JPRS ID: 8359 TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 62
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/09= CIA-R~P82-00850R000'100030062-9

~ nu. ~ i ur i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/8359
_ 28 March 1979
~ ~ A
TRANSLATIONS ON St1B-SAHARAN AFRICA
r
FOUO No, 627
~
U. S. JOI~1T PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ON~.Y -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~
NOT~
JPFt5 publicaCions cottCain ir�arn~tion primarily from fnreign
_ newspapers, perio~iicals anct bocks, buti also fXOm news agency
Cransmisaions and br~adcasts. Materials from foreign-lan~uage
~ sourcea are tranalated; thoae from English-language sourc~s
are Cranscribed or reprinCed, with the originai phrasin~ and -
oChQr characteristics retained.
~
Headlines, editorial reporta, and material enclos~d in brackeCs
are supplied by JPRS. Processing fndicaeors such as (TexCj
_ or (ExcerptJ in the firsC line of each iCem, or fnllowing the
last line of tt brief, indicaCe how the original informaCion was
proceased. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- -
mation was summarized or extracCed. _
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliCerated arc
_ enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
Cion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the _
original buC have been supp?ied asappropriate in context.
Other unaCtribute.d parenthetical notes with in the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. _
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGUI.ATIONS GO'VERNING 0{+'NERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
016LlOGRAPHIC DATA 1~ Repon No. 2. Reeipient'~ Aeee~.iun Nu, c
S?ILET .TPRS L! 8359 ~
. uea u ue
. eport ue
7~RAN5LATIONS ON SUB-SAHA,gAN AFRICA, FOUO No . 62 7 2 8 March 19 79
6,
7. Author(~1 6~ Perlamins Urs~ni:~ti~,n Repi.
_ No.
V� Perl~xm~~s OrR~ni:~t~on N~me end Addre~~ 10. Projett/T~skiWurk Un~c ~o.
_ Joinr Publication� !`uasear~h Servica
1000 Nocth C1Cbe I~,oad 11. Concr~ct/Gr~nc No,
Arlington, Virginie 22Y01
- 17. Spon~otin~ Or~~nisuion N~me ~nd Addre~~ i3, Trpe ol Report ~ Per~od
Co~ered -
A~ above
t~.
- IS. Suppl~menurr Nae�
1~. Abser~ea
~The report contains information fro~n African and specialized Weat European
publicatiAna and radio on political~ econ~mic, and eociological developments.
17. Key tord~ ~nd Dxuokot Ao~lr~i~. 17~. Os~criptor�
Political Science x Inter-African Aff. Chana RWanda
Sociology Aagola Guinea Sao Tome and
Economics Benin Guinea-Biseau Principe
Culture (Social Botawana R Iv~ory Coast X Senegal
Scfences) Burundi Kenya Seychelles
Technological Cameroon Leaotho Sierra Leone
Cape Verde Liberia Somalia
~Central African Madagascar % South Africa
Empire MalaWi Swaziland ~
~Chad Mali Tanzania
Comoro Islanda Mauritius Togo
gCongo Mozambique Uganda
~Djibouti Namibia Upper Volta
Equatorial Guinea Niger Zaire
17b. Ideasifieri/Opee-Ended Tetms Ethiopia ~Nigeria 2ambia
- Gabon Reunion -
~ Gambia Rhodesia
17c� COSATI Field/Group OZ ~ SD~ SC. SK -
ls. Av~ilab~lrty St~tement 19. Security Class (1 hi~ IL ~\'o. of PaEes -
FOR UFFICIAL USE ONLY. Limited Number of ReP�r`~ 58
Copies Available From JFRS ��ur~cy ~ss ( h~i 22, p�i�
Paa
ro~~. Nr~~.~, ~wcr. ~�~ti UNC ASSIF FD
TH(S FOAM MAY BF REPRODUCEO ~~~aM~�oe ~�re~�o++
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~
- FOR OFFIC~AL USE ONLY
JPRS L/8359
2 8 March ].9 79
.
TRANSLATIOfVS ON SUB~SAHARAN AFRI CA
FOUO No. 627 -
_ . CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-AFR~CAN AFFATRS
Amin, Nyerere Riva7,ry ~ine$ -
(JEtJPTE AFR~QUE, 7 Mar 79) 1
InevitabJ.e Con~xontat~,on
~ The Schoolt~acherRs Revenge, l~f Francois Soudan
'Big Daddy's' Last Round, by Francisco Vergara
Dieputed Zairian Intervention in CAE
(JEITNE A2tRIQUE, 7 Feb 79) 10
Development of Black African Marxism, Leninism Traced
(Jean Copans; AFRIQUE-ASTE, 5 Feb 79) 12
Swiss Diplomatic Tnterest in Africa -
(Francoise Hubscher; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 14 Feb 79)............ 17
CENTRAL AFRICAN II~T,RE
France Unable To Dissociate Itself Fron Bokassa
(Jean-Marc Zaidi; JEUNE AFF:L~UE, 7 Feb 791 19
G'~iAD
PosBibilities of Nation's Survival Discussed
(Jacques Latremoliere; MARCIiES TROPTCAU]C ET -
MEDITERRANEENS, 16 Feb 79) 22
_ Real Conf lict Said To Be Between Men of the North
_ !(Abdelaziz Dahmanii JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 Feb 79) 32
Kamougue Seen as ~ossi6le New Strong Man
(JEUNE AFRTQUL, 21 Feb 79) 34
- a- [III ~ NE & A- 122 FOUOj
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CONTENTS (Conti.nued) png~
_ CONGO
Sassou Ngueaso, ~ackexs Said To RepresenC ~CT Le~t WYng
(Jos-Blaise Alima; JEUN~ AFItTQUE, 21. Feb 79).......... 36
DJISOUTI
French Economic Aid Repoxted
(MARCHE3 TROPI,CAUX ET MEATTERRAN~ENS, 16 Feb 79)...... 40
Br ief s -
Mirages Arriv~ 43
Ielamic Ai.d 43
IVORY COAST
Merchant Shipping T,ndustry Devalopment Dfacussed
(Lamine ~adika Tnterview; JEUNE AFRTQUE, 28 Feb 79).... 44 -
- NIGERTA
Briefs
Dunlop-Michelin Rubber Pro~ect 48
SENEGAL
Press Said To Feel Threatened by Press Code Sill
- (Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE APRIQUE, 7 Feb 79).......... 49
Alleged Shortcomings of Press Code Noted
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 21 Feb 79)......... 52
SOUTH AFRICA
Briefs
French Marine Supplies 56 -
_ Uranium to Belgi~ 56
- b -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
r
INTER-AFRICAN AFFATRS
AMIN, NY~R~RE RIVALRY ~XAMINED -
Inevltable Confrontation
Paris ,T~UNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Mar 79 pp 22-23
~rticle by anonymous autho~
~ext7 Calm and discreet, Julius Nyerere had hesitated a long time before
confrontin~ his hot-headed neighbor~ Idi Am3n. He finally decided to begin
the conflict and seems to be on the ver~e of xinnin~;.
It is a mortal conflic~ between Idi Amin Dada~ president of Uganda~ and Julius
Nyerere~ Tanzanian head ot state. Their troops have been facing each other
. for 3 months and, at the end of February~ it appeased that the marshal-presi-
~ dent--who has been in the Korld news for H years--xas seriously threatened.
On 2~} February the Ugandan city of Masaka~ located 60 km from the Tanzanian
border and 120 km from the Ugandan capital, Kampala, fell into the hands of
the troops di~cted by Idi Amin's opposition and backe~d by Nyerere.
This rivalry betrreen the txo men is a particularly rare phenomenon. It is ~
true that there raas a confrontation betKeen King Hassan II and President
- Houari Boumediene. But opposition betxeen Algeria and Morocco has alrrays
been greater than any personal conflict. -
~
This is not the case in East Africa. �Here it is less a territorial or ide-
ological dispute than an incompatibility of temperaments. What is there in
common between the commonwealth's former boxin champion~ xho xeighs more than
~ 120 k~;, and the respectable "mHalimu" (teacher~ of frail form? Idi Amin is
an intuitive person~ devoured xith ambition and devoid of all scruples.
Nyerere is a humanitarian intellectual~ eminet~tly pragmatic. Therefore, all
' ~~ndertakin~s of the txo men in domestic and foreign politics are marked by
diametrically opposed measuz~es.
- A~loslem of modest be~;inninPS and coming from an ethnic Froup near tho Sudan-
ese borcier, Idi Amin suffered from domination exercised xithin the army by
the Lanr;i and Acholi tribes. He bitterly resented the contempt displayed
- by the Christian aristocracy of the former kingom of Bu~anda and the trades-
people of Asiatic ori~in. Coming into poxer in 19~1~ he does not xait lan~
1
FOR OFFICIAL iISE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~'OIt 0~~'TCIAL U5E ONLY
to sat~.afy his desire for ven~eance. As early as January 1.972~ he massacrea
the Lan~gie and Acholis and removas the Bugandana from the administratton.
Seven montha later~ I~e expels more than 40~000 Asiana. HA then persecutes the
- ChriRtian clergy. Undoubtedly~ some of these decisions are acceptable to the
peuple and~ for a part of African pu~lic opinion~ exemplary. Idi Amin xa~nted
onl,y personal revenge ~ Nonetheless, he becomes the symbol of the c~tru~~le
_ a~ainst privile~es and forei~n domination.
Much more than his rival~ Nyerere i~ a progreasive natSonaliat. His patriot-
ism is embodied in the "cultural r~volution~" xhich enables Tanzania to de-
velop its herita~;ei architecture~ the arta~ the national SWahili lunguage en-
riched by a vocabulary borroxed mostly from the country's dialects. Contrary _
- to his rival, Nyerere is ~ dyed-in-the-xool socialist whose dream ie to trans-
form Tanzania into a fecleration of community villag~es~ "u,jamaas." But~ in
~ contrast to Idi Amin~ he detesta takin~ drastic measurQS. His religious scru- -
ples and concern for efficacy impel him to fa~,ror persuasive methods rather
than the use of force. He constantly searches for intermediary soluti.ons (de- -
collectivization of sevexal hundred villages~ denationalization of certain _
businesses) to deal with the citizena and adapt the goals he has set for him-
self to the disma~ reality of a country which ranks amon~; the xorld's poorest. _
Is it any wonder that the expeditious methods of the Kampala master earn him
more of an audience in certain circles than the sloW ploddin~ of the "mxalimu"? .
At the Juncture
Like Tanzania~ Uganda is at the ~uncture of Black Africa and the Ar.ab xorlu~
_ of Is1am and of Christianity. But the two leaders !~ave led their countries in
different directions.
A Moslem ~overning a country of Christian ma3ority~ Idi Amin felt himself in-
, sulted by the ar.ro~ance of certain Israeli officers rrho had installed several
bases in Uganda in the 1960's. M oreover~ he quickly grasped the political and
financial advantage he could drax from a dismantling of these military instal-
lations~ veritable sources of anti-Sudanese and anti-Arab sutNersion.
- Suspicious Tradition
Four years before the 4 July 1976 Israeli raid on Entebbe~ th~a Ugaz:dan head o�
state had severed all relations xith Tel Aviv. He sided xith the Ar:1b World
and Palestinian Fedayeen--to the great satisfaction of his fell~x ~;,untrymen
and a number of his African peers.
In contrast~ Julius Nyerere~ a fervent Catholic in a country of Tslamic ma-
,jority, is the embodiment of a suspicious tradition in the black continent in _
re~;ard to the Arab xorld. The humanist in him disapproves of thg p~o-slavery
undertakings in xhich certain sultans of East Africa had engaged until the end
of the 19th century. The tactician understands the advantage of anti-Arab
2
FOR OFFICIAL L'SE ONLY '
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
FOR OFFICZAL U5E ONLY
propa~;anda amon~, the black peoples of Zanzibar~ for a long time dominated by .
the ori@;inal dynastiea of Oman.
With his neS~hbors of the Indian Ocean and of Cast and South Africa~ the
"mrralimu" has always striven to r~concile the politica of principle xith tf~e
strate~;y of the possible, -
He maintains the best relations with Rwanda and Burundi~ small bordering coun-
tries ~rhich~ with Tanzania, make up the Or~anization for the Administration -
and Development of the Kagexa Basin, He cooperates xholeheartedly with nearby
pro~;re ssive ~overnments (Seychelles) and rrith his "front-line" partners (gar- -
ticularly Mozambique and Zambia).
M ode rate
On behalf of revoluti~nary solidarity~ Nyerere discreetly supports various
movements opposed to the governments of Comoro lslands, Malaxi and Zaire.
In Dar es Salaam he protects the Liberation Committee of the OAU and furnishes
considerable military aid to the under~round forces fighting against Rhodesia
and South Africa. Sut~ being realist~.c~ Nyerere preaches moderation to the ~
Rhodesian and Namibian ~uerrillas. To prevent either of those powers from
,?ainin~ a foothold in Tanzania~ he maintains equal balance betxeen them.
Nyerere is benefiting from Chinese aid~ which has particularly tnade it possi- _
ble for him to build the railroad connecting Tanzania xith Zambia (Taz~.ra).
He is accepting Soviet-Cuban military support. Lastly~ he is maintaining very
cordial relations xith~the United States and, especially~ Creat Britain, ap-
proving the An~lo-American plan for Rhodesia.
Di~'ference of Style
To be sure~ Idi Amin has also carried aut a nationalist policy xhich has safe-
f;uarded his froedom of maneuver xith regard to his neighbors and the big
powers. His methods are often peculiar and strike the imagination of crowds, ~
as when he had himself carried in a closed litter by Westerners tu�symbolize
- "the reven~e of the blacks." He xillingly resorts to blaclanail eonducting a -
_ see-saw policy between the ~ast and West~ Libya and Egypt. Or to violence~ to
strai~hten out his former partr.ers of the Last African Community (Kenya an~
Tanzania).
- As we can see, there is foremost a difference af style betxeen Idi Amin and -
- Nyerere--much more than a conflict in doctrine.
Only a fex months ago, the txo leaders seemed to be ~olidly installed in poWer.
In a matter of time, one of them xill perhaps have ~iven up his position, for
, Julius Nyerere~ normally patient, has been shocked by the invasion of the
northern part of his country in November. For the first time~ he appears
- quite determined to fight--on the field of battle--for lack of a boxing ring,
as the U~andan president Kanted.
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ~NI.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE OIdLY _
For Africa and the whole world~ there is a new stake i.nvolved: it is that
of knowin~; whether a discreet idealist can win out over a cynical comedian.
'I'he Schoolteacher's Revenge
Paris J~UNC AFRIRUr in French 7 Mar 79 pp 2~-25
~rticle by Francois Soudan7 -
/
~ ~ext7 "In capitalism Ke have a headache. Tn the construction of socialism ~
we plan a headache~ which doAS not make it moro uncommon. Ruite the contrary." -
~ These few l�nes in the form of a prophetic smile~ the w~rk of the Latin Amer-
ican poet, Roque Dalton, could undoubtedly been written by Julius Nyerere.
"In 1967," he stated one day, "a group of younq people askod me hox long it
would take for Tanzania to become socialist. I answered 30 years. I was
mistaken: I am now sure that it will take much longer!"
This former "mwalimu" of 57 years of age~ with slow and serious ~estures,
_ father of independence and Tanzanian head of state since 1962, is not unaware
that his eyes will close long before he feels the effects of that aspirin
which would cure his headaches socialism.
At a Snail's Pace
- From Dar es Salaam, temporary and somewhat antiquated capital Who~e name sig-
nifies "house of peace~" to Kigoma~ on the shores of Lakc~ Tanganyika pas~ing
via Dodoma, the future metropoli.s in the heart of the Masai plateau~ no one
wi'_1 tell you that Tanzanian socialism exists. Especially not Julius N,yerere. -
It is true that 11 years ago, in 1967~ there Was the famous declaration of -
Arusha in xhich the "mwalimu" had revealed some of the essential principies
of his political optionss self-sufficiency on the sub~ect of investment and =
' consumption~ collective forms of production (the kell-known community villages~ =
"ujamaas")~ popular control of administrative and political organizations~ re- ~
forms in education and health service and the like= but the Tanzanian plan is
not de~i_~ned for militants Hho are in a hurry~ ~nd "u~amaa" society advances -
at a snail's pace.
