DCI/NIO MEETING, 25 MAY 1978

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002500050010-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2001
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 22, 1978
• Content Type: MF

-
Approved Foreease 2002/01/24 : CIA-RDP81130040.025000500iN
MEMORANDUM FOR: All National Intelligence Officers
FROM Presidential Briefing Coordinator .
SUBJECT KUNIO Meeting, 25 May 1978
1: The subject of discussion at the Thursday, 25 May, DCl/NiO
meeting has been changed. The subject of the meeting will be the
question,
Are recent and current Soviet intervention abroad
different in kind than earlier interventions, reflecting
increasing sophistication and hard-won experience or are
there other more important influences, e.g. improved
logistics and lessening concern for US interventions?
The meeting is now scheduled for 110G in the DCI's Conference Room. As
is well known- this schedule is subject to change. Meeting time and
place will be confirmed by telephone.
2_ Many western observers are comforting themselves when viewing
apparent Soviet successes in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, etc. with
the knowledge that earlier Soviet intervention's in such places as ?
Guinea, Ghana, Egypt' and Indonesia failed eventually. Other observers
argue that at its root this view sees certain historical constants
(Soviet ham-handedness". is sometimes raised te this stature) as pre-
venting long-term Soviet 'dominance over a Third World country. They
argue further that the optimists see the Soviets as either incapable of
learning from.past.mistakes or see historic constants as beydnd Soviet
power to influence,and finally that 'either proposition seems self-
evident. A third group of observers would argue that recent Soviet
interventions promise more success to the Soviets than past interven-
tions not because the Soviets have grown more clever, but because the US
has withdrawn from the field. at a time when Soviet technical capabilities
to intervene have matured.
3. Attached is a copy of William Luers' paper for a recent seminar
which addresses Soviet policy in the Third World. It is forwarded not
to endorse the views stated, but to provoke discussion. It is requested
that each NiO consider the proposition under iiscussion within the frame
of reference of his area of responsibility and be prepared to contribute
to a broad discussion of it on Thursday. No formal Presentations are
planned. NIO/USSR will host the seminar.
Attachment
Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81600401R002500050010-2
MEMORANDUM* ' The
Attached is a
DCl/N10 Meeting and
Director of Central
In-101 i gence
copy of my memo for the Thursday
a copy of the L4grs paper you reguestes.
Date 24 May 1978
FORMawer-PREV QUS
Ivor 1Kelease 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R00250005
Approved For Rose 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81600401R9500050010-2
THE U.S.S.R. AND THE SOURCES OF SOVIET POLICY
A Seminar Sponsored by the
Council on Foreign Relations and the
Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies
.The Wilson Center
Honorable George F. Kennan, Mr. Winston Lord, Chairmen
SESSION VI: SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS THE THIRD WORLD AND THE USA
The U.S.S.R. and the Third World
William H. Luers
U. S. Department of State
May 19, 1978
Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81600401R002500050010-2
?
Approved For Ree 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R41,00050010-2
THE U.S. - USSR AND THE THIRD WORLD
This paper is designed as a briefing on Soviet
policy toward the Third World. In compiling this brief
review I have tried to do four things:
-- describe a few of the Soviet experiences that
have shaped the diverse Soviet policies and involvement
in the Third World.
-- discuss Soviet economic and military programs
in the Third World
-- discuss briefly the recent Soviet/Cuban involve-
ment in the Horn of Africa; and
-- draw some conclusion as to the nature of current
Soviet policy toward the Third World.
I have not addressed U.S. relations with the Third
World or attempted to describe an appropriate U.S. response
to Soviet activities. I leave the debate on U.S. policies
to the discussion period.
PART I: PAST SOVIET EXPERIENCES
Soviet policy toward and engagement in the Third
World most certainly has roots in Russian imperial history
and in the early Soviet period. Ideology and State interests
have competed for dominance in determining the course of
Soviet policies. But it is not within the scope.of this
study or my competence to seek in Russian history for
Appecived-Foi. ReTeate 2002/01/24-7.-C1A:RDF81B00401R0-02500-0511010-2
Approved For Ree 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R4,00050010-2
- 2 -
clues to Soviet motives for projecting power into the
Third World. Instead, I have chosen to discuss how Soviet
experiences in the Third World since the mid-1950's might
have conditioned Soviet policies of today.
After World War II the Soviets sought opportunities to
take advantage of the dissolution of the colonial empires.
