JPRS ID: 8514 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060025-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 25
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8514
14 June ].9 79
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
CFOUO 36/79)
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JPR5 L/85].4
~a June ~9~9
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 36/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
COUNTRY SECTION -
FEDEEtAL REPUBLIC OF G~MANY
New Force Structure, Mobilization Plans Discuased
(CAPITAL, ~Y 79~ 1
Tra.de Union Leadera, Rank and FYle Seen a1; Odds
(CAPITAZ,~, h4~y 79) 6
Criais in DGB
Fhrthmann on Wage Policy~ Friedhelm Farthmann
Interview
Unions on Supe:.�visory Boards
Union Paymerits
FRAt:CE
Five Years After His Election, Giscard Opens His Heart Up
to Philippe Bauvard
- (PRRIS MATCH, 25 ~Y 79) ~o
Text of Elleinstein Speech Not N1a,de to PCF Congress
(Jean Elleinatein; PARIS MATCH, 18 MaY 79) 22
Nation's Nuclear Dissuasion Policy Discussed
~ ( Paul Arnaud de Foiard; ARMEES D' AUJOIA~D' HUI, May 79 ) 27
Competence of Graund Forces NCO's Outlined
(Jean-Faul Marrot; ARNIEES D~AUJOURD'HUI, Nlay 79) 32
Responsibilities oY Air Force NCO's Outlined -
- (Jean-Paul Faraud; ARMEES D~AUJOURD'HUI, May 79)..... 37
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUOJ
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CONTENTS (Continued) ~B~ ~
Militr~ry, Gende~rmerie NCO Schools Charted
(ARMEE3 D'AUJOURD~HtJI, t~y 79) 41
- SWEDEN `
Briefs -
New Swedi~h Submarines 45
SWITZERLAND
New Antiaircraft Vehicle Adopted -
( DEF'II~tsA, 1Nar 79 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . ~+6
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COUNTRY SECTTON FEDERAL REPUBLTC OF GERMANY
NEW FORCE STRUCTURE, MOBILTZATTON PL.ANS DISCUSSED
Hamburg CAPITAL in German May 79 pp 138-142
, [ArCicle: '~The Fire Department"]
[Text] The New Crisis Plan~ning of the Federal Army
In the future, the federal army should have a peacetime
sCrength of only 340,000 men. Yet in a crieis aituation,
it could be doubled at a momente notice. The goverrnnenC~s
p~.ann~ng ttae ser ~his at i~a goa1.
The intelligence ataff of the Bundeswehr looked irritaked. Quite different
findings were available to them via armaments analysea and sate113Ce photo-
graphs than to the civilian Herbert Wehner, who recently went public with
his battlefield verdict: that the conventional equipment of the Soviet army
- is defensive.
Wehner's vote implied that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his cabinet, with -
tRe oppesing assessment, are blocking the negotiations between East and West
on a troop reduction. It broket out in the ~pen in the preparat3ons for
the German army reform, whith which Bonn wants to parry the increase field
superiority of the Soviets, and it was assessed at the Hardt level as a
political appeal "in the interest oP the policy of detente" to temporarily
dispense with an increase in defenee readiness.
_ But a stop signal was lacking. Neither parli~ment nor the administration ~
gave any evidence of the intention of giving up the new defense planning.
And an adviser to the chancellor commented ~n the vow of the Social Demo-
cratic chairman to put Che disarmament trend ahead of defense oblig~tions:
in a free interpretation of H~ningway and tne scenario of the Old Man and
the Ar~y - it corresponds to the armq which eats up the old man~s peace of
mind.
The ~ederal army, whtch the SPD senior views as growing too strong, would,
~ if based on the o1d structure, which is now being dissolved, be only condi- -
tionally prepared for defense. According to the latest NATO doctrine, it
is in the front ranks with rather diluted American and British fnrces
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eCat~.oned here, and would have Co bea~ rhe pr~inary burden of a convenCionally
delivered attack from ehe eas~, un~i~. reinforcemen~s could be flown in from
overseng.
The Sovieta demonstYated in 1968 Che blitzkrieg aCrategy on which they
~ ope:ate, in ~he occupaCion of Czechoslovakia, which wenC off according to
Che war plans. ParaCroopera along with ~anks and artillery were dropped
in Che exCremc: west of the operations area, se~ up at the rear of the enemy9
drove againet Che heavy tank units coming from the eas~, and additional
tiank units were immediately broughC to the border as comba~ reserves.
According to an experC evaluatior~ of the German general sCaff, the armed
forcea and strategy of the Soviet army is anything but defeneive. For Moscow
is the only nation in the world which in peacetime relies on two clasaical
branches auited to an operationa' campaign, so extensive in quality and
quantity tihaC no mobil3zation ie required: wittiout calling up reservisCs, the
Eollowing can be senC into combat:
--Tank units with 50,040 modern combaC vehicles;
--Five airborne diviaiona ouCfiCted with heavy equipmenC.
With its classical order of batCle, the federal army could probably stand up
- Co a massive offensive thrust. The 33 brigades aC the preaent time in the
active army are trained in tank interception, and specifically, in a type of
cooperation between rocket regiments and panzerpulks: the "hornets" have to
deliver the first defensive strike wiCh helicopters outfitted with antitank
- rockets, and whatever manages to break through runs into the defense positions
of the German tank units.
But up Co now, things were in pretty poor shape behind the front line, The
territorial army, noC recruited except in case of mobilizaCion, was bare
infantry, without any kind of heavy weapons - by nature nothin~ more than a _
watchman and security company. IC also in essence had no other mission: it
~ was to take up sentry positions in front of supply operations, depots and
bridges. On one hand, it would have Caken days with o1d structure to re-
plenish the home defense troops from 10% active 3n peacetime with 9U% re- '
servists in case of a. crisis. On the other hand, their combat eFfectiveness
- against heavy airborne uniCs would have been zero. For, as an army general
put: "one is powerless with rifles against tanks."
The army in the field in such a situation would have to split up in order to
be able to fight equally towards tre west and the east. Or would have to _
give ground in order to set up new defense posttions in the interior of Che
k~ederal Republic, from which both attack formations - those from the air and
those on the ground - are again ~aunched against the east. But, the general
_ oD~ected: "The Federal Republic is not wide enough that we can afford to do
this."
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' Thus, in order Co make Che unhindered forward defenae poesible for the field
army, as ae11 as ~he interdicCion of a~Cacking unirs at ~he federal border, _
_ a completely new Army e~rucCure is needed~ wh3ah had already been envieioncd
under OeQenee M~nisCer Helmut Schmid~. Tn thie cnee, three plnn pointH were ~
- Co De obaerved. The federal army ahauld:
--Retain ita peacetime sCrength of 340,000 men;
--"In principle", not exceed Che costs; -
--tn case of ~ crieis, be twice as strong in accordance wiCh the alert plan.
When the plan had marured, it received�the highes~ praise of the NATO mili-
tary leadership. "It ia a marvel of organizational technique," ran the com-
men~ary from Bruesels. And previously reserved officera at Che Hardt level
added: "if i.t comes off this we11, and hopeEully we wi11 not have to prove
that in case of war, we could be saCisfied."
According to the p1an, the field army, over which NATO has exclusive dis- _
positional ttuthority in combat, has 36 br3gadea in the future instead of 33,
with a brigade to every four combat battalions. Actually, one of the bat-
talions is a"skeleton" force in peacetime, as they say in military ~argon:
it does not have the full rated strength and is built up quickly only in
case of a criais.
Above and beyond this, special units of the territorial army are formed,
WRich are under German command: six eo-called home defense commands, equi- -
valent to active armored infanCry brigades, which even peacetime have 50 Co
60~ of their actual etrength and can be at full force in a few hours.
Where Che personnel supply for the field army and the territorial army can
come from so quickly fo].1ows from the mustering plan. The Bundeswehr has a
quiet active reserve, 30,000 so-called ready reaerves, emergency reservists
in civilian occupation, which, as a communication of the defense ministY�y
zeads, "regularly trained with their hame units." Their immediaCe call-up
by the minisCer of defense is permitted by law even before a general mobil-
ization.
An following a mobilization, the remainder of the territorial army can be
brought up Co battle strength with reserviats,.and specifically to a level
o~:
--Six home defense regiments, which like the home defense commands are
armured to support the German NATO units;
- --45 home defense battalions, stationed behind the front for area protection;
--150 fully monitorized home defense companies, which have to secure riv~r
crossings and roads;
--300 sacurity platoons, which watch over supply depots and important defense
operations.
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If neces~ary, Bonn~s defense planners could actual:ly Ea11 b~ck on sufficient
replacements, in texms of quanCity alone: Che Bundeswehr numbers 900,000
reaerv:~ats, of which 600,000 are firmly planned for Che case of war, 450,000 ,
in the army alone. Moreover, Che qugliCy ia extraordinarily high. "Our -
reservists, who report for training, perhapa differ in eheir haircuts from
those liable for military service, but noC in Cheir level of performance," _
was ~he ~udgemenC of an army spokeaman. And, ~'tihere are no shirkera among
Chem."
In the future, ehere will be more exerciaes rhan before so Chat Che level -
of performance is mainta~.ned. The army pre~~iously had 4,000 permanenC posi~-
- tfons for reservisCs among iCs 34U,000. This made 3C poasible to annually -
aupplementally ~ra3n 130,000 ex-servicemen with the active units. By this
time, Che number of reservisC permanent assigrnnents has been increased ro
5,900 so that every year, 210,000 former soldiers could compleCe an exercise
for at least 10 days.
The weapcns also are in line with rhe new peraonnel structure, where the
- federal army hasprov3ded the following in the meant~me: the neweat and most
modern go to the active f ield army, and rhe o1d weapons are modernized and
are ready for outfitting the territorial army, as the planning of tank oper-
ations alone provides. The defenae echelons have the following available:
--1,800 of the newest icype of Leopard II tanks as the op~rations force of
the field army;
--3,000 Leopard I tanks as an operational reserve of the fieldarmy;
- --800 American M 48 tanks, which has been rearmed with a new cannon, to
provide armor for the territorial army to pursue peneCrating tanks.