"Ten years after the declaration of Arusha~" Nyerere rrrote in 1977, "Tanzania _
is certainly neither socialist nor self-sufficient." ~nd it even seems that
the country is now re~ressin~ in this connection. Most of tha retail busi-
nesses, nationalized in 1967~ have been returned to the private sector. htany
state companies~ particularly in the distribution sector~ are being subjected
_ to measures aimed at improvin~ their finances and profitability. A recent
directive from the "Cham cha Mapinduzi~" the country's only political party,
spoke of an "intense fight against corruption." Lven administrative decen-
- tralization, one of the key points of the declaration of Arusha~ is nox bein~;
disparaped: it is being accused of promoting more bureaucrscy.
4 _
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
FOR OFFICIAL U5C ONLY
A reversal ha~ begun. I't ha:~ taken the form of a rapid "decollectivization." -
- Of the A~000 "u;jamaa" villa~;e~, only two are st111 of the totally commun~?1
; type= on~ of these is the pilot "u3amaa" of Mwendapole~ about 40 km from `
Dar es Sal~am. Moreover~, this chan~;e is identical to that experienced--on a
more modest scale--by noi~;hborin~ Mozambiqtie, to that now being experienced
_ by An~*ola and to that which perhaps~ tomo~row, will be experienced by China.
However, thesc readjustments should not ~ive one the idea that riyererQ has -
_ supposedly had a sudden chan~e of viewpoint or poliey. Forei~n investors axe
undouY,tedly better recefved at the present time than previously, but nothin~
_ basic in the socialism of Arusha has been altered: neither its internal de-
- mocrac~ �nor the constant criticism of positions taken.
I'ragmatism
_ Simpl,y ~tated, it miist not be for~;otten that one of the fund.amentals of
Nyerere's thinkin~ is praqmatism. Tanzania's Western admirers will perhaps
. ~;nae,h their teeth to some extent. The "mwalimu" does not care; the West i~
of little interest to him and his headache is sufficient.
However~ th~ '~e~t is very much interested in Julius Plyerere. This is true to ~
j the extent that his country is one of those which international financial or-
e ~anizations aid the most: in 19?8 this aid came to about $20 (4~500 CFA
~frican Financial Communit~r7 francs) per capita. To be sure~ the socialist _
bloc and especially China~ which built the famous Tazara railroad, are also
providin~ for the Tanzanian needs, but to a lesser extent.
1
; However~ for the Western institutions the Tanzanian case is somewhat grati- _
fyin~;: contrary to what is happeninU elsewhere, no attempt is being made to
control the use of the funcis~ as it is taken for granted that they will not
be diaerted or wasted.
Antithesis _
To this confidence~ o~'ten exaggerated~ it must be said, is sometimes added _
a veritable fascination: for every~hing Nhich E urope and the United States
value in the fields of a~ronomy, sociology and African history~ Dar es Salaam _
has become a sort of Mecca where one comes to take the pulse of an African
socialism without pretense. Nany subjective factors play a role in this re-
lation: the fact that Nyerere is a fervent and practicin~ Catholic~ the fact
that his condemnation of capitalism and the neocolonial system is founded~
above all else~ on moral ~rounds ("Capitalism~" he wrote in 196z, "is, more
than anythin~ else~ an attitude of mind."), and the fact that the declaration
of Arusha associated a Khole series of subjects with the attribute of honor
in circles of the Western liberal Left (self-management~ self-sufficier~cy,
_ a~rariai~ reforms and the J.ike). This noticeable image is particularly im-
~ pressionable among mem~ers of the B~itish Labor Party for xhom Nyerere is -
the precise antithesis of Idi /4min: on the one hand, the exemplary legacy
of the colonial era and, on the other, the shameful descendant.
5
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
FOR 0~'FICIAL USE ONLY
rod and the Devil. Moreover, Nyerere is not militantly and violently anti- _
W~stern: hig very practic~l sense of efficacy does not lead him to hi~hfloxn _
diatribes at the rostrum of international organizations.
' RP,Sp(.'C't .
ror example, he has never concealed his support for the An~lo-American settle-
ment plan for Rhodesia and, in the eye~ of many Western inte llectuals~ his
nonalinement makes him the last representative of the ~enuine Third World,
I'aradoxically~ Nyerere is less known in Africa than in the Weste rn world. N ot
n fascination for. the man but, rather, a sort of respect. Respect for one who _
has succeeded in instillinr~ in his people a sin~le African languasce: Sxahili; _
respect for this modez:l leader still close to the traditional ima~;e of the
chief~ wise~ deep-rooted and affable and whose poxer rests much more on col- -
lective opinion than on force. Respect~ also, for this country which is at-
temptin~ to plow socialism as one plows a furrow~ a practic~l and aus�tere so-
cialism~ nut a socialism confined to books.
tl,yerere is not speakin~ to the outside Korld= he is not proposing any uni.ver-
sal theory arid has never tried to be gin a dialog With the We st on this level.
This militant nationallsm~ this socialism of lastin~ quality is a discreet
process. To ba known these days when one is a statesman, one must~ first of
all, "engage" in foreign politics, Nyerere is not a shorty individual~ but ~
that has never prevented him from living up to his responsibilities: from the
- East to the Cent~~~~ nassing via South Africa, many of the continent's libera-
- tion movements have begun their operations from Tanzania. Nyerere is not one
to arouse passional reactions. Moreover~ he dces not xant to do so. But,
' nevertheless~ for Africans he remains a head of state who is somexhat differ-
_ ent from the others~ if only for the fact that his re~ime is one of the rare
re~imes in Africa in which corruption and ostentatious wealth are not the
- principal characteristic of daily living: luxurious automot~iles, such as the
inevitable Mercedes, are not allowed to be imported into 'fanzania.
~
Prior to the risks of his Ugandan offensive, the "mxalimu" had used the force -
of arms only once. In January 1964. a military rebellion by young officers
support~d by the unions drove Nyerere from his capital. A few days later, he
retiirned to Dar-es~alaam thanks to the intervent~on of British troops.
M i f;raine
Nowadays~ when he reminisces in the presence of visitors, he always recalls
those somber times with bitterness. This latest combat agai~st the Kampala ~
"dictator~" this "purification task" conducted by the auste re Nyerere is un- _
doubtedly not~ even if he considers it necessary, for the purpo~e of firing
him with enthusiasm. The socialist mi~;raine of the Dar es S alaam schoolteacher _
thus feeds itself on these memories: how much servitude is :~ecessary to
achieve freedom?
6 -
, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
P
FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
'I~i~; Daddy's' Last Round
Faris JCitNi~ ~FRIQUr in Fronch 7 Mar 79 pp 25-27 `
~rticle by Francisco Ver~;ara]
~ext7 How has Idi Amin kept himself in power up to now? Is it only owin~;
- to an army which terrorizes a people hostile to the marshal-president? That
ts the most widesprr~ad answer and true to a~~;reat extent, But that is not
the only factor. Despite his extortions, Idi Amin has acquired ~enuine popu-
- larit,y in certain strata of the population~ and one cannot say that he re pre-
sents absolute evil in the eyts of the 12 million U~andans.
_ The problems of Uganda, potentially East Africa's richest country~ did not
be~;in with Idi Amin.
It is his predecessor, Milton Obote~ who introduced violence into political -
life. Followin; ~ dispute with Parliametl. ~n 1966, he suspended the Consti-
tution and had tho~e who were opposin~ him arrested~ five of whom Were min-
isters in his own government.
= It was he also who ordered the army to occupy the palace of the "Kubaku," thE
IIu;andan Icin~ who was standin~; up to him. The monarch was very popular~ and _
. the manner in which Obate evicte~ him brou~ht on a crisis resulting in the
coup d'etat of 7.5 January 19?1 and the assumption of power by Idi Amin.
Opposition parties were forbidden under Obote's re i~n. The army was co~rposed
more than 50 percent of two Nile ethnic ~roups from the North~ the Langis and _
the Acholis, who represented 10 percent of the population. Milton Obote had
been the tar~et of several assassi.nation attempts. He was even wounded at
- the end of 1969.
- The Savior
In 1971 Idi Amin was we~comed as a sa.vior. The Asiatic tradespeople who were _
- fri~htened by Milton Obote's nationalization plans~ the Bagandas who xere
dreamin~ of a restoration of the monarchy and the British and Israelis Kere
3ub~lant. Only the Soviets considered that it was an "imperialist operation."
_ ~;veryone was mistaken. Obote's distrust in regard to London and Tel Aviv qave
- way to a militant hostilit,y, and the timid measures relative to the Asiatics
= and traditional chiefs were replaced by a brutal defeat. Very quickly Idi
Amitl upset Uganda's ethnic, reli~ious and sccial balances.
He launcl.ed a recruitin~ campaign to bolster the army~ which numbe red 6~000
- men in 1971. Lan~;i and Acholi soldiers uere completeiy eliminated. The artqy
_ increased to 12,000 men. Privates rapidly replaced the officers who had been
dismissed. The new president gave special privileges to the original soldiers
of the 'rlestern P1i1e and to Moslems. -
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~0[t O~~ICIAL U5~ ONi.Y
i~eve rthele~~~ thlc re placement of an elite ~roup by another group contained
- a certain amo~~nt of z~ balancinp. The country xas divided into 10 new rePions
which uere no lonp.r-.r bnaed or_ ethnic~ ~trains. In 1973 ~Wahili, xhieh does
not `~lon~ to any particular ethnic ~roup, uas proclaimed the national lan-
~uame. _
Amin tried to eliminate the traditional ch~ef~. In 1973 their position became
eleCtive. In placec~ xhere former. leadin~ citiyen~ Kere reelected, Amin ap-
pointed r~embers of the military to replar.e them. He de ~eloped a polic,y of
direct contact uith the "older inhabitants~" thus by-passin~ the traditional
chi^fr,. }iic prcvincial toura xer~ very popular. ~
Deci~ionc uhich cau3ed ind~gnati~n abroad toxard Amin xex~e welcomed r+ith re- -
lfef in IJpanda itrelf. This Was the case~ for example~ xith the expulcion of
the AF~iatica, xh~ uere a privilep,ed minority. Better educated and wealthier,
they had ref�ced to mix xith the tJgandan people. The iaarshal's attitude
toxard them made him appear a~ a courageovs leader in U ganda. Neverthelesr~
it, had di~astrous consequence~ for the economy.
Production Declininn,
The absence of skilled labor affected textiles~ the ~LLdar industry, and trans-
portation. Export~ der.rea~ed considerably. The drop In production amount~d
to '~0 percent for coffee, ~0 for cotton, ~2 for tea and h'} for cuqar. The
~ result uas a r,ertouc deterioration in the livln~; conditions of the urban pop-
ulation and especially of the ~Iesternized Christian elite who 3oined the
I.anPis and Acholis in afferin~ opposition.
The property of the Asiatics xas dictributed amon~; the Moslem military, xhich
increased the bitterness of Lhe vast ma,jority of citizens. The repreasion of
all these qroups xa, brutal.
In thc~ country~ amonn the trad~tional peasantry~ xho account for 90 percent
of thc population, the rituation uas differe nt. Althou~h the cotton, coffee
an~ ~urar-cana cropc lo^t r,*round, that of faod~tuffs deve?oped. Between 1971
and 1~~7 the product:on of corn increased 216 percent~ that of rice 212 per-
cent and that of potatoes 320 percent.
AccordinP to the U' :.conomic Conus~ission for Africas "Food production has been _
sufficient in general" due partic�larly to "the importance given to food cropE."
iteduction in Incorx
An inerease in food prodtic*_ion per eapita is an excepLional phenomenon in
Africa. F;oreover~ in the ca~e of coffee~ althou~h the volur.~ of exports de-
- cr~ar.e~l, the unit ~x~+ort price advanced: fron 1975 to 1977 it xas multiplied
s?nd 1/?. times. As a result, and oxinQ to a sudden drop in icnports~ Upanda's
trade balance rema!nPd larPely on the surplus side fro~a 19~1 to 1977. The
forei~r? debt decreased. -
8
FOR OFFICIA;. USE ONLY �
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
' ~OIt O~~L~IAL US~; ONLY
In 197~ the situation chanrmd. 'The drap in ti~e market price of coffee reduced
1!q:~nda'~ export income by half~ The year 197'~ ahould be gtill more difficult. -
Th~ prerident for life has had to reduce hi~ i?rmy's privile~es~ Durin~ the
la~ t feN ueek~: th~re have t,~en rumorL of conr;.derabl~ delgys in the aoldiera'
pay. 1'erhapa it is this situqtion xhich d~r,itled Idi Amin's opponents to
launch their offenrive~ an offenRive xhose ob~~ective is nox very clears to
drivc "Bi~ Daddy" from his U~andan kinp,dom.
COPYRIC}{T: J~~ine Afri~ue CRUPJIA 1979
856E3
- CSO: ~~400
~
.
r-
~
- 9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~OR O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
YNTER~I~RTC~AN AFFAIRS
DISPIJ'PED 7.AIRUN INTERVBNTION IN ClE
_ paris JEUN~ AF'RIQUE in French 7 Feb 79 p 65
~Text
7 Md some units of the Zairian errt~r actually intervene on~5aturday,
20 January, to reatore order in Bangui during the violent demonstrations
that ahook the capital?
There are txo conflicting the~ee. French governmQnt sourcos assert, ~rithout
being xilling to make a public etatenent, that the i~ntervention did actually
take place; a high Central African oPficial, and travelers arriving from
Hangui, are entirely of the eame opinion. But eeen from Africa, thinga
appear different. Our erecial correapondent Sira~iou Diallo, in Zaire in -
peraon, picked up item8 that call the intervention tk~eeie in queation again.
Thus, according to the high Central African ofPicial mentioned abave, "the
regular arm~p, stationed in the capital, xae quickly svamped by the youn~r
demonatratore on Boganda avenue, in iront of the adrainiatration building,
houeing aeveral mt.niatriee~ including those of National Education and
Higher Education. That ia vhen Hnperor Bokaeea called out h!a Praetorian
guard, atationed in the Patace nf Bereugo; it tired upon the crovd of
higti achool and college etudents, killing aad xounding several."
Clashes are then auppoaed to have occurred betxeen the emperor~s per~onal
guard and aoldiers of the Central lfrican an~r, aickcned by the represaion
of sct~ool children. Hotiiied of thia ~ituatiion, Bokaaaa is reported to
- have decided to cenfine the aroqr at Bengui to the Kasai camp, and appeal to
F~ench troops (vhich is categorically denied in F~ench ofiicial circlea). ~
According to this report, Bokaaea is then ~uppoaed to have approached Zaire.
. In Kinshsaa, an entirel~~ different veraion of the Pacta ia given. The con-
fuaion is said t~ have ariaen becauee of the preaence at Baagui airport of
txo Herculee C 130.type aircraft belonging to the Zairian air force. They
are 8uppoaed to have landed during the atternoon of Friday, 19 February.
The first bae r~aturning from the IInited Statea~ vhere it had been fitted vith
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~OIt d~FICIAL US~ nNLY
epecial equipinent. It received the order Prom Qen Kikunda Unbala, chief of
^ the Zairian air force gen~ral ataff~ to change direction after a etop at
Dakar, and make a refuelling atop beforo meeting, at (}emena, in the north
of 7.ai.re, ~'reaident Hobutu, who happened to be there becauae o! a~Amilq
bereavement. Ae for the second aircratt, it had on board eome xo~aen bring-
ing to (}emena various ob~ecta needed for the furieral ceremony. In Zairian
circles, it is thought not impoeeible that the authoritiea at Bangui m~y
have uaed the chance preeence of theae txo ini.litary aircraft to scare the
demonatratore.
COPYRIOHT: Jeune Afrique. ORUPJIA 1979
1211~9
CSO t Lt400
~ 11
FOR OFFICIAL USE OKLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
FOR O~FICIAL US~ ONLY
- TNT~R-AFRICAN I~FAIR5
DEVELOYMENT OF BLACK AFRICAN MARXISM, L~NINISM TRAC~D
Paris A~'KIQU~-ASIE in French 5 Feb 79 pp 50-52
[Article by Jean Copans: "Africa and Marx"~ -
- (Text] Latent Europeocentrism and New Tasks for African Marxists The
dominent ideologies of the Western World attack~ criticize or manipulate
Marxism according to the relationahip of the political forces at the mo-
menr. Bad faith may follow (apparent) benevolence. Thua we see the re-
cent university consecration of Marxism ir. ~urope, or even in the United
5Cates. These consecrations are nevertheless most often poisoned gifts,
which result in the destruction or subCle weakening of the revolu[ioti~ary
charge and of the criticiem of the eatablished order, which is at the base
o� the theory developed b~ Marx, Engels and Lenin.