Lenin had led them to expect not only an embrace from the former
colonies but a significant trembling in the metropoles. The
first major Soviet efforts in the Third World were eminently
"Khrushchevian"--innovative, personalized, ideologically
justified, ill-conceived and ultimately failures. The Soviets
successful entry into Nasser's Egypt coincided with the new
opportunities that emerged from the Bandung Conference (1955).
Khrushchev recognized these opportunities at the 20th
Party Congress (1956) saying that "the disintegration of the
imperialist colonial system is a postwar development of world
historical significance." In the next decade Khrushchev pro-
fessed to see the emergence of "national democratic states,"
mainly in Africa and Asia, headed by "progressive" or "revolutionary"
democratic" leaders who were not yet socialist but were perceived .
to be on the track toward socialist development. These
charismatic leaders were honored in Moscow and their nations
received the first significant Soviet economic assistance
and military aid.
In the 1960's the Soviets received one disappointment
after another: from the Congo crisis, to the disintegration
Approved For _Release 2002/01/24 : CIA-RDP81B00401R002500050010-2
Approved For Relee 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R0000050010-2
- 3 -
of the "Casablanca bloc" (Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, and
the UAR) and the ouster or shift in orientation of most
of the "revolutionary democrats." Moreover, Soviet aid paled
before programs of the U.S. and the former "metropoles".
Their first parries into the Third World were inept and based
on naive premises. The Soviets--like the U.S.--learned that
the course of events in post colonial Africa and Asia was
-unpredictable, that their own ability to transform assistance
into influence was limited, and that nationalism, economic
and political underdevelopment and residual Western traditions
in these new societies imposed major obstacles to Soviet
objectives.
The second major experience that shaped Soviet policies
toward the Third World was the split with China. As the
break with Peking developed;. Moscow sought to buttress its
relations in the rest of Asia. India eventually became the
center piece of that strategy after it split with China. During
20 years a relationship has developed with India which has
been useful to both countries. By far the largest recipient
of Soviet aid and one of the largest buyers of Soviet arms,
India has managed effectively its dealings with the Soviets,
who have grown to live with India's independence. The Soviets
not only failed to promote communism in India, they most certainly
preferred an independent non-aligned India to another giant
communist competitor on the Asian continent. If the break
with Peking led Moscow to establish a balanced state-to-
state relationship with India, it also gave impetus to Soviet
_ Approved For Release 2002/01/24,.:_ClA,RDR811300401R002500050040=2?.
4
Approved For RelOe 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81600401R0000050010-2
- 4 -
efforts to compete with China nearly everywhere
else in the Third World. Containment of
Chinese influence has been one of the major
motivating factors in determining Soviet policy toward
the Third World.
The third set of experiences that most certainly
shaped the Soviet view of the future arose from Soviet
involvement in Cuba and Vietnam. Like Korea in an earlier
period, the special factor of U.S. military engagement,
with all the attendant risks of escalation and U.S.-Soviet
confrontation, imposed special constraints on Moscow. Indeed,
the prospect or the actuality of U.S. military action was
perhaps the critical factor in the Soviet approach to such
"national liberation struggles." At the same time, the
experiences in Cuba and Vietnam underlined for Moscow the
fact that their only effective tool to gain influence in
the Third World was probably military assistance and
arms transfer.
? The Vietnam experience speaks for itself. Let me
turn to Cuba. Moscow must have taken two important lessons
from over 15 years of. life' with Fidel:
-- large scale military.support to a revolutionary
regime that is under fire can bring significant political
influence but the sustenance of such a regime can be
costly in economic terms (over $9.9 billion since 1961).
Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R002500050010-2
Approved For Rel
2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R0000050010-2
-5-
-- the revolutionary and ideological zeal of a
client communist state can be occasionally troublesome
(Fidelismo in Latin America and the missile crisis in the
1960's) and occasionally supportive (in Africa and the
non-aligned in the 1970's) for Soviet policy.
Whatever problems have existed in the relationship,
it is clear that Cuba, over the past decade and a half has
unlocked a number of doors for the Soviets in the Third World.
-- Cuba became the first and only major revolutionary/
comthuniSt regime in the Third World -- it received full
Soviet support for the development of socialism and the
irreversibility of the revolution.
-- Cuba became an effective and consistent supporter
for the Soviets in the non-aligned movement through
which many key decisions in international organizations
are influenced and even determined.
-- Cuba gave the impetus to reactivating Soviet
participation in Africa and,most importantly,provided
the combat troops to make the military involvement
effective.
Clearly the Soviets would like to find and support
a few more Cubas--but not many since the venture can be
costly.