The abundance with which Bonn has pravided armaments for its military forees
allows, in terms of organizat3on, for the formation of Chis strategic reserve.
Most troops of Che territorial army are lead as equipment units: tanks,
armored personnel carriers and personnel vehicles awatt the crews in Che case
of mobilization. The smooth cooperation of those called up would not be
questioned in case of mobilization: the alert soldiers know each other ~re1.1,
Chey have served together and been through reserve exercises in tiic~ s~~me uniCs.
Why the federal government is promoting the new army structure has been -
officially voiced by Defense Minister Hans Apel:
--The conventional defense force of the federal republic will be strengthened;
--Thereby, the deterrence of a potential aggressor is more effective;
---In case of an attack on the federal republic, forward defenses would be
assured;
- --And finally: the negotiating position of the federal government would be -
improved in a crisis.
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~ In thie way, as it ia eaid ae Che NArdt level, the Bundeswehr is ~.n line with
the ~hinking of the Bundes~ag and Che federal government Chat an e�~ective
policy of de~ent ia possible only with an en~during security pol3cy. After
a:,1, "we probably all ars~ working from the fact ~ha~ defense readinesa is _
a1s~ a form of peace assurance."
COPYRIGiix: 1979 ~runer + Jahr AG & Co
8225
CSOs3103
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. COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
TRADE UNLON LEA.DERS, RANK AND FII.E SEEN AT ODDS
- Crisis in DGB
Hambur3 CAPITAL in German May 79 pp 295, 296, 299, ~O1
[Article: "The Crisis of the Trade Unions--Problem of the Base"]
[Te~cC] There is a rupture between ~~ase and superstruc-
ture in the DGB [German Labor Union Federation]. The _
membership is no longer cooperating to the extent de-
� sired by the union officials. Wage policy, Che main
b usiness of the uniona, is increasingly at risk.
The German trade union leaders of late have found themselves exposed to a
demand which they like Co set others and dislike to hear themselves--the
deaiand for self-determination. Their fellow members at the base are rais-
ing it in order to bring the supermembers at the executive levels into
line.
Worked u~ over the miserab le result of the steel strike in North Rhine-
Westphalia, plant union representativea at Hcechst, Mannesmann and Thyssen
demanded the immediate dismissal of their leader in the negotiatio~is, Kurt
Herb, and, on top of it, the voting out of office of Chairman Eugen Loderer
and two other members of the executive of the Metalworkers Union. In ad- -
dition th e shop stewards demanded thaC the statutes be changed in order to
give more say to the base.
The printers went even further. In the course of their wage dispute, they
suddenly denied their support to their leaders. The wage committee of _
their union, where members and functionaries of the base are in the ma~or-
ity, re~ected as inadequate the campromise with the employers about ra-
tionalization safeguards, approved under the direction of Chairman Leonhard
_ Mahlein, making it necessary for new negotiations to be atarted.
Heinz Kluncher, the powerful chairman of the Public Service, Transporta-
tion and CommunicaCions Union, suffered a similar fate. In a stroke
ballot, his longshoremen in the coastal tawns did not yield to their boss's
p ereuasion and re~ected a solid wage increase, asking for more.
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Like I:luncher, Mahlein and Loderer~ moet of their counterparts in the other
14 unione of the DGB are experiencing a grawing aelf-conPidence of the mem-
berahip, numb ering a Cota1 of 7.6 million. IC no longer accepCa without �
contradicting whatever is being done at the top and ia making its reais-
tance fe1t, and thia ia not by any meana only a question ~f an integral or-
ganizational conflict.
The Crade un3.ons, after all, also exercise public functions--for example, -
in checking on labor administration and social insurance. Via codeter-
mination on supervisory boards, Chey affact plant policy. BuC, moeC im- ~
_ portant of all, they 1ay dawn conditions in wage agreements ~ointly with
industry and at the same time decide about employment, economic planning
and growth.
, The course b eing steered by Loderer, Kluncker, Mahlein and othera in wage
policy depends on the internal constitution of the unions, however. If
the leadership does not obtain a ma~ ority for its policy, the wage buai-
ness becvmes less calculable, and compromise is made more difficult. In
order to inaure reelection alone, th e union leadership is likely to take a
tougher stance in ~he next round. `
This, as ahawn by Great Britai n's bitter experience th~�s pas t winter, costs
the whole economy dearly. In the United Kingdom the uaion leadera had to
bow to the resis tance of the base and fight the wage guidelines of the
- government they had follawed in previous years. Since Prime Miniater James
Callaghan and industry were not ready without ado to grant higher increases,
- a wave of strikes paralyzing production and ~conomic upswing swept over the
Untted Itingdom,
- Though Germany has not b een gripped by the English sickness, Otto Wolff
von Amerongen, president of the Federation of Chambers of German Industry
and Commerce, thinks that follawing the steel strike th e world of wages is
not unscathed any longer. He says: "The unions have given reason for
doubt in their senae of responsibility for the economy as a whole."
It was the b ase that prompted this doubt, because the labor struggle cex~
tainly would not have materialized if the Metslworkers Union delegates at
their last union ~ongress had not forced their Eugen Loderer to take action.
In opposition to his declared stand, they saw to it that the 35-hour week
was included in the list of wage demands for the coming three-year term of
office o� the executive.
Ttus the 1979 wage round was the last opportunity for Loderer to do smne-
- thing to b e able to report to the delegates to the 1980 union congress on
- activities by the executive aimed at attaining a shortening of the work-
weplc. And without any action in this matter, the next conf lict with the -
base would have materialized.
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The delegatea, hawever, are noC afraid of conflicts any more. The Cradi- _
tional reluctance ag,ainst internal union criCicism has waned. Thia is no
wonder, b ecause tha younger generaCion in the DGB is gaining momentum.
Already 17 percent o� the members are no more than 25 years old. They _
- live in a different realm of experience tihan the older leaders and mem-
bers, who learned solidarity as a result of political persecution and auf-
fering in the war and therefore placed exCernal unity above all elae iz~
democ racy as well.
This identif3cation was maCched by leadership personalities with great
charisma such as Otto Breimer, the predecessor of Lc,derer as hea~i of the "
Metalworkers Union. G~nerally these were able to present Che members from
carrying out disputes mere ly by warning that cont roversy weakened the
fighting ability of the organization. If nevertheless the executive was
threatened by defea t in a questian of principle, an appeal by the chairman
for solidarity would reestab lish th e equilibrium. In this way Brenner's -
action at the trade union congresses prevented the withdrawal of the Metal-
workers U*u.on from Concerted Action demanded by the delegates. At the 1~368 ~
congress he evan managed to make them declare their ~ust-passed withdrawa 1
resolution null and void.
Legendary labor leaders were succeeded by suber pragmatis+ts whose policy :
generally is drafted by staffs consisting o� political scientists,
sociologisCs and econamis ts. Their sp ecialized academ3c knowledge is in
demand if only because Che demands have grawn which state, society and
economy make of the trade unions--f or instance, as a result of codetermin-
ation or lab or management. These top representatives likewise require th e
previous advice of the experts whenever Chancellor Helmut Schmidt invites -
them for talks.
The reverse side of the medal is this: the greater the share in pawer, the
greater the involvement of the trade union leaders in official economic =
policy, all the more so b ecause more than three-quarters of the executive
members of all DGB unions are SPD members. Of the 11 functionaries on the ~
executive of the Metalworkers Union, 10 are active SPD members.
This affiliation with the govertmnent alienates the superstructure from the
~ bas e. According to an analysis by leftwing Br~men Senator for Finance
- Henning Scherf, SPD, the union leadership oriex~ted tcxaard the SPD-FDP gov- -
ernment cannot by any means depend on a ma~ority of delegates at the fed-
eral congresses. Scherf estimates that only two-fifths support the
policies of the executive, one-fifth are infiltrated by the DKP, and the
rest are keeping a critical distance.
The fact that the policies of the higher-ups were satisfying fewer members
was apparent from the 1978 so-called union barameter--an opinion poll com- _
missioned by the DGB 14 times since 1963. The hand fell to an all time
low. While the population again took a quite positive view of the need
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f~r trgd~ unton~--in oeher words ~ Cheir legieimacy--Che inCerviewer~ r~-
corded g lo~a in ~upporC, particu]~rly amnng thoee organized in uninne~
:i
_ ~o- iCe area~ the executive of the Pood, Luxury Food~ gnd Re~Caurant~ Union
r~ceiv~d infotmgeion abnut thie diegruntlemene af Ch~ memb ership in an empir-
- ic~l eCudy by the ~riedrich Ebert Foundation. The etu~iv, for ~xenple~ re-
v~led ~erioug orgenizational shortcomings. ALnoet ane-third of the member~
faile d to receive ~.nvitations ro attend eveneg. The aeg eagment from below:
gccording Cn 37 percenr of thoee organized, l~cgl paid officiale ~ttended
only inadequaeely "to the real prob lems of wurkers in enterprises."
Such resulra are probably ar leae t an indication that organizational mat-
tere are in bad shape in oCh er unions as well. While such ~horCcominge
are noC denied aC DGB headquartera in Duesseldorf, a tendency to attribute
them to the eCrong incregse in memberehip preponderateg.
rrue, the unions are increasing their membership~ bu~ thie ig happening
lese b eceuae of c].ass-consciousness than because of opportunism. From
1973 to 1977 the number of p eople organized in the DGB rose by 300~000.
This upward erend continued last year. Today 35 percent of all workera
are DGB members; in 1969 the figure was 30 percent. In the 1950's and ~
_ 1960's there had been a cons tant loss in organization, with the DGB wasting
away.
