superior was expected to defend and forward the interests of the subordinate. 380 Peclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release k-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1. 1' 5. Loyalty was demorstrated by adherence to form and cereniony:1 (a) the bonds tit friendship, for example, were often formalized in special ceremonies between the parties_ It. was also common for people to make formal declaration of their: loyalties; (b) even among classmates it was common to make feelings of loyalty explicit. G. Loyalty and obligation wire closely associated: (a) it personal obligation could develop into a long-lasting loyalty; (b) a grant or gift of material assistance created a loyalty and a permanent obligation on the part of the recipient. 7. Feelings of bust tended to be confined to relations in which loyalties were present. One could count on other's behavior only in those relations that involved loyalties. One could place the greatest trust in relatives, for example, but not in strangers. TRANSITION PERIOD Revolution 0/ 1911 The West brought to China new ideas and new proposals for solving old problems, while at the same time creating problems which had been unknown in traditional Chinese society and which, in due time, produced both military and political onslaughts on the Manchu regime. A few words now be included about a further new development associated with the final decades of the Manchu dynasty, namely, the emergence of readily identifiable new social, political, and economic groupings with ideas or interests that made them potential foci of opposition to the Manchus, and also potential rallying points for the kind of nationalism that was about to become an important factor in the Chinese situation. The New Merchant and Commercial Class The business contacts of the new merchant and commercial class were for the most part with the West, and its operations, in any case, were outside the traditional framework of Chinese customs and institutions. The Government, as the protector of that framework, made it difficult for this new class to do business in the way and on the scale it wished. The New Student and Intellectual Groups The new student and intellectual groups were composed of individuals who had turned their backs on much of the classical education that had play,4I so important a role in the traditional order in favor of Western knowledge and ideas. These groups represented it net loss the the maintenance of the old order, which, relying heavily upon its ability to recruit and hold the loyalty of the old order of intellectuals - and thus the govern- ment -- WWI weakened by the disinclination of the new student and intellectual groups to serve it. The time also came when thesa groups represented active opposition, demanding a fundamental change in the Chinese system of government that would bring it more in line with Western theories and practices. Chinese Emigrts Many 6migre4, quite naturally, were in clo,:e contact with Western developments, and came to feel that their own country was backward by comparison Some of them had It further, practical reason for wishing for changes in China. namely that the Chinese govern- Meta was too weak to prmert the interests of its nationals living abroad. 381 STAT )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 These new roups were united in demanding a new nationalistic consciousnem in China that would, the believed, strengthen the country in many war and bring it into lino with other, especially Western, peoples from the standpoint of coping with the realities of the twentieth centur) world. Their nationalistic tendencies brought them into opposition to the Manchu dyiet ty purely aside from the other reasons they hail for opposing it; no nationalist could aerept gracefully the fact that the ruling dynasty was an alien one that had conquered Chinh as recently as 1614, and that it had consistently discriminated against Chinese in favor of Manchus. The new groups, however, really had nothing in common except their general dissatis- faction with the old order, a strong anti-Manchu feeling, and a greater or lesser Western orientation. This was to have important consequences over the next years, for it meant that the elements that prepared the way for the revolution, though agreed on the need for a change of regime, lacked even the beginnings of a common body of ideas ? ideas as to the shape a new regime in China should take, or as to what it should do once it had taken shape. Indeed it seems probable, in retrospect, that ipso facto, given their divergent interests and loyalties, they were incapable of agreeing on either a form of government or a postrevolu- tionary program of action. The cement that held them together, insofar as they were ever together at all, was the personality of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. With great singleness of purpose he labored to build a movement out of opponents of t!if Manchus, and no questions were to he asked as to what the individuals and groups joining the movement wanted over and above the overthrow of the Manchus. Dr. Sun personally appears to have favored at this time a republican form of government, tempered by certain adjustments to the traditional system in Chinn. But through the period when the revolution MIS being prepared he did not attempt to bind the movement to any concrete plans, presumably because he knew only too nen that raising such questions would merely divide his following. Attempts at Republican Government The unavoidable result of the failure on the part of Dr. Sun and his followers to develop plans for the postrevolutionary period was that when the revolution unexpectedly occurred (on 10 October 1911) they were not in a position to seize and hold power. The Tung Mn Hui, as it was called (it later became the Kuomintang (Nationalist) Party) had little or nothing to contribute except the notion that under a republican form of government most of the country's problems would somehow solve themselves, which no one was likely to mistake as a recipe for governing China. Even the organizational and propaganda work that might have helped the republit an institutions to function successfully (e.g., by explain- ing to the masses how they work) was beyond its capacity. Nor was any other single group ready, in any meaningful Sense of the word, to take on the responsibilities of government. Not even the one group (aside from the unorganized revolutionists) with any prospect of winning political power -- the military elite or rather, the various military leaders in command of armies out over the country, eaeh with forces personally responsible to him --- was in position to back up his claim to poitieal favor with military strength. How powerful the military were going to be in the new regime became clear when the most powerful of the military leaders, Yilan was named the first president of the republic. Even Dr. Sun Yat -sen appears to have acquiesced in YOrin's accession to the the presidency ? partly because Dr. Sun Wit..4 far more voneerned about getting a republican form of government established than about its personnel and prop-son and partly liecause 382 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 .."4111.1111.?. 1 i 17? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: 1'. 4a. of a conviction on his part that the major problems of the moment were economic. Thus he was content with a post that made him responsible for the development of the nation's railways asd made no attempts to dominate the political scene. It soon bet-ante evident that YOan Shih-k'ai intended to use the presidency merely as a steppingstone, and to establish himself as the emperor of a new dynasty. Even Dr. Sun and his followers now began to see, too late to do anything about it, that the presuppositions for a republican system of government did not yet exist in China, and would na come into existence until the Chinese peop:e had been taught the essentials of republican government. For the moment, certainly, only considerations of military power could determine the residence of political power. Revolts did break out in opposition to Yuan Slith-k'ai's announced plan to mount the Dragon Throne and re-establish the imperial system of government, but it was obvious that whoever had superior military force would control Chinese politics. Ynan Shih-k'ai died in June, 1916. Conceivably, China might now have had an opportunity to make its first experiment with a genuinely republican form of government. Rot whnt ensued upon Yfian's death, again because of lack of preparation on the part of the elements that wanted a republican China, was a period of competition and civil war between several war lords and thus a period during which even a unified central government was out of the question. The war-lord period must not, however, be dismissed as a mere temporary phase, with- out consequences for the future It destroyed many features of the traditional pattent of government in China, and added new elements that have continued to be present in Chinese politics ever since. During this period violence came to be the essential characteristic of Chinese politics. It was not only that henceforth military figures were to dominate Chinese political life; henceforth any individual or group that sought to influence political affairs in China would either fail or win influence through military power. The scholar and the bureaucrat were now to give way to the army leader. And the politician who sought power must first. obtain the support of armies. Ever since the war-lord period the major political decisions in China have turned upon considerations of military power. Even for the masses of the people the issue has been not so much whom one believed in as who was likely to be victorious on the field of battle. For the people as individuals, it was always better to be found on the side of the winners in the struggle for military power. In a word, in any major political 'ash the people have tended ever since the war-lord period to support whatever group seemed most likely to win Another consequence of the war-lord period was a widespread conviction that China should be ruled by a single group with a clear monopoly of political power. The war lords had so successfully checked and balanced each other's power that, as has been pointed out, a strong central administration was out of the question. Henceforth even the intellectuals would tend to dream their dreams in terms of a political life in which a single group would have undisputed responsibility for the administration of the government. They would be blind to the dangers of one-party rule, and disinclined to believe in the virtues of an open, democratic competition for power. Henceforth they would seek "efficient" government, even if it. meant rule by a small group, as the only (in their view) realistic alternative to power so divided that no group could carry out a decisive program. TIIE NATIONALISTS Rise of the Kuomintang As Chinese polities became more and more dominated by considerations of military power and violence Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his followers became inerea.singly impotent in controlling the course of events. In 1917, however, Dr. Sun finally broke with the Peking 383 STAT Declassified ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1 '.acr ?-? 420 goverrunent, and established a separate regime at Canton, which, though it was never any stronger than its local military leader, did become the rallying point of elements dissatisfied with the polities of the war lords. Not until 1913 was Sun Yat-sen able to establish an actual government, and then it was little more than the government of the city of Canton, with by no means a free hand even against the leading military commander in that part of China. In that same year, however, on 20 January, Sun received assuranees of assistance from the Soviet Union. (On that date he and Adolph Joffe, the Comintern representative in Asia, signed a docu- ment stating that China was to count on the support of Russia, but that it was not itself ripe for Communism.) The first result of this agreement was the arrival in Canton of a group ef Russian advisors, among them Michael Borodin and General Galen, who were to help reorganize the Kuomintang with the Russian Communist Party as a model. In the course of their stay they imparted to the Kuomintang two ideas that were to have a lasting effect on its destiny: first, that a political party that has effective discipline and strict control within its own organization can exereise a control over political developments quite out of propor- tion to its numbers, especially when the opposition is disorganized or lacks decisive control over all of its own elements; and second, that the Kuomintang must create an elite military academy, to turn out loyal officers for its future army. The first director of the resulting Whampon Military Academy was Chiang Kai-shek, and it was through the relations he established in that capacity with the new corps of on' that Chiang was able, in the long run, to build up his own political power. The Soviet Union, thus committed to assist the Kuomintang, called upon the Chinese Communist Party to collaborate with the Canton government. The Chinese Communist Party, developing initially out of Marxist study groups among college professors and students, had held its first organizational meeting in 1920, and its first congress (in Shanghai) in July 1921. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, though refusing to sanction the idea of collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, ruled that individual Communists could become members of the Kuomintang if they were prepared to accept its discipline. Many of the Communists disliked the idea of joining a movement headed by non-Com- munists, but, as always in the Chinese Communist Party's history, the wishes of the Comin- tern's leaders proved decisive. At the Third Congress of the Party, held in Canton in June 1923, it was resolved that the Party would support the Kuomintang, nnd that its members would, as individuals, accept the leadership of Sun Yat-sen. The resulting coalition between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists was never smooth and harmonious. From the beginning the Communists' first loyalty was to their own leaders and to the objectives of the Communist International; also from the beginning, the non-Communist element in the Kuomintang distrusted the Communists, and suspected them of exploiting the alliance as a means of increasing their own influence. There was, however, little open conflict between the two groups while the Kuomintang was still isolated in Canton and the Russians were there to advise it. Sun Yat-sen died on 12 March 192.5, and control of the Kuomintang passed, tempo- rarily as it turned out, into the hands of a triumvirate consisting of Chiang Kai-shek, a military leader considered to be slightly left of center, Hu lian-min, a scholar who had long been an as?;ociate of Dr Sun Yat-sen and who, because of his commitment to many of the old values of traditional Chinese culture, was considered n right. winger, and Wang Ching-wei, an ambitious, militant radical who was considered the kader of the left wing of the Kuomintang (he was to become the leading Japanese puppet in China during World War II). The continuing struggle for power among these three and their followers and the constantly growing tension between the Nationalists and the Communists were the major political facts of the ensuing years. 384 STAT 111111111MEr Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 J 4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: ? I- 4 ment of China. At the time the Nanking government had been established Chiang's armies had little or no foothold north of the Yangtze But it was now clear that the new Nation- alists were the strongest force to appesr in Mina since the death of YOun Shih-k'ni. - The ideas and ideals of Sun Yat-sen became the formal ideology of the Koominutng. Dr. Sun had distinguished three stages in the realization of his concepts of government. First, there was to be a period of political unification, to be accomplished by the Nationalist Armies. Next there was to be a period of "political tutelage," in which the Kuomintang Party would be responsible for the government, and assume the obligation of preparing the people, through education, for the day when democratic government would be possible in China. The third period would find China being governed in accordance with Dr. Sun's doctrine of the Three Principles of the People, or the San Min Chu I. The three principles were of People's Nationhood (Min-lsu), People's Power (Min-ch'uan), and People's Livelihood (Min-sling). The first of the three, People's Nationhood, was little more than an affirmation that the Chinese people were of a single race and constituted a single nation. It had just been used as a slogan for unifying popular forces in the struggle against the Manchus. After the Revolution, however, and more especially after 1924, it took on new meaning, and thanks to the treaties signed by the Imperial government, became a challenge to the favored positions enjoyed by the Western Powers. Under the Nationalists, certainly, the principle of nationhood was understood as a mandate for the elimination of "unequal treaties" and all other manifestations of Imperialism in China. In 1927, when the Nationalist Armies moved out from Canton to unify the country, the tensions between the Communists and the Nationalists at last broke out into the open. In the Northern Exrdition, Chiang Kai-shek was at the head of the armies that were to conquer the Southeast and, ultimately, take Shanghai. The Second Nationalist Army, which moved north into Central China and eventually captured Hankow, was under the direction of the Rits.inn advisors and included, together with some left-wing elements of the ICuomintang, most of the Chinese Communists. Upon reaching IInnkow, this group decided to move the Nationalist capital from Canton to Ilankow in the hope of eliminating Chiang Kai-shek and thus preparing the way for Communist domination of the new government. Chiang responded by establishing another government at Nanking, and it seemed for a time that the coalition would dissolve into two warring elements even before the Northern militarists had been eliminated. No final showdown ever occurred, however, because just at the moment when it see.ned most inevitable, the Ilimkow regime came to grief over its own internal proble:ns, particularly the question of what role the Chinese Communist Party was to play in its counsels. This latter issue (and, within the Communist group itself, the issue as to what policy the Party ought to adopt in the matter) came to a head when Borodin, acting on orders from Moscow, instructed the Party tc take over control of the government, by force if need be, and proclaim itself the Soviet Govern- ment of China. When this decision of the Kremlin was made public, the non-Communist elements at Hankow broke with the government, and left the Communists no alternative, finally, but to quit IIankow and move into the mountainous areas of Kiangsi. here they were to rebuild their party and develop their own armv before bidding again for power in China. Per:od of Supranacy With the collapse of the IIankow government, Chiang Kai-shek's Nanking regime, with the ICuomintang Party as its backbone, could plausibly be called the central govern- 385 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 : ? CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 The second principle WM an affirmation of the ideals of Western demorracy, especially that of popular control over government as concretized in Dr. Sun's concept of the Five Power Constitution. The principle of the People's Livelihood is somewhat more elusive than the other two. It had overtones of what might be called non-Marxist Socialism, the centnil idea being the need to raise the standard of living of the Chinese people by any and all means that would not compromise the in?lependence of the country. The resulting economic program would include a kind of land reform, but as a general propoition Sun thought in terms of China's industnal development the principal mei.tis to the end he had in mind. The Nationalists accordingly welcomed industrial enterprises financed by pnvate capital, thus moving very far away from the scicialistic emphases in their philizsophy, but simultaneously took the view that the government should itself participate in or even conduct numerous economic activities. These extended beyond the fields (communientions, tmnsportation) that the governments of some capitalist countries have claimed as their own, to include such activities as government operation of factories and spinning mills. Although the Kuomintang generally remained faithful to the ideas of Sun Yat-sen in its official progrnm for the Chinese people, it never had much opportunity to translate the latter into reality, Ilecause it was kept to, busy fighting off successive threats to its tenure of political power. When, in 1028, the Kuomintang arinounced that it was entering the second of the periods or phases mentioned, that of "political tutelage," it did not mean that the party had, or even thought it had, already unified China under a central govern- ment and so completed the first phase. Not until 8 June 1928, in point of fact, did the Nationalist forces enter Peking, and even at. that time thc:r power did not, in the north, extend far beyond the main cities. Manchuria remained under the personal control of the "young Marshal" Chang Mitch-Hang, despite the fact that he had declared his alle- giance to Chiang Kai-shek. In the year following their entry into Peking, the Nationalists were obliged to put down a revolt by the two strongest military leaders of the Northwest, Yen Hsi-shan and Feng YO-hsiang. Next it was the turn of two Kwringsi commanders, Li Tsung-jen and Pal Chung-hsi, who revolted in an attempt to withdraw the Southwest provinces from the control of the Nanking government. Then, in 1031, came the greatest challenge of all, when the Japanese launched their invasion of Manchuria, from which, two years later, they began to move into North China. By 1937 the Nationalists' conflict with Japan had assumed the proportions of a large-scale war, which was to go on until Japan's capitulation in 1945. Organization of the Government When the leaders of the Kuomintang undertook the task of organizing the central government, they had to struggle with the same difficulties that had stood in the way of their carrying out the policies of Dr Sun Yat-sen. Nevertheless, after numerous draft constitutions had been proposed, they ended up with a form of government which, in general, parallels that which Dr. Sun had envisaged. The present Constitution, which forms the legal basis of the Nationalist government in Formosa, NV .'1.9 adopted by the National Assembly on 25 December 1946. Many consti- tutional lawyers feel that it is the mo,1 satisfactory constitution ever produced in China. Under the 1916 Constitution, the government receives its powers from the people through the agency of the National Assembly, which is elected on the laws of both geo- graphic regions and vocational groupings. The National Assembly elects the President and Vice-President, and functions as the constituent power, amending the Constitution and 386 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT ?0/170/17 -1A-09 "W..o Yid [Ministry of Audit Supervisory Commissioners People's Political Council trr-. National Govornmont Prosident ? ? Vico-Prosidont Stat.* Council Offices Military Budgetary Control Excmination -Examination Commission -Ministry of Personnol Warts Civil Executive National Economic Council Legislative LiMinistrios Interior Foreign Affairs National Defense Financo Economic Afforrs Education Communication Agriculture and Forestry Social Affoirs Food Water Conservancy Justice Health Land Commissions Judicial -Supremo Court -Administrative, Court -Disciplinary Commission Miscellaneous -National Resourcos -Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs - -Overseas Chinese Affairs pig. 1?Organization of the National Government, April 1947 [ Ministers without Portfolio Roliof cmd Rehabilitation ' Administration Information Office ?0/170/17 -1A-09 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 I ;1 voting on mendments profs:eq.(' by the Legislative Yuan. In addition, it is empowered to impeach tl President-and Vice-President. It meets only olive in time years, tinles-i extra- ordinary se sion.s lire called. Each of its delegates serves for n six-year term. Under the 1916 Constit tion the powers of the Pivsident are greater than they had been under earlier constitutions, despite the faet that. the Nationalists, fearing doinination of the government by one man al in the ease of Yuan Shih-k'ai, had at one time been h'tcrmi,ud to restrict the President's authority. The powers of the office are so great, in fact, that the President would not need to violate any pmvision of the Constitution in onler to reduce the govern- ment to one-man rule. The Constitution provides only one possible check on him, i.e, the Legislative Yuan is nominally free to reject his appointments to key positions. The 1946 Constitution follows Sun Yat-n' s idea of a five-poaer or five-yilan system of government, distributed among Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Control, and Examina- tion Yflans. The Executive YOan is responsible, under the dimetion of the Prime Minister, for the administration of all government ministries and certain special commi&sions. At present, the Executive Ydan of the Nationalist government on Formosa includes 14 ministries and 5 special offices and commissions. The most important of these are the ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Finance, Communications, Education, and Economic Affairs. The Legislative Yuan is a full-fledged parliament, responsible for passing legislation and approving the budget. It may also propose amendments to the Constitution, which must, however, be approved by the National Assembly before going into effect. Its membershir also is elected from both geographic and vocational constituencies. The Judicial Yflan controls the courts and ovcrsees the administration of the law- enforcement agencies. It appoints the members of the Supreme Court, and of the lesser courts as well. The Control and Examination Yflans were unique contributions of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and represent his attempt to carry over into a modernized form of government. certain features that had been characteristic of the traditional Chinese system. The Exaniination Yuan, which organizes and administers examinations for prospective civil tzervice appoint- ees, constituted a recogiition of the value of impartial, competitive examinations44 the key to fitness for holding governmental positions. It was also a product. of Dr. Sun's belief that the administration of the examination function should be on an equal plane with the other functions of government. The Control Yilan also has a long record in Chinese political history. Originally it had been responsible, as an independent office, for seeking out and investigating any irregularities that might exist. anywhere in the bureaucracy. Its purpose was to uphold the latter's integrity: no official was exempt from its scrutiny. In its modem form, the Control Yuan has, in addition to the traditional investigatory functions, the responsibility for approving presidential appointments to high nonpolitical posts, and for supervising the Ministry of Audit, which audits all the records of the government. The members of the Control Yuan are elected by the provinrial and municipal assemblies. Although in theory the five Yflans are of equal power, they have never been so in practice The relative power of the five Ytlans and the Office of the Presidency has varied from time to time, but, in general, the Executive Wan and the 011iee of the Presidency have dominated the government, while other Yttans have wielded little more power than certain mintstries of the Executive Yuan. 388 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release niA_RnP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ^ The Nationalists have, in general, tried to continue the Chinese tradition of govern- ment by bureaucracy. In order for such a system of government to function smoothly, however, there must be broad agreement %% Rhin the society on the objectives of govern- mental policy, and the distribution of political power must be stable and clear. Neither of these preconditions has ever been present in modern China and, as a result, the bureaucracy has not been able to operate effectively. Role of the Kuomintang Party The Kuomiotang was able to speak for the new middle class in China in that it accepted as both necessary and desirable seine form of social and economic change. It took the position that these changes, some revolutionary in character, should be the product of evolutionary development rather than of strict and sudden ii:.plementation of a dortrinaire program In particular, the party emphasized the need for industrial and commercial growth aa a means of rounding out the largely agrarian esonoiny of traditional China This, it. held, would both increase China's power and relieve the agrarian problem that had plagued the country increasingly for decades. The principal groups actively support- ing the Kuomintang were the new industrialists, the rising skilled-labor groups, the mer- chants who were not tied to the traditional economy, the landlords, the students and intellectuals, and, in general, people who looked to the West ha guidance and inspiration. The Kuomintang leaders had learned well from their Soviet advisors the importance of creating a party organization that could be used to command political power; the one they created had the structure of the Communist Party of Russia as its model While, therefore, great energies went into discussing and drafting constitutions and setting up the offices of the central government, the center of political power in Nationalist China always remained outside the government and in the Kuomintang. As in the USSR, major policy decigions were first fought out in die party and then presented to the relevant governmental organs, whose task was merely that of implementing them Moreover, no one could expect to be appointed to a high official post without prior indorsement by the Kuomintang. At the present time, the National Congress, which represents the various local party offices, is at the top of the party hierarchy. Its primary function is to elect the Tsung-ts'ai or Director-General, the man who controls the party apparatus. Chiang Kai-shek has held this post since 1933 and, for the reasons noted, has largely dominated the Chinese govern- ment through these years. Chiang in his capacity as Tsung-ts'ai is ad% ised in policy matters by a Central Advisory Committee, which he elm irs. Under this committee, there a-e numerous sections :11111 departments, super % ising activities in their special fields. The most import ant .of these include the Information Department (covering political propaganda), the Youth Depart- ment, the Secretariat, and the Overseas Affairs Department. The party organization, like the National government, has provincial brainiest and local party offices at the hstrn or county and municipal levels. These offices recruit new members, organize the local party membership, and serve as centers through which the party distributes information about government and politics. Furthermore, like the local representatives of the Communist Party in the USSR, they net as a check on the govern- ment officials in their area. The Kuomintang, then, has always had many of the organizational characteristics of a Communist Party: it has many typically Communist organizational practiees as well. Just as good Communists are taught to worship the doctrines of Marx-1.enin and Stalin, so the Kuomintang sought to instill in its membership a crusading faith in the tenets of Sun 380 ..????????????.10.4.??????? STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 r- --Secretariat I I r-- --Section 1 :1 I (Party activities in Free China; underground II I work in MainlandChina) 1 I I- ---Section 2 : (Party affairs in profe:sional organizations, o O intelligentsia, etc.) : .- E- - -Section 3 o 1 O (Overseas party affairs) a- Zs 15 ... 0 Vb 3 o s r __?Soction 4 -0 (Propaganda, party ideology, cultural activities) -2 1 ? a 1). 2 1 .2 .....: e 1 r? -- So c t ion S L ? 00 tn ol : u 1 I (Political work in government organs; liaison 1 E 1 1 14---1-- o-- ?3? ?1 CI co ... -2 ..- I wiih 6 an I I I ti-Communist democratic organizations) .t? l----Section ej (Social, political, and economic struggles against the "enome) 1)--- i?-? LI - --Section 7 .-. I k (Party ontorprisos and party-member livolihood) I I 1 1----Cadre Training Commission I I I-- --Discipline Commission I i r -- -Finance Commission I I-- --Party History Compilation Commission I L_-- Planning Commission Fig. 2-Kuomintang Party Structure, 1951. 390 STAT ??????? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Yat-sen. However, for a number of refiscovythe Kuomintang has never achieved the degree of disciplined control over its membership that characterizes Communist parties. This explains in part why the Kuomintang at no time had an effective monopoly of political power in China. The fact that party discipline was weak within the Kuomintang made it not so much a political party in the usual sense of the term as the arena in Mush the atruggle for power among competing groups in China went forwLrd. So intense and continuous was this struggle that none of these groups ever really got itself in position to use the party machin- ery as an instrument for accomplishing its own purposes. !lather, Kuomintang policies always represented a balancing out of numerous conflicting points of view, and thus were never vigorous or decisive. Chiang Kai-shek's personal !inner derived, in the main, from his skill at bringing about this balancing-out of interests and at neutralizing extremist elements; for this very reason, however, lie did not himself have a free hand about party policy decisions. Cliques within the Kuomintang As has been pointed out, the Kuomintang looked for support to the rising Chinese middle (laza, whose members, in general, subscribed to a relatively homogeneous act of broad propositions about their country's future. This basic homogeneity did not, however, prevent the formation of cliques which, whether for reasons of political ambition or on account of differences about concrete policy, competed with each other for power. Thus the history of the party is the story of a constant struggle between these cliques, with different ones corning to the top at different times. And, likewise, the policies that the party followed at any given time depended on which clique happened to be riding high at the moment. Chiang Kai-shek minimized the danger of any effective threat to his position in part by his skill in playing off these cliques against each other, and in part by surrounding him- self with groups on whom he could always count for complete loyalty. The most important of these was the Whampoa Graduates, a group of military officers who had received their training at the Whampoa Academy during the period when Chiang was its director. Some had been skilled commanders while others appear to have little military competence, but as a group they have mutually supported each other and have generally loyally justified the faith that Chiang has placed in them. They have had considerable influence in the Army, and, as a result, at times they have weakened the military power of the Nationalists by placing their clique above the interests of the total army. Other of the more noted groupings within the Kuomintang include the Kwangsi Clique and the CC Clique. The first of these consisted of the personal followers of the Kwangsi commanders, Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen Ever since their revolt against Chiang in 1930 they have had somewhat less power than the other military commanders. How- ever, they have been extremely popular in the province of Ewangai and have built up a following in other quarters as a result of their reputation as skilled commanders and politi- cians who have not conceded to every wish of Chiang Kai-shek. Li Tsung-jen was elected ? Vice-President of the Nationalist government in 1948 over the favorite of Chiang Kai-shek because many Chinese felt that he could appeal to the liberal element which the American government sought to support in China. The CC Clique took its name from the two brothers who led it, (leen Li-fu and Ch'tn Kuo-fu. During World War II this group appeared to be increasing in its relative power and, since it was characterized by many American observers as the "right wing" of the 391 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release .01A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 :1 1 Kuomintang, this development contributed to the tendencies of some to charge that the Kuomintang was becoming a reactionary force. Since the Nationalists have moved to Taiwan (Formosa) there has been a drastic reduction in the numbers and strength of the various cliques in the Kuomintang. Individual men still have personal followings, but the mutual danger to all Ima tended to minimize the splitting up of the patty into separate factions. At the present time the main standard for evaluating political developments within the Kuomintang is how close individual men are to Chiang, and not so much the development of separate political power groupings. Thus, those who are not in the inner circle of the Generalissimo do not appear to be positive political forms capable of overtly influencing policy. Politica During World War It When the Japanese first moved into Manchuria in September 1931, the central govern- ment at Nanking backed by the Kuomintang had not as yet achieved its goal of uniting China. Nanking's control of Manchuria was little more than nominal, but the influence of the central government in this area vis increasing. This was one of the factors which caused Japan to conquer these noethern provinces, for otherwise there appeared to be a high puczibility that Chiang Kai-shek would eventually be successful in unifying nil of China. The Japanese aggiession emphasized the necessity of increasing China's power by accelerat- ing the program of uniting the country. As the Nationalists turned to the problem of building up Chinese power in the face of the Japanese attack, the question of the Chinese Communists again became critical. As long as large areas of China were controlled by the Communist Party there was little hope that. China could be united in its efforts to stave off the threat of Japan. During the years 1934-1935 the Nationalists conducted large-scale military operations against. the Corn- munists which resulted in driving them out of their mountainous retreat in Kiangsi and finally forcing them to resettle in the northwest. The Reds were substantially weakened, but the campaigns failed to eliminate them entirely. By 1936 the Chinese Communists were isolated in the northwest area in the province of Shensi, and the Nationalist troops responsible for containing them were the armies of Chang Ilsileb-liang who had been driven out of Manchuria in 1931. The commanders of these troops had little heart for their task as many of them felt that the most urgent objec- tive should be the reconquest from the Japanese of their home provinces. This attitude was intensified by the Communist propaganda which began as early as 1935 to call for a "united front" against Japan. In December 1936, Chiang Kai-shek visited Sian to inspect the operations against. the Communists, but on his arrival at the capital of Shensi he was "arrested" by Chang Much-Hang. The Chinese Communist representatives, who were immediately called to Sian, first, demanded the execution of the Generalissimo, but on orders from Moscow they changed their demands and pressed instead for a "united front" under ttie leadership of Chiang himself. After Chiang Kai-shek was released on 25 December 1936, the way was opened for negotiations between the Nationalists and the Communists for an entente directed against the Japanese. During the early months of 1937 steps were taken in this direction, and with the commencement of open hostilities after the Japanese attack at the Marco Polo Bridge, outside of Peking on 7 July 1937, the negotiations for a "united front" were accelerated. The final agreement of the Nationalists and Communists was the product of this series of negotiations. The agreement can be summarized under the folio% ing points: (I) the Communists would place their armies under the over-all direction of C'hiang Kai-shek in 392 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 .01A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 t the operntions against Japan; (2) the Communists wo I i d abandon their policy ot' seeking to overthrow the Kuomintang by force, and would cooperate with the Kuomintang in achieving the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; (3) the Comniunists would eliminate their Soviet governments and would adopt a democratic form of government allich would respect the people's rights and support the machinery of the national government; and (4) toe Communists would end their propaganda for bringing about class strumle. It was clear from the beginning that the entente was based upon expediency in the face of the Japanese threat, and that there was little in the way of mutual tnist or confidence. By 1933 the relations between the Communists and the Kuomintang were dearly showing renewed signs of deterioration. The Kuomintang found that under the slogan of the "united front" the Communists were in fact seeking to expand theie propaganda. In addition, the Chinese Red armies had flouted the agreement to submit to the command of the Nationalists, and these armies, through their guerrilla activities, were rapidly expanding the atm of political control of the Communiste. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought about a radical change in Chinese politics. With the entry of the United States into the Pacific War victory over Japan waz assured. No longer would the cooperation of the Kuomintang and Communists be a critical factor in defeating Japan. For the Chineae the central political question WILS no longer the prrsibility of expelling Japan from the country, but rather it, was the far more critical one of who would have control over China after the defeat of Japan. American policy, on the other hand, was based on the single objective of defeating Japan and involved postponing any fundamental considerations of the postwar alignment of power in China until after this prime objective had been accomplished. The Chinese never felt as the American government did that the war in the Pacific was between two clearly defined groups ? the Japanese and their enemies. For the Chincso the war was, at. the minimum, a four-way struggle for power. Japan was still dearly the national enemy who would have to be defeated but it was obvious that Chinese power would never be the key factor in this defeat. As the shower of Japan was increasingly neutralized by American seapower, the contest for power between the Nationalists and the Communists was intensified. The numerous semi-independent military commanders comprised a fourth element seeking to gain power for the postwar period. Some of them, for reasons of expediency, had associated themselves with the Japanese, Nationalists, or the Communists. Others maintained relative independence of all these main groups until near the end of the war. The Americans held that all available power should be thrown into the defeat of Japan and considered any holding bark on such a complete commitment as traitorous, corrupt, and generally immoral. However, Ow various Chinese groups involved viewed the defeat of Japan as only a Pyrrhic vietory if it were to result in their particular group losing its relative power in the postwar political scene Since American contact and influence in China was limited primarily to the Nationalist government, American pressure was applied to force the government of Chiang Kai-shek to devote its entire energies to fighting the Japanese and to et.14,c its effortm to counteract the expansion of Communist power. Such pressure was naturally not welcomed by the Chungking government. In its view the Communists were more dangerous than the Japanese. Should the Nationalists overextend them,elves in fighting the Japanese, they asserted, the Communists would certainly seek to move in and take over total control of China. For the Chungking government every American suggestion as to military strategy against Japan was first weighed in terms of its implications for the postwar power of the Kuomintang. 593 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Chinese-American relations were further strained by the fact that the representatives ol the United States in China were not in full agreement as to the mast desirable policy to fo low. The Chinese were quirk to capitalize on these differences in order to push their own \The two principal American views on strategy against Japan were those expounded respectively by General Joseph Stilwell and General Claire L. Chennault. General Stilwell pushed constantly for large-scale commitments of Chinese troops to fight against the Japanese. He felt that all internal conflict between the Chinese should be eliminated and went so far as to advocate giving American aid to the Chinese Communist armies if these troops would be employed against the Japanese. Naturally these views were welcomed by the Chinese Communists. In addition, Stilwell felt that the main effort of the Chinese armies should be directed toward the recapturing of Burma which would reopen a direct land supply route to western China and eventually make possible extended campaigns on the Asiatic mainland against Japan. General Chennault, through his service to the Chinese government as commander of the American Volunteer Group ("Flying Tigers"), had established very cordial relations with the Chungking government. His view; on how the war should be fought made him acceptable to the Nationalists. General Chennault felt that the best way to prosecute the war in China was to rely heavily upon air power and employ Chinese troops mainly to defend the American air bases in China. To General Chennault the most economical way to defeat Japan was through the application of air- and seapower rather than through extended land campaigns on the mainland of Asia. General Stilwell's position on this matter was strongly backed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, General Marshall, and the chief State Department repre- sentatives in China at the lime. Chiang Kai-shek steadily resisted the joint pressures from all these sources, even under the threat that lendlease aid would be cut off from China. The relations between General Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek steadily deteriorated until, in August 1944, President Roosevelt felt it necessary to remove him. Not only were relations between the Chinese and General Stilwell reaching the breaking point, but also there was the clear possibility that the Nationalist government might drop out of the war rather than submit to the political and strategic demands of its allies. When Stilwell was removed Mr. Clarence Gauss, the US Ambassador, resigned and General Patrick J. Ilurley was appointed in his place. With the appointment of Hurley, the United States undertook to mediate between the Nationalists and the Communists. Initially, Ambassador Hurley was hopeful that it might be possible to bring the Communists into the central government, and that the Communist and Nationalist Armies might cooperate in the war against Japan. However, after a series of negotiations with both factions Ambassador Hurley became disillusioned about the intentions of the Chinese Communists and felt that they were committed to a policy only of maximizing their own power. With the defest of Japan the struggle for power in China became far more intense and open. Both the Communist and the Nationalist armies sought to reoccupy the territories held by the Japanese (luring the war, and civil war marked this race to power. In November 1015, Ambas.sador Hurley resigned with the warning that American policy was nat being effectively carried out by some members of the Foreign Service, and that there was a real danger that the Communists would seek to dominate all of China through civil ecnflict if necessary. American policy turned once again to efforts at mediation when, on 27 November 1945, General of the Army George C. Marshall was appointed US Ambassador to China and President Truman's Special Representative there. 394 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 The Marshall Mission to China la.sted until 6 January 1917. and although it did for a brief Kned achieve a temporary cessation of hostilities, the basic conflict between the Communists and the Nationalists was far too deep and intense to be settled through a policy of mediation aimed at a coalition government. To the Nationalists, the American assump- tion that the Chinese Communists, faithful adherents of world Communism ander the direction of the Kremlin, could cooperate in it democratic form of government appeared to he highly unrealistic. They felt that the danger from the Cthamunist quarter WAS far too real to justify any policy lacking solid guarantees that, should the Chinese Communist turn out to be less benign than sonic were picturing them to be, the cause of the non- Communists would not be irrevocably compromised. For the Communists, all American demands for mcdiation and compromise could lead to the strengthening of their power since Ameriean pressure for compromise could only be applied to the Nationalists. A detailed survey of American policy in China during the war and immediate postwar years would reveal that the United States vacillated between unconditional aid to the Nationalists and demands for compromise with the Communists accompanied with restric- tions on assistance to the Chinese government. For the two Chinese elements the period was one of constantly seeking further power and of unqualified distrust of each other. For both the Kuomintang and the Communists, the attitude of the American government was always a key factor and regardless of what the United States did, it had implications that directly affected the relative power of each group. With the ending of the Marshall Mission in January 19 17 the scene was laid for the final civil war for control of the Chinese mainland. TIM COMMUNISTS The Chinese Communist Party today holds the monopoly of political and social power in all the areas under Chinese Communist control. All major as well as most of the minor decisions affecting the control of men in these areas are made by the Party. Although the Communists have employed other instruments of control, they have at all times preserved the integrity of the Party and have never permitted these other institutions to escape from the domination of the Party. The various "people's organizations" and the formal gor =tent of the "Chinese People's Republic" serve only as instruments which the Communist Party manipulates for the achievement of its objectives. Thus, even though all of the important offices of the formal government are held by members of the Communist Party, it is through the organiration of the Party that they make the fumlamental decisions and not n members of an independent organ of government dominated by individual members of the Party The Chinese Comnumist Pally is thus a "state-above-the-state," and there is no law higher than the Party. Since the first Party Congress in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party has been in every respect a "Marxist-Leninist Party" and has assumed for itself the historic mission of carrying out a Communist Revolution in China In its role as "leader and vanguard of the Revolution" it has sought. to control and dominate all "revolutionary elements." Arcording to the definition iied by the Chinese Communist Party, only those groups which it controls are heviilutionary" and thus acceptable, and all greups or indiviiluals it does not control are labeled "reactionary" and "counterrevolutionary." Thus, through its propaganda it has sought to create the impression that only those groups which it feels that it can dominate are "progressive," and "dedieated to the people." As a part of world Communism, the Chinese Communists have at all times been faithful to the strategic objectives of the international movement Although the relations of the Chinese Communist Parts to the Kremlin has'e varied at different pc.riods, the 395 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Y- history of the Chinese Communist Party is that of the fulfillment of the objectives of Moscow. At times the Kremlin has employed Russian advisors to direct the Chinese Communists; at other times it has appointed or dismissed the native Chinese leadership; and on still other occasions it has Wight the Chinese Communists the techniques of ob- taining power and then kf t them to work out the imtnediate tactical problems for them- selves. The Chinese Communiqts give full credit to Stalin and the Communist Party of the USSR for the guidance and ,mple necessary for their rise to power and have now declared their confidence that Premier Melenkin Is ill continue the policies of Stalin. Organization of MP Party In the formal organization the Chinese Communist Party is a direct copy of the Russian model. Not only have the Chinese applied the same titles to the various offices in the Party structure, but the Party organization operates in the same manner as the Communist Party in Russia. In thez,ry, the highest organ of the Party is the National Party Congress, which is a body of representatives from the lower levels of the Party supposed to meet every three years. However, the timing of such meetings is subject to the decision of the Central Committee c,f the Chinese Communist Party, and actually the intervals between meetings have been highly irregular.* The representatives at the Congresses are handpicked by the controlling bureaucracy of the Party, and they are called upon to listen to reports of high Party officials and approve changes in the constitution of the Party. The Party Congress is at times called upon to support changes in the tactical "line" of the Party. In general it can be said that the Congresses n:e used by the leaders of the Party as a means of inform- ing the rank and file of developments in Party affairs, and to give to the organization the appearance of adhering to democ:atic procedure. Mao Tse-tung is the Chairman of the National Party Congress. Directly under the National Party Congress in line of authority comes the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, again under the chairmanship of Mao Tse-tung. Nominally the Central Committee decides all policy questions and supervises the operational agencies of the Party. In theory this agency should he extremely important but in actual practice the Central Committee only enforces the decisions made by the Central Political Bureau (Politburo), the members of which it is supposed to elect. It is in the Central Political Bureau or the Politburo that the real power of decision is located. Thus, although in theory the Politburo is under the Central Committee which in turn is under the Party Congress, the actual control of the Party is in the reverse order. The Politburo makes the decisions for the Central Comntit tee and the Central Committee runs the Party Congress. At the present time the Politburo consists of thirteen members who are the most powerful leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and thus of the "Chinese People's Republic." Mao Tse-tung is the Chairman of this body just as he is of the two larger bodies. The Politburo operates in great secrecy and it does not make direct formal public statements of policy but, rather, uses the other organs of the Party to announce any partic- ular decision. Any important matter which affects the Party is diseusseal by the Politburo and it determines not only the policy objectives of the Party, but also the functions and ? Dates anJ places of meeting of the National Party Congresses ? First ? July 1921, Shanghai, Second: June 1922, Canton. Thinl? June 1923, Canton, Fourth: January 1925, Shanghai, Fifth: NIny 1927, Ilankow; Sixth: August 1025, Moscow, Seventh: April MIS, Yenan (Fushih). 396 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 : n4nivzipnn4nnnn70007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 .01A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 .r.????=????=????????