THE NORTH KOREAN SUCCESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002100110012-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
The North Korean
Succession
Confidential
RP 78-10385
October 1978
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The North Korean Succession
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
Key Judgments
North Korea presents a difficult intelligence problem, because Pyong-
yang still rules over one of the most tightly closed societies in the world. Our
understanding of the dynamics of the domestic political situation is especially
limited because of the highly personalized rule of North Korean President
Kim 11-song. Still, there is a need to assess the prospects for the post-Kim era.
In examining Kim 11-song's highly unorthodox approach to the succession
question, we have reached the following conclusions:
? For the past five years or so, North Korean President Kim 11-song has
been quietly grooming his elder son, Kim Chong-il, as his successor.
? Kim Chong-il, now in his late 30s, has been allowed gradually to
assume greater responsibilities in the domestic political and economic
realm. He is not, however, identified at public gatherings; his name is
not mentioned by the media; and he does not meet with foreigners.
? The elder Kim probably sees several advantages in keeping his
succession scheme under wraps:
-It provides an opportunity for the son to be tested while keeping the
elder Kim's options open if his heir does not measure up.
-It enables Kim 11-song to avoid a lame duck status for himself.
-It shields North Korea from possible embarrassing commentary
from its allies as well as its detractors.
? Socialist states have historically had problems in arranging an orderly
transfer of power, and the precedent-setting father-son succession
scheme further complicates the task. Still, the special conditions at
work in North Korea-its isolation and Kim I1-song's firm grip on the
levers of power-render the son's chances perhaps greater than might
otherwise be expected.
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? Kim Chong-il's chances will improve if the active, 66-year-old elder
Kim holds power for another five or 10 years-particularly if the son
finds an appropriate time to "go public." The early removal of
Kim 11-song, however, would measurably increase the likelihood of a
succession struggle, possibly accompanied by violence. A crucial
question will be the extent to which the son has been able to develop
alliances in the military and security establishments.
? There is no evidence that the succession scheme is having a significant
impact on North Korea's policy. Kim II-song appears to be keeping a
firm grip on all important policy questions, including the central issue
of North Korea's strategy and tactics toward reunification of the
Korean peninsula on Communist terms.
? If Kim Chong-il does succeed his father, he is likely to emulate him in
taking a direct personal interest in various projects and making
contacts at the local level; he has shown intense pride in North Korean
performance under proper organization and motivation.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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The North Korean Succession
Kim Chong-il-The "Party Center"
Since at least early 1973, North Korean Presi-
dent Kim I1-song has been grooming his elder
son, Kim Chong-il, as his successor. The first
indirect allusions to the process occurred in
February 1973 when Kim I1-song unveiled the
so-called "three revolutions team" movement at
a major gathering of the Korean Workers Party
(KWP). These teams, made up of representatives
from the party, technicians, and students, subse-
quently have been directly associated with Kim
Chong-il. Indeed, the South Korean press jocu-
larly refers to them as Kim Chong-il's "shock
troops."
Detailing the activities of Kim Chong-il is not
an easy task. The North Korean media do not
refer to the son by name and do not identify him
at leadership turnouts. Kim Chong-il has never
met with foreigners. For a while his picture was
displayed in public places in North Korea, but
even this practice has been curtailed to reduce
speculation among foreign visitors about the
son's identity and status.
The regime nevertheless feels that it is neces-
sary to chronicle the exploits of the younger Kim
in some manner. To do so, Pyongyang uses
special honorific expressions. The most promi-
nent codeword for the son is "party center."
The unraveling of the mystery surrounding the
term "party center" is in itself an analytical coup
of some merit. At first it was thought that the
term was merely an abbreviated reference to the
Korean Workers Party Central Committee-a
group of more than 100 important party leaders
that meets once or twice a year in plenary
session. An analyst with FBIS noted, however,
that the party center was credited with perform-
ing tasks and conducting activities that seemed
to be more fitting for an individual than a group.