The tu rnabout in 1969, however, was no accident, according to the Munich
eocial scientists Wolfgang Streek, Herroann Bayer and Eckbert Treu. In a
atudy gbout "organizational-structural processes of change in West Genoan
ttg de uniona" they reach the concluaion that (1) the oppoaition against
- unionization on the part of many entrepreneurs decreased after an SP'~-
FDP government took over in 1969 and (2) the rights of trade unione were
expanded and strengthened by the I,abor Management Act.
This has facilitaCed the racruiting of new members. Workers often are
farced by circumstances Co become or remain union members. The resson,
according to the Munich analysts, is that through its influence on person- `
nel p lanning a strongly union oriented works council can give preference to
union membere. They are given firat conaideration in employment and kept
as long as poasible when it comes to layoffe. This kind of inembershi.p
then is the best job insurance, but the fact that it fs not voluntary is
cause for discontent among many members.
Whereas the negative freedom of association--in other words, the right not
to join an organization--is also among the guaranteed constitutional rights,
as determined explicitly by the Federal Constitutional Court, thia "is
often so only on paper," according to Herbert Borner, district director of
the G erman Sala ried Employees Union (DAG), the competitor of the DCB. Says
Borner: "You can b~:t there are same subtle c~ays of iaducing a person to
, join." For instancE~, in plants that are highly organized nonmembers are
treated as outsidera until they give in.
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~OEt d~~ICIAL US~ dNLY
'Tt~i~ i~ wheC ig ~uet~inirig the DAG gt prea~nt. IC i~ receiving a greer
incrpa~e in mpmberghip fraa mnong the renkg of dieeaCi~fted pmploy~ee in
Che Dr;B. Federal Exe~uCiv~ Karl Kau1a reporte that in Che first couple of
mc~nChg of thi~ y~ar alone 3,500 pereone ~witched to the DAG~ Hig pxpl~n- _
gCion i~ thgt th~ employeee are re~i~ting "bd.ttg Chr~wn inCo th~ g~me pot"
g~ th~ orher work~rg.
On th~ e~ur~fgce~ thig ig g mgrginal phenom~non, buG talcen together ~uch ~
events explain the prnfound disgruntlement prev~iling in DGB uttiong ~very-
where. The official~ are virtually at a loes over it. Qn one ~ide Chere
is the ma~ority of Che memberahip, at a dieCence from the organization and
only shaking their headg over Che official wgge policy; on the nrher eide
there i~ a committed hard line minority predomineting at union congr~~eea
and forcing iCe lin~ on Ch~ leadership.
This ig what constituCes the presene union crieie.
Farthmann on Wage Policy
Hamburg CAPITAL in German May 79 p 296 '
[Interview with North Rhine-Westphalia Minister of Labor Prof Friedhelm
Farthmann: "PoinCa of Dispute"]
[T act] CAPITAL: You come from the trade union movement~ Mr Minigter.
What is iC that you do not like about the politics of your former col-
lea gues ?
Parthicann: I have no basic criticism.
CAPITAL: R.+eally? Even neueral labor market experts accu~e the trade unions
of a lack of solidarity in wage policy. While the veteran memberehip is
being protected, the job risks are ehifted to the shouldpre of women,
foreigners and ha~dicapped.
_ Farthmann: This is not an accurate descripCion. Of course the main body
of the unions, the elite of skilled workers, is playing a specia~. role in
making pol3cy. But so far there have not beea any union measures aC the
expense of ~reaker elements. Precisely these weaker elements through base
amounts have benefited over and above the norn?al wage percentages.
CAPITAL: Thia jeopardized ~obs, b ecause unskilled workers became too ex-
peasive. The machine does the job less expeasively in the long run.
Farthn~ann: Airy Wage increase entails an increased effort tvward ration-
alization.
CAPIiAL: This is resieted by the unions with demands for safeguards against
rationalization--another way of describing the breaking of technological
progresa.
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I
~dit O~~ICIAL US~ QNLY
~erthm~nn: Of Couree, e~p~ciully the FItG cannoC fnr~gn technologicgl
progre~~. We mu~e noe delgy or impede it. In faet, iC oft~n means humgni-
zetian--for instance~ when machines �acilitate ]abor. On ehe oth~r h~nd,
raCi.onalizaCion cgn al~o be inhwnan~ depriving the worker of hie profes~~onul
gnd pCOri0R1~C exietence. Thi~ m~~n~ Chat one mueC wai~h Cl:e pros and cons.
CAPITAL: Such w eighing often ie done one-~id~dly. Ag i~ ~hown by Che
egreemene in the prinCing indu~try, eafegu~rde againgC rgtionalization often
go in the direction of employing a gCroker with an eleaerical 1ocAmative--
ro us~ a Bri+~i~h parable.
Fer~thmann: ThaC would make no senae. I Chink that so far competiCiveneae
and the state of the technological deve lopment of our ~conomy have not
auffer~d from eafeguardg againeG raCionalization. The unions are~ hcwever~
awgre that Chey mueC noe eighCea Che screw too much, leet they drive the
plants ~broad.
CAF'ITAL: In ehe case of eom~ plants~ there would be reason for this to
happen if the unions ahould manage, with an all-out efforC~ to obtain a
35-hour week.
Farthmann: At present a~horr.ening of Che workweek for everyone would in-
deed noC b e feasib le from the point of view of employment policy, becauae
it would cauae an additional demand for highly akilled workera in industry~
which could not be covered by the present unemployed. I therefore Leel
that the problem is not a topical one at present. .
CAPITAL: Will it ever become a problem? -
Farthmann; One mus t act pragmatically. If there were a slump in the auto-
mobile industry or an otl shock, the aituation would look different.
CAPITAL: But evea without auch dire straits the uniona often provoke a
strike for the sake of a percentage point. It is a question of minimal
- pointa of diapute.
Farthmann: The German unions' sens e of responsibili ty is acknowledged
throughout the world. It is, however, an old story that it ia easier to
diatribute laxge than smal.l economic grawth. Wage policy is more diffi-
cult because the elbowroom for distribution is smaller.
CAPITAL: Judging by all that we know, that will not change.
~ Farthmann: I am therefore afraid of even tougher confrontations in the
future. Then also the question of ~uster wages is being posed. Today's
_ diff'erences in incvme, for example, b etween uaskilled workers and members
of the board cannot be justified.
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Nnlt O~FICIAL US~ nNLY ~
Uni.ona on Supervisory Boards
- Hamb~.rg CAI'ITAL in GeYman M~y 79 p 299 -
~Article: "Alien Determinaticm")
[Text] The unions think in etraCegic Cerma, buC the member,~ find ie dif-
ficult to follaa ~uit. Therpfore codeterminaCion quite ofCen causee prob-
1~ with f~llo~w workera in py.anrs.
An example: Wheu the mmibera of the board of the Ford Works assenble in .
Cologne, they are ~oined by the American Het~man Rebhan, who arrives b,y
plane. But he does not represent the parent cnmpany on the boar~l; rather,
he represents the workers--ae secreeary genergl of the Internatiemal Feder-
aCion of MeCalworkere.
Recently Rebhan's deputy, Werner Thoenesaen~ has been regulmrly invited Co
board meeCinga in Stuttgart of Standard Elektrik Lorenz~ an affiliate of
the U.S. multi ITT. The Dueas~eldorf managere of Du Pont de Nemoure, a
German subsidiary of the U.S. concern of the same name, has ko put up
with his colleague froa~ the International Federation of Chemical, Energy
and Factory Workers~ the Canadian Charles Levinson. And the board of the
Hertie affiliate Bilka was ~oined at the end of April by the Swise
Herib ert Maier, the secretary general of the International Federation of
Private Industry Employees.
The choice of these four foreign leading officials, the first and ao far
only representatives on boards of German enterpriaes, is indicative of
th e new thinking and strategy of the multinational trade union federations.
Con~~rns operaCing worldwide are to be brought under the cantrol of inter-
national officials via national codetermination.
The unions are also pursuing this aim by forming international advisory
councils for the multis consisting of workerst representatives of important
concerns and officials of the international. Such supranational advisory
councils new exist in the case of all leading automobile and electrical,
chemical and food industry enterpris es. Their delegates regularly exchange
infox~?ation about working conditions and employers' concessions which are
quite us eful in their own talks aimed at achieving improvements. But so
far the boards have refused to recogi~l~e the international advisory coun-
cils as interlocutors. Excep tions are the Dutch electronics multi P M lips~
the Swiss metal concern Brawn Boveri, the food manufacturers Neatle and
the French tire manufacturers Michelin.
The demand for concentrated action vis-a-vis the multis has been more
pr ~saing as far as the unions are concerned ever since the industrialized
countries registered high unemployment. Workers' demands are being blocked
with the remark th~t production can be shifted. The goverriments of almost
all European countries are competing for the installation of branches of
~
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~OFt O~FICTAL U5C dNLY
internaeional concerns--for inetance, of an nsaembly plant of t'ord, re-
cently adverCised openly by Ford with the request tihat ati lease 35 perc~nC
of the cosCs b e grant~d by way of inves hnenC assisCance. Many a govern- '
menr~ Meealworkere Secretary Gen~rgl Rebhan suepecte, moreover is likely
Co make ita reply more attrac~ive tiy ~romising eo keep the uniona out of
the plant.
In countries with unemployment such thinga do not evoke any protest, much
less international aolidarity.
~ "The sCaCe of awareness ia nothing to brag about," admits Dr Jutta
Kneisael of the Metalworkera Union headquarters in Frankfurt. The union
therefore forew ent paeaing on the call for a boycote by the International
Metalworkere Federation againat South Africa to the plants, "becauae no
worker would have gone along wiCh it anyway." And Che same aCtitude was
adopted by the Dutch workera in Che parent worke of VFW-Fokker when it
was a queation of keeping threatened ~obs in German planta.
Support being uncertain~ the international uniona are now going a different
" route--for inatance, via German codetermination. Dieter Noth of the Can-
merce, Banks and Insurance Union ia popularizing the action; foreign
colleagues, he says, can view with Cheir vwn eyes the German model of co-
operaCion b etween capital and labor. `
Union Paytnenta
Hamburg CAPITAL in German May 79 p 301
[Article: "Death Payments, etc."]