Naving said that, thare still remain blanka, ailences in the theory of
Marx, whicn have permitted doubta to arise as to the universal value of
its concepts and of its point of view. That is the aituation in Black
Afr:ca. The relative weakneas of the theoretical Marxist analysis produced
in Africa and by Africans cerCainly has historical causes, which go back
essentially to the viaion apread by the dogmatism of Stalin, to the in-
existence of a real Internationale after World War II and to the opportunis-
tic and chauvinistci colonial politica of the European Communists. After-
wards, the renewal of Marxism (toward the end of the 1950's) often took
- on sophisticaCed forms, transfotming the confrontation of ideas in[o a
theological debate (each faction against the other) or an "archeological"
one (the rereading of the texts of only the foundera). In short, Marxism
has often remained bookiah and much im~ortance has often been given re-
marka made in very specific circumstances, even conceptions outdated by
historical evolution a.1d by the luiowledge of various social formationa.
Unfortunately, this Western practice of theoretical development has had
repercussions at the level of forms of the asairsilation of Marxism by
African intellectuals. fie approach con3isting of an African reappropria-
tion which would be, at the same time, a specific creation has not really
taken place. Qne of the reaons for the "delay" (which also concerna the
Western p a+ers, who have to analyse Africa from this theoretical perspec-
tive) comes from the relationship of Marx to Africa and the way he took
(or continued) the analysis by Hegel.
12
FOR OFF~CIAL U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
F'dIt dI~'~ICYAL U5~ dNLY
- This rerending, which is cdncreCe, political (with xespecC to the sCruggles
of Che Africen masaes and not European sCrugglea, historically daCed),
i~ indiapeneable c.uid iC is enCirely to the credit nf the 5enegalese econo-
misr and pttilogopher Amady Ali Dieng for demonatrating this to us in his -
rec~nt colleCtion of articles.l
But ler him spe~k for hi~ngelf, for Che clarity of his study ia undeniable:
"Mgrx cho~e to be interested eagentially in the capit~liat method of pro-
duction, which, conceived and dev~eloped in Western ~urope, hae cre~ted the
material and social canditiona for the passage to a higher regime: com-
munism. In the9e conditions, counCries whi.ch have not known the develop-
, ment of internal capiCalism, and on n large gcale, Could only occupy a
m~rginal place in hig work, The countrieg locnted in Africa, Asia, Ameri~a
, and Oceania have only been sCudied as a funcCion of the development of -
Weatern cgpitalism.
"Mnrx and Engels had not completely broken with the Hegel of "Leseons from
the Philosophy of History"2 on the problem of Asia. They were able to
eacape, thanks to the experiences of ~ocial etruggles in Eurnpe, and par-
ticularly in England, in France and in Germany~ from German ideology and
particularly from the ideas of Hegel. But they did not live through the
social atruggles in the countries of Africa, Asia and Indian America and
thus become able to test aeriously the ideas which were current in the cul-
tivated circles of their period."3
Dieng in fact deals with two different sub~ects:
--the knawledge and the place of Africa in the work of Marx;
--the ma~or problems of contemporary Africa, which present a challenge to
logical Marxist analysis.
Just as the two preceding quotationa suggest, Dieng refts~ea both the
fetishism of Marx (a theory perfected and closed once and for all) and
the trap of African chauvinism (which would ~ustify itaelf through a de-
magogic anti-Europeocentriam). The honeaty and effectiveneas of this analy-
sis leads [o a new political psychology. Dieng invites his comrades to an
intellectual adventure: the Marxiat tradition as iC exista is not up to
the level of the historical requirements of the preaent deve lopmen~ of
African societies.
The only way for Marxism to become a truly universal doctrine is to shoW
that the analysis of the social and historical formations of Africa can be
made on the basis of the principles of dialectical materialiam. This posi-
tion is not as obvious as it seems because many African Marxists (French-
speaking) "have been influenced by the ideology of che French Co~unist
Party, which has not always had a correct attitude on the problema of the
independence, the culture and the languages of Black Africa."4
13
FOK OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~OR O~F'ICIAL U5~ ONLY
NoC Infgllible
IC is too bad, perhap~, thaC in hig annlyais of the rel~tionship df Mnrxism
to Africa, Uieng regtricCed hims~lf tn Che descriptinn of Che works of
Mnrx ~nd ~ng~1g and of th~ir ndn-rupCure (unconscious) with Hegel. The
influence of Lenin, of Che Bolghevik ehinkers of Che Third Inte rnationnl,
the dogm~eiam of Stalin, the Cheories of Mao on clasaes in the coloniul
cnuntries are merely new sedimenCary layers placed on top of the involuntary
~uropeocentrism of Marx. And when we asaesa African Marxigm, it is cer-
Cain that the poliCical consCraintg hgve played a greaCer role than the
response of Marx to Kege1.
Neverthelese, it muaC be ggid thae Mgrx, just gn nny revnlueionary thinker,
is neither Cotally competent nor infallible and that the point of departure
of the analyeie comes from the place given specific class strugglea.
This timidity on the part of Dieng ia even more noticeable in the second
part, becauge he is content Co criCicize a cerCain number of workg, without -
making a thoughtful, personal argument. Taking up first the nnture of
civilixationa, he goes on to a reevalusCior. in glowing terms of the his-
torical work of Sheik Anta Diop.6 I confess Chat I dn not entirely ahare
this point of view, but Dieng rightly points out the revolutionary quality -
of the affirmation of 91ack civilizationa in the face of u"profoundly
Jacobean" Marxism. Dieng then examines the realitiea of negritude and of
African philosophy. He a~reea with or anticipatea Hountond,ji on numerous
points and explains that one muat separate oneself "from those African ~
intellectuals who strongly decry cultural ~^aimilation, but who are the
most consciously assimilated. What we reject is the naivete with which
certain African intellectuals, who consider themselvea as the castaways
of civilization, hang on to any life-buoy, held out by any expert in negro-
logy."
After the philosophers, it ie the mathematicians and socioYogists (in par-
ticular Majhmout Diop) who attract his aCtention. He wonder~ why Senegalese
mathematicians have never become interested in the com{~uting methods and
mathmatical thought of the various local populations, instead of singing
the praises of pure and baeic mathematics. As for the works of Diop,~ they
are both empirical and dogmatic and do not bring to bear a truly Marxist
analysis on the history of classes in Senegal.
I would like to emphasize, in conclusion, one or two parenthetical comments
by Dieng concerning the non-use and silence on African languages. The
problem is complex and the banal generalities, for or against a aingle na-
tional language~ often a foreign one~ do not fundamentally solve anything.
But the fact that all the philosoFhic~ scientific, li[erary vork is written
in a foreign language is ecandalous. Because~ if we wish co speak to the
masses, to put theory and practice together, we must transmit through
Writing (Which poses the problem of the transcription of Af rican languages)
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~OR O~~ICYAL US~ ONLY
or ornlly (the new nudio-vigual me~hods c~n cerCainl~~ be useful in this
regard) this new critic~l thought. To quote Dieng: "The young African
philogophers and scier~tists have before them the Cnsk of expresaing them-
~elveg, of forging scientific and phtlosophical concepts in Che l~ngua~es
of Cheir cduntries. It is in Chis way th~e tl~ey will beteer be able to
expreas the concerna nf our pedples."
In spite of the uneven qunliry of thie boolc, the contribuCion of nieng
is extremely valuable, His modesty, compared to the ouCbursta of an Adotevi
or the subtleCy of a HounCond~i, is all the more effective. To denounce
the consequences of the ~uropeocentriatic interpretation of Marxism on
_ African thought was indispensable. To poinC ouC a few landmarks for ehe
building nf an authentic Marxism by Africana is'more than useful.
We regret, cerCainly, Che absence of a full-fledged program for the areas
_ to be explored, concepts Co be consCructed, uctions to be taken. DuC,
first of all, the psychology must be changed, even the reflexes of the in- -
Cellectual Af rican, and there will never be too many studies of tf~is sorC,
"to find ourselves in the apparent chaos contained in the hiatory ~f our
countries."
Examplea of courage and intellectual honesty are much too rare in today'e
Africa to fail to bring nCter?tion to them and encourage them.
FOOTNOTES ~
1. "Hegel, Marx and Engels and the Prob lems of Black Africa," San Kare,
'Cabral-Fan~n' collecti~n, Dakar, 1918.
2. Here is how the greatest German philosopher spoke of Black Africa:
"It is the country of gold, turned inward toward itself, the country
of childhood, which beyond conscious history is enveloped in the dark-
ness of night. The Negro represents natural man in all his barbarity -
and his absence of discipline."
And Dieng concludes: "EuropeocenCriem is not dead; it threatens the
creative development of Marxism. The Marxists of the non-European
countriea must read the worka of Marx and Engels using lheir methods
of reading."
4. Let us point out on this point the excellent and well-documented book
of C. Mad~arian: "The Coloni~l Question and the Policy of the PCF
(1944-1947)", F. Maspero, 1977.
15
FOR OFFZCIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
FOR OF~ICTAL US~ ONLY
5. Dieng i~ the auehor of aeveral original studies (on the social classes
nnd Che sl~ve sysCem of production in Che caCCle trade in Senegal, eCc.)
_ 6. "Negro Nations and Cultures" (1954), "AnCeriority of Negro Civiliza-
tiona" (1967), eCc~
7. "The History nf the Socigl Clasaes in West Africa: Senegal," Maspero,
~ 1972.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afriq~ue GRU~JTA 1Q79
-,'i
.i~
8956
CSO: 4400
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
- FOR OFFICIAL USF: ONLY
YNTEK-AERICAN AF'FAIRS
;
SWISS DIPLOMATIC INTEREST IN AFRICA
' Parid JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Feb 79 p 36
[Article by Franc~iae Hubscher: "An Unusual Swisa"] -
[Text] For the firat time, a chief of the Swias diplo-
matic service has set foot on Black African soi1.
- Until now, all Africans knew of the 5wiss were its businessmen and iCs
- foreign aid personnel. "The Red Cro~:s and the strong-box" were a11 they
wished to be known for. Is this image going to change af ter the visit _
which took place from 14 to 28 January by the federal counselor for Foreign -
Affairs, Pierre Aubert, to five countriea: Nigeria, Cameroon, Upper Volta,
Ivory Coast and Senegal?
This is the first time in SwLsa history thaC the head of the diplomatic
se rvice, upsetting ~ust a little the stay-at-home habits of hia compa-
triots, has set foot on African soil. "Switzerland," Pierre Aubert ex-
plained during his stay in Ouagadougou, "has never possessed coloniea.
We can therefore offer Africans completely disintereated sid, technical
or financial cooperation."
Just the same, one can point out in Africa the very small ahare of the
Swiss national product (barely 0.2 percent) which is devoted to aid for '
development in the Third World. "The Swisa are rich, but Switzerland is
poor," answers Pierre Aubert. "The annual budgetary deficit of the Con-
fede~ation is on the order of 1.5 billi~n Swiss francs (3.75 billion French
f ran~s)
Did the explanations of the Swiss chief diplomat~ who was pleased with the
friendly reception he was given everywhere, co~nvince anyone? In any case,
Swiss industrialists certainly intend to profit from this trip, in their
own way. They hope that after the trip of the federal counselor to Lagos,
the stock of watches which were ordered and then blocked at the frontier,
since the Nigerian government decided to impose quotas on its imports, will
finally be delivered (watch sales amount to more than 50 million Swias
francs per year) .
17
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX
AcCive NeuCraliCy
' They are glso counCing on the viait of Pierre Aubert to help them inveaC
more ensily in Cameroon and especially in the Ivory Coast, where they are
already in s~cond place, ~ust behind France, with 5 percenC of r.he capital
of Ivorian industry. But Chey aeem Co miss Che old days when Swiss foreign
aff aira were their privnCe domain. 'i'hey are especially afraid thaC ehe
_ "uctive neutrality" called f or by their miniater wi11 result in inCerfering
_ with the good relations they have with South Africa.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979 -
~
8956
CSQ : 4400 ~
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
FOR OFFICIAL U5~ ONLY
~
~ CENTRAL AFRIGAN EMPIR~
, FRANCE UNABLE TO DISSOCTATE ITSELF FROM BOKASSA
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Feb ?9 pp 64,65
~Article by J9an-Marc Zaidis "Is the Crown Going to Fall?" 7
il ~TextJ D~pperor Bokasea has had some trouble because of
~;:ie 20 Janusry riota. But he has not lost poWer over it. .
Does the ezploaion on 20 ~nd 21 January 1979, xhich revealed the deep dis-
contentment of a portion of the Central African population, endanger
F}aperor Bakassa I's regime?
Are changes to be expected at the head of the state, or at least, a xeaken-
iag of the government? The alarm has been a sharp one, and the authoritiea
in Bangui are not minimizing the aeriousneas of the eventa that bloodied
the capital. On Friday, 26 January, one xeek after the demonetrations, the
creation was announced of a"national committee" charged rrith p~ying cinil
- serva,~ts' salaries and student grants. This measure, xhich incidentally
canfirms inforluation according to xhich no salaries have been paid for
several months, shows that the government is seeking pacification. Other
decisions should follow, xith the saine goal. That doee not of itself asaure
that all diacontentaaent s+ill come tu an end. But if the recovery of control
by the forces of order had z~ot sufficed, the riake ot' nex riota xould have
to be removed. With calm res~ored, there ia no indication that Bokaeaa~s
throne is seriously threatened.
Spontaneity
The events of 20 and 21 January shoxed that the means oY repression~ a~ail-
able to the government functioned xith a certain "efficiency." Taking into
account nexs items reporting clashes betxeen Central ~frican soldiera of
the regular arn~r and elements of Bokassa~s personal guard (aee inaet), the
emperor should hoxever be concerned about it. The spontaneoue nature of the
demonstrations also favors Bokassa, since it is a sign ttu~t there e~cists no
organized opposition.
_ 19 -
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
A short-lived parliamentary opposition, the Central African Democratic
_ ~olution Movement, led by Abel 4ownba, was banned in 1960, aftor elections -
- in which it won 20 percent of the vote.
Since his acceasion to power at the time of the 1 January 1966 cnup d~etat,
Bokassa has auccessively el3minated all thoae xho could repreaent a poten; .
tial danger to himself, atarting xith his txo inconven3ent deputiea~
Col Alexandre Banza and Captain Malendomia, ~r].th xhom he overthrex President
Dacko. The latter is no~r an imperial advisor; some people ~?ond~r if he -
~ might not regain poxer aome day. It is not very likely. His preaidency,
- which did not leave the beat of inemories behind it, and hi~ cloae associa-
tion with the preaent regime, seem to rule it out. We ahould also add that
even though he hae no adversar~es of any stature, the euaperor has little
trouble making up the teama xhich back him up in power.
Despite the suceesaive eliminatione xhich give political life its rt~jrthm, -
there are always men who xill accept, often with little conviction, min~.s-
terial responaibilities. Tncluding some among former militants o! the
National Union of Central African Studenta (UNECA), an organization imbued
with ideological currents, usually leaning toward ~he left. Orice they are
in power, they can do nothing. The slightest hint of opposition on the part
of a minister provokes thunderbolta from Bokassa, xhose touct~y authoritarian- -
ism and impulsive reactions ara vell knoi+n.
These reactions by the emperor, "haunted by the idea of aeeing a potential -
rival appear," his son, Prince (}eorge, told us, have also af~acted his
relations ki.th FY~ance. Under the presidency of Geor~es Panpidou, notably,
Bokassa frequently accused the PSrench services of plotting against hirn.