President Kim II-song and his son Kim Chong-il (left)
The party center, for example, directed films,
made inspection trips, designed city plans, orga-
nized youth festivals, and met with various
North Korean groups. Moreover, the party cen-
ter has increasingly been described in terms
usually reserved only for Kim 11-song; it is
portrayed in the same paternalistic manner-an
all-knowing, omnipresent, and compassionate
leader who mingles with the common folk and is
attentive to their needs.
Early Life, Family
Nepotism is not a new phenomenon in North
Korea or, for that matter, other countries in
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Asia. A large number of Kim 11-song's relatives
hold important positions in the North Korean
hierarchy. Some have demonstrated talent;
others clearly have advanced solely on the basis
of their relationship to the "great leader."
At one point it appeared that Kim 11-song was
actively preparing his younger brother, Kim
Yong-chu, for a leading role. At the fifth con-
gress of the KWP in 1970, Kim Yong-chu was
elevated to full membership on the KWP
political committee, an elite group of some 10 to
15 top party officials. In 1972 Kim Yong-
chu led North Korea's delegation to the historic
talks between North and South Korea on
reunification.
By early 1973 the talks foundered, and Kim
Yong-chu began to slip in party ranking. He has
since joined the ranks of "nonpersons." Some
reports assert that Kim Yong-chu was demoted
because of the breakdown in the talks; other
reports claim he was in ill health. In any event,
Kim Chong-il's fortunes began to rise dramati-
cally at about the time his uncle's took their
downturn.
Reliable information on Kim Chong-il's early
life is scant. His birthday is celebrated on 16
February; there is still uncertainty about his
birth year, although most reports place it in 1940
or 1941. There is also uncertainty concerning the
whereabouts of Kim 11-song and Kim Chong-il's
mother, Kim Chong-suk, in the early 1940s.
Most accounts suggest that Kim 11-song took
refuge in the Soviet Union after Japanese forces
moved vigorously against Korean Communist
guerrilla units in Manchuria in the late 1930s.
North Korean hagiographers put guerrilla leader
Kim in the Korea-Manchuria border area.
The issue could have important implications
for the younger Kim. As successor it is important
that his birthplace be established on Korean soil.
In recent years, Pyongyang has focused greater
attention on the activities of Kim 11-song and
Kim Chong-suk during the anti-Japanese guer-
rilla war period. Although the details of these
accounts are vague, they leave the impression
that Kim senior spent much of his time operating
out of a guerrilla stronghold in the Mount
Paektu area of the border. As such, North
Korean propaganda extolling the "spirit of
Mount Paektu" can be interpreted in part as an
effort to establish the legitimacy of the younger
Kim.
Kim Chong-il's early family life is also ob-
scure. According to one account, Kim Chong-il
had a younger brother who drowned in a back-
yard pond when the caretaker left the two boys
unattended. Since 1974 a campaign has been
under way to depict Kim Chong-suk, Kim
Chong-il's mother, who died in 1949 at the age of
32, as a fervent follower of Kim 11-song and a
staunch revolutionary in her own right. That
program is unquestionably meant to lend support
to Kim Chong-il's candidacy.
Kim 11-song remarried in the early 1950s. His
second wife, Kim Song-ae, is a member of the
KWP Central Committee and chairman of the
women's league. She appears regularly in public
and is identified as Kim 11-song's wife. Kim
11-song reportedly has a son and daughter by this
second marriage, but neither has been mentioned
by name in the press.
Expanding Duties
Kim Chong-il is said to have made his first
major contribution in the realm of literature and
art soon after completing his schooling. He is
given credit for directing the film adaptation of a
number of well-known Korean plays and classic
works. These films, the accounts continue, were
produced in record time, and this has been used
to characterize his approach to all subsequent
endeavors.
