ANTI-COMMUNIST GUERILLA UNITS IN KWANGSI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R008100430002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

ammo" ,LASSIFICATLON CONFI .i co - 'i oinr 25X1 A
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IINFORMATI RIEF-'0FIT
CONFIDEN) CD NO
SUBJECT Anti-Communist Guerrilla Units in kaangsi
2
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ADIHY
An 1-Comouniet guerilla, inM.:angel are
a. Remnants or former Nationalist armies
hsien and ?WO (districts), incluang
and border guards,
landlords and other farmers.:
made up of the following elements:
and peace preservation units of various
heien police units, self-defense units
Former Nationalist military and -civilian personnel, reservists, and intel-
lectuals?,
d. Local bandits and secret society mothers,
After the defeat of the Nationalist Central China Command in South Kwangsi, the
1 Army Group under HUANG Chieh 11/t ) and some 4angsi natives in the 10
Army Group succeeded in withdra ,Indochinae Over 150,000 men of the
Nationalist 7, 46p 48, and 56 Armies, all natives of Kwangsi. and Nationalist
irregulars of the five military administrative districts remained in Nwangsi.
Some were captured by the Communists, but most retained their arms and slipped
away to their homes or followed Nationalist officers to remote and mountain
country to form resistance group,a Local irregulars of various hsien preserved
their strength in some nountainous regions because Communist forces were unable
to reach them and bring them under control. Among the Nationalist troops which
fled to Yaoshan (109- 23- ) were a regiment of the 7 Amyl, two regiments of
the 46 Army, and a regiment of the 56 Army, all at between 60 to 90 percent nor-
mal strength. Other troops assembled at Shihwantashan (108- , 22- and on
the KWangsi-Indochina border.
Ruthless Communist control measures in Kaangsi drove many landlords and farmees
to establish clandestine connections with the guerrillas and eventually to join
them. Local intellectuals and leading citieens? under threat of being branded
enemy agents" for their non-Communist ideology, also jeinc2 anti-Comnniet
units, as did members of secret societies uho came under atrict controls. Local
bandits also attached themselves to guerrillas after the Commnelst conquest.
CLASSIFICATION cour
NSDB j
FBI I
ONTROL ? U.S. OiiieTaTALS ONLY
A
This document is hereby regraded to
CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the
letter of 16 October 1978 from the
Director of Central Intelligence to the
Archivist of the United States.
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Guerrilla organization passed through several stages. The firsts from December
1949 to March 1950, saw uncoordinated attacks by Nationalist remnants and local
irregulars against Communist peroonnel and communications and supplies. Some of
these elements went over to the Communists or uere brought under their control,
but many never surrendered. Groups which remained intact included:
About 4,000 men in Shihwantashan on the Kwangsi-Indochina border under YAO Huai
(J4
4.-
About 3,000 men in South Kwangsi under LO Huo /?, ).
00 e%
About 2,000 men in the Kweichow-Kwangsi and Hunan-Kweichow-Kuangsl border areass
commanded by CHIEN Ya-tan (r1 g9 ) and YANG Piao (A.,i444 ).
Ur' ik n?
About 3,000 men in Fuchuan Hsien (111-06, 24-49), Ho Hsien (111-31, 24-23), and
Kungcheng Hsien (110-40, 24-52) in eastern Kwangsi commanded by LI Jui-
hsiung (A IC" ) and CHOU T I ien-hsiung ( 4 / 4 ),
/- .41rJ
About 1,000 men in northern Kuangsi, commanded by AA Chin-min ( 03
;
About 2,000 men in the mountainous area of Tzuyuan Haien (110-36, 26-14)
manded by TANG Shou-ytieh (10 q y.tia ) and T'ANG Chieh-lOuei (ie
a
About 2,000 men in central Nwangsis commanded by LIN ilsiu-shan (aq , and
'Mb Li-tlien (v4! ')
60,000 to 70,000 armed men, in small bands of 100 to 1,000 each, in various hsien.
COM -
?
I 4
From April to June 1950, the Communist authorities in Kwangsi coordinated their
mopping-up operations against the guerrillas with the Communist "Reorganization
Committee." The guorrilla units, which had previous3y been uncoordinated and
had operated independently, sent representatives to Hong Kong, where a guerrilla
command was being formed. Intergroup liaison was arranged in Kwangsie Before
mid-June 19500 45 guerrilla units aggregating over 100,000 men were in coordina-
tion with one another. After the Korean war began. Kwangsi guerrillas were able
to develop still more, gaining gradu41 control of the areas surrounding Liuchoui
Nanning, Wuchou? and Paise. They disrupted land and water communications, de-
stroyed Peasants' Associations, killed Communist officials, and captured Communist
food supplies
6. By October 1950, guerrilla units iv Kuangsi included the following:
a. Over 10,000 guerrillas in southern Kuangsi to the Kweichow-Kwangsl-Yunnan
borders in Yaoshan? Shihwantashan, the Kweichow-Kuangsi border "asiens and in
Kuposhan between Puchuan and Ho Hsien.
b. 200,000 guerrillas with a Unified command for various sections of Kuongs
with the following commanders:
Soutil Kwangsi: LIANG Chao-chi ( f41) and WU Wen-hsiang (idef-
irN
North Kwangsi : CI! EN Ping-nan (1, )/41).