He shoWed hia ill humor by fostering relationa v~th eastern countries (the
Soviet Union, Romania) or by expelling French cooperators. Tha emperor ~
used to go back on his "impulsive moves" later, as he did on hia adharence
to "scientific socialima" or his short-lived conversion to Isla~ai on -
20 October 1976 after a visit to Tripoli. ~
Despite the eatrangementa, Paris, xhich can be counted on for financial aid ,
continues t,o be Bangui~s privileged partner. With Valery Giscard d~Estaing,
relations seem to have improved markedly. France cannot dissociate itself ~
from the empire, firstly because of its uranium, but also because of its
location, betxgen Chad in the North, vhich is still causing concern, and
Zaire in the South, which ie not yet on the road to recovery. Bokassa knoWa, -
moreover, how to ple~y upon this ~spect of thinga, by letting it be underatood
_ that he could find other allies. Did he not send an emissary to Colonel
- Qadhafi on 2lt January? With no aerious rival on the horizon, Bokassa can -
still count on FSrance's aupport. That is probably hie best trwap-card. The -
financial aid he so mnch needed aeems to have been granted. According to
Prime Miniater Maidou, xho made an official visit to France and Belgium at
the end of January, the talka xere positive. The success of this mission
~ill not prevent, in the good old Bangui tradition, a big ministerial shuffle,
2(~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
I~'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
probably in February. With a nex team in oharg~s o,f ourrent affairs~ the ~
emperor will be able to go back t~ his palacQ at Berengo and forget the
unpleasantnesaes on 20 and 21 January,
COPYRIaHTa Jeune Afrique. 4RUPJIA 19?9
121l~9 ~
CSO: l~lt00
~;4�~
r
r
21.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~Oit O~~~CIAL U5~ ONLY
CHAb
PO5SIBII.ITI~5 0~ NATION'S 5URVIVAL DI5CU55~U
i'aris MARCHE~ TROPICAUX ~T M~UITEFtRANBEN5 in Fr~nch 16 ~eb 79 pp 433-436
~ (Article by Jacquea Latremoliere: "Chad's 5urvival and its ~uture"J -
_ (Text] 'I'he political teneion which had been hatching for several weeks
' in Ndjnmena ended by de~enerating into an open confrontation bet~reen the
men of Prime Minister Habre Nissein (Armed Forces of the Rorth, or ~AN,
numbering over 1,000 trr~opa) and the Chad National Army (numb~ring about _
11,000 men plus 3,000 gendarmes coumanded by Lieutenant Color?el Kamougu~).
Quite severe street fighting broke out on 12 February, in the morning, in
the c~pital of Chad. Their outbreak aeema to have been caused by the pro-
clamation of a atrike by secondary achool students. After opening fire
on the national army aoldiers, Who returned it, Habre Hisaein's men at-
tackeJ and seized ttie radio building pro[ected by gendarmea who withdrew.
Lieutenant Colonel Kamougue then mounted a counter nttack vith the gen-
darmerie againat the reaidency of the prime minister, in Chagoua. The
prime minister was either absent or is said to have fled on time~ while
a Chad squadron was flying over the city~ whose pilots, certain informa-
tion notwithstanding, Were neither participants in the French cooperacive
program nor membere of the French military.
In the morning of 14 February the ci[y of Ndjamena appeared to have been
split in half. The African districts were being held by the FAN while the -
_ modern adminiatracive to-~rn by the national army forces.
, In Habre Hissein'~ stronghold, in the northeaetern part of [he country~
the FAN have reportedly encircled the national army garrison in Abeche~
and occupied the entire city of Biltine.
The French forces ata~ioned in Chad have at no point intervened. They
Would do so should the safety of the French be threatened, ahich ~+as not -
the case on 14 February.
22
FOR OFFICZAL USE 0;1LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~dK U~I~tAI. U5~ dNLY
The number of civilian victims in the capital ig reported high. The
aituation remain~ confuaing and contactg with Nd~~mene diffiCUlt as a re-
sult of the deetruction of the telecommunicatione eCation by Habre Hig-
gein'~ supporter~. '1'he ~rticle which fnllows is an effort to de~cribe the
Ch~dean political-economic development,
Two men were vying Eor po~,+er fn Ndjameng. The ferment in the southern re-
gion~ wae enhanced by fightg and the diatribuCion of pamphletg. The
~'rench army i~ presettt in the capital and thp main cettters of the 5~heliatt
Zone. Aozou and the former ~LT (Borgou-~nnedi-Tibeste) are in the hands
of thE Libyans nttd the Goukouni. The Ouassi, $atha, 5alamat and Guerrn are
criascrossed by rival gangs which claim to belong to an organizgtion about
which no one knowe whether it is centered in Tripoli or Algiere, in addi-
tion to th~ pergonal undetground wh ich Mr Nabre Niesein hag develop~d i.n
the Biltine pre�~Ceure. There are paCrorigge~ nttributed or clnimed to be
attributed to the protagonistc~ in the drnma: Col Qadhafi to Goukouni, rhat
of Gen Numayr~, Co Habre Hiasein, and that of Mr Senghor to Abbg Siddick.
_i Preas corregpondents bet on their "winn~ng horae" and reject ~11 others.
One can see the diff iculty experienced by prench readers to find their way
and see through auch troublee the future of a country Which is presented
both ae ~n artificinl creation of colonialiem and ttie key to the center of
Africa.
Is it a question of the final spasms of a dying corpae? Or else, converse- _
ly, could the real Chad work through such upheavals, the nomad folloaing _
hig anceBtral 5ourhal, the merchant exporting hia cnttle to Nigeria, the
peasant planting his cotton seeds and cultiv~ting his plants, and harve~t-
ing and gelling his r.rops? In a aord, will the Chad of underground force8
go through a simple eve:it such as that of the "ma~ors" which leave on the
ground no more than shalloW tracks Which disappear With the firat gush of
Wind?
Yet, a federal system seems to correapond only imperfectly to the essential
feacures of the Chad. The two Chads, willingly diecussed, the useful and
the ocher, the white and [he black, the Moelem and the fetishist or Chrie- _
tian, are based ~n the morals of a fable. Whcreas the Southern Chad was
administratively aesimilated by the old colonial poaer, the Northern Chad
_ remains a mosaic of 5aharian, Sudan, and Nilotic populatione among which
move big Bedouin tribes coming from the Arab Peninsula and some Bororo
Peuls.
The cement Which keeps all this together is, unquestionably, the Islamic
legal tradition. HoWever, it is above all~ n certain sense of statehood,
a feeling of belonging to old political encities. Therefore, the restruc-
turing could be undertaken only from [he bo[tom. That is perhaps What
Gen Malloum thinks about when he speaka of "an administrative and political
reorganization, redivided, and decentralized." In fact, he speaks of a
north-south federation~ whose northern part would~ itself, repreaent a
federation. Unforcunately, this target Would he difficult to achieve ~nde=
present circumstences.
23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~d~t O~~ICIAL US~ nNLY
Cood nnd Bad Carde
It would be preeumptious to euggest, in the wak~ of eo many nCher, ~ miracle
preacription which would regolv~ th~ Ghadean crigis. Nowever, we ~duld try
to set up a 1oCa1 sc~le df vnlu~g which ~rduld enable ua to identify in thig
game the woret ~~rdg.
'rhe eouth remains united end firro as it wa~ in Gentil'g timp. It ig also
~ th~ only productive area in term~ of a m~rket economy nr, ~t least, g
controllable market economy. It ig clear that in no case would prance
give itg preference to the north at the expense of the south to th~ extent
to which it intends ~n help to ensure the political balgnce in Central
Africn.
~ Periodical infnrr~~~Cion appearing in the pregs on the c~ntamination of the
south by the northern rebellion is pure fanta~y arid proves, above all, the
ignorance of thdse who disaeminate it. The truth is the opposite. The
southern citips are ehe merchnnt ereas inhabiCed by Bernou or Naoussa
Moslemg some of whom, in fact, hgve been affected by PROLINAT propaganda
and have triggered eome incidents such as the one in the course of which
a prench nun was killed several months a~o in Moundou. HoWever, the popu-
lar excitement ie a reaction to these facts and the recently distributed
tr~cts are a warning to the "brothera from the north" who are reminded,
for the sake of calming them down, of the fire which destroyed their ghopa
in Moundou in December 1971. The movement ig apontaneou8. The Nd~amena
government has been able ao far to auppress its violence. Hovev~r, the
move~aent could also be "Caken into consideretinn" ahould the north-eouth
rivalry becnme acute in the capital. The name of its aupposed or prnbable
leader ia already largely famili~r.
The trumps of the northern reaiatance, whether operating up front or vege-
tating in greater mediocrity in the distant bush, can only increase their
fighting spirit lacking as they gre of a legitimacy rooced in n political
past. Such militancy ia linked uith the effecCivenesB of foreign support.
From this double viewpoint the imporcance of Coukouni, an offapring of the
Tibesti Derdei--who is not an emperor of the desert but, neverthelesa. re-
maina an authentic chief--could not be underestimated assuming th~t he
do,es not venture too far from his own grot:nds. Mr Habre Niasein's clan-
destine forces are suitably armed. However, he profits most from his
agreement with the chieftans of Tama and Zaggawa who use his forcee to
chase the other gangs from their landa and Who give him legitimacy as he
protecta them.
Born of [he breakdown ef an official authority, such clandestine forces,
in their totality, would be as fragile as that poWer if not supported by _
or profiting from the complicity of the existing customary tzadition com-
plicit~?. Since such support and c~mplicity could be Withdra~+n ac vill.
their influence could be detenoined anly in terms of their stocks of
Weapons and munitions. Therefore, at any time they could find themselves
in a poaition of inferiority should a rival gang affiliate itself With
a supporter considered more generoua and regular in his deliveriea.
24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~Ott O~~I~IAL U5~ ONLY
Theer, fact~ enable ue to under~tand the diffi~cultiee Facing Gen Malldum in
thp cdurse o~ hi~ long eearch for a euitgbl~ p~rtner with Who to promote
~ne pacific~tion of the north, a~earch ahich took him frdm Kh~rtum to
Sh~bha, Bengh~ai, Tripoli, and Libreville. The eolution to which he fin-
a11y re~igned him~elf h~d the e~~enCiel merit of W~gkenittg th~ forc~s nf
hie opponent by rallying to the national cauee gn energ~~tic mgn believed
capeble of underetgnding th~t, eut aff h~nceforth from ;ai~ dld fri~nde,
hie guppdrt could be b~sed nnly ott ~~hieving pprfect hgcmany viCh the rep-
reeentgCivee of the ~outh. Our gmbgegador in Nd~amena, involved in thie
matter by virtue nf ~rench military auppdrt ta Chad, gp~~nt, it i~ ~aid,
hi~ morninge with Gen M~11oum and hie efterttoone with Mr Habre Ni~~ein~
The Libyan problem
Outside the border~ we mugt distinguieh betw~en th~ eupport ~+hich Cel
Qgdhafi gide~ Goukduni's ~ItOLINAT, hi~ own inrureidn~ dn Ch~d territory,
and the international recc~urge ahich Chad could eventually uee againgC
Libya. 5upport for Goukouni ie evident and the latter hag no intentiion
of denying it, while pointing out that he doea not approve of the aeizure -
by hie protector~ of the Aozou ~trip (1J0 kilometer wide and 2,800 kilo-
meters lvng) and Chat, in the paet, there have been ehoot-oute between
thpm, specifically at Oumchi, in 1976. True, this Wae at a tim~ When he
had not yet broken With Habre Hi~sein.
In fgct, Libya has set up ita oWn gupply etoree dn Chadean territory, at
Oumchi, Gouro~ and Ain Calak~. The pre~ence of its forcee in the Aozou
5crip ie ~uridically indefeneible. The old problem of the demarcation of
the Chadean-Libyan border and the happengtancea Which complic~tpd it~ baued `
on the Rome agreem~ntg of 7 January 193S, were, in fact, finally eettled
With the friendship and good-neighborly Franco-Libyan treaty concluded in
Tripoli on 10 August 1955. Article 3 of the document unquestionably vali-
dates the Rome agreementa ~ich are not included in the liat of valid
international acts on the border~ attended to the treaty, "recognizing"
--the very word u6ed in the text--thc track of the borders ag etipulated
in the French veraion.l
Folla~aring a violent parliamentary del~ate~ as the treaty called for aban-
_ doning our claims on Fezzan~ the 6 Dec~mber 1956 laW autharized the
president of the republic to ratify the treaty. The exchange of ratifica-
tion InsCrumente took place on 20 February 1957. Becoming independent,
~had subsequently proclaimed that the bordere inherited from the coloniza-
tion period Were to remain untouchable. This position wae reiterated
~aith the Addie Abeba charter of 25 May 1963 Which gave birth to the Organ-
ization of African Unity (OAU). It vas reaeserted even raore emphatically
and concisely With the reaolution adopte~ in the course of the conference
, of heade of states held in Cairo bet~+een 17 and 21 July 1974.
Therefore, it ia totally illegal for Libya to continue to occupy a part
of che territory, khe reason for Which the Chadean government did not
present this queation to the OAU or the United Na[ions Securicy Council,
25
FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~Olt d~ICIAL U5~ UNLY
as Gen Malldum intet?ded to do ~t the end of 1977, was to pregerve the
po~gibility, subsequently invalidated, of g reconCili~t3vtt with Goukduni.
ACtu~lly, Libya doeg not even argue ag~ingt Chad'~ rightg. Naving spre~d
thp leg~nd thgt Pregident 'Tombglbaye hnd ngreed tn Chie ocrupatidn in the
cdur~~ of hig vigit to 'Tripoli itt June nf 1~~~--h~d euCh an ~g~eement
~xi~t~d t1t~ qu~gti~n ig wtty ie it not procluced by Co1 Qadhafi--it ig s~t-
ig~ied, in fact, aith th~ gilent occupaeidn di the areg.
Th~ pr~senc~ of precioue mineralg in this area ha~ been cited to explgin
th~ attitude. Intereeting indicationg might have been found. HoWever,
the Aozou treagureg are, more likely, of the s~me legendgry nature as the
Goleondian. Had they been extant, a joint exploitation would have led to
a conciliation betor~~n th~ interegte of the tWO partieg better than could
be ~~Campli~hed with an interminable conflict. In fact, the pregence nf
theg~ for~es syrobolizes the claim of the Jamahiriya ta exert alone an in~
fluec~ce in the tradition inherited from the Senou~eie in this Centrgl
African aector.
The legal gspect of the prablem should be exploited. Asking an internation-
gl cdurt Co condemn Libya, baged on the solidity of its case, the Chadean
government may not sUCCeed in recovering what belonge to it. HoWever, it
would force, something which wo~ld b~e of g~reat~r imp~rtanc~ tn it, the
various competing clandestine forceg to adopt the type of pogitinn on a
national problem which, if negntive, would not enhance their etatue in
th~ eyes of the population but ahich~ if positive, would openly oppoge ~
chem to Libya. The same choice would have ta~ be mAde by their more or
less acknowledged protectors. A11 in all, the operation vould lead to a
r~conciliation Within and outside the borders, to the e~t~bli~ht~ent of a -
specific comnon interest base, and the development of nev support making
this base more 8olid.
Economic Survival
Long before the rebellion broke out~ Chad aas characterized by the coexis- -
cence of three different economiea. ~t Was based on the one erroneously
described ae self-9ubaistance Which, in fact, ia self-subeistance in terms -
of food Without being mieerable. It is familiar aith the notion of trade,
With little cash changing handg, true, considering the value di the cap-
ical in terma of livestock, and involving anything related to the eathetic _
aspec[ of existence governed by inQnutable values: Tea, sugar, arms, and
women's ~ewelry. It has always been difficult to control, and the isola-
tion of the northern districts ia lesa responsive than ever in this area
to the activities of an administration henceforth limited to administrative
centers. ~
Official statiatics aho~ fluctuatione in the tonnage of food crops Which
seem quite controverelal: 850,000 tons of varioua cereal crops in 1970,
650,000 cons in I975-1976, and 550,000 tons in 1976-1977. Actually,
there has been no famine in Chad and faod gifts shipped by international -
organizations have been aubstantially leaser com~ared With those received
by vther Sahelian countries affected by the drought.