Kim Chong-il is also portrayed as having a
special interest in engineering and science. He is
credited with two concepts in industrial develop-
ment, in particular the use of computers and
long-distance conveyor belts. The North Korean
press regularly contains laudatory articles about
the successful automation of various industrial
processes throughout the country. Some of these
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projects have become the butt of humorous sto-
ries
slurry pipeline is said to-have been inoperative
for an entire year after Pyongyang announced its
commissioning.
There is some circumstantial evidence that
Kim Chong-il's role-and hence his stake-in
economic affairs goes well beyond these cele-
brated technical innovations. In February 1974
at the 8th plenum of the KWP Central Commit-
tee, Pyongyang introduced a new set of long-
range economic targets-the so-called "10 pro-
spective goals." Long-term economic plans are
normally promulgated at party congresses; in
early 1974 North Korea was just entering the
second half of its six-year plan (1971-76), an-
nounced at the fifth party congress of the KWP
in November 1970.
In retrospect, it appears that the 8th plenum
served, in effect, as a small-scale party congress
to put the stamp of approval on these new
targets. One reason behind this unusual step may
have been the desire to mask the involvement of
Kim Chong-il in formulating or supervising the
implementation of these long-range objectives.
Shortly after this plenum, the term "speed bat-
tle"-a hallmark of Kim Chong-il-was first
applied in a major way to economic production
campaigns. The "speed battle" refers to the
technique of mobilizing all available manpower
resources to achieve a selected goal over a rela-
tively short period of time.
If Kim Chong-il did, in fact, make his debut
on the economic scene in early 1974, his timing
could not have been worse. Because of the world-
wide recession of 1974, demand for North Ko-
rean exports of raw materials dropped sharply,
and Pyongyang in a short time began to default
on the foreign loans it had received to cover
imports of whole plants, machinery, and technol-
ogy from Western Europe and Japan. North
Korea's inability to meet even the interest pay-
ments on the loans soured Pyongyang's global
trade relations and in many cases delayed the
delivery of machinery needed to complete the
plants.
Despite its economic woes, the regime has not
abandoned its ambitious development plans.
Pyongyang, after two successive years of "read-
justment," formally launched its new seven-year
plan (1978-84) in late 1977. The forum was the
first sitting of the newly elected national assem-
bly. Four of the original 10 prospective goals-
cement, steel, coal, and marine products-were
scaled back significantly, but the overall plan
still seems to be beyond North Korea's reach.
Kim Chong-il, for his part, seems to have
weathered the poor economic performance with-
out any noticeable change in his status. In fact,
the adoption in May of this year of a new slogan
seems to suggest a somewhat more institutional-
ized role for Kim Chong-il in guiding the econo-
my. That slogan exhorts the populace to produce
more in the "spirit of Chollima spurred on by the
speed campaign."
The Chollima, or winged-horse, campaign re-
fers to a labor-intensive production campaign
instituted by Kim 11-song in the late 1950s-then
the Korean version of China's "Great Leap
Forward." For all practical purposes, Kim
Chong-il's speed campaign or "speed battle" is
simply an updated version of the earlier move-
ment. Nevertheless, by formally coupling the two
concepts, the new slogan elevates the son's con-
tribution in directing the national economy to the
same level as that of his father.
Building a Political Base
Some of the techniques used by Kim Chong-il
to strengthen his grip on the economy have a
political payoff as well. The three revolutions
teams, for example, provide the younger Kim
with a separate institutional arm to check on the
performance of local party and administrative
leaders. The teams are credited with eradicating
all sorts of bureaucratic evils and outmoded
concepts. In practical terms, this frequently
means that many veteran functionaries who have
been unable to cope with the new demands made
by Pyongyang have been purged or demoted.
Over a period of time this process provides an
opportunity for the younger Kim to install hand-
picked party representatives responsive to his
leadership.
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Kim Chong-il also is in a position to exercise
his influence through more conventional party
channels. According to most reporting, Kim
Chong-il has been the party secretary responsible
for the important Organization and Guidance
Department of the KWP Central Committee
since at least 1974. This department coordinates
sensitive personnel matters, including promo-
tions, transfers, and demotions for party func-
tionaries from the national to the local level.