=miNrm..??????????? ???????? the administration of the Party. Any major decision of either the Party or of the govern- ment is approved by the Politburo rind it nss es the reaponsilality of making, decisions iii 'natters involving all phases of Chinese life. The responsibility for administering the lower levels of the hiemrchy of the Communist Party is in the hands of the Central Secretariat, whose chairman is also Mao Tse-tung. In theory the Secretariat is directly under the Central Committee and is equal to the Politburo. The Secretariat functions through a large number of "cominittees" and "de- part ne tits" each of which is resprinstble for some philiNe of Party life and artivity. Among these are committees for the training of new members and committees for directing "mass organizations," such as youth groups, women's movements, and labor movements. As the Party moves down from the national level it has its regional or provincial organization.s as well its its local "cells." Depending upon the importance and the munber of members involved, the local organizations have many of the same subdivisions found at the national level under the Serretariat. Thus, there is a secn?tariat in each of the loyal groups and ponsibly one or more "departments" or "committees" which are responsible not only to the kwal leadership but also to the comparable national ageney. The organiza- tion of the Communist Party is a rigid hierarchy in which it is pocsible for the top decision- making group, the Politburo, to insure that its deeisions are faithfully carried out through a chitin of command that reaches down to the smallest "cell" group. Discipline is rigidly enforced not only by select men at each level of the organization, but also by each superior level over its immediate subordinate group. A further guarantee of rigid adherence to ditaipline is the use of parallel chains of command which check on the activities of the members at all levels. Thus, in addition to the hierarchy of the various secretariats at each level, there are the hierarchies of the numerous "committees" and "departments" which, through their own chain of command up to the Central Secretariat, can report on the activities of the secretaries of the local party organization. Membership in 11w Far1y The official figure for the total number of members of the Chinese Communist Party as of 1950 was 5,800,000. This makes the Chinese Communist Party one of the largest of any national Parties, but it represents only a little over one percent of the total population of Chinn. During the immediate postwar years membership expanded quite rapidly as the Party found it expedient to accept tnembers without fully checking on their qualifications. By making it relatively easy to join, the Communist Party was able to gain greater support from the public. However, once power was achieved this policy was dropped and a program of reinvestigating the qualifirations of members was introduced This resulted not only in a reduction in the rate of recruiting new member, but also, through the dropping of mem- bers, in an actual decrease in the size of the organization. The theory behind limiting the size of the Party is that it is possible to carry out. political policies far more effectively with a small, well-disciplined and thoroughly con- trolled organization than with a large and unwieldy group of MPH. The Communist Party is thus composed of a relatively small elite placed in positions to dominate all phases of political life in the country. As long as this elite remains small it is easy to insure its discipline at the hands of on even smaller dominant leadership. Membership in the Chinese Communist Party gives the individual certain rights and privileges denied the ordinary citizen. Within the arm of his jurimlict ion and responsibility he may exercise petty tyrannies over his neighbors, friends, and fellow workers. In the local scene he may be above the law and he may serve as the direct representative of the 397 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 -;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 - authorities in maintaining control over the private lives of the people. With these powers there are added respcnsibilities for he must wek to remain in good standing with the Party authorities, and he may face serious deprivations for violations of Party disriplioe. Distinction must be made between the rank and tile of the dues-paying Party members who carry Party cards and the Party "cadres" who give full-time senlee to the Party. The Party cadres are paid by the Party. They are thus professional tevolutionnries who have no other life outside of Party work. The cadres serve as the bureaucrats of the Party organization, staffing the various commissions, departments, and siscretariats. They also serve as the political commissars at the Army and Meld Army level in the "People's Liber- ation Army." For Party members there is a constant danger that they will be found to have deviated from the Party "line." The most serious crimes with which a member can be charged include "sabcitage," "espionage," and "reactionary tendencies." There appear to have been relatively few oecasior.s :vhen the Party leaders have found it necessary to level such strong charges against members who have fallen from grace. The most common charge upon which a member is ousted is that, of "opportunism." This ineludes acermations that the member joined the Party only to further his per.sonal advantage when it appeared that the Communists were to be the "winning side." The charge also covers eases where the member is held to have used his status in the Party to further his personal interests. The charge of "opportunism" almast invariably brings with it the ousting of the member nnd may result in more serious punishments. Another serious charge is that. of "defeatism" which covers the crime of expressing the opinion that possibly the Party has not. been following the wisest course of action. "Defartism" also covers the error of suggesting that Soviet Russia may not have the full interest of China at heart or that Russian support has not been all that it should have been. Minor reprimands which may carry no direct punishments or may only result in demotion within the Party include the following: (1) "Commandism" ? the issuing of orders and commands without carefully checking to see that the ?niers are fulfilled; (2) "Bureaucrntism" ? the performing of paper work in a routine manner without demon- strnting either initiative or vigilance; (3) "Dogmatism" ? slavish adherence to theory without regard to the problems of application. (4) "Empiricism" ? concentration on the practical problems of administration to the extent. of disregarding theory. Organization of the Gorernment The government which was officially established in Peking on 1 October 1919 k one of the important instruments which the Chinese Communists have employed in controlling China. Although the establishment of the government was announced at this time, and many of the more important offices began to function immediately thereafter, the Chinese Communists have not as yet set up all the office!: planned in the oflirial blueprint, and the Party continues to dominate the country through other ageneies. In addition the Com- munist Party maintains an authoritarian and paternal control over all the activities of the formal government In theory the new government of China is a coalition govenunent sine' groups other than the Communist Party are tepresented and nonne-nben: of the Communist Party hold some of the offices. 110?? ever, all the elements which have taken part in the government have either been under the full and direct control of the Party or have been willing to support all its objectives and hence have not attempted to challenge the monopoly of power held by the Communists. 398 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 r. Plenary Conference of the Chinese Political Consultative Council Warra,..M.M?loatartni 1 1 1 The Notional Committee of The Central People's The Secretariat the People's Political Government Council Consultative Council 1 1 The Office of the The Supreme Peoples Supreme People's Court Procurator Generul 1 1 The Administrative The People's Revolutionary Council Military Council Southwest Northwest Military cad Political Committees Central and South People's Control Cultural and Educational General Offices Financial and Economic Committees East China Northeast Peoples Government Political end Legal Mini 'tries Publication Affairs of Overseas Chinese Press Affairs of Minority People's Customs Legislative Information Justice Public Hoot+ Academia Sinica ? (Science Yam) Education Culture Labor Forestry and Lund Reclamation Water Conservancy Agriculture Communications Fig. 3?Organization of the Communist Government (Tho Central People's Government of the Chinos* People's Republic) Postal Service and TeleiCommunicotions Railways Light Industry Food Industry Textile Industry Fuel Industry Heavy Industry Trod* Finance Public Safety Foreign Affairs Interior Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release DIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Not only is the relationship of the Party to the government much the same as it. is in Russia, but the organization of the government aLso follows the Soviet Rumian model. Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) In theory the highest governmental organ of the Chinese People's Republic k the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This body, made up of 662 delegates, met in Peking from 21 September to 30 September 1919, and unanimously adopted the entire program prepared for it by the Communist Party. In particular, it approved the three basic documents which come the nearest to being what might be termed the constitution of the new government. These included the Organic Law of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference, the Organic Low of the Central People's Government :if the People's Republic of China, and the Common Program of the CPPCC. According to its own Organic taw, the CPPCC is supposed to meet triennially, subject to the decision of the National Committee of the CPPCC. M these meetings it has the power to revise the Organic LAW, elect the Central People's Government Council, and review and hear reports on general government policy. The CPPCC has a National Committee which is to. meet semiannually and which directs all the activities of the main body. Mao Tse-tung is the Chairman of this committee and thus holds the post of highest prestige in the formal government. Local committees of the CPPCC are to be established which will have the function of building up public opinion in support of the government. However, the Communists have not felt the need to use such groups and at the present time only a few of them appear to be in operation. Central People's Government Council This body which is formally elected by the CPPCC has the respensibility of directing the state at home and representing it abroad. It is expected to meet every two months, but since it does not publicize its meetings it, is impossible to tell how active it has been. Mao Tse-tung is also the Chairmen of this group and under him there are 6 vice-chairmen and 56 members. However, through the National Committee of the CPPCC it N possible to alter the size or the membership of the group at any time. The Central People's Government Council has legislative, executive, and judicial powers. It enacts the laws of the land and also has the power of final interpretation of these laws. It approves the government's budget and issues decrees for the administration of the bureaucracy. It also has power to appoint or remove all the top officials of both the central government and the lora! governments. In its formal organization the Central People's Government Council might be expected to command a great deal of power in the rule of China, but in actual practice it appears to be employed only as the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party and to give an appearance of legality to the decisions of the Politburo. Government (or State) ..idministration Council This body, whieh is elected by the Central People's Government Council, comes the closest to being a cabinet for the government. It N the highest executive body of the state administration and is responsible for the work of the bumauerriey it is led by Premier Chou En-lai who is concurrently the Foreign Minister. Its size and composition is not set 400 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 by law, but it includes the premier, a vice-premier, a general secretary, and the heads of all the ministries and commissions of the government. It meets once a week and has the power of issuing administrative decrees, deciding on questirms rf conflicting jurisdiction between ministries, and supervising the activities of all the ministries and commissions of the govern- ment. The Administration Council has divided all the ministries, offices, and commissions under it into four groups which are each headed by a committee directly responsible to the Council. The most important of these is the People's Supervision or Control Committee which has under it the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Information (propa- ganda agency), and the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs. The l'eople's Supervision Committee also serves as a general "watch dog" of the entire administration of the govern- ment and the limitations of its powers are not clearly defined. The Political and Legal Affairs Committee is responsible for the maintenance of order in the country at large and for all the local governments. The most important ministries under it. are those of Interior (responsible for local government and law enforcement). Justice, Public Security (secret police), and the Commissions of Legislative Affairs, and Nationalities AfTa;rs (minority groups). The Finance and Economic Committee has under its jurisdiction such important ministries as Finance, Trade, Heavy Industries, Railroads, and Agriculture. The fourth sulxlivision is the Culture and Education Committee which is responsible for domestic propaganda. The most important ministries under it are Cultural Affairs, Education, Public Health, the General Office of the Press, and the General Office of Publications. It is through this commission that the CommunirLs have exercised their policies of "thought control" and censorship. People's Revolutionary Military Council This body, although nominally under the jurisdiction of the Government (or State) Administration Council, is a highly autonomous group which is separate from the adminis- tration and has no civilian checks on its authority. Mao Tse-tung himself is the Chairman of the Council. The People's Revolutionary Military Council is responsible not only for all military policy, planning, and organizing of the military establishment, but it also has great powers in the civil administration. The Communists, in their rise to power and during the period before the formal establishment of the Government, relied almost exclu- sively on the Army as a means of controlling the civilian population. The Army thus developed the machinery for civil control and has continued to function as a governing force even after the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China was established. It was through this Army administration that China was divided into six Administra- tive Areas that have replaced the old political divisions of the provinces. These areas are each controlled through a Military and Political Committee which is directly responsible to the local field commanders in the area. The divisions are: (I) The Northeast People's Government Committee, (2) The East China"Militnry and Political Committee, (3) The Central Militnly and Political Committee, (4) The Southern Military and Political Com- mittee, (5) The Southwest Military and Political Committee and (G) The Northwest Military Committee. The Northeast People's Government division, which includes Manchuria, is no longer considered to be directly under military rule and thus, nominally, it is considered to have reached the stage of civilian government. However, the Army is still the dominant instrument of control in the area. 401 ????????????????????11. STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 In actual practice the Communists have relied upon the People's Liberation Army as the most efficient instrument of government. Thus, although in the Communist's formal description of their system of government the Army does not compare with the government in importance, in reality it is fully as important in government as are the official agencies of the central government itself. Techniques of Control The C).inese Communists have dedicated themselves to a program of completely rr-tking over Chinese society on the Marxist-Leninist model. Not only have their formal statements of ideology indicated this objective, but all their actions have been directed to the realization of such a form of society. Many features of the traditional Chinese society have been exploited in the effort to develop a new Communist society. China has long known its own traditional authoritarianism, and the Chincre have been accustomed to political control by a bureaucratic dlite. However much these traditions may have facili- tated the establishment of the Communist pattern of control, it has still been necessary for the Chinese Communists to apply many new and radical techniques for the control of men. For the carrying out of this major program of remaking the society the Communists have devised a system of "wheels within wheels" in which the Communist Party serves as the central axle. It thus dominates the movements of an elaborate hierarchy of organiza- tions which, in the end, controls almost all phases of life in China. In easence, the Com- munists, through the structure of the Party, the formal government, and the Red Army, have established the most thorough-going bureaucracy that China IIILS ever known. It is estimated that, excluding the rank-and-file of the military establishment, there are between ten and fifteen million people in this total bureaucracy. This group of the population, which includes almost all of the politically active and conscious individuals, is thus brought under the direct control of the Communists. Direct discipline is applied to all these mem- bers of the bureaucracy to insure that they carry out the wishes of the Communists. In addition, they arc controlled by their realization that, should they fail in their tasks, they would risk losing their official status and with it their preferred position in the society. The strict hierarchy makes each member of the bureaucracy responsible to a particular superior, and thus the Communists try to assure that these ten to fifteen million key persons in the society will always seek to please the Communist leaders. The size of the bureaucracy is designed to make it possible for the Communists to employ official controls over many of the minor phases of people's lives. Thus, the Com- munists have been able to establish checks on the freedom of movement within the country. For anyone to travel or even to change his domicile within a city it is necessary first to receive official approval. By limiting the freedom of travel and carefully checking all those who are permitted to use the transportation system, the Communists have been able to - limit public knowledge about general conditions in the country. These restrictions have limited the effectiveness of the time-honored Chinese system of obtaining from travelers infoimation and rumors about conditions in other sections of the country. The bureaucracy also exercises political control through its direction of economic affairs. The government's control of much of the economy prevents the development of independent economic groups which might threaten the pcwer of the Communists. In addition, the controls placed on the still surviving private businesses are so extensive and pervasive as to leave the individual merchant at the political mercy of the state. The process of land reforth has brought the peasant under complete control of the Communists. The detailed government records compiled in the process are now used against peasants 402 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 both for trec purpases and in connection with government demands for numerous services to be rendered to it. The peasant who was formerly at the mercy of the landlord now finds himself victimized by an all-pervasive government whwe basic philosophy assumes the complete subordination ef the individual to the state. Other techniques of control e:nployes1 by the Communists include an absolute monopoly of !III the mass media. (For a full treatment of this subject see the Chapter entitled "Mass Communications.") MI newspass rs are forced to adhere to the Party line and may print only the official news. The publishing !kid is directly controlled by the Party; only liter- ature which meets its approval can he published or sold. This control over all the sources of genust information makes it extremely difficult for opposition within the country to ex- press itself. The Communists justify such practices by claiming that these sources of in- formation "belong to the people and thus cannot be used by any enemies of the people," a justifieati .1 which a.%umes that the "people" rind the Communist Party of Chinn are one and the same thing. In addition to these formal techniques of control which depend upon the coercive power of the state and the secret police, the Chinese Communists employ many methods which are more indirect and subtle. In general, these seek to erate nn atmosphere in which opposition to the Communists is not only difficult but is made to appear immoral and contrary to the interests of society. One such method is the "volunteer system" in which acts that are in fact commanded by the government are publicly reptesented as the spontaneous expression of the desires of the people. It is interesting that, while the Communists seek to establish government control and planning in almost every phase of life, they still desire to make it, appear as if their policies were the pnyluct of the undirected and freely expressed wishes of the people. The most obvious reasons for this is the Communist feeling that they must at least pay lip service to the ideas of democracy, and that by claiming that certain actions are the work of "volunteers," they niay temper the harsh aspects of direct and totalitarian control. A much more subtle but possibly more important effect of the "volunteer system" is its effect in making the individual feel that everyone else is "in on the show" and that therefore he too should join. Thus, the announcement that students are "volunteering" to leave their classrooms to serve the new government, or that merchants are buying bonds on a "volunteer basis," is merely an effort to make the individual who otherwise might not take part feel that he is standing alone against the tide of public opinion. The use of the "volunteer system" in Korea should not be interpreted as solely for external consumption or as a ruse by which the Communist government attempts to escape responsibility. A3 long as all the channels of information assert as one yoke that the people are "volunteenng" to support government policies and are spontaneously- demanding action, the individual is made to feel that, he is alone in his reservations and that it would be impos- sible to seek out others who might be opposed to the trend of "public opinion." This policiy, combined with the known acts of terror of the Communists and the generally unsettled conditions in China during the last decade, tends to creme a high sense of personal in.secunty in those who are not actively a part of the Communist movement. The Communists have combined with the "volunteer system" the technique of "public confes.sionals" in which individuals are called upon to stand up before groups of people and confess their previous sins and "dangerous thoughts." The public confessional serves several purposes. It clearly indicates the Communist insistence that no individual may have a private life and that any hidden thoughts or past actions are sources of danger to the citizen unless he exposes them to the public. The public confessional thus complements the volunteer system in isolating the individual who might be lagging in his support of the 403 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? new regime. However, the public confessional does include a path to security since, through the act of completely exposing one's self, the individual may obtain redemption. Thus, those who have gone through the process of confessing their previous crimes usually an- nounce that they now feel like a remade individual Is they have last the old sense of uncer- tainty rind insecurity. The public confessional is a spectacle which, for the onlooker, may tend initially to increase his own sense of insecurity regarding his still bidden thoughts, but which may then drive him to seek security through joining in the process of athnitting those "guilty" thoughts or acts. Given the traditional reluctance of the Chinese to discuss his pnvote alTa:rs, there can be little doubt. that for the individual to go through an experi- ence of this order means that he has broken with all that, went before. It should be noted that nut the least significant function of the pubic confemional is to pros ide the authorities with material for dossiers on the individual which can he used at a Inter date if the confessor loses the favor of the regime. In order to isolate the opposition, while giving a sense of personal security to those who folly oleoi ;Cy theresOvess with the "cause," the Communists also use mass organizations. The Communists have provided these mass organizations for all levels and functions in the society, with groups representing the youth, students, professional occupations, workers, peasants, and women. These official mass organizations arc set op for all the important elements in the society in order to prevent the people front forming their own independent informal groups. Any organization not controlled and recognized by the Communists would be immediately labeled "antirevolutionary" and would be eliminated by the state as a threat to the "people." Thus ti e Communists attempt to monopolize the right to organize, in order to minimize the po:zibili .y of organized opposition. The common feature of all these techniques of control is that they offer the individual the highest hope of personal security if he faithfully follows the direction of the Communists, and even the thought of opposition appears to involve great personal risk. The Communists have consciously sought to increase the sense of isolation and helplessness of the individual while holding out the promise of a degree of personal secur:ty only if the individual behaves according to the wishes of the Communists. Political Symbols The widespread use of terror and police measures should not be interpreted as meaning that the Communists rely entirely upon coercion. In fact it would be more accurate to say that they have used coercion in large part as an auxiliary for their program of persuasion and indoctrination. They count, that is to say, on the constant threat of coercion to produce a climate conducive to the acceptance of indoctrination and to reduce the people's disposition to call into question what the propaganda says. The type of symbols employed by the Communists and the role that these symbols are expected to play is the real key to the Communist technique of political control. And although there is a new "correct" propaganda line for nearly every issue that arises (which, since the Communist apparatus monopolizes all the miss media in China, becomes eff;ctive overnight), it is possible to make some generalizations about the Communist propaganda output in terms of the slogans it uses and the purposes they serve. I. Identyication. The Chinese Communists have striven to identify their movement with the masses of the people and to create the impression that they are the only qualified and trusted leaders of the people. They have sought, to this end, to show not only that they alone understand the problems of the masses, but also that they speak just as the masses would if they were capable of articulating their feelings and opinions. In Com- munist piopaganda, the symbol "the people" does not have the vague and guieralized 404 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ??? , . reference that one might infer frocd all this. The Communists have always made it clear that only certain groups are entitled to consider themselves as included in "the people." The component groups, as oi this writing, are the "peasants," the "laborers," the "intel- lectual workers," and the "progressive women." Before the Communist take-over on the mainland the term "people" was so defined as to taks in also the "petty bourgeoisie" and the "national bourgeoisie" (i.e., the small merchants, the traders, and the larger merchants not primarily engaged in international trade and finance). The Communists have sought to make good their claim to be the "leaders of the people" by "organizing" the groups mentioned, and giving their activities great prestige. The Party manifestly controls and dominates the actions of these groups and, in any case, reserves for itself a complete mon ?poly of political decision-making. They have, neverthe- less, succeeded in milking large aumbers 31 people feel thnt they are taking part in the political process. Through skillful manipulation of their new organizations and adroit exploitation of cleverly conceived propaganda slogans, the Communists have been able to create the impression in the minds of many that they ins, genuinely active in the making of political decisions. Many elements who have never felt politically significant have thus been made to believe not only that they have an interest in the perpetuation of the regime, but that they are actually helping to determine the course of political developments. Large numbers of people, in consequence, are today emotionally -sommitted to the policies of the Party, and effectively blinded to the fact that the Communists exercise exclusive control over political developments. And even those who are not so blinded are, in con- siderable numbers, taken in by the Communist assertion that their policies, however determined, are "in the interests of" the masses of the people. Both these groups of people are probably decreasing in number today. In their writings and. their more sober public pronouncements, to be sure, the Com- munists have always made it eminently clear that the identity and structure of the Party must not be "submerged" or lost in the und,tfined masses ? that, in a word, the Party leads the masses but can never be controlled or directed by them. The Party, in other words, is by no means taken in by its own propaganda about popular participation in the political process. 2. Erpeclalzon. The Communists make no secret of the fact that they desire to transform each and every phase of life in China, to carry out a Marxist-Leninist revolution, and to pattern that revolution on the Russian example. The Communist propaganda, however, tends to be vague as to the precise outlines of the future China. Emphasis goes rather upon the evils that are to be eliminated, which from their point of view has the advantage of focusing attention on matters that have immediacy and reality for the prop- aganda audience. Their propaganda, without being specific about anything, conveys the impression that everything the "people" objected to in the old society will be done away with The Communists capitalize on all the discontents and frustrations of the population in general, while avoiding such disagreeable questions as whether or not their own objectives might create new problems and tensions. In short, instead of expatiating on the virtues of the new world they propose to establish, they emphasize the negative goal of eradicating all the evils and injustices associated with China's past. Another characteristic of the Chinese Communists' use of symbols of expectation is to be found in their habit of identifying themselves with the future, and the air of certainty with which they proclaim that they will as a matter of course dominate the "next stage of history." They claim to have not only a key by means of which they can infallibly predict the future, but also the determination and power it a ill take to make the future behave as they wish it. Thus they describe themselves as the "wave of the future," attribute to 405 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 themselves a monopoly of all that is "progressive" and "revolutionary," and point to their omnipotence as the guarantee of drat triumph on an ever larger scale. (Thus, they imply, one should join them, ti for no other rea.son than blowing which side one's bread is buttered on.) The opposition is depicted as being "feudal," "reactionary," and "decadent.," all three of which terms, of course, represented it as belonging to the past and thus helpless face-to-face with the inevitability of Communist domination of the future. 3. identifying the Enemy. Much Chinese Communist propaganda is devoted to attacking and vilifying the "enemies of the people." In spite of their indisputable hegemony over the mainland, not, to speak of the Red Army's monopoly of force, their propaganda speaks constantly of the "threat" of "counterrevolutionary" groups: "reactionaries," "imperialists," and "Kuomintang agents," who are conspiring against "the people" and, in the absence of vigilance on the latter's part, likely to succeed in their designs. The "enemies of the people" theme is Kept alive to facilitate attribution of any failing of the new regime to the readiest available scapegoats: "Kuomintang agents," "saboteurs," or "former landlords." The propaganda at one and the same time stresses their record of liquidating such groups as do exist; this keeps alive the idea that such groups or individuals are capable of threatening the policies of the government, and whenever difficulties arise blame is placed with these real or imagined elements. However, a far more importi.o.t function of this theme is to remind everyone that those who gain the displeasure of the regime might at any moment be charged with being "enemies of the people." The Communists have quite carefully not specified all of the qualities of an "enemy of the people" but, rather, have left, the idea vague enough to cover all kinds of nets and thoughts. This contributes to a sense of uncertainty which stifles original ideas or actions because of the fear that they might be considered to be reflecting "counter- revolutionary" qualities. Such vague evils as "manifesting qualities of cultural imperial- ism" can be defined so as to encompass numerous crimes. Thus, the constant attacks on "the enemies of the people" become threats to everyone reminding them that. they must at all times give unquestioned support, to the Communists or face the consequence of being singled out as a "dangerous element." 4. Morality. The Chinese Communists, for all of their demands that the Chinese society be radically changed, still speak in highly moralistic terms which' are not, entirely unmcaningful to those Chinese brought up under the old order. Even the emotional themes involving concepts of struggling, fighting, and violence are handled in a highly moralistic fashion. The Communists emphatically declare that they are on the side of ethical and moral purity, and that they are violently opposed to all forms of corruption and degeneracy. There is an earnest and almost Puritan quality that runs through all of their propaganda which leaves little room for humor or the recognition cf human frailties. The Chinese Communist newspapers arc deadly serious in their treatment of all subjects and there is no longer any space given to lighter and more informal 3ubjects. The Communists have decreed that there is no place for the frivolous, casual, or socially sophisticated in the new order. To a large extent this expresses the feeling of the devout Communist that he must dedicate his entire life to carrying through the objectives of the moment. However, the seriousness of the Communists also appears to appeal to the strongly moralistic qualities of Chinese culture and personality . Thus, as the Communists attack and destroy many of the old cultural patterns and taboos, they make it clear that they are only doing this in order to establish a new form of morality which will have all the self-exacting overtones of the older system. Confucianism must he eliminated but it is to be replaced by a system of 406 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 - ethics which will be mor., demanding. It should be noted that this emphasis upon morality serves to further the traditional Chinese emphasis upon social conformity, and to make all opposition not only politically unwise but morally and ethically wrong. A SEUCTED READING LIST Ch'ien, Tuan-aheng, The GOM72PICTli and Politics of China, pp. xviii, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1950. Hsieh, Pao-cluto, The Government of China (1644-1911), p. 1,5, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1925. Linebarger, Paul M. A., Government in Republican China, pp. xv, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New Ycrk, 1938. ?, The China of Chiang Kai-shek: A Political Study, pp. xi, World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1941. MacNair, Harley F., China in Revolution, an Analysis of Politics and Militarism under the Republic, pp. ix, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1031. Marx, Frit: M. (ed.), ForeArn Governments: Dynamics of Politics Abroad, 2d ell., pp. 553-61, 593-621, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, on. Morse, llosea B., The Trade and Administration of China, 3d rev. ed., pp. xv, Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., Shanghai, 1921. Pan, Wei-tung, The Chinese Constitution: A Study of Forty Ya?rs of Constitution-making in China, pp. xi, Hefner Publishing Company, New York, 1945. Steiner, H Arthur, "Report on China," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 277. pp. x (September 1951). The Strategy and Melia of World Communism, Supplemrd 111, Communism in China, pp. ii-vi, 1-105 (81st Cong., tat seas.; 11 R.), Government Pnnting Office. Washington, D. C., 1949. Vinarke, Harold M., Modern Constitutional Development in China, pp. ix, Princeton University Prow, Princeton, 1920. Wan, Yah-ltankr, The Rise of Communism in China (1960-1950), pp. 77, Hong Kong, 1952. 407 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 CHAPTER 9 EDUCATION Since this chapter is intended to be a survey of the development of China's educa- tional system from the beginning of Chinese history until the present day, it has seemed advisable to break the story into periods of manageable length. The following division has bscn adopted: (1) Fawn the earliest times to the rise of the Ch'in dynasty in n.e. 221; (2) From the Ch'in dynasty to the rise of the Sui dynasty in A.D. 589; (3) From the Sul dynasty to 1862 (when Western ideas first began to influence China's educational system); (4) From 1852 to the removal of the lcuomintang Government from thC mainland in 1949. (5) From 1919 until the present. EAIILIMT TIMES TO 221 D.C. (Cll'IN DYNASTY) In dealing with this period in Cl iucse educational history, one must be careful to distinguish between faA and fancy, for both have deeply influenced subsequent develop- ment. So far as they are known, the following are facts. Facts Of education prior to the Chou dynasty nothing is known. Knowledge of Chinese society under the Chou dynasty is also far from complete, but it is sufficient to give one some idea of the important role played in it by a certain type of formal education. It was a feudalistic society, in which there was a sharp distinction between patricians and plebeians. The plebeians were the nameless people whose only duty was to farm the land and whose status was tantamount to that of serfs, for the lot of the peasant has never been a very happy one in China. No provision was made for giving the plebeians any formal educa- tion; however, the duties and privileges of the patricians were such that each generation had to assure the next a certain amount of education. First of all, the patrician had religious duties; there was no special caste of priests to perform them for him. Ile had to be taught the ritual code according to which all sacrificial ceremonies should be conducted. At many of these ceremonies music and dances were performed, and about these also he had to be taught at least enough for him to under- stand their significance. Since contact with spiritual beings was held to be possible only through the medium of writing, the earnest-minded patrician saw to it that his sons re- ceived some training in the art of writing. Again, the patrician's chief worldly duty was his duty to go to war when called upon to do so by his superior, ideally in the name of the king, so that members of this class required training in archery and charioteering. Archery contests came to play a very important role in social life, both at court and among the lower-ranking patricians. A patrician, finally, could be appointed to an official post; and this privilege became the strongest factor in making the patrieian's education truly liberal. Government was not taken lightly in those days. When the Chou established their rule they introduced what seems to have been a new idea, the concept of the "Heavenly 405 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Mandate." With this concept they legalized their newly acquired position as kings: Heaven having taken the mandate away from the Shang dynasty to give it to the house of Chou, the kings of this house ruled over China as Heaven's appointees. On the other hand, Heaven could withdraw its mandate (as it had withdrawn its mandate from the Shang dynasty) at any time, whether for inefficiency, incapacity, or misconduct; the best guarantee against this, the surest way of being a good king, worthy of the mandate, was to follow the example of successful ancestors. Consequently the reading of historical texts and of other types of literature pertaining to antiquity became a very important item in the curriculum prescribed for a royal prince. And in due time this same kind of material was used to instruct the young patricians who wants.I to enter the civil service. Besides all this, the yceng patrician was taught how to be a good patrician in daily life; he had to know the rules of correct behavior in Ns relations with his pareats and other kin, with his superiors, and with his equals. Knowledge of poetry, for example, was highly prized as a social and cultural asset. When one comes to the lest couple of centuries of the Chou dynasty, he at last has enough reliable information to form a picture of the educational system. In brief, it was as follows: When a boy reached the age of ten he could cuter a district school, where he stayed for nine years as a boarder. Courses were divided by semesters; in spring and summer there were outdoor classes (in archery and charioteering), and in autumn and winter indoor classes. (rites, music, writing, etc.). The eldest sons had the right to go to the "Royal College," whrre the king's sons received their education. This at least was the system in the royal domain; and it appears to have been copied by the feudal lords in their states, where similar institutions were called "State Colleges." Fancy The fanciful picture of education in ancient China, drawn by the pious Confucian scholars of the Ilan dynasty, is rather different. From the legendary days of the venerable Emperors Yao and Shun there was an institution of higher learning in the capital, and there were preparatory schools in both the capital and in outlying districts. Both were public schools. Upon the recommendation of the local officials, talented students from the preparatory schools were sent to the capital, there to attend the "university" and be trained to fill the high official posts to which they were appointed upon their graduation. According to Chinese tradition, the early rulers were constantly searching their entire realm for talented men By establishing this system of universal education, they assured themselves of a regular flow of such people. In later days scholar-officials never missed an opportunity to point these things out to the Emperors, who could hardly question the wisdom of the ancient sage-kings. Thus it came about that an historical fiction ultimately gave rise to the well-known examination system, which was such an influential factor in the development of education in China. Both fact and fancy agree on the point that scholarship and education were major concerns of the official class, and that teachers and scholars, though dependent on the higher ranking patricians, had a place in the political hierarchy. Toward the close of the period, private teachers, who gathered about them their own circle of disciples, are not infrequently mentioned in the records. To this class belonged most of the great philoso- phers of the period of the Warring States, Confucius himself being traditionally regarded as the first paivate teacher. It should not be inferred, however, that the private teachers represented a tendency to distinguish between a career in education and an officio) career. On the contrary, the private teachers constur.tly endeavored to gain official recognition and to obtain, for themselves and their students, official employment. 409 ??????? STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? AMIN c'em TO SUI DYNASTY (A.O. 589) Ch'in Dynasty Under Ch'in Shih Iluang-ti's rule there was no place for the -multitude of private teachers who had played so prominent a role in the development of thought during the period of the Warring States. In education, as in so many other fields, uniformity became the rule. Unorthodox schools, which might provide people with tools for criticising the ruler's laws and decrees, were prohibited. Indeed, these laws and decrees were considered the only worth-while subjects for study, and government officials the only teachers Compe- 1 tent to tenelfthem. Once a man had mastered them, he had established his claim to be the kind of recruit that the Ch'in rulers wanted for their civil service. Not even Ch'in Shih Huang-ti, however, was so bold lei to believe that the knowledge ? ? of past generations could be completely dispense(' with. What he did was to store it. in a place of its own, the Imperial Library; he put in charge o it a body of scholars known in ? Chinese as po-shih, the nearest English equivalent of which is "professor." The latter ? were chosen, it seems, for their extensive knowledge of matters past and present, and one source says there were seventy of them. It is known they had students assigned to them, but unfortunately, neither the number, nor how they were sele.eted, nor what manner of educational institutions they attended is known. ? Han Dynasty Under the Han dynasty, Confucianism was again in the ascendancy, and China's educational curriculum was revised. As far as the government was concerned, tho aim of education remained the same as under the preceding dynast). to get a steady flow of good civil servants. But a quite different yardstick was adopted for measuring qualifications for civil service employment. The Confucian virtues, such as filial piety and brotherly love, were assumed to be a candidate's highest qualifications. The future official was to be an embodiment of these virtues, and, as such, a teacher of the people; he was to select, and recommend for employment, all persons he encountered who excelled in these virtues. Often the emperor himself would issue a call to search high and low for such candidates and bring them to the capital, where they would be invited to write essays on topics fur- nished by the Emperor; those who wrote excellent essays were given official positions. That is how Tung Chung-shu, one of the great Han Confucianists, first attracted Han Wu-ti's attention. In Chinese this system of selecting and recommending persons for civil service employment is called hadan-cita; it was the forerunner of the examination system established by the Sui dynasty. The backbone of this scheme of selection and recommendation was quite an elaborate school system. All instruction was built around the Confucian canon, believed to expound the Confucian virtues more clearly than any other text. Specially prepared textbooks, less difficult and less profound than the canon, were used in the elementary-schools, but their function was merely to carry the pupil to the point where he could begin to handle the full text. At the university (rai-hsach), which was the apex of the system founded by Han Wu-ti at the urging or Tung Chung-shu, there were, from 136 n e., distinct professors for each of the five classics (Book of Odes, Book of Dt?cuments, Beek of Changes, Spring and Autumn Annals, and Book of Riles) then constituting the Confucian canon, and students began to be assigned to each professor. The university had its ups and downs during the Han dynasty, but gr .erally Kerns to have flourished. By the days of the Emperor Shun-ti (A.n. 126 to 1-11), its physical plant included 210 buildings with a total of 1850 rooms, and it had an enrollment of 30,000 students_ Its fame was so widespread that even the Huns sent students to it. 410 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ,IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Prospective student/ were selected and recommended either by the minister of edu- cation or by local officials. Candidates had to be eighteen years or older in order to qualify, though boys who showed extraordinary nbiliths were sometimes exempted from the rule. The punishment for a recommendation, proved to be undeserved, was banishment to the frontier region. Toward the end of the Han dynasty higher ranking officials were granted the privilege a sendhur their sons to the university without such a recommendation, and consequently the general standard fell considerably. A student eisibl sstses sny nor; of the five classics as his "major" subject, and each student stood a part-written and part-oral examination after one year (later two years) in residence. Students who were successful in the examiruition were admitted to the civil service; those who failed were required to present themselves at a subsequent examina- tion unless they had failed in every subject, in which case they were dismissed from the university There were no tuition fees, hut students had to pay for their own board. Poor students supported themselves by performing menial tasks for their wealthier con- temporaries. Education on the elementary level was left in the care of local officials. Very notable in this connection was the career of Wan Wang. prefect of Szechwan. When he under- took his duties as prefect toward the end of Ching-ti's reign (156 to 141 u.e.), Szechwan lay virtually outside the orbit of Chinese civilization. Yet by the end of his term of office the name of SZCChWall WM being linked with those of Cie' and Lu, which at that time were the states reputed to be the centers of Chinese culture. his achievements as an educator evoked laudatory comment from the Emperor, and an imperial decree declared them an example to be followed in all other commanderies and states The result was that colleges were established in all the regional capitals, at which young men were trained for local official posts according to Confucian precepts. Later, schools were established in smaller administrative areas as well. These were of two types: elementary, each in charge of a single "Master of the Classic of Filial Piety," and secondary, taught by a "Master of Classics." This system of education was, of course, far from being universal in the modern sense. It was not the government's intention to provide educational facilities for every child. Yet it was universal (and democratic as well) in one respect: every male person, with very few exceptions, had a formal chance to be selected ami recommended for training on the basis of his personal abilities measured against the Confucian ideals, regardless of wealth or class. The system's wei.kness, from the standpoint of equality of oppoitunity, lay in the fact that both the management of these schools and the business of selecting and recommending students were in the hands of members of the bureaucracy. Given the strong family ties by N%hich every Chinese is bound, favoritism unavoidably entered into the appointments. In actual practice, money also played its part It is said that wealthy people offered sums of money to have their sons accepted as students even in the college founded by Wan Wang. An interesting departure from this purely Confucian system of education began with the establishment (a D. I78) of an "academy of arts" by the Empeior Ling-ti. As a lover of the tine arts, Ling-ti forced through his scheme for such an academy over protests and remonstrances from Confucian quarters, and instructed his top-ranking officials to send talented persons there to study. There was a great deal of private teaching during this period, both on the elementary and the advanced level The elementary private schools were called "halls of writing." A contemporary author writes about them as follows: "I went to the Hall of Writing when I was eight years old. In our school there were over a hundred boys. If you had done a-8 411 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-R0p81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 something wrong you had to sit with your shoulders bare, and sometimes, if your writing was ugly, you gut whipped." Private schools on the advanced, i.e., academie, level were conducted by venerated masters of Confucian lore, many of whom used a monitorial method of teaching: they interpreted the classics to their most advanced students, who instructed the less advanced students. Both in education and schulandiip the private teachers played a role the importance of which can hardly be exaggerated. They per- formed an essential educational function even under the Han dynasty, and in the turbulent centuries following the fall of the Han dynasty, when the public school system had become only a faint shadow, it was they who kept alive the flame of scholarahip and pedagogy. More than one ruler, through the centuries in question, attempted to transform that faint shadow into somethine more substantial, and to use it for his own purposes. None, heiveve:, bucceedcd, for one reason became of the high mortality rate among Chinese rulers of this period, and for another becaum of the limited power they were able to exer- cise. China was continually plagued by internal strife and ir.vasions from the north, and it was not until A.D. 589, when the house of Sui reunified China, that the peaceful condi- tions conducive to the development of an educational system were again to prevail in China. One other factor deserves mention here. The period embraced the years during which Buddhism and Taoism, adopting a negative attitude toward all forms of worldly education, became established in the country and built up huge clerical organizations. The state of education at the beginning of this period is deseribed by a Chinese source As: From the year A.D. MO until A.D. 220 the world a-as disintegrating, and people did not care any longer. With the framework of society crumbling, the Confucian doctrine crumbled even more. Then, by the year 227, the new ruler [i.e., Ntirq-ti of the Wci dynasty 227 to 239] began anew to clear away the ash piles in the university, to restore the old stone tablets, and to provide for the salaries of the professors. . . lie had it announced throughout the provinces and commanderica that all those who wanted to study be sent to the universit 7. When the university was ? d reopened there were several hundred students. In the decade from 227 237, with the rr_ .y troubles, both internal and external, people adopted an escapt mode ' that. t, and many persons came and applied for entrance in the university, a hough bj nature they were set egairat ecl.C.arly work. By this time there were some thousand students at the university. Under such circumstances the professors all became in the end very negligent, offering nothing for the instruction of the students. Also, the latter had come originally only to escape military service, and finally there were none who had even the ability to 'turfy. In winter, they arrived, in spring they left, and so it went on year after year. . . . Not ten out of a hundred passed the examinations. . . Around A.D. 215 . . . , out of mare than four hundred court officials below ministerial rank not ten could write; the majoily of them just followed each Other's lad in gorging themselves on food And then retiring to take a rest. Alas indeed, scholarship had sunk to a low level. Post-Ilan Period Under the 'fan dynasty, the public school system and the hsCan-ehe system had been closely integrated, but through the upheavals and disorder that accompanied and followed the fall of the dynasty, the hailan-chii system failed to draw talented people into the civil service. In an attempt to remedy this situation a new system was introduced at the time of the Emperor Wei Wk-ti (220-227), its actual author being the Emperor's Minister of Rites, Clan ChIln. Under the new dispensation, officials were classed in nine grades, and an official was appointed for each province and comniandery whose continual task was to examine the merits not only of candidates for civil service positions, but also of civil servants on active duty. On the basis of his repoits, officials were demoted or promoted and candidates were appointed at particular grades. These examiners were the chung- 412 STAT classified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap -RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? cheng, "the men unbiased and just." How this system might have worked in the absence of corruption will never be known; it is certain that the ehung-ehtn7 proved susceptible both to the glitter of gold and the thickness of blood, so that it was soon a popular expres- sion that "the pear do not figure in the higher grades, nor the rich in the lower grades." The system was finally nbolished by the though the classification of officials in nine grades was retained While it lasted this eke:silica:6?n was a serious tinnier to the develop- ment of an educational system. In A n. 27(1 a new school was established that was called kuo-tztl-i?aeh, which is usually translated "Imperial Academy." Its literal meaning is "school for the sons of state," i.e , the cons of the highest officials in the capital. Its record of Accomplishment appears to have been modest, but it is worthy of note because China's highest eshicational institu- tion from the T'ang through the Ch'ing dynasty was calks' by the same name. From A.D. 42?) until MO China was divided by the Yan,-,ta into two portions, north and south. In the south, the efforts of some of the best thinkers were working toward a synthesis of Confucianism, Taoism, nnd Buddhism, and in consequence, non-Confucian ideas and materials played a much krger role in education there than in the north. Edu- cational activities in the south reached their high point of achievement under the Liang dynasty (502-556), a family with a genuine spark of literary genius. (Its members showed a keen interest in culture: Emperor Yu an Ti, for example, gave lectures on Lao TEO.) In general, students in the south seem to have been chosen on a more democratic basis than in the north. Two imperial decrees of the year 414 indicate both the undemocratic nature of public education in the north, and the extent to which non-Confucian doctrines, especially Bud- dhism, were frowned upon. The decrees speak for themselves: We hereby decree that sons born to kings, dukes, and down to ministers and the dignitaries under them, shall all go to the university. Sons ot men skilled in the various types of manual labor, of artisans, and of cerventi, shall all learn their father's or their elder brother's trade. These people are not allowed to establish schools in private. The penalty for disobedience is death for the teachers, and extinction for the patrons and their families. The ignorant people, lacking proper knowledge, is deluded through its belief in magic and black art. Privately people support magicians and hide away all kinds of books on soothsaying, genmaney, astrology, etc. Also, Buddhist follouers call up supernatural appearances on the strength of vain assertions made by barbarians from the west. These things arc not conducive to the universal ac- cept-ince of Our government's transforming influence, nor to the propagation of pure virtue in the world. From kings and dukes down to the common people, all those who privately support within their homes Buddhist priests, magicians, and gold and silversmiths (employed for the manufacture of religious objects), shall hand these persons over to the authorities. . . . The penalty ler disobe- dience is death for the magicians and priests, and extinction for the patrons and their families. Sum DYNASTY TO 1862 The outstanding feature of this period, for present purpoaes, is the examination system, which was first establHted under the Sui, was taken over and improved by the rang, and was retained with only minor changes by succeeding dynasties. The Chinese term for the system itself is leo-chti. Civil Service Examinations Following is a general outline of the civil service examinations of the period, drawn from available historical data regarding the T'ang dynasty, and from Prof. Robert des Rotours' Truitt des Era omens 4 13 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release .