26
FOR OFfICIAL US~ ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~
- ~O~t d~~I~~AL U~~ ONLY -
On the other hand, conceivably, the preaence of rival gangg in the northern
pl~ina diacburages the population from engagtng in farm work, fegring
pillage ~nd the extraction df booty. It aould unque~t4ongbly be an ex~g-
geration to depict the Volcan, naglany, dr th~ Third Army Cl~nde~tine
~dree~ as models of integrity~ Nowever, there ig gener~l teetimony to thp
effeCt tl~at th~y are not short bf mon~y and pny fnr the food they r~quigi-
tion. Thi~ tends tn prove that guch food exi~ts~ that the rebellion is
fittanCi~lly ~upported from the nutgide (not by Libya alone), and, finally,
thgt the clandestine forces ~re ~ware of the severe digagreements th~y
would be expdaed to in terme of the eavironment in which they mu~t operate,
which is not exactly their own, should they behave like regulgr goldiers.
The next levEl is Chat of a market eCOnomy covering an extensive ~eographic
area, for it is related to two ad~acent countries. ~xclusively A~rican,
from the seller to the intermedi~ry end to the purchaser, u~ing secret
channelg to avoid customs, avoiding all conversion to cash inside borderg,
the amuggling of cattle to nigeria ia equally difficult to ags~ss. It is
- egtimat~d ag reaChing annually 200,000 head of cattle, khereas the offi-
cial slaugliterhouseg in ~archa handle 6,500 totts, or approximately 50,000
head, therefore, slightly over one~-third of the amounta exported as ft'ozen
meat. Dried fish Caught by the fishermen nf Logone, Chari, and the lower
5alamat is exported under comparable conditions to Cameroun and Nigerin in
gubstantial quantitics yet even tnore difficult to assess.
~inally, drawing the factual balarce of Chad, we ghould not ignore the
importance of "invieible income" brought thro~~gh the wages of the Ouaddninn
Chekalla thousands of Which have migrated to the plantations of 5udan's
Cezireh. This is ~ population migration a}~irh the insecurity prevailing
along Chgd's border areas hag naturally only increased.
There is a third level, that of a modern type market economy. It is based
on cotton and, henceforth, other products such as oil (from cotton or pea-
nu[s), beer, wheat and, unquestionably, tomorro~+, petroleum. Chad's "writ-
ten " economy acknowledges exclusively this output, hence its apparent
weaknes~ in terms of a population numbering, in theory, four million
- people. This is the only economy Which feeds the atnte budget~ 55 percent
of whose revenue comes from customs fees, the balance coming from induscry
or trade taxes or indirect [axation. By virtue of the prevailing circum-
stances, the personal income tax Which could have pravided us With valuable
inforroation on the factual ta~xation poWer of the Chadeans. plays an infin-
itesimal role. Due to the lack of an up-to-date cenau8, ite di~torted es-
timate could only represent a reason for additional [rouble in areas unaf-
fected by the rebellion.
Unless considered exclusively in cerms of the recorded economic figures,
the sum tctal of the official gross national product would be 100 billion
CFA, or approximately 25,000 CFA per capita. Such figures Would provide
insufficient estimates concerning self-subsistancc and the movement of un-
controlled goods. Unquestionably, it is here [hat We should look for an
explan~tion for the gstounding resistance of [he population to current ad-
versi[y. 27
~OR OFFICIAL US~ 0:1LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
Cotton
A~ tt~e bn~~ of thi~ "rE~corded" econnmy, cotton would account fnr abuut
7 billion GFA (5n C~A francg per kiln fnr whitp entton, nr 9d percent of
the crop, and 25 C~A francg for y~lldw ~ottdn) fdr 1~7~-1g'9. In term~
of v~~lue, it gCCOUrit9 for 75 percent of exporte and for 10 percene af eh~
interttal gtgte budget r~v~nue. The ~und for Ch~ 5tabilixarion df Cotton
prices and the Coton-~Tchad mixed ecdndmy compgny are the only Chgdean source
for economic inve~tments.
'rhe National Office for Itural Uevelopment (ONUtt) ig in charge of orggni~ittg
the cor.ton growing population. Coton-Tchgd i~ in charge of the picking, -
ginning, and g~lling tl~e crop with Che help of cepiCttl gnd technicgl aid
~upplied by th~ Comp~gnie fr~ncaige pour 1~ developpement des fibreg tex-
tileg (C~DT).
This is an unquestionable ter.~nical succeas, which deaerves even more
credit cottgidering that the cotton cropg have hgd to gurmount the handicap -
created ~mong Che peaganta by the authoritarian methuds used to ensure
their development preceding and imcnediately after ~lorld War ~ra. This
success also contains nn impnrtant moral element, having proved that the
Chgdegn farmer could improve.
This is eloquently cnnfirmed by a fett figures. 'The marketed output, to
begin WiCh, rose from 46,800 tong of cotton seed in 1961--a tonngge ahose
loW level experienced the fluCtugtion triggered by the departure of the _
colonial ~uthoritics--Co 145,000 tons in 1978-1979 (estimate), With penk
production of 148,000 tons in 1968-1969, and 174,000 tons in 1975-1976.
Yields have equally shotm an encouraging progression: ~rom 150 kilograms
per hecta~e ii~ 1961-1962 to 510 for the last crop. The area cultivated
with draft animals or mechanized facilities rose from 115,000 hectares in
1971-1972 to 195,000 hectares in 1977-1978; areas on which fertilizers Were
used rose from 3,695 hectares in 1961-1962 to 120,200 hectar~es in 1977-1978.
At the same time, the use of ineecticides rose from 280,000 [0 1,124,000
litera. ~inally, ginning yields rose from 36 percent in 1961-1962 to
41.6 percent today.
Wag this technical success accompanied by a financial success? Unfortunate-
ly, cotron has remained a speculative crop Whose rate experiences gubstan-
tial fluctua[iong specifically in function of the American output and
world consumption. The use of fertilizerg and insec[icides for productive
crops is profitable only if it ia converted, in terms of gross yields, in-
to "traditional" crops through an additional increase in output Whose
sale price should be higher than the purcha~e price of the producta used. ~
Overall, this ratio has remained poaitive.
Over the past feW years the converse development of goods. rising, and of
staples, declining. has, nevertheless, greatly loWered the profit from
Chadean cotton. Predictions for 19~9 global consumption are more favorabie
28
- FOR QFFICIAL USE Oti'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~Oti d~~'ICIAL U5~ ONLY
compared with 19yg by about dne million ba~.e~, liowever, this gdventgge
f~ hindered by a better global crop compar~d with l~~t yegr's ~nd ehe
exigtence df a higher stockpile compaced with 197g. At worat, we cnuld
conceive, if not of the rigk Chgt Che profit from cotton crope would be
elimin~ted, ~f the nece~gity to ~b~ndon ~he u~e of fertiliz~r~ ~nd in-
8@CC~Cfdpg. Thig would lower tottnag~a and, congequently, the farm~r~'
income, un1~~s they exp~nd culCivgted ~reas Co CntUpP.f18~tE'. fdr thi~ de-
cline, which see~e difficult.
Let ug ttd to cottott growing the est~bllghment of the Moundou~-Kdumrg Cotton
~xtraCtion Complex, which opened in April of 1g78. At the conclu~ion of
the 1977-1978 c~mpgign it h~d produced 2.6 million liters of unrefined
oi1 nr 2.4 millinn liters of refined oil, 60 percent of wl~ich was expnrted.
Other Agric~~ltural and Induatrinl Activities
Rural development nccounts for the ma~ority of foreign atd, the only
~ource, together with the F'und for the Stabilization of Cotton I'rice, for -
public investments. The South Chgd Agricultural Development Project,
~ointly financed by this fund, the ~AC (Aid and Cooperation FundJ and the
~D~', covere 280,000 pro~ectg gnd hag four ob3ectivee: Production divergi-
fiCation, yield improvemente, eoil protectinn, and socio-profes~innaly
action in peasant areae.
The development of the lake poldera is agsis[ed by the ~AC, the World
Bank, USAIb, and the ~Ab (African Deve~opment ~und). Agricultural anter
projects involving canals, callectQrs, and drainage and irrigatinn eta[ions~
are based on the egt~blistunent of family units of nbnut one hectarp e~ch.
'IR?o polders totnling 1,200 hectxreg on ~hich Nheat and cotton are grown
~re already in operacion.
Along With the United Nations developmen[ program, the U5AID, and the
Commisaion for the Basin of Lake Chad, the FAC is engaged in e long-term
_ and multinational operation, for it involves Cameroun and Nigeria ae Well,
in promoting livestock breeding. It applies to 200,000 breeders and
300,000 head of cattle for the three countries. Its purpoae ie to develop .
the best ponsible eanitary infrastructure, a more satisfacCoty mnnagement
of cgttle drives, a more efficient explvitution of the cattle, and a more
developed form of farming and liveatock breeding tombination.
The Societe nationale sucriere du Tchad (Sonasut) developed, through the
initiative of a french private group and in association with the atate~
An agroindustrial complex Whose first sec[ion apreadg over 1,500 he~tures.
It~ facili[ies Were opened in Sahr in ~tarch 1978. This is an extremely
fast implementacion of the project, the agreement pro[ocol having been
signed in 1977.
In the infra8tructural area, folloving the repairs and expangion of the
Nd,~amena Airport in 1976 and the various projects for the atreightening
- nnd study of roads, a major project ia under~ray: The i~toundou-Guidjiba
29
POR OE'PICIAL USE ONLy
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~o~ n~~icint~ us~ drtLY
Aacig (304 kilomet~r~, 116 in Chgd) tnC~ling 17.1 billion C~A, ~ninrly
Ein~nced by th~ World gank, the ~~U, the Snudign fund~, th~ Afric~n Uevei-
opment gr~nk, ~nd the Uank for the nevelopment of Centrnl Africen St~te~~ _
Thc finn~nCin~ of nnother prd~e~t~cov~rin~ ehe non~dr-Lni Axie (198 kilo-
meterg), egtitngted at 1~9 billinn GFAi ig currently und~rwgy.
~inally, let u~ point dut that rhe gatisfaCtory gtart of A tObgCCO indug~
try (16 mi111nn p~cks in 19~8), the M~undou Brewery (140,Unn heCtolitere),
ttie buildittg nf n new ri~e-hulling plant in Lai and, finally, the building
of a small refinery which wi11 be linked through a pipeline to the Kgnem
Oil Ueposit. The install~Cions wi11 becdme dperationgl in 1981. With a
150,000 ton processing cap~city it will ensure Chad totgl petrnleum inde-
pendence. Thi.e would be gn gppreciable saving of foreign exchgnge fnr n
Cduntry wh~rre a 1ite~ c~f g~a~-oil ~ellg currently �or 85 C~A franc~ in
- 5ahr.
Nopea for the Future
For these reaeons, the ratid between output and the population seems ob-
viously dispropvrtionate. Yn terms of strictly orthodox financing, the
servfcing of the foreign debt being below the 20 percent fatidic ceiling
of fbreigt~ tegc~urces, would b~ admi~gible if the gratuitou~ natur~ of ~
large percentage of the foreign aid grgnted G'hgd did not diatort ita menn-
ittg. Actuglly, it is the ratio between a budget of 17 billion CFA, run-
ning a chronic deficit ranging from 2 to 3 billion~ and the annual fnreign
aid (27 billion C~A) which ahc~e begt the imbalance of the Chadean economy. -
Over one-half of this aid comes from France. True, 50 percent of it goes -
to military support. One~third of such expenditures are borne by the
Chadean budget itself. Therefore, the factual rat~o betWeen the civilian
budget and economic, technical, and financial foreign aid is, in fact,
11.4 billion:20 b illion CFA.
In the case of any other country living on this basis one could think in
terms of bankruptcy and of a fictitious exiatence or else in terma of the
fact that financial efforts deployed by others to ensure its development
Would be diaproportionate in terms of its possibilities.
The truth is leas eevere and snore complex. The profitability of aid
granted Chad should increase in tetms of the official structures Whi~h
account for merely a part, not only of the potential, but of the factual
activities of the country. Nor should a realiatic laak at things igi~ore
the strategic importance of the Lac Basin uhose occupation by an aggres-
sive pos~er could have most disastrous consequences on the effectiveness of
tne efforts to promote che development of African reaourcea and the pos-
sibility for a balanced economic dialogue bet~+een that continent and
Europe.
Flhere~s it is true thac~ geographically, Chad is the African keystone,
conversely, it ia noc accurate to say that as a stat~ Chad Was a purely
artiEicial creation of the colonizing paver. Had that poaer really aanted
30
FOR OPPICIAL US~ O2iLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
rn~ d~~~crnL us~ aNLY ~
to ~hApe fdr it~a ~dle Cdnvenience g politiCgl geogr~ptiy, it wnuld h~ve
fnil~a, In f~ct, it made u~e nf the confllctg ~xigting ttmong Africnn polit-
icgl entiti~g to impoae itg gllinttce, fdllowed by ite military supremgcy,
impo~ing dn the whole a cnsh economy ba~ed on the ~~ti~fgction nf itg nwn
eCOnomic requirementg. Neverehelege, numerous politic~l entities ~urvived
~nd tradition~l tr~de mechnttigm~ hnve not dieappeared. The prdfound reagan
for Ch~d'g trouble~ muy be found, in all likelihood, in the error of th~
government which promoted the independenCe ~nd which could noC have gvnid~d
it, of wimhing to pl~y, without having the megns, by forctng ie, Che game
whiCh the old colonizer himgelf h~d lenrned, me~nwhile, to moder~te.
In the ~~tne way that Chnd's renl ecottomy cannot be seen through offirinl '
statistirs, ite political future would not be decided on the bnaig of the
rivalrieg which merely scratch its surfaCe. It goe~ on living beneath
figureg and cormnuniques. Itg unity will be ~ained on the basie of the
immuCxble unitie~ which compose it gnd iea pogsibilities will be re~lly
determined the day when these two imagee of n~ingle country, the recorded
� ~nd ehe one ba~ed on cu~tom, will finally coincide.
FOOTNO'T~5
1. On this ~ub3ect we refer to the acco~?nta by Bernard L~nne on "The
~rontiera of Chnd and Libya," submitted as a paper for the diploma
of the Ecole de8 hautes etudes en sciences socieles (1977). Mr. Lanne
has ~ubmitted on the same topic ~n important report to the Acc~demies
of Overseea 5ciences, it~ 1978.
2. The figure is based on the extrapolation of polls [aken between 1960 ~
. and Y963 in urban and rural areae. The breakdown of inedical facilities
over moat of the country makes Duch extrapolntion clearly doubtful.
COPY~t~GHT: Rene Moreux et Cie.. Paris, 1979
5157
CSO: 4400
31
F'OR OFfICiAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~Oit O~~ICIAL U5~ ONLY "
CHAn
.
~ CONF'LICT SAID TO ~E $ETWE9~1 MEN OF THE NORTH
Paris JEtJNE AFRYQUE in F'rench 7 Feb ?9 p 18
~Article by Abdel~zi.z Dahmanis "Ia the Rupture in N~D~emeaa Yrreparable?"7
~Text~ The ahadoW of ()oukouni creeps in between Preaident
Felix Malloum and hia prime ~ninieter, Hiaeein Habre.
_ Armed vigil in K~D~amena. The lack oP truat between Preaident Fel3~c
Malloum and hie prime minieter, Hiseein Habre, became public knowledge at
the ~nd of January. On both ~idea, provocation aeema to have been sought.
Firat it ia Hiaeein Habre, the tormer reaiatance fighter, a man of the North
and a Moslem, young and spirited, having Mahamet Salah, chiarman of the
National Council, and theoretically the third ~oat important peraon in the
state, arre8ted. Hr 3alah la beaten up by the prine miniater~e men, membera
of the F~N (lrmed Forcea~ of the North) for ^apreading lalae information."
Next it is ~'elix Halloum, a level-headed a~an, a careet� aoldier, a Chriatian,
imprisoned in Preaident Itgarta Tombalbaye~e time, taking retaliatory measiarea
against certain friends of Hiseein Habre.
The teneion reached its height on Sunday, 28 January, when a round of rifle
fire in the very middle of ~he capital resulted in txo dead and aeveral
xounded. That is Hieaein Habre~e FArt men, aay some people. No, it ~e the
police, atill taithful to Nalloum, retort the othera. The situation hae
deter3orated eo rauch that civil aervants and atate organizations are begin-
ning to take aides vith Habre or Halloum. The head of atate, notably, de-
nounces the ATP (Chadian Prees Ageacy), the official agencq, xhich is sup- _
posed to have apread "tendentious rumors intended to aov panic and dieaen-
sion."