Central Kwangsi LO Hao-chung
East Kwangsi : LI Jui-hsiung and HSU Wei-wei (0,
e-
Yaoshan area : LI Pi-chIeng ( 4 19 and HAN Meng-hstan )*
r
Northwest Kwangsi: WU Chung-chien ),
Southwest Kwangsi: WEI Chieh-po
4- h Al
Kweichow-Kwangsi
border : YANG Flee
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7. Between November 1950 and February 1951, the Communists sent over 100,000 regulan
4e-eerie nni additienal militia into Kvangel for all-out mopping-up cameeitene
against the guerrillas. Operations reached their climax in January and eeerteary
1951, simultaneously with the large-scale arrests and executions of "Kuomintang
agents" and former Nationalist militany and government personnel. In the anti-
guerrilla campaigns, the guerrillas suffered heavy looses, since their command
was not well unified and they were short of supplies. They were mostly, in late
February, spread out according to plan out of the roach of the main Communist
attack waiting to strike effectively at Communist forces and to receive supplies
and equipment.
8. Guerrilla plans for more effective use of their capabilities include the follow-
ing suggestions by CHANG Jen-min (3kly, AO, LO Hao-chung? and HSU Chti-ming
a.
Establishment of communications networks: The guerrillas feel that signal
communications are necessary because of the strict Communist controls.
It of their signal supplies have been lost or damaged, however, and the
two radio sets remaining in the Yaoshan area require repairs and parts. For
signal connections, the guerrillas plan radios at Liuchou? Wuchou, Kweilin,
Fanning, Lungchoup and Paise, within the cities if that is feasible but
otherwise at the neaeest guerrilla base atil the radio network can be
implemented, communication is to be maintained by couriers operating through
these stations.
b. Unification and streamlining of designations of guerrilla units: Various
Kwangsi units are known as armies or columns or detachments, without clear
indication of their oonnections; the only common term in these titles is
"Anti-Communist National &ovation. Those designations should be coordi-
nated.
c. Breaking up of units into squads and platoons to facilitate operations: The
intensive Communist anti-guerrilla campaign brought an overwhelming force
into Kwangsin with all guerrilla areas surrounded, every crossroad guarded,
and troops in every village. Small Communist contingents are sent out on
four to six day expeditions against the guerrillas. To counter these re-
straints, the guerrillas should be organized in small groups of not more
than twenty men, for increased mobility.
d. Development of principles of organization and combat: In order to preserve
their strength and at the same time expand their activities, the guerrillas
should seek cover by working on farms or in busineas among the populace.
Loyal officers should be assigned for liaison clandestinely from the command
butt for the sake of security, there should be no lateral communication.
Liaison officers should commit guerrillas to combat operations only at tha
most opportune moment and then should assenble them secretly for a raid and
disperse than to their original positions immediately after the nission.
e. Principles of combat: The following are suitable for guerrilla activities:
(5)
Avoid the enemy's strength and strike at his weakness.
Raid larger groups of enemies but outnumber the enemy in single combat
Ambush, raid, and disrupt communications.
Wrest the initiative from the enemy, spread away from enemy concentration,
and counter enemy strength in cities with guerrillas in rural areas.
Make quick attacks on exterior lines but fight long defense battles on
interior lines.
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(6) Use. guerriila and mobile tactics, sometimes combined with paipitional
(7) Dort be distracted while fighting; take no chances while attackingl.
withdraw from an engagement without running; and on the ,!afensive
avoid conventional tactics.
Establishment of bases: In Yaoshan, Limantashan (109-59, 22-38)0 Shihean-
taahan, and Kuposhan on the :lunan-Kwangsi border, and in the mountainous
regions of the Kweichow-Yunnan-Nuangai border and along the Kweichowenangoi
border of the Tamingshan (108- 23- ), some major bases should be strength-
ened and those destroyed should be rebuilt. Secret bases to serve as alter-
nate bases should be established in remote vantage points not under effective
Communist control.
, Training of troops: Guerrilla troops must be trained constently to etudy
Communist tactics and work out counter-measures and to improve morale and
combat techniques. If poseible? there should be training in handling manons.
Each man should be trained for sturdiness and endurance,
Arms, ammunition, and medical sunplies: Guerrillas have secured some of
the supplies they require from raid on Communints, but they should also,
for real effectiveness, receive outside aid.
Improvement of the over-a/1 command: Essential personnel for operations
and orsanization should be placed in sufficient numbers in the departmente
of the over-all command for Kwangsi to make it as effective as possible.
Establishment of a main liaison office at Hong Kong: A special commissionca
at Hong Kong is needed to maintain contacts and exchange information rovinel
for the guerrilla command in Kwangsi? Such a position should preferably be
agreed to in advance by the Hong Kong goverment,
ATTACHMENT A: Strength and Location of Anti-Communist Guerrillas in Kmangsi,
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