-;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 There were three types of examination: (I) Doctoral; (2) Selective civil service; (3) Record-of-service. Doctoral Examinations Of the many types of doctoral examination, the most important were: (a) examina- tion for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (chin-shill: "accomplished scholar"); (b) ex- amination for the degree of Doctor of Classics (rning-ching); (c) examination for the degree of Doctor of Law (ming-fa); (d) examination for the degree of Doctor of Lexicolog,y (ming-tze or ming-shu); (e) examination for the degree of Doctor of Mathematics (ming. anon). Both the degrees of Doctor of Philosophy and Doctor of Classics, much more highly regarded than the other degrees, were created under the Sui dynasty. Candidates for these degrees were tested first on strength of memory (i.e, given quotations from the classics, for which they were expected to provide the context), and then were given ques- tions that required them to write a number of essays. The candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy was asked, over and above the performance called for in the two parts of the examination just mentioned, to write two compositions in a style and on a subject prescribed by the examiners. A candidate for of Doctor of Classico IVMS required to answer orally ten questions about the general meaning of passages from the classics. In both examinations, originality was less important than erudition; the surest way to success was to make copious allusions not only to the Confucian classics, but also to other works of literature, especially the ancient Taoist texts. Doctoral examinations were held once a year in the capital, Chiang-an (now Sian), under the supervision of a vice-president of the Ministry of Rites. No one could be ad- mitted as a candidate unless his candidacy had been proposed in one of two ways. There were those presented by teachers in the college or university where they had been studying; and those who had been presented by prefects. Candidates of the latter group are called hsiang-kung, which means literally "tribute from the provinces." It was part of the pro- vincial prefect's duty to pres.ent talented men as specimens of his prefecture's human re- sources, just as he had to present specimens of its natural resources. Indeed, in the typical official presentation of tributes from the provinces, the loiang-kung took precedence over other tributes from the prefecture. One, two, or three hsiang-kung were presented from each province each year (three from the larger provinces, one from the smaller). A candidate from a province needed to be recommended by the magistrate of his district in order to present himself to the head of his prefecture. The prefect then ex- amined all candidates' qualifications and selected the best among them to proceed, after. having been duly feted, to the capital Any magistrate who recommended an unworthy person, or who faded to recommend a person of real talent, was subject to severe punish- ment. Candidates who passed the doctoral examinations became mandarins of either the eighth or the ninth grade, depending on the type of doctoral examination they had passed and on the marks given them. They did not receive appointments in the civil service as a matter of course. In other words, the mandarins were not necessarily officeholders. Selective Curd Service Examination In order to enter the civil service it NVIIS necessary to pass a selective civil service ex- amination. These examinations also were held once each year in the capital. Although only mandarins were eligible to take them, there were other ways; of becoming a mandarin than by passing a doctoral examination (Pot example, one could become a mandarin by 414 )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 being related to the emperor, or by being the son of a m.uidarin. In a roundabout way, it was even possible to buy the rank of mandarin) Candidates were grouped according to rank as mandanns, mismined on style, logical reasoning, bearing, and speech, and classi- fied according to excellence of conduct, talents, and merit;. Positions were subsequently assigned to them on the basis of their standing in the examination, taking into account, as far as possible, each candidate's personal preferences. Thi.4 list was then checked and rechecked and, finally, confirmed by the Emperor. Noimally there were more candidates than available posts, and it was usually necessary for it man it, come up for the examina- tions three or four tures. This costly delay in getting started on an administrative career could be circumvented by passing one of two special, more difficult, examinations which carried with them immediate appointment. All positions mentioned were temporary. At the end of a term of duty, each incumbent had to submit to an examination of the kind described to obtain a higher post. Only after a man had achieved the rank of mandarin of the fifth grade ? a fact. incidentally, of which the Emperor himself had to be notified ? was he finally exempted from this procedure. Not everybody, of course, reached this rung in the hierarchic ladder. Reeord-of-Senfice Examination Record-of-service examinations were conducted every year, on the basis of which officials either were promoted to a higher grade in the mandarin hierarchy or granted a raise in salary. These, however, were not examinations in the same sense as the doctoral and selective civil service examinations; they were analogous to the efficiency ratings of modern civil service systems. Heads of administrative departments in the capital and prefects in their local capitals published the records-of-service of their subordinates each year, and their reports, after being checked and rechecked by the central authorities, were finally placed before the Emperor. For mandarins of the third grade and up, the report was made directly to the Emperor. Bureau of higher Education This, in brief, was the examination system under the T'ang dynasty. The public education system was tied into it at every possible point, beginning with the most, impor- tant single educational entity, the Bureau of Higher Education (in Chinese, kuo-ted-chien, which means, literally, Intendance of the Sons of State). The Bureau was not it teaching institution but an administrative organ in the Ministry of Rites, and the following institu- tions of higher learning looked to it for supervision: School for the Sons of State (i uo-Izti-hstieh), with a faculty of five professois (po-sluh), five associate professors, four assistant professors, and an enrollment of three hundred students. As the name implies, it was a school for the elite of the empire; the students were all sons of high-ranking officials, thus sons of mandarins of at, least the third grade. School of Higher T arning (l'ai-hetich) ? with a faculty of six professors, six associate professors, and a student body of five hundred. The students were chosen from among the sons of mandarins of the fifth grade or abave. School of the Four Oates (ssi-meln-hsfich) t with a faculty of six professors, six asso- ? The term rui-itsildi has been mentioned as the Chinese equivalent of "university." It is often ad- visable to use different translations for one and the tame Chinese term used in diffe rent period.% because of the Chinese tendency to keep on using a name long liter the reality it stands for has virtually disappeared. t This institution derived its name from the fact that it originated 44 a qii.utet of schools, one Inside each of the four principal gates of the capital, during the Tuba Wci dynasty GIS6 -5311 The four were soon brought together in a single school. 115 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 .',IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 *mt. ????????Plimm.m??????????.? date professors, four assistant professors, and an enrollment of 1300 students, which mado it by far the largest of China's educational establishments. Five hundred of the students were chosen from among the sons of mandarins of the seventh grade or above, while the other places were reserved for commoners of rerr.arkable talent. College for the Propagation of Literature (kuung-irtra-kaan), which was established En A.D. 750 to provide educational facilities for those who were preparing themselves for tho degret of Doctor of Philosophy. It was staffed with four professors and two associate profezsors. The number of students who attended it is not, known. School of Law (la hstich) with a faculty of three professors, one associate professor, and fifty student& School of I.exicolou (shu hatleh) with two professors, one associate professor, and a student licxly of thirty. School of Mathematics (suan hst2eh), with two professors, one associate professor, and a student body of thirty. Enrollment in the last three schoels mentioned %vas open to the sons of mandarins of the eighth and ninth grade, and to the sons of commoners. Upon completion of their training, the students presented themselves, duly endorsed for this purpose by one or another of the faculties, for the examinations for the degree of Doctor of Law, Doctor of Lexie?logy, or Doctor of Afathemati. Branches of all the schools were maintained in the eastern capital, Lo-yang. Aside from these seven schools managed by the Bureau of Higher Education, there were a few educational institutions supervised by the central authorities. Among them were the College for the Advancement of Literature (hung-tren-kuan) and the College for the Aggrandizement of Literature (ch'ung-wIn-kuan), managed respectively by the Im- perial Chancery and by the Staff of the Crown Prince's Palace. These colleges did rot differ in their curricula from the schcol for the Sons of Stat', but only very close relat of the Emperor, the Empress, the Empress Dc ager, aid sons of top-ranking officials, such as ministers, were, accepted as students. B h, therefore, were small; the College for the Advar.cement of Literature had thirty stun Ats and the College for the Aggrandize- ment of Literature, twenty. Because of their exalted position, these students were exempted from the regular doctoral examinations; they were given special examinations, similar in character to those for the degree of Doctor of Philceophy or of Classics, and the standards they were obliged to meet were perhaps not as high as those for candidates in the regular examinations. One feature of the special examinations was that the student could opt for an historical text instead of the usual two classics. Only at, a relatively Lite date did this become possible in the regular examinations for the degree of Doctor of Classic& Another government office with educational responsibilities was the Office of Higher Medicine (I' ai-i-shu), under the direction of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (rai-ch'ang-ssa), which manage a School of Medicine (s-hstirh), with one profe.ssor and one associate pro- fessor of medicine with a combined allocation of forty students, one professor and ono associate professor of acupuncture with twenty students; one professor of massage with fifteen students; and two professors of exorcism with ten students. Mention must be made of the elementary school (hsiao-hsuch), supervised by the Department of the Imperial Library (uu-shu-trai-shing), which instructed the on of the Imperial Family and of out- standing high officials prior to their enrollment in the College for the Advancement of Literature, the College for the Aggrandizement of Litentture, the School for the Sons of State, or the School of Higher Learning. In % D. 711 a school was established, much to the chagrin of the staid Confucianists, for the teaching of Taoist doctrine It %vas called the School for the Aggrandizement of 416 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 r.IA-RnP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ? ? the Occult Lore (cleung-hstIa"-hsarh), and was organized under the Bureau of Sacrifices, which, like the Bilreau of Higher Education, formed part of the Ministry of Rites. The main school, with one hundred pupils, was at Ch'ang-an, but there was a branch in Lo-yang that could accommodate an equal number of students. Entrance requirements were the same as ttur.e for the School for the Sons of State, and a special examination was instituted, at the game time as the school, for the degree of Doctor of Taoism, to carry with it the privileges enjoyed by a Doctor of Classics. Cho prefectural and district schools were left to the care of local administrations. The number of students at these schools varied from e;glity at the prefectural school in the Capital to twenty for the district school in a small-sized district. Students were selected by local magistrates, witlicut regani, as far as legal theory was concerned, to social status. A graduate of such a school could either apply for hsiang-kung for his prefecture, or he could seek admission to the School for the Sons of State, the School of Higher Learning, or the School of the Four Gates (his selection depending on his father's social status). Each prefecture had its school of medicine and, after A.D. 741, its school of Taoism. Academic Life Prior to the T'ang dynasty, students paid no tuition, though each was expected to offer his teacher a complimentary present as an expression of high respect upon their first meeting. Under the T'ang, the custom was set aside in favor of a system of prescribed gifts, to be dieted by the student upon entering a school. Students at. the School for the Sons of State and those at the School of Higher Learning offered three rolls of thin silk; those at the School of the Four Gates offered two rolls; and those at the Schools of Law, Lexie?logy, Mathematics, and local schools, offered one roll. There were also gifts of wine and meat. Three-fifths of these gifts went to the professors and two-fifths to the associate professors, over and above their official salaries. Although the gifts can be re- garded as a form of tuition, they were not used to defray the cost of ninning the schools. Students entered the central schools when they were between fourteen and nineteen years of age (in the School of Law, from eighteen to twenty-five years). For the local schools there are no comparable figures, but it is known that graduates from these schools had to be under twenty-five years of age to qualify for entrance to the School of the Four Gates. The school year was divided into periods of ten days, one day of which was a day of rest. At the end of every ten-day period there was an examination, and at the end of the year students were examined on what they had been taught throughout the year. Those who failed three successive annual examinations were dismissed, as were those who had attended school for nine years (six years at the..:.chool of Law) without having been ac- cepted as candidates for the doctoral examinations. The student had two one-month vacations each year, the first in the fifth month (it was called "vacation for cultivating tiv fields"), and the second in the ninth month (to give students the opportunity to get their winter clothes). Any student who had been accepted as a candidate for a doctoral examination but who chose to continue his studies instead was permitted to do so. (A student at the School of the Four Gates who wished to continue his studies was transferred to the School of Higher Learning; one at the School of Higher Learning was transferred to the School for the Sons of State. This does not mean that these schools were on different academic levels. It WW1 merely a question of honor.) It is not too easy to gain an insight in the life of a student at the capital, but the fol- lowing composition may be helpful. It was written by Han Yt1 (768-824), a leading writer of his day and at one time president of the Bureau of Higher Education. 417 fr STAT ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Biography of Ito Fan, Student It is more than twenty years ago that the student Ho Pan entered the university. At the annual examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, the perfection of his studies and the nobility of his conduct were Kent:wed u itio praise by his fellow students, none of whom dared to put himself in a class with Ho Fan. Together they went to talk with the professors. The professors sent r report to the president and vire-presidents of the Bureau of Higher Education. These, in turn, listed in writing more than ten instances of brilliant behavior, and sending this list on to tha Ministry of Rites they brought it to the Einperor's knowledge. Students in the capital who, in writing or in speech, enhanced Ho Fan's reputation, were too many to be mentioned here, and legion sero the high-ranking officials who knew Ile Fan. None of them, however, worked in the Ministry of Rites. The officials in the Ministry of Rites were, on the whole, persons with whom Ile Fan had no affinity of m:roil, noel Isocaure of this he was unsuccessful. 110 Fon was a native from Huai-rum. Both his father and his mother were still alive. When he first entered the university he went home once a year, but his parents stopped him. After that he went home every other or every third year, but again they stepped him. For five yams lie did not go home. Being a man of undiluted filial piety, he himself was unable to suppress his passionate concern for lois aging parents, and one day he took leave from his fellow sturients to return to the prefecture of Ho t to support his parents. The other students could not stop him, in they locked him up in an empty building. At that time there were more than a hundred teachers eoenected with six different branches j of the university, and they, from their side, spoke with Mr. Yang Ch'One? vice-president of the Bureau of Higher Education, about Ho Fen's dutiful behavior, requesting him to order his reinstatement as a student. At the time the post of president of the Bureau of Higher Education MIA vacant, and it so happened that Mr. Yang was leaving for the prefecture of Tao.? Ito Fan's reinstatement was not effected. Mr. Ou-yang Chan remarked: "Ho Fan was a person of human-heartedness and courage." Somebody else said: "While Ho Fan attended the university, the students did not act contrary to duty. If one of them had lost a parent and had no way to go horse for the burial, he commiserated with that person in his loss and treated him with fatherly love. A kindness, be it great or small, he would by all means try to repay. Is not this what you mean by his human-hearted:1m? But Ho Fan's inner strength gave way under his feelings of pity, his deportment gave way under his affec- tions. 1, for one, am not aware of his courage." Said Mr. Cu-yang Chan: "When Chu Tz'a rebelled,I the students at the university were all going to join him, but when they came to Ho Fan with a request for his initiative, he berated them sternly with his face in serene composure. The scholars at the university did not join the rebellion. Was this not proof of his courage?"** T'ang Dynasty Prior to the T'ang dynasty, professors (po-shih) had the two-fold duty of advising the Emperor and of offering instruction to the scions of the empire. With the expansion of the educational system under the T'ang, however, the professors began to teach full- ? A province stretching from Ilankow eastwanl to the seacoast, between the river liwal and the Yen gt ze. t In Anhwei, north of the Yangtze, 15 miles upstream from Nanking. t The School for the Sons of State, the School of Higher Learning, the &hoot of the Pour (Lacs, and the Schools of, of Lexicology, and of Mathematics. This happened in 70. The prefecture of 'frio was situated In the southern part of Hunan province. 1 In 783. Chu Tz'n was in control of Cliang-an until the next year, when he auffeted defeat and was driven away. so According to the //rim T'ang-thu, ch 191, lie Fan studied at the university for twerhy years. This t4C1713 very long inolnsd, but both our rources arc in agreement. lie must have been one of those students who preferred to continue their studics instead of going up for their doctoral examination when judged ready to do se. 418 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 time, and as of the year 740 another arrangement was made for the advisory function. This was in the form of an advisory board charged with responsibility for providing 11113%10'S to any questions the Emperor might put to it, about cultural matters, and was called the han-hri-yOan, the Ilanlin Academy (han-lin means "forest of writing-brushes"). A great number of comprcheasive scholarly works %Nese %written under its supervision, some of them as late as the Ch'ing dynasty. Duiing the latter part of the T'ang dynasts, Buddhism (especially Zen-Buddhism) began to concern itself with education Long before this, Buddhism had become very influential in China, and had established monasteries nil over the country. In time, some of these monasteries became repositones of Buddhist texts, from which it was a brief step to the offering of instruction in Buddhist lore. For example, a book of rules for the man- agement of monasteries, dating from as long ago as the eighth century, shows that, the educational function had, tven at that time, become a recognized part of the management problem. Buddhist novices were taught, among other things, how to read, a privilege that very few commoners could hope to enjoy Moreover, since the art of block printing was not applied to the production of books until the first half of the tenth century, books remained scarce in China until a very late date, so the Buddhist novices, having learned to read, enjoyed more oppoctiunties than most to acquire genuine learning from the texts within their monasteries. Novices, furthermore, pfcntiful, if for no other reason than that many of the monasteries had acquired the owncrship of large tracts of land; becoming a novice usually meant an improvement in one's economic lot. The role of the Buddhist mor.asteries' educational facilities in attracting scholars prompted a number of far-sighted Confucianists to create comparable facilities under Con- fucianist auspices. At first this was merely a matter of granting earnest students per- mission to use Confucianists' own private libraries, and assisting them in their studies. These facilities were called shu-yian, i.e., "library," but as their instruction developed the mine term came to mean "academy," as it certainly did by the time of the Southern T'ang dynasty (937 to 012) when it occurs in the name of the White Deer Academy (pai-ht sliu-ylian). The latter was located near the White Deer Grotto, on a hill south of Chiu- Chiang in Kiangsi. Through a deed of land this Academy derived an independent income, and there is no doubt that it considered itself an educational institution, not a repository for books. Under the Sung more and more shu-yean were established, at first on private initiative, later on instructions from the government. These academies came to play a role quite similar to that of the pm ate schools run by Confucian scholars during and after the Han dynasty. It was in the sing-yaan that the exponents of Neo-Confueinnism pro- pounded their theories to the students and, taking advantage of the atmosphere of quiet detachment, did their thinking. The name of one of China's greatest thinkers, Chu Usi (1130-1200), is connected with the White Deer Academy. Sung Dynasty The Sung ruler4, recognizing that an independent source of income is a great advan- tage for a school, set re4de lands not only for the support of the government schools in the Capital, but also for the support of !oral schools. The Confucianists, spurred on by the constant friction between themselves mind the Buddhists, directed the Emperor's attention to the hitter's rich monastic land-holdings; and in 1151 a decree was promulgated authoriz- ing the expropriation of those lands as a means of getting the wheNwithal to establish more public schools. Another important innovation under the Songs was the practice of dividing students into three groups comparable to that between freshmen, sophomores, and seniors. This 419 STAT A : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 am.????????,....rer.P10.??? /VIM ? ? made it possible both to regularize the curricula and, since thereafter each freshman and sophomore had to pass an examination before he could enter the next higher clas.s, to raises scholastic standards by weeding cut incompetents. Seniors who passed the final examina- tion were made eligible at once for official positions. In the year 1070 the number of fresh- men. sophomores, and seniors at the university (l'ai-hsaeh), into which the Sung had com- bined the School for the Sons of State and the School of Higher Learning of the T'aag, was two thousand, three hundred, and one hundred, respectively. The weeding out process was dearly at, work! The Sung did more for the development of regional schools than any preceding dy- nasty. An order issued in 1014 provided for the establishment of schools in the prefectures and districts, with the sole proviso that each district school must have at least two hundred students. An order of the year 1102 decreed that elementary schools were to be established in all the prefectures and districts and set the age for entry at ten years or over Prior to this date, the care of local educational institutions had been a concern of the local adminis- tration. Now special educational commissioners were appointed in the different prefectures. From the time of 'rung Chung-shu's proposals on education to Emperor Ilan Wu-ti, the Confucianists considered the domain of public education their special preset: e, which it was their duty to guard with a watchful eye. China's traditional system of public educa- tion became, in effect, a part of the Confucianist cult. At prescribed times, for example, students and teachers alike were expected to withdraw to the Confucianist temple for worship. In present-day Peking, the Confucian temple stands next door to the Hall of Classics, well within the confines of the former 1: uo-td-chien. The prevailing atmosphere throughout the system became one of illiberal orthodoxy, and this, in turn, made for a creeping atrophy of creative effort. It was impressed upon the mind of every student that the classiest texts were the definitive achievement of human thought, to be consulted and followed on all matters much as the average person in our day would consult the dictionary on a point of usage. From a fairly early date, therefore, there were expr=ions of dissatisfaction with the large percentage of automatons that the educational system, in combination with the tradi- tional examination system, sent into civil service positions. Only one official appeared, however, who had both the courage and the vision to try to do something about this prob- lem. He was Wang An-shih (1021-1030), social reformer and, at one time, Prime Minister. Although he did not. dispute the value of ethical training which the educational system offered, he was determined to allot space in the curricula for the study of contemporary problems, to reduce the imrortance of mere plagians.m of the classics, and to change the examination system accordingly. Also, he was fully conscious of the opposition he was going to encounter, and therefore sought to make his reforms more palatable by incor- porating his ideas in commentaries on classical texts. For a short while his texts were used in the schools, but the orthodox garb in which his ideas were dressed did not deceive the Confucianists, %%lio soon found means of removing Wang An-shill from office Everything then settled back into the old channels. The educational system was, however, an efficient vehicle for the transmission of Chinese culture, and, at such, won deserved fame among the peoples surrounding China. Even as early as the T'ang dynasty it wss attracting a considerable number of students from such places as Manchuria, Korea, Zsgan, and Tibet; and the talcs these students took back with them from China greatly increased the reputation not only of China's educational institutions but of its culture as well In due time this reputation was re- flected in the fact that each of the barbarian tribes who successively overran parts of North China during the Sung dynasty attempted to restore or maintain the existing edu- cational establishments. ? 420 STAT .........1,M1,1,,??????????????????1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release DIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ? - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 The Mengols The Mongols, more self-confident and assertive than the other barbarian tribes, did, however, inject some of their own ideas in Om Chinese educational system. (Besides being more race-conscious than the barbarians %% ho hall preceded them as conquerors of Chinese soil, the Mongols ruled over a larger area of China for a longer period of time than any of their predecewors.) They succeeded, for exainple, in establishing schools for the teach- ing of Afengol lore nnd of those aspects of Chinese culture in which they themselves were particularly interested. However, in reorgnnizing the edecational system they were just al pragmatic as in all their other governmental transactions: for extunple, they retained the School for the Sons of State (lata-tzil-hPtleh) under the Bureau of Higher Education (kito-tzil-chien) for the training of the traditional type of Chine:4 civil servants. But. they also established a Mongol Bureau of Higher Education with a Mongol School for the Sons of State (at which, however, a Mongol translation of a Chine history book was used for instruction), and a Mohanunedan School for the Sons of State, offering instruction in the langlinges spoken by the Nloharninedan peoples. The Emperor Jtn-tsung (131.2-1320), of the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty, also re.stored (greatly modified) the examination system. Exaininations for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy were held in the capital every three years, under the Emperor's personal super- vision. The centlidates normally numbered nbout a hundred, and came, as they had formerly, largely from the provinces, where they had undergone preliminary selective examinations for the degree of chtl-jen ("recommendees"). Both as students and as examinees persons of Mongol or Turkish extraction enjoyed special privileges. The tests to which they were subjected, for example, were decidedly easier than those for the Chinese; and a Mongol Doctor of Philosophy was accorded the sixth rank in the mandarin hierarehy, while his Chinese counterpart tvas accorded the eighth rank. (Ambitious Chinese some- times tried to eliminate this handicap by presenting themselves as candidates under Mongol names.) A Chinese gradunte or Doctor of Philosophy was eligible for appointment to a teach- ing position in a provincial, prefectural, or district school. These schools did not feed students to the School for the Sons of State in the capital. Only sons or close relatives of members of the Mongol guard and high court officials could attend the latter, which was a self-contained unit with its own elementary school, high school, and college. In theory, as least, the academic level for the local schools was about the same as in the School for the Sons of State. At. the provincial level there 'ere Mongol as well as Chinese schools, medical schools (medical science wns much encouraged by the Mongols), and so-called yin-yang schools, where instniction was offered in such diverse subjects as soothsaying, astrology, exorcism, ns well aa pure astronomy. The yin-yang doctrine had great attractions for the shamanis- tic Mongols. Strict legislation vas enncted to assure n11 these schools, and the shu-yann tts well, permanent ownership of arable land as an independent source of income The number of schJols at the end of the thirteenth century was, according to "The History of the Ytian Dynasty," over twenty thousand, although this may be an exaggeration (The first Emperor of the Ming dynasty made the statement that the schools created by the Monrols existed in name only.) Ming Dynnsty Under the ling dynasty (1308-16 I l), the examination system and the public educa- tion system were completely integrated. LegnI provision was made for schools for boys fifteen years of age and above in the proportion of one school for every group of twenty-five 421 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ^ 1 families. (These schoot. did not prove popular, in part because wall-to-do families had been accustomed to providing their sons' pris ate tuition at this level.) The district, sub- prefectural, and prefectural schools were given a fixed number of students (twenty, thirty, and forty respectively), all to be supported by the government; and provision was made for the holding of entrance examinations in the local capitals. Prom that time forward the term shbg-otiart ("student") was interchangeable with the term hsiu-ls'ai ("flowering talent"), which had hitherto been used for persons who had pa=cd the examinations in the pioviacial capitals. The latter became a career mile,tone comparable to the B.A. degree, and was the first step on a long and arduous road toward a position in the civil service. A student spent a minimum of the ione years studying the classics, the standard his- tories, and laws and ordinances before he could be as a candidate for the degree of chu-pn, which might be called the equivalent of the M.A. degree. Examinations for this distinction were held at intervals of three years in the provincial capitals. (A candi- date who failed was sent. back to his school. A candidate who failed repeatedly could retire upon reaching the ego of fifty, at which time the degree of chit-Pn was granted him on an honorary basis.) The best among the chii-jIn were permitted to go to the capital to submit themselves to the rigorous examinations for the degree of chin-shth, Ph.D. The best among the chin-dtih were appointed members of the Haulm Academy. The others received ap- pointments in the regular civil service. The Imperial Academy (in Chinese kuo-iztl-chien, the term applied to the Bureau of Higher Education under the T'ang) became under the Ming a kind of national university, replacing the elaborate system of central schools of the T'ang dynasty. Its students, like those in the local schools, were supported by the government; and by the year 1421 its student body numbered 9900, an impressive figure when one remembers that, because of the local schools, it enjoyed no such educational monopoly DS the cent r".1 schools had en- joyed under the T'ang. Each prefectural school sent two "best students" to the Imperial Academy every year; each subprefectural school three every two years, and each district school one each year. Sons of high officials accounted for most of the remainder of its student body. (A chi1-jen who failed to pass the examinations for the degtee of chin-shih was permitted to enroll in the Academy while awaiting the next examination.) ,Upon completion of his studies, an academy student could, like the graduates from local schools, become a candidate for the degree of chi1-jh From the Ming dynasty on, the accepted principle was that nobody could enter the civil service without passing this examination. Clearly, the Ming rulers' major contribution in the field of education was the establish- ment of the local schools out over the country. The motivation underlying the govern- ment's interest in education remained that of training recruits for its own bureaucracy, but the Ming, unlike their predecessors, believed that this could best be done by ministering to the Chinese people's need for educational facilities. One interesting by-product of this belief. however, NMI a conviction on the part of the government that it was providing all the educational facilities the people required, so that there was no need for private initia- tive in education. Thus the Ming did not give the shtt-yuan the kind of support they had received from the Sung and l'Oan rulers; there was no arrangement by which students from these schools could register as candidates for the degree of chaltn. Indeed, by the year 133S the emperor was ordering that all the shu-yonn be destroyed. Although this policy never became completely effective, it dal greatly inhibit the growth and activity of the private academies. Against this, however, must be set the fact that the Ming rulers tried, even if only on a sinall scale, to spread knowledge of Chine culture and institu- tions among a ?vider segment of the populace by opening the local schools to people who 422 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 3IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ????????????????.1...m.......????????????? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ^ Isere not interest, primarily in an official career. Such supernomerary students did not receive government support; but. if a position became available among the ranks of the regular students they could apply for it, and there came a time when a certain number of supernumerary students were allowed to compete for the degree or chtl-fin at the trien- nial provincial examinations. In addition to accomplishing a major decentralization in the field of education, the Ming also instituted sonic minor reforms. They took control of the local school away from the administrative officials and entrusted it to centrally appointed educational corn- mimioners. They offered students in the Imperial Academy opportunities for interim em- ployment in a government bureau, so that they could begin to acquire administrative experience at a relatively early age. (At first such student-officials were appointed only after they had attended the Imperial Academy for ten years. By the latter half of th fifteenth een(ury, however, they were being permitted to substitute, for years at the Academy, years of study under a private tutor, and this led to great abuse; e.g., to the appointment of student-officials wh.. had spent less than a year at the Imperial Academy.) althotigh the Ming government provided everything the students it supported required, from books and beard and lodging to separate quarters inside the compound of the Empress's palace for the wives of mariied students, it also imposed on them a very strict disciplinary code, of which the following paragraphs are an adequate sample: When rtrzt-mbloi to eat, students shill condutt themselves with propriety and dignity, and with proper respect for their food and drink. Shouting and clamoring, standing up and sitting down during the meal are not allowed, nor is it allowed to force on one's own [initiative] one or more of the cooks to prepare meals outside, and recklessly to spend the government allotment in food. Offenders will be severely sentenced. A student who has been working in a government ?flied shall, upon finishing such work, return forthwith to the Academy to coatinue his studit. He shall nut, when being thus away from the Academy, avail himself of the opportunity to :mpg? in some other business. Offenders will be severely sentenced. Any serious complaint., either against the military or the civil branch, crin be voiced by farmers, laborers, merchants, or shopkeepels, but no student is allowed to do so. Recalcitrant and unruly rascals who violate the school regulations shall be reported to us by the president Whatever the case, no mercy will be shown. With their whole family they shall be transported to malarious districts, where they Anil serve either as soldiers, or as subordinate officials, or as magistrates. Hereafter the school regulations shall be strictly enforced. If, as has happened before, unregistered persons put up anonymous posters in uhich they defame the teachers, let all persons come out with it, or hand the culprits over an bonds, in reward for which they shall receive two pieces of silver. As for posters that have been put up before this, if there aro persons ho know about them, let them either turn informant, or band the culprits over in bonds, in reward for which they, too, shall receive in like manner two pieces of silver. The criminals themselves shall be sliced limb front limb and their heads shall he impales! in front of the Academy; all the possessions of their family shall be confiscated, and its members traworted to malarious districts. This is an Imperial order. These were not idle threats. In 1391, for exampk, the student Chso Lin was executed and his head impaled in front of the Academy became he had slandered his teachers. In 1333 the Academy had as its president Mr Sung Na, who enforced the school regulations with great harshness and exercised extreme frugality in allotting food to his charges. The time came when the students were on the point of starvation; yet when the Emperor learned that one of the assistant professors had enlisted the aid of the secretary of the Ministry of Officials in an attempt to oust the president, he had both the assistant professor and the secretary executed. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 5. 423 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 The Ming retained the medical schools and the vin-yang schools they had inherited from the T'ang, but abolished the schools of law, lexicology, and mathematics. These subjects were subsequently taught in the regular schools. They also created an Imperial College of Astronomy, which took its place in the ch.ster ol specialized schools in the capital. Despite the lip-service paid to the principle that civil service positions could only be held by those who had passed the necessary examinations, certain hereditary rights to such positions continued to be acknowledged. Officials in the higher echelons of the bureaecracy were permitted to send their sons to the Imperial Academy without their having satisfied the entrance requirements. Wealth, too, sometimes opened the door to persons who could not otherwise have qualified, especially during the latter half of the Ming dynasty and through the Ch'ing dynasty. Ch'ing Dynasty The Ch'ing dynasty, until it was forced by external circumstances to adopt a different course, followed the general policy of maintaining existing Chinese educational institutions with only minor changes. However, the Ch'ing expanded the examination system to proportions entirely out of line with the educational facilities offered by the government. The earlier practice had been to select the best among the lulu-teal and send them to the Imperial Academy, and to call such of these as came from the provinces kung-shIng ("tribute students"). The Ch'ing continued to grant the title of kung-ehtng to outstanding hsiu- ts'ai, but the large majority of the Ch'ing kung-sheng were not students at all. The term came to denote a rank in the examination system, intermediate between hsiu-ts'ai and chfl-jen, which exempted the holder from the ordinary hsiu-ts'at's obligation to subject himself to the exacting, time- and money-consuming examinations that were held every three years in the local capitals. Many of these kung-sUngs remained "tribute students" for the rest of their life, holding down permanent positions in local administrations. The schools tended increasingly, under the Ch'ing, to be sheer training schools for the bureaucracy. Scholarship for scholarship's sake was frowned on. The Emperor Yung- cheng drove this point home in an Imperial decree: "It should be borne in mind that in subsidizing students it is not Our aim to encourage useless scholarship, but rather to instill into the people that respect which it owes to its rulers and to its ancestors." Like the Mongols in earlier days, the 'Manchus had a racial problem to deal with. They adopted strict precautions to prevent themselves from being absorbed by the Chinese culturally as well as purely ethnically, and set up special schools in the capital to instruct young Manchus in Manchu lore and in archery and horsemanship. (Some of the students at these schools also received instruction in Chinese.) These schools, moreover, were under much more rigorous supervision than the Imperial Academy. The real halls of learning during the Ch'ing period were the sha-ysien, which generally fared better, particularly in protection, under the Ch'ing dynasty than under its predecessor. In 1733 they ceased to be pnvate institutions and became full-fledged government schools. The Emperor Yung-cheng ordered all governors-general to establish shu-nuan in their provincial capitals, and the institutions increased greatly in number. Their students were thenceforth selected by educational commissioners attached to the governors'-geneml staff. The Emperor decreed, at the same time, a ban on private lecturing, thus making no secret of the political character of the government's motives in reorganizing the shu-yflan. The two things that most impressed foreign observers during this period were the ex- amination system and the universality of China's elementary educational facilities. The day came when an M.P. rose in the British Parliament to advocate the adoption of a 424 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 system of civil service exeminations based on the Chinese model. There Was an elementary school in pinctically every Chinese village. The establishment of such schools was en- couraged by the government, and the usual practice was for the Iciessl aethorities to locate and recruit the teachers. In every other respect, however, the schools were private institu- tions, and reflected a local dettrmination to sive children the benefits of an education, although by present-day standards the quality of the instruction offered left much to be desired. The students learned their lessons by rote, and used for the most part materials far beyond their comprehension. 1862-1010 (ftEMOVAL OP Ns-no:sit/X:1T GOVERNS/ENT) Contact with the West China's traditional philosophy had accustomed the Chinese to see the world as an area with China as its center, and in which things change not along a straight line but within a closed circle. Although this point of view cannot be called static neither WAS it likely to encourage progress. It was certain, therefore, to clash sharply with the dynamic philosophy of the Western world when and if it came in contact with it ? as, largely under duress, it finally did. The outcome of this clash was, furthermore, easily predictable: the superiority of the West in "this-worldly" matters, especially, haa obliged theChinese to try toassintilate as much as possible of Western civilization in hon t a time as possible. The resultant neglect of Chinese culture has brought in its t onsequences (among them a feeling of inferiority on the part of the Chinese) hardly Isss important than those of Western ideas and Western technology. This goes a long way toward explaining some of the Chinese behavior in recent years, and has contributed to a marked impoverishment of the culture of the world as a whole. As the vehicle of culture par excellence education was mote immediately influenced by contriet with the West than was any other Chinese institution. Indeed, the whole history of Chinese education during this period can be understood only if looked at in this per- spective. Missionaries The prelude to the great changes that were to take place after 1862 dates from the seventeenth century, when Catholic missionaries like Matted Ricci and Johannes Adam Schell von Bell made a deep iinwssion on the Chinese. Their scientific knowledge, es- pecially in the field of astronomy (although Copernicus was still considered a heretic), attracted a considerable number of Chinese students. When, in 1701, a Papal decision ruled that Catholic doctrine and the Confucian rituals for the veneration of ancestors were incompatible, the Chinese government promptly banned the Catholic missionaries; with them went the only contact China had with Western thought and Western science. Not until 1842, after the signing of the treaty of Nanking, did Catholic and Protestant mission- aries again come to China. This time they came in numbers, so that there were sufficient personnel to establish schools as well as churches for the dissemination of the Christian faith and, along with faith, the Western knowledge of which the Christians were the bearers. The early-day missions had no established educational policy The schools they maintained ministered primarily to the needs of the new converts, most of whom were drawn from among the humbler classes. The mission sehools, nevertheless, gave the 425 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: :IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1. r AIL ? Chinese their first taste of Western education. From these early schools spread the facts nd ideas that, as time passed, were to open wide crevices in the structure of Chinese society. Influences of the West The treaty of Tientsin (ratified in ISGO), which created, among other things, the Chinese Foreign Office, contained a clause stipulating all dispatches from foreign countries were to carry Chinese translations for the first three years after which the Chinese would receive dispatches in the language of the originating country. This meant that the Chinese gov- ernment had to start training its tran personnel to translate the Western languages. In 1862 a school was established for this purpose in Peking, called the eung-ranstuart, and two years later it was expanded to include a department of science and raised to the rank of a college. In 1868 Dr. W. A P. Martin became its professor of international law, and the following year he was appointed as its first president. Two disastrous wars with the West, and the resultant ignomiree.4 heaped upon China (e g., the tm.ties of Nanking and Tientsin), had convinced a number of high.ranking Chinese that China urgently needed young men trained in the nciences of the West. By establishing the t'ung-tan-kuan, the government had officially recognized this need, but there wits still enough opposition to the whole idea to prevent any major steps from being taken for another thirty years. Infernal Efforts The efforts of three viceroys, Ts6ng Kuo-fan, governor-general of Kiangrum and Kiangsi, Li Hung-cluing, and Chang Chih-tung, deserve mention here. The first, Ts6ng Kuo-fan, enlisted the services of the first Chinese who graduated trom a foreign university, Yung Wing (1828-1912). Yung Wing was born on Pedro Island, four miles southwest of Macao, and in his childhood attended the first minaionary schools to be established in ...lacao and, later, in Hong- Kong. In 1817 he sailed for America to attend the Monson Academy at Monson, Massachusetts, from which he was graduated in 1850. He spent the next four years at Yale University, where he earned his way by managing a boarding house and acting as librarian for one of the university literary societies. Ile took his degree at Yale in 18.54, and returned to China in the autumn of that year. Ten years later . he returned to New England, to execute a commission front Tsiing Kuo-fan to purchase machinery for what was to become the, Kiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai. By 1867 the 'Carignan Arsenal had as an annex its own mechanical school. Chang Chili.tung set up a similar arsenal in Canton during his governor-generalship of Kwani,eung-Kwangsi (1881-1889). This arsenal also was used as it training school for military and naval personnel Later, having been transferred to Wuchang as governor- general of Hupeh-liunan, he organized the Government Mining and Engineering College at Wucheng. At about the same time, Li Itung-chang was planning the establishment of a university in Tientsin (A spacious building was finally constructed for this purpose, with funds con- tributed by both Chinese and Westerners; but for the time being no further steps were taken.) Li Ifung-chang also associated himself with a group of persons who were urging the Throne to include physical science and mathematics in the list of subjects covered by the traditional examination system. Although the proposal met with a great deal of op- position in official circles, it was finally adopted in the wear 1887, when an Imperial decree made it possible for persons trained in the sciences to receive official recognition for their 426 STAT eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? k-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 1 ? erpcsate and enter upon an official career. (At first, the decree produced little in the way of practical results, for the simple reason that no examiners were available who were familiar with the new subjects.) Yung Wing's name also comes up in connection with China's first educational com- mission abroad. The plans for this commission were worked out. in the early seventies by Tang ICuo-fan, Li Iiiing-chang, and a few other high officials after consent had been obtained from the Emperor. They selected 120 students averaging twelve to fourteen years of ago for the project, whom they divided into four equal groups to be sent abroad, one at a time at intervals of one year, for 15 years' training. Because of his experiences abroad and the fact that he was known to have been thinking in terms of such a project., Yung Wing was appointed assistant Commissioner. The post of Commissioner went to Cli'dn Lan-pin, a member of the Hardin Academy known for his devotion to Chinese learning (Yung Wing was suspected of "pro-foreignism" ? he had become a naturalized American citizen in 1852.) The student groups were taken to the United States, as planned, through the years 1872-1875. The commission established a headquarters in Hartford, Connecticut, and the boys, as they arrived; were farmed out by twos and fours to live with New England families and pick up what they needed to know in order to take care of themselves in American grade schools. They did very well from the first, taking to their new environment and, all too quickly from the standpoint of the project purpose, acquiring American ways and neglecting their native customs and the Chinese education. (Yung Wing appears not to have been worried about this, but Chl6n Lan-pin was greatly disturbed.) Reports of this development got back to China, however, and gave rise to much unfavorable criti- cism. One result of this was that. Li Hung-chang withdrew his support from the project. In 1881 the mission was ordered abolished, and the students directed to return home. For the moment, at least, Chinese conservatism could breathe more easily. Sino-Japancse War, 1894-1895 The blow needed to defeat the conservatives was dealt by the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, from which many Chinese drew the following moral: Japan, another Oriental nation and, moreover, one the Chinese had always regarded as second-rate, had been able to inflict a defeat on China only because it was well on the road to Westernization. Opinion shifted sharply on the whole Westernization issue. The Emperor Kuang-hsti became in- terested in Western learning himself, and let it be known that. he was reading translations of Western books. The missionary schools and colleges and such other schools as were teaching Western language and science were swamped with applications for admission. Two sorely needed institutions of higher learning were launched: the Pciyang University in Tientsin (which Li Hung-chang had planned a full decade before) and the Nanyang College in Shanghai. The new attitudes on education are epitomized in Chang Chih- tung'a famous book Exhortation to Learning (Ch'tian-hstich l''icn) in which he set forth a project for a modern school system and advocated numerous educational reforms subse- quently put into effect. The book was published in 189c.f and enjoyed a tremendous vogue. The "Hundred Days' Reform" The year 189S was also that of Emperor Nuang-listi's "Hundred Days' Reform," in which he was advised by N'ang Yu-wei (1855-1027). The Wang Yu-wei, with Liang Ch'i-cleao (1b73-1929), T'an Sati-t'ung (1863-1898), and other progressives, organized a reform party whose objective was to transform China into a modern nation under a con- stitutional monarchy. The party seized upon Chang Chih-tung's Exhortation to Learning 427 STAT ?