Though the rupture ia on~y hanging by a thread, neither Habre nor Mallotm,
nevertheles~, hae dared take the decieive step. For txo reaaonss
1: the control ttut eaah of the txo men hsa over a portion oP the
32
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~
~Ott O~FICIAL U5~ ONLY
~
army, tha polioe, and powera of deciaion i~ only partial. Both have to
reck~n with other �orces that are not under contrul, and the powerful reaie-
tance fightera Who condemn them both.
2t ~ance, xhose financial and military aid ie a deciding factor,
and which eponeored the reoonciliation of Felix Mal'loum and Hieaein Habre,
has aignified ite diepleasure at the deterioration of relationa betxeen the
txo men, which would plqy into the hands of enemies of a�atable and moder-
ate" Chad. ~
Though France~e approaoh haa been dieoreet, the pres3dent of the OAU,
(~aafar el-Nimeiri, ite ambaasador to N~D~amena on behalf oY the Sudan
and the ahargee d~affairea of F~ypt and Saudi Arabia have intervene~d xith -
both men. To defuee the crieis. In thie connection, aome people are talk-
ing about a"holy var feeling" aaid to be prompting the ?ioelema in the North.
Reconciliation
In fact, the real conflict ie atnong men of the North. Hieaein Habre doea
not saem to appreciate an appeal~e being made, in tha framework of national
reconrtliation, to (3oukouni Oueddei, xho holda the noxthern ne~qu3a, in the
name of FROLINAT (Chadian National Y.iberation F~cont) and xhoae forcea occupy -
over 50 percent af the country.
A poaeible rapprochement betxeen (}oukouni and Malloum oould only take place
at the e~cpense of Hissein Habre, trho xould see his iniluence diminiehing.
The mere mention of posaitile negotiation betxeen Malloua and (}oukonni, xhich
could be the forerunner of an end to the len~tY~r Chadian draa~a, hsa revived
the appetitea of all the aplinter.groupa claitaing to be part of FROISPIIT.
For example, amall reaistance groupa, like FROISNiT-volcano, aad P'ROLIIIAT-
third arrq}r.
No-one wanta to be left out of the big account settling aaiong Chadians nox
outlined upon the horizon. But atill, for the national reconciliation to bo '
founded on sound, xell-balanced basea, a~ctarianiam and interpereonal
conflicta muet be left behind.
COPYRIaHTt Jeune APrique, aRUPJIA 1979
1211~9
_ CSO s 4L~00 -
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
FOR OFFICIA~ USE ONLY
CHAD -
I
KAMOUGUE SEEN AS POSS7BLE NEW STttONG MAN
Paria JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 21 Feb 79 p 17
(Article by A. D,: "Chad--The New War"~
~Text] For weeka now the regime in Ndjamena hne been paralyzad~ President
of the Republic Felix Malloum and his Prime Minieter Hisoein Habre have
not apoken to each other~ and the Council of Miniotere has not met.
The paralyais hae affectied all ataCe bodiea. Each side hae rallied military
forcea and media oupport behind it, However no one has dared to aeeume �W-
the reaponaibility of atriking a blow. The interior of the country itoelf,
more than half of which ie controlled by Goukouni~o F'ROY~YNAT, hae felt the
- ef�ects.
Lacking the power o� decieion in Ndjamena, the prime mini~ter has focuaed
his efforta on the ~ast, in the Biltine and Ouaddai regione, beyond the
control of the central suthority and Goukouni. It wa� to thia eector that
Hisaein Habre wiChdrew in 1977 with hie Attned Forcee of the North (FAN),
after tangling with Goukouni. Theae regione also orfer an advantage: their
population ia halfway between that of tl~e North and that of the South.
Wanting to be eure of a rear basa in the event of a political defeat in -
Ndjamena, the prime minioter launched ~n offeneive on ZO February to win -
control of Abeche (35,000 inhabitanta, 4th largest city in the country).
But this battle brought a new pretender to the central regime into the -
political arena--Lt Col Wadal Abdel Kader ~Camougue, a memb~r of the Higher
Military Council, former mini~ter of foreign affaire, and preaent head of
the police force. He too regardo Abeche ae hie "territory," having on
aeveral occasione directed the deotiny of the eaetern region.
Will Wadal Abdel Kader Kamougue be the new "etrong man" of the country?
_ In any case~ ha is playing a leading role in the preaent criois thanke to
his police, the largest armed body (6~000 men) and the best diociplined of -
any in the whole moeaic of combat forcea in Chad. It was Kamougue's men
who profited from further incidenta, on 12 February, to attack the reaidence
of Prime Minister Hiesein Habre in Ndjamena with extreme violence, using
mortare, rockete and heavy machine gune.
34
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~o~ o~ricr~u, usE ornY
' The batCle bagttn in thn morning, with Chadi~n NaCionul Ax~my (ANT) eoldiera~
loynl in principle to Malloum, fighting the ~'AN ~roops of Hinaein Hebre.
- AfCex the police arrived and joined for~a~ with the ANT~ Chey opread
throughout varioras eecCo~e of tha city, caueing panic among the people and
- killing a number of individual0. On 13 February, the city was cut in hn1f.
Hissein Habra is be~.iovad to have left his rosidence before the attack. -
Just prior to the incidente, according to eome reporta, he wae prepttring
to publiah a atttCement pxotonting tihe meeting of Che Chadian Military and
PoliCic~l Committee, a body inc].uding aupportere of boCh factions~ which
President Malloum had demanded,
_ The chief of staCe had sought this meating after deciding that "the people
o� Chad were threatened by their follow citizene." Nothing wae settled,
but Felix Malloum, and this ie importttnt, yielded Co Kamougue, agreeing to
give him heavy weapona previou~ly the prerogative of the army. And thie
despiCe the facC that Kamougue had boen suepected of plotting a coup d'etat
just afCer Hiesein Habre tiook government of�ice (Auguat 1978), in which
_ connection the chiet o� ntaCe took him violently to task. Ae a dieciplinary
_ measure, he was tranaferred from hie foreign affAire poet to the police, -
In extremis, Franca and Saudi Arabia had diesuadEd him from nttempting hia
coup.
Kamougue wanted the reconciliation with the FROLINAT to be effected through
_ Goukouni, who in his eyes waa tha real leador of the rebels in the North,
rather than Hissein Habre. On 12 February, he abandoned his neutral poai-
tion. Will he be tempted to play his own cnrd or will be srand with
President Malloum? Thie man emerging from the current crieis haa experience
- and unprecedented drive. ~n 1971 ha headed the national polico force and,
with the responsibility for the operationa bureau, wae escond in command to
- the head of the army general staf�. In command in 1973, then a lieutenant
colonel, he became miniater of foreign affaire in 1975 after the coup d'etat
~ agains~ Tombalbaye. T,~ny there are some who exp~ct him to impose his
authority, to the detriment of Hiasein Habre, by re~ching agreement with -
Goukouni. -
Will Chad, battered and divided, find peace again thereby?
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. G12UPJIA 1979
= 5157
CSO: 4400
~5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~ -
~Oit O~I~ICIAt, U5~ ONLY
CONGO
5AS50U NGU~S50~ BAClCERS SAID TO REPR~S~NT PCT L~FT WING
paris J~UN~ AFRIQUE in F're~ch 21 Feb 79 pp 32-34
~Article by Jos-Illai~e Alima: "The Victory of Saaeou Nguesoo"j
(Text~ The Congoleee had no idea Che aeoaion of the Central CommiCtee of
the Congolese Labor party (PCT) which began in $razzaville on 5 F'ebruary
would hold puch a aurpriae for Chem. president Yhomby Opango~ who had
in �act intended to aak for the reoignation of tha 36 cnembaro of the higheat
par.y body, wga forc~d to submit hi~ re~ignaCion. Somethis~~ ~v~n rarer in
Africa, which on thio occaaion waa aomewhat unaxpected~ waa the fact that
it was following the regular electione that the outgoing preoident had tc
yield to Col Denia 5a~sou Nguerao~ long regarded ao number two man in the
regime.
Tha acenario perfected in advance by Ceneral Yhomby did not work, We Were
told by a leading Congoleae political figuYe. The former chief of atate
, had intended to caakc~ an aAOeaamert of almoot two yearo of adminiotration
before aeking thoae preoent to renew their confidence in him by entruoting
him with the provioional political leaderahip with reoponoibility for
preparatione for the third congreaa of the pCT~ which a~o initially echeduled
for December 1978.- He had no idaa that tWO of the participanto in tha
meeting had aleo decided to oeek the �ame poot. Thuo he Wae greatly eur-
priaed to aee two of the regime'a otar psrformera~ Jean-PierrQ Thyotere
Tchicaya, organization official of the party, end Colonel Sasaou Ngueaoo,
- preaent their candidacy. It then became naceaeary to win a tWO-thirdg
majority. On the first ballot, Ceneral Yhoroby, WiCh 15 votes, held the
lead over Mr Tchicaya, With 14 voteo~ t+hile Colonel Saaaou Ngueaoo trailed
far behind with 7.
~ Furious at failing to obtain the neceaoary majority, General Yhomby then
made an err~r~ threatening the participanto in the congreao about the rieka
failure to elect him Would mean for the country. The membera of the Central
Cotnnittee, from Which Yhomby wao excluded after Marien Ngouabi bQCame
_ president, were only aaaiting thie opportunity~ it Would �eem~ to proceed
with the "agenda." The civilian candidate~ Mr Tchicaya~ then announced hie
' withdrawal in favor of Colonel Saooou Ngueaoo. Thua the tWO military officera
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~O~t O~~tCIAL U5~ dNLY
were pitted ona against the oCher, And Saroou Nguea~o wan olecCed without
difficulty, thu~ t~king over �rom Yhomby, Thio was Che end of the third act
of a play in progYeoa wiChout inearruption oince Che aoogouination of
Mnj M~rien Ngou~bi on 18 March 197~.
5uapicion
Thc former presidenC of tt~e republic wao killed in his offioe on khaC date.
The circumetancas of hie annati~ination have rem~in~d a myaCery deepite a
trial wt~ich w~a widely publicized by Che authoriti~o (JEUN~ A~RIQU~~ No
895). What ia knoWn~ on the baaia of the trial hearinga~ ia thnt two com-
' mandos ent~red the office of th~ praoidenti of Cha r~public. Marien Ngouabi
was ne~oeiating with Mannemba-babat~ hia predecesoor, ahom he inCand~d~ _
according to r~porC~~ to reinat~Ce. It wus within Chia ConCext t1~at ~n
officer Cloae to Magsemba-Debat~ Captain Kikadidi, wan di~paCched Co Marien
Ngouabi to invite him to a meeCing with Mas~emba-nebat. Officero oppoaed
to tl~e reinatatement of the civiliann in power are then believed to hgve
intervened by having presidant Ngouabi a98a8gitlated~ at the vQry moment of
the arrival at his office of ehe omieaary from Massemba-bebat.
The second act was tl~eir following trial, including the oAntoncing to
death and the execution of aix individuala. Meanwhile~ Maeoemba Debat
himself had been ahot following a apeedy trial. But the feeling of dia-
content had not been diosipated thoreby,
General Yhomby and his governmenC have nlwnyo repreoented themaelvao ae
the heira of Ngouabi~ and rafQrQncea to the formar chief of eCato have
been landmarka along their route. ~ven Coday~ the portraito of Che laat
tWO Congoleae preaiden[e hang oide by oide in every office. Above hia
photograph, it says: "~ternal glory to Comrade Marien Ngouabi." HoWever
even theae precautiona were not anough to diapal the ouopicion hanging over
the military who took over in :tarch 1977. An atmoophere of mistruat de-
veloped among them which led to the aplintering of the coalition into oeveral
fiercely hostile faction~.
The firat evidencee of thQir claoh wera to be seen juat hour� after the
death of Marien Ngouabi. At that tirae, according to the official report~
the presumed assaaain Wao Captain Koutando~ an officer clooe to Yhomby.
A few houra later eventa took a dramatic Curn: the name being mentioned
was no longer the aame. Now it wa8 Captain Barthelemy Kikadidi. Mean-
while, the military had entruated the exorcieo oE power to Major Saaeou
Nguesao. He t~~en pasaed it on to the moot oenior officer With the higheat -
rank, i.e. Yhomby. Thu9 there Wae no lack of deale made during thia inter-
lude. Fron that to preau~aing that the exoneration of Captain Moutando aaa
linked with Colonel Yhomby's taking mattera in hand wae onlv one step~
Which the Congoleoe opposition wa~ quick to taka.
~toreover, the viciesitudea surrounding the escnpQ~ capture and execution ~
of Captain Kikadidi remain to be clarified. This condemned man revealed~
37
FOR OPFICIAL U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~bIt O~F'ICIAL U5~ tlNLY
ju~t a few minuten befora his exacution~ that contrgry Co Ch~ governmant
ver~ion, ehe prentna~d ~oogoain of Mari~n N~ouabi had never l~ft th~ ~ongo
and thgt Che militury kn~a thi~ veYy well. Yt ie ev~n eaid that Kikadidi~
waund~d, w~e tak~n to tha World Nealth Org~nizgtion (WHO) camp in Drezzn-
vi11Q, whera he w~A vi~itied by ouct~ laading light~ a~ Yhomby~ 5ylvain Gc~mg
und Sasoou Nguensn, Ngua~~d~ mnranvsr, i~ reported to have bean enraged
to le~rn th~t Barth~lemy Kikgdidi had besn ahot, ~nd to have demanded thgt
he be buried wiCh full militgry honore.
The leaet one can ~ay i~ that tliere Wae 1~Cent teneion between 5aoeou -
Nguesso ~nd Yhombi Opango. 'Ph~ f~ll of Yhanby waa doubelea~ a raoult of
the political unease pravailing in the counery. The ochioma and ambitiona
_ of the men in power h~ve cr~axod an atrooophere of ahrani~ instability.
~or a number of yearg tho Con~o hao lived in a conCinuing otaCe a~ ri~ge.
Innwnerable agsaeaination~, c~nopiracie~ end purgdu followed the ejentinn
of Fr Fulbert Youlou in Auguat of 1963. Junt recently tWO attemptg on the
life of the chief of sCaro in Painte-Noire failad~ gnd there are e ane aho
say that they were Che wor?c of oupportera of hio predecaeaor.
Contradictiona
P~rbllel to this, e~�onomic chaoo hea deapened ouch that Che dimeneiona are
cntastrophic today. The inflationary fate in near 90 p~rcent, while the
majority of the factories ara idli;~g and aome have cloeed their doore.
Travelers from Brazzavilla report amazing aceneo: in linea hundreda of
metera long in front of th~ pbvmaatero' window~ ~tate employoeo ara at- ~
tempting to eollect their three-r~onthe-overdue wages,
Political strugglea have mortgaged the future for a long time. In the
past, the party waa all-powerful and the people'o militia were the law.
~ Today~ it is not too clear whera the authority is. A number of timea
General Yhomby has complained of bei~ng the prieoner of the party. In vieW
of the dramatic turn taken by evanCe~ iC is aaid~ Marien Ngouabi had
decided to put the authority back in the handa of Maeaemba-Debat. This -
maneuver wae fatal to both men. Their cucceeoor did not evon aucceed in
getting the machinery of atate moving again.
The palace confron~ationo are para.ileled by otrange contradicticna~ in-
conaietent with the revolutionary ri�or the merita of Which are ~o loudly
praiaed along the banko of the Congo River. For example~ a plan for the
building of S00 housing unita in ;toukondo, in the $razzaville 4uburba, it
ia reported, will be financed by South Africa.
Vengeance
- Civen this context, the repreaentatives of the left wing of the PCT are
- likely to emerge the victora in the teat of ~trength which developed in
the Central Committee. Haa it noC long been thought, moreovAr, that
Colonel Sasaou Ngueeso intended to app0al to Ambroise Noumazalaye? A former
38
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~OIt O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
student aC Touldune~ ehe man~ who w~n prime mittiuCer under Maed~mba-nebat
waa conaeantly at th~ mida of Jean-Clauda ~rneati Ndgllg, tiad~y in exile in
~urdp~, the repregenCativa of ~ pure and uncompromioing mocialiam gnd a gra~C
~dmir~r nf ~idel C~aCro.
