Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 31, 2000
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 9, 1950
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R004000160009-5.pdf174.33 KB
ERU v Y R Approved For ReleaseTZO~bd v 'I~58Fi -I~D Z-00457 b J66 = IJX~ kjoi IINF R TION REPORT CD NO. 25X1A COUNTRY Chile SATE DISTR, 9 JAN 50? SUBJECT Chilean Investigaciones Report oni(t e. Communist Party of Chile 25X1A NO. OF PAGES 2 PLACE NO. OF ENCLS. ACQUIRED Tg CJA IJBM (USTED BELOW DATE OF IN SUPPLEMENT TO 25X1 X REPORT NO. The following report on the Communist Party of Chile (PO;Ch) was prepared in the Chilean Investigaciones by order and for the guidance of its director general, Luis Brur...,, 1, According to Communists supporting the present Political Cor*mission of the PCChsds Executive Committee, the 7 November 1949 shooting affray in the Plaza de Armas of Santiago was an unforeseen result of the brief demonstration ordered for that day by the Party's, Santiago Local Committee. It had been planned to have the Communists from the First and Eighth Communes meet in front of the central building of the University of Chile from where they would neet other marching groups. The main demonstration was to be held on Avenida latta after which the Party members were to return home. Although general orders were issued in June 1949 that the Communists should defend themselves from police aggression, Party leaders had no intention of pro--a yoking an armed clash with the police. Although the Communists admit that the first shot was fired by a Party member, PCCh leaders have branded him ae ana ^roh'fzt and are attempting to identify him and obta in proof of his guilt with the intention of turning him over to the authorities. 2. Opponents of the present Political Commission rn aintain that the Commission has planned for a long tire to provoke an incident in the hope that such would lead to serious trouble. 3, The outstanding leader of the Chilean Communist Party at the present time is Gabe Gonzalez vhose political policy is being, supported by Volodia Teitelboirr and. Luis Reinoso but opposed by Carlos Contreras Labarca and his faithful followers. The Chilean government should not forget that during the time Contreras Laharca served as Secretary General,, the Party helped elect three presidents and had 17 Congressmen, some cabinet ministers, ample funds, prestige, a vigorous press, and supporters in strategic positions throughout Chile, By handling the matter carefully, the government could have called attention to the Partyts present difficulties and could have played on the differences between Contreras Tabarca and Gonzalez with a view toward provoking a schism v.thin the Party. This v u)d have been possible because of the Party"s unique situation today. It should not be forgotten that in the PCCh?s last National Congress,, ET _ NAVY sTA7s NSRB DISTRIBUTION ARMY FBi E AtR CLASSIFICATION WM regraded to This document is hereNy with the CONFIJi ,; SAL in accord with ^; 3 from the App - C1 letter of 13 C 0.- - - iCF3 to the ~`v+' ~i ll~ V t. S.+Dsrecto: c' `- c t'.z united StatOs. ate- Next Fe'{c N Date: 2008 ~ ~ CIA-RD 5 Document a. HeGa dD~ Class. -Approved For Release 2000/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R004000160009-5 CONFID& . CENIMAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY -2- the position of Contreras Labarca was so weak that it was believed he would be expelled from the Party. Salvador Ocatnpo Pastene, of political vision, defended Contreras Labarca and managed to swing the coal miners' votes in his favor. Even though Contreras Labarca's situate Lion deteriorated after the Congress, it was not possible for Co sunist leaders to call another Congress because the Party had been declared illegal in the meantime. The Political Commission did not dare expel Contreras Labarca from the Party-since it was feared that this would arouse the twrath of the coal miners. As a result, he and his followers were isolated and though they no longer had any rights v thin the Party they were given tasks to perform and vmre asked for finencial contributions. 4. The govertuctent policy of persecuting the PCGh as a hole rather than certain of its leaders has resulted in a move toward reconcilation between the two factions. Consequently,, the Party will soon be stronger than before. 5o The arrest of Graciela (Chela) Alvarez and her banishment to Concepcion twos a desirable measure since she is strongly pro-Stalin and nothing can be done with hero', However, the arrest of Jorge Jiles Pizarro was an error since he is hated by so many Party members. An even more grievous and potentially dangerous mistake was the search of the house and office of Raul Barra Silva, -who is pro-Tito but who may collaborate actively -vrlth the Gonzalez faction if persecuted by the police. 6n If the present unselective persecution of the Communists continues, there is reason to fear that they may reach a state of desperation in tahieh they may be used by anarchists to unleash ridespread violence of incalculable harts to the country. SSPW.110 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R004000160009-5