Approved- Far-Re tease-2002M /24 -:--etA=ReP81-B0040-1 R0025Cte05.00-1-0---2-
Approved For Rel
2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R0000050010-2
- 6 -
Permit one digression from the Cuban experience.
The Soviets had the Cuban experience in mind when they
moved so cautiously with the Allende Government in Chile.
By the time Allende became President of Chile (November 1970),
the Soviets had dropped their pretensions to being the
guiding force and guarantor of communist parties or the
radical left in Latin America. Allende needed economic
assistance on a large scale to survive. His quandry offered
the Soviets a unique opportunity to demonstrate that
peaceful transition to power was possible for Marxist
parties and would be supported by Soviet economic might.
Think of the implications of such an event for Latin America
and for contemporary "Eurocommunists" wherever they are.
Soviet restraint and reluctance was remarkable.
The aid was minimal. Allende was neither effective
nor revolutionary. The Soviets never embraced him ideologically
referring only to Chile's "revolutionary renovation" or
"radical reconstruction."
The final irony of the Soviet decision not to support
the Unidad Popular was that the very year (1973) that
Allende was overthrown by Pinochet the Soviets were preparing
to embrace warmly the return of Juan Peron as president of
Argentina. No contemporary figure so epitomized the Latin
American strong man of the right. But the Soviets clearly saw
in Peron a man with whom they could work in one of the
potentially wealthiest nations of the Third World.
-- Approved -For Release. 2002/01/24_: _CIPARD281130_040:U3Q0250_0_0500_11072
Approved For Rel
2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R0000050010-2
- 7 -
Peron sought Soviet help for an economic and trade
relationship that could prosper. He had a reputable
background of independence from the U.S., and presented
no ideological challenge to Soviet policy. Within a short
period of time Soviet offers of credits and cooperation to
Argentina exceeded those offered to Allende. Argentina
under Peron became the largest recipient of Soviet aid in
the Westerh Hemisphere after Cuba.
The fourth complex of experiences that has given a
special spin to Soviet policies has been the Middle East.
If the major Soviet security concerns lay to the East and
West, the major area for the expansion of political and
economic influence and for superpower competition in the
Third World has been the Middle East. In the 1973 war,
the Soviets were able to respond to Arab requests with an
airlift of supplies and arms with the speed and dependability
comparable to the United States. During that war over
800 military support flights were flown to Egypt and other
Approved For Release 2002/01/24 : ClArRDP81600401R002500050010-2
Approved For Re1110e 2002101/24: CIA-RDP811300401R0000050010-2
- 8 -
Arab nations. This was a new, more muscular Soviet
behavior, an important manifestation of the Soviet Union's
capacity and readiness to behave like the other superpower.
Finally, the most important factor in the development
of Soviet attitudes toward thellird World has been the
United States. The initial thrust into the Third World was
to prevent the U.S. from drawing these newly emerging
states into a system of anti-Soviet alliances. The Soviets
developed a large scale navy aimed, in the first instance,
at countering U.S. attack carriers and nuclear submarines.
By the late 1960's, however, the expanding navy had taken on
an additional rationale and had become an important factor
in the Soviet presence in the Third World. More importantly,
the entire shape of Soviet programs for developing countries
increasingly resembled U.S. bilateral programs--lucrative
arms sales to steady customers, selectivity in bilateral
economic assistance and emphasis on trade opportunities.
An important aspect of Soviet economic policy toward
the Third World which has not developed similarly to the U.S. is the
Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81600401R002500050010-2
Approved For Rel. 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP811300401R0000050010-2
_ 9 _
multilateral and institutional. The most remarkable phenomenon
of the past decade has been the degree to which international
financial institutions (IMF, IBRD, UNDP and regional banks),
multinationals (banks and corporations) and international
organizations (OPEC, UNCTAD, GATT, WHO, FAO, commodity groups,
etc.) have dominated the outlook, energies and development of
the Third World. To non-waring Third World states whose borders
are relatively stable (all but sub-Saharan Afrida, the Middle
East and Indochina) the dominant issues of the day (food,
energy, development, trade, technology, health, education) are
not dealt with bilaterally with superpowers but through an
expanding international network in which the Soviet Union is
inactive and largely irrelevant.
If the Soviets failed to follow our lead toward the inter-
nationalization of development programs and if they failed
to commit significant resources to Third World economic develop-
ment, they did learn too well from our military sales and
assistance programs. The most disturbing aspect
of Soviet relations with the Third World is their readiness
to transfer significant quantities of military equipment but-
tressed by advisers and, in-two recent cases, Cuban combat
troops. It is in this area that Soviet policy has become most
threatening and destabilizing.
Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81600401R002500050010-2
Approved For ReIllpe 2002/01/24 rCKIRDP81B00401R0000050010-2
PART II: SOVIET PROGRAMS AND PRESENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD
One method of measuring Soviet involvement in the Third
World is to compile charts showing the expansion of Soviet
diplomatic relations, the increase in military and economic
assistance and the placement of more technicians in developing
countries. According to this "penetrationist" school of
Sovietology, the growth by increments of Soviet presence has .
resulted in a comparable increase in Soviet influence and
power. What the penetrationists do not usually measure, however,
is the comparable growth in the presence of other powers or the
increasing capacity of Third World states to control Soviet
inputs and manage. or mismanage their own affairs.
Rather than compile such statistics, I have looked at the
record and cumulative totals of Soviet economic and military
assistance over the last ten to twenty-five years. From 1954
to 1976 the USSR extended a total of $11,769 million in economic
assistance, $6.7 billion of it in the last ten years (Table I).
From a base of $291 million in 1967, the value of Soviet
aid commitments peaked at $1.2 billion in 1971 and again in 1975,
but dropped to $390 million last year. Actual drawdowns on these
agreements have remained remarkably constant over the decade at
between $300-700 million a year. Of the nearly $12 billion in
Soviet aid extended since 1954, only a little more than half or
about $7 billion has actually been used by recipient countries.
(Cuba has received $10 billion since 1961.)
Compare these modest figures to the scale of international
lending. In 1977 alone, loans to LDC's were as follows: World
Bank, $7.3 billion, other regional banks (ADF, ADB, and IADB),
Approved For R-elease 2002/01/24 CIA-RDP81B00401R002500050010-2
Approved ForRelpe 2002/01/21: RA-RDP81B00401R0.00050010-2
$2.83 billion, US commercial banks, $52.3 billion, and US
bilateral assistance $5.6 billion. As the resource flow to the
Third World has expanded enormously over the last decade buttressed
by the increased wealth of the oil exporting states, Soviet
participation in this growth has been marginal and, except in
a few countries, unnoticed.
Although instructive, the overall figures do not answer
the fundamental question of just how much influence the ruble
has bought. Excluding Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea, a look at
the top 20 recipients of Soviet economic assistance since 1954
gives an indication of the relationship between lasting friend-
ship and the ruble (Table II). Among the first five recipients,
India is non-aligned, while Egypt, Turkey and Iran have close
ties with the United States. Afghanistan has maintained a non-
aligned policy--it is too soon to judge whether Afghanistan's new
leadership will desire to preserve the previous balanced approach
to international affairs. Algeria (6), Iraq (7) and Syria (9),
have good relations with Moscow, but could hardly be considered
Soviet pawns. No. 11 is Argentina, which for various reasons
discussed earlier stands ahead of Chile (12). Other countries
on the list, such as Somalia (14), Indonesia (15), and Ghana (40),
are symbolic of traumatic reverses in Soviet relations with the
developing world.
'What is most evident in the pattern of recent Soviet-economic
assistance, however, has been the emphasis on developing closer
economic-ties with neighboring countries or countries in the
near periphery, particularly in South Asia and the Arab world.
Similarly, there has been a de-.emphasis on ideology in economic
Approved- For-Release-2002101 /24-:--CIA-Ft-DP-8-180040-1ROG250-0050-010-2 -
Approved For Rel. 2002/01/24: cVk-SIDP81600401R0.00050010-2
ties over the past decade. One writer has called this
"counterimperialism."* At the 25th CPSU congress in 1976,
Kosygin announced that Soviet cooperation with developing
countries should take the form of a "stable and mutually
advantageous division of labor." The purpose of such a policy
was not just to win political and ideological influence.
It was to establish long-term economic relations and broaden
the base of Soviet economic relations with the world.
The Soviets learned that economic investments in nations
with ideologically compatible leaders does not always prove
effective. Moreover, proximity of some nations offered oppor-
tunities for longer term, more stable economic relations with even
capitalist-oriented states. The Soviet Union began to
give priority to its own longer term need to trade. Thus,'
the major stress of Soviet economic assistance in the past
decade has been directed toward India, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan,
Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Algeria. It is clear that the
Soviets also hope that by establishing more stable economic
relations with these countries hostilities could eventually be
diminished and perhaps greater political (even ideological) com-
patibility achieved.