The North Korean press has discussed the
relationship between the conventional party
structure and the three revolutions teams at some
length. It has revealed that considerable friction
has sometimes arisen between local party offi-
cials and team members. Kim 11-song evidently
believes that the dynamic tension created by this
interaction serves a useful purpose. It broadens
political participation by thrusting the youthful
members of the teams into the political process
earlier than might otherwise be the case. It also
keeps the party veterans off balance and prob-
ably more attentive to Pyongyang's directives.
In any case, the teams are developing into a
permanent fixture on the North Korean political
scene. At recent 30th national day celebrations
in Pyongyang, Kim 11-song gave the teams a
relatively strong endorsement by declaring that
the work of the teams in the last five years had
confirmed their "advantages and vitality." Inas-
much as the teams have come to be closely
identified with Kim Chong-il, the son is a pri-
mary beneficiary of the endorsement on national
day.
Perhaps the most potent political weapon
available to Kim Chong-il is his evident role as
chief interpreter, protector, and propagandizer of
Kim 11-song's thoughts. Since early 1974 there
has been a nationwide movement known as "dye-
ing the whole of society" with Kim 11-song's
thoughts.
Pyongyang's own treatment of the movement-
leaves little doubt that Kim Chong-il is its motive
force.
The movement can be viewed at different
levels. First of all it is an effort to link virtually
every aspect of North Korean political life to
some statement or aphorism from Kim's collec-
tive works. Like Mao Tse-tung's written legacy,
practically every word uttered by the elder Kim
has been recorded for posterity. Six volumes of
Kim's works, some with appropriate revisions,
have already been published by Pyongyang.
As Kim 11-song's personality cult has deep-
ened, drawing a distinction between the policy of
the KWP and Kim's testimonials has become
increasingly difficult. As a result, whoever con-
trols the interpretation and elaboration of Kim
11-song's thoughts in effect sets the party line. By
guiding the movement to indoctrinate all of
society with Kim's thoughts, the younger Kim is
in a position to evaluate the ideological rectitude
of party officials and, more importantly, to cen-
sure or demote those who are found lacking. As
keeper of the faith and as secretary in charge of
organizational affairs, Kim Chong-il has two
powerful levers by which to expand his influence.
Any attempt to assess the personal traits of
Kim Chong-il is, of course, complicated by the
absence of firsthand reporting about him. His
activities, as portrayed in the North Korean
press, do, however, provide a basis for some
tentative observations. Like his father, Kim
Chong-il has exhibited an intense national pride
in the ability of the North Korean people to
perform prodigious tasks against all sorts of
obstacles ^ if they are properly organized and
motivated through mass campaign techniques
such as the "speed battle."
The younger Kim has also displayed his fa-
ther's penchant for taking a direct personal
interest in various projects throughout the state
and for meeting face to face with workers and
officials at the local level. If Kim Chong-il
departs in any way from the practices of his
father, it may be that his plans are more ambi-
tious and his own budding personality cult more
extreme. But he also has demonstrated on occa-
sion an awareness of what the traffic will bear,
and he has evidently made adjustments
accordingly.
The Elder Kim's Strategy
Kim 11-song has taken great pains to conceal
the plans for his son from the outside world. Kim
almost certainly has domestic as well as foreign
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considerations in mind in adopting this unusual
scheme. He undoubtedly wants to give the son an
opportunity to prove himself in a key but unpub-
licized role. Despite the elder Kim's immense
power and prestige, it will take some time to
transfer the political acceptance and legitimacy
he enjoys to the son.
By not acknowledging the son's existence to
the outside world, Kim 11-song also retains the
option of changing his plans if the son, like the
President's younger brother, fails to measure up
to expectations. The North Korean populace, of
course, is fully aware of the father-son succession
scheme. As time goes by, it will become increas-
ingly difficult for Kim 11-song to reverse himself
without undermining his own prestige. Whether
the point of no return has already been reached is
a moot question.
Kim 11-song-an activist leader-wants to
avoid a lameduck status for himself. He greets
foreign dignitaries at the airport, personally pre-
sides over all major leadership gatherings, and
makes frequent inspection tours of the provinces.
The father and son seem to have struck up a
workable division of labor, with the son playing
the behind-the-scenes role of organizer and
enforcer.
By keeping the younger Kim under wraps,
Kim 11-song shields North Korea to a certain
extent from embarrassing commentary from its
allies as well as its detractors. Thus far, China
and the Soviet Union, Pyongyang's two treaty
allies, have avoided any commentary, public or
otherwise, about Kim Chong-il by taking the
position that the succession issue is strictly an
internal matter.
For reasons of cultural affinity, China is prob-
ably more inclined to take at least a tolerant view
of a family succession. Peking wants to keep
Pyongyang firmly in its camp and therefore is
willing to play up to Kim 11-song's personal cult.
North Korea, for its part, has been relatively
supportive of Hua Kuo-feng's efforts to prevail
over his domestic opponents. Pyongyang was one
of the first foreign countries to endorse Peking's
attack on the Gang of Four.
The Soviets are more distrustful of Kim
fl-song and are unwilling to endorse Kim's cult.
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They have not forgotten Kim's ingratitude for
past assistance and his penchant for taking high-
risk actions that jeopardized Soviet strategic
interests such as the Pueblo affair and the shoot-
down of an unarmed US reconnaissance aircraft.
Moscow undoubtedly does not cherish the pros-
pect of trying to cope with Kim junior, who could
well be as irascible and unpredictable as his
father and in addition lack the seasoning influ-
ence of long years of grappling with the tasks of
nation-building.
Kim 11-song probably is objective enough to
recognize that his succession move is unpopular
with other senior North Korean leaders. He
certainly has the power to declare his son succes-
sor at any time, but he may reason that such an
abrupt step might only drive disgruntled ele-
ments within the party under cover. Moving in a
more deliberate fashion provides the elder Kim a
better opportunity to gauge the reaction within
influential party circles.
The Case for Opposition
Kim 11-song's wariness may not be misplaced,
as there have been signs that Kim Chong-il's
candidacy is coming up against some resistance.
Clearly that opposition is not taking the flagrant
form of the alleged assassination attempt in the
fall of 1977 that had supposedly left Kim
Chong-il a vegetable. The story, which did not
surface until February 1978
L
Rather, the opposition is passive and difficult
to measure, even when it surfaces. For example,
some of the political movements initiated by Kim
Chong-il have elicited less than a positive re-
sponse from high-ranking party leaders and the
national media. The so-called "Campaign to
Capture the Red Flag of the Three Revolutions"
is a case in point. Kicked off with much enthusi-
asm in December 1975, the campaign has never
really taken hold. It is essentially a mass exhorta-
tion movement that seeks to spur greater produc-
tion by bestowing symbolic rather than material
rewards. If the recipient fails to maintain a high
level of achievement, the Red Flag award passes
on to the next deserving winner.
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On occasion the North Korean media have
acknowledged that opposition to the son exists. A
Although it is possible to isolate muted signs of
opposition to Kim Chong-il, identifying the
sources of that opposition is a far more difficult
task. A few North Korean leaders have openly
identified themselves with Kim Chong-il's cause.
They have referred to the "party center" in
speeches or have associated themselves with po-
litical events designed to boost the younger Kim's
prestige. Most of the leadership, however, has
not publicly taken a stand.
Despite all of the presumed backstage maneu-
vering over the succession question in recent
years, the top echelon of the party hierarchy has
remained relatively stable. At the secondary
level, however, there has been considerable
turnover. It is tempting to speculate that these
personnel changes are related in part to the son's
efforts to solidify his control by moving trusted
allies into positions of authority. No clear pattern
emerges, however; indeed, among some of the
political casualties have been persons who were
thought at one time to number among the son's
political allies because of their relative youth.
