SOVIETIZATION OF CZECHOSLOVAK ARMY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00047R000200180003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 21, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/05/01 : CIA-RDP82-00047R000200180003-6
SECRET/SECURITY INFO
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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COUNTRY
SUBJECT
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE
ACQU I RED
INFORMATION REPORT
Czechoslovakia
Sovietization of Czechoslovak Army
DATE OF I
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFETTINO THE NATIONAL DC PENAL
OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE IS, SECTIONS 799
AND 794, OF THE U.S. COON, AS AMENDED. .T5 TRANSMISSION OR REV,
LOTION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT IV AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IN
PROHIBITED OT LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PRONIRITED.
REPORT
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DATE DISTR. 50 Nov 1952
NO. OF PAGES
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
MMIMIRRIMMO
1. The promotion of Cepicka to the rank of army general and assigning
him the post of Einister of National Deiense created an unfavorable
reactioa among the officers. Cepicka is not a career soldier; he
does not have the least understanding of military problems. It
was clear that his promotion was purely political and that his
appointment would mean a complete new series of political purges
in the army and ultimately complete subjugation of the army to the
Communist Party. These fears were fully justified; as soon as
Cepicka took over, new severe purges began, affecting the Quarter-
master Corps in particular because Cepicka wanted to win the con-
fidence of the enlisted man by bettering his food. The Sovietiza-
tion of the Czech Army was quickly completed.
2. The pre-World War II Czechoslovak military doctrine was entirely discarded
and a Soviet doctrine introduced by the new issue of field
tactical manuals in 1951./
manuals issued after l945 were either
or based on the Soviet doctrine. The
difference in tactics between the old
Sovietized one.
(a)
The
translations of Soviet manuals
following illustrates the
Czechoslovak Army and the
Offensive warfare
(1) The former approach march and approach, which began as
60011 as the marching formations reached the area
controlled by enemy field artillery (about eight km)
were replaced by the attacking march which ends in meeting
engagement. Covering elements during the march, frontal,
flank, and rear guards, were replaced by frontal, flank,
and rear shielding detachments, according to terminology.
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The Composition of these detachments was changed as well;
according to the former tactical principles, an infantry
regiment Was covered by an advance unit of battalion strength.
This battallen sent forward as its cover one company, the
company one squad, the squad its riflemen, and these were
Covered by individual scouts. According to the Soviet manual,
a battalion is covered by a platoon, strengthened by a '
detachment of heavy weapons. This platoon is covered by one
squad, and the squad by a pair of scOuts? .
(2) According to former tactics, the infantry, after jumping off..
from the line .of departure advanced into the line of assault:.
by rushes and without halting for any length of time. This
? advance was supported by HMOs; apart from artillery.- HMOs
were located in a so-called fire base (which was immediately
behind the line of departure), and they advanced after the
? supported-unit had reached its first objective. At present,.
the infantry advances from the line of departure into the line
of assault by degrees from one phase-line to another. The
phase-lines-are pre-determined according to terrain features
? at distances of approximately 150-200 m. At these phase-lines
the infantry halts for four or five minutes, digs in and opens
fire with all available weapons. ? The supporting HMOs are
incorporated in the attacking formation -and fire from their
respective phase-lines.
(b) Defensive warfare
(1)
As far as static defense is concerned, special emphasis is
placed on the tenacity of men with high morale to hold the
positions. In order to achieve this, extensive political
indoctrination is used to inoculate each man with the realiza-
tion of his individual responsibility for defense. The hatred
of the enemy is one of the means used to attain this aim.
(2) The deployment in a static position remained unchanged in
principle. Theterminology was adjusted to that used by the
Soviets. A more substantial change took place in assigning
defensive tasks to units of battalions or lower levels.
? Instead of the former frontal defense sectors, these units
are now assigned areas (rayons) of defense, each consisting
? of three basic terrain points. The individual commanders are
personally responsible for holding these basic points even if
encircled.
(3)
A further change has taken place in the cover of the main line
of resistance (defense). Instead of the former advance guards
which consisted of a scout echelon and a combat echelon, at
present so-called combat cover is sent forward as cover. Thus
a battalion would send forward one platoon about one to one and
one half km in front of the main line of defense. The squads
of this platoon would be deployed in a line and each of them
would defend an area of resistance which would result in their
mutual protection Each squad would cover itself with a pair
of guards.
(4) So-called wCAtank company areas or aseAtssk battalion knots
are organized in the direction of likely enemy tank attacks,
A company 41rtAtakk area consists of one rifle company, three
to five AT guns, one to two light astitsals weapons (bazookas
or AT rocket launchers), IMGs, and mortars. The battalion AT
know comprises 12 to 15 AT guns.
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ThesCestmUniat propaganda tries to create the impression that the
Czechoslovak Army is a tool of the working class for the safeguarding
Of7the sedial:' progress achieved by the February putsch. This ,progress
must be safeguarded against internal enemles and the aggressive Weatern
POWerili The greatest emphasis is plated cn the propaganda that the main
taSk Of the Czechoslovak Army is to safeguard pdade in close cooperation
with the Soviet Army. A series of facts contradicts this camouflage of -
the peaceful mission of the Czech Army, and, in fact, provet the exact
Opposite. If the Communist government of Czechoslovakia really con-
sidered only defense, it would concentrate on defense measures along the
Western frontiers and place more emphasis on defensive warfee-e in army
schools and courses and in the actual training of troops. In reality,
however, a process is under way of quickly reorganizing an army made
up primarily of prevailing rifle divisions into an army of mechanized
and motorized units. Every effort is being exerted toward achieving a
higher degree of battle preparedness for offensive action. The
following facts illustrate this:
Since early 1951, all officers have been trained in the operation
of motor vehicles.
All students in officers, training schools are taught to operate
motor vehicles.
In August 1951, there was a sudden transfer of 150 young infantry
lieutenants to the tank corps.
The automobile plant Tatra in Koprivnice 27936N-1809g7 was changed
from a civilian administration to a military one at the beginning
of 1951; there was a complete. switch in production to army trucks.
There wals'an intensification of training in motorized and mechanized
warfare in the Infantry Officers' Training School in 1951-52.
The tactical problems dealing with offensive warfare make up three-
fourths of the problems dealt with at the officers, school.
Offensive action was the subject of four out of five of the
tactical problems during the military refresher schooling of the
instructors and staff officers of the Infantry Officers, School in
the 1950-51 school year.
all the Infantry Divisions
o ze an eac v s on and infantry regiment was
to have a tank unit as an organic component.
-end-
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