While Soviet economic assistance has been a relatively
stable and minor factor in the evolution of Soviet efforts to
seek influence in the Third World, their military programs and '
arms transfers have expanded steadily. Looking at Table 3,
you can see that the value of Soviet military agreements have
increased progressively over the past decade from $525 million
* Richard Lowenthal in Problems of Communism
Approved For Raelease-200-2/01124 ciA-kbPsi BooLOA gb02500050190:2 ?
Approved For Reif. 2002/01/244 C1-RDP81600401R0.00050010-2
in 1967 to over $4 billion last year. The value of arms
deliveries grew from $500 million to $3 billion over the
same period. Moreover, the record of Soviet arms transfers
is a more reliable measure for determining the relationship
with developing states. Looking at the top 20 list of Soviet
arms recipients over the past decade (Table IV), one sees
that the expected entries -- Vietnam (1), Cuba (9), and North
Korea (8), appear in the top ten. Others in the group
including Syria (3), Iraq (4), Libya (6) and Algeria (10),
have close relations with Moscow and generally support Soviet
positions. Only Egypt (2), India (5) and Iran (7) are
either non-aligned or have closer ties with the United States.
In the second group of ten, the list of recipient
countries presents a more varied picture. Among these are
China (11), Somalia (13), Peru (14), Nigeria (17), Sudan (18),
Uganda (19) and Guinea (20), most of which have distanced
themselves from the Soviet Union. Only Angola (12), North
Vietnam (15) and perhaps now Afghanistan (10), could be
said to be close to the Soviets.
In 1976, the Soviet bloc had over 10,000 military technicians
in Third World countries, less than 10 percent of these
were from Eastern Europe--the rest from the Soviet Union.
Most of these technicians were concentrated in Iraq, Syria,
Algeria and Somalia. Military personnel from Third
World countries have increasingly sought training in the
Soveit Union. In 1976 over 4000 were trained in the Soveit
Union. The countries indicated above plus Libya and Tanzania
have the largest share.
Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81600401R002500050010-2
Approved For Rel. 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R0000050010-2
- 14 -
Soviet arms agreements last year were up considerably
over the year before. A major increment of course came from
Soviet sales to Addis Ababa of over $800 million, but
lucrative agreements were reached also with Algeria, India,
Libya and Syria -- deals which together came to nearly three
and one half billion dollars in sales. The main focus of Soviet
military assistance has been in the Middle East, South Asia
and more recently to sub-Saharan Africa. The only significant
recipient of Soviet military assistance in Latin America has been
Peru where the Soviets continue to emphasize military sales
at a time when Peru is practically bankrupt and needs economic
support which it can seek only in the West.
Approved F-or Release 2002/01/24.:CIA.RDR81B00401R002500.05_0010-2
Approved For Ree 2002/01/24 :_CI44RUP811300401R.00050010-2
PART III: Soviet Involvement in the Horn of Africa
Angola was the first example of the most recent
Soviet tactic in the Third World. There, the Soviets
together with the Cubans, dramatically shifted the
balance of power in 1975 by providing significant materiel
and combat support for Neto's MPLA. In less than two
months, the combination of Cuban troops and heavy Soviet
military aid turned the tide in favor of Neto and
permitted him to establish control in most of that country.
We next saw the Soviet-Cuban formula applied in
Ethiopia: a development which needs to be seen, however,
against the complex background of the Soviet presence
and role in Somalia.
-- Over a period lasting a decade, the Soviet Union
provided more than a billion dollars worth of weapons and
technical assistance to Somalia, creating the military force
which enabled Siad Barre to prepare and carry out the
infiltration and subsequent invasion of the Ogaden.
--After 1976, however, the Soviets thought that the
Mengistu revolutionary regime in Ethiopia might be added
to Somalia as a client in the,Horn. Mengistu's Ethiopia
was ideologically attractive to the Soviets; perhaps reminding
them of Castro's Cuba after the fall of Batista: a revolutionary
leader preparing to reconstruct the social order of his
country along radical lines using military force, in a siege
atmosphere.
Approved For Release 2002101/24: CIA-RDP81600401R002500050010-2
Approved For RelOe 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R011000050010-2
- 16 -
-- Somali irredentism over the Ogaden, however, had
been a source of tension for decades, and ultimately proved
to be the stumbling block for Soviet policy in Somalia.
-- Late in the summer of 1977, the Soviet government
tried to dissuade the Somalis from large scale incursions
into Ethiopia and sought to reduce the chances for open military
conflict' between the two countries.
-- This tardy Soviet effort failed. After having been
ejected from Somalia, the Soviets turned their full support
to Ethiopia which had broken its military relationship with the
U.S. In responding to Mengistu's plea for assistance against
invasion from Somalia, the Soviets abandoned for the moment
any hopes of retaining a presence in both countries.