[Tact] Herbert Borner, district director of the DAG in Braunschweig~ is
benefiting from the toughneas of the competitor Metalworkers Union. Ever
eince the latter began half a year ago in Lower Saxony to collect the
atatutory fee from iCs members, hardly a single day has pass ed without
deserters calling on Borner. The DAG is more generous.
This shows Chat when it is a question of money thinga b ecome aerious for
many union members. And although most union payments are tied to the amount
the member pays in, the treasurers find it difficult to obtain the fees
fixed by statuCe.
Basically, the fee depends on the income: the higher the income, the
greater the fee that has to be paid in. The average is 1 percent of gross
income per month. The fees leveled differ depending on whether they are =
geared to the fixed wage, ar, in the case of the miners, or to the actual
income, as in the case of the metalworkers.
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Too much in any caee~ in the opinion of many workers. Thus �or many work-
ers the feea aYe Che main reaeon why Chey are no~ unionized. 'Thia is the
conclusion of a etudy liy Che Friedrich Ebert Founda tion abouC nonmembera in
the field of the Food~ Luxury Foods and Reseauranta Union--ulso knaan ae
'knachwurta Union" among their fel~.ow workera.
The realixation that both memb ership and atatutory payment of fees are needed
- increases in the case of a strike. Withoue financial asaiatance from the
unio~n, Che people affected would have to rely on social aid or would have to
dig into their savinga. And here Che union offers more.
According to a study by the German Economic InaCitute in Cologne, the
strike payment per day amounta eo double tn triple the amount of the
monthly union fee. Members of the Metalworkers Union, the Conatruction~
Stones and Earth Union, the Coffimerce, Banks and Inaurance Union and the
Leather Woxkera Union, who pay in DM 20 a month, receive DM 40 a day. The
chemical workera get DM 52, the woodworkers DM 60, and textile induatry
workers DM 65.40. In mos t unions there are also aupplements for apouses
gnd children.
With these paymenCa German workere are proCected better against the finan-
cial riaks of strikes than are their counterparta in neighboring West '
European countries. In Italy and France, for example, there is no auch
thing as aCrike money. This ia also reflected in the amo~lnt of atrikes--
in favor of the Germans. Whereas a strike dces not cost Italian and French
unions anything Co speak of, German unions incur huge financial burdens in
case of strike. The MeCalworkers union computes the cost of a 1-week
strike by 100,000 members as about DM 20 million. Since the time it was
founded, it has paid out DM 450 million in strike payments.
While the metalworkers so far have not had to curtail payments, i~ the case
of th e printers union, weak in membership, the maney did not even suffice
for one labor struggle. Greatly in debt, the union had to cut strike s>>p-
port at its 1977 congress. Since then, the payment has been only DM 85.50 -
rather than DM 114 a day for a monthly membership fee of DM 30.
The printers will also have to forego many another payment in the future.
The loyal service and old age bonuses have been eliminated. So, apart fram
support in labor struggles, there is left by and large only the legal sup-
port afforded to members in disputes with employers.
There is, hawever, also a trend taward reducing extras in other DGB organ-
izations, what with financial straits often making it necessary to curtail
payments. Only a rich union such as the OeTV [Public Service, Transporta-
tion and Cammunications Union), which seldan strikes, can continue to make
payments as usual. Its 10 types of p~yments congtitute the most expensive
list in existence. It assists its members in emergencies, in case of
l~+
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unemployment and illneas~ makea death paymente and disburses ~oyal service
and old age bonuses.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
8790
(S0: 3103
.
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~oa or~c r,~ us~ otu~,Y
COUNTRY SECTION FWINCE
FIVE YEARS AFTER HIS ELECTION, GISCARD OpENS HIS HEART UP TO PHILIPPE
BOWARD
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 25 May 79 pp 35-37
[TextJ I am sorry to disappoint you. The Elysee Palace is not at all like
a palace from the Arabian Nighta. It ie an office building, and for all
that, it ia really not very efficient--one-third palace (national), one-
third ministry and one-third barracka. The Republican Guarda play the role
of the young girls of the houaehold. But even if the old gilt decorationa
on Che ceilings have taken on a certain patina, the technocrata who prepare
the preeident's dossiera have become considerably younger. The "new
gentlemen" are more qften 30 yeara old rather than 50. They are bright and
svelte. Their lapels have no decorationa and their waistlines have not
been pushed out af shape by luncheons in town. In this hive of activity
where no one ever raises his voice except the official greeter who is
responsible for announcing viaitors to the chief of state, everything is
done in the name of one man, who in turn acta only in the name of 53 million
citizens. Because the president is loath to make hia viaitors go down a
winding corridor, one can only reach his etudy after gning through thE
office of Francoia Folge de Combret, the (now empty) office which Charles
de Gaulle occupied for 8 yeara and where Val~ry Giscard d'Estaing aometimes
receives certain guests, and finally the room where his peraonal aecretary
and assistant work. Only then does one reach the holy of holies: a
beautiful corner room overlooking the park, where everything is muffled,
from the carpets~to the noises of the city which are only heard as sofC
murmurs like a wa~e at the shore of the ocean. `There is only the shrilliah
chime, every 15 minutes, of the famour Bardoux grandfather clock.
I am especially happy about this interview which will enable me to sketch
the the personal assessment of the third president of the Fifth Republic
- after 5 years in office, because if the term of the presidency had been
shortened--according to his initial desires--he would already be packing
his baga. He explains very clearly why he once thought that the 7-year
term was not the ideal period and why he now has~decided not to change
anything:
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,
~t Or'A7C~AL US~ ONLY
_ --When I thought about ~h~e problem in the pase, I wondered wheCher the
_ confidence one puts in one'g chief of etate, and which ie the sourc~ of
hie power, could laet very ~.ong. Laeer nn, I realized tha~ in the excep-
Cional times in which we are 1lving, when political responaibillry ~.s heavy,
time ia too ahnrt to get Chinga done if, for example, you Cake away from a
5-year term the montha requiYed for dealing with the various doesiers and
Che monChs preceding ehe nexti election. _
Like his two immediate predeceseors,Val~ry Giacard d'Eataing has ~ very high
_ conception of hie office. One could ever~ say that over the last 5 years
- hie ~ob hae been the prism through which he has o~iserved the world~ France
_ and, at times, himself:
When one has a unique and distinct position with which no one can be
- familiar before having held the poaition--such as my position--one must not _
toy with it. One muat respect it and treat it with care. Now, all
- countrieg where the term of the presidency is ahorter than in France seem _
, to regret it.
For the time being the ~ob has a tendency to obacure the man. The president
Chinks thaC in his poeition one does not have the right to speak about
himaelf until much later and that means when one ia no longer in this
poaition. This diatance which he intends to keep from himself is also
based on his feelings of certainty that he has virtually not changed over
the last 5 yeara:
I believe that people change very little. When I look at old photographs
of the childish faces of my classmates whom I run into sometimes nowadays,
I do not get the impression Chat their features have really changed. Those
who were cheerful still are, and those who were unhappy have not changed
their ways.
In these 5 years which have gone by so fast that one may wonder whether
problems do not speed up the passage of time, the president distinguishes
two phases: a period of a year or two which is a period o~ getting used to
the job (one cannot get a true idea of the highest office until on~ has done
everything at least once) and the phase of full exercise of authority
which--in his case--coincided with the outbreak of the first serious
problems. How many hours a day does he work? It is hard to say:
- The chief of state is not a bureaucrat. When I take part in the festivities -
honoring Joan of Arc in Orleans, is that work? When--as in the case of
this evening--I resinne a tradition which I had to give up for several
months, rsnd din~ at the home of Frenchmen who have invited me, ia that
wurk? When I am talking with you, is that work?
Valery Giscard d'Estaing does not use the telephone much more than his
predecessors. But he has turned the gray phone on the left side of his _
dPsk into the number one instrument of his international politics. Even if
he virtually never calls the members of the government--except in a
crisis --he routinely communitcates with foreign leaders: _
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T'OIt OT'FZCZEIL U~~ ONLY
I oftet, r;ay to mye~l�, "Sayl I haven't spoken with euch ~nd such a chief
of staCe for a long Cime," and I get in touch with him aggin to make eure
_ of ehe progrees of our ~oint plans.
_ The wear and tear of power? He does noe believe in ie in Che le~et:
_ Thoge who do not have power aeem to hope that it will deatroy tihose ~aho do
have it. But that is not 1:rue.
He �eels ChaC Che loneliness one finda at the top standa out more. And
not so much because one withdrawa from his contemporariea, buC becauee Che
poeition is too conauming to maintain all the social relationshipe Chat one _
had be�orehand. If one go~e by what he says, the main change lies in a _
_ different r~~lationship with time:
When I was a atudent, I lived my life according to the seasona and exams.
As a minister, I lived according to the year and the fiscal year. Ae
chief of atate, I must look ahead several yeara. But, as a hwnan being,
the moat en~oyable time ia the time measured day by day.
Doea he someCimea en~oy exerciaing power? He closes his eyes~ Obviously
. he has never asked himaelf that queation. However, since he excels more
than anyoneelse in the little game "answers to everything," he comes up -
= with the anawer in 10 aeconds: -
En~oyment of power is very rare. But it does come about on two classic
occasions. FirsC of all, when I speak in public. Next, during large-acale
naCional events when they are succeasful and lead to an expression of real
collective emotion.
The drawbacks of power: There gre many and they are generally at a rather
pedesCrian level:
What I miss most today is not being able to atroll about anymore, not
being able to say to myse~f, "It is 5:30, a beautiful day, I am going to
sit down at a sidewalk cafe and read my newapaper for a hour." It is an
insignificant matter when one can do it. It is essential when one can no
longer do it. When one is a minister, life becomea normal again when
one leaves the miniatry. When one is chief of atate, one is never again
"off" as the audio-visual specialista say.