The Succession Outlook
Historically, Communist states have had great
difficulty in arranging an orderly transfer of
power. By most standards, Kim Chong-il would
seem to have more going against him than for
him because Kim 11-song's father-son succession
scheme has no precedent in the Communist
world.
There are, however, some special conditions at
work in North Korea that render the son's
chances greater than might otherwise be ex-
pected. First, of course, is Kim 11-song's great
personal power. Many of his senior lieutenants
may be unenthusiastic about the younger Kim,
but they are probably loyal to Kim 11-song-he
has systematically eliminated his rivals or near-
rivals over the years. Thus, their resistance is
likely to remain passive as long as Kim senior is
around, and, as time goes by, their own numbers
will diminish through death and illness.
There are also no obvious challengers to Kim
Chong-il. The elder Kim's penchant for person-
ally overseeing virtually every aspect of North
Korea's development has created an enormous
gap between Kim 11-song and his immediate
subordinates. Only party veteran Kim Il has
anything approaching an independent stature,
and his health is poor.
Finally, North Korea is probably more of a
"closed society" than any other country in the
world. Cambodia may be more primitive and
ruthless, but in North Korea a generation, which
has matured under the rigid control of the
Korean Workers Party, has received virtually
exclusive indoctrination in Kim 11-song's
thoughts. To the people, Kim 11-song is both a
political leader and a father figure. North Ko-
rean propaganda has sought to capitalize on and
magnify this personal appeal in order to establish
the legitimacy of the son's claim. Kim Chong-il
is presented by Pyongyang as the "embodiment"
of Kim 11-song's thoughts.
In assessing Kim Chong-il's chances, much
depends on the timing and circumstances sur-
rounding Kim 11-song's departure from the scene.
Should the elder Kim, who at age 66 maintains
an active schedule, continue his reign for another
five or 10 years, Kim Chong-il's chances will
improve correspondingly. An interval of this
magnitude would allow time for several processes
to unfold that would be beneficial to the son.
At the most elementary level, it would permit
the youthful-looking Kim Chong-il to mature
physically and to develop more poise and the
kind of commanding presence that has long been
exhibited by his father. Korean society, like most
Asian cultures, still places a premium on age,
equating it with wisdom and authority.
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It would also give the elder Kim sufficient
time to orchestrate his son's public unveiling at
an appropriate time. When that time might come
about is anybody's guess. Given Kim Chong-il's
evident role in the current seven-year economic
plan, the successful conclusion of that plan might
make a suitable occasion for bringing the son
forward. The plan is not supposed to end until
1984, but if past experience is a guide, North
Korea might claim "prefulfillment" of the plan
as early as 1982.
Most of the veteran party leaders who now
form Kim 11-song's inner circle of advisers are in
their 60s or older. In five to 10 more years a
younger generation of leaders inevitably will
move into the party elite. These new leaders
presumably would be more responsive to the
younger Kim, or at least they would present less
of a challenge to his authority.
If, on the other hand, Kim 11-song dies or
becomes incapacitated in the near term, the
likelihood of a struggle over the succession in-
creases measurably. The contest might well take
the form of the traditional palace intrigue. Inas-
much as Kim Chong-il has never been introduced
to the outside world, he could be quietly moved
off center stage by a coalition of party and
military veterans. The anti-Kim Chong-il plot-
ters presumably would be united only in their
opposition to the younger Kim.
A succession struggle in North Korea could be
accompanied by violence. Kim II-song has ruled
continuously since 1945, and there is no prece-
dent to serve as a guide for a transfer of power.
outcome, it is doubtful that unrest would-be
permitted to spread uncontrolled throughout the
country or that there would be a general break-
down in law and order. That could invite un-
wanted intrusion by China or the Soviet Union;
worse yet, it could encourage Pyongyang's rival
in the South to take advantage of the North's
disarray.
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