RESULTS OF THE SOVIET AND SATELLITE AUTUMN MANEUVERS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP82-00457R011900010008-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 19, 2002
Sequence Number: 
8
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 5, 1952
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R011900010008-5.pdf91.3 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R011900010008-5 FORH O. FEB 1952 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CLASSIFICATION SECRET COUNTRY SUBJECT DATE OF INFO. PLACE ACQUIRED INFORMATION REPORT REPORT NO. SR,;' zechoslovakia A :::!ts of the Soviet and Satellite Autumn r!:'.S dY__t ~?V ors 25X1A 25X1A CD NO. DATE DISTR. 5 May 1952 NO. OF PAGES 2 NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW) SUPPLEMENT TO 25X1A 25X1X 1. z'--=.,W Ug the maneuvers of aaitumn 1951, the Soviet Pioneer Corps has been moved to 1sk (5C 35N, 137-02E) on the Amur River. Penal detachments of the Soviet which also participated in the maneuvers, have been sent to Karaganda '73-10E), in the coal mine district of Kazakstan,and the Alma-Alta steel Soviet infantry divisions have returned to their bases near Kaliningrad. . of the Czechoslovak Fifth and Eighth Divisions were sent to Ceske Budejovice ~.- uthern Bohemia for reorganization. ? or handling of logistic support during the autumn maneuvers resulted in _1-s for the mass production of the heavy truck MAZ-525 to be given to the ~!>> Automobile Works on 15 February 1952. The MAZ-525 truck has a capacity tons, a 300 hp. Diesel motor,and hydraulic lifting equipment. Armor plating . .stalled around the driver's seat, and similar armor will be placed on the 1950 The production of this truck is under the direction of Ashot Pogosov, %`. :_t:y Minister of Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises. 4, It ;3as been established that the autumn maneuvers were not for the ;tt-:'y?ng maas deployment toward western Europe* The Politburo was opposed to any ~==~= of such international importance. The need for general readiness of Soviet n in r a is of , -' rict ed G ..say - - -_ ? eneral a7.M, antemen)co is s for widespread maneuvers. 5. _.>u was a division of opinion in the Politburo with regard to the extent of the 1.? viers, Yj lotov wishing them to be on the largest possible scale, to impress -..=' frighten the West while M l k , a. en ov insisted on the necessity of restraint to dvranta e of th g e peace propaganda, which is achieving good results. 6. ,,acv Soviet and satellite military experts are satisfied that the autumn-maneuvers that th i a CLASSIFICATION SECRET e ov et Army will be irresistibleeif fully deployed. STATE yV t N~vY NSRB ARNY + R at DISTRIBUTION Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R011900010008-5 Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R011900010008-5 25X1A SECT m