_ Translate: never invisible again, always "on," always in the limelight.
The smallest room becomes an echo chamber. Convinced that lonelineas is
henceforth his lot, he has remained aloof from the policemen responsible
_ for his security:
On Sundays, we manage to go to Mass as the Madeleine. We walk back. The
danger for chiefs of state does not lie in an impromptu walk, but rather
a trip announced in advance.
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- FC~t QFFICIAL US~ ONLY
tlas he given up seeing certain pereone since he took n�fice? The queseion
hae never come up because his frie~~ds hav~ nlways been chosen ouCside
, politica~ circles. Hae the role of the president become more powerful since
1974? He denies it categorically:
My id~a o� running a government is Chat authorit~? musC bp exercised along
wiCh all those who agsume responsibilities and who have areas of ~urisdic-
tion, that cooperaCion among men ie essential and that it is virtually
only in casea of disagreement that one must worry about what ia under whoae
~uriadiction.
. The m~ny changes on hia Ceam are merely becauae of his deaire not to thwarr
the careers of his aseociates. As far ae recruitment ts concerned, he
- follows only one simple principle, and he is sometimes surprised that it is
not a universal one:
First of all, I ask myaelf who is the best in his field, then I choose him
for my Ceam.
Five years of power have not changed hia view of the French. Even though
he aeea them from on high, they are atill of the same atature in liia eyes.
If anyChing, he places even more imporCance on them than before:
I do not have the impreasion that I know people better; but I have a clearer
view of Che political personnel. You know, I was voted in, and I often
think thaC it ia better for my personal equilibrium that I was voted in to
this position by universal suffrage. When I think of t~:~ 13,396,203 French-
- men who voted for me in 1974, I think of them as men and women, and not
_ as votes.
When his popularity standing declines, he consulta the polls with a touch
of inelancholy. When it risea, he has a reaction of anticipation and is
already thinking about the next decline. This leaning toward future pro-
spects breaks off abruptly as soon as it is a question of thinking about a
- second 7-year term:
I will only speak abouC that problem much later. Th~ day one decl~rec ~
his candidacy, one is more a candidate than a president. Do you remember
General de Guall.e at the ead of his f3rst Cerm? T~ao months before the
election, Georges Pompidou, his grimP minister, did not yet know whether
- he would run. I do not see, as far as I am concerned, what interest Chere
is in starting a campaign 2 years in advance. One must never forget that
Providence alao has its say in the matter.
Struck by the fact that one generally does not get to finish out his
aecond 7-year term, the president attributes a good part of this discourag-
ing fact to age and illness. Tan, mature, having aompletely eliminated
_ the signs of fatigue which he at times showed during his first 2 years in
the Elysee Palace, Giscard looks more like a man at the beginning of a
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career ra~her than someone at the ~.~ak of hia career. Still, thae 1.a noe
why he refrained from keeping the promise he had made during his electoral
campaign to periodically publish a report on hie health:
I asw that thoae who did so caused stirring, queations and scoffing
remarks. I think it is sti11 too soon eo do it in Fra~?ce.
His face ia like a calm lake frrnn which he has coneciously eliminated all
ripples. There is only an occasional smile, which does not mean that hP :
is amused; or a thoughtful frown, which momentarily reduces the aize of
- his forehead. How many daily exerc3aea muat he have done Co fight against
inner turbulence and learn the art of serenity:
That ia a discipline I have cultivated for a long time. I am a true
Aquarius, very emotionaL, very suaceptible to on-the-spot impresaions. This
_ tendency runs the risk of damaging activities whi.ch ehould be carrizd out
in an atmoaphere of calm, especially since French political life is more
turbulent than elsewhere.
- Do people tell him th~ truth? Does what he must know manage to overcome
the many barriers which separate him .from the rank and file and thus -
- sometimea from the event itself?
My asaociates do not lie to me, but there arc~ not enough of them to bring
me the whole truth, even though in my position it is extremely easy to get
information. I remember that de Gaulle did not have a piece of paper on
his desk and he was abreast of everything. I also recall that when I left
_ the Ministry of Finance, I felt cut off from information for a while.
What he does know, he learns more than men than from reports l:e is given
or newspapers placed on the coffee table near the window:
As a matter of self-discipline, I do not read the press very much, and -
- when I do read it I look fox in~ormation, ignoring praise or criticism.
If I took into account everything that is said or written, rather than a
solid line, I would only have a series of broke,l lines to offer.
He does not en~oy himsief at the Elysee Palace which he considera to be
more of a place of work rather than a residence, but he does appreciate
this quiet spot, away from the footlights, where one has a respect for
timetables, habits and customs. He is not any fonder of official trips
abroad--despite what a certain segment of putilic opinion may have thought: -
It is always a hardships, but it is part of the duty of French presence.
France has diplomatic relations with 153 countries throughout the world.
If one considers that it is a good idea to visit each one every 10 years,
one must make at least 15 trips per year--without taking into account ~
that a French president must visit all the African couittries once during
his 7-year term in office. But there is yet much to be done and I am
surprised that we have, for example, ao few relations with India, one of '
the most imporCsnt countries in the world where no French president has
yet gone.
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_
~'OR OF~IpTAL USE nNT~Y -
= We are on Che road to an easing of pol3Cica1 tension:
The tone hae changed. There ia real dialogue going on now. When Francoia
Mitter~and came to see me the other day, I read him Brezhnev's atatemenCs =
on China~ I am trying to be a French preaidenC. We11, France is a complex
and eophisticated country. _
Progress is also being made ln the xeduction of social inequalities:
It is a fact and it ia a good th~ng that the two poles are comtng closer
together. There are sti11 efforts eo be made for tlie lowesC-paid employees, =
but what is commonly referred to as discontent among the cadres i~ also '
undoubtedly a result of this reduction of social inequalities. ,
Being among the first generation of statemen to have to deal with the
audio-vieual realm on a daily basis, the president, who writes all his
speeches by hand, often resorts to sounding them out loud as Flaubert
_ liked to do. He forces himself to use ahort sentences, the sound of which
_ he t~sta out, and which he refuaes to memorize:
Substance must take precedence over memorizing. And besides, i~ the speecti
follows the rules of the theater, it has a tendency to become a role.
' Aware that the forum today is no longer a city of 5,000 but rather a
- television channel watched by 15 million citizens, Giscaxd feela more and
more that a speech which one cannot reply to is poorly received. In Chis
area, too, he draws inspiration from the founder of the Fifth Republic:
I saw de Gaulle work for several years. I watched him. I noted the tiniest -
details. So nowa~ays, in difficult situations which are not necessarily
the most spectacular, I wonder how he would act and what would be his =
reaction.
Is he glad Chat his son Henri has gone into politics?
. He is merely satisfied that he is what he is and that he chose his election
district on his own, like a big boy. What about his plans to write--novels
in particular? The publishers will have to wait. Ae will not get back to `
that until "afterwards." And, as for "afterwards," I think that could be
9 years from now. When I left, I got the impression that the Bardoux
grandfather clock was starting to grow impatient and that Raymond Barre, _
= who was waiting for his weekly interview in the General's office, was
looking at me in a funny way...
COPYRIGffP: 1979 par Cogediprease S.A.
cso: Sii9/5~5 -
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COUNTRY SECTZ0~1 FRANCE -
- TEXT OF ELLEINSTEIN SPEECH NOT MADE TO PCF CONGRESS ,
~
' Paris PARIS MATCH in French 18 May 79 pp 44-45, 69
/Speech by Jean Elleinstein, Communiat Party Historian and Phil~sopher/
%Text/ He is still a party memoer but he can no longer
- speak out--neither in L'HUMANITE, nor at the congress
' which is meeting this week. J~an Elleinstein, Communiat
~ Party Historian and Philosopher, here publishes the
~ speech which he was not authorized to deliver to his
comrades.
Dear Comrades, I want to thank you for letiting me addresa the congress al-
~ though, I know, some of you are oppoaed not only to the ideas I have been
developing but also to the way I am doing that, in particular, "in the
opposition press, on radio and television," according to L'HUMANITE, on
5 May 1979. I have been a party member since 1944; I spent many years of
my life fighting for a cause which I thought was ~ust because it was in-
tended to liberate man from the forms of oppression which weigh on him.
Persecuted during the war because of my Jewish origin and forced to live
under an assumed name at the age of 14, I then wound up in the Sante Prison
~ because of my activities against the war in Indochina for several weeks and
~ then I went underground for many months, from 1953 until 1954. I do not claim
~ that I did more than oChers did. I held on to the ideal of my youth. But
my experience over the past 35 years prompt me that, in Che meantime, we still
~ need democracy, even more democracy, and once again and always, democracy.
' This is why I am f ighting in spite of slander and insults to which I am sub-
~ ~ected. But I do have a certain idea of communism and this is why I write
' and speak out.
!