-: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 .',IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 as its educational platform. The "Hundred Days" began when Kiang Yu-wei's argu- mentiwon over the Emperor himself, and the reform, such as it was, took the form of a series of decrees, among them one stressing the importance of scientific studies, one pro- viding ior modern district schools to be housed in temples, and one providing for a Uni- versity in Peking. Inde, in retrospect, the reforms were rather too far-reaching than otherwise, for they produced an anti-Western resetica co powerful as to make them aelf- defeating. It was, moreover, this reaction that finally led to the Bo= uprising, which, because of its sheer folly and rashness, finished off the anti-Western conservatives, tho most influential of whom paid for it with their lives. The Empress Dowager, key figure in the reaction, learned a lemon from the uprising and its consequences. Soon she was ad- vocating the very reform measures that she had been busy defeating only ft short time before. The drastic, organist-d reform of the education system suddenly became practical politics. Emigration for Education The first problem attacked was China's conspicuous shortage of persons t% ith 'Western- type training. This dearly called for a government program for sending students abroad. Young men who could afford it were already going abroad in considerable numbers with- out government sponsorship; some, indeed, had already returned and were making their influence felt both in the professions and in business. Japan was the nearest and easieat place for such young men to go, and, after the Japrinm) victory over Russia, there was a veritable flood of Chinese atudents into Japan. (In the course of a few years returned students from Japan were taking an active part in the work of progress and reform all over China.) Evidently, however, the number of families able to finance a on through several years of study at a foreign university waa small by comparison with the country's need for trained personnel. In recognition of this, an edict promulgated in 1901 recommended that provincial governors select promising young men to be sent abroad to study, and that their expenses be defrayed by the provincial governmenta. This was followed, in 1905, by a decree suggesting a larger number of students should be sent to Europe and America. At the same time, Chinese ministers abroad were instructed to give special attention to the needs and welfare of such government-sponsored students as might come to the coun- tries to which they were accredited, and, in general, to treat the students as if they were their own sons. Finally, it was decreed that any student returning to China with foreign training might present himself with his diploma before the governor and educational com- missioner of his province for examination; if he were found satisfactory, he should bo recommended for appointment in the bureaucracy. (This applied to private students as well as government-sponsored students.) By 1907 the number of students who thus pre- sented themselves had grown zo large as to call for t nation-wide system of control and examination. In a number of countries, e.g., Japan, Ame:ica, France, Belgium, Germany, and Eng- land, Chinese students soon became so numerous that the regular legation staff could not handle them. Each of these legations soon found itself with an "educational bureau," made up of officials who could devote full time to the students' problems. Soon, too, competitive examinations were established in the various provinces to determine which students should be sent abroad, and regulations were drawn up to govern such examina- tions. By 1907 one of these examinations (in Kiangsu Province) was being thrown open to women. By 1910, according to one estimate, over 2500 government-scholarship students and at least 5000 private students (150 of them women) were receiving training in Japan. In England thsre were already 140 government-sponsored and 150 private students; in 428 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 r.IA-RnP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Belgiu , Prance, and Germany, respectively, 70, 80, and GO government-sponsored stu- dents, plus an indeterminate number of private students. The number of Chinese students in the United States in the same year wits estimated to be not less than GOO. (The United States had returned to China over ten million dollars in Boxer Indemnity funds, and China had gratefully committeu itself to sending 100 students to the United States each year for four years, and 50 students each year thereafter for twenty-eight years.) The first group of these students had been selected (by competitive examination in Peking) in 1909. Later, only persons who had taken a prtliminary course of training at Tsinghua College in Peking were accepted as applicants. Reforms, IP01-1910 Another problem attacked early in this period was that of what to do about the old examination system, and the relation between it and the educational process ? based on the idea that the purpose of education was to prepare a man for an examination that will admit him to the public service. The reform movement cut the Gordian knot of the ex- amination system by abolishing it in 1905. This was done despite its reputation for being traditional, on the grounds (set forth in a petition by Yfirin Shih-k'ai and others) that re- taining the system would violate ancient custom, since in early antiquity recruits for public office had all been taken from public schools. However, the idea that education was a matter of training future officials did not disappear overnight. Rather, the reform move- ment disposed of it by indirection ? by buckling down to the hard business of establi.thing a national school system that would, in practice, train people for functions other than that of government servants. The key developments during this period then were: an edict, issued in 1901, providing that all shu-yilan were to be turned into modern universities or colleges modeled after the Imperial University in Peking, thus providing each province with an up-to-date institu- tion of higher learning; the establishment of middle schools ::. 2very prefecture; and the establishment of higher primary schools in every district, and lower primary schools throughout the country. The course of study in these institutions was to include Chinese classics, history, principles of government, and Western sciences. In 1903 a commission was appointed, with Chang Chih-tung as a member, to draw a detailed plan for a national public school system. This commission's report, which included even, for example, sug- gested regulations concerning discipline and curricula, as weli as proposals on how the neces- sary schools were to be established, ran to four volumes, and became the authorized prognur for educational changes throughout the empire. The accompanying chart outlines the proposed new educational system. As conceived by this commission, the aim of the lower primary schools was to give to children above seven years of age the knowledge necessary for day-to-day adult living; to inculcate in them the foundations of morality and patriotism, and to promote their physical welfare. Model (or what we would now call pilot-plant) FChools were, according to the plan, to be established at the earliest possible moment by the government: at lesst two in each sinall district, three in each large district, and one in each large village. Students in these schools were to pay no tuition. Higher primary schools were to be established in cities, towns, and villages, at least one such school to be maintained by the government in each of thcse territorial divisions. In these schools tuition was to be charged, in an amount to be determined by local condi- tions, most particularly by the community's ability to pay. The rffiddle schools were to provide higher general education to children between the ages of fifteen and nineteen The higher schools were to offer students a choice among Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 429 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 three different courbes of study: a course that would prepare them to enter university departments of Chinese classics, political science and law, literature, and commerce; a course that would prepare them to enter university departments of science, agriculture, and engineering: and a course that would prepare them for admission for medical training. In all three courses, great stress was placed on foreign languages. Finally, the chin-shih kuan or school for Doctors of Philosophy was to offer to the old style Doctors of Philosophy (chin-shih) an opportunity to study Western learning. school of research (5) university (3 or 4) chin-shih higher school of big ar university higher industrial kuan iudustrial foreign school preparatory normal teachers' (3) (3 or 4) languages (3) school (1-3) (1-3) t A I T i 'I f (1) prep. (5) (3) i middle middle lower Industrial school normal (3) (5) (I or 5) (2) preparatory 1 t apprentice primary industrial higher school industrial supplementary primary A A A f lower primary (5) f kindergarten Fig. 4. ? Educational System Proposed by 1003 Commission (number in parentheses indicates yea.-s) The scheme went into effect in 1905. A Ministry of Education was organized, and a year later it established provincial boards of education, each with its centrally appointed commissioner of education, and local bureaus of education, each with a district inspector appointed by the commissioner of education. The rate of progress from 1905-1900 to the fall of the Manchu dynasty is shown in Table 1. 430 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? In the years 1003-1910 the number of students attending modern schools increased from 1274 to 1,625,534. Tho old educational system had virtually ignored the existence of females; the new system never did, even in its beginnings. (Mission schools for girls had existed for many years, but had never received much support or been taken very seriously. The first, modern school for girls under Chinese auspices had been founded in 1897, at Shanghai.) Official provision was made for both primary schools and normal schools for girls as early as 1907, and the relevant facilities developed rapidly over the next years. TABLE 1 INCREASE IN NUMBER OF SCHOOLS (1905-1910) Y ear Governmental ? Public Private b Totals 1005 3,605 393 224 4,222 1906 2,770 4,529 678 8,277 1907 5,224 12,310 2,206 19,830 1008 11,516 20,321 4,046 35,013 1009 12,888 25,688 4,512 43,088 1010 14,301 32,254 5,793 52,348 Supported by the central government. b Nfrantained by local public funds. The Republican Government No account of this period of Chinese educational history would be complete if it failed to mention the growing political consciousness of Chinese students that accompanied the foregoing developments. As new schools were founded and old ones expanded, the cam- puses became hotbeds of political discussion and activity, which very early took the form of organized student intervention in political affairs. (This remains an important, factor in Chinese politics, even today.) The students seized upon every political crisis and issue to hold mess meetings, the upshot of which was invariably advice or protest to the gov- ernment. The authorities, both civil and academic, sought to discourage these demonstra- tions, but, they did this so ineptly that they fanned the flames rather than put them out. The students became attached to the revolutionary ideas of Dr. Sun, whose cause, far more than any other, benefited from their agitation. Dr. Sun often said, in later years, that, what was happening in the field of education was the chief factor in the successful overthrow of the Manchus and the establishment of the republic. However that may be the revolution and the unsettled conditions it created through- out China slowed up the expansion of educational facilities in many parts of the country. Educational planning, to be sure, went forward apace, but the reality always lagged far behind the blueprint. This was not because of any faltering of enthusiasm for education; in the very first year of the republic the government, announced lts basic aims in the field of education, weaving into them, as opportunity afforded, the Three Pec pie's Principles of Sun Yat-sen. Mucation should, it proclaimed, make young Chinese into good citizens of the new republic; it should be practical; it should emphasize military virtues. On the cultural side, the government continued, education should attempt to foster the social virtues. STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 In the first years of the republic, the practical and military aspects of education were emphasized at the expense of its intellectual and civic aspects. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's influ- ence was primarily responsible for the subsequent reversal of this trend. Education, he held, should concern itself above all with the national cultural heritage as a symbol of national unity. The influence of the American educator John Dewey is discernible hero in the en- couragement of good citizenship as one of the basic aims of education. His influence also made itself felt, in time, in the field of popular or mass education, where it was Dewey's teachings that inspired such pioneers as Dr. Yen Yang-cleu (James Yen). The temporary educational policy outlined by the provisional government in 1012 put great stress upon the diffusion of knowledge through quasi-educational institutions and activities; e.g., public lectures, newspapers, and libraries. It urged provincial gov- ernors to foster these activities through their local officials and such private groups as might wish to help. Upon the election of Yuan Shih-k'ai as President of China, a new Ministry of Educa- tion was formed, and a few months later the Emergency Central Educational Conference met in Peking in July and August 1012. Guided by the recommendations submitted by this conference, the ministry set about to reorganize the educational system and its ad- ministration into n more effective organ of the new republic. The reorganization plans were revised in 1922, and again in 1032. Always, however, a sharp distinction was main- tained between higher education and secondary education, and between secondary and primary education, for each of the three was, for programing purposes, treated princi- pally as a separate and distinct problem. There is, therefore, good reason for taking them up separately, getting clearly in mind the developments in one field before passing along to another. This survey will begin with the year 1912 and end with the establishment of the Communist regime. The period may be divided, in accordance with Kuomintang doc- trine, into three subperiods: (1) the period of military government, lasting until 1928; (2) the period of One Pasty Tutelage, from 1928 until the beginning of 1948; and (3) the period of Constitutional Government, which started in the early spring of 1948 with the adoption of the new constitution. This division should be kept in mind in reading the following sections. Primary Education Primary education was, in principle, the concern of local authorities, but general directives on the subject were issued from time to by the central government. The latter also drew up a succession of plans for primary education, of which at least the fol- lowing must be kept in mind: (1) The Plan of 1912; (2) the Plan of 1920; (3) the Na- tionalist Government Plan of 1927; (4) the Adult Education Plans of 1928-1029; (5) the 1938 Law on local administration of primary schools; (6) the "General Regulations Gov- erning the Implementation of People's Education" of 19-10; and (7) the Post-war Five- year Plan of 1946. All these plans had as their general objective the most rapid possible increase in the number of children in elementary schools, and all rested on the premise that the way to accomplish this end was to expand the number of trained teachers and to multiply school faciiities. (None of the plans, however, neglected the problem of providing elementary education for illiterate adults.) The best possible measure of their BUCCeSs, therefore, is statistics regarding the percentage of children of school age who were attending school at the beginning and end of the period, and at various intermediate points. Between 1912 and 1932 the percentage *pears to have remained fairly constant. Between 1932 432 ?????11. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: ------ CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 and 1914, however, it rose from 21.8 percent to 76 percent. (The number of students attending elementary classes for adults rose from 206,021 in 1933 to 1,446,254 in 1035 ? not a conspicuously large number, in view of the large number of illiterates in Chinn.) This increase is prsticularly impressive if the reader bears in mind the number and dim- culty of the psoblems facing the goveniment thruugh the years in question: the shortage of trained teactiers; the chaos created by the almost incessant civil war between the Na- tionalist govern-neat and the war lords or Communists; and the sheer impossibility, in the coatext cf the civil svar, of raising adequate funds for education. The most conspicuous change the republican government brought about in the primary school curriculum was to eliminate classical materials in favor of materials relating to everyday Chinese life, with the result that the curriculum came to be much the ssme as that in Western countries. This meant that new textbooks had to be written, printed, and distributed, itseui an immense task. Most of them were printed under government auspices - in part because privately published textbooks had to be approved by the governmcnt before they could be used for instruction Some foreign observers have complained that the textbooks of the period were intensely nationalistic and, all too often, politically and socially tendentious. The nationalistic emphasis does appear to have been strong during the first decade of the Chinese republic, i.e., while the unequal treaties were still a major issue; but that emphasis gradually diminished when, under the impact of the May Fourth Movement in 1910 (the "Laura's. Revolution"), "popular education" became the vogue. (Professor John Dewey visited China at this time, and was listened to attentively in many (luarters.) The new intelligentsia played a crucially important role in this movement on the side of popular education. One of the most conspicuous single figures in the move- ment was a Chinese graduate from Yale known as Dr. James Yen, who began his work on behalf of literacy during World War I among the thousands of Chinese laborers in France. lie and a colleague, both of them free only after working hours, and using only readers and textbooks they had themselves compiled, taught more than 5000 illiterate Chinese how to read Yen was so gratified at the result that he went back to China to pioneer in the field of mass education. Like the American Johnny Appleseed, he visited rural village after rural village, planting wherever he went the seeds or knowledge that he felt his country needed, and enjoining his students to continue the good work among their neighbors. As time passed his work received increased recognition and increased support both from the government and from private sources. From the year 192.3 on Dr Yen directed the activities of the newly established "Chinese Poptilsr Edecation Promotion Society," which has done signal work on behalf of literacy in China Until 1926 this society confined its activity to the cities; after that, it undertook an intensive program of rural education directed at the major Ills of the Chinese countryside: ignorance, poverty, disease, and lack of public spirit It provided t laming in language, hygiene, livelihood, and citizenship, using schools and private homes as the centers of the educational program For language-training purposes, it. compiled lists and dictionaries of basic characters and basic terms, published a one-thousand-charac- ter text for city dwelleri, another one thousand-character text for peasants, and a third one-thousand-chararter text for general use. It hurdled the barrier of rural apathy in the only way possible, i e , by learning that the needs of farmers are not the same as those of city dwellers, and appealing to the peasants in terms not of the needs they ought to have but those they did have and feel The society also published home-study reading ma- terials, thereby filling the very real gap created by the shortage of teachen.; it also pub- lished its own weekly newspaper for farmers. As for training in "livelihood," it carried moulem agricnItural technimies to the peasants' homes by developing a imitate training 433 STAT ^ ec assi le in art -Sanitized opyrjor iover1 Tr.)r_ _ r _14 04/03 : ase ?v)-N? CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 7 school, and by carrying out its own agricultural experimental program, first in Ilopeh and, after the Japanese invasion, in several provinces of Free China. The increase in number of students at public primary schools in this period was ac- companied by a decrease in the number of students attending other primary schools. This was largely a matter of the absorption by the public schools of children who, without them, would have been sent to mission schools for other than religious reasons. (The foreign mis- sionary organizations had been far more evangelical in their primary schools than in their institutions of secondary and higher education, and large numbers of Chinese who had not embraced the Christian religion had disliked the primary schools for that reason.) Nonmis- sion private schools of the modern type continued to thrive; indeed, throughout the period the best school in nearly every Chinese community was a school run under private auspices. Such schools made a great contribution to China's educational development, if far no other reason than that they enjoyed opportunities for experiment that were necesiarily denied to the goveinment schools. Secondary Education The institutions of secondary education included middle schools, normal schools, and vocational schools, all three of which figured in the plan for China's educational system drawn up by the Imperial Government in 1903. When the republic= government took over, it maintained this aspect of the Imperial Government's program, but in 1922 ;t took steps to bring the whole secondary education system more in line with American models (the previous practice had been to imitate Japanese models). The middle schools weie divided into junior and senior middle schools of three years each (the so-called 3-3 plan for middle schools), and the central government adopted the policy of providing normal and vocational curricula in the middle schools themselves. This eased the financial burden of maintaining middle schools, but in the opinion of some authorities was an unwise deviation from the 1903 program. Many counties could not afford a middle school with so ambitious a curriculum, and would have been better off with a junior middle school plus simply a vocational school. After 1931, many county middle schools were converted into vocational or rural normal schools. When the educational system was reformed in 1932, the mutual independence of the three types of secondary schools was reconfirmed. From the standpoint of source of income there were three kinds of public middle schools: national, provincial or municipal, and county. The national middle schools were few in number and were, for the most part, connected with national institutions of higher education. Since there was no comprehensive plan for the regional distribution of second- ary schools, the majority of middle schools, and of normal and vocational schools as well, was concentrated in the wealthier provinces, particularly in the big municipalities. Not until 1938 did the Ministry of Education promulgate a set of regulations for the distribu- tion of institutions of secondary education calculated to remedy this state of affairs by dividing each province into school districts on the basis of population figures, financial condition, cultural level, and communication facilities. The course of study in the middle schools included Chinese, English, history, geog- raphy, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, botany, hygiene, drawing, music, manual work, and physical education, with standards in each of these subjecta set by the ministry to which all teachers had to conform. Prior to 1929, little attention had been given to standanlization. The middle schools often actually competed with one another in their course offerings by providing all manner of elective courses, particularly in the social sciences and literature. This chaotic situation prevailed increasingly from 1922 to 1929, and resulted in a grave deterioration of secondary education. 434 STAT an,g4.1....???????????????????......., Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 After the inauguration of the Kuomintang central government, however, the Ministry of Education called on specialists to work out standards for each of the subjects to be taught in the junior and senior middle schools. These standards were decreed at intervals through 1932 to 1934. Henceforth all subjects in the middle school cm ricula were specified (i.e., the elective system was abolished), and their function was narrowed down to that of preparing students for higher forms of education. Eilglish was offered throughout the three years of the junior middle school (formerly it had been a third year elective), with vocational subjects, which were now abolished, as options. In the senior middle schools a choice was offered between a course of study with emphasis on science and one with emphasis on literature, the latter including more instruction in Chinese, English, and logic, and less in mathematics and related subjects. The weekly schedule of instruction was reduced from 35 to 31 hours for the junior middle schools, and from 34 to 30 hours for the senior middle schools. A large proportion of the country's private middle schools were mansged by foreign missions. (Private corporations and persons were not permitted to establish normal schools, and therefore concentrated their efforts on middle schools.) They were often able to offer courses that Chinese middle school teachers were not equipped to teach, and many of them, in consequence, achieved a standard of excellence well beyond that of the Chinese public schools. Parents (Christians and non-Christians) who intended to send their children to one of the excellent missionary universities or colleges naturally preferred to have them attend the mission middle schools as well. Thus whde the pupils of mission primary schools tended to be either the children of Christians, or waifs and orphans, the mission middle schools drew pupils from good families of all creeds. Even during the war against Japan the secondary schools continued to expand at a rapid rate. In 1937 there were 3264 middle schools (of which 255 were Christian middle schools) registered with the Ministry of Education, with a total of 627,246 students. In 1943, in Free China alone there were 3455 registered middle schools, with an enrollment of 1,101,037 students. Although these totals include both normal and vocational schools, they are nevertheless indicative of the rapid rate of progress that was maintained through these extremely difficult years. After the establishment of the republic, the 1903 system of normal schools was reduced to two types: normal schools, which were institutions for secondary education, and normal colleges, sometimes called higher normal schools, which were institutions of higher educa- tion. The former, normal schools, were supported by the provincial governments. They offered a five-year course, and under the 1922 school system their curriculum was divided into a lower and a higher grade, each covering a period of three years, to make possible their integration wallet middle schools. When the law on normal schools was adopted, it stipulated that students must be graduates of junior middle schools, and their course of study at the normal schools was accordingly shortened to three years. Both because of shortage of funds and because of the crying need for teachers, special normal courses of only one year's duration were authorized, to admit graduates of senior middle schools and senior vocational schools. This was also done for kindergarten teachers' training classes of two to three years' duration, admitting graduates of junior middle schools. When the Outline for enforcing compulsory education was adopted in 1935, one of the chief stumbling blocks was the persistently acute shortage of elementary school teachers; it was accord- ingly decided to authorize the counties to establish short-course normal schools offering four-year courses and admitting primary school graduates, and to permit one-year normal classes, admitting junior middle school graduates, to be attached to normal and middle schools. kJ 435 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1 ? Simultaneously with the creation of middle school districts in 1933, normal school dis- tricts were marked out, each to have one normal school for men and one for women. This was done as part of a general program by which the government hoped to boost the effi- ciency of the normal school system, provision being made at the same time for the estab- lishment of simplified normal schools and village normal schools. The expenses incurred in the training of normal school students were to be borne by the government, but it was stipulated that normal school graduates were, in return, to serve for a period of three years as teachers in whatever localities might be designated. District educational authorities were urged et this same time to arrange for summer sessions for primary school teachers. Two types of vocational schools were contemplated in the school system adopted in 1912: one to give a three-year course for graduates of lower primary schools, and a second to give a three-year course for graduates of higher primary schools. Under the provisions of the 1922 plan, vocational schools could be attached to middle schools in accordance with the pattern set up for normal schools, with local authorities being given considerable free- dom to vary the length and nature of the courses dependent on local needs. This led, unavoidably, to a vocational school system that entirely lacked standardization and coor- dination. The one general statement that can be made is that private educational societies accounted for most of the adult students in this field. A change began to take place in the early thirties, with the promulgation of the law on vocational schools. This law provided for the establishment of junior vocational schools offering one- to threc-year courses for graduates of primary schools between the ages of twelve and eighteen, and of senior voca- tional schools offering three-year courses for graduates of junior middle schools and five- or six-year courses for graduates of primary schools. Each school was to offer a single course of study: agriculture, industry, commerce, or home economics; and each was to provide such workshops, factories, and/or experimental farm stations as would facilitate practical work on the part of students. Consequently, many of these schools were es- tablished in places where they could cooperate with local factories and business houses, expeiimental farms or agricultural stations, etc. The number of vocational schools, esti- mated in 1937 at 494, fell sharply during the first. years of the war; but by 1941 it, had risen to 332 and increased steadily after the war became an allied effort. It is interesting to nate, in connection with the vocational school program, that factories and mining concerns employing more than 300 and 500 men respectively were required to maintain supple- mcntary training classes. Higher Education After the founding of the Chinese Republic, the 1903 system of higher education was reformed with a view to establishing universities, technical colleges, and higher normal schools. The universities were to have schools of liberal arLs and sciences, law, commerce, agriculture, engineering, and medicine; and there were to be technical colleges of agricul- ture, industry, commeren, law, medicine, pharmacy, navigation, and foreign languages. Certain changes in the system brought about by legislation in 1922 have come in for bitter criticism on the grounds that they sought to expand higher education at the expense of standards. Among other things, the 1922 legislation authorired universities consisting of a single college, it converted higher normal schools into nonnal universitica, and, under special conditions, it, permitted technical schools to be established offering a minimum of three years of instruction (any technical school offering the same period of instruction as a university was granted university status). The same legislation, however, included other measures which are regarded as healthy changes: the instniction period for universities 435 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release .01A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 011.1.??????????????? ^ was set at four to six years; and the preparatory departments of universities and technical schools were abolished. Of the universities established as a result of the 1922 legislation some at least were so ill-planned and under-financed as not to deserve the name. In 1929, the Nationalist government introduced two basic laws, one on the organiza- tion of universities and one on the organization of technical schools, which put unprece- dented emphasis on scientific training. The need for this type of training is shown by the ratio between students being trained in liberal arts and those being trained in science, which, as of that year, was 73.4 to 26.6. Under the new laws a university was to consist of not less than three colleges, one of which must be a college of science, agriculture, tech- nology, or medicine. An institution not qualifying in this regartl was to be known as an independent college. Since 1929, then, there have been three types of higher educational institutions: universities, independent colleges, and technical schools. Definite entrance requirements, common to all the schools within each category, were laid down by law, as were common standards for degrees. A eitalit system wss adopted with the stipulatien that it was not to be used as a means of lowering existing standards regarding the period of time required for any type of training. Finally, the laws provided that no institution of higher learning could be established without a certain minimum amount of funds. The following years witnessed the consolidation and reorganization of the system of higher education in accordance with these legislative measures. A number of independent colleges were integrated into universities, some institutions were abolished, and a number of new schools were established on the basis of need and location. Some institutions es- tablished research schools, to work in cooperation with the Academia Sinica, China's highest organization for research (an agency of the National government). Graduate studies were fostered at a number of institutions of higher !earning, under the general limitation that only institutions with an annual budget of more than one million dollars (Chinese), adequate library and laboratory equipment, and faculty members qualified to conduct. research, could offer graduate programs. The outbreak of war in 1937 sharply arrested progress in China's system of higher education. Its universities, colleges, and technical schools were concentrated, even more than its institutions of secondary education, in and around the larger cities in the eastern part of China ? precisely the part of China that the Japanese overran almo ,t, immediately. Many of these schools had sufficient notice of the invasion to move some of their staff, their equipment, and their students to such remote inland places as Kunming and Chengtu. This exodus, indeed, assumed epic proportions. Not only did it save a large part of China's investment in higner education, but it produc'ed the highly beneficial result of interesting educators and students in the peoples and resources of parts of China that scholars had hitherto virtually ignored The war, so to speak, helped bring the western provinces into the government's program of modernization, and to give them at the beginning of a nuxlern system of education. Soon after the war the universities returned to their former campuses, which, especially those of the national universities, had suffered much damage under the occupation. Vast sums had to be spent on rebuilding and on buying new equipment. The government not only made funds available for the purposes as generously as could have been expected in the difficult circumstances of the postwar period, but it also adopted toward students a policy analogous to that which underlines the 0. I. Bill of Rights in the United States. Practically all the students at, national universities were, in consequence, soon being Aup- 437 STAT L. ^ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ????/???????????????? ????-?. ? ported by the government ? on a low level of subsistence, to be sure, but one adequate to enable thousands of young men to pursue their studies who might otherwise have been entirely unable to do so because of inflation of the currency. Some 50 percent of China 3 institutions of higher education were privately sponsored. Of these, a considerable number were supported by boards of foreign missionsin countries other than China, and .compared favorably with trniversities in any part of the world. Recognizing the value of private universities, colleges, and technical schools, the govern- ment had begun to make grants to them in connection with its expansion program for higher education in the thirties. (One of the first private universities to receive such a grant had been Yenching University, located in the vicinity of Peking.) When war broke out in 1037, China's institutions of higher education showed a total enrollment of 41,922 students. In 1916 (the first postwar year) the enrollment was 129,224. The number of students attending private institutions had increased by nearly 100 percent to 42,000, and the number enrolled at, public institutions had more than quadrupled to over 87,000. Table 2 shows the number of institutions of higher learning in China in 1934 and 1948: TABLE 2 NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING' IN CHINA, 1934 AND 1948 Type Universities Independent Colleges Technical Schools 1934 I 1948 1934 I 1948 1934 I 1948 National Provincial Private 13 7 20 } 31 26 5 12 22 23 21 20 10 10 9 20 29 24 Total 40 57 39 67 29 73 An Evaluation of Republican Efforts The course of events in China since 1911 has followed the path not of evolution but of revolution. It has not only transformed China's social structure but, to a considerable extent, it also has altered the outlook and way of life of China's millions, and has posed educational problems far more difficult than those faced in the same period by other coun- tries. The revolutionary leaders who established the Chinese republic in 1912 attempted to cement China's basically agrarian society, formerly ruled by an absolute monarchy, into a modern industrial society under a democratic republican government, which was to dedicate itself to the goals embodied in the Three People's Principles. In a sense the revolu- tion merely began in 1911. Only 38 years after that beginning, in 1949, there was de- clared in China a "People's Republic," which was to carry through another revolution in accordance with a pattern set by Marxist ideology. China's educational program was now put under entirely different directives and aimed at an entirely different set of ob- jectives; the communists promptly neized control of the educational system and turned it to their purposes. Thus, for parpo .3 of evaluating the pre-Communist republic's achievements in the educational field, the period 1911-1949 is a closed chapter. Since democracy is possible in the long run only if it is rooted in an articulate citizenry, it can be argued that the major task of education in China after 1011 was to reduce and finally eliminate illiteracy. As is shown in the survey of primary education, this task was 438 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Armor. far from accomplished by 1949 ? even taking the statistics furnished by the Ministry of Education at face value, which, because the ministry had a vested interest in making the results :ook as good as possible, would be inadvisable. One need not go far afield to dis- cover the major reason for the failure: primary educational facilities over the country as a whole remained hopelessly inadequate throughout the period. The task of creating primary schools was assigned to the local authorities; the control exercised by the centntl government in many parts of China was weak at best, and establishment of the schools was for the most part left to the discretion of local authorities, who in any ease did not have access to the funds needed to carry out an adequate program. The school lands set aside by the imperial dynasties had long been pre-empted by the local gentry, and treated as the latter's own property. The people, moreover, had been quick to associate themselves with the Kuomintang, which, though hard pressed through much of the period, never attempted to curb their position of dominance in local affairs. They were not likely to propose, nor let anyone else propose with any effect, the introduction of a fair system of taxation for educational purposes, since this would have obligated them to pay most of the costs of educating their less fortunate fellow citizens. According to Chinese tradition (on which of course most of these landholders had been brought up) a man's first obligation is to his family, and his second to some group, usually a guild, which is bound together by common interests and common dangers. Since there was little security under the law, peaple could protect themselves only by participating in such groups. Geographic units like the county had never been regarded as representing a community of interest, or as a proper focus of loyalty and obligation. As a general proposi- tion, there was little or no public spirit on the local level; where, despite all this, local schools did get themselves established, they tended to be financed by nuisance taxes, a considerable share of which were collected from people of scant capacity to pay. In spite of legislation forbidding their assessment., therefore, tuition and fees had to be charged at practically all public schools in order for the schools to met expenses. Not until 1944 did the Central government attempt to stop this practice. Thus in spite of the high regard in which learning was held in China, many people deeply resented both taxes for educational purposes and tuition fees. They reacted to the latter in particular by not sending their children to school at all ? the more readily since child labor continued to be at a premium throughout these years, and since the economic condition of the masses of the people did not improve or at any time seem likely to do so. The average Chinese seeks education in an attempt to improve his lot, and if he feels that improving his lot is out of the question, his incentive for seeking education is, to say the least, considerably reduced. In the larger towns and cities, where there was what might be called a middle class, and in the municipalities that had relatively reliable sources of income, the state of education was notably better than elsewhere, but only 10 to 15 percent of the Chinese people lived in such places. In short, ;t can be said that the condi- tions were simply not present from 1911 to 1949 for the successful introduction of universal primary education on a six-year or even a four-year basis. The republic's achievement in this field must be evaluated with those facts in mind. The second great task of education in a democratic society is to teach the people their rights and duties under a democratic form of government. This is the area in which the republic's educational program failed most conspicuously. The failure may be att.: ibuted, in part, to the same factors that blocked the republic's anti-illiteracy program, especially the shortage of primary schools. This chapter, however, is equally concerned with second- ary and higher education, and other contributing factors must be mentioned. 439 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 :;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ?,?-; Democratic government as the West knows it was completely alien to the Chinese people; the best form of government they had ever dreamed of was a benign paternalism. What they had actually known, for the most part, was government by absolute autocrats, many of whom were bent on self-preservation and self-aggrandizement. For the common man, therefore, contact with governmental authority had_ traditionally meant trouble of one sort or another; his normal reaction had always been to have its little to do with it as possible. The political thinkers who propounded the new democratic ideas that underlay the republic had simply taken them over lock, stock, and barrel from the West, and had made no serious effort to adapt them to the framework of Chinese society. They had merely taken it for granted that a democratic system of government, having worked well in the West, could work equally well in Chinn. This, of course, was to ignore the historical background against which democratic government had risen in the West, and, most par- ticularly, the types of experience that had prepared certain Western peoples for participa- tion in self-government. The Chinese reformers, if they had been taking these things into account, might have considered the possible necessity of achieving certain basic economic and social reforms before attempting to change Chinese political structure. In this context, it is not surprising that democratic institutions, when they were suddenly introduced after 1011, did not "catch on." The Chinese people were not ready for them ? or, by the same token, for a program of civic education appropriate to them. If such a program had been introduced in the school system it would undoubtedly have found itself operating in a vacuum. In any case, no real effort was made in this direction, and still less was there any attempt made to provide the kind of civic education that would have helped create the presuppositions for a democratic system. The reformers did toy with John Dewey's notion that the "school is society," i.e., that the school should train people in the kind of problem-solving they?would be called on to do in actual community living, and some educators believed that this notion, if generally applied, would hasten China's democratization. But little was accomplished along these lines. Purely aside from the fact that students were few in number, the life they led in school bore little relation to the life of the Chinese people. Many students, upon graduat- ing, felt hopelessly out of place in the world at large; one result of this feeling was that graduates tended to crowd together in the larger cities, where they generally saw only each other and kept themselves isolated from the rest of society. The kind of schools China needed were institutions that, besides teadiing children the usual academic subjects, could have served as centers for intensive efforts at reforms in agriculture, economy, and hygiene. Such schools would have earned the respect and confidence of the people, and could ulti- mately have inspired trust in the government itself. The third task of democratic education is that of preparing the individual student to earn a living, as well as preparing the student population in general to participate effec- tively in raising its country's standard of living. By 1919,. it could not be said that under the republic China had made much progress in either industry or education, and the ques- tion arises of buw much of the blame for this failure rests on education? Before attempting to answer this question, it is necessary to review some basic facts. Eighty percent of the Chinese people were engaged in very intensive agriculture. Individual landholdings were very small, and the farmers' cash income very low. Chinese agriculture did not produce the surplus needed to finance improved methods of agricultural production, let alone to provide for the kinds of training needed to use the new methods of production and thus modernize the country's agriculture. Similarly, urban populations could not be trained for the varied types of skilled work required by an industrial society, when China could not afford tools, machinery, and fac- tories to employ even a very small portion of its population. During the war, when Ameri- 440 STAT i Declassified n Part - Sanitized Copy A IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ??????????? ? proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 can equipment was flowing into Chinn, emergency courses in the handling and maintenance of machinery were offered for uneducated Chinese at Chungking, Kunming, and else- where, and proved highly successful. In the Chinese educational system vocational train- ing was offered exclusively at the level of secondary education; yet, wartime experience indicated that it could be successfully offered at the primary level. The secondary schools also attempted to prepare students for careers in administration and education. There was, however, little demand for administrative personnel in business enterprise over the country, and most students trained for administrative tazks had to find employment in government offices, for which there was never any shortage of applicants. The shortage of primary school teachers, on the other hand, remained acute throughout the period, al- though normal school training could he had free of charge at the expense of the government. There were several reasons why the inducement of free normal school training did not prove particularly effective. The very poor, ;ho, other things being equal, might have responded in large numbers vere generally unable to send their childten even to a primary school. With many people of the "middle class" the advantage of a free education weighed less than the accompanying obligation to serve as teachers for at least three years in localities designated by the government, which carried with it the prospect of possib:e exile to some rural village far from the comforts of city life, in exchange for the small salary of a school teacher. Mention has been made of the Chinese predilection, revealed in the recold of Chinese university life, for the humanities rather than the sciences, the opposite of Western em- phasis. This is not a matter of the Chinese being tremendously concerned with things of the mind, but derives, rather, from the almost universal belief that manual work, or any- thing connected with it, is beneath the dignity of the scholar. In traditional Chinese society scholars occupied the highest rung on the social ladder, farmers the next, and artisans the third; and it is clear, in retrospect, that the attitudes inherited from that society operated, especially in the early years of the period being considered, to hold down enrollment in departments of science. For a long while both private enterprise and the government were constantly short of engineers and scientists while the nation had more persons holding degrees in the liberal arts than it could possibly use. In a backward country like China which is attempting to "catch up" with the out- side world, there is always the danger that blind admiration for supposedly "higher" forms of society will lead, in the educational system especially, to grave neglect of valuable ele- ments in the inherited culture. This certainly happered in China under the republic, with two highly undesirable consequences. (a) The modern educational system intro- duced into China by the reformers failed, precisely because it did not purposefully foster the indigenous cultural heritage which would appeal to the people. (b) By the same token, it tended to establish a sharp differentiation between the majority of the Chinese people and that small minority who had tasted the fruits of contemporary science and knowledge. The educated, once out of school, did not feel at home in their surroundings; for the most part, therefore, they concentrated id the larger cities, where they could keep in touch rith the kind of things they had learned at school The very separateness of their way of life tended to deprive them of a sense of purpose within Chinese society, making them view themselves as square pegs in round holes. Some observers hold this sense of futility ac- countable for the popularity among the educated of an extreme nationalism that led them into all manner of absurdities. The only remedy for this would have been to give the national cultural heritage an honorable place in the nation's educational system, and thus have kept the gap between the educated and the uneducated as narrow as possible. 