It remains td be oe~n if he who wino the day can cure hiroo~lf di th~t
et~rn~l mal~dy, vengeance~ which for mdre thgn 15 yegro hao repegtadly takan
th~ Congo beck to the ~tareing block,
COpY12IGHT; Jeune Afrique GItUPJiA 1979
5157
C~O: 4400
39
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~'0~ d~~CIAL U8~ (~NLY
t)JI I30UTI
F'RENCN ~CONOMIC AYU ft~pO~tT~b
paris MAttCti~5 mttOpICAUX ~T M~DIT~EtR~1N~EN5 in ~renCh 16 ~'eb 79 p 462
(Text~ buring the debate in the ~rench National Assembly on the bill au-
thorizing approval of the economic and financial cooperative aqreement be-
tween F'rance ~nd Djibauti (siqned on 27 June 1977, followed by exchanges
of letters of 26 January 1978), th~ report pregented by Mr Georges Gorse
focused particularly on economic relations between France and ~jibouei and
foreiqn aid.
~conomic Relations between France and Djibouti
These relations show a larqe deficit in trade exchanges to the detriment
of Djibouti, offset by significant public assistance.
A) French trade with the Ftepublic of Djibouti shows a large surplus for
France, since French importis have dropped qreatly sfnce 1975 because of the
political and economic events which have oacurred in the area. The follow-
ing figures are fn F're.nch francs: _
1975 1976 19~7
Imports 21,955,000 3,124,000 4,706,000
Exports 161,765,000 110,143,000 130,162,000
6) Public assistance from F'rance in 1978 to the Republic of Djibouti (ex-
cluding military aid) can be evaluated as follows (in millions of French
francs): economic aid (FAC (Aid and Cooperation FundJ investments), 7.3;
technical personnel assistance, 64.6= other technical assistance, 6.8j so-
cial and cultural programs, 5.3~ total, 84.
This total, which does not include assistance related to military technical
- cooperation and to the aides provided to set up the Djibouti Army, neverthe-
less represents 3~~ percent of Djibouti's national budqet (247 million
francs in expenditureP fn 1978) and 8.6 percent of the PIB (Gross National
Product] (975 million francs), as estimated in 1976.
40
FOR OFFIC IA.L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~'OIt n~'~'ICIAL US~ ON~,Y
in the ~rea of inve~tments, the ~'AC executive Committee authorized finan~-
ing of geveral pro}ect~ fdr 7.3 million ~rench francg during 197H: partici-
pati~n in financing an earth gtaei~n for gatellite telecnmmunicatic~n~, 4.5= -
~~udy c~f a pild~ farm in A~~~r, 0.3= teaching college for elemeneary gChodl �
~ teaahera (firat stage), 1= antituberculosis campaign and hogpitel c~uiptnent,
1.5.
Several pro9eceg ~r~ under s~udy and shr~uld be gubmitted td the ~'AC exe~u~
eive commietep in 1979, in partiiculgr the campleeion nf the Atear f~rm ~r?d
_ ct~tt~letinn of the teaching college and ttie bdulaog G~5 (college
d'en~eignement ~econdaires College of Secondary ~ducation].
.
' Since bjibouti'g independence, ehe Central ~'und for ~conomic Cooperation _
hag nr_t yee had tio examine any loan ~pplic~eion.
In the arca di technical agsisCance, rijibouti ha~ 502 ~obs for technical
assistants. As of 1 November 1978, the number af ~;ca~itidt~g available was
still only 360.
~rance is tihus already responding, ae least in part, to the urqent need for
terhnical aid and training evident in practically all sectorg. On the
other h~nd, ehe portion devoted to investments remains modest, inasmuch as
- a development program or plan for Djibouti has not yet been worked atat.
Nowever, the FAC expects to consider measures for enlarging and oui.fitting
the port of Ujibouti.
Although it is not economic aid in a strict sense, it should be mentinn~d
thae the cost of military conperation amounted to 57 million francs in 197A.
The pay of French troops stationed in bjibouti must be added to this,
amountinq to 270 million francs in 1978, which benefits the Djibouti econ-
omy either in the form of taxes or as expenditures.
- With reqard to the Addfs Ababa/Djibouti railroad, whose leqal status is
not settled, the French Government is encouraginq the quest for a solution
favorable to Djibouti interests.
France's significant aid continues to be attractive despite the appearance
of other public assistance. In facC, with the exception of the assistance
granted by Saudi Arabia, other foreiqn aid remains limited and irreqular.
Before its independence, Djibouti received foreign aid only from France and
- the European Development Fund [EDF]. Since 27 June 1977, the new nation
has applied for a number of assistance pzograms, in particular with the
specialized organizations of the United Nations, Egypt and oil-producinq
Arab countries, as well as with the United StaCes. It has usually obtained
positive responses which have resulted in the approval of numerous credits,
currently representing a total of more than S80 million. But those are -
commitments over several years, some of whfch remain uncertain.
41
FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~'OI2 0~'~'ICIAL US~ d1V~Y
~ On1y the cdntributidng of 5a~di Arabia dn the bilatieral level and thoge o~
the ~nF' on the multilateral 1eve1 appear gignificsnt. 5auc~i Arabia has al-
ready dis~ensed $10 millir~n nf the $'ld miiiion which iti has promis~d.
~'u1fi11mene of dther cnmmiement~ muge be gprearl nue nver 3 nr 4 yearg. in
the ce~e e~f tih~ EDF, S10 million h~~ been ~llo~~ted for 4 yearg, mainly to _
quarantee financing o~ projeGti ~tuc]ie~.
o~her commitmenes have be~n made by iraq, the ~mirates of ehe Persian Gulf,
the bevelopment Aid ~'unc~ c~f ~he Arab ~,eague and UN agencies, which have a1-
reacly granted asgistance to the Ogaden refugeas. mhe tinited S~aees and the
~~tG have not yet determined the progran~ which they plan to ffnance.
_ CdpYItIGHT: Itene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979
11915
C50: 4400
42
FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~dlt d~~ICiAL U3~ dNLY
I
i~7I BOUmI
glti~~'S
MItt1,G~5 AWtiV~--Abnut 10 "Mirage 3 C" Eigheer planes r~f ehe ~rench Air
~'orCe were s~nt eo Ujibouei ~t tihe end of ~anuary. mhes~ aircraft, from
the Creil (oise) base, wi11 guar~ntee bjibouti'~ air defenge, in accnrdance
with the defenae agreements concluded between F'rance and the new nation.
They replace the "F' 100 5uper 5$bre" planes of the French Air F'orce, which
were practically no longer in use except in Diibouti. (Textl Iparis
MARCN~5 TTaOPICAUX ET IwI~DIT~ItRANEENS in F~rench 16 F'eb 79 p 462j 11915
ISLAMIC AI6--~he ~slamic So~idarity fiund has presented two checks in the
amoune of S350,000 to the ttepublic of Djibouti. This gift, bjibouti
foreiqn affairs minister Mr Moumin Bahdon staeed, is intended on one hand
to off~et the effects ~f the drought which has recently affected njibouti
and, on the other, for the welfare of Djibouti youth. (Text~ (Paris
MARCNES TIbOPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in F'rench 16 Feb 79 p 462J 11915 ~
CSO: 9400
43
FOR OPFZCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~Ott U~~ICIAL U5~ ONi.Y
IVOttY CUAS'T
M~ItCNAN'r 5HIPPING INDU5TRY b~V~LOpM~NT DI5CU55~b
pgris J~UNE A~RIQUE in ~rench 28 ~'eb 79 pp 40-41
(IntervieW with I.~t~ine Fadika, mini~t~r of inexchnnt narineg by 5lradiou biello:
"A New Order for Merchant Shipping"~
(Text~ The merchant marine Waa for a lang time a domain regerved for the
colonial ghipowners. The Ivory Coagt is one of the first Africen count~ieg
to hgve veneured ineo this ~ector. 5ince 1973 especially it has been
feverighly active, $t the regional level as Well gs Within the ACP (African~
Caribbegn and Pgcific Countrieg~ or UNCTAb [United Nations Conference on
Trgde attd Develc~pm~ntj fram~ork~ nimed at convincing [he othpr Africen
gtateg of the tteed to promote g neW ieternational order for merchant ghipping.
The man Who embodies this new policy ia no longer an unknown quantity:
Lieutenant Commander Lamine Fadika, the Ivorian minister of inerchant marine,
a graduate of the Brest (I~rance) Naval College and with a certificate from
the Paris War College, Ws~s kittd enough to talk over this issue With ug.
(Questionj The merchant mariae was for a long time the special preserve
of the colonial pc~era. Whae led you ta break up that ntonopoly?
(Answerj We have been interested in that sector ever since the outline law
in that it wag in 1959 that the �irst ships flying the Ivorian flag were
launched. But it has been only since 1974 that we hgve made the merchant
marine a national cause. The rise in the price of hydrocarbons that year
severely affected the open economies With respect to international trade, _
~uch as that of the Ivory Coast.
(Question] You were quick to make decisions.
(Answerj Yes. Presiden[ Houphouet-Boigny then created tvo nev ministerial
departments~ one responsible for trade, the other for the merchant navy.
With respect to the merchant marine, imagine that every ton of inerchandise
We export or import covers an average distance of at least 1,000 kilometers
in each direction~ as opposed to 1,000 to 2~000 for the developed countries.
44
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~d~t O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
Now, for the very rea~on that we are underdeveloped, we ~xport the ma~or
ghare af what we prdduce ~nd impnrt tihe major part of Whgt we cnng wne.
[Questionj In other word~, Che 1973 crisis played a revegling ro1e.
C~?ngwer~ It brdught out a11 of the fgctnrg df our ~oreign trade'~ imbglanre.
5ince then the Chief of gt~te has given ug the mig~ion of ~dn~dlidgting c~ur
eeonomiC independence by correcting the itnb~l~nceg. And in order td do go
we believe th~t it ie e~sentigl td e~tebligh a large ngtional fleet. Hence
the CreaCion of SITi2AM (Ivori~n Marititne Shipping CompanyJ.
~
[Question) $ut in back of a firm ~uch gs SITftAM, ~ren't the n1d ghipowner~
_ whd became rich on the cdloni~l routeg cotttittuing tn exp~oit Afrita?
[Answer) On that gub3ect I am categorical: 5ITRAM ir~ a I00 percent national
~oncern. Of courge until March 1976 it was a semi-puhlic firme ,'~nd, even
though the state was the majority shareholder, I gdm3t thgt the decision
Eenter~ were in Europe. However, we have achieved a policy of naCion~l in-
dependence, for which ;SITItAAM was tn serve ag the epearhegd, Cc~uld not be
conducted under those circumgtances. That is why the gc~vernment reeolved
to make 5IT~tAM's capital 100 percent Ivorian, [o transfer to the Ivory Coase
all of the decigion cencers and to promote a very active pnlicy for the
training of national cgdres.
[QuestionJ Yes, of course, but what has renlly changed eince the state'g
interv~ntion?
(AnsW~rJ 5ITkAM noW has a sizable fleet whieh is already handling 30 per-
cent of our imports and exports to and from the European countriea bordering
on the Atlantic and on the North Sea which are our first trading partnezs.
[Questionj The change resides at the level of the amounta of inerchandiee
transported.
[AnsWer] The policy that has been implemented for 6 years is enabling us
to attain a deeper knowledge of the cm ri[ime market's mechanisms as a whole
in a sphere easential to our foreign trade. In addition, it confers upon us
a decisive weight in determining the freight rates which affect us. This is
_ Why SITRAM's existence makes it poasible for the Ivory Coast to economize
and to earn more foreign currency than in the past.
(Question) Why does the Ivory Coast keep itself to itself in a sector so
vital to all of the African countries?
[Answerj We have always sought to unite our efforts with those of the sub-
region's countries. It is in fact thanks to this coordina[ing that since
1976 the freight rates far merchandise consigned to the area can be in-
creased only with the agreement of our trading partners. Moreover~ it aas
on President Houphouet-Boigny's initiative Chat a ministerial canference of
45
~ FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~Oit U~~ICIAL U5~ ONLY
the gteteg of Wegt gnd Central Af rica.wag ~et up. Thank~ eo ehig cooperation,
ehp gbusiv~ nnuiipulating ~f freight raee~ was Cermingeed.
[questidri] Wh~t pe~Cent~ge df ehe mereH~ndi~e drigin~ting frdm ar ~angign~d
td Af ri~g ig Crgngported by ghipe flying g genuin~ly A~ric~n flag?
~Answer~ I do not have any speCific figures in my head, bui: I belteve Chat
percentgge doeg not amount to 5 percent. Which is very ldw. Imagine thgt
Africa'g total ~hare of world ~hipping w~s legs thgn 1 percenC in 1976.
[QuestionJ What ig the eh~re c~rried by ehe Ivorinn merchgnt marine?
(Answerj Ten percent of our foreign trade is effected by seg. Oux goal is
to increase thig percent~ge to 20 percent gt le~st by 1581.
[Questionj gy devel~ping its merchant marine as it ig doing, i~n't the Ivory
Coast_ very eimply giming at replpcing Che traditional shipownerg?
[Answer~ Our merchant marine has ae iCs eesential goal defending Che pri-
mordial intereata of our development. So there could be no question of o~r
fleet replacing fore ign shipowners in the pilleging of African resources.
[Ques tionJ In this sphere as in othera the pursuit of profits nonetheless
legds tn domination of those who are weakeat.
(Ansuerj In 1977 52Tt2AM realized 750 roillion C~A (African Financial Com- -
munity ( monetary uniL)j francs (15 aiillion ~rench francs) in net profits
after amortizing its debts. This means that it is perfectly capable of pro-
viding for the shipping of our basic products under optimal market conditions.
But SITRAM for all that is not exploiting and is not dominating any country,
i~ has no imper.lalistic goal.
(QuestionJ You heve made yourself personally the precentor of a new inter-
national merchant shipping order. Isn't that a mere political slogan?
(AnsWer~ The new internatinnal order that we are championing in the Ivory
Coast has regrettably not become a reality. BetWeen noW and April 1979 we
- will see more clearly how things atand. It is on that date that the S-year
period for ratifying the code for the conduct of maritime conferencea es-
tablished by UNCTAD expires. If at the end of April 25 countries repre-
senting a quarter of the World's merchant ahipping tonnage have not ratified
the convention, well, that will be proof We have failed--for thc tiaae being
at least.
[Questionj Even at the level of your European partners linked With the ACP~
isn't it possible to Win out?
[MsverJ Adherence by thc countries oE the European Common Market to the
merchant shipping convention ae recommend could of course provide a sub-
scantial boost. But We must not have too many illusions. TF,e traditional
4ti
FOR OFFICIIIL USE ONLY
_
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~OEt O~FICIAL U5~ ONLY
mariCime powerg gre gt Chi~ time openly opposed Cc~ the convenCion. Just the
sgme we do ndt degp~ir df g~eing good sen~e and ~ustice prevail. In gny
event, thp ACP ~tgte~ me~ting itt Bgngui l~~t year decided to include UNCTAD'a
cnde of conduct in the negotiations on Che future Lome convenCion.
CQueetionj boes the Ivory Coget on ita own have qualified men available to
operate a merchant mgrine worrhy nf ehat name7
(Answerj We h~ve given the tr~ining of inen firse priority in our merchant
ghipping policy.
(QueaCionj And ynu think you ~~re gufficiec~C unto yourselves outaide of any
co~per~Cion of a aubregional or regional gorC?
CAnawerJ Not aC a11. On the conCrary, we have decided to ~oin our efforta
with Chose of the subregion'g fraternal countries with a view to establiahing
an acgdemy of sciences and technology of Che sea in the Ivory Coast. An
academy having ae ita miasion the training actd perfecting of cadrea and
merchattt shipping peraonnel in all branches and aC all levele. IMCO (InCe r-
gnvernmental MariCime ConaulCative OrganizaCion] (a specialized egency of
the Unit~d NaCidns iri th~ ~spher~ of maritime navigation) ia in charge of
carrying out and superviaing the educatior.al and technical part of that
pro~ect. IC will be an eatablisl~ment wi'ch a 750-atudent capacity (cadete
and students) coming from all of the French-speaking countries of West and
Central Africa. Its opening is nnticipated in 1981.
[Questionj All of that is being done with or agninat the old colonial ahip-
oWners?
(AnsWerj Our maritime policy and in particular the organizing of our mer-
chant marine ia not directed against anyone. However~ we are determined
not to Zeave up to foreign interest groups the task of decidinp for us aad
~ in our atead the Ivory Coast's policy in auch a vital sector. What could
"e';1 be more natural than that this should lead in fact to a real setback for
rhe traditional shipowners. But for all thgt we do not nurture any feeling
of animosity against anyone at all.
_ [Queation) Why doesn't the Ivory Coaet envisage ~oining other African coun-
trfes to create a multinational merchant ehipping firm?
[AnswerJ In May 1975, at the time of the constituent meeting of the Abidjan
ministerial conference, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny stated: "No
country in our aubregion can establish on its own a flee[ completely meeting
the vast and complex requirements of our foreign trade;" this means that We
/ Ivorians are convinced that the future belongs to reg4onal ~leeta.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 19~9
8094
CSO: 4400 4~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
FOit OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
NIGERIA
I
BRIEFS
DUNLOP-MICHELIN RUBBER PROJECT--The Dunlop and Michelin tire companies have
agreed on g~oint invement of 21 million naira in a hevea planCatian in
Bendel aeaCe. It will be Che largeat of its kind under single ownership =
in all West Afr~ca. The Nigerian Rubber Board has requeated the minietry
of land and houaing to make the necessary land available for the pro~ect.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Mar 79 p 574] ~
CSO: 4400
48
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
F'OR OI'FICIAL US~ ONLY .
SENE(}J~
PRFSS SAID TO FEEL THREATENED BY PRFSS CODE BILL
Paria JEUNE AFRIQUE in Fk~ench 7 Feb 79 p 23
~Article by Sennen Audriamirado, s ecial correspondent in Dalcars ^The
enegalese Journalists' Grieeance"~
- ~TeztJ One of the freeest press bodiea in Afr3ca feels
_ ~reatened.
~om our apecial correspondent in Dakar
"This is r.ot the mini~ter of Information removing you, but Daouda 3ox
throwing you out." Without mincing ~aords, the Senegalese minister of Infor-
mation was "driving away" a~ournaliat from the debate held in Dakar on
27 January on the theme of freedom of the press in Africa. Jacquea Sy, a
teacher at the Da~car echool of ~ournalism and a corre~pondant for the nexs-
_ paper TA%AW, had ~ust stated that he vas spe~lsing for his party, the RND
(National Democratic Aasembly, as yet unauthorized) in denouncing "the gov-
ernment~s dealings ~rith France, its refusal to pl~r by the rules of the
demoaratic game, and ite intention of gagging the preas of the nation."
A manifest digression from the theme of the debate, the first of its kind
in Africa, the apeech nevertheless served as an indic~tor of one of the
greatest problem$ of the African preass the eternal confuaion betxeen
~ournali~m nnd political militaritiam. And Mam Less Dia, director of the
satirical paper LE pOI,ITICIEN and organizer of the debate, had chosen his
- moment xell: a time When the rich Senegalese preas feels threatened xith
being stiPled.
- Gag
Aa a matter of fact, there is a bill in preparation simed at instituting a
press code, but which the Dakar ~ournalists including some cloae to the
government are already calling a gag law or a villainous lax.
Concern is aroused by txo points. The first is the possible creation of a
49
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
_
~Ott 0~'~ICIAL US~ ONLY
control oommieaion, aharged with "continuoue checking of each publication~s
aocounte" and prepsring a quartexly report oa them (article 25 of the bil?).
According t~; rumore ~irculating in governmental carridors, the ob~ective
ie said to be the unmaeking of organe eubeidized by foreign govert~naenta.
In partiaular, they eay hero, by Algeria, Iraq, ar~d Libya.
Hlackmeil
Thue the co111mator vould be~on L~ D~MOCRAT~, belonging to the Senegalese
llemocratic Party (the logal~oppoeition), xhich in reality now appeara only
periodicallyj the RND~a TAY6W, and form~r council chairmnn Mawadou Ma~~
ANDE SO!'I.
Whatever the fact~ are, the accounta c~heck envieeged ig felt by maqy pro-
fesaionals to be dangeroua interPerence that could lead up to the dieappear-
ance of aeveral maa~t~eada; maet-heada Whoae divereity makes Dakar the
undeniable capit,a~l of the African prese.
Second eource of anxietyt the intention ~ecribed to the government of trying
to have all the texta in a publication inepected by a conaaiaeion, and before
printing. In fact thia i~ by no meane the case. The bill merely atatea -
(article 37) the time limits for depnaiting duty copiess before diatribu-
tion, for the dailieaf 2b and 1~8 houre, reapectively,fcr xeeklies and other
periodicals. Nonetheleeel The director of a publication printed in Dakar
but distributed in the Weat of Africa, aesured uss "The inatitution of
theae limite barely conc~ale the ir;ention of censoring the prees. For
Senegal and ite relative democracy, it rrould be a great leap backxarde."
Hoxever, no decieione have been made yet, and Douda Sox did atate, on
27 Januarys "There can be no diacussion ebout a tezt xhich does not legally
exiat yet~." The fact remaine that the discuseion ha~ etarted so thst there
rrill not exiet a text that xould be like a atrait-~ecket for a preas which
until nox has looked upon itaelf as the moat free press in Africa.
Officials are of course disclaiming any intention of gagging the press.
According to them, it ia ~uet a question of organizing and raising the moral
atandards of the preae tranaformed, it ie true, by some, into an instru-
ment of all-directional polenica, defamation, or even political blaclaaail.
According to inPormation leaks, hoxever, the government~a concern really ie
in fact a political one. In a country xhere the conetitution limita politi-
cal commenta to thoae of only the four authcrized partiea, the unaccepted
oppoaition hae found in the presa an i.ndirect xay of expreesing itself and
creating nex currente of opinion. .
Hartender
The d~bate ia then inclRed a pelltical one. Md ia indeed taking place among
political cliquee. The oniy onea left out of the bueines~: the ~ournaliata.
Which cauaed Mem Leee Dia to aay: "2~q nexspaper ia not a partq one, and I
SO
FOtt Of'FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
_
~Oit U~'~ICIAL US~ ONLY
i
put all partiee, authorized or not, in tihe ~ame bag. But if this lga ie
voted in, I give up. I xill ahut up shop, and not be g~ournaliat any
longer. I xould rath~r be a bartender.n
COPYRIOHT s Jeune .lfrique, aRtTPdIA 1979
121lt9
C~0 s !tl100
51
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~oK d~~icrn~, us~ ~tst,Y
- 5~NEGAL
ALLEG~D SHOR~'COMINGS OF PRESS CODE NOTED
Paris JEUNE A~RIQUE in French 21 Feb 79 pp 29-30
~ [Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Which Causee the Press to Goesip"]
(Text] On ~ February, the government approved a Prees Code bill. Sennen
Andriamirado saw the confidential report tha,t inapired the bill.
Planned aince February 1976, the Presa Code (see JA 944)~ degi~ned to
organize and to regulate Che profesaion in Senegal, became a bill only in
January 1979.
In the emall world of the oppoaition of the underground and of ehe -
"independent" preas--not affiliated with a political movement--it had at
firat been thought that the purpoae of the bill was to prevent certain
excesses. A publication, PROMOTION, since November 1978 had been the
prime mover of those long debates that delight Sene~alese ~ournaliats and
political militanta. Accused of libeling a good half dozen personalities,
PROMOTION later lost all of the cases ~that were brought against it, which
hardly militated in favor of its credibility. On 2 February 1979, the
courts once more found it guilty of inaulting a foreign chief of atate,
Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko, whom the newspaper had implied was at
the bottom of the fortune of a rich Senegalese buainesaman. "The PP.OMOTION
affair, a thorn in the eide, very nearly caused the government to give up its
pro~ect of making the prese toe the line," a Dakar colleague told us...But
the director of a periodical--not suspected of having any antipathy toward
the government, eays: "The deaire of the government to regulate the presa .
has nothing to do with the PROMOTION affair. It is a very longstanding
matter. Try to find out more about the Biondi report." That Biondi report--
named after Jean-Pierre Biondi, technical adviser to the directorate that had
responaibility for final editing--has become the Dakar presa's Loch Ness
monster. Everyone is talking about it. No one has read it. The government
ia not publiahing it and it took some doing for us to obtain it.
The history of thia phantom report goes back to the end of 1975. Democra,cy
at that time wag ~ust groping about. The only authorized opposition party
then was Abdoulaye Wade'8 PDS (Senegaleee Democratic Party]. On 27 November
1975, Prime Mini.ater Abdou Diouf instructed a work group to draft some
52
- FOR 0~'FICIAL L'S,: ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~Ott d~~ICIAL US~ dNLY
"~pecific propognl~ to b~Ceer coordinaCe or expres~ informgtion."
Directed by llanuda 5ow, minister nf Information and Telecommunicaeiona, the
group conaisted of officiale, for example, presa profeseionals: Jean-pierre
Biondi, presidettCial gdviser, wae designatied general reporter; Habib Thinm,
deputy and direcCor of the periodicale~ ETHYOPIQtT~S and 1'UNITE A~RTCAINE;
Ibrnhima llem, chief of Ch~ Preeidential Press Corpe; Obeye Diop, founder of
1'OUEST AFRZCAIN; Bara biauf, director general of the naCional daily,
LE SdLEIL;Saliou Fall, chief of Informaeion; Jugein Mendy, editor in chief
of MONITEUR AFRICAIN; Aesane Ndiaye, director general of OItT5 (Radio-TV);
and Cire Thiam, director of the Senegalese Presa Agency.
Curtailment
- On ~ebruary 1976~ the report on "Information in Senegal," was ready; the
proposals were submitted to Che prime minister. The lasC para~raph of
the document reads: "This report enda with a final apecific proposal: Che
publication by the Senegalese government of a pamphlet entitled, for
example, ehe Senegaleae Preas Code, to establieh in a basic Cext the Inform-
- ation Charter of a country that is aufficienCly self-assured to be able to
face today's world without apprehenaion." Three years went by before the
- timid appearance of a Preas Code bill, nicknamed in advance the "Gag Law."
Precisely what threata do hang over the Senegalese presa, in any case one
of the freest in Africa? Actually, leas from specific represaive measures
than from the apirit that emerges from the famed Biondi report. The February
1976 work group based ita proposals on concerns for which aome give it credit:
the inadequacy of the texts in force (law of 1881 in particular); bungling
of the freedom of the presa owing to lack of respect for professional ethica;
anarchy in the proliferation of titles that prove to be ephemeral.
Other statements in the report are entirely of a political nature. Thus,
the document criticizea (page 5): "the absence of any precise conditions
for the effective control of the national press by the public author-
ities (aeizure). Actually, seizure is conceivable only in the case of a
serious threat to law and order." The work group Chua conaidered it necessary
to make some proposals which, "without going back on the principle of free-
dom of the press, woui.d make it possible for the government to take
_ better precautions against exceases and license of freedom." That was the
germ of what the ~ournalista now perceive as "threats against freedom of
the presa." There is a connection. It has inspired measures which, without
- aligning Senegal with the ma~ority of the African countries in the matter
of the presa, are all the same disquieting for the future.
The direct and legitimate brainchild of the Biondi report, the Press Code
bill, which is circulating now among the ministers while waiting to be sub-
mitted to parliament, as a matter of fact contains some provisions that are
53 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~0[t O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY _
gnodyne only in appearance; in pgrticular, two commitiCees are provided
for, which mighC change many Chinga.
Conerol
The firet, the NaCiottal Press Commi~tee, i8 to be charged (art. 16 of Che
bill) with "ruling on ehe validity of the pres~ orggng. Compo~ed of a
~udge, two newspaper representatives, two prinCers, and two ~ournalisCe,
it wi11 ;~udge, with full sovereignty~ on whether an nrticle ia worthy of
being publiehed. In nonofficigl Dakar press circles, it is atated Chgt: ~
"This committee will be eaey to handle and Co be manipulated. Only Che ~udge
will have some leeway. But the printers will be at the mercy of the govern-
ment. They glready have been given to underatand, unofficislly of courae,
that if Chey print this or that newapaper, Chey no longer will have the
benefit of big staCe contracta."
The second committee, the one to "conerol publicationa," is also being con- ~
aidered beforehand as the future "performer of directed control-type ~obs
(see JA 946). Compoaed of Chree peraonalitiea (art. 24 of the bill), a
~udge, a representative of the Miniatry of Iitformation, and the director
of the publication with the largeat circulation, it "vouches for the contin-
uing verification of the accountability of each publication and prepares a
quarterly report of it; makea a semiannual review of the management of each
publicaCion and forwarda it with ita commenta to the minister of Information;
makes a periodical verification of the circulation of publicationa and
publiehea their reaulta."
Codification and Regulation
If control of the actual frequency is not disputed, on the other hand verifi- _
cation of accountability is allegedly resented as an intolerable interference
in the internal affaira of press enterpriaea. A Dakar ~ournalist, while very
close to the government,has nevertheless told us: "The government in reality
wants the press that it controls to make a good impresaion. The newapaper
with the biggeat circulation ia the daily, LE SOLEIL, in which the state
has interesta. The director of LE SOLEIL will therefore be a member of the -
committee. The latter will work as a small entity: a judge, an official,
and a~ournalist with a quasi-official status will be the censora of the
entire Senegalese presa."
If the Preas Code bill ia adopted, there may be a general ouCcry from the
independent preas or that of ehe opposition. There is only one concession:
the independent ~ournalists ackno~ledgt, that the profession needs to be
"codified and regulated." But they add that, "with respect to professional
ethics, certain colleaguea no doubt are open to criticism; but, here as in -
France, one begins by condemning bad newspapers and ends by gagging the
good onea."
54
FOR OFFICIAI. [TSE OM.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~ox o~~icTnt us~ orr~Y
That i~ doubtlees why Che Pregs Code bill also provideg~ gnd Chig i~ noC ies
leaet diequieting aspect, th~t prior to dietribution~ gll publication~ must
mgke a preliminary deliverq eo the minieCerial offices. Thug, control of
sech headline will aerve ae a ea~'eCy meneure and will meke iC pos~ible tn -
handle one of the mn~or concerna of the Biondi YeporC: Che poseibility of
eeizure before distribution.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1979
CSO: 4400
55
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9
~0lt O~FICIAL US~ ONLY
SOUTH AF'RICA
BRIEFS -
FR~NCH MARINE SUPPLIES--Marine maeeriel for civilian use supplied to Che
5oulth African merchant marine eccounta for Che 40 percent increase in
French-South African Crade in 1978, according eo Che AFP bureau in Johan-
nesburg. According to the laCest available atatistics on the firsC 10 months
of the trade year, toCal trade exceeded by 192.5 million rand (962.5 million
franca) the 1977 figure, which was estimated at 468.2 million rand, that is,
a 41-percent increase. However, during the period January to October 1978,
the French shipyards delivered to South Africa ahipa with a total value of
- 215.6 million rand (1.07 billion francs), in particular the container ship
S.A. Heidelberg. Theae de~iveries inflated the total French exporta to
South Africa to 427 million for January-October 1978 compared to 239.5 mil-
lion for the entire 1977 trade year. Subtracting the marine maCeriel (which
can be regarded as exceptional), French exports to South Africa during the
first 6 montha of 1978 totaled 211.4 million rand (1.05 billion franca).
In the same period South African exports to Fr.ance totaled 233.5 million
rand (l.lb billion francs) compared to 228.2 million rand (1.14 billion
francs) for the entire 1977. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-
RANEEN5 in French 9 Mar 79 p 647]
URANIUM TO BELGIUM--The Belgian Goverrnnent on 1 February gave its approval
and guarantee for a contract to purchase South African uranium valued at
5 billion Belgian franca (730 million French francs). This contract, which
covers a 10-year period, was arrived at between the Synatom company and
the South African Government. It was announced several months ago. A num-
ber of anti-apartheid organization addressed protests to the Belgian Govern-
ment when the deciaion was announced. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET _
MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 466]
CSO: 4400 ~ND
56
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030062-9