~ Proportional Representation--A Rule for External Use
i
' The preparations for the congress once again demonstrated the importance of
the questions and criticisms of scores of thousands of communists and the
� ability of our party leadership to channel them, so as to create the illusion
~ of quasi-unanimity in the party. That has to do with the rules of the opera-
~ tion of democratic centralism which date back to the Stalinist period and _
- , 22
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1~'tlk UH'~tCIAI. USN: ONI,Y
which th~y ~dneinue ed use gkillfully. To be el~~eed n d~leg~t~ in the ~e~-
Cion cdnEerenc~~, in Chp fed~r~tinn Cdnferenc~g, ~nd t~ ehig ~ongreg~ it~elf~
nn~ hgd en be g~ g m~tCer nf f~ce in agreem~nt wiCh ehe regdlueinn drgft~a ~nd
Ch~ gegtutes which the Centrnl Committe~ gubmitted ~or di~cu~~ion. A v~ry :
preci~~ direntivp wae communicgt~d Co g11 orggnizgCione in the pnrty 1pnd~r-
ghip. Ae a matCer of fact, this involved a ma~ority ~1ete c~hiCh ~ygtem~ti~~11y
dropp~d gll crieic~l communi~e~, eh~t is Cn ~gy, ~ny minnrity~ r~g~rdl~~s nf
who ie might bp. On~ of two deleggee~ might $~C ~ver the bnrri~r ~rhi~h dur
l~~derghip hgd pur up ggainsr th~ minority bue ehgt ig nbviougly v~ry diffi-
cult. proportiongl repr~eentgtion, which our parey dea~ndg fnr eh~ n~rion~l
nnd muniaipal electiona~ ie a rule for pxCern~1 u~~, not intern~l uge. A
number of communisCe r~frgin frnm gttending the Congre~g prep~r~tory meet~ng~ _
- and ~om~, I am ~orry to say, l~fr the p~rty; they ~r~ often ~eagon~d milit~ntg
who however are discourgged by the methods used by Che leaderehip. Otherg
are afraid of ehe "ideological war" conducCed inside th~ p~rty ~gain~t g11
thos~ who ehallenge its orientation. At Arcueil, ~~Cud~nt by the ngme df
_ Yves ttducaut~ wg~ even begt~n up. ~verywhere, peopl~ h~ve b~~n trying "rn
ghooe u~ dowm m~rglly" according to the cdrrecr C~rm ueed by Hel~n~ p~rmelin.
In epite of Che ide logical and political pre~gureg from the powerful p~rty
leadership apparetue, the minoriey neverthelegg did exprese iteelf during ~
number af cell meetings, sec.ror conferencee, and f~dergCion confprPnces. The
selecCion carried out through the methodg of bureaucratic ~entr~liem ~rp ~tifling -
Che voice of thia minority the higher up you go. Numeroug down at thp
base, Chey are very rare at the top. It bothere me Co dist~~rb the quiet of
these places and the serenity of your debates buC I would like to underscore
everything that is artificial in thia unanimity which corre~ponds neither to
the feelings of a number of communists, nor to the sentimentg nf a by no me~ns
negligible portion of the voters. Shaking the th~rmometer never lowercd the
temperature. According to the survey publi~hed by L'EXPRESS on 7 M~y 1979,
37 percent of the communiat voters believe that our party'g internal opera-
tions are not democratic while 44 percent believes that they are.
Dear Comrades, if we want to renew and transform our party, there is no other
way than lo democratize iC; thaC means profoundly amending its operating
ru~ea and above all its practices. But our party is noC committed along
that road and this is what I find to be so dramatic.
French Communist Party Returning to its Old Demong
On top of this essential disagreement, there are others Whose importance is
no less great aince they deal with the party's political orientation, its
strategy, ita attitude toward the USSR~ the socialist countries~ and the
countries of Europe. For the past 25 yeara we have fallen behind quite a
bi~; in 1956, at the time of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the congress _
featuring Khrushchev's secret report on Stalin's crimea; in 1968 and there-
after, at the time of the May events and the invagion of Czechdsiovaki:~..
In 1956, we began to realize that without however analyzing the reaeons for
this historical error. In 1968, there was no longer any question. Events
undoubtediy are still too recent and the .:urrent leaders in our party, who
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~OR O~~I~~At, U~~ dNLY
in g~m~ w~y wer~ h~rdly re~pongibl~ fdr ehi~ ~itugtinn~ ~re ~ri11 tnn
num~rdug. ie ~epmed tn tnp eh~e Ch~ Z~nd Cdngr~~~ of ehe p~~_%t~"ren~h Com-
muni~t ~g~e~7, h~id in 1976, eouid h~v~ bp~n g higCdriC~i eurning pdint
gfC~r the ~igning nf th~ ~oinC gov~rctm~nt prngr~m work~d uue with the
3oci~li~t p~rty in 1972. i mu~t hc+w~ver noe~ ehat ehi~ i~ noe eh~ e~~~. The
PC~ i~ r~Curning Co it~ old demong. ~C crieiciz~g tih~ ~oci~li~t p~rCy with-
out drawing any di~tin~tion~ ~nd ie ref~~~g cl~~rly Cu ~C~t~ th~ need for d
higtorieal ~liignc~ withoue which th~ 1~f~ r~nn~t hope eo b~~otn~ the m~~dr-
iey in i~gi~ig~iv~, government~l, ~nd pr~~idcnCi~l e~rmg, iC i~ now in -
the ~ommunitip~, in Ch~ d~p~r~ment~, ~nd in d~ity life. Fgr from d~v~inping
~ rpgl ~uro-communi~t policy, rh~ PC~ i~ ~huCCing iC~~lf dff in ~ kind of
' C~iiie Communi~m whieh worri~g me ~v~n m~re ~ine~ ie run~ counte~~ to our
int~rngeidngliet tradition. Thp ~'r~nch ~ommuai~te ar~ ho~tile to thp expgn-
~inn of th~ Common M~rk~t. Th~ chall~ng~ th~ n~ed for g~uropeen pconomic
pollcy. Tl~e digagreement thgt hav~ with the Italian gnd Spanigh communi~t
parti~e ig not ~ g~condary one. It involve~ th~ gtrgeegy af ~o~nrnunism in
eh~ ~1~~t~ a~ ~~set~r of faat. Havin~ ~ r~al Europ~~n poliGy preguppoe~g
gn pnCiraly n~a ori~ne~eion for th~ PCP. ~lgming the r~~~on~ for the crieig
dn L~urop~ d~~~ rine gepm en b~ in lin~ with the idea according tc~ which ehe
eri~ig ie g ngCidnal one. '1'h~ ~truceurgl reform~ whi~h in Weseern ~urope
alone would permi~ ~ Cr~neformaCion of ehe ~conomy ~nd ~nciety in a eoCiallgt
aenee can b~ implemented only within a per~pe~tive of cdnvergenc~ among the
eocialist p~rei~s or the gocial-democr~tic gnd communiet partiee in Europe.
They muse t~k~ into ~ccount the economic fgcts of life and the complex prab-
lems ahtch the crisie poees for the Wegtern economy. ~1~ gll have reaeon to
defend the int~reatg of the workers aho are struck by unemployment but it
aould bp illusory to think that only national solutione could reduce the
crisie.
Prosp~ctg of 23rd Congress Seem Hazy
Ne hav~ reaeon to fight against the policy of a government ahich manages
neith~r to foresee nor to resolve the major difficultiea which we are strug-
gling with; but it aould be uaelesa to think that we could cut the price of
gasoline or raW materials with aorda alone.
We must be a great fighting party, a great ruling party~ and at the same
time we must be the defender of national intereat and We mugt be the unbiased
nnd unreserved fighter for a democratic and aocialist Europe Where the weight
of the people and the vorkers will prevail over that of the multi-nationals.
The independenc~ of thig Europe will not prevent it from remaining a member
of the Atlantic Pact. It Will enable it to establish new bonds with the
eocialist countries of the Eastern Burope--who Will remain membera of the
Wareaw Pact--and these new bonde can be uaeful for detente and for their
real indep~ndence. Qn ihe part of the French communiats. this requires an
action that aill be really independent of the Soviet Union. Although the
resolution. Which you may adopt, ia correct in criticizing S[alinism, it
nevertheless does indicate a definite retreat, compared to the 22nd Congress,
regarding the socialist countries since it apeaka of the "overall poeitive
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~OR U~~ICIAL US~ f~NLY `
- balgnCe" which eh~y guppog~dly r~v~g1. t dn bell~ve th~e tt1~r~ gr~e esgenei~l
hi~tdri~~1 c~nCribuCiang of socigli~m in cdnC~mporgry hi~Cdry: eh~ OCenb~r
Itevolution, th~ Chine~~ tt~volution, St~l3ngrgd~ deeene~, the role of the U5SR
in inCern~Cion~l poliCic~. gut gil of ehig muge not mgke u~ fnrg~t th~ -
abepnCe uf polleieaL d~mocracy in ehe USS~t~ th~ conf~ices betw~en th~ eocinlist
~ountri~e, the economic difficulei~e nf th~ USSR, and ~ cerCain number of
fenGure~ of its for~ign policy. Whi1e our congregs is being he1d, Orinv ~nd
5hch~r~ndkiy are ~ti11 in prisnn and eo gre B~hro in ~geC Gprmgny gnd Sabat~
in Cz~Choglovak~~.. Now~ we h~v~ nn ~C~1p to megsure the pogitive ~nd negg-
Civ~ ehingg. Th~ import~nC Ching ie to se~ Che coner~diceinns in the US5R
gnd ehe ~nci~llgt cnuntrieg. Our 11ne should be npither pro-Sovi~t nor anti-
5nvieC. But thp resnlution dr~fC if anything 1een~ toward pro-S~vierism end,
in praCCice, the party leadership ie going back to a policy which one thoughC
mighr be condemned by the expe::ien~e of the~e past 60 years.
The political proep~cCs outlined by this 23rd Congre~~ se~m Co be often hazy
_ and enmeCime~ even dang~rous. You, eh~ deleggtes to th~ cnngr~se, recommend
union at Che grggs rootg but once ~gain you have Co accepC iC with the aocial-
i~te, once again it would be neceseary for that union to be accompanied by
a union at Che top, withouC which the eleceinn victory of the left is nothing
buC a di$C~nC utopia for the third millenium. I think that one m~st noC limit
this union Co Che two ma~or political pgrties on the left, that, on the con-
trary, we muat expand it to include the community and cultural associations,
the women'g movemente and the ecologists, the labor unions, while reapecting
their independence, the committeea of all kinds which will give the people's
move~nt a new dimension amid regpect for political democracy. There are
many who, in France, uspired to a new way of making politica and who, in
practice, intend to conduce a real systEm of aelf-management.