441 STAT Dec assified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 t.: ? i ? EDUCATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA The Communist; at least according to their own professions, want the people to think, and thus they put great emphasis upon discussions and experiments in which students and teachers take part on a practically equal basis. At the same time, Communist doctrine assumes that almost all problems can be completely solved on the basis of such data as hap- pen to be available, and that only one "correct" solution to any problem is possible. Once the Party has studied a problem and decreed the only possible correct answer, therefore, no one is entitled to a different opinion. This fundamental tenet means that each time the solution to a problem is so decreed, the field in which free thought and discussion are possible becomes smaller by just that much. (Evidence from the USSR, where the Com- munists have ruled for more than thirty years, seems to indicate that in the long run the field in which free thought and discussion is possible becomes increasingly small.) A large part of the education offered in today's Communist-dominated schools, and almost all of what is offered through pseudo-educational media such as discussion groups, is not education but sheer indoctrination, interlarded with deliberate misinformation, particu- larly about the capitalist countries. The ultimate educational objective of the Communist authorities is to convert the Chinese into reliable and gullible automatons, devoid of all capacity for independent thought. Middle and Iligher Education If the preceding statements are clearly applicable to mass education under Communist rule, they are even more applicable to what passes for middle and higher education in present-day China. The Communist view is that these forms of education thould be available only to members of Communist cadres. Graduates of middle and higher schools become, in a sense, leaders in their communities; it would, therefore, be foolish to let anti- Communists graduate from them, or to miss any opportunity to steep in sound doctrine the Communists who do graduate. Thus the so-called common courses at today's universi- ties, even those in subjects like current affairs, Marxist philosophy, and Chinese revolu- tionary history, serve primarily purposes of indoctrination; they are, furthermore, required of all students and account for about 30 percent of the curriculum. (To some extent the Kuomintang had prepared the way for this sort of thing ? government schools under the republic had likewise been rigorously controlled, C011rges in ICtiomintang ideology had been compulsoiy, and student activities and organizations had been subject to constant restric- tion and repression.) In line with the Marxist axiom concerning the unity of theory and practice, the Com- munist authorities encourage both students and faculty to devote a considerable part of their time to educational activities among the people. The nature of these activities varies greatly, depending on the locality and the background and field of study of the students. This policy has the dual advantage of drawing within the field of Communist indoctrination activities a considerable segment of the population of the larger towns and cities, where most of the institutions of higher learning are located, and of training the students as future cadre membern. Such off-campus activit;es nccessanly go forward at the expense of academic standards, which the available evidence indicates are quite low at the present time. Reorganization Communists have also reorganized the schools themselves in accordance with princi- ples of "new democracy." Under the Kuomintang the administration of schools was always in the hands of individual executives. The Communists have set aside this policy in favor of committee nile. On the committees sit representatives of teachers' organize- 442 STAT dem, . _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: assified in Part - Sanitized Cop Ap ? roved for Release 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01u4orwv-,-?,_ it ?!, tions, student organizations, arid organizations of nonteaching employees. Committee rule gives the students an amount of pouer they never had befo-e, and, while it appears to have lett to some excesses, the students on the whole have shown considerable restraint in using it and the system undoubtedly tends to bring teachers and students closer together. A less healthy aspect of all this emphasis on organization is that the Communists, when they need to, can play the organized groups off against one another. The Communists were well aware that in many cases the sympathy with %%Well they were received by the in- telligentsia was because of disgust with the former regime, that no amount of mere indoc- trination would change this kind of sympathy into heartfelt surrender to Communists' ideals, and that numerous intellectuals would reserve their judgment on the regime until the Communists had shown what they were going to do. There were also, of course, edu- cated people, many of them engaged in educational work, who in their hearts rejected Communism but who were vitally inieded because of their specialized skills. At first, therefore, the Communists had to let the schools operate much as they had before the take-over and content themselves with introducing changes gradually and piecemeal. This apparently liberal policy confused many observers, although it is the policy every dictatorial government adopts that has yet to consolidate its power. Genuine totali- tarian control is established gradually; first in minor matters of interest to minor groups, then over major matters, with objecting groups being eliminated one at a time, until finally everybody is cowed into submission. Unless this process is halted in the beginning stages, there is no stopping it. That, then, is the policy the Communists have adopted since they fell heir to a system of schools they could not staff with adequate personnel of their own. Once the idea of or- ganizing had been accepted by the majority of students and teachers, and the desired or- ganizations were actually under way, it WAS easy to use them to eliminate the few who openly dared to oppose or refused to join them. In the case of teachers who were irre- placeable because of their particular skills, the usual policy was, and still is, to allow them to continue in their posts temporarily while, at the same time, forcing them into the posi- tion of social outcasts. By now, however, most of the former non-Communist staff members taken over with the schools have been weeded out, at least from the institutions of middle and higher education. The Communists hastened conversion of the school staffs by means of an extensive program of indoctrination of teachers in summer schools and night schools. The knowledge of what was happening to "reactionaries" was enough to force the reluctant to attend these courses, while the faint-hearted, together with those who at least knew which side their bread was buttered on, were soon vying with one another in confessing former sins and temporary lapses, in professing their fervent belief in the new doctrines, and in de- nouncing colleagues and associates. Thus both fear and greed were mobilized on behalf of the Communists' ultimate educational objectives. The publication of new textbooks has been undertaken by the Communists in a characteristic manner. Communist doctrine has now penetrated nearly every activity of the human mind, and this calls for new books in literature, history, and all the social sciences, and even courses in physics, chemistry, biology, and higher mathematics. The term "education" is also applied by the Communists to indoctrination courses conducted und&r the supervision of political commissars in the Army, and under the guid- ance of cadres in factories, bureaus, etc. These courses devote a certain amount of time to teaching elementary reading and writing, and to urging people to attend night schools in which these subjects are taught. They contribute to the Communist drive against illiteracy, and, since this drive has been by no means unsuccessful, are not irrelevant from the standpoint of mass education. frIr Release ? 443 STAT ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020( Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 t ? A SELECTED READING LIST Blot, Edouard, Estai sur rhistoire de rinstrudion publigue en Chine et de la corporationdes Wires depuis anriens temps jusqu'a nos jour, pp. xii, 13. Deprnt, Paris, 1845. Chavannes, Edourrd, "L'inztruction d'un futur empereur do Cline en Pan 1193," At moires roneernant l'Asie Orientate . . vcl. I, pp. 19-64, L'Academme des Inscriptions et Ilelles-Lettres, Paris, 1913. Chen, Theodore H. E., "Education and Ist?-ipaganda in Communist China," The Annals of the Amer- ican Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 277: 135-15 (September 1951). Chu, I:ing, "F.ducation," in Chen, Sophia II. C. (ed.), Symposium on Chinese Culture, Chap. XIII, pp. 241-260, Shanghai, 1931. des Rotours, Robert (trans), Le I:cite des tremens, tradu(l de la nourelle histoire des T'ang, pp. viii, E. Leroux, Paris, 1032. Fung, Yu-Ian, "Why China Has No Science," International Journal of Ethics, vol 32. 237 03 (April 1922), Hunter, Edwnrd, Brain-trashing in Red China, the Calculated Destruction of Men's Minds, pp. Ail, Vanguard Press, New York, 1951. Kim, Ping Wen, The Chinese System of Public Education, pp. xii, Columbia University Press, New York, 1915. Monroe, Paul, "Modern Education and the Student Movement," Chap. X, China, a Nation in Evolu- tion, pp. 271-297, The Chautauqua Press, New York, 1927. Peake, Cyrus Ii., Nationalism and Education in Al odtrn China, pp. xiv, Columbia University Press, New York, 1932. Pott, Francis L. H., "Modern Education," in If. F. MacNair (ed.), China, pp. 427-440, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1946. Smith, Arthur H., ViRage Life in China, pp. 70-110, F. II, Revell Company, New York, Chicago, 1899. Zi (Haul, Etienne. Praligue das ezamens litteraires en Chine, pp. iv, 1894; pp. iii, 18)0, Shanghai. 444 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release r. A -R nipsi -01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 4 CHAPTER 10 LITERATURE INTRODUCTION Very few At can hope to have a firsthand knowledge of Chinese literature; only those who have made a thorough study of the Chinese hingaage are in a position to enjoy the continuous stream of literary works which has flowed down through the cen- turies written in n style difficult to understand even for the Chinese an average edu- cation. The curious reader who tries to explore this literature can only do it through the help of translations. Some of the more important novelists and poets have been translated into English, though few retain the spirit and idiom of the original. And if the reader looks to Chinese literature in the hope of finding a body of writings conforming to the ideals and achievement of Western literature, he is Lkely to be disappointed. While it is true that Chinese literature employs the usual forms of poetry, drama, the novel, and the essay, in China some genres usually receive an undue proportion of attention from men of letters. Among these the essay and poetry stand out; the novel or drama did not receive critical sanction and encouragement until quite recent times. European nations were fortunate in having available Greek and Latin classics and the Bible in the development of their literature at the time of the Renaissance: the Greco- Latin, the Hebraic, and the Germanic represented different cultures and world-vieyvs which gave variety and scope to literary expression. In Chinn, the most important foreign cultural influence came in the form of Buddhism two thousand years ago, but at that time Chinese culture bad already taken shape under the dominance of Confucianism and Taoism, and its literature could already boast of the Confucian canon, and of poets, philosophers, and historians. The rich mythology of Buddhism helped to kindle Chinese imagination and supple? ment indigenous folklore; in the course of time this element was duly reflected in ver- nacular literature, but the courtly and official insistence on Confucian teaching gave a character to Chinese literature which was unmodified throughout the dynasties. TRADITION In its beginnings, Chinese literature depended on religion and mythology; it was only through the embodiment of belief and myth that poetry and drama could articulate Chinese racial aspirations and attain levels which were not merely didactic or practical. Two of China's earliest and greatest writers, the Taoist philosopher Chuang Tr.0 and the poet Ch'il Yttan (332-295 n.c.), drew heavily on mythology. Chuang Tel made use of a series of fables and myths to illustrate his points; he exhibits it mental agility and a fer- tility of imagination not in evidence in the works of later prose writers. In Ch'0 Y0an's poetry we find a number of myths that flourished in Southwest China at that time but Inter ceased to function as a vital factor in poetry His poetry was preserved in the collec- 445 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 tion Ch'u Tz'd, which arsigns to his authorship Falling into Trouble (Li Sao), Nine hymns (Chiu Ko), Heavenly Quesiioning (7"irn Win), Distant Wandering (Yawl Yu), and Nine Declarations (Chiu Chang). Ch'il Ytian lived a life of court disfavor and exile reminiscent of Dante; in Li Sao lie pictures himself on an imaginary journey through Heaven and Earth and describes his sorrows at not being properly appreciated. In the course of his journey the poet meets gods, legendary kings, wizards, and celestial ladies. His other poems also indicate the presence of a rich mythology, which can now be only partially reconstructed. It is un- fortunate that Chinese civilization so early developed its political and ethical bent, and that the mythical forms of knowledge and belief were so early discouraged. The later poets could not, as Yttan could, transmit their feelings in terms of mythology; they tended to express their feelings less obliquely. The establishment of Confucian orthodoxy in the Han dynasty not only fixed the Chinese way of thinking but also its artistic expression. Confucianism is an ethical system which incorporates little of the older mythology, Confucius eulogized the Golden Age with its mythical kings; but to him Yao and Shun were not so much glorious heroes on the order of Theseus, Beowulf, and King Arthur, but exemplary monarchs to whom later rulers should look. Even to the legendary Yfl, the hero who saved China from the Flood, incredible deeds of prowess were not attributed; in the Confucian conception, he was a conscientious worker for the people, who did not even go home to see his wife when at his job. No doubt popular myths flourished along with the official interpretation, eSpecially those about Yu and the Creation. Such early compilations as the Shan Ching testify to the richness of the folk imagination; but they at best constitute a minor tradition, and were not made use of by the courtly writers. Allusions of a mythological character are, however, frequent and remain a staple in the classical style in both poetry and prose. The impoverization of myth under Confucian rule was counterbalanced by the con- tinued popularity of Taoism and Buddhism, which satisfied the popular hunger for the supernatural and for a more detailed picture of cosmology. It is typical among post-Han writers that few are orthodox Confucianists; their writings exhibit some blend of Con- fucianism with Taoism and Buddhism. It is essential to the health of their art that they are not completely dominated by the practical approach. The early advent of rationalism in the age of pre-Ch'in philosophers was one reason why China did not have the epic poem. In the alsence of a living mythology, the Chinese early developed a fondness for history, which becomes prominent in their art from the time of the Warring Kingdoms. The Spring and Autumn Chronicles, a commentary on the Confucian classic Tso Chuan, is a rich example of terse narrative. Ss-ma Ch'ien (1.15 n c), the compiler and author of Historical Records (Shih Chi), is China's greatest historian and also its greatest prose writer A liberal portion of his history was devoted to the lives of kings, generals, and other eminent men, and set an example for the twenty-three other dynastic histories to follow These Twenty-four Histories are documents of incomparable rielins and detail for which there is no parallel in the West. Effects of Education Before attempting a brief history of Chinese literature, something should be said about the nature of the education that Chinese men of letters almost uniformly received throug'a the T'ang to Ch'ing dynasties. The basic motivation of that education was to obtain offi- cial employment and the status of a scholar. In China's largely rural society, an official career was the only career open to the scholar other than farming or simple retirement. The examination system made it imperative that every aspirant should possess a thorough 446 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 '11 4 ? ?i?N. knowledge of the Confucian classics and their commentaries, an adequate know edge at Chinese history and literature, a command of calligraphy, and an ability to writ prose and verse according to certain prescribed forms. The initiation of a Chinese boy in the Confucian (-lassies (an assorted cellect on of philosophy, history, and poetry) was not unlike an English schoolboy's initiation in Latin in later centuries. The language in which the Confucian canon was written was com- pletely different from the spoken dialect. The preparation for a literary carver, therefore, was incidental to the preparation for an official career. The advantage of such an educa- tion was the uniformity of culture which it produced; its defect lay in its lock of capacity to achieve periodical revolutions in thought and sensibility. It fostered a minor talent with which China was especially rich -- that talent whieh attains a certain level of ex- cellence in style but essentially lacks an individual vision of life, and so has nothing im- portant to say that has not already been said more adequately. Minor talent sticks to conventional forms and sentiments. It is this stable monotony of reiterated sentiments which accounts for the fisceiti quidity of the prose and poetry of later dynasties, and caused the incursion of vernacular elements into the really significant creations. Poetry Poetry has been the art most continuously practiced by Chinese men of letters since the earliest times. It, is traditionally believed that Confucius chose out of the available folk and court songs three hundred and live pieces bearing the title Book of Poetry (Shih Ching). The Book of Poetry represents the culture of North China. It has a simplicity of appeal and a freshness of feeling that contrasts violently with tl e obscurity and sensuous quality of the Ch'u Tz'ff. In spite of the quaintness. of their language, the best folk songs can be read with genuine pleasure. They are lyrical poetry without sustained moment; each line consists of four characters and refrains are frequently used. The main line of Chinese poetry (shth) included a short composition consisting of lines of regular length. The Iran ytieh-fu (songs assoeated with the Bureau of Music) and the folk songs continue in this tradition, and by the end of the Later Ilan dynasty five-word poetry became an established genre and had distinguished practitioners. The form of verse used by Cleu Yean, with its greater elasticity of structure and freer movement, became in the Han dynasty the fu ? a kind of prose-poetry making use of a rich vocabulary of description. It celebrates the courtly occasion and expresses public emotion In the absence of a living mythology, it has constant recourse to allusion; in a sense, it serves as a kind of thesaurus at a time when the compilation of dictionaries was still an incipient art. The Fu of Two Capitals by the historian Pan ICti, and the Fit of Three Capitals by Chang IIeng, are justly famous for their rhetorical display of the glories of court and palace. The fu MIS mainly descriptive, though in later hands it also was capable of handling private emotion. Thomson's blank verse poem, The Seasons, with its poetic diction and panoramic presentation of nature, is the nearest parallel in ?Vestern poetry to the fu. The shih came into its own in the times of Wei and Chin, and the founder of the Wei dynasty, Ts'ao Ts'ao, and Ms sons, also, wrote distinguished poetry. The five-word poetry in the hands of T'ao Chlen and the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove was remark- able for its philosophical contemplation of nature and its sense of superior detachment. Its insphation was apparently Taoist In the time of turmoil and chaos, men of letters became skeptical of the values of Confucian ethics and found the Taoist philosophy more congenial. This poetry is usually called km shth (Ancient Poetry), as distinct from the poetry written according to more strict prosodic rules first formulated by Shen Yo (141 513) Regulated 447 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1 verse, or It1-31--ih, is the term applied to poetry written in five- or seven-word lines, with an eight-line stanza, following a prescribed and invariable rhyme-scheme. Both la-shih and ku-shih were produced in great quantity in the T'ang dynasty, the Golden Age of Chinese poetry. The T'ang poetry has been translated into European languages in great quantity, and the names of Li Po, Tu Fu, and Po ChQ-i are familiar to Westerners who are otherwise unacquainted with Chine literature. Westerners who give exclusive attention to this poetry may, however, acquire a false picture of Chinese poetry; while the T'ang Period is unexcelled for the sheer copiousness of its product and the uniform high quality of its achievement, it does not supersede the achievement of pre-T'ang poetry, with its meta- physical quality. The reader of John Donne and George Herbert will perhaps find the poetry of rao Cleien and Yilan Chi more congenial than the rang poetry, which is preva- lently Romantic. Sung poetry lacks the spontaneity of that of the rang Period; but its learnm and allusive character adds to the range and tone of Chinese poetry. It is hard to characterize Chinese poetry for people who have not read it in the original. To read it in translation is to miss its full flavor, and not to realize the compactness of statement of which Chinese poetry is capable It is elliptical and concrete to a degree not possible in English poetry. The nature of the Chinese language permits the omission of connectives, articles, and prepositions which are necessary in English for coherent state- ment. In Chinese poetry, therefore, the characters mainly consist of nouns and verbs and their modifiers, so that the degree of compression it achieves is something that cannot be put across in any other medium. To approximate its quality, one must think of a poetry that achieves the music of the French Symbolists along with the power of statement of the best couplets of Pope. Because of its brief compass, the Chinese poem does not excel in didactic or narrative discourse. It is nearly always lyrical. The successful poem creates a mood, and mobilizes nuances of feeling and range of tone to arrive at a universal state- ment on the basis of a specific peAonal occasion. The antithetical elements in Ifi dith, especially, through the violent a.ssociatiori of disparate experiences, give the feeling a general application. The reader of English poetry is used to the long poem; he can point with pride to such achievements as The Faerie Queene, Paradise Lost, and The Prelude. There are no such poems in Chinese; even poems of such moderate length as Prothalamion, Lycidaz, and Michael are rare. Po Clitei's Song of the Everlasting Wrong is considered long, though it has only about a hundred lines. The average poem consists of four to eight lines; the nearest parallel to such poetry in English is the poetry of Ben Jonson, Marvell, Landor, and the later Yeats. In such poets we have an urbane grace, the restraint, civilized emo- tion, and the extreme weightiness of statement that are in sonic ways akin to Chinese poetry. In Jenson, Marvell, and Landor, this grace lies in the fusion of classical learning and wit. In the Chinese poets, there is the fusion of bookish inspiration and simple sensuous experience. The poet remembers what earlier poets have written, but is undismayed in his contemplation of nature. He also represents the clash of the Confucian acceptance of life and the Taoist urge to escape from duties and responsibilities. There are poets, like Tu Fu, whose attitude is dominantly Confucian; but it is not an accident that most poets from T'ao Ch'ien to Li Po to the Ming and Ch'ing poets have Taoist elements in their make-up The sense of the transience of life, the Epicurean pleasure in wine and women, the horror of vulgarity and officialdom, the sense of mystical harmony with nature, all of which figure prominently in Chinese poetry, are Taoist sentiments. The themes in Chinese poetry are not many: friendship, love, nature, and the minor shocks and pleasures of life. Since Ch'il Yuan, no poet has attempted to embody his vision of life in a systematic statement, whether in alkgorical, story, or autobiographical 448 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1 sor form. By Western standards, the Chinese poem is necessarily a minor poem; the com- plexities of a poem n eight lines long are not to be compared with those of a poem that has plot, dialogue, and character. So one must estimate the quality of a Chinese poet only in terms of his total work: whether he has something significant to convey and achieves unity and p.srsonal quality in the use of imagery and symbols. Seen in this light, the best Chinese poets can measure up to the European poets. A poem by Li Po is a minor work, but by taking into consideration the whole of his work one discovers a world-view, a unique way of using language, and a predilection for certain words and images which give it genuine quality. The major poets of Chinn, then, are those who significantly add to the range of feeling and mood. The biter poets are inferior, not because their technique is immature but be- cause they do not have anything new to say. The diverse and rich achievement of English poetry of the last four centuries partly reflects changes in beliefs, manners, and,changes the social and industrial structure which made periodic shifts in itliem and sensibility a nece:isity But in China, in spite of the recurrent dynastic changes, there were really no major changes in belief and in the mode of economic production ? in the way of life ? which impelled the poet to alter the older mode of perception. From If= to Ch'ing, there were the saine iural scene, the same mountains and rivers, the same courtly civilization centering in the capital. The structure of society rested on the same bcsis: the life of the scholar went the predetermined round of a literary education, an official career either in the capital or the remoter parts of China, and retirement. His sensibility registers the occasions of joy in nature .nd among friends, the sorrows of parting, disappointment and death, the imagined mclancholy of the courtesan or housewife in her moments of wistful longing and of satiety of desire. In times of war and foreign invasion the poet became acutely aware of social injustice, of poverty and oppression, of a vague or strong patriotic sentiment. Though the metrical form changed from time to time because of vernacular influence and because of the use of different musical accompaniment (notable here are the emergence of tz'a in the Sung Period and that of ch'a in the Yilan Period), the sensibility did not receive new stimuli nor the benefit of a new current of ideas. In an extremely stable civilization it is hard to preserve the vitality of art, which tends to become academic and derivative. No account of Chinese literature is complete without a brief survey of rang poetry. This poetry is usually divided into four Periods: Early T'ang, Golden rang, Middle rang, and 'Ate T'ang. Li Po and Tu Fu, writing during the reign of Ming Huang (Ilsatin Thong), belong to the Golden Period; Po Cha-i, Yiinn Chati, and Han Yil to the Middle Period; and Li Shang-ying, Tu Mu, and WZ.,n T'ing-yilan to the Late Period. A recent critic com- pares the four Periods to the four seasons of the year This is a broad description, but it is a valid one on the political level and indicates that this poetry never departs from natural and seasonal emphas.. From the early freshness of Wang Wei, the painter-poet, to the obscure and wintry feeling of Li Shang-ying, it. cover.; a great variety of moods from which the later poets seldom depart. The earlier reign of Ming Huang Tsung) represents the apex of T'ang pros- perity. The Emperor's favorite, Yang Kuei-fei. is the symbol of gaiety and luxury; but with the revolt of An Lu-shan a period of civil war began and the dynasty never recovered its greatness. Li Po and To Fu represent the two sides of the picture: the former respond- ing to the perennial inspiration of nature, the beauty of women and the intoxicatio.i of wine; the latter to social injustice. suffering, and war. Li Po often employs lines of unequal length, nnd is unexcelled in the four-line poem called Tu Fu is the master of hi-shih, skillful in the use of antithetical couplets. Because of his social consciousness and erudite quality, Chinese scholars usually think To Fii the greater poet. However, no Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 449 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 geniiine re-evaluation of the Chinese poets hos been undertaken in the last forty years, so that one cannot report theexact standing of one poet with respect to another in the Chinese tradition, nor the standing of Chinese poetry in relation to the poetry of other nations. Some modern Chinese poets have discovered the greatness of Li-Sluing-ying and his spiritual affinhy with much of the best modern European poetry,. A work of reappraisal should be done here on a large scale with a view to discovering what the poets have to offer to modern man. The vernitcular impulse has periodically asscrted itself, and thus infused new blood into Chinese literature. After the glory of rang poetry, n new song-form arose to rival the prestige and popularity of shih. This form, it'd, is characterized by lines of unequal length, and prescribed rhyme and tonal effluences occurring in a huge number of variant patterns, each of which bears the name of a musical air. Before the literary men took it over, I2 was sung by courtesans to musical accompaniment. In the hands of the poets, it still retained its colloquial language and strong erotic quality. By exquieitely modulating words to an intricate metrical pattern, tz't1 exploits the musical quality of the monosyllabic hinguage to its utmost capacity. The late T'ang poet, Wein T'ing-yen, was its early expo- nent, and it was the dominant poetical form in the five dynasties and the Sung dynasty. Li Yu (937-978), the Emperor of a srnall dynasty, reconled the frustration of his romantic and political life in a number of exquisite tz'il poems. The Sung poets who wrote mainly in the tell form include Liu Yung, Chou Pang-yen, and the poetess Li Ch'ing-tsao. The other Sung poets who distinguished themselves in both sluh and tz'll are Ou-yang !hitt, Su Tung-p'o, Wang An-shih, Huang T'ing-chien, and Lo Yu. The school of Su Tung-p'o and Lo Yu was noted for its expansive moods of adventurous and patriotic feeling. Essay Since the novel developed at a later stage, the prose literature of this period in China mainly consisted of essays and historical writing. Though tales had been written in the literary language since the rang Period, the narrative did not share the essay's place of eminence. The prestige of the essay must appear as a strange phenomenon to Western readers, unless one remembers that, like poetry, it is usually a short composition and a deliberate artifact with a rich, ornate, and even artificial quality. Not unlike fu, it was a kind of prose-poetry. The restrictions imposed by this kind of regular prose, however, were hardly conducive to systematic philosophical or didactic discourse. The great T'eng Confucianist, Han Ye, broke away from this tradition and initiated the Ku-w& i movement, which had mr.ny distinguished followers, including Liu Chun-ytlan, Ou-yang Itsiu, and Su Tung-p'o. The style of ku-tan was mode!ed after that of Mencius, the pre-Ch'in philosophers and Ssa-ma Chlen. In the hands of Han Y9 it was an efficient vehicle for moral discourse, but it. became also in time nn instrument for recording intimate personal happenings. By the time of Ming dynasty, the familiar essay became a distinct genre from the didactic essay. Any scholar could write an say; many were especially tempted to indulge in this form because of its prestige and because of the facility it, offered to creative instinct without the arduous labor of genuine literary creation. In translation, these essays are flat and betray their essential limitations as a literary genre. Few Chinese prose writers were impelled to give an imaginative reconstruction of experience. through the use of plot and character, and e:.cept for some neo-Confucianist philosophers like Chu Ifsi and Wang Yang-ming, few displayed a capacity for sustained argument and discourse. For genuine prose literature, we should turn to the more significant development of the novel. 450 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Novel The man in the street could not enjoy the poetry and prose of the literary men. He did not have the education to appreciate the style; and, in tiny case, he wanted colorful action and vivid characters, which were provided more amply by the professional story- tellers and, later, by the drama. The storytellers have been a main-stay of popular enter- tainment down to present times. The Chinese have a keen interest in history, and the storytellers developed definite cycles of history, which played up to this interest. Many hua-pen or prompt-books, printed in the Sung dynasty, are presei v ed, and later story- tellers added to the huge repertoire. The first novels were compilations of these stories by literary men who preferred to remain anonymous. The names If some of the Wan and Ming novelists are known, but very little about their personal lives. The periods stressed in storytelling are for the most part periods of turbulence: the Period of the Warring Kingdoms, that. of the founding of the Han dynasty, the Period of the Three Kingdom; the Period of Sui and T'ang, that of the founding of the Sung dynasty, etc. Other minor cycles deal with the fortunes of a particular official and his followers. Pau, the upright statesman of the Sung Period, for instance, is a center around which heroic exploits and detective episodes have been gathered. The Period of the Three King- doms is especially vividly imprinted on the popular imagination. Almost every schoolboy in China has some knowledge of Liu Pei, Chu-ko Liang, Ts'ao Ts'ao, and Kuci YO. This is so because their stories are retold by old to young, are presented on the stage, and are embodied in excellent literary form in San Kuo Chth Yen-i or The Romance of the Three Kingdoms. The author of San Kuo, Lu Kuan-chting, is a great novelist who is able to impose design and structure on the mass of historical events. He has a fine gift of irony: though his historical perspective indicates that Liu Pei was justly entitled to inherit the Ilan dynasty, he depicts him as a hypocritical person. Kuei \Vs prowess is intentionally exag- gerated, to exhibit his pride and limited intelligence. These fine points, however, are usually missed by the lay reader, and in popular imagination Kuei Yu is the military saint of China. San Kuo was written in a kind of plain wen-yi, i.e., the literary language; the second great Chinese novel, Shui flu Ch'uan, or Water Margin, was written in pai-hua, i.e., the colloquial spoken language. For this reason, the advocates of pai-hua usually prefer Shui Hu Ch'uan to San Kuo. This is, however, a mistaken judgment: Shui Flu, manifestly a compilation of heroic sagas, lacks the organic structure of San Kuo. It tells of the bandits who gathered around Sung Cleang at the end of the Northern Sung dynasty. Some of the cycles are brilliantly told. The nearest approach to them in Western literature in virile quality and the existentialist assertion of the characters is the Icelandic family sagas. But the latter part of Shut Hu, after the heroes have gathered a:round Sung Chiang, be- comes rather dull: there is no variation in the pattern of the episodes. The masculine viewpoint of this novel is curious: there is hardly a woman character who is not an adul- teress who meets depth at the hands of Wu Sung or Shill llsiu (The English translation by Pearl S. Buck is entitled AU Men Are Brothers.) Both San Kuo and .Shui flu, represent- ing types of historical romance and rogue saga, have many sueces.sors which exhibit a less fine control in style and structure but bay a vitality that is pleasing to young and old alike. The rise of vernacular literature was not solely the work of storytellers: Buddhist missionaries and priests also had a hand in this development. In the days when Buddhism was new, the missionaries relied on tales and apologues to hold audiences incapable of following abstract expositions of doctrine. The translation of Buddhist text was directed at a popular audience, so the vernacular element was necessarily introduced. By the 451 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1: time of the Sung and Yuan dynasties. Buddhism was so adapted to and Mused with native Taoist traditions that a d-finite mythology, !way Buddhist and partly Taoist, was formed, and fictions making use of these elements vied in interest with secular history. The most famous work in this genre is the Record of a Journey to the Irest (Ilii yu du). The author, Wu Ch'kg-tn (ca. 1500-1580), made use of earlier sources but was mainly responsible for the invention of a prodigious number of adventures and for the introduction of a fine comic and satiric note. This novel had its base in authentic history: the seventh-century pilgrimage of Iisuan-tsang to India to obtain sacred texts. Around this journey the author wove a huge number of fantastic and humorous incidents that have no Western parallel except perhaps Cerviautes and Bunyan. It is interesting to find the mixture of legend and history in the account of the birth of IfsOan-tsang and of T'ang rai-tsung's descent into Hell. The hero of this novel is the Stone Monkey, who accom- panies lIstian-tsang on the journey and overcomes monsters and evil spirits on the way, sometimes with celestial assistance. In the allegosical scheme he represents human in- telligence and cunning undergoing the purgatorial act; he is supernaturally powerful, but still require:, divine guidance in times of crisis. Another guide for Ilsflan-tsang on the jomney is the Pig, which represents human sloth and sensuality. He provides comic foil to the Monkey in his blundering efforts to cope with supernaturai opponents. Though recent scholars have insisted on the satiric character of this novel, the allegorical reading still stands, and the novel is the richer for its inclusion of diverse elements. The English translation (partial) by Arthur Willey is entitled The Monkey. In the Ming dynasty another type of fiction came to maturity which depicts the domestic lives of ordinary men and womcn. It was inevitable as fiction developed that the novelists should consciously try to depict ordinary life in realistic terms. The best novel in this genre from the Ming Period is Chin Ping Mei. The author cakes an episode from Shui 11u?the murder of Wu Ta and the adulterous relation between IIsi-men Ch'ing and P'an ? and develops it into a dispassioni.te study of the carnal aspect of human life. The novel has been considered pornographical: it excludes nothing from its description of ordinary life. But to read it as pornography is to miss the point; the author nowhere attempts to excite the reader, and the accumulation of detail in the sexual passages finally produces, with the death of Hsi-men Ch'ing, a sense of disgust which is unforgettable, and which makes the novel able to stand comparison with the novels of Flaubert and Joyce. The finest Chinese sensibility, however, is revealed in the Ch'ing novel by Ts'no Chan and Eno n, the Dream of the Red Chamber (Hung Lou Meng). It is a work that ranks among the world's greatest novels, and one that certainly has no peer in China. To approximate its quality, one can only refer the Western reader to the works of Proust and Henry James. Though the Chinese language makes it. impossible to compose carefully modulated long periods, Hung Lou Meng conveys the sense of delicacy and finesse of feel- ing that are present in the works of the two Western writers. No critic, however, has been able to describe the imaginative quality of this novel in critical terms. The earlier com- mentators saw in it many allegorical meanings, while modern critics tend to regard it 113 an autobiographical novel, and thus focus attentis/n cn the love story of Pao YO and Tai Yu. Both accounts of it are incoriplete. In the novel there is a definite use of symbolism and a definite reliance on the Buddhist philosophy. The authors state their point subtly in mythological terms in the first chapters, and the gradual tracing of the love tragedy and of the decline of fortune of the once illustrious family only reinforces the mood of disillusion, the theme that is implicit in the whole novel. It is not an accident that the 452 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release (IP nPR1_nin43R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 11 [3 sentimental hero, with his entanglements in the world of passion, is n in the end as the dedicated monk. The novel is a coherent work of art, with symbolic dimensions of meaning developed within a definite religious framework. Short Story Having offered this brief account of some of the great Chinese novels, one may pass along to some examples of the short story, a genre which wai established in the T'ang dynasty in the form of ch'uan-ch'i, usually a very brief narrative written in n highly literary style. The most popular representative of this form is the Ch'ing collection of stories with supernatural elements ? P'u Sung-ling's Liao-chai Chih-yi (the title of Herbert Giles' translation is Strange Storks from a Chinese Studio). Many stories in the collection are based to a considerable extent on folklore, from which we can reconstruct Chinese tradi- tions regarding the ghost, the sorcerer, the vampire, and the fox-fairy. The book has as its unifying theme the loneliness of the Chinese scholar and his need for spiritual com- panionship. This need is treated in numerous stories about the scholar and the fox-fairy. In a typical talc, the lonely scholar meets a fox lady and falls in love with her. They live idyllically for a time, but because the fox is not a real woman, the scholar suffers physical exhaustion from their union. Reluctantly the fox woman has to go away. Sometimes a Taoist priest intervenes. There is a sense of desolation in the denouement of such stories that is reminiscent of Keats' to Belle Dame sans iferci and Lamia. They are a special kind of love story, expressive of a deep psychic need. Satiric Novel The Ch'ing dynasty witnessed the resurgence of a critical spirit, of which the typical manifestation in literature is the satiric novel. In the field of scholarship, it manifests itself in the study of the Confucian canon on a philological and historical basis. It is not true that Chinese men of letters had only scorn for popular fiction. In the Ch'ing dynasty many literary men were actively writing fiction, and one original critic of the period, Chin Sling-t'an, is able to speak of the author of Sluti Hu in the same terms as of Chuang Tel and Ss0-ma Wien. He discerns in these writers a quality of imagination that is lacking in the average rJetry and prose. The best satiric novel is the Unofficial History of Official- dom (Ju-lin Wai-shih) by Wu Ching-tz0 (1701-1754), which exposes the corruption and hyporasy of officialdom and the hollowness of Confucian ethics and decorum. The author changes his characters constantly, so that the novel has no coherent plot. It nevertheless achieves a peculiar structure of its own. By the late Ch'ing dynasty, a general awareness of governmental corruption and inefficienc:; prompted many novels to be written in the satiric tradition So the novel already promised to become the country's major literary form even before Western influences began to be felt. These influences were to direct the course of Chinese fiction along altogether different lines. Drama The Chinese drama, which came to maturity only in the Yflan dynasty, does not have so many masterpieces at which to point as does the novel. This can be accounted for partly by its origins and partly by the vagaries of popular taste. Chinese drama is essentially lyrical drama, with emphasis on verse speeches and singing, to which the audi- ence listened without caring about the dramatic structure of the play. The ch'O, whether as an independent form of entertainment or as incorporated into the play, represents a further extension of the it has a freer metrical movement and includes even larger colloquial elements. It is a further annexation to the world of passion, comedy, and pathos 453 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 under the domain of poetry. The drama in the West early profited (rem the criticism of Aristotle, and the concept of form and the unities were subsequently regarded as cardi- nal. In China there was no such criticism to guide the drama's development; like the novel, it took its themes from popular historical episodes and love stories. The dramati its, however, seldom imposed on this material any moral structure other than the simple con- trast between virtue and vice or that between heroism and villainy. In consequence there was a conspicuous lack of genuine tragic feeling. Moreover, the Chinese drama is a form of opera, and the attention is easily monopo- lized by the singing and acting, two areas in which it boasts of an arduous discipline and a long tradition. Even in its decadent farm as Ching Ilsi (Capital Theatre), the singing and the graceful movements of the actors always give pleasure to the audience. The present form of drama introduces louder musical instruments to accompany the action, especially during the acrobatic representation of combat. The foreigner, however, is likely to be too distressed by the loud music to appreciate the subtleties of the acting and singing. In Icun-ehlO, the dominant drama in the Ming and Ch'ing Periods, only string and wind instruments were used for orchestral accompaniment. The foremost YOan dramatists are Mid Han-eh'ing, Wang CLC-fu, and Ma Chili- ytian. The play by Wang Sliih-fu, !hi Hsiang Chi (The Romance of the Western Chamber) is still widely read. Based on a story written by the P'ang poet, Ytian Chen, it tells of the courtship of Ts'ai Ying-ying by Chang Chiln-tstii. In attractiveness and grace, however, the heroine is overshadowed by her maid-servant Hung-niang. It is largely through her efforts that the lovers are able to meet clandestinely at first and, later, to unite in matri- mony. Before their union Chang has to triumph over many difficulties, among them that of passing his court examination. This play set the pattein for most subsequent romantic dramas and novels, and always captured the Chinese public. The success of the formula is to be seen in its social context of marriage by parental arrangement. The Chinese girl, if she meets an agreeable young man, cannot afford to be cruel and capricious in her dealings with him. She avows her love frankly, and plot complication arises only in (he lovers' effort to overcome the obstacles parents put in the way of marriage. To vindicate her choice, she urges her young man to go to the Imperial Examination. He usually proves successful in the ordeal and the lovers are finally united. This formula, however, has been rigorously rejected by modern writers. The most famous Ming dramatist is T'ang Hsien-tsu, whose plays include Mu-tan T'ing (The Peony Pavilion), and who belonged to the ICun-clet1 School. The best Ch'ing plays of that school are T'ao-hua Shan (Peach Blossom Fan), by IC'ung Shang-jen, and Ch'ang-slulng Tien (The Palace of Everlasting Life), by Hung Sheng. They are all romantic dramas written in an exquisite lyrical style. Like The Romance of the Western Chantber, they are still widely read as literature. The librettos of the Capital Drama are written in a far less refined style, and become animated only when recited and sung on the stage. MODERN The preceding section has been a necessarily brief account of the traditional Chinese literature. Most of the titles mentioned are available in English translation, and the reader is advised to read some of them in order to get an authentic taste of an alien sensi- bility and culture. On the other hand, modern Chinese literature is almost completely different from the older literature. It is characterized by the universal adoption of the spoken language, or pai-htta, and by its imitation of Western forms. Mention has been made of the lack of change in sensibility and social structure as a deterrent to the continuous 454 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 r,,,,,,,-/ormAnnnn9nnn7-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 A . vital growth of Chinese literatere By the time of late Ch'ing, the impact of Western civilization was too sudden and great to be tenthly assimilated and understood. The result, as far as literary expression was concerned, was a new enulity in technique and feeng. Influence of the West From the time of the introduction of Buddhism, there hail been no cultural influence from outside powerful enough to upset the social stnicture and to impart new elements into the icligions and intellectual make-up of the people. Nestorian Christianity had made little impression on Chinn, and bad soon died out. The introduction of Christianity by Catholie priests in the late Ming and early Ch'ing Periods was very important, in that its missionaries were the indirect means of introducing China to 1Vestern art and science. But what occurred was merely a polite encounter which did not ben.- immediate cultural results. The significant encounter came in the form of a series of war; with the European nations and Japan. This time China was shocked out of her complacency by tr.scovering the superior technological equipment of the West. The consequent attitude was not one of curiosity and cultural exploration: what the Chinese felt was an urgent need to adapt and reform in order to exist at all. The emphases 're both political and technological. There was a Confucianist rearguard action from some gunners, but its protest was in- effective because it was droned out by the louder voice for sweeping charges. Ch'dn Tu-hsiu, one of the lenders of the May Fourth Movement and later the Trotskyite leader in China, stated that: In order to support Democracy, we have to oppose Confucian rules of conduct, old ethics, and ideology; in order to support Science, we have to oppose old art and old religion. In order to sup- port both Democracy and Science, we have to reject old culture and old literature. There is a crudity in this statement: Democracy and Science are employed as magical terms with which to exorcise the old Actually Confucianism is a body of thought which sanctions democracy, and traditional Chinese scholarship is a further manifestation of the scientific spirit rather than its antithesis. The great historian and scholar, Hu Shih, knows both East and West. But in thought he is a pragmatist, a disciple of Dewey, and indifferent to the Christian tradition in Western culture. Like all good Confucian scholars, he is an agnostic. Thus he exemplifies an essential fact regarding modern China; the aspects of Western civilization seized upon for imitation in the last. five decades can be summed up in one word ? positivism. The Christian and humanistic traditions of the West have been curiously neglected. It is only in the light of China's imperfect assimilation of Western influences that one can account for the tremendous success of Marxism in China. It is only logical that China's superficial, positivist, scientific liberalism should later have yielded ground to Marxist philosophy, which piescribes a definite creed and program of action. This is not said with the intention of minimizing the importance of Christianity in the social life of China; missionaries and native preachers were very beneficial in training respectable citizens, but their influence has been subliterary. It does not affect the intellectual, who superficially views Western civilization primarily in terms of its development in the past hundred nnd fifty years. Thus the Christian understanding of life Is hardly reflected in modern Chinese literature. A great mnny prominent and respected nuthorities now hold that modern Western literature is significant only when it embodies, in some form, the Christian meaning of life, as with T S. Eliot, James Joyce, and 1Villiam Faulkner; or takes a spiritual stand in de- 455 STAT ????????????????....0. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 : riA_Rnpsi-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 471. fiance of Christianity, as with D. H. Lawrence. Western literature which is purely secular and interprets life in merely sociological and political terms tends to be insignificant. The ?veaknes of modern Chinese literature lies in this lack of spiritual content. It tr.:rats evil as a sociological phenomenon, and nowhere emphasizes love, sin, and suffering in the way they are emphasized in the great literature of the West. Modern Chinese literature has little to offer to the reader with mature training in either Chinese humanities or Western culture. It is largely sentimental; it reduces the com- plexity of life to the opposition between justice and injustice, and, does so in the most simple Marxist terms. Insofar as this literature preserves a part of the finer Chinese sensibility, or makes a successful adaptation of Western techniques, it merits some praise. But modern Chinese writers are only imperfectly trained in Western literature and lan- guages. Most of them know only Japanese or English, tuel though the influence of Russian literature is now paramount, very few Russian works have been translated from the original Few modern Chinese writers have made a systematic study of Western literature from Homer to the present. They have merely picked up certain authors who suit their aims, and they are too much engaged in polemics to give adequate attention to literary con- siderations. The case of Lu TIMM is typical: after producing two volumes of short stories, which are in a class by themselves, he was continuously occupied with translating or writing polemical essays. He made no further genuine contribution to Chinese literature, and the adulation he has received in Communist quarters since his death is really incommensurate with the slim body of his creative writing. Such dissipation of energy not only compares poorly with the performance of bourgeois writers like Henry James and Proust, but even with that of writers in the USSR, who are accorded a higher official status. The textbeoks of modern Chinese literature tend to focus attention on the "new" writers who wrote in the wake of the May Fourth Movement. This, however, gives only a one-sided picture. The readers of the "new" literature belonged to the most powerful and articulate class ? the more radically minded high scheol and college students ? and only to that class. After graduation, they kept up with their reading; some even joined the rank of writers. Prior to the Communist success on the mainland of China, they were always loud in their denunciation of the national government, and contributed much to the bad reputation of the Kuomintang. Most of them were the victims of Communist propaganda. The immaturity of the "new" literature is in part at least a reflection of the taste of this group of readers. There are, however, other classes of readers, and the writers who cater to their tastes should be noticed here because they represent the older literature in its decadent forms. Popular Novel The satiric and sentimental novel was popular during the Ch'ing dynasty, and even after the founding of the republic, it continued to attract it large audi nce. The chief name to be remembered in connection with it is Chang Iltn-shui, whose early novel, Ro- mance of Tears and Laughter (T'i Yin Yuan) was a best-seller. Dining the war years, he continued to write fiction in Chungking, sometimes with patriotic overtones, but be- cause he lacked ideological tiaining, he remains in the older school. Many of the novels published in daily installments in the big-city newspapers are also of the sentimental school, but have scant literary merit. The picaresque novel is also enjoying a tremendous popularity in modern China. In recent decades, the emphasis has shifted from historical romance to a special type of ad- venture story %Ouch glorifies the Taoist recluses and swordsmen. Like detective fiction 458 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release .7,1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 .";1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 r?-? and Western fiction in America, it constitutes a special genre with established conven- tions. Mt: most it,lept swordsmen in such fiction are a sort of supermen, who could emit from their respective mouths nr finger tips a sword-ray that could kill any enemy at any distance. When two such rays meet in the air and fight, the person with the weaker ray often has to forfeit his life. The most popular wnter in this genre in the twenties was Pu lisiao-shltng, wItose majot work, the Chronicle of Strange ildrenturers (Chiang-ho Chuan, ran to twenty volumes. The novel begins with a feud between two clans in Hunan Province, and includes many authentic stories and legends flourishing in Hunan. The supernatural clement grows more and more prominent as the novel stretches from volume to volume. In the forties n greater writer appeared under the pen-name Lott-chu. His masterpiece is the Swordsmen in the Mountains of Sc (Shu than Chien-ya Chuan), which is not yet finished and has nlreatly run into fifty volumes. According to those who have read him, the imagination of the anther is truly staggering, and on the same level with Scott and Dumas. The mountain, 0-mei, in Szechwan, is traditionally famous for its monks and recluses who have attained a sort, of supernatural power. The author supple- ments the folklore of this region with a fertility of invention unsurpassed in present-day China. He preserves the element of fantasy, which is noticeably absent in the "new" literature. Familear Essay and Anecdote Another kind of writing still much indulged in is the familiar essay and anecdote. The literary men of earlier days, having perfected their prose style, entertained themselves and their friends by writing random thoughts, familiar events, and anecdotes about, emi- nent people. Prior to the Communist success, many magazines and newspapers featured this kind of writing. Some magazines, founded by Lin Yutang, were devoted to humor and the familiar essay and boasted of seveml of the big names jn modern literature who had turned "reactionary." Such writers, of course, did not have a positive program of political action to offset the dynamic current. of Leftist writing. The best essayist in the group was Chou Tsou-jen, the brother of Lu Ifsun, who combined his diverse interests in Greek culture, anthropology, and the psychology of sex with a fine appreciation of certain elements in Chinese literature. His brother is now canonized as the literary saint of China. He himself, years after the war, was still serving a prison term tinder a sentence imposed on him by the national government for his collaboration with the Japanese during the occupation. Anecdotage has secured n permanent place in the Chinese newspaper. In America, the personal element in newspapers is supplied by syndic:0Ni columnists. In China, almost every newspaper has a literary page, which features articles by its readers as well as those by more eminent ?vriters. Such writings consist of gossip, reports on matters of ephemeral interest, and political and literary criticism. In Shanghai there was the perennial vogue of the "mosquito" newspapers, which cover the amusement world and social news of a sensational sort. Break with Me Past: The "New" Literature The preceding account is intended to correct the picture Of Leftist domination which emerges from a study of the more significant Chinese writers. The modern period in Chinese literature has often been calletl a Renatssance. It is true that a radical break from the past has been affected, but the period has not produced any writer who 'an be called truly great. Its literature, compared with that of the Italian or English Renaissance, ? - 457 STAT ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 is insignificant. Even by Chinere standards, it has produced no poetry of any importance, and no novel on the order of the Dream of the Red Chamber. The drama, under IVestem influence, has gained in stage effectiveness, but it cannot equal the lyrical feeling of the older drama. 1Vritten under conditions of personal poverty, government persecut!on, and national turbulence, tli.s new literature testifies to the vitality and energy of its writers. But their energy was directed to negative rather than positive ends: the deliberate repudia- tion of the older trays of thinking and feeling. It aims at a complete tweak with, rather than assimilation of, the past. It is the Chinese mind violently disavowing its old self to meet new challenges. Literature, no longer an autonomous art, has become the instru- ment. of reform. The ohl is indiscriminatingly identified with whatever is sterile and bad in Chinese culture. In the shrill words of Ch'6n Tu-hsiu: I am willing to brave the enmity of all the pedantic scholars of the country, and hoist tho great banner of the Army of the Revolution in Literature in Paipport of my friend lEn Shih. On this ban- ner shall be written in big characters the three great principles d the Army of Revolution: I. To destroy the painted, powdered, and obsequious literature of the aristocratic few, and to create the plain, simple, and expressive literature of the people; 2. To destroy the stereotyped and monotonous literature of cla.ssicism, and to create the frwh and sincere literature of realism; 3. To destmy the pedantic, unintelligible, and obscurantist literature of the hermit and the recluse, and to create the plain-speaking and popular literature of a living society. There are a great many dogmatic terms in this passage: for example, Chinese literature has hardly been "aristocratic" since the end of Han dynasty, and the presence of "cla.ssi- cism" in literature should mean the exclusion of the fustian and staleness that. Ch'tn deplores. ilu Shih is a far sounder critic: he rightly feels that every age should have its own literature and that the literature of the ne?V age 8hou1d be based on the use of the living language and living material of contemporary society. Ilu Shill is the architect of the Literary Revolution, but he had little influence in the subsequent development of pai-huo literature. He did not have a great deal of creative writing to his credit except for an early volume of pai-hua poetry called Experiments, and an autobiography. His true greatness lies in his adherence to the tradition of the great Ch'ing scholars: the imaginative recon- struction of the times and thought of older Chinese literature and philosophy. The practical and propagandist nature of modern Chinese literature can only be under- stood in the context of the Chinese feeling of national inferiority. The youth of twenty or thirty years ago was exasperated at the fact that China could not stand forth on an equal footing with Japan and the Western Powers. Ile was also teased and puzzled by the Chinese character, lie saw in his nation's weakness not only the corruption and inefficiency of the government but, more importantly, the insidious Confucianist influence on thought. and behavior, rind the Taoist and Buddhist encouragement of superstition and a resigned attitude toward life. Much of the motivating power behind modern literature lies in the effort to liberate the Chinese mind from the clutches of so-called "feudalism." The Western observer tends to attribute great merit to Conflicianism: he secs in it the stabilizing force that binds a people together through the centuries in order, unity, and peace. The modern Chinese youth; by contrast, dislikes Confucianism with a vehe- mence that will not be readily understood: he sees in it hypoerisy and control ? the ruth- overriding of the feelings of the young. 458 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release niA-RnP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1 1 The Attack on the Family System The onslaught against Confucianism is primarily an aack on the family system. Even in the thirties and lot t ies, the attack cm the family is still \he vital theme in the works of younger writers like Pa Chin and Ts'ao Yu. If one rereads this literature of protest. today, one feels that the issues introduced are very remote. One longs for that older order which has been thoroughly done away with through the continuous years of war and the more recent rigorous application of the Com- munist way of life. The old rituals and the feeling of piety are much finer things than the patriotism and class struggle which has supplanted them; now the aging father is no longer the figure of authneity imposing his will on the young ? he is rapidly becoming an economic dependent living out a cheerless existence. As in other nations, the intense glorification of youth tends to make the old look more and more inarticulate and impotent. Much modern literatnre, however, depicts the clash of the older and younger generations and retains an historical interest for what it tells us of the period of transition that China's social structure once passed through. More specifically, the onslaught is launched against marriage by parental arrange- ment. The joys and pains of courtship were not much stressed in the old literature. The sense of freedom afforded by the release from parental control gave rise to a flood of love stories, enjoyed to the hilt by the adolescent readers. In the twenties, the love stories of Chang Tzu-p'ing and YO Ta-fu testified to this demand. Yti Ta-fu was a student in Japan during his formative years; there he lived a life of dissipation among the courtesans. He did, however, develop a sense of guilt which partly redeems his exhibitionism. His works include Chert-lun (Sinking), Jih-chi Chiu-churty (Nine Diaries), Afi-yany (The Lost Sheep). The reader of the decadent literature of the West will not find YO Ta-fu very exciting. But he is typical of one type of revolt against the customary good form and restraint to which the students in the twenties sympathetically responded. Chang Tztl-p'ing, the prolific novelist, is more of a commercial writer. Lu Hsan The awareness of the old and new, not in the personal exploration of passion but in the subtle clashes of ways of thinking and feeling, is best revealed in the short stories of Ln Hstin collected under the titles of Outcry (Na-han) and hesitation (Pang-huang). A thud volume, Old Stories Retold (Ku-shth thin-plot), deals with Confucius, Lao TO, Chuang Tzti, and other Chinese sages and heroes; but his effort to introduce them in con- temporary settings and caricature is seldom successful. Lu Ifstin is known for his icono- clastic attack on the Chinese tradition, but he had had an excellent old-style literary educa- tion, and his best stories reveal a wistful longing for the old ways. Thus he gives to such characters as the genteel K'ung 1-chi a dignity that seems pathetic in its modern setting. The difference between Lu lIsOn and the later writers lies in his recognition of this sense of dignity in people of inferior station, without which society must disintegrate. The maid-servants in The Dream of the Red Chamber have that dignity. In Ism lIstin's story, Divorce, one sees the irony of the situation as the heroine tries to prevent the annul- ment of her marriage. Her husband has taken up with another woman, and asks for a divorce. The woman refuses on the ground that she is his lawful wife, married according to proper rites. She goes with her father to her husband's home to vindicate her rights, though she is finally awed into submission by the august presence of the local dignitaries. The tone of the story is comviex, brcsuse the woman clearly has not developed any social 1 ???????????....???? 459 )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ak-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 4 ???????????????????????????????????????????? ????? consciou.sness that might enable lier to see the anomalousness of her position. Sh.: sticks to her virtue, name, and dignity in the station of wifehood. Lu lIsfin subtly exposes the absurdity of her situation, not in terms of protest but in terms of irony. Isi 11.sfln 7'he True Story of Ith Q is the only piece of modern Chinese literature that bas been translated into many different languages. It has a rich humor that is genuinely Chinese, and it effectively embodies typical Chincse failings in the life of its hero -- inferiority complex, sinug sense of superiority, and capacity for rationalization. But in structure, .4h Q is decithslly not Lu Ilstin's best work. The theme of revolution introduced in the latter part of the book is not really integral to the fife of the hero. He has only a vague knowledge of what 'evolution means, and with his shrewd instinct for self-preserva- tion he is not a man to be incelianieally led to death by external forces that are incoinpre- hensible to him. The irony at the end doe- not have the dramatic force necessary to give his death the quality of inevitability. Lu best stories ire grounded in childhood memories: in his return to his native town after fin absence of many years in Japsn and Peking, he is exposed to the shocking contrast between the traditional ways of living and the standards of value he now holds. In Benedict:on, Lu 'Tsars describes a countrywoman who, at the death of her child and two successive husbands, tries to seek consolation in the future life In lin accidental encounter with her, the author unintentionally confirms her belief in reunion with her people in the after life and thus causes he suicide. This gives him a sense of guilt for his share in the death of the woman. The beliefs and ideals of the woman are not ridieuled, but are treated with respect and compassion. In In the Restaurant, Lu Ham tells of a casual encounter with an old schoolmate, now a disillusioned schoolteacher, without prospects in some far-away province. Once he had been an active student leader; now he is too much weighed down by life to protest. Though he has lost the sense of piety for his departed kin, he returns to his hometown, in obedience to his mother's svishes, to remove the bones of his younger brother from a flooded place and to give some velvet flowers to a girl he remembers. The girl turns out to be dead. From one point of view, the schoolteacher's absorption in the mere fulfillment of deeds of piety indicates the failure of his courage. But it also indicates the presence within him of higher principles, which are above the mere clash of old and new ideas. In the story Soap, Lu Hsfin gives a satiric exposure of one type of Confucian gentle- man who, beneath his lip-service to filial piety, is just an average sensual person. The gentleman buys a rake of soap for his wife , but as he tells of a girl beggar in the street, the wife senses that his buying of the soap has been motivated by unconscious libidinous desires. The gentleman praises the piety of the girl in tending her blind, and reports a conversation he has overhesol: "Ah Fa, don't think this heggage mere dirt. If you buy two cakes of soap and scrub her body nice and clean, she will be quite something." In these stories Lu Ifsiin reveals a fine sense of irony that is missing in his numerous imitators. Lu Ifsfin was not a Communist; in his stories and essays he was moved by a burning desire to disinfect China of her sickness, sloth, and corruption Because he commanded a large audience and had grvat prestige, the Leftist writers worshipped him, and in the last years of his life they forced 11;m into a position of leadership. The most cursory exami- nation of his early writings will reveal, however, that he is a rugged individualist and that he is opposed to any authoritarian system of government, even one by the proletariat. Ills later conformity to 'Marxist principles actually atrophiN1 his literary powers. In 1930 he was one of the founders of the League of Leftwing Writers of China. His writings then merely consisted of brief polemic essays and translations. In spite of their biting tone and trenchant style, the est have only marginal importance in the history of Chinese 460 .................r.....????????????????????????????.........'-???????????????"???????? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release A in nr-101 tll flA '2RnnAnnnn7nn07-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 literature. Nominally the leader of Leftist writers, he beenme their tool and instrument. Lu Hein must have resented from his grave the farce of his canonization by the later writers. Ideologtcal 0, :gins of the Literary Revolution In order to understand China's Marxist writeri in the thirties. one must tram the divergent ideological origins of the Literary Revolution, which reflected a crude n.ssortment of European literary movements from the Sturm-und-Drang of Goethe to the so-called neo-realism of the post-Gorky Soviet writers. The New Youth group, cornprisi.ig Ilu Ch n Tu-lisiti, and other Peking professois, expounded the seieutific liberal tradition of the West. The New Youth magazine, for example, published more social and political criticism than works of pure literature. An allied group, the Crescent Moon Society, had as its leader HMI Chih-mo, a returned student from Cambridge and the first popular pai-hua poet lie represented the Anglo-Ainei wan tradition, which has become lesa and less articu- late in the later development of Chinese poetry and fiction. Hsu made translations of Wordsworth and Shelley, and in his own poetry showed a strongly Romantic influence. Ilis adaptation of English meters is not completely successful, and since his death (in an airplane crush), there has been no effective exponent of the Anglo-American tradition among Chinese writers. The Creation Society and Kuo Mo-jo A more dynamic group was the Creation Society (1920-1929), founded by Kuo Mo-jo, Y0 Ta-fu, Clan Fang-wu, and other returned students from Japan. Dunng the twenties, the Society published the Creation Quarterly, the Creation IVeekly, and the Creation AhnIthly. Its guiding spirit, Ku? Mo-jo, was a man of prodigious energy who after 1925 turned from a Romantic individualist into a 11Earxist Socialist. If is change in political outlook was symptomatic of the coming Leftist dominance among Chinese writers. By that time the Literary Revolution had been won: pai-hua had been universally adopted, although the ideological conflicts among the writers concerned had gotten nowhere. The Creation Society, later in its career, moved from the Literary Revolution to the so-called Revolutionary Literature. Lu Ilstin's conversion to Marxism further consolidated the Leftist front. One should remember that at that time Soviet Ilumia was looked upon by most people without suspicion, and that, under the misguided influence of Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang actively cooperated from 1921 to 1927 with the Communist Party on behalf of national unity. Always the ardent idealist, 'Clio Mo-jo actually joined the Kuo- mintang and Communist forces in their northern expedition against the tear lords in 1926-- 27. Though his works, considered individually, do not achieve high literary distinction, Ktio's literary career illustrates the mistaken idealism that typified Chinese men of letters ,n this period. Kuo's writings range from poetry, drama, fietion, and es,qays to studies in archaeology and ancient Chinese history. lie translated (locale's Faust, War and Peace, and the novels of Upton Sinclair, who is, therefore, the contemporary American writer best known in China. Kuo's researches in archaeology are a landmark in Chinese scholarship, though his interpretations of ancient Chinese history and the earlier Chinese philosophers, based upon a Marxist approach, have yielded results that are highly debatable. In the field of fiction ICtio's role has been insignificant, because his imagination does not find sustenance in contemporary subject matters. In poetry he represents the Whit- man school of free verse. 1V1iile the earlier writers of pai-huo poetry, like 1E30 Chih-mo and WM I-to, used 1Vestern meters to replace the overstrict Chinese prosody, Kiio wrote 461 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: /"..1 A ini-sincsi n1rm?-4lPnfI4GGG070007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 in an expansive, self-assertive style that has since proved to be more popular. His early . poetry, collected under the title Godde.:4, makes use of Western and Chinme myths, am! is full of rhetorical gestures. The poem Hound of Hearen begins In the following manner: "I am the hound of Heaven;/1 have swallowed the sun;/1 have swallowed the moon;/ I have swallowed all the stars;/I have swallowed the whole universe;/I have become I." This, of course, is pure rant. His plays, which mainly treat of episodes in Chinese history, are certainly inferior to the works of younger contemporaries such as Ta'ao Ye. His most important and certainly me.t readable work is a series of autobiographical ventures: My Childhood, Before and After the ReroMon; Black Cat; Ten Years with the Creation Society; and The Northern Expedition. They are now republished in two volumes under the titles of My Youth and the Chronicle of Revolution. Many Chinese writers (IIu Shih, Pa Chin, YU Ta-fu, and Shtn Ts'ung-wen) have written brief biographies, but Kuu's autobiography is both more detailed and more illuminating concerning the dynamic cur- rents and personalities of his age. The first volume traces his life in Szechwan: his incipient revolt against feudalism in family and school, his friendships, his dimissals from school, his nominal marriage to an ugly girl with bound feet. The second volume tells of his life in Japan, his literary friends and projects, his twociation with the Creation Socicty, and, finally, his impressions of the Northern Expedition. The section on his literary life con- tains invaluable material on literary history, and traces the gradual but. inevitable progress of Marxism among Chinese tvriters. The section on the Northern Expedition is disappoint- ing, because Ku? fails to give a unified account. of the campaign. What he records is merely impressions of events, and of such prominent. figures as Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung. Kuo's autobiography stops at 1927, but the unwritten portion of his career is equally interesting. Immediately after the Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek made a auccesdul coup d'itat against the Communists and the Leftist elements in the Kuomintang. It was a couragcona step on Valang's part, because even at that time Russia's deaigns on China were apparent. In taking it, however, Chiang permanently antagonized the intellectuals, as is shown by the subsequent increasing sympathy for Communism among writers. As a prominent Leftist writer and political worker, Kuo was unable to remain in China after the purge. He and his Japanese wife went to live in Japan, where he did archaeological research work on the oracle shells and bones. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, he made a dramatic return to China, to become once again a leader among the writers in the interior. He wrote at that time a few plays, such as Ch't1 Ytian and K'ung-ch'iao Tan (The Peacock's Gall-Madder), which are typical of the historic-patriotic plays pro- duced at that time. In 1947 he toured the USSR as a sort of cultural ambassador, and in 1949 composed an ode on the seventieth birthday of Stalin, so bombastic in tone that it. zeemed to be a caricature of his o1c1 style. At present he is reaping his profits as a loyal worker for the Communist Party: he is vice-premier of the State Administration Coun- cil, chairman of the Committee on Cultural and F..ducational Affairs, and head of the Acad- emy of Sciences. When, in its later period, the Creation Society advocated revolutionary literature for the proletariat, it was reinforced by the Sun Society, under the leadership of Chiang Kuang- tz'il and Ch Hing-ts'un. Chiang Ktiang-tz'13, a vigorous writer for the Communist cause, died (at the age of thirty-one) in 1931. His colleague, Ch'ien Ifsing-ts'un, has written historical plays and books on vernacular (pai-hea) Chinese literature. The Literary Research Society and Mao Tun Though the Creation Society was romantic in its early leanings, the Literary Research Society espoused from the very first the cause of realistic writing. Its leaders were novelist 462 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 : f-,1 A In nina 1 _n 1 nAqPnnodn00020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1 Mao Tun (real name: Shen Yen-ping), short-story writer Yell Shao-chfln, and seholar and editor Cheng Chen-to. Their organ, the Short Story Magazine, published some of the best Chinese fiction of the twenties, together with translations of Russian works and those of the leer European nations. Though certainly Marxist in its basic orientation, the Literary Research Society remained objective enough to permit nonpartisan writers like Lao She, Pa Chin, and Shih Che-ts'un to contribute to its magazines. The leader of the Literary Research Society, Mao Tun, is the most respected novelist in modern Chinese. literature. His works are unequaled as conscientious, dialectical studies of social and political conditions in China. Like Kuo Mo-jo, Mao Tun did political work during the period of Kuomintang-Communist Party collaboration. His experiences during that period became the material for his first important work, the trilogy Eclipse (Shih), which includes the novels Disillusion (Ire: MO, Uncertainty (Tung )'ao), and Pursuit (Chui Ch'iu). Projected egninst the background of the split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, this trilogy describes the lives of young people coping with reactionary elements and consumed by doubt and uncertainty. On reading them over, one is struck by Lhe fact that Chinese youth in the twenties was much like the "lost" generation in the novels of Heniingway, Fitzgerald, Hux'sey, and Waugh of the same period. Animated by vague ideals, they engaged now in promiscuous sexual relationskips, now in political and social reform. Part of the significance of Eclipse lies in the fact that while Mao Tun now has definite Leftist sympathies, he has not let his ideology warp the outlook of life he had during those turbulent years. The resulting vision is a nihilistic one, transcending the various feudalistic, capitalistic, and proletarian conflicts embodied in his characters. Mao Tun's second majer work is nil Yeh (Tc Twilight), a romance about China in 1930. his a more ambitious piece of writing than Eclipse, but in it Mao Tun is Is success- ful in abstracting from his ideological preoccupations as he dissects the industrial and financial society of Shanghai during the stormy year when the Nationalist Army was fighting both the advancing Communist forces in Changsha and Wu-han and the war lords in the North. The chief character is Wu Sun-fu, a well-intentianed industrialist who, in order to make his factory a going concern, engages in speculation in the feverish Exchange Market and ends up in bankruptcy. His household, colleagues, and rivals are described in great detail. Factory strikes, Communist terrorist activities in the coun- try, and the frivolous love-life of both young and old are all worked into the scheme. Much of this material is merely documentary, and is not integrated into the structure of the novel The underlying materialist interpretation of history is discernible throughout, as Mao-Tun shows how the characters are conditioned by the feudalistic or capitalistic environments in which they live. In some of the episodes, symbolism is subtly used for propaganda purposes. The father of NVu Sun-fu leaves his home for Shanghai, holding a Tnoist tract in his hand. Suffocated by the warmth and perfume of his daughters-in-law and granddaughters, he dies immediately on reaching Vu's residence. At the end of the novel, the Taoist tract is soaked in water as min pours in through an open window. Both the book and the old man are indicative of the inability of the old mentality to exist in the modern age. In another episode, the blackguard son of a country landlord becomes a member of the Kuomintang. Ile carries home with him a volume of Three People's Panciples (San Min Chu I). Later he discovers that his infant son has urinated on the book. This is subtle propaganda to discredit the Kuomintang; it is as if an atheist writer should describe the horror of the pastor on discovering his son urinating on the family Bible. In spite of a Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: /"..1 A rt rt0 n1rm?-4Rnn4nnn070007-4 463 STAT sified in Part - Sanitized Cop A roved Yr 2014104/03 for Release ? 50- 1 CIA-Kuro , 40-7 "? : its relative complexity, The Twilight tends to reduce its characters to btu."( and white, and the author's evident sympathy fur the factory worker and the peissnt becomes a summons to hysteria and dissension. Mao l'un continued to write realistic and documentary-style works during and after the Sino-Japanese War, though these new writings did not compare in scope and power with his two earlier works. His seperiority over the more propagandistic Communist writers lies in the fact that he manages to pioduce the illusion of objective reality. He uses the Marxist point of view without overtly stating it in didactic terms. Representative of his newer work is the short novel Rotting (Fu-shih), which relates the trials of a young woman working for the Kuomintang Secret Police in wartime Chung- king. It is a first-person narrative, cast in diary form. As usual, Mao Tun is adept at portraying decadent official types and innocent and sophisticate(' young people moving in a circle of corruption and intrigue. The heioine has had many love affairs, and, its she works for the secret police, she become. ,r,ersasingly disillusioned. The diary traces the reawakening of her conscience when she is assigned to work on a Communist prisoner who turns out to have been her first lover. Her job is to get the names and addresses of his fellow Communists. She lives with him once again, and pretends to spy on him After her lover has been killed, she is assigned to work among college students. There she rescues an innocent girl, a fellow worker for the secret police, from the clutches of Kuomintang power. In doing so, she presumably loses her life, since the diary beaks off at this point. Mao Tun uses his fine dialectical mind to expo.% the corruption of the old regime and to convey a sense of the hopefulness of the new. Like Km) Mo-jo, he toured the USSR after the War, and now enjoys high prestige in Communist circles. The Kuomintang and the intellectueis This account of the leading cliques and writers only partially suggests the consolida- tion of divergent literary attitudes and movements in the solid Leftist front in the late twenties. In the absence of more satisfactory documentary evidence, the spread of. Com- munism among Chinese writers would be difficult to trace. By the thirties, in any case, most writers had become Leftist. Those earlier leaders of the Literary Revolution who did not conform to the party line, e.g., Hu Shill. were thoroughly discredited. Other writers, like Chou Tsou-jiln and Lin Yutang, were labeled reactionaries. Leftist writers not only controlled most of the magazines and literary supplements of the newspapers, but persecuted .relentlessly all writers who did not conform. The editors of the magazine listen Tat (Les Contemporains), Shih Ch6-ts'un and Tu Heng, reacted against the League of Leftwing Writers, and styled themselves "the third group." They entered a plea against the atmosphere of hysteria and literary polemics and asked for the freedom to write. The Leftist writers, led by Lu lTi,?n, attacked them in essay after essay, and de- clared there could be no third group in the struggle for the dominance of the proletariat. In short, young writers of the thirties had either to stop publishing or follow the fashion. And the group of mediocre writers who (lid flourish at that. time were all pretty much alike in their Marxist approach to life and their treatment of subject matter. The greatest failure of the Nationalist government lay in its inability to win over the intellectuals. Compared with the efforts of the Communists at propaganda, its own efforts were stupid and blundering. It was not resolute and dictatorial enough to suppress all dissenting voices (as the Communists are today doing so effectively in the mainland of China), and it was not sincere enough to let the people know about its predicament. In- stead, it pursued a policy of half-hearted suppression and cloaked its weakness in grandiose and empty words, which only further alienated the intellectuals and the student group. 464 sTAT 0 - x V? Please Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 : ? The Kuomintang had the traditional respect f students, and fervently wished for their cooperation in the task of national defense ant reconstniction. It should be noted that before the Sino-Japanese War, students in the nn tonal universities paid only a token tuition of about two or three US dollars; during and after the war all students in national universities were exempted from tuition and furnished\ with free room and board. Yet it was the students who were most swayed by Communist propaganda, and most resolute and active in denouncing and discrediting the government. In 1916, immediately after the war, Wen 1-to, n Communist agitator and distinguished minor poet of the twenties who had turned professor of Chinese, was assaa:inated by the Kuomintang Secret Police. This caused such a furore among the students that the deceased Wen promptly became a literary hero on a par with Lu Ilstin. This illustrates the ill-advised character of the Na- tionalist government's policy. It should either have left Wen I-to alone, c:r have had him indicted according to due process of law. To be sure, many an intellectual has been shot by the Communist mithorities, without its provoking even a murmur. "Undirected" Talents: Pa Chin, Lao She, Shen Ts'ung-wen There are a few writers who, while not orthodox Marxists, have,escaped the open antagonism of the Communists, because their work either treats of the lower social classes or is sufficiently Leftist in tendency to include trenchant criticism of the "feudalistic" and capitalist elements in Chinese society. Free from persecution, these writers reach a wide circle of readers, and are able to present their individual vision of life without dis- torting it in the direction of class struggle theory. The more eminent of them are Pa Chin, Lao She, and Shen Ts'ung-wen. Pa Chin is an anarchist, with a burning humanitarian zeal to do away with injuatice and cruelty. His style, compared with that of Mao Tun and Lu lIstin, is flat and crude, but he is an extremely powerful writer and is widely read among the young in China. His most popular novel, Chia (The Family), is typical of his work; its characters are either defying parental control or submitting to it. Largely autobiographical, it tells of the three brothers of the Kno family in Szechwan. The oldest, Chtieh-hsin, represents compromise; lie is aware of the cruelty and injustice of his elders, but he places his destiny in their hands and makes a mess of his life in his effort to be docile and preserve the crumbling structure of the family. Ile gives up his beloved cousin Mei without a struggle, and marries another girl. (Mei dies of consumption, and Chaeh-hsin's wife of childbirth His younger brothers, Ch8ch-min and Chneh-wei, represent enlightenment and revolt, the former being con- cerned with individual happinass, the latter (spokesman for the novelist himself) with revolution. All the characters are projected on a more or less allegorical level, but the novel is mechanical in structure and is characterized by great crudity of feeling, a pervasive atmosphere of sentimentality, and a lack of any positive ideals except social protest. The popularity of The Family indicates the existence in contemporary China of an immature and uncritical audience, who welcomes propaganda if it takes the form of sugar-coated fiction. The fortunes of the three brothers are further traced in the novel's sequels: Ch'un (Spring) and Ch'iu (Autumn). Lao She is known to Western readers through the English translation of Lo-eo Hsiang- tztl (The Ricksha Boy). Because of his indifference to ideological problems, he is perhaps the most readable of the novelists writing in China today. He stems from the English tradition rather than from that of the Soviet writers, and has a great flair for humor, which he uses to illuminate the incongruities of the Chinese character. Reread today, his early humorous novels such as Chao Ta-yrich and Lao Chang Che-hstieh (The Philosophy of Old ('hang) often seem merely facetious, though there are occasional passages that are 485 STA1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: rs I a o rl DO I _ninNARnnAnnon20007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 : IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 reminiscent of Dickens. In his later work he controls his use of humor, and the result is somewhat tem trivial. The Ricksha Boy is a fine realistic study of the life of a Chinese coolie, though its plot is rather thin. If is new work SstIShih rung rang (Four Generations in One House), not yet completed, bids fair to be his masterpiece, though now that he is writing under the Communist rule Lao She is compelled like everyone else to adopt a Leftist point of view. Shen Ts'ung-wen is a prolific writer. In his Autobiography ho tells of his childhood and his life as a soldier. Most of his storks are based on his memories of soldiers and peasants, and of the mountains and rivers of Hunan. They often have an idyllic quality that is refreshing by contrast with the sweeping ideological concerns of other writers. Ilia best known story is l'ien Ch'en (7'he Border City) which tells a simple love story of country people. Shen writes in a lucid colloquial (pai-hua) style, and some of his work ranks very high in modern Chinese literature. The New Drama Among the younger writers who rose to fame in the latter half of the thirties, the most dynamic is certainly Ts'ao YO, the leading dramatist a contemporary China. Like Pa Chin, he adopts a Leftist point of view without insisting on orthodox Marxism, though this is less true of his later work like Petching Jen (Peking Man) than of his earlier writings. Contemporary Chinese drama in no way approximates the spirit and style of the older drama: it has its roots in Ibsen and the problem plays, whereas the older drama was lyrical and pectic. There have been several attempta to reform the older drama, but no dramatists have succeeded in using it to treat of contemporary problems. To a much greater extent than that, of the novel and of poetry, in other words, the development of the new drama involves the successful adaptation of the Western form. The early experiments were decidedly crud; and the plays of Ibsen, Wilde, and Shaw, though translated and pre- sented on the stage, met with no marked success. The first playwrights, T'ien Han and Hung Shen, wrote several plays of no great merit. The new drama became genuinely popular only with the phenomenal success of Ts'ao YO's first play, Lei-pi (The Thunderstorm). It has all the characteristics needed to please a Chinese audience: its plot is highly sensational; fate broods over the tragic action; it depicts a variety of the conflicts between old and young and rich and poor that have be- come the staple theme of Chinese fiction. In the play, the conflicts between father and son and employer and factory worker, together with the inmate:A rdationshipa between brother and eister and step-mother and son, arc successfully manipulated to lead to a denouement in which nearly every important character meets death. The Chinese audience had never before seen such melodramatic virtuoaity on the dap. Ts'ao Yti followed up his initial success with a second sensational play, Jth-du (The Sunrise). This time the scene is laid in Shanghai, and the play emphasises capitalist and bourgeois decadence of all kinds. Ts'ao YO uses a laborers' worksong as musical accompani- ment for the play, and the symbol of the sunrise to indicate the kind of hope denied to the banker, broker, society gill, and petty bank clerk. Ts'ao Ya's third play, Yfian Yeh (The Wilderness), is regarded by many critics as his best. Employing the theme of revenge in a primitive village setting, it exhibits a considerably greater genuine dramatic power than his first two plays. Ilis ideological preoccupations come to the fore again in Peking Man. Two dominant symbols are used: the Peking Man with his primitive strength is presented as typifying the assertion of love and hatred that would redeem the old China, and the coffin of the patriarch of a decaying family is preiented as the symbol of death and failure. The anthropologist and his daugh- 466 i???????????41^.....1 ??????????????????????-???-??????????????ftr,???????, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: r?iil_Pnpsi_ninzvARno4000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 44.7 _ ter, with their positivist scientific spirit and their repudiation of Confucian ideals, are depicted as the hope of China. The dialectical underpia4iing of the play is along Marcia lines. The theme is similar to that of The Family, and it is no accident that Ts'no Yu has also made a play out of this novel. He has also made a successful Chinese adaptation of Romeo and Juliet. During the ..var years, both in the interior and in Shanghai, there %vas n great demand for plays. To meet it, many European plays were adapted and many original plays written. The more competent playwrights who appeared at this time were 1Vu Tu-kuang, IIsia Yen, Yuan Chun, and Sung Cluh-ti. The drama boom during the war years reflects the popular demand for entertainment at a time when Hollyv-txxl movies and traditional drama had ceased to be so readily available. The drama is today largely a propagandistic instrument of the Communist government. Poetry Compared with the drama and the novel, modern Chinese poetry has neither dis- tinguished practitioners nor a popular following. Mention has been made of the earlier experimental poetry of Ilu Shit), Wen I-to, Hsu Chili-mo, and Km Mo-jo. The later poets, in generab.followed the lines laid down by Wan and Kuo; only a few have attempted, without much success, to create a pai-htta (spoken language) poetry comparable in density of expression and feeling to the older Chinese poetry. The influence of the French Sym- bolists and of Eliot is largely responsible for these attempts. Ho Chi-fang, Pien Chih-lin, and Fang Chih have tried to recapture fluidity of feeling while maintaining rigidity of form, but their poetry, stemming aa it has from academic circles, has never been popular. Ho Ch'i-fang early forsook his estheticism, moreover, to become a Communiat worker in Ycnan (Fu-shih) and write in a more popular style; he is now an important Communist official. The se.hool of poets following Kuo Mo-jo has even less literary merit. There is no discipline involved in writing free verse of this sort, and its practitioners usually stress popular sentiment rather than individual emotion. During war time, Kuo's followers, e.g., Tsang IC'o-chin, Al Ch'ing, and T'ien Chien, turned out a steady torrent of patriotic and propagandist verses that bear no significant relation either to the Chinese tradition or to the best contemporary poetry of the West. COMMUNISM: LITERARY THEORY AND PRACTICE So far, only writers have been considered who had achieved fame before the Sino- Japanese War. With the outbreak of that war, there began a third phase of modern Chinese literature, which can no longer be discussed in terms of personalities, because the relevant literary output has become increasingly uniform in character and Marxist in approach. Before the war, the Communists were engaged in a struggle for survival, and did not have time to expand their cultural and propagandist activities. Most Communist writers lived in Shanghai or hong Kong, and were cut off from life in the Communist-held areas. This was a disguised edvantage because, not being free to engage in overt propaganda, they had to express their ideas obliquely, which often enriched the literary quality of their works. The irony of Lu polemical essays and the objective, quality of Mao Tun's novels would not have been possible under the Communist government. When the Communists pledged themselves to join the anti-Japanese front, they had a breathing space during which they could not only build up their military strength but also consolidate and enlarge their gains through intensive propaganda. In the Nationalist-held interior, Communist propaganda continued to make headway among students and in- 467 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT 0.??????????"?5?00.0. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 tellectuals by appealing to them in teras of patriotism. In the Communist arras, definite steps were taken to build a positive Communist culture. In speech after speech, Mao Tse- tung stressed the neeessity of building a new culture based upon the idea of the rising oroletariat and the displacement of the feadal, semi-colonial, semi-capitalist culture of Nationalist China. In 1912, Mao addressed a group of cultural workers in Yenan shill) on the tasks and responsibilities facing them. This series of talks was later published as a pamphlet entitled The Dtrectismt of the New Literary Movement. Since it is reganled as the bible for all Communist writers, note must be made of its main ideas. ,lf co Tse-tung Mao begins by asking what the new literature stands for. It stands, he replies, for the proletariat classes and the Chinese Communist Party. Literature that flatters the privileged classes and promotes feudalistic and capitalistic interests is to be positively dis- couraged. Until recently, he continues, Communist writers in the Kuomintang areas have addressed themselves primarily to the petty bourgeoisie (the students, clerks, and small officials), and have exposed for them the feudalistic and capitalist decadence in society. Insufficient attention has been paid, he insists, to the peasants, workers, and soldiers, who represent 90 percent of Chinese population. The new literature should be primarily de- signed for them, and only secondarily for the petty bourgeoisie. how can this be done, asks Mao, it writers and cultural workers still retain bourgeois attitudes and have hardly any genuine and intimate knowledge of proletarian life? Clearly the one way out is hsgeh- hsi ("to learn"). Having armed themselves with sound Marxist ideology, cultural workers should go to live among the proletariat, and share their emotions, thoughts, ways of living, and speech. Only thus can they produce works that, will be understood and accepted by the people. Mao then turns to the problem of technique. When addressing the petty-bourgeoisie, he asserts, the writer can deal with the subtler feelings and use a large vocabulary. But when he speaks to a proletarian audience he should, in the interests of intelligibility, avoid using advanced techniques and difficult vocabulary. The propagandistic and educational content of a piece of writing should be readily comprehensible. The immediate task, in short, is the democratization of literature rather than improvement in its quality, since the latter can await the day when the people have become better educated. The function of literature is utilitarian: -to effect, consolidate, and glorify the proletarian revolution. The negative approach of the Communist writers in Kuomintang areas is, therefore, no longer adequate. In view of the steady extension of Communist influence and territory, the constructive aspects of the Communist regime should henceforth be emphasized. This new literature for and of the proletariat should not, says Mao, be judged by literary standards primarily; ideological considerations should take precedence over literary ones as a matter of course. If a piece of writing contains feudalistic or capitalistic elements, then the higher its literary quality the more pernicious its influence. Thus a piece of writing that embodies correct ideology is to be preferred, however inferior its literary quality, to one that carries a wrong message. At the same time, Mao is aware that tiresomeness is not one of the constituents of successful propaganda, and he warns all writers against work projected on the didactic or textbook level. They should take the old folk forms of art, song, music, dancing, and storytelling, and pour new ideas and feelings into them. Where this is dune the latter will meet up with far less resistance on the part of readers. When onftxamines the state of publication in Communist areas, whether during or nftcr the war, one can see that Communist writers have been faithfully following these injunctions. In fact, Mao, for the most part, was merely formulating authoritatively ideas 408 STAT Dec assified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 l? ^ that had been in the air for a long time. Communist writers even in the thirties had been concerned with the problem of enlarging their audience to include the peasant and factory worker. Some had advocated abolition of Chinese ideographic writing in favor of a system of Latinized Chinese characters that would enable even the illiterate to read after a brief course of training. All agreed dint the peasant and soldier were to be given greater prominence as the subject matter of poetry and fiction. In the late thirties, there appeared A new group of writers who specialized in peasant life: Al Wu, Sha Tiog, Wu Tsu-hsiang, Ou-yang Shan, and Nieh Kan-nu. (MI these writers have emerged since the war as important Communist writent.) Anti-Japanese fceling ran highest just before the war, when some young Manchurians who had escaped from Japanese control cashed in on public sentiment by writing about guerrilla warfare in Manchuria. Most of them had seen active service with guerrillas, and had worked with Communiat volunteers. Among them were Ifsiao Chan and his wife Ilsiao Hung, Tuan-niu Hung-hang, ho Feng, and Shu Ch'itn. Most of them spent the war years in Communiat territory, and except for Ifsiao Hung, who died during the war, and Irsiao Chun, who has been silenced for his heretical views, these so-called Northeastern writers today constitute an important group of Communist writers. The migration of men of letters from Shanghai and Peking into the interior of China during the %war made possible an unprecedented literary exploration of the life of the backward inland Chinese. This coincided, as a result of the demand for a "Literature of National Defense," with a widespread literary glorification of the soldier and guenilla forces. In both the Nationalist and Communist areas, therefore, there was a shift of interest from bourgeois introspection into the individual and family to a somewhat idyllic presentation of the soidier and peasant. The individual psyche, never a dominant preoccupation of modern Chinese writers, further receded in importance as a theme of literature. Under Mao's official encouragement, proletarian tendencies in literature have become the dominant current. Present-day writings, in consequence, fall into two categories: original poems and stories about the peasant, soldier, and worker; and adaptations of folk songs, dramas, and storytelling. In both categories, the writer has ceasmi to be an indi- vidual. In reading the earlier pai-hua %writers, however inferior their literary ability, one at least found each had something different and personal to offer. Now literature and the arts are a government-controlled activity, with explicitly defined aims and functions. The writer's first task is to observe the ideological requirements. lie must justify the historical mission of the proletariat and demonstrate the inevitable collapse of feudal and capitalist society. Ile must glorify the Communist Party. For example, though everyone knows that the Communist contribution to the war against Japan was negligible., he must make it appear that the Communist forces were responsible for the victory. There are prescribed %ways of treating types of people. If the writer writes of the village, he must depict the enlightened peasant as industnous end courageous, the ignorant peasant as willing to reform his old habits, and the landlord and his henchmen as wicked people who deserve to be severely punished. If he writes of a village under Japanese con- trol, he can seldom get away from the tstereotype of the enlightened peasants helping the Communist guerrilla forces and of the bad officials and landlords as tools of the Japanese. A literature that, as a matter of course, glorifies the proletariat and condemns other classes is not, of course, a literature that seriously probes the meaning of life. Seeing everything as either black or white so simplifies life that one can hardly avoid the grossest types of sentimentality. Moral issues arise only when characters are exhibited aa mixtures of good Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release rI4flAWnnAnnnn9n107-4 469 STA 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ????????,....???????11, Iand evil. When the idea of class struggle replaces individuals deckling between rie.,11 and wrong, reality is invariably caricatured. Beamse of the naivet6 of its ultimate aspump- tions, this new wnting is not really literature but propaganda. Considered as propagandists, the Communist wnters can be complimented on the industry with which they tern out an endless flow of writings which are remarkably alike in their reiterated application of standard themes. A representative list of war novels and collections of war stories published in Communist areas during the war would include: The Old Warrior, The Iron Band of Soldiers, Lit& Hero, The Brave Men, The Little Trumpeter, The Unconquerable People, Total Retreat, With Our Oum Blood and Flesh, The Mine, The Red Flag Waves Triumphantly, and Behind the Enemy Front A similar list couId be made of stories and novels about peasants. Art es Propaganda The question arises here: How effective is this literature as propaganda? Mao Tse- tung seems to make a fundamental mistake in urging all writers to write about the peasant and soldier. The proletarian is not necessarily interested in stories ab?ut his own class; most factory workers, on the record, greatly prefer an escapist movie with action and spectacle to a movie about capital-labor relations. There is a deep human need for re- laxation to which the Communist way of life does not minister, and to which, on Mao's principles, Communist literature cannot minister either. Finally, though there is a vigorou3 literacy movement in Chinn, most proletarians are still not in a position to read the stories and poems designed for them. Communist literature, therefore, insofar as it, is read at all, is read by people who have had at least a primary school education. The prominent woman Communist writer Ting Ling, after conducting a survey in her literary journal IVIn-I Pao, reports that most of its readers had found proletarian writings dull and hard to follow, and that their favorite authors were still Pa Chin, Chang Ilang-shui, and the erotic novelist Fang Chang and Fang do not even belong to the school of writers stemming from the May Fourth Movement, And Pa Chin, though a fighter against the tyranny of feudalism in Chinese society, is not an orthodox Marxist. (Another survey, conducted by the same magazine, shows that the citizens of Peking nostalgically prefer Hollywood movies to both the native and the Russian cinema products.) Ting Ling admonishes her readers to dis- card their bourgeois tastes, and devote themselves to proletarian literature in a more serious way. Thc surveys mentioned show that propagandistic literature has, so far, not been very effective. But liter...ttire is only one item in the regime's program of intensive propaganda and indoctrination. Everything ? from movies to radio to comic strips ? is state-con- trolled. The small citizen cannot escape the pressures on him. Ile has no choice but to resign himself to what little entertainment he can get from what he sees, reads, or hears. however, if current fiction and poetry have only a limited appeal, the regime's cul- tural workers have been much more succeasful in bringing new content into the ballad, dance, and play, and thus adapting folk art to their purposcs. It would be hard to ex- aggerate the importance of such activities in the lives of today's Chine?cc masses. Before the Communists came to power, popular drama and story-recitals had been an autonomous activity, which the government had neither hindered nor encouraged; now they are the government's principal means of reaebing the masses and maintaining its hold on them. The popular vogue of yangko, a kind of dramatic skit comhined with a certain Northern variety of music and dance, has been phenomenal Every schoolboy nnd girl has been taught yangko rnusical airs and the appropnate bodily movements, with the result that any newsworthy event, any not-too-complicated propagandist story, can now be staged 470 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50.-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Ar on the street before a mobile audience. Ile same thing has happened to other forms of folk entertainment. Even the Capital ' heatre, most of the repertoire of which dates back to the Ch'ing dynasty, has been made over into a vehicle for Communist propagntida. New librettos have been prepared and old librettos revised so as to bring the entire reper- toire in line with the new ideology. Such famous pelforrners in Peking Opera as Mei Lan-fang, Ch'eng Yen-eleitt, and T'an Fu-ying continue to play to capacity houses in the big cities. Each of these artists, moreover, has his own immense following in the popula- tion, who can hardly fail to be influenced by the propaganda he is disseminating. Exploitation of Traditional Forms The utilization of traditional cntertainmeat forma has had a reciprocal impact on the development, of poetry and prose. Storytellers in China have been reciting ballads and epic stories, with and without musical accompaniment, ever since the Sung dynasty. Modern Chinese literature had previously learned little from the storytellers (the tech- niques it employs have been mainly of Western derivation). Today, in the effort to write prose and verse narratives that, will reach the proletarian elms, numerous writers are imitating their techniques. The Communist pioneer in this line of work is Chao Shu-li, whose lively colloquial stories, such as The Marriage of llsiao-&h-he and The Verses of Li Yu-ts'ai, all lend themselves to recitation before an illiterate audience. These stories fol- low the inevitable propaganda line, but manage to preserve some traces of tustic fun in their portrayal of country types, and thus have a quality which is missing from most Communist stories. Chao Shu-li, together with Lao She and the poet T'iett Chien, is now editor of the literary magazine Shuo-shno Ch'anirch'ang (Stories and Ballads), which is devoted to colloquial-style storytelling. Lao She, who has a sharp car for folk speech, is especially successful with ballads. The group's prose stories, punctuated at regular inter- vals with verse stanzas, clearly involve a regression in technique from such models as Do Maupassant and Chekhov back to a more primitive form. But this imitation of anony- mous medieval art has made possible, appatently, the first successful experiment in popular reading ler the proletariat. It is the first branch of pal-hue literature since the May Fourth Movement that has deliberately turned its back on Western models in favor of the native tradition. The stories and ballads in Shuo-shuo Ch'ang-ch'ang can lay no claim to literary dis- tinction; they are interesting primarily as evidence of the deliberate lowering of the level of appeal in connection with the regime's bid for popular favor. The story Chin So and - the ballad ?'/me Reformation of the Sing-Song Girls are typical. In the former, Chin So is a good-natured peasant working for a villainous landlord, lie is very stupid, and even appears at times to be it willing victim of landlord exploitation. A village widow, who happens to be the landlord's mistress, flirts trait him, but he sets his heart on marriage. Ile buys with his own money, and takes for his wife, a refugee girl from a famine district. The land- lord soon has designs on the girl and, through the assistance ef the widow, has her drugged and raped. The girl makes a great deal of trouble over this, and the landlonl tries to kill both Chin So and his wife Luckily Chin So escapes, to return years Inter as a Communist, soldier. The landlord is sentenced by a people's court, and receives his just, punishment. The Reformation of the Sing-Song Girls describes the trials of two young girls and their final liberation under the Communist government. Kuei-tstin is maltreated by her step- mother. Together with Chin-hua, an orphan girl, she escapes to Chang-chia-k'ou (Kalgan), and goes to work as a waitress in a restaurant. Chin-hua's brother, who is Kuci-tsun's lover, accompanies them on the journey, and is captured by a Kuomintang press gang. The girls find lodging in a hotel, the proprietor of which finally sells them to a brothel, 471 STAT _ - - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 : - CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 lj _ __? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release r.1A-RnPsi-01043R004000020007-4 where where they are manhandled and have no choice but to entertain the customers. Before long, they both have syphilis. When the Communist Army comes to liberate the city, Kuei-tsun, having believed all the bad reports she has heard about them, flees. She is adopted as a daughter by an old couple in nnother ciV, given fine clothes, and taught to sing and dance. Behind this apparent benevolence, however, there is only villainy, since the old couple soon sells her to a house of prostitution. The Communist For again some to her rescue, and this time she does not flee. Under the Communist regime, she is rehabilitated ? she learns a useful trade and has her syphilis cured. Iler lover, meantime, has deserted the Nationalist Forces and joined the Communists. Chin-him is already a factory worker, and has a Communist soldier boyfriend. In the end, the two couples marry. Both stories arc highly contrived Communist propagniala, which strive to get acmss the point that the Communist government is the friend of the oppiessed, and to point to the villainies of the landlords and other feudal elements in the Chinese society. The maiden in distress has always been a popular theme, in folk stories, and in this ballad there is a sadistic strnin that is clearly intended to ticicle the popular palate. Few Communist writers, to be sure, are engaged in the kind of experimentstion just describes]. Most still use the orthodox forms ofspoetry, short story, and novel. The big names in present-day literature are ICuo Mo-jo, Mao Tun, and Ting Ling, all three Corn- munist writers who had attained fame in the twenties. Kuo is an important functionary in the government, too busy to publish anything except occasional articles, though he is known to be going ahead with his autobiography. Mao Tun, besides being head of the Department of Cultural Affairs, is co-editor of Ilsiao Shuo Yuch K'an (Fiction Monthly) and Jen Min Wen Ilsaeh (People's Literature), China's two leading literary journals. He is still busy writing, and portions of his new panoramic novel about the war period, Tuan Lien (Discipline), have appeared in print. Ting Ling was once a daring woman rebel, whose first husband was shot as a Com- munist by the Nationalists. She has lived for many years in Communist territory. Her recent publications include When I Was in Ya Ts'un, a collection of short stories, and the novel On :he Sangkan River. In style she is more disciplined than that of the younger Com- munist writers, and sometimes she succeeds in writing about life in the pre-Communist areas without dragging in ideological issues. Her story, "Night," included in When I Was in Ya Ts'un, depicts the weariness of a Communist official walking home at, night after an interminalle committee meeting. His wife is much older than he, and their relationship is an unhappy one. On his way home he has jokes with a newly married fellow-worker, and sees a pretty girl leaning against a door. When he reaches home and sees his wife, the idea of deserting her crosses his mind. During the night, he helps his cow give birth A girl, a fellow Communist worker, watches him . . . not, the reader is told, for the first time. Suddenly a feeling of tenderns rushes over him and he goes to sleep in his wife's arms. There is genuine poignsncy in this story; unlike most Communist stories, it incul- cates no feelings of hatred, and it is projected on a fairly civilized level. Almost none of the big-name writers has left Communist China. Lao SW is attaining a position of genuine leadership through his vigorous experimentation with ballad poetry. Pa Chin and Zeno Yit are both recognizably restive; neither had been an orthodox Marxist, and it is evidently taking them time to adjust to the new situation. The National Com- mittee of the Association of Writers and Artists lists, as of 1919, over a hundred name; most of them familiar ones. Although not all the older writers are actually writing, leade. - ship has not yet passed to the younger writers, i.e., those who began to publish just before or during the Sino-Japanese War. 472 50-Yr 2014/04/03: STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 _ The active younger tvriters today are: in the short story field, Ai Wtt, Cheu Prh-fu, Ou-yang Shan, and Liu Pai-ytl; in poetry, Al Ch'ing, T'ien Chien, and Tsang K'o-chia; in the drama, Min Yen, Yuan Chan, and Sung Chih-ti. Some of, like Chou Erh-fu and Liu Pai-ya, were in Communist territory during the war years; some, like Ai Wu and Hsia Yen, worked in the Nationalist interior. It is uselem to try to distinguish between these writers in terms of merit or even style; in all essentials they are almost alike, with the same Marxist approach, the same proletarian subject matter, and the same propaganda emphasis. The best Communist-area works published thiring the war are perhaps the following: Kao Chien-ta, a novel by Ott-yang Shan dealing with the cooperative movement; Chung Ku Chi (Planting the Seed), a peasant novel by Liu Ch'ing; Chiang-shan Ts'un Shih Jih (Ten Days at Chiang-shan Village), a novel about land redistribution by Ma Chia; and Pal Chou-en Tai-fu (Dr. Bethune), Chou Prh-fu's fictionized biography of the Canadian physician Dr. Norman Bethune, who first served in the Spanish Civil War and later worked for the Chinese Communists. The most prolific of the Communist writers who once lived in the NationalLst areas is Al Wu, who, as has been mentioned, had been writing about peasant life even before the war. Ai Wtt was a native of Szechwan, and hat! seen much of Southwest. China before ho started to write. His recent works inchide two autobiograplites, eight novels, one novelette, and severat collections of short stories. The novel Shan Yeh (The Mountain Region), which depicts a war episode in South China, is considered the best novel written in 1918. Russian Influence The preceding account indicates that the most popular genres in Communist literature are the novel and short story about the peasant and soldier. This is in accordance with Mao Tse-tung's demand for proletarian literature. If one looks at contemporary Soviet literature, one finds the Same subjects predominating in it as well, though the fact that Russia is highly industrialized makes the factory worker an equally important hero as the peasant. Stories about the heroic Russian resistance against the Germans are also much in vogue. Translations of Soviet authors are the chief foreign literature read by Communist Chinese writers today. As a result of this one finds a strong Soviet influence in the new Chinese writing. In terms of the Chinese tradition, however, the peasant story can be traced to Lu lisOn and Shtn Ts'ung-wtn, and the prototype of much war fiction is lIsiao Chun's Village in August, first published in 1935, about. a small band of guerrilla forces stationed in a Manchurian village. (It is available in an English translation.) Village in August is so poorly constructed that it. can best he described as a series of sketches. Under its varnish of often violent realism, there is a core of sheer sentimentality. The characters, for example, are simple, idealized "types" representing courage and villainy. The most dramatic epkode in the book is that about Seventh Sister Li and her soldier lover 13oi1 T'ang. The village in which the guerrilla soldiers arc stationed is attacked by superior Japanese forces, and the guerrillas pull out. On the road Boil T'ang finds Seventh Sister Li Just being raped by a Japanese, her child dead beside her. He feels he CIIIIIIOL leave her as she is, and stays with her, only to be killed. Recovering consciousness, Seventh Sister sees what has happened, puts on T'ang's uniform, and takes up his rifle to join the guerrillas. She is wounded, and dies in a hospital. This episode plays on the conventional themes of love, loyalty, and courage. It undoubtedly aroused anti-Japanese feelings in the readers, and thus had a certain value as propaganda. All the more recent war novels are also covert propaganda, using stock themes and simple characters. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: /"..1 A inininoi fa1rm?-4RnfI4DDD07(1007-4 473 STAT. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 r???=a The case of Ifsiao Ch'en is illuminating in another iespect. He has been an established writer ever since the publication of Village in AugusL During the war he was an active worker in Communist territory. After the war he was appointed editor of the newspaper WZn Mica Pao, in Ilarbin. Like many an idealistic youth, he was attracted to Communism because of. his patriotic zeal. Back in Manchuria, where he could see the horrors of the civil war at first head, the atrocities involved in land reform, and the imperialistic behavior of the lordly Russians, he wrote editorials against continuation of the civil war and against a too-friendly attitude towanl Russia. An early protego of Lu lisan, he quetsd from the master in support of his opinions. For his pains, he was deluged with abuse and attack from the entire Communist press. lie lapsed at once into silence, and his subse- quent fate is unknown. A collection of the attacks on him has been published under the title Ilaiao Chan's Thought: A Critique. Few writers in Communist China are likely to miss the point, or try to follow Ilsico Clitth's example. Ile stands as a warning to all cul- tural workers who might be tempted to claim a modicum of freedom. What the Com- munist government expects of them is collaboration in perpetuating a lie, and a sterile literature is the unavoidable result. SUMMARY In view of the large mass of writings published in Communist China, it. is interesting to notice what Chinese men of letters profess to think of it.. The general opinion is that it leaves much to be desired. Looking over the lending literary journals, Ilsiao Shuo Yaeh Klan and WM I Pao, one is aware that great efforts have been made to raise the level of current literary output. While much of the criticism is ideological, a substantial portion is still devoted to practical problems of the craft: how to write poetry, how to handle characters in a story, how to embody the typical in the particular, etc. Seasoned writers are solicited for ailv;ce to young writers; literary criticism and theory are constantly translated from the Russian. Ilsiao Shuo publishes in each issue a critical symposium on one contemporary work of literature and discussions of literary problems occupy even larger space in Wen I Pao. All this registers dissatisfaction at the present state of Writing and the need to improve it. One important factor, of course, is the general decline of literary standards among the younger writers. Earlier writers, like Lu Ilsen and Kuo Mo-jo, all had had sound education in the older Chinese literature and, since they were the first to adapt Western forms into Chinwe literature, had had to read extensively in Western literature in their quest for ideas and techniques. The younger writers are men with only the average high school and collegc edncation, which did not encourage study of classical Chinese. They are also poorly trained in foreign languages, and, since they have a considerable body of pai-hua literature in front of them, they fee: little urge to scck out Western models. They are unaware of the existence of the significant modern writers, like Proust, Joyce, Eliot, and Yeats. The modes of feeling and technique represented by these writers are thus not available to them. Since they are also cut away from the Chinese tradition, their resources are narrow and their perspective limited. Eraluation of Present Efforts A more important reason for the decline of letters is the very unanimity of purpose and approach. The current insistence on proletarian subject matter leaves the writers no choice. Most of them are men and women with a petty-bourgeois background, who if they were encouraged to write of their bourgeois experience could at least draw upon memory and imagination. Obliged as they are to turn away from the self and weave idyllic romances about the soldier and peasant, they write without conviction. They cannot come to pips with reality because they must write according to the Marxist ideology, which is a distortion of reality. The Communist critics are, therefore, wasting their time 474 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release (IA-RnP81-01043 R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ??? as they puzzle about how to avoid stereotyped characterization, and create particular characters that are also universal. It is impossible to create characters at once particular and universal, like Hamlet and Falstaff, unless one is prepared to forego the theory that. certain classes are always in the right and certain others always in the wrong. The love and understanding that must inform all the characters in a good hook is inoperative as a matter of course when a large portion of humanity is viewed with the eyes of hatred and Vengeance. The Chinese men of letters, in a word, have lost the virtue of disinterestedness. The vice of the older literature was its merely decorative quality; the vice of the new is its in- sistence on affecting events. Even before literature became part of the propaganda ma- chinery of the Communist Party it had been regarded, as we have seen, primarily as an instrument of social reform. Today, writers are so occupied with ideological and practical concerns that they cannot possibly attain a state of critical detachment. The only exception to the foregoing generalization in recent years is the novel Wei ChYn (The Besieged City). Its author, Cleien Chung-sliu, is the most learned man in present-da:, China. The son of a famous Chinese scholar, he is equally well trained in Chinese and Western literature. He has a prodigious memory, and rehds fluently Greek, Latin, Italian, French, and German. After a sojourn in Oxford, he taught for a while during the war in the Combined Southwest University in the interior, later returning to Shanghai, where he wrote his novel. Its prose, characterized by a complete rejection of the current journalistic style, successful assimilation of Western idiom and imagery, and revitalizaCon of the language, certainly represents the finest achievemera. in pal-hue literature. His novel is picaresque and satirical. It traces the journey of a returned student to the interior of China. The story centers upon the student's courtship of a girl, their marriage, and his disillusionment. Around this theme are woven many fine comic and satiric episodes about literary men and professors. In this respect, the novel has a certain kinship with The Unofficial History of Officialdom. In his collection of short stories, Jan Shou Kuei (Men, Beasts and Ghosts), Chlen Chung-shu further attacks the mediocrity and obscurantism of the academie group. Here, however, the element of humor and satire is often achieved at the expense of story structure. It is a great relief, nevertheless, to turn to him after the oppressive monotony of most recent writings. Ch'ien is hardly a writer to be sanctioned by the Communist regime; he will probably be wise enough to keep quiet. At present he is directing a project that is translating the works of Mao Tsc- tung into English, which is quite a come-down for this talented satirist. Tradition and the Future The lover of China is less likely to shudder at the synthetic quality of current Chinese letters than at the fact that the success of the Communist Party among men of letters antedated its political success. In the past, Chinese scholars were the defenders of sanity, of wisdom, and of a moderate and benevolent type of government. Today they must plead guilty to having given prior and blank-check support to a regime of violence and despotism. A genuine renascence of letters, moreover, will come only with the overthrow of the Communist government. By that time the intellectnals may have learned their lesson and may try, as they have not done since the Literary Revolution, to understand the Chinese culture of the past and to levy upon the spiritual heritage of the West. A nation cannot deliberately break with the past without inviting crudeness in feeling and thought, as witness the deterioration of pal-hue because of the perpetuation of clich?and uncouth terminology made necessary by the demands of Communist propaganda. The language will continue to deteriorate unless the writers somehow check its deterioration by aiming at precision of statement. It is only through the efforts of good writers that a 475 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release DIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 language can he saved from cant and journalese. Future Chinte writers must study the older literature carefully if for no other reason than that only by tali ng in it can they learn to write well. The older literature can help in other ways. In pai-hua poetry, there is not even an established system of prosody. The older paetry waa quantitative, in that the rhythm of each line of verse depended on the tone and length of each of its words. In pai-hua poetry, this system is usually replaced by the much looscr stress system, which permits as many as three or four words under each foot. The result is that in modern poetry the line is much longer than the traditional five- or seven-werd line. Such poetiy is much too easy to write, and tends to discourage pregnancy of meaning and economy of language. Much still has to be learned from the older poetry before an artistically sound new poetry can come into being. The literature of the past should be studied above all !treatise it embodies the older civilization and the older sensibility. Current "scientific" education has made Chinese youth despise their heritage Its typical pruduct la A barbarian who can claim no kinship with the past, and his anecators. Only through study of the old philotophy, literature, and history can he develop historical perspective and learn that the mode of civilization charac- teristic of the twentieth century is only one of many pcsztble ways of thinking and feeling. Uult?-r,. he can develop a humane, tolerant attitude on this point, he is at the mercy of a positivist absolutism antithetical to literary creation. The repudiation of the old in the past five decades was motivated by a. desire to imitate the West. As a result of the emphasis on science and technology, however, Western cul- ture was never thoroughly studied for its own sake. \That was stressed was the mood and temper of thought concomitant to technological advancemenL The first great trans- lator of Western works, Yen Fu, significantly chose to work on Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, and Darwin. Hu Shih popularized the philosophy of pragmatism. Sun Yat-sen based his Three People's Principles primarily on nineteenth century thought: nationalism, democracy, and socialism. After that came the dominance of Marxist philosophy. One would have thought that, with their traditional emphases on the harmony between man and nature, on the idea of the great chain of being that unites the Emperor and the meanest plebeian, the Chinese would be the last people to accept the idea of the class struggle. That this idea has now taken root in China testifies, above all, to the lack of knowledge of their tradition and to the superficiality with which the Chinese have studied Western culture. Chinese writers of the future must correct both these deficiencies. A SELECTED READING LIST Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance, pp. x, :10, Univerbity of Chicago Prtms, Chicago, 1933. ?, "The Literary Renaissance," in Chen, Sophia H. C. 1,td.), Symposium on Chinese Culture, Chap. VII, pp. 150-164, China Institute of Pacific Relations, Shanghai, 1931. hunter, Edward, Brain-washing in Red China, the Calculated Destructsa of Men's Minds, pp. viii, 311, 208-47, Vanguard Press, New York, 1951. Lao Sh6 (Ch'ing-Ch'un Shu), Ricksha Boy, pp. 315, trans. by Evan King, Sun Dial Press, Garden City, New York, 1946. !Rung, George K., "Hein Ch'ao (The New Tide). New Trends in the Traditional Chinese Drama," Pacific Affairs, 175-183 (1929). Machlair, Harley F (cd.), China, Articles by Pearl S. Back and Dryden L. Phelps, pp. 397-420, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1946. Snow, Edgar (comp. and Using China: Modern Chinese Short Stories, pp. 360. Reyna! and Hitch- cock, New York, 1937. Tlen, Chun (Chun Ilsino), Villace in August, pp. xix, Smith and Durrell, New York, 1042. Wang, Chi-chen (trans.), Ah Q and Others, Sdated Stories of Lu listin, pp. xxvi, Columbia University Press, New York, 1041. ? (trans.), Contemporary Chinese Stories, pp. ix, Columbia Univerpity Prers, New York, 1094. Wrioht, Mary C., "How We Learn about Communist China," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Stria! Science, vol. 277. 224-28 (September 1951). 476 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 rIA-RnPF31-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 411,1".????Im.,?????MrsrlMI?11001.1?1), CHAPTER 11 COMMUNISM AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS INTRO oucriox Past History Never before in the history of China has there been such intense activity in the field of mass communications as under the present Communist regime. Many scholars have attempted to compare and contrast the pattern of Communist success on the mainland of China with the pattern of dynastic succession that, hes been repeated so often in the past. The Nationalist government can be said to have "forfeited" the "Mandate of Heaven" when it proved itself incapable of coping with the disorders of the postwar period. The Communists themselves had been in large part responsible for the confused situa- tion with which the Nationalists had failed to cope. Like previous rising dynasties, the Communist regime owed its success to the combined support of the literati and the lower classes. However, there was no precedent for a situation in which a new dynasty owed whatever confidence and support it enjoyed to intensive propaganda and obstructionism by a group of professional revolutionaries over a long period of time. In earlier Chinese history, each change ef dynastic rule was followed by a period of persecutions, sometimes mild, sometimes severe. This was also true under the change to Communism, but, there was no precedent for the notion that on intensive program of mass education and indoctrina- tion should be one of the main tasks of the new regime. The Mongol and Manchu dynasties, to be sure, made it their busine to immunize and conciliate the literati. But they set. in motion no over-all ;deological program for the people at, large, and both dynasties, as they became more stable and accepted, tended to relax the vigor even of their measures vis-a-vis the literati. In the eyes of the people of China, there used to be only two kinds of government: good government and had government Good government was invariably Confucian government. After years of misrule under an old dynasty, the people instinctively turned to a new one in the expectation of bettered living conditions. This new dynasty had little or no need to paint the evils of the old regime, and proclaim its own virtues. Both were taken for granted The short-lived Mongol dynasty, which deliberately preferred foreigners to the Confueiar literati for government service, was, to some extent, an exception; its initial reign of terror and massacre surpassed, where it !it n:rk, that of the present-day Communists. The other dynastic changes, in any case, follow one and the same pattern; the continuity of Confucian tradition in the art of government made ideological education unnecessary. The literati carried the responsibility for government and administration; the illiterate peasants tilled the land and reaped the crops. The ditties of both were clearly defined and clearly understood After the change of regime as before it, both went right on doing what the had always done, and would have done had the regime not changed. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release riA-RnPF31-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03 477 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 The criteria by which the goodness or badness of a government was evaluated under the Confucian tradition were highly pragmatic. Either a government had shown "sincerity" and "ability" in laboring on behalf of the people, or it had not. Modern ideological notions like the class struggle and economic determinism were far removed from the Chinese mind, and there were no theoretical or doctrinal grounds on which a government could justify its "right" to rule, or disprove retrospectively the "right" of its predecessor to rule. The change came, or at least began, not with the Communist regime but with the thevafall of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1912. The republican form of government needed some basis other than the traditional monarchic end paternalistic ideas. and found them in nationalism and democracy. These ideas, however, were not present in the minds of the people and would not be unless drilled into them; the whole machinery of running a republi- can government also had to be explained. Recognizing the immense difficulties that would have to be faced in the course of transforming Confucian China into a democracy, Sun Yat-sen had mapped out two transi- tional periods that would have to precede adoption of a genuinely constitutional govern- ment: the military period and the period of political tutelage. (It was, indeed, only upon the eve of the National government's collapse on the mainland that the constitutional government was (hinny declared.) The propaganda nnd indoctrination activities that both the situation and Sun Yat-sen's doctrine called for were never pressed very vigorously. Officials and people continued to cling to the traditional assumptions about ruling and being ruled. In turn lured by the succe: of Communism in Russia, of Nazism in Germany, and by capitalism's vitality in the United States, the Kuomintang government pursued no long-term consistent policies in the education of its people. Attempts at Westernization kept company in republican regime policy with equally feeble attempts at preserving the externals of a Confucian code, and neither set of objectives was backed up with an intensive program of political education and indoctrination. Even in the struggle against Japanese aggression, when it came, it was in terms of patriotism, not ideology, that the Kuomintang government attempted to rally the Chinese people. The Failure of the Kuominlang The weakness and inactivity of the Kuomintang was in part due to the failure to curry out Dr. Sun's plans. Mostly, however, it was due to the Party's not having an ideology to communicate. The San Min Chu I (Three Peoples' Principles), which it bad inherited from Dr Sun, were a watered-down mixture of nineteenth-century nationalism, democracy, and socialism, plus traditional Chinese political theory. Sun Yat-sen had been neither a coherent thinker nor a man with a definite position, as may be seen from his reaction to the success of Communism in Soviet Russia, and his responsibility for the early Kuomintang collaboration with the Communist Party The San Min Chu I was weak in philosophical foundation: on one level it was a primer on politics and civics; on another, an impractical plan for grandiose national construction. On neither level did it offer for the unconvinced any body of doctrine that lent itself to domestic propaganda purposes. Nor was that all; the San Min Chu I might, other things being equal, have been more acceptable to the Chinese than Marxism-Leninism precisely because it did represent no radical departure from traditional ideology. But in its actual conduct of affairs the Kuomintang government paid little or no heed to the teachings of the San Min Chu I. it represented the severance of idcoloey from practice. Prartiee was determined by contingent external and internal factors, which again did not lend themselves to the uses of domestic propaganda. A further word is in order about the consistently half-hearted propaganda policy of the Kuomintnng government. Instead of trying to mobilize all educational, cultural, and government workers behind the San Min Chu I and Kuomintang policies, the Nationalist 478 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 government contented itself .vith censoring and suppressing anti-Kuomintang propaganda. Even here it. failed to act with the kind of vigor that might have put real difficulties in the way of Communist propaganda when it at last got uoder way. At no time did the Nationalist government have any more than partial control of education and the press, or ?MSC to adopt an attitude of laissez faire toward other media of commoniestion: radio, theater. movies, book and magazine publication. The Communists then had their work all cut out for them when their chance came as it did during the war years, while they %ere still nomi- nally part of the coalition government. In this respect, as in others, the discredit into which the Kuomintang finally fell reflected its failure to utilize the ma.. communications with vigor and purpose. Communist Opportunism The turning-point, then, insofar as it came (it, tarblican ern, was a matter of what the Communists did while waiting to seize pov. than of what the Kuomintang did. As early as the late twentim they were busy u..1 , techniques of propaganda to win the intelleetuals to their cause, to forward their organizational drive among urban workers and students in Kuomintang areas, and to speed organization of the peasants in districts already Communist. These propaganda efforts were to pay huge dividends when the time came to "liberate" these groups. The Communists are now engaged in similar efforts vis-a-vis the masses in general, which it is the intention of the writers to analyze and describe in the present section. Communist Theory The Communists' concern about ideological indoctrination in China is easy to under- stand. Entirely apart from the ideas on this question they inherited from Marx and Lenin under Kuomintang rule, new ideas had indeed been introduced into China. But traditional ideas and traditional modes of behavior, all of them clearly incompatible with Communist ideology, stubbornly refused to disappear. These the Communists had to eradicate, because their regime, committed as it is to definite notions of right and wrong, correct and incorrect, true and false, cannot tolerate any other ideology within the sphere of its influence. Impos- ing a ready-made ideology from above is, in a sense, the course of less resistance, as com- pared to, for example, merely maintaining a more or less free market for ideas, which is, insofar as it. did anything in this regard, what the Kuomintang had done. It is easier to call upon others to accept a truth of which one regards oneself as the sure and exclusive possessor, than it is to call upon them to attempt, independently, a critical evaluation of competing culture. To put it. a little differently: the search for truth is an arduous intellectual process, so that any system that. attributes to itself absolute certainty will have immense attraction for the lazy minded and semi-educated. It excuses them from the necessity to think, and it gives them something for which to live and work. The Communists know this, and in China are making the most of it.. Nowthat it has the support of a safe majority of the intellectuals, the Communist government is redoubling its indoctrination program among the masses. This, it must be agreed, looks at first blush like a genuine effort to benefit the people and raise their cultural level. Under the Kuomintang regime elementary education had made great strides, but 80 percent. of the population were still illiterste when the Communists took over. The Communist study program thus puts itself forward as, find, of all, an attempt. to remove illiteracy while at the same time providing mass education and entertainment. This interest in popular culture, even if it is simulated, as it almost certainly is, could hardly have failed in a country like China to win the people's gratitude. The fact that a certain mci- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 479 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 U. 411' dence of literacy and "culture" is an operational necessity for Communism since the Com- munist philosophy works through concepts, and mince concepts can most easily be conveyed via communication, is lost on the masses The aim of Communist propaganda in China is precisely to uproot and destroy the animal aelf-sufficiency, individualism, and piety of the Chinese petunia, and to put in its place a new mentality, susceptible to jargon and group influence, and therefore may manageable in the interests of the government. Already symptoms of this new mentality are apparent in every class of the Chinese people. however, there are also indications of waning enthusiasm among the people in Communist China. COMMUNISM AND COMMUNICATION The Totalitarian Potters In the totalitarian state all media of communication are state controlled. In the demo- cratic state most communication media are commercial enterprises. In the United States, for example, newspapers, publishing companies, radio networks, and movie studios are primarily run under private auspices. For the most part, they "sell" the American way of life, and at one time or another cooperate with the government on this or that. specific program. They are not, however, obliged to do propaganda work for the government., in the sense of being subjected to punitive sanctions if they do not. In Soviet Russia, by contrast, all these industries are, as a matter of course, distributors of government propa- ganda. The Communist, way of life, avowedly materialistic and utilitarian, runs to come extent counter to natural sentiments and feelings, so that the atmosphere of assurance about the underlying doctrine has to be artificially re-created each day by huge networks of indoc- trination and recreation. Communist. China's mass communications system is now approaching the Soviet pattern; indeed, the fact that Communism is not yet firmly established in China makes, in some respects, for greater not lesser emphasis on the selling of ideology than one finds in the USSR. The tacit premise is that everybody during every waking hour, whether he is at work or play and whether he is aware of what is happening or not, should be moved a little closer toward becoming a thoroughly cooperative participant in the total production or war effort. The technique used is, avowedly, that of behaviorist, conditioning, the end result of which is that a person accepts what he is told as truth, and i3 IO think only in certain predetermined channels. Readers of Brave New World and 1934 know where the technique logieally leads; and if it has not yet done so in China, this is because in that country it runs up against a deeply ingrained traditional heritage of skepticism and lack of enthusiasm for impersonal causes. In short, Communist indoctrination tactics and procedure have not yet been able to transform the Chinese into automatons. But unless some internal or external force upsets the Communist govcrnment and its pror agnnda machinery, the moment may net be far away when the Chinese people will have been completely brutalized, and will have been cut off from the old cultural traditions that have preserved some of its sanity and good sense up to the present time. Governmental Control and Policy Government in Communist China, then, is not merely an organ for legislation and administration. It is a machine for the manufacture of consensus, whose end-product, if it, functions as intended, will be an artificially created will of the people that, corresponds as a matter of course to Communist policy. The I'cople's Government includes, to he sure, a variety of democrtaie group, but the power of making decisions rests, indisputably, with the Communist Party. The non-Party members who hold top positions in the government 480 STAT .? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release JA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 "N. are to all intents and purpoesea indistinguishable from the Party members. Kuo Mo-jo, for example, who is Vico-Premier of the Administrative Council and Chairman of the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, is not a Party member, but he had been one of the most zealous promoters of the Communist cause lintg before he occupied any important post in the government. Even the so-called democratic parties are merely pro-Communist factions of the ICuomintang, which, in any case, have na choice but to "cooperate" with the Communist Party; i.e., they have no bargaining position from which to insist on policies of their own. There is, then, no question of the propaganda machine's being used even marginally, to sell put:cies that are not Communist. The Central Committee The Central Committee of the Communist Party, in any cam, makes the major deci- sions on propaganda and assigns missions pertaining to both propaganda and education to the government's Department of Propaganda. The Central Committee is the higher deliberative organ, making its decisions felt through its vatioua well-disciplined Party offices; the Administrative Council of the government is reaponsible for implementing the Committee's decisions, and seeing to it that they effectively reach every clam of people. WithIn the administrative apparatus, the tasks of "education and culture" are apportioned among the Mittlara ef Culture, the Ministry of Education, the Mini!ary of Health, the Information Administration, the News Administration, the Publications Administration, and the Academy of Sciences ? all directly under the Administrative Council. A special Committee on Culture and Educational Affairs is maintained within the administrative apparatus to direct and coordinate the work done in these ministries and administrations. The Ministry of Culture Among all these ministries, the Ministry of Culture is that which performs the major functions relating to propaganda. It consists of the following: Arts Bureau, Science Popu- larization Bureau, Social Cultural Enterprise Bureau, Bureau of Dramatic and Vaudeville Reform, Liaison Bureau for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Central Institute of Drama, Cental Conservatory, Central Institute of the Arts, Central Institute of Litera- ture, and Chinese Opera Research Institute. The very titles are a sufficient indication of the extent of the Communists' ambition to reform and control the cultural life of the nation. In addition, the government maintains centralized communications agencies. Tho publication and distribution of hooka, for example, is for the most part entrusted to the Hain Una (New China) Bookstore. The distribution of domestic news, similarly, is entrusted to the NCNA (New China News Agency); except for foreign news, most of which is supplied by Tam, all the news appearing in Chinese newspapers comes from NCNA. There is simtlar centralized control of education, broadcasting, the film industry, etc. The Common Program The cultural and educational policy behind thin rigid government control of all media of communication is outlined in the Common Program adopted daring the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in September 1949: Article 41: The culture and education of the People's Republic of China are now democratic, that is, national, scientific., and popular. The main tredzs for raising the cultural level of the people are training of personnel for national construction work, liquidating or feudal, compratlore, fascist ideology, and developing of the ideology of serving the people. Article 42 Love for the fatherland and the people, love of labor, love of science, and the taking earn of public property shall be promoted as thc public spirit of all nationals of the People's Republic of China. 481 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 O / Article 43: Efforts ehall be made to develop the natural sciences ao ea to place them at the service of Industrial, agricultural, and national defense construction. Scientific sits' ioveries and inventions shall be encouraged sr.d rewarded nd cientific knowbsige shell be popularised. ' Article 44: The application of a scientific historical viewpoint to the study a and interpretation of a s? history, economies, polities, culture, and international affairs shall be promoted. Outstanding works of social ocience shall be encouraged e.nd rewarded. Article 45: Literature and the arta shall be Anoted to serve the people, to enlighten the political consciousness of the people. ard to enenurage the labor enthusiasm of the people. Outstanding works of literature rind a;ta shall be encouraged and rewarded. The pe,lite'a drama and cinema than 1,e developeo. Article 46. The method of education of the People'a Republic of China is the unity of theory and practice. The People's Government shall return: the old tacatioied syatern, subject matter and teaching method systematically according to plan. Article 47: In order to meet the nidespread needs of revolutionary work and national construction work, universal education shall be ciuried out, iniddle and higher eduattion shall be strengthened, technical education ahall be atreed, the education of workers during their spare time runt education of cadres who are at their poets shall be strengthened, and revolutionary political education shall be accorded to young intellectuals and old style intellectuals in ft planned and systematic manner. Article 43: National sports shall be promoted. Public F--aith and medical work shall be-extended and attention shall be paid to safeguarding the health of mothers, infants, and children. Article 49: Freedom of reporting true news shrill be es.feguarsicd. The utilization of the prcas to shunter, to undermine the intent s of the state and the people, and to provoke %%odd war is prohibited. The people's brnadeasting work and the people's publication work shall be developed, and attention paid to publishing popular books and newspapera beneficial to the people. The Propaganda Machine The government evidently cannot carry out such a program merely by controlling communications alone. It. must atlso organize the workers in cultural and educational enterprises, and actively mobilize them behind the program's purposes. The total Com- munist propaganda machine is thus engaged, on the one hand, in supervising and controlling aII media cf communication, and, on the other, in the active training and organization of personnel. During Kuomintang days, there was no government pressure on cultural and propa- ganda workers to organize. Such organizations as did exist were as often its not Marxist (e.g., the Lmgue of Left-wing Writers in the early thirties). In the cultural and entertain- ment world of the time, characterized by sharp opposition between the old and the new, the progressive writers and cultural workers were mostly Leftists and thus vehemently opposed to Kuomintang policies. The old-school artists, writers, and actors stuck to their decaying traditions, and were mostly nonpolitical. In neither group were there voluntary propagandists for the Kuomintang. Both for this reason and because they were organized, the Communist and Leftist cultiiral workers hail a fairly free hand; they were able, for example, to monopolize the book market, on the high whoal and college level. Th s Communist government had. in other words, merely to univentalize a pattern that the prerevolutionary Leftists bequeathed to them, and they have already extended it to all the art, literary, entertainment, and scientific workers in the land. The All-China Federation of Art and Literary Circles, for example, today includes virtually every known name in China's art, literature, theater, and music worlds. (Its Chairman is Kuo Mo-jo; its Vice Chairmen, Mao Tun and Chou Yang.) Yet it convened its first meeting immedi-. ately after the founding of the People's Republic, that is, as recently as September 1019. 'Lite Federation has seven divisions ? literature, drama, music, fine arts, cinema, dancing, art, and opera reform. Only a few intellectuals and artists have kit China for Taiwan (Formosa) and Hong Kong since the Communists crime to power, so that. to say it includes nearly every known name in its several fields is to say also that. it includes many non-Com- munists and nonprogressives. Along with those of progressive theater and movie workers, 482 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release riA_RnpRi_nin4f1Ron4000020007-4 STAT -??? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 one finds such ren wned names in Peking Opera as Mei Lan-fang, Chou IIsin-fang, Chtng Yen-chou, and sucl representatives of second-rate local entertainment as the star of the Shao-htsing opera, Clan lisi-ftng. Along with modern cartoonists are such exponents of traditional Chinese rt as the 90-odd-year-old Ch'i Pai-shih. MI this indicates more than anything else the nature and extent of the coordinated indoctrination program that the government intends tA carry through. The pattern eaten& also to the amateur level: there are educational opportunities and recreational outlets for workers, peasants, students, soldiers, and the urban population in general. The counterpart of this active propaganda approach is frequent popular demonstra- tions of loyalty to the Communist government and Party. The Kuomintang did not minister in any way to the desire for learning and for creative expression among the less educated. As this chapter will make abundantly clear, the Communist government has succeeded in turning that desire to its own ends. During the period of the liberation, it undoubtedly evoked demonstrations of loyalty from the people that were without precedent, and that contributed greatly to the initial consolidation of the regime. The Communist government sees to it that not only the Party, government cadres, and the professional educational and cultural workers, but. various other categories of people are so organized as to participate directly in such demonstrations. The MI-China Federation of Labor, the MI-Chinn Federation of Democratic Women, the All-China League of Democratic Youth, the All-China Federation of Students, the Committee for Defense of World Peace, are all popular organizations of which it makes good use in this regard. To this, however, one must add that these efforts now appear to be reaching the point of diminishing returns, and that, even from the beginning, the indoctrination program, despite what is mid about peoples' demonstrations, had no easy sledding. Tho reasons for this are very simple. If the Communists had chosen to devote themselves to the building of an independent and strong China, the Chinese people would have rallied overwhelmingly to their support and would, moreover, have freely accepted such ideological training and hard labor as the Communists might have demanded of them in the name of that objective. In point of fact, however, the Communists did not make that choice. Rather, they have made it their business to construct a new social order in China, and to do the bidding of the Soviet. Union in the sphere of foreign policy, both of which visibly militate against coopera- tive effort toward national reconstruction; both have greatly complicated the Communists' task in domestic propaganda. The reader will readily understand this if lie imagines himself trying to explain to a Chinese pcivant why the man power and resources that have gone into the Korean War would not better have been used to put the Chinese domestic economy on a reasonably sound footing. The Communists' response has been to double and ledouble the size of their propaganda campaigns: as they have done, for instance, in the face of popular indifference to their "Resist the US-Aid Korea" slogan. In a word, the Chinese Communists are deeply committed to a program of radical social change and to the i impart of Soviet Russia in international politics; as large numbers of the recipients of their domestic propaganda clearly see, they nre not only not dictated by Chinese interests, but actually work against them. And they are having great difficulty, in consequence, in selling their slogans, despite the extreme technical excellence of their propaganda. Targets of Propaganda The purpose of contemporary Chinese Communist propaganda, then, is to help make China over into a Communist state, able to take its place in the fraternity of Communist nations under Soviet leadership. This, in a nation that is largely illiterate and, above all, practical-minded, cannot be accomplished by disseminating the doctrine of dialectical Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 483 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? I. materialiam. Marxism-Leninism, as far as popular propaganda is concerned, is merely a matter of teaching people to distinguish between "enemies" and "friends." The US, the lCuomintang, and the exploiting classes are "enemies" of the Communist Party, and the Soviet Union is "friend." This, is a major emphasis of Chinese Communist domestic propaganda. In Mao Tse-tun's Da People's Democratic Dictatorship, China is duel ibed as a feudal, semi-colonial country under imperialist dominatissi Establishment of the New Democracy, the phrase he used to designate the transitional period prior to the full adoption of Com- munism, calls for the liquidation of all feudal, colonial, and imperialist forces, 60 that any petson (or class) who supports or connives with these forces is an enemy of the people. According to the earlier, more generous definition, "people" includea the working class, the peasant class, the petty-bourgeoisie, and Chinese (as opposed to foreign) capitalists. More recently, the definition has clearly changed so as to exclude the remnants of the la-It-named group. The enemies of the people include Kuomintang officials and agents; those also have collaborated with Japanese and/or American imperialism, landlords, corrupt merchants, and industrialists. The organ responsible for popularizing the Soviet alliance is the Sino-Soviet Friendship Associatkin. its chairman is the leading Communist theorist, Liu Shno-chi. Founded in October 1019, it now has 3,000,000 members, and 1,700 branches throughout the country. Its headquarters in Peking presides over a general effort to familiarize the Chinese people with the facts about the Soviet Union, most especially its alleged cultural and scientific achievements. A word must, be said about each of the two groups within China receiving the brunt of the Communists' propaganda onslaught ? the "lan(llords" and the "counterrevolu- tionaries." The landlords must not be confused with the socio-economic class that this term suggests in the United States. Land cultivation in China is intensive, and land- holdings, by American standards, extremely small. In consequence, the landlords were a weak group, even from a strictly economic point of view, long before the Communids took over. 1)uring and even before the war income from the land was meagre at best, and lagged far behind the rapidly rising costs of living. The countryside was, moreover, constantly being overrun ? first by bandits, then Communist troops, then Japanese troops? so that the landlords could not count on any return from their holdings. Many of them moved during those years into cities, and sent their sons to college, with the result that many of the latter turned their backs on the land in favor of some business or professional activity. Under the Communists, the landlords' position has taken a sharp turn for the worse, if for no other reason than their dependence on the services of tenants and agricultural labor, both of which arc increasingly difficult to find. In short, the landlords are a condemned group quite independently of the campaign of hatred and extinction the Communists are waging against them; this should be borne in mind as one reads of the public trials in which they are accused of heinous crimes, vilified, abused, and finally given the death penalty. Yet all propaganda media continue to depict the landlords as rivals of the Renaissance Italian aristocrats, with. an infinite capacity for oppression, usury, rapine, and indiscriminate cruelty. They continue to be executed in large numbers, and yet their alleged victims, the peasants, fare no better than before, and, with current tax levels and current practices regarding the requisition of foodstuffs, cannot hope to fare better within the foreseeable future. As for the counterrevolutionaries, variously called reactionaries, Kuomintang agents, or running-dogs, this is merely n catch-all category for all actual or potential, real or sup- posed, opponents of the regime. Most so-called counterrevolutionaries are, when appro- 484 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: -;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 .";1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? betided and tried, given the death sentence; the remainder, except for a negligible few who go free, arc given a conditional death sentence, i.e., two year of hard labor during which they are to reform themselves (if they fail to show improvement at the end of two years, they will be put to death). In this group belong, of course, the active guenllas, and till who ;lave taken part in uprisirn.s against the Communist tyranny. The guerilla forces on the mainland have now been decimated, but loval uprisings continue in spite of the ruthless punizliment meted out. The South Chinese, noted for their independent spirit, have been the most conatant offenders against the regime, and have suffered, in coeseqtiefice, the most severe retaliatory measures. The main target of propaganda attack is the United States. In all propaganda the US L s pointed out as the chief enemy of Ciliate Since historical evidence with which to hack up this ehatze is difficult. to marshal out of the past, the propaganda writers concentrate their efforts on recent happenings, where they have a free hand in the matter of interpreta- tion. The instances of US aggression on which they chiefly rely are three in number: the Korean War, the Japanese treaty and the rearmament of Japan, and US intervention in Taiwan (Formosa). Of these, the most profitable from the Communist point of view has undoubtedly been the second. Japan is China's traditional enemy, and now that the US is clearly helping Japan, it can be made to appear that the U.S has always been behind Japanese aggression in China. On the positive side, the propaganda output emphasizes the changes on glorification of the worker, the peasant, the Communist soldier, and on the apotheosis of Stalin and the Chinese Communist leaders. The primary propaganda aim of the Communist government is achieved just to the extent that the majority of Chinese see themselves as the "people," recognize the Communist. Party as their benefactor, Soviet Rtmia as their ally and brother, and willingly cooperate with the government, in promoting production and exposing and denouncing all reactionary and saboteur elements as their enemy. BOOKS Introduction The average Chinese adopts a much less critical attitude toward the books and news- papers he reads than his counterpart in countries where education is more or less universal. The Communists' only quarrel with this is that the readers are too few in number; hence this emphasis on primary and supplementary education, which may be described as a con - mous attempt to mas.s-pmduce readers whose critical faculties are so undeveloped that they will believe whatever they read. M for the intellectuals, i.e., those with developed critical faculties, the Communists handle them by keeping them busy manufacturing propaganda, the ideal state of affairs, from the Communist, point of view, being one in which everybody is either a victim of propaganda or a maker of propaganda. The professor may very well harbor anti-Communist thnughts, but he is expeeted to turn out article sf ter article testify- ing to his belief in Communism. Though no believer in Communism, he miiat see to it that his public utterances show him to be a loyal supporter of the prment government. and its political tendencies. This makes it possible for the Communists to pour out a constant. stream of publications, capable of supplying the ideological nectls of all educational levels of the population. Their confidence in verbal propaganda WI the most effective means of indoctrinntion, is, apparently, unshaken by the fact that. it has not, thee far, been particu- larly successful. The tuditional educational system in China was such that a man either received thorough grounding in the Confucian classics, or he received no book learning whatever. It was only with the creation, in republican China, of a "modern" educational aystern that 485 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ? -- the country began to develop a class of people subject to ideological influences and yet untouched by traditional wisdom. Members of this class, who may be described as the half-educated, arc for various reasons deeply conscious of the importance of creating a strong and independent Chinn, but. have never had any opportunity to develop the faculty of judging and thinking for themselves. They are eager to learn, but able to think only in strictly utilitarian terms. Communist prop: gamin has, in general, had its easiest conquests among this class; in part because for a considerable period during and before the war, most nontraditional books published in China were Leftist in tendency, if not positively Communist. The Chinese do not particularly object to bad binding, paper, and type. It is, therefo:e, easy to manufacture books and pamphlets in Chins at low cost, although in the past the more respeemble publishers have, in general, not chosen to do so. The largest book firms in China, the Commercial Press and the Chung Hua Book Company, for example, once published fine reprints of tho best editions of Chinese classics, and numerous books on academic subjects that could not possibly have a large sale, making up their losses on these books by profits on the government-approved textbooks they published for school and college use. (The Kuomintang organ, the Chang Chung Book Company, published, besides government-approved books, studies in Kuomintang ideology.) The best sellers in pre-Communist days were mostly works of fiction and topical journalism published by smaller firms like the Communist Shen-mo Bookstore. There was a considerable number of these small presses in China, and they published a good deal of material that appealed to students and to serious-minded adults. Translations of Russian woiks, for example, were quite popular: novels like Silently Flows the Don, Days anit Nights, Cement, have all been translated into Chinese not once but several times. As far as the intellectual reading public was concerned, the Communist government inherited a situation very much to its liking. The "Great Books" Since the Communist government, is engaged in ideological education of the masses, rather than of the intellectuals, book publication at present makes scant appeal to the latter. Moreover, the books published in Communist China, both fiction and nonfiction, are mostly propaganda. A recent survey shows that 20.7 percent of the books published by the Hein Hua Bookstore are works on ideology and polities clearly intended t3 indoctrinate, and only 15.9 percent are belles-lettres, even if propagandist fiction is included along with books on literature and the arts. The fact that books on political subjects sell better than fiction is, to be sure, not surprising. In China today there is a great demand for "learning," and any Chinese unacquainted with Marxism feels that he must do something about it, which usually means starting out with some introductory works on ideology. Just as in Nazi Germany I litter's Mein Kampf was a best seller, so books by Mao Tse-tung and other Communist leaders are widely read in present-day China. As for the cadres and Party members, ?vhose need for correct ideology is, on the Communist. view, even more acute, twelve basic books on Marxism-Leninism are prescribed: Marx and Engels: The Communist Manifesto; The Ideology and Methodology of Marx and Engels (compiled by the Liberation Press); Engels: Socialism, Utopian and Smentifut; Lenin: The Stale and Revolution; Lenin: Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism; Lenin' Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder; Stalin Foundations of Leninism; Lenin and Stalin on China, compiled by the Liberation Press; Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, by the Central Committee of the CPSU: Iscontiev: Political Economy; The History of Social Development, compiled by the Liberation Press; Lenin and Stalin on the Socialist Economy, compiled by the Liberation Press. 486 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? As required reading, these books are much in demand. Recently it was authoritatively estimated that. three million copies of them were available on the shelves of bookstores. Publishing Houses The history of the Hein IIIla Bookstore, today the largest. Chinese enterprise engaged in printing and distributing books, shows very clearly what has been happening to the book- publishing industry since the Communists took over. As recently as 1938, the Hein Hua 13ookstore was a small bookshop which had been established by five Communist cadres in Sui-te, Shensi wider the name Northwest Resist-Japan Bookstore. It greatly expanded its business during and after the war, and by 1951 had 887 branches, with SO printing shops comprising about one-fourth of China's total printing capacity. Plans for the Hain Hun Bookstore's 1951 operations called for the sale of 347,000,000 volt:44es to the Chinese public, no less than 100,000,000 of which were to deal specifically with the Resist US-Aid Korea Campaign. Even if one bears in mind that the books it publishes run, for the most part, from twenty to eighty pages; these figures are impressive. (The figure for the Anti-US-Aid Korea publishing effort confirms, however, one point about the resistance the Communists 'tare run up against in this phase of their propaganda.) Another important publishing agency is the International Bookstore, founded as recently as 1 December 1049 as a subsidiary of the Soviet International Book Company. It. distributes books and periodicals, in both Chinese and Russian, that. have been printed in the USSR for distribution in China. Its output in Chinese is, for the most part, transla- tioss of Soviet books. Between December 1947 and February 1950 it reportedly sold 772,440 books and 601,252 periodicals. This vigorous Communist penetration of the book-publishing field has been accom- panied by a program of systematic suppression and destruction of books printed before the liberation. The larger book firms, like the Commercial Press and Chung Hua, have been virtually eliminated as competitors of the Communist. presses. They were allowed to retain in their deposits only a fraction of the twenty thousand titles they were publishing, and even these are to lapse as soon as the present stocks have been sold. The rest of their stock was converted into pulp. This kind of vandalism is without parallel in all Chinese history, at least since the legendary burning of books by the First Emperor of the Ch'in dynasty, in the third century, n.c. Nor has any serious attempt been made to replace the destroyed items with Marxist-slanted books on the same or at least comparable subjects, especially Chinese history and culture. Most of the hooks being published in Communist China have no scholarly pretensions whatever; they are designed to fill propaganda needs, and do not profess to be designed for anything else Along with books on political and ideological subjects, there is now, therefore, a huge output of literary and journalistic work glorifying the Party, the People's Liberation Army, the pea.sants, and the workers, and vilifying the Kuomintang, landlords, the United States, and other imperialist and reactionary "elements." People with developed literary tastes are, to say the least, unlikely to read any of this flood of publiratiohs for any purpose other than that of seeing what the Communists are doing. This is partly the result of what writing under a Communist regime does for an author's spontaneity and inventiveness; it is also partly the result of the very hatred the regime breathes ? a hatred that, colors even the love it professes for the proletariat. Literature that traffics in clear-cut alternatives between heroism and villainy degenerates unavoidably into melodrama, and thus cheapens its heroes. Communist literature rarely rises above this level. 487 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: .01A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ^ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Literary Weaknesses One of the common themes in current Chinese fiterature is the promise of happiness for China's peasants once the land reform luta been effectuated. One might expect that since the issue of so-called land reform is no longer in doubt, there would begin to be produced an intelligent dialeisticul treatment of the relation between letallord and peasant. But what, the literature in fact does is to present the landlord in the blackest colors possible: he oppresses his tenants and peasants, he rapes women, he keeps concubines, he smokes opium; as often as not, he formerly collaborated with the Japanese-controlled puppet government in its attempt to suppress the Communist guerillas. Of course the fact that he is made out such a complete villain, devoid of humanity, makes him, propagandistically speaking, less effective than he might be for the Communists' own purposes. Tim first test of literature is that it aheuld be interesting, and moat of the literature turned out, in Communist. China, despite its heavy mixture of sadism, is dull. Leading Communist critics are not unaware of these shortcomings of China's current literary output,. But their dis.satisfactien with the literary workers is restricted at every possible opportunity. The makers of literature must, they are told, develop a correct ideology, and master the elementary literary skill needed to put thinga across. It might he argued that the remedy is not more criticism, or even "self-criticism," but one the Com- munists cannot apply: to set the writer free to write about things they know and for which they care. When the present-day Chinese writer puts words on paper, he has and need have only one concern: to produce a concoction that, will meet the approval of the Party Chief. As indicated previously, it does not make a difference whether the writer is a genuine Communist or a time-server; the one turns out an end-product that is just. as banal and superficial as the other. Only the sadism demonstrably serves a propagandistic purpose: it habituates the reader to cruelty and injustice, and diverts his attention from his own state of frustration. Standard Themes The standard themes of this literature are: the heroism and prowess of Communist soldiers and cadres in the Anti-Japanese War; the War of Liberation; the Korean War; the evils of the ICuomintang and the Japanese and American imperialists; the delights of pastoral life in the People's Liberation Army and among the liberated peasants; the libera- tion of women from feudal forces; and the production achievements anti happy life of the country's industrial workers. The once-popular theme of conversion on the part of intellec- tuals and petty-bourgeois (most Leftist writers were of petty-bourgeois origin and could write about this from personal experience) is now discouraged since the peasants and workers have crowded the petty-bourgeoisie off the stage. Posters, Comic Strips, and Picture Books Although the anti-illiteracy movement in China is extremely vigorous, the number of people who can rend is still a small minority of the total population. In their determination to influence directly the masses of the population, the Communists have increasingly oriented the publishing industry toward the requirements of the illiterate and semi-literate, that is, toward posters and cartoons, comic strips, and picture books. Slogans were the mainstay of official Chinese propaganda even in the days of the Kuomintang, which made a great to (lo of shouting them during rallies and posting them on walls and in other conspicuous places. The Communists are past masters at this sort of thing, but, unlike the Kuomintang, they place their main emphasis on pictures, especially pictures that can be counted on for immediate visual impact. During every parade and in 488 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? ever) office building people see, for example, portrait after portrait of Mao Tse-tung and Stalin Similarly, caricatures of Chiang Kaisshek, of the stars-and-striped Uncle Sam, of Trumap, Acheson, MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Dulles are in every magazine and newpaper and on 'every poster. Chiang Kai-shek, by Chinese standards a more handsome man than Mao, appears as a bald-headed pigmy with contorted features. The Voice of America hos been held up to ridicule in a cartoon of Truman breaking wind before a microphone. The Communists know that among the less educated such ribaldry passes for cleverness and draws genuine laughter. Comic strips have a much longer history behind them in China than in the US. Forty- or fifty-page comic books, with a picture and an explanatory caption on each page, were the staple attraction of street cireulating libraries in China as long ago as the end of the Ch'ing dynasty (1912). Often fifty to a hundred volumes are required to tell a single complete story, and the pictures are crudely drawn; but their regular consumers ? the ricksha pullers, the apprentices, the small children, and the housewives-- object neither to their bulk nor to their crudity, and find them immensely entertaining. In their early days, most picture books recounted historical romances and adventures; practically every dynasty had its rich cycles of heroes and deities, so that materials were never wanting. Later, popular novels and movies were made into comic strips. The Communist government early recognized the propaganda potentialities of this medium, and launched a new series of picture books for the street libraries. Instead of armored and plumed warriors the ricksIss-puller now has the Liberation Army; instead of Taoist monks, he is served up recluses, landlords, peasants, and workers. The new books have less audience appeal than the old ones, which, like their American counterparts, "shot the works" on variety of incident and on adventure. The Communist stories, by comparison, are stereotyped and monotonous ? necessarily, since there are few directions in which the plot, of a Communist story can move ? while the old stories, helped along by the fantasy and superstition the Communists deplore, could run into almost interminable serials. Unless Communist artists devise new ways of interesting the "readers," China's entswes will continue to yearn for the old-type strips. Textbooks The area in which totalitarian control over publishing is producing the most far- reaching consequences is that of textbooks for use in the public schools. in Kuomintang days, textbooks were compiled by the editorial boards of the major book firms, under the nominal supervision of the Ministry of Education. Their major vice, it can safely be said, was dullness. The history textbooks, for example, set down dry fact after dry fact, without any attempt whatever at over-all interpretation. Textbooks on Chinese literature were mere anthologies of classical and modern prose and poetry, completely innocent of ideological or critical tendency. The Communists have completely changed all that. The textbooks on social sciences and the arts, for example, have been completely rewritten to embody the Marxist viewpoint. If the subject is world history, this is a feasible enterprise. But no thorough Marxist reinterpretation of Chinese history yet exists, so that the writers or texts on Chinese subjects are still, so to speak, feeling their way. Their chief whipping-boys, up to the moment, are the many monarchical rulers in China's past who used the services of the bureaucratic literati Their chief heroes, whom they have seized upon in an attempt. to prove the existence of the class at niggle in Chinese history, are the leaders of and partici- pants in the peasant rebellions of other days. 'rhis has run them into some difficulties: The successful peasant rebels, e.g., the founders of the Ilan and Ming dynasties, invariably aligned themselves with the literati once they were in power, and became the perpetuators of "feudalism." The unreserved praise of the Communist historian goes, therefore, only Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 489 STA Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 DIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1 1 7-- ? to the pea&ant rebels who did not succeed: !Luang Clear) at the end of the Tang dynasty, Li Ter-chic:rig and Chang Ilsien-chung at the end of the Ming dynasty, and Hung Ilmiu-eleuan, the leader of the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion. According to official Chinese history, of course, all of thew were unaerupulous bandits and killers, and the Communists are having a hard time, this late in the day, whitewn.shing their evil deeds. The line is, moreover, a dangerous one for a tyrannical regime to play with; in glorifying the rebels of the past, it may he teaching the lessons that will produce new eelbAlions if Communism contitittest to dissatisfy the Chinese populace. The Kuomintang history textbooks always had something to say about the positive achievements of Chinese civilization. The Communists make 110 such how to the pest, as may be seen in the way in which a current history textbook quietly disposes of Confuciva: Kung Chiu was a petty aristocrat of the hu State. Ile was well-versed in feudalism. Not being very lucky in politics, he turned to teaching. Ile upheld feudalism and emphasized Ole clarsRytrm. lie urged the people to be loyal to the crnialor and was thus the mentor of conservatives and aristocrats. Ile had ninny disciples. Kung Ch'iss was allowsl by various feudalistic emperor who came later, was looked upon as a saint, and was adslrmsed a Kung Fu-tzti. The point here is not that the Communists are the first Chinese political movement to speak ill of Confucius, for that sort of thing dates back at least to the 'Allay Fourth Move- ment. What is important is the reduction of an important and highly controversial figure in the history of Chinese thought. to the status af a petty aristocrat at the service of some- thing called feudalisrn, the smug superiority this implied toward all Chinese history and culture, and the willingness to ignore indisputable historical fact in favor of a preconceived formula. The following passage from the same history text bhows what China's youth are today being taught about. the whole scholar claw of the past: scholars sought a good life. and yet they despised laborers who lived by their own etTorta. So the scholars went to work for the rich and the powerful, and in this way obtained fine clothes and luvuzies for themselves, and were able to support all their faradic& Then. why should the rich and the powerful have favored the scholars? They did so because the scholans could draw up plans for their masters, proclaim their fame, and fortify their pwsitions. If the masters did not treat their scholars wel!. they would have gone over to their enemies and have worked for them. It, was, in point of fact, the essence of the tradition to train scholars in the OJnfucian ideal of serving the people, but nothing is said about this whatever. Everything must be made to fit in with the Communist dogma that mere selfish interest, whether of an individual or of a claw, determines all that happens in history. The junior middle schools (i.e, the 7th, 8th, and 9th grades) offer world history and Chinese history, along with a course on the Modern World Revolution. In the senior middle schools, the students are taught. from a Chinese Revolution Reader, a History of the Chinese New Democracy Revolution, a History of the Chinese Modern Revolutwnary Movement, and three other books on Chinese history with more conventional titles. In all history books it in taught that, just as the capitalist order replaced the feudal order, the socialist order will inevitably replace capitalism The United States, as the only powerful capitalist country in the present-day world, comes under constant vituperative attack. The students, like the readers of the huge output of journalistic and literary work mentioned previously, learn to think of America as it land of capitalist luxury, fanatical war-mongering, labor discontent, unemployment, and vice, though her as with the peasant rebels the war of the indoctrinator i3 not easy intellectually! There is at once the emphasis that the US is a "paper tiger," i.e., not. to be feared, and yet a center of world aggression whose challenge can be met only by heroic measures 490 .........?????????????????????????? .STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 KEIV8PA PERS Communist China's newspapers and magazines, which, of course, ani characterized by the same propaganda empha.sis, make the same kind of bid for num support of the cur- rent, government programs. Prewar Status In the prewar period China, despite its high illiteracy rate, had a highly developed press, with a daily output impressive in quantity and quality. The leading (lanai in Shang- hai, e.g., !lain Win Pao and Shun Pao were almost as thick as The New York TiM1.3. Shanghai alone had some twenty large-size ne-sspapers, not including the big English- language dailies such as the China Press, North China Daily news and the US-sponsored Shanghai Evening Post. If sin Wen Pao and Shun Pao were commercial enterprises, rarely advocating policies of their own, neither supporting nor opposing the government, and devoting large amounts of apace to advertisements. The main ICuomintang organ was the Central Daily News, published in Nanking. It was generally agreed that the best prewar newspaper was Ta Kung Pao, which fluted for impartial news coverage and ustuto editorials on world and Chinese events. It appeared daily in Tientsin, Shanghai, and hong Kong. Most dailies carried ono-page or half-page literary sections offering readers a regular diet of humor, gossip, and fiction By the time of the Sino-Japanese War, however, many of these literary supplements had taken on a Leftist tinge that by no means reflected the views of the newspapers' owners and managers. An example is the famous "Liberty Section" of Shun Pao. Cities like Shanghai had tabloid papers, devoted to sensational news and to goings-on in the amusement world. During the war all these newspapers shrank in size, in part because of a paper shortage, in part because of rising production costs. After the war, most of the big newspapers moved back to their former homes in Shanghai, Nanking, Peking, and Tientsin. In Man- churia and other Communist areas, there developed a rash of Communist newspapers. Present-Day Publications The leading Communist newspaper at present is Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily News), published in Peking and distributed throughout China. Another important party organ is Chieh Pang Jih Pao (Liberation Daily), published in Shanghai and other important cities. Each city and hsien (prefecture) has its local papers, but these meetly follow the pattern of the two big dailies. During the period following the Communist take-over, the Chinese newspapers devoted very little space to news. Rather, they served an gazettes of government regulations and orders, and devoted their editorials and literary supplements to ideological indoctrination. The Communists soon discovered that these practices discouraged circulation; people expected to find international and national news in their newspapers, and, when given the opportunity, showed they wanted it even in the distorts(' form in which it is supplied by the NCNA and Tam. At pro: ent the newspapers pretty much conform to prewar patterns. Article 49 of the Common Program reads: "Freedom of reporting true news shall be safeguarded The utilization of the Press to slander, to undermine the interests of the State and the people, and to provoke world war is prohibited." The first of these sentences must be rend in the context of the second, which is nothing if not candid on all points except one, namely, that the decision as to what constitutes slander or what will undermine the interests of the State will be made by the government, so that "true news" is news that the govern- ment declares true. The press, in short, is free only in the very special Communist sense of this term, which excludes all criticism el the government except on minor details of 491 ????????.. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved .;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 for Release 50-Yr 2014/04/03 program enforcement. The freedom even operates retroactively: a newspaper frequently "apologizm" to the public when it discovers it has printed "erroneous" news and com- l. mentaries, or carries a statement from a department store or theater apologizing for its having used "wrong" advertising techniques by exploiting the latent bourgeois sentiments of it. potential patrons. In short, before the new regime came into power, one eould get. a pretty dear picture of what. was going on both in China and in the outside world by com- paring reports from the United Press, Reuters, and TIM. Now the Chinese read only government-spproved news, and no Chinese can be expected, or hirncelf expect, to know what. is happening in China and the rest of the world. The statistica about present-day Chinese newspapers are extremely confusing. Accord- ' I ing to a survey made in 1950, there are 624 newspapers, of which 165 arc dailies and 216 Army publications. A further survey, by no means exhaustive, made in May of the same year, indicates tlutt 150 of these dailies have a total circulation of 2,600,000 copies, which is I quite small, given China's vast population. As of October 1951, Kim Mo-jo reported that there were 475 nes.varspers above the village level, 1,000 newspapers on the hricn (pre- fectural) level, and nswspapers within the armed forces with an aggregate yearly circulation of hUMC 7,000,000, again a sinall figure. Even if it is assumed that the population is still SO percent illiterate, there should be at. least. 60,000,000 potential newspaper readers in China. It should not be surprising to learn that the propaganda officers of the Communist Party have of late been expressing concern over the people's "indifference" toward the Party's newspapers. The Propaganda Department, of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party reported that. Jen Min Jih Pao, which had been expected to sell 63,919 copies in that Administrative Area by the end of 1951, had been selling only above 46,000 copies. In Shanghai the comparable figures were 17,320 and 6,400 respectively. Chieh Fang Jih Pao, with a projected circulation of 143,500 in East. China by the end of 1951, was selling only 105,200. Furthermore, these totals include copies delivered to various government and Party offices, where ordinary people have no access to them. Propaganda The chief thing to be said about Communist newspaper propaganda is that it goes forward within limits that make it, impassible for it to be very interesting. One knows what, the day's newspaper is going to say before one picks it up: all the Soviet-bloc countries aro heading for peace and prosperity, and all anti-Soviet countries are heading for calamity and disaster; the United Nations is losing the war in Koren; and the 1953 production and crop records in Chinn will exceed those of 1952. This explains the popular indifference men- tioned previously, which is fully confirmed by the measures the Communists have adopted in the attempt to get their newspapers read. For example, organized newspaper-rduling meetings have been set up in many cities, so that 70 or 80 people gather in a room at. regular hours to listen to some Party officer read the day's news aloud. In Ku-shih Haien, Ilonan, 176 officers read daily to 42 different groups with an aggregate audience of 3,000. In rural areas, news bulletins and "blackboard" newspapers are set up in public places. Still another well-known method of news communication is th- so-called "living newspaper," news events acted out on the atage, which was very popular in the Communist areas during and after the Sino-Japanese War in Communist areas. Like the Yangko folk-dance, however, the "living newspaper" is waning in popularity. The government is also making a concerted effort to reduce the concentration of newspaper reading in city areas. Formerly, almost no newspapera reached the rural areas because no peasants could read. Now the Post. Office is regularly delivering newspapers even to remote corners of China. Two million copies of 402 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 11A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03 STAT ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1! I 132 newspapers are currently being distributed by mail every day, and newapapera arc being published in the languages of national minorities such as Mongolian, Uighur, Kazakh, and Korean. StA0AZINES Even by its own prerevolutionary standards, then, China's newspapers are in a bad way. The aituation with respect to magazines, which have been much in vogue in China for some thirty years, is less clear. Innumerable magazines, some short-lived, some that sur- vived for many years, werr unched between the beginning of the May Fourth Movement arid the Communist take-over Devite a few Chin= counterparts of tha movie and con- fessions magazines in the US, moreover, the Chinese magazines tended to be highly literary and/or political in character, or at least tried lo be. A considerable group of Leftist writers aimed their output at them, and gave them a tone of intensity and seriousness out of propor- tion to their actual level of literary and intellectual excellence. Popularity with Students The popularity of newspapers with the students was partly a matter of their reflecting the students' avid interest in politics. Most American college students exhibit a greater interest in social activities than in national affairs. With the Chinese, the reverse is true. Even prior to the Communist success on the mainland, parties, dances, and sports played a negligible role in ii-udent life; the center of interest was always ideological and political. The magazines, especially the "progressive" ones, made it their business to stimulate this enthusiasm for politics and ideology, which characterized not only the students but the petty bourgeoisie its well, and thereby gained great influence in both quarters. Before the war, the magazine Shing lino (Life), edited by the late Communist journalist, Tao Fung, had for example a great following, and regularly published a large number of Leftist fiction writers (Ai Ssa-ch'i, flu Yu-chih, Chin Chung-hua), and certain writers who specialized in Soviet-oriented political analysis. The prewar Tu Shu Tsa-chth (The Study Magazine) devoted itself to the dissemination of Marxist ideology, though it maintained a thin pretense of objectivity. Current Types As far as magazines are concerned the Communists found the ground well prepared For them. Except for those specially designed for workers, peasants, anti children, the current magazines are much like those that flourished before the take-over. The political and literary types still dominate the scene. The magazine with the biggest circulation is Ilsi (The Study Magazine), established in September 1919.- It features essays in political analysis, articles on Marxist ideology, rind translations of Soviet works, and is designed to supplement the twelve "indispensable" books of the Communiat cadres. Because it is projected on a relatively difficult intellectual level, it now publishes an elementary edition for beginners. Ai Safi-chi is a regular contributor. The articles he has published in it have recently been collected under the title, Study Anew. The offices of the literary magazines are located in Peking and Shanghai, though the British colony of !Jong Kong remains to this day an important center of Chinese Communist literary activities. The leading magazines published in Peking are: Literary Garette (Van I Pao); People's Literature (..1t.n 3! in Wen Ilsfieh); Stories and Songs (Shuo-rJtuo Ch'artg- ell'ang); and Plays. Shanghai's leading literary magazine is Fiction Monthly, edited by Mao Tun and his associates. All these magazines feature original writings, translations, criticism, and works by established writers and beginners. - ? 493 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 . _ Literary Immediately after the "liberation," the dumber of literary magazines was much greater than today. In 1951 the Standing Committee of the All-China Federation of Arts and Literary Circles decided to merge some of the timelier magazines with larger ones, thus tacitly admitting that there was not enough publishable material to go around. The circulation totals of the existing magazines are not known, but available evidence strongly suggests that both readers and editors art. dissatisfied with their contents, which are dull and stereo- typed, as they must if they are to serve the propagandist aims laid down for them. The Leftist literature of Kuomintang days, *written under constant pressure and devoted to criticism of the regime and the government, had produced a genuine ferment among its readers. What the magazines are publishing today lacks the vitality and sense of urgency and, above all, the relevance t.o what readers are actually interested in, that might enable it to generate such a ferment today. Readers arc given article after article glorifying the Party and the regime nnd apotheosizing the peasant and the worker Such criticism and/or self-criticism as get in are directed elsewhere than at high government. policies or Marxist dogma, their sole function being to correct deviations trona the Party "Line." One result of all this is that the magazines cannot perform the function to which they lend themselves moat readily, i.e. getting aero ss propaganda without their readers knowing it is propaganda. In an effort to widen the scope of its propaganda drive, the Communist government, is channeling great energies into the publishing of cartoon and pictorial magazines. An American journalist in Hong ICong reports having seen a Cartoon Propaganda Reference Book, which gives detailed instructions for illustrating typical propaganda themes and for drawing typical Chinese, Russian, or American faces. The Cartoon Monthly, the major publication of the type indicated by its title, reflects the lack of training of the available Chinese artists in the techniques of visual satire, and is poor by Chinese as well as Western standards. There are several picture magazines, all clearly modeled on the cemparable publications in the USSR and, like the politico-literary magazines, dull and repetitious. Scholarly Journals Directly under the Committee on Educational and Cultural Affairs is the Academy of Sciences, which publishes a variety of scholarly journals which were expected to contribute to the national effort at reconstruction, but which are not, apparently, being put to propa- gandist uses. The Academy has 14 separate institutes of research, each of which has an annual or quarterly bulletin of its own publishing the latest researth findingsof its members. But both research personnel and research equipment are notoriously in short supply, and the researcher's isolation from the work of colleagues in other countries necessarily depresses the level of excellence that current Chinese research can hope to maintain. The Academy is, therefore, unlikely to publish scientific works of much importance. The remaining media of mass communication are the drama, vaudeville, the movies, broadcasting, the dance, art, and music. The Communist government is making increasing demands on workers in all these fields, which it regards as doubly important because of China's high illiteracy rate. DIRAILA Introduction Drama is the traditional form of Chinese entertainment. Almost every province in China has its own opera and its own traditional dances and songs which, as natural expres- sions of the region's culture, readily communicate to anyone brought up in it.. In a province such as Kiangsu, where there is a variety of dialects, one finds not so much a regional theater 494 )eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 4-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 : (using this term in a broad serial., to include all the item:: ,arieties of theater. The Kuomintang did not attempt to oat, of its regional products still embodied, as of a recent o \the Ch'ing dynasty, though some modern influences had The three major forms of drama center around Peking Belt, Soochow-Shanghai and the Yangtze River Belt, and conform to the three major divisiona in dialcets. meationial) as 111.1ItterOUS local control popular entertainment; date, the ideas and sentiments crept into them. and the Hwang (Yellow) Pjver the ICwangtung Belt, and thus Folk Dancing Because or the court patronage it enjoyed during the Ch'ing dynasty, and its resultant rich heritage of acting and singing techninims, the Peking Opera is easily the most dia. t inguis.hed opera in modern-day China (it is interesting to note, in passing, that it influence has never penetrated the Kwangtung area). In Northwest China one finds that the folk dance and folk music have remained at a primitive stage of development. The Communists, while living in the Shensi, Shansi, Kensu area during the war years, picked up and exploited the native forms of dance and drama there, and have given them nationwide currency as srmbols of the Communists' sympathy with the peasants and their stand on behalf of the people. The most popular form of dance adopted was the Yanyko, which consists of a simple, rhythmic three steps forward followed by one step backward. Quaint, colorful costumes are worn when the dance is performed, so that. the participants contrast sharply ? and favorably -- with the drably clothed spectators. Another dominant dance form adopted by tho Communists is Yao Ko (literally, waist-drum, a reference to the swaying of the waist to the simple beat of the drum). Before and immediately after the liberation, the Yangko and Yao Ko were extremely popular. Huge Yangko parades marched down the streets of industrial cities, and short plays and "living newspapers" were staged to Yangko music and rhythms. But the Yangko is too unsophisticated for the modern Chinese; the townspeople, used to more complex forms of entertainment, have always regarded it as a temporary fad. Thus when Yank? dances were staged in big cities like Shanghai, elements of burlesque were often introduced into them, for the most part unintentionally. But the dance had served well the purpose of the Communists during the period of liberation: the peasants, workers, students, and women all found in it a common way of expressing emotion and enthusiasm.. IYeatern-styled social dancing had been introduced only in certain limited social groups, and hi most places in China there were few means of collective fun-making except feasting and the theater. The Yangko was primarily a communal art, and so facilitated =Las gathering; in both city or village. nncouraged by its initial success with the Van gko, the Communist government is now reaching out to reform all dramatic and vaudeville art in China. During the Kuomintang days the traditional emphasis upon the ideals of loyalty, filial piety, and chastity continued unmodified in folk drama and vaudeville. The Communist government could hardly be expected to overlook the potential usefulness of these media for purposes of Marxist indoctrination. It has, accordingly, attempted to overhaul the reper- toire in all forms of operatic drama so as to make every item a vehicle for Communist ideology. All theatrical workers, moreover, have been organized and given ideological indoctrination courses. Opera One cannot emphasize too strongly the skill with which the Communists have exploited the traditional Chinese theater. Consider, as an example, the Peking Opera. Most of its 'standard favorites were plays exemplifying the traditional virtues. These plays had stood leclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: k-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 495 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CIA-RDp81-01043R004000020007-4 50-Yr 2014/04/03: ? the test of time because those virtues, given the values and preferences of the Chine= people, wtre over a long period accepted as the virtues. Many of them have been banned by the present regime. An outstanding example La The Fourth Son Visits His Mother. Yang Chi-ych is a great general of the Sung period who, with his sone, is stationed at the border to guard against invading tribes from the North. His fourth son is captured one day, and given in marriage to the princes., of a foreign tribe. After a lapse of eighteen years, hostilities are renewed Yang Chieh Ni'a widow and his sixth son lead an expedition against the tribe into which the fourth son has married. The latter requests permission from the princess and her mother to go see his mother and wife in the enemy camp. Ile goes by night, and returns at dawn. The play has the noble simplicity of an episode out of Homer, and points up the ideal of filial piety against, a background of great dramatic pathos. According to Communist theory, however, the fourth Eon is clearly a coward and a traitor to his country and, in any case, his blubbering filial piety should not, be represented on stage. Many plays of this character have had to be reworked before they could be cleared for performance. In another play, ICtian Vu is d?icted as a Chinese military hero, rich in the virtues of loyalty and generosity and, at the mune time proud, individualistic, and aloof. Under the Communist scheme of values, however, individualism and alienation from others are undesir- able characteristics, so that the revised Communist Nunn Yu version does not put, ICuan YtI forward as a hero at all. Instead, the agents of Kuan YU's downiell are presented as liberators of the people. Even comedies do not escape the Communists' revisionist zeal. The Roving Dragon Flirts with a Phoenix depicts the courtship of a restaurant waitress by a Ming Emperor. The role of the Emperor was traditionally assigned to the Chinese equivalent of the romantic tenor in Western opera. The Communists assign it, rather to the clown, thus emphasizing the fact that the Emperor is a low villain because he takes libarties with a commoner. Neither dramatic propriety nor dramatic effect appear to be taken into account in all this: besides being transformed out of all recognition, the playa are immessurabl:,- cheapen(/' and degraded. The only plays that can be produced unchanged are those that are deemed to embody a "revolutionary spirit," e.g. plays based on episodes from the novel Water Margin, many of which deal with popular attacks on landlords and corrupt officials. (Some new plays, e.g. Forced to the Liang Mountain and Three Attacks on Chu Chia Village, have been adapted from this novel.) A Chinese Opera Research Institute has been established for the express purpose of revamping the old repertoire and training new actors. Habitual theater-goers are naturally shocked by the changes in plot and atmosphere of their favorite pieces. But the better- known actors still have enormous di awing power at the box office, and, in the absence of better entertainment, the theater will probably continue to be patronized because of them. It is difficult to untleretaad, given the remoteness of Chine= Opera from real life, why the Communists are taking all this trouble to rewrite it ? especially since the Ballet and even Shakesinale are tolerated in the USSR. But the answer lies, undoubtedly, in the Communists' determination to turn everything to a positive, current propaganda purpose, and to see to it that, wherever people turn for relaxation and amusement they shall encounter the new ideas and new values. How far this determination goes may be seen from what has happened to China's storytellers and minstrels. With their re.pertoireof feudal historical sagas and sentimental romances, both types of entertainment have always been very popular in North and South China. Now both have been organized, and new stories are replacing the old The new stories, with correct content as far as the regime is concerned, do not have the same appeal as the old. But the close, face-to-face relation between story- 406 ieclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 k-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 STAT . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 1 1 teller and audience is not one that the regime's propagandists can afford to pus up, so the storyteller can either learn how to peddle his aew wares or go out of busioess. In order to burrive in present-day China's mass communications one must make propaganda. Western-style drama had reached its peak of development in Chian during the war years, when a series of fine plays by Ts'ao Yu had made the Chinese andienee conscious of tie artistic and entertainment values of the spoken drama. The playwrights used both historical and contemporary events, and produced mainly plays that. were vehicles for patnotic and/or antiaggression sentiments. Kno Mo-jo's play on the poet Chuch Yana and Ts'ito 110.8 Metamorplu;sts are conspicuous examples of the kiod of thing that was produced on a fairly large scale and became extremely popular. The spoken drama flourished even in the Communist areas, though the plays produced there were less elaborate; many, indeed, were merely skits. Propaganda Plays The postwar drama did not. have much drawing-power, partly because Hollywood movies and other forms of entertainment were again available The spoken drama should, however, be thought of as one of the vitql means of communicating experience and ideas that contemporary China ha .s at its disposal If honest plays that express genuine emotion or tackle genuine problems are not being produced, as they are not, it is because of the propaganda responsibilities that the Communists have imposed on the playwright. as on other writers. Most new plays are the products of collective authorship, because an ideolosically correct play requires the deliberation of many minds as a guarantee that the end product will be unexceptionable from the standpoint, of Marxist. doctrine. A genuine tragedy, a problem play, a timely and amusing comedy ? all these are equally out, of the question. Most current plays are either melodramatic (to play up the corruption of the Kuomintang, the evil influences of the imperialists and reactionaries), or didactic (calcu- lated to point up the virtues of the worker, the peasant, and the Communist soldier), and all are on about the level of East Lynne and Uncle Tom's Cabin. The most famous example of postwar melodrama is perhaps The While-Haired Girl, a play by lb o Chin-tz and associates, which has enjoyed a huge success wherever it has been produced. First produced in the Communist areas as long ago as the early forties, the play was primarily a propagandist's indictment of exploitation of the peasantry by the landlords. AS in most melodramas, the symbol of the sufferers is n beautiful, innocent girl, the mortgage- holder is the landlord, and the hero who saves the family home is the People's Liberation Army. The plc., laid in n small farming village near the mountains of Northweatern llopeh, between 1935 and I q39, is said to be based on actual fact. Happy One, the seventeen-year- old daughter of a widowed farmer, is deeded by her father to the landlord as compulsory payment of a debt. In the landlord's family, Happy One is first. the victim of constant. mistreatment, then is raped, then finds herself pregnant by the landlord. A few months later her master decides to sell her into a brothel, and she attempts to kill herself but is prevented from doing so by another servant, who helps her to escape. From that day onward her one aim is to get revenge for herself and her father. She takes refuge in a mountain cave, where she gives birth to her child and then maintains a precarious existence over several years by pilfering offerings from a lonely mountain temple. Her deficient, diet plus the fact that she never sees the light of the day, causes her hair to turn white, so that the people of the locality, who occasionally get a glimpse of her, begin to call her the "white- lia'red immortal fairy." The Sino-Japanese War breaks out, and the landlord turns into a Japanese puppet official. But the Eighth Route Army guerillas reach the village, and among their ranks is none other than Happy One's pen.;ant lover. The guei dins organize the 407 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: .7,IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 .-;IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 ? peasants, and the lover rescues Happy One and her child from the mountain cave. The final scene is a public trial of the landlord conducted by the enragrA peasants. Happy Ono appears at the trial to give her teathnony, and as the curtain falls the trod-up landlord and his henchmen sro dragged away to be executed. The plot, in other words, follows thc usual melodramatic pattern without much original- ity or imagination. The piny's one virtue lies in the fact that it successfully incorporates traditional e,,ong and dance elements into modern-style drama. The Communists, not for- getting the traditional asaociation between the theater and music, appear to have included the elements as bait for those who were theater-goers in the more or le s remote put. The music, to eome extent anyway, semr.s to redeem the crudity af the plot.. Professor Derk Bo&le, of the University of Pennsylvania, reported after a stay in Peking during 1910 that "seeing ',The ll'hile-lla:red Girl] was an exciting and memorable experience," which suggests that there must be ?omething in the acting, the atmosphere, and, most especially probably, the music, that communicates in a way that the plot could not possibly do. The orchestral music, according to Bodde, is an immense improvement over the Peking Opera. Now charming, now poignant, it includes none of the falsetto singing of the traditional Chinese opera, but, since mueh of it is based on Chinese folk music, it is not Western. As in Chinese Opera, certain motifa arc risz,oc? iated with certain charaeters. The orchestra is a combination of Western string instruments (violin, cello and contra bass) with the native er hu (the Chinese type violin), flute, drum, gong, and wooden clapper. In some themes the Western instruments predominate; in others, the Chinese. The rarult, remarkably succmtful, is a new music genre for China. The thing that reminds one most of the old-time drruna is the use of dram, gong, and clapper to punctuate and accentuate the movements of the actors ? sometimea a highly effective device, as whim the percussion instruments burst into a cre- scendo of fury during a pursuit or a scene of violence. In short, the play, despite the realism of its plot, resembles a stylized ballet because of the music. When the actors aro not singing, they move about the !stage with the rhythmic steps and gestures that are used on the tradi- tional stage. The successful combination of Western and Chinese muirical elements and the retention of symbolic acting both help account for the vogue of The While-Haircd Girl. Numerous short plays with songs and music have been produced during the years since the play won its popularity. An example of current didactic drama is the play The Question of Thought. Through its four dialogue-laden acts, the play depicts the process by which a group of typical unre- claimed students undergo thought reform in the North China People's Revolutionary University. One is pro-American, one a landlord's son, one a former Kuominteng army ?Meer, one a subdued clerk, and one a pretty girl whose mind is on trivialities and boy- friends. The group goes through long periods of agonizing conversations (democratic discussion groups) until, in the grand finale, all have become true Communists, full of hatred for the United States and full of love for the Soviet Union. It is not badly done, in thn! sense that, members of the audience with the :tame background as the characters in the play arc likely to recognize their own problems end rutty well be influenced by the solution it offers. Another type of carrent play is direct propeganda, who primary purpose is to win popular support for government piograms. The collectively-written Song of the Red Flag, for example, is a play about, "emulation" drives among factory workers. The heroine, Ma Feng-chieh is "uncooperative," at the beginning of the drive; moreover, the various groups of workers engaged in increasing production are bickering among themselves. But once she is fully indoctrinated, Ma becomes labor hero, besides which her group wins the red flag. 498 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: 11A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03 .7,1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 11? The play hardly pretends to be other than trivial or to offer any thing to the audience except propaganda. But when it was first produced in Shanghai it ran for three months, and was considered a hit. The dearth of good plays in China cannot be doubted when even such poor material as this is well received. Theaters are still noL numerous in China: excluding movie house, there are about 160 theaters in 13 major cities, unevenly distributed. In Shanghai alone, for c:c.-trnple, there are 10 theaters for Peking Opera, 30 for Shao-lising Opera, 9 for other dialect operas, and a few legitimate houses for Westeni-style drama. By comparison with the number of theaters, the number of theatrical troupes is quite large: there are, according to Communist &sumo% 400 entertainment troupes, with 40,000 members. Many of them tripes make one-night stands in small towns and villages, performing either in the open or in some large public building. The "Living Newspaper" Before turning from the theater, mention should be made of the Communist phenome- non called the "living newspaper." Most editions of the living newspaper are playlets euch as Truinc.n Dreams of Hitler and The Dance of the Devils (the devils being Truman, NIac- Arthur, Chiang Kni-shek, et al). But some living newepapers are quite elaborate. Take the play Resist US and Aid Korea. This play, first produced in April 1951 by students and faculty members of the Shanghai People's Dramatic Art School working under the direction of the noted playwright and director Tso Lin, lies no less than 50 scenes arid 33 settings. The "plot" consists of a series of episodes in the history of Ameriesn aggreasion against China during the past fifty years. In the prologue the Arneriean John Foster hello Jepanene Premiei Ito browbeat the Chinese envoy Li Hung-chang to sign away Taiwan to Japan. In the epilogue Foster's grandson, John Foster Dulles, is seen plotting a separat.e peace with Japan. In between are four episodes illustrating America's cultural and economic aggres- sion against China and the invasion of Korea. However much the historical facts are dis- torted, the use of authentic historical personages like Foater, Dulles, and Leighton Stuart is clever in the extreme, and the point, that the US is always coilabomting with Japan against China's integrity and security, is not likely to escape any member of the audience. Movies Even more than the theater, the movies are proving to be a highly effective medium ef propaganda in Chinn, where the vast number of cities, tOWII8, and villages calls for a medium that requires few personnel. The Chinese took an immediate liking to Hollywood movies when they were first introduced back in the days of FairLanIcs, Pickford, and Chap- lin. Many Chinese are named after movie stars; except, for top-ranking government offi- cials, the movie stars are the Americans the Chincse. public knew be,st as recently aa the late forties. Even today most, high school students, if shown pictures of Gary Cooper, Bob Hope, and Betty Grable, would immediately identify them by name. China's taste in movies runs to "spectacle" pictures, musicals, comedies, tender romances, tragedies with pretensions to artistic quality, and action pictures with animals and scantily dressed women (e.g., the early Tarzan movies). In a word, Chinese taste in movies roughly corresponds to American taste; the large box office successes of 1951 (e.g., Quo Vadis, An American in Paris, Shaw Boat, A Place in the Sun) would be sure of an enthu- siastic reception in China if they were permitted to be shown there. The only types of cinema the Chinese do not like are what we might call "sophisticated" comedy and drama, which call Zither for a knowledge of English or a knowledge of United States society and culture, and certain Hollywood productions that, for cultural reasons, the Chinese react Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: IA-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 499 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved 1A-RDP81-01043R004000020007-4 for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/04/03: ? ? ? ? to negatively. (They like Bob !lope, but have never taken Bing Crosby to heart, because his vomit! American manner baffles them and his films usually lack the lavish musical numbers that the Chinese delight in.) There seems no doubt, that the Chinese turn to Hollywood movies, when they are available, primarily out of escapist rnotivt, -- to savor the technieolored lu.sury that they cannot have in their drab daily lives. (The Communists in their campaign for the taippression of American movies, have largely bilked their ease on the view that the efTects of exhibiting sex, gangtiterdom, and "bourgeois decadence" are pernicious.) The film industry, despite keen compctition from Hollywood movies, has con- tinuously expanded over the thirty years. People who have had a high school or college education usually prefer the Hollywood variety to the Chincse, but thc Chinese messes, having no English, tend to avoid ell Hollywood products above the level of spectacle films and slapstick comedies. Only technical incompetence and the lack of capital and talent, therefore, keep the local