-- In the latter part of 1977, the Soviets supported
the Government of Ethiopia with a large .scale
lift, sustained over a period lasting several
air
and sea
months. This
major operation, amounting to more than a billion dollars
in sophisticated military equipment and tanks, together with
an infusion of 10-15,000 Cuban comb-at troops, turned the
tide of the military camapign. A notable feature of the effort
(not seen in Angola) included the establishment of a Soviet
command structure to coordinate the logistics and possibly the
tactical movements of both ground and air elements of the Cuban
and Ethiopian forces.
So much has been written about the aggressiveness of
Soviet policy in the Horn of Africa that any further recitation
Approved For-Release 2002/01/247 C1A=RDP111-B00401-R0025-00050010-2
Approved For Relee 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R0000050010-2
here will add little. Soviet involvement in Ethiopia
was not uninhibited adventurism. Soviet policy displayed
some self-limiting elements.
The Soviet government did apparently seek to
dissuade
the Somalis from invading the Ogaden.
The Soviets did not encourage and may have counseled
against Ethiopian and Cuban troops crossing the
border into Somalia.
-- Large scale retribution against the Somali popu-
lation in the Ogaden has not yet taken place, although we
do not know whether Soviet advice is
in any way responsible
for this.
-- Thus far, the Soviets and the Cubans seem to have been
reluctant to commit their own personnel to military operations in
Eritrea, and have called for a political solution to thp secession
problem there. The Soviets will probably not restrain their
Ethiopian clients, but the question is whether they and the
Cubans will choose to remain aloof.
-- There is some evidence that Soviet policy in
black Africa operates under a. loose OAU constraint in the sense
that it aims for and perhaps is limited by a need for
legitimacy in the eyes of other regional powers. The
Soviets have deliberately sought to avoid involvements
which would open them to the charge of participating in
the adjustment of African boundaries by force. The Soviets
Approved For Release-2002/01124-:.C1A-RDP81-B00401-R002500050010-2
follow
Approved For Rel.e 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R011000050010-2 ?
- 18 -
closely the lead of the front line states on the Zimbabwe
and Namibia. issues.
To conclude, looking at Soviet objectives and
intentions in the region, one can draw certain tentative
conclusions:
-- As early as 1976, the Soviets had seen in the
Mengistu revolutionary government an ideologically promising
regime which might establish them in Africa.
-- Once ejected from Somalia, Soviet support for
Ethiopia was kept within limits consistent with OAU policies-
on territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders.
-- Soviet operations in Ethiopia vividly demonstrate
their possession of a logistical force and command
*structure which, in conjunction with Cuban manpower, can
be used to intervene in politico-military disputes far
from the Soviet homeland: a message to the U.S. and
others that the Soviet Union regards itself, and is prepared
to take the prerogatives of a superpower whose interests
are far flung,and which must be accomodated in the resolution
of regional conflicts it deems important to its interests.
-- The Soviets and Cubans now appear to be determined
to retain a large military presence in Ethiopia, in order
to serve as a prop for the Mengistu government, and presumably
to help in shaping the course of Ethiopia's internal develop-
ment`, as they have been doing in the case of Angola. Con-
ceivably, as noted above, the Soviets hope to develop a
Approved ForRelease 2002/Crtf24 : CIA=RDP81B00-401-R0025-00050010-2
Approved For Re, 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R0 00050010-2
- 19 -
relationship with Ethiopia rather like that they have had
for so long with Cuba. Ethiopia of today may be like Cuba
in 1961, but Mengistu is not Fidel and the size, diversity,
and massive needs of Ethiopia will present the Soviet leader-
- ship with a formidable and perhaps overwhelming challenge..
App-roved-Tor Re1dest-e-2002/01724- : CIA:RDPSI8004171-R002500050010-2
Approved For Ree 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP8160040114500050010-2
- 20 -
PART IV: CONCLUSIONS - CURRENT SOVIET POLICY
Several conclusions appear justified from the
foregoing:
The diverse, opportunistic and erratic character of
Soviet involvement in the Third World suggests no basic
commitment to Third World de'velopment or to a comprehensive
engagement with Third World problems.
The force driving the projection of Soviet power into
the Third World flows from Soviet state interests in a secure
in
periphery and/assuming both the rola and image of a super-
.
power . "ft Afr 44. 'bite- Soogots Art r's mIVIN to pforcstvo-A.
or r or to ftst t se" tofto pot. r1/44. ttAZr _ inf We" cole.4.
Ideology is a factor. The Soviet's generally
opportunistic approach to the Third World and failure to
engage in the "North-South dialogue" seems conditioned in
part by Lenin's predictions that the crisis of imperialism
arises out of the breakdown of relations between colonies
and the metropoles. More importantly, in such cases as
Cuba, Vietnam and perhaps Ethiopia where state and ideological
interests coincide and reinforce each
ment is apt to be particularly high.
The Soviet decision to remain outside the major inter-
national financial and trade institutions and programs for
resource transfers severely limits their capacity to influen
and shape events in much of the Third World. This is
other, Soviet
commit-
particularly true in the Middle East, Latin America, and Asii.
Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81600401R002500050010-2
Approved For Rel.e 2002/01/24 :2q1A-RDP811300401R0100050010-2
Although the Soviets may find it in their economic and ,
political interests to become involved bilaterally in
developmental and trade questions such as they have with
India and some nations near their borders, they seem dis-
inclined and economically ill-equipped to participate in
international institutions. They must sit out the North- .
South dialogue because it is precisely in that setting where
they are economically outclassed and intellectually unsuited.
The most troublesome aspect of Soviet behavior in the
Third World has been and is likely to continue to be their
efforts to seek influence by stressing arms transfers, military
relations and, on occasion, facilitating the introduction
of Cuban or other forcas_into-et-s.i.enal conflicts. At least
in the short term, military power translates into political
influence in parts .of Africa. Mugabe and Nkomo, for example,
are likely to be more intransigent when bolstered by the formidable
and tested Soviet/Cuban force. For the same reason, Neto and
Mengistu are likely to become more difficult neighbors.
Most serious is the specter of deep racial conflict in Southern
Africa in a situation where the front line states are backed
by Soviet might. In a crisis ,situation, moreover, the
presence or potential of Soviet power could again play an
important, possibly critical, role in the Middle East.
? There are some limits and constraints on Soviet power
in the Third World. In much of the Third World where economic
issues dominate and where borders and regions are relatively
stable, Soviet military power is marginal or irrelevant. In
Approved 'For Relea-te-2002/0.17221TCIAIRDPV1 B00401R06250-006.0010-2
Approved For RelOe 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R0000050010-2
- 22 -
Africa, the Soviets are. likely to try to be seen as working
pataiciii isrik.ts
within4 , development
of an OAU consensus against their involvement. To the
extent that the Sovie4,becomesincreasingly divisive;to:.=14. 171pse. .45-,
presaine.t.
ihAte.....ts Airmail% tel,"Zeigetc.e. 4
their power4e4wees4611Q4.y6they risk expulsion or rejection
from important regions in Africa. Most importantly, the great
powers have consistently underestimated the capacity of
countries in the Third World to assert themselves effectively
against outsiders and to preserve their own national integrity.
The developing Arab, non-aligned, and Western concerns over
Soviet behavior are likely also to give the Soviets pause.
The Middle East remains for the Soviets the most
critical area of interest in the Third World and the one where
the potential for superpower confrontation is highest. Indeed,
their adventures in Africa, in part, flow from their
frustration in not playing a major role in the Middle East.
There is a certain logic to the return of Soviet attention
to Africa since it is the part of the world in greatest flux. /
urks.-11 44;44.1.vit
But there is also a paradox in the Soviet return to Africa
since it is the area ,of the greatest Soviet debacles. High
risks in such a volatile environment are likely to lead to
further setbacks. Soviet policy in Asia will continue to be
conditioned by Moscow's obsession with China. In Latin
America opportunism and hopes for increased trade mark a
relatively low level of Soviet activity.
Approved For Release 2002/01/24 : CIA-RDP81600401R002500050010-2
Approved For Re.e 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401400050010-2
- 23 -
? An important test for future Soviet effectiveness
in Africa will be in Ethiopia. Here, too, the Soviets
face a dilemma. Should they be effective in assisting
inconsolidating Mengistu's power and establishing a Soviet
client state on the Cuban model, the Soviets and a
fvrtivw 4(4.r.s1
revolutionary client,:e4a44-Imnsimwappig Ethiopia's neighbors)
Irk,- Iva) AA 6i 4.4.1c. A4I. IA
The Sovi'.'gts could become not only a more controversial and
feared intruder but they could also find a high economic
cost in taking on some of Ethiopia's economic burden. Should
the Soviets not make a major commitment to Ethiopia and seek
instead to enlarge their role in Southern Africa they could
find themselves in unmanageable conflicts and racial wars
-f-ew-4,44.1644--L-ivey?erre??drregrripareei- and they could risk losing
their footing in Ethiopia as well.
In'the ebb and flow of conflict and stability in the
Third World it is often the pqueption of the power balance
that is as important as the actual application of power or the
importance of the conflicts themselves. Soviet perceived
successes in the recent years in Angola, Ethiopia and
possibly Afghanistan may be ephemeral. But these successes
give encouragement to foreign adventures by a conservative
Soviet leadership troubled at home feeling the need to
legitimize its ideological credentials; give concern to
America's allies and friends who are or consider themselves
threatened by Soviet power; and bring into question the value
and terms of detente between the superpowers.
AP prOved-FofiCelease 70-0210.172477C1A:RDP8-1800401R0025por500ru0=2- ?
Approved For Reee 2002/61/24tlik-RDP81B00401400050010-2
TABLE I
SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(US
YEAR
$ MILLION)
EXTENDED
DRAWN
1954-1976
1967-1976
11,769
6,704
6560
4315
1967
291
310
1969
,494-
155
1970
198
385
1972.
802
430
1975
1,229
485
1976
875
420
1977
390
(prelim)
500
(prelim)
* * *
'Approved For Release-2002/01-/24-64-RDP8ii300401k00I5-6-06-5-0-010-2
Approved For Relie 2002/01/24-: da-I-DP81B00401 R.00050010-2
TABLE II
SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1954 - 1976*
(By order to total value of aid extended)
Total $11,769 million
Countries
Value
1.
India
1,943
2.
Egypt
1,300
3.
Afghanistan
1,251
4.
Turkey
1,180
5.
Iran
750
6:
Algeria
715-
7.
Iraq
699
8.
Pakistan
652
9.
Syria
467
10.
Bangladesh
300
11.
Argentina
245
12.
Chile
238
13.
Guinea
201
14.
Somali
154
15.
Indonesia
114
16.
Ethiopia
105
17.
North Yemen
98
18.
Morocco
98
19.
Sri Lanka
95
20.
Ghana
93
*Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea are not listed because of
their special relationship to the Soviet Union.
Approved ForRelewe_ 2002/01/2.4 : CIA-RIDF'.811300401R002500050010-2
Approved For Ree 2002/01/24 261A-RDP81B00401400050010-2
TABLE III
SOVIET MILITARY AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES
TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(US $ MILLION)
YEAR
AGREEMENTS
DELIVERIES
1955-1977
24,875
20,215
1967-1977
20,375
16,640
1967
525
500
1969
350
450
1970
1,150
1,000
1972
1,600
850
1975
2,000
1,685
1976
2,450
2,190
1977
4,000
(prelim)
3,000
(prelim)
* * *
Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R00250005001-0-2
U--
,
- 27 -
Approved For Ree 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81B00401R.00050010-2
TABLE IV
SOVIET, MILITARY ARMS TRANSFERS
TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1967-76
(By order of total value of transfers)
Total $17,972 million
Countries
US
$ Millions
Value
1.
Vienam
2,481
2.
Egypt
'
2,365
3.
Syria
2,015
4.
Iraq
1,795
5.
India
1,365
6.
Libya
1,005-
7.
Iran
611
8.
North Korea
480
9.
Cuba
355
10.
Algeria
315
11.
People's Republic of China
191
12.
Angola
190
13.
Somalia
181
14.
Peru
165
15.
Yemen (Aden)
151
16.
Afghanistan
100
17.
Nigeria
70
18.
Sudan
65
19.
Uganda
65
20.
Guinea
50
Approved For Release 2002/01/24: C.IA-R01581B00401R002-5-00050010-2
Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP811300401R002500050010-2
ADDENDUM
To Paper Presented By William H. Luers
"The U.S. - USSR and the Third World"
Page 20
Add the following sentence to end of third
?paragraph: ...superpower. "In Africa the Soviets are
responding to perceived opportunities to expand their
influence."
Page 22
The first six lines should be revised to read:
"Africa, the Soviets are likely to try to e seen as
working within political limits which make difficult the
development of an OAU consensus against their involvement.
To the extent that the Soviet presence becomes increasingly
divisive within the0AU or the use of their power exceeds
African tolerance, they risk expulsion or rejection
from important regions in Africa.. Most importantly
Page 23
First paragraph, line 6, should be changed to
read "revolutionary client will further alarm Ethiopia's
neighbors, including Black Africa."
Same paragraph, line 13, delete phrase "for which
they are ill-prepared".
Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP81600401R002500050010-2