Unity FeelinF Persista in Electorate
The party leadership now claims that the ~oint government program was full
of illusions. I would rather say that it did arouse hopes which the
breakup of the left had cruelly disappointed. Thefeelin~ for unity
remains deep, atarting with our electorate. Let us not disappoint it this
time and let us rebuild that union which was defeated at the very n~^ment when
it seemed to be winning in 1978.
The party muat accept the nonaggression pact proposed by the rec~nt congress
on the Socialist Party. We muat be united~ as we have become accustomed to
saying to millions of women and men who hope for a better tomorrow.
The party leadership defenda itself by saying that this congreas will not be
a congress to close the doors but to open them. Well, let it prove that
clearly. Let it propose a union with the Socialist Party on precise social
and political ob3ectives. The party must show that it is truly independent -
arith respect to the USSR and it must adopt a conaistent European policy, it
must accept a democratic reform for the operation of our ~arty which will
facilitaCe debate~ the horizoatal circulation of ideas, as well as the neces-
sary poYitical and ideological confrontations.
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FOtt O~~IC'~AL US~ ONLY
= I know, unforCunat~ly, Ch~C thie i~ noe Che currenC ori~nCnrion and I gm
gfr~id Ch~C Chie will only legd eo the furCher weakening of dur parCy, in-
cludi.ng on Che ~1~cenral level~ ~Cgreing wieh Che ~uropegn electiione. Thig
ig Che policy of the pgrCy's current leaderehip gnd it~ methnds which wi11
be Che cause of ChgC~ and noti ~hie "ideologicel wgr" whtch it talks about and
which it suetains through it~ eectarian and erubborn attirude.
Comradee, excu~e my frankness. I think ChaC iC wduld be wrong to c~nceal
my rhinking, eo tone it down at a momenC in our hiseory ae imporeanC ae thie
' one.
There are two poe~ible linea of development. ~ think thae the party ie cur- -
rently m~king the wrong ~hoice and I have not lost hope thar there will be a
change in the heading over Che next eeveral yeare. The longer we wait to do
that, the more difficult wi11 it be~ especially since this policy promotea
the upswing of the 5ocialiat Pxrty. Beyond Che auditorium of Chis congrees,
I would like eo address all party membere~ ell comm~inist votera, in order to
eeii them Chat they have Cheir role to play in Ch,'_e greaC bartle which will
not be won without this congrees. The need for traneforming and renewing
our parCy continues to exisC and iC w1,11 have to be puahed through in epiCe
of resistance from those who look to the paet rather than the future.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 par Cogedipresae S.A.
5058
CSO: 31.00
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_
FOR O~~ICYAL US~ Oftt.Y
cotr~r~tY s~~rrort ~~C~
;
NATION'~~ NUCLEAIt DIS5UA520N POLICY DISCU55~D '
P~ria ARME~S D'AUJOURD'HUI in ~rench May 79 pp 71-72
[Summary of preae conference of Gen Paul Arnaud de Foiard at Armed ~orces
War College; daCe not given]
[Textj Nuclear weapons consCitute the corneratone of our national defense
policy because their destructive GapabiliCies dissuade any a:Cacker more
effectively than any weapon has ever done. And yeC, can the ~bility we
now have to diseuade be permanently ensured? For example, any eign of
vulnerability leada one to Chink that the absence of war is far from being
eternally guaranteed. It may therefore be indispensable to begin now to
eneure our diasuasive caF~abilitiea by improving the military effectiveness
of the use of tactical n�clear weapons.
Difference in Vulnerability Deatroya Balance of Risks
Some of the factors that may lead one to question the stability of our
disauasive ability merit particular attenCion. While the element of tech-
nological surprise is scarcely likely, given the vigilance exercis~~d in
this domain, it neverthelesa appears that the more advanced a society is~
the more vulnerable it is. In this connection, one has but to remember ti~e
paralyzing effect which�a few centimeters of snow have on a large Western
metropolitan area.
The difference in vulnerability is also visible with respect to tt?e geo-
graphical and economic organization of the counCries involved. For example,
the concentration of a large portion of the industry of the United States
in the Great Lakea region and the congestion in the Rhine Valley are impor-
tant factors affecting wlnerability, while the USSR and China have enor-
" mous apace available to acatter their facilities.
Furthermore, the adoption of systematic protective measures can enable a ~
nation to maintain the minimum operation of economic and administrative
circuits, thereby giving the existing government the hope of holding on.
It would appear Chat only the East is taking such precautions. _
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FOCt OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
Finnlly, Che deC~rioraeion in their general e~.CugCinn may Enrce certuin
ngei~ne Co t~ke r~.ek~ which glnne will gu~ranree Che ~urvivul o� their
pnlieical syatem. ~or exxmple,profound socioideologicnl upheavgls in ehe
USSR or Che gephyxiation of Wesrern economiea due en being deprived of
sourcee of rgw maCeriels could cause Che leaders o� those couneries to
emberk on a rnce and a formidgble series of �oreign milit~ry venCuree.
These are sub~ects for thoughe. For 30 yeare, cliseuasion h~d been main-
Cained. It will~continue Co be maintained only if Che proper condieione
are provided, which, in ~ddition ro political probleme, also poses the
problem of Cactical nuclear we~pons.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Ma~or Role
1'acCical nuclear weapona are an indiepeneable factor in the effectivenesa
of dissuaeion. ,
Actually, strgtegic diseuaeion doea not ban all forma nf war or aggr~ssion
and, ae a corollary to Chat stiata of affairs, all or.nothing, a atrategic
arsenal alone does not consCitute an effective meana of defense. The role
of tacCical nuclear weapons ia therefore that of providing the nuclear
threat in itself absurd with a senaitive or rational nature, that is,
credible and therefore, effectively disauasive. Neverthelese, one muat
emphasize two facCora which are essenCial for an underatanding of the uae
_ of tactical weapona. .
The damage caused by CacCical use of nuclear power muat remain rationally
acceptable by the adversary and quite obviously, by frienda as well. -
The use of tactical atomic weapons makea aense only if it is closely linked
to the unleashing of strategic power which eliminates all possibility of
a reasonable continuation of fighting, thereby procuring the benefit of
the equalizing power of the atom.
It is conaequently not necessary to have a nuclear arsenal making it posai-
ble to compete with that of the possible adversary.
Naturally, as soun as there is a halt in fighting, brought about by the uae
of tactical nuclear weapons, any meeting around a table would take into
consideration the actual situation in the field at the time of discusaions.
In the face of a conventional adversary unable to compete in terma of the
- ratio of forces, which would mean losing an important advantage of disauasion
at the outset, it would appear that we would then be forced to rely on the `
military effectivenesa of tactical nuclear weapons.
Let ue add that in order to meet any lightning offensive with the aggressor
blocking any response by taking the tactical nuclear initiative as soon as
the ob3ective sought is realized, it is necessary to organize our defense
as soon ae possible and undeniably, everything that happens in West Europe
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~Ott 0~'~ZCIAL US~ ONLY
cnncerng us. Nnwever, Che current ~iCugtinn, whinh dneg noC pue ug nn Ct~t
fronC line, provides u~ wieh freednm o� nceion which, due eo ehe very un~
certain nature of our reaction, favore the digsu~eive element of which we
should noC deprive ourselves.
Milltary ~ffectivenese of TacCical Nuclegr We~pons
Th~t is our current concepeion of Che uge of tacrical nuclegr wegpons. But
~uge as in Che case of etrategic diesua~ion, problems nre pnged Chnt might
involve the seed of a chgin reacCinn nn which we muat re�flecr. The differ-
ence in vulnerability to a straCegic nuclear serike increasee the risk of
conflict, as we have 3ust aeen, and once the conflict has begun, it b~comes
much mnre difficult for Che victim Co force the atracker eo gtop by wielding
a Chreat whoae execution would eince straCegy ia linked to CBCCiCB lead
to coneequences more harmful to the victim than to the adveragry. Neverthe-
less, it would not appegr thgt we can now deem that the enormity of the
strgeegic nuclear threat has been decreased significanCly by the existence
of a difference in vulnerability beCween the adversaries. It is necessary,
however, to seek Co make Che most of the use of tactical nuclear we~pona,
inaofar as any indication of a lack of determination in the vigor with which
they arQ tised could provide the aggressor wiCh the adv~ntage bestnwed upon
him by a smaller degree of vulnerabiliCy. In the field of tactical nuclear
weapons, one must in a sense be able Co take greaCer rieks in order to com-
pensate for handicap of wlnerability to the effects of atraCegic weapons.
For its part, nuclear proliferation is unavoidable in the long run. Indi~~
and countries in the Near EasC and Latin America now appear to be cloae to
this nuclear repute. Such proliferation will include an intensification
of the risks of local nuclear conflicts, bringing about a profound chnnge
in the balance of influence. It will lead to a apreading of ehe uae of
' nuclear weapons, which involves the formidable risk of the unleashing of
such weapons. Nations will then be forced to become hardened to the effects
of nuclear weapons, which will consCitute a powerful factor in destroying
dissuasion.
The effect of such a general tendency is once again the need to master the
tactics and techniques militarily effective in the use of nuclear wenpons.
New Weapon: Neutron Bomb
In recent years, the miniaturization of weapons has made considerable
progress and a new type of neutron weapon has emerged. In Che opinion of -
some observers, this weapon could restore absolute control of the battle-
field, since neutron weapons can neutralize the action of any traditional
force.
This is an important advantage given to the defensive forces and consider-
ing the risk of a loss in value of strategic weapons brought about by our
increased vulnerability to the previously mentioned strikes, it is tempting
_ ta think about basing our defense on a neutron battle.
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~ox o~ricrnt~ us~ ortt.Y
Nowever, nne mu~e immedi~tely nore ChnC g nuclear Confrnneneinn of ehi~ -
Cype would require: Che e~Cgblishment of n nucle~r-neuCrdn bgCCl~ Cdrps
whose costi we mgy not be able Co bear; gnd Che av~llabiliCy of lnrge
numbers of convenCional forces, if only Cn prevenC Che ~dvereary from
aeeking refuge in highly populxted areae in which, quire obviously, the
use of neutron weapon~ would be imposaible without rigking eurning the pre-
viously mentioned nuclear tacCic on ourgelvea becau~e by definition, ehe
nCCacker cgn only be ehe adversary.
Finally, in auch xn atmosphere nf violence, Che ability to prevent the use
of CBCG~Cg~. gnd atr~tpgic wegpons from going beyond exCremely vague limiCs
cannot be gbeulutely guaraneeed.
It is therefore a matter of a burdenaome and very dangernu~ defense policy.
We may one day be forced eo resort to it due to ~ deterioration in rhe
general situation which we were unable to gvoid, but it dnea not aeem
necessary to aneicipate such an ev~enCuality. In our current aituaCion, Che
benefit of being ~ble to diaeuade aCronger enemies nnd the facC of nor being
~ forced to burden our general economy with the need Co have a military sys-
Cem sub~ecred to the requirement of ~ favorable ratio of etrengCh conatitute
advantagea Chat it would be ineane Co give up.
It therefore appears indispeneable Co maintain the close links between
tacCical nuclear action and the threat of strategic reprisals. The fact
neverthelesa remains thaC our doctrine, which in its current'form takes
the military effecta of tactical nuclear action leas into conaideration than
it doea the political significance, could in the near fuCure be brought to
put more emphasis on these effects and to seek to increase their value.
The difference in vulnerability threatening us resulta from our economic
and geographic organization, from the impasse reached with reapect to
measures of protection or civil defense against atomic attack, and mainly -
from the very nature of the liberal consumer society that we constitute.
We are in a situation in which the promptness of Che defenaive reaction and
its initial military effectiveness are undeniably riecessary asseta. Any-
thing that can improve the operational value of our forces therefore now
appears to be deairable. Since the limita of our con~ventional poasibilities
are contained in tt}e existing ratio of forces, it seeme indispensable to
explore all possibilitiea in the domain of tactical nuclear weapona. But
while this improvement is highly desirable, one muat not loae sight of the . '
fact that the purpose of the tactical aequence remains halting the attack
under penalty of death.
Biographical Information
Div Gen Paul Arnaud de Foiard was born on 9 September 1921 in Meudon. Most
of his career has been in the Foreign Legion, where he was the commanding
officer of the 2d REP [expansion unknown] in Mers-el-Kebir and then in
Corsica in 1965. In August 1.972, he was given command of the lst Airborne
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~OR O~~ICIAL US~ OM,Y
_ gYi,gnda. ~rom AngugC 1974 to November 1975, he held the po~C of chi~f nf
staf~ in the General 5ecreCari~t o� Narional D~fensa. In 1975, he bec~me
aommgnding officer of the 11th Dp [expension unknnwn]. Since 1 September
1977~ he has been asaigned ro ehe pose of direc~or of the grmy's advgnced
military tr~ining and commending officer of the Armed ~'orcea War Cnllege.
- General Arnaud de Foi~rd h~~ been awarded the Legion df Hnnor and Chg
_ MiliCaYy Medal on an excepCional baeie. ~
COPY1tIGHT: 1979 - Revue des forces e,rmees francaiseg "Armeee d'Au~ourd'hui" ~
, !
~
~
11,464
CSO: 3100
~
;
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' COUNTRY SLCTION ~RANCE
COMPETENCE OF GROUND FORCES NCO'S QUTLINED
Parie ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French May 79 pp 52-53 ,
- [Art3cle by Ma~ Jean-Paul Marrot:* "Men and Women of Their Time: The
Infantry Non-Commieaioned Officera"~
[Text] "In our army as, unquestionab].y, in other armies,
the NCO'e corps has alwaye been a ke~etone. There are
three ma~or reasone for this:
"Firat, holding a hinga poaiCion, the NCO'a tatce part both
in the deciaion making process, a reaponeibility which they
ahare with the officera, and the execution of decisione;
"Furthermore, within self-contained unita which are the
natural crucible of all true military life, they have a
length of service far exceeding that of the officera or -
conacripta. Therefore, they provide the best guarantee
for atability;
"Finally, holding contact poaitiona, they are the closest
to the men and the realitiea of daily life as a result of
which they are the most familiar with it and able to follow
its evolution, inform, and advise."
*Saint-Cyr graduate, Vercors year, Ma~ Jean-Paul Marrot chose the marines
after graduaCing from the Ecole d'application. He has been succeaeively
platoon commander in the 3rd RPI Ma [Marine Paratrooper Regiment], the 6th
RPI Ma, and the 33rd Marine Regiment, as well ae company commander in the
22nd Marine Regiment. He is a staff college graduate and has a staff college
certificate in auperior scientific and technical military teaching
(humanities). He is currently serving with the bureau of personnel of the
army's general staff where he is in charge of problems related to non-
commissioned officers.
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Wherea~ thig excerpti of one of Che initiia]. genera~. d~.rectiiv~g i~gued by Army
General Lag~rde, tihe grmy'~ chief of etiaff,~ c].early ~.ndi.cat~s ehe privil~6ed
position held by the NCO corp~, iti a~.go emphaeixes rhe difficultiea which
tihai.r function involves. '
Yn a world characeerized by the accelerated change 3n techniqu~e and waye of
thinking, and in whieh ehe evolution of the men and ehe weight of exiating
r~alities are beceming more and more demanding wieh every paseing day, the
NCO's would be unable to fulfil eheir prim~ry miesion un].ese they were~
eimultaneons~y:
People directly in touch with rea~.ity;
Soldiere, experte in their craft;
Commandere, knowing how to command ae weii ae serve.
Direct Contact with the Men
Rooted in the deep French soil from which they come and to which most of them
go back to etart a aecond career,2 ehe 63,000 rion-connnissioned officers in the
army are, above a11, men and women of tiheir Cime.3 They reflect the multiple
aspects of their age through their geographic and eocial origins~ level of
acholarship and training, reaeona for their enlistment, experiencea,
aspirations, and opinions.
Thia divereity may be equally found in their working environment: distributed
among the 19 armies or services, thQ NCO's serve in 17 specialized branchea,
subdivided, in turn, into 79 basic ekills. Whether employed as apecialista,
instructors, technicians, administrative aervices cadres, or connnandera of
~small combat, support, or training unita, they are part of the same statutory
corps, the army NCO's.
The arnry makes the blossoming of their peraonalities posaible: any display
on their part of a liking for effort and peraerverance, and a feeling of
reaponsibility and honesty gives them a healthy, balanced, and varied life
made possible by virtue of the diveraiCy of their assigned tasks, the human
solidarity and warmth which develop in the course of team work, and the
opportunity to surpass themselves, favored by their direct command of inen
' and a broad margin of initiative and assumption of important responsibilities.
Soldiers with Exteneive and Continuous Kaowledge
IniCially trained in school,4 or in self-contained unite~ the NCO'e, whatever
their arm, aervice, or apecialty, begin by learning their craft as soldiers,
for their authority is based on their compeLence.
Suited to the missions they will be intruated with, the basic training offers
the NCO's the indispensable military, technical, physical, intellectual, and
human and moral aroature.
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Wha~ever th~ir :Pu~ure employmen~ may be, th~y mu~t poeseae the necessary ~
knowledge for the handling of faciliti~.es~ materiel~ and peraonnel, in order
_ to carry out combat miesione, and the phyaical ehepe which wi11 al.low Chem
eo wiehstand the effort which w~'.11 be required gnd pueh back the 1lmits of ~
fatigue. They muet be sufficiently broad-m~.nded eo underat~nd and have an
opinion of the world surrounding Chem~ for being able to know their men, and
for ~.nsuring their active involvemen~.
The ever faeter renovatiion of techniquee and matariel requirea a corps o�
highly ekilled experte whose kaowledge wi11 be kept up ~hrough ~echnical
training. This acquisitiion of new knowledge demande of tihe NCO's, tihroughout
their career, a~ustained peraonal efforC. In order to help them, a training
system with the iasuance of certificates whoae earning deeermines their
promotion, ha~ beea aet up. Such examinationa which require echool training
- contribute to the enhancement of the image of the NCO. _
Acknowledged CompeCence
The NCO's are we11 aware of the fact that Cheir competence will give them the
neceesary command auChority. Therefore, every one of them tries to develop
as an expert or a apecialiaC in a specific Cechnique or function.
Within the arcny such competence, if proven, has never been contea~`ed.s
FrequenCly it confers on them an authority higher than their rank: a para-
trooper general would respect the dacision of the NCO ~ump maeter.
Furthermore, thia authority is acknowledge,d even beyond the lim3Cs of the
institution as can be confirmed by the list of equivalences and confirmations.
Cotmnanders Who Give the Example
Holding within the command eyatem the essential poaition we know, united with
the hierarchy, the NCO fills an "office"; he has been assigned a mieaion and
responsibilities. He is a commander. As auch, he givee the example, he
commanda, he serves.
The NCO is t:he commander who "can cope." He is the perfect executant to be
emulated by everyone.
Being both at the head of the men and behind a machine, he bears the
reaponsibilitiea of being "first on the rope"; crystallizing with him the
confidence of the men, he leads; it is he who executes orders the beat. He
is the model to be emulated. He is the heart of the basic cells and the ~
baeis of any atructure.
Chiefs Who Command . . .
A current cliche not withstanding, the NCO ia not a aimple link in the
hierarchical chain: far from being one among many executants, he participates
and contributes to the functioning of the entity. He exercises some of the
responsibilities and initiative to which he is entitled by virtue of his
competence.
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He ie, ~herefore, the one who "knowg how Co make nthers do," he wt?o, behind
- a miesile launcher or a radar ~yetem, or head~.ng a group or c~mbat platioon,
knowe how Co allocaCe ase3gnmentis with maximum effectivenese.
Having the character and influence indiepeneable in decision making and, if
neceseary, puniehing, as we11 as tihe open-~mindednass and tihe qualities needed
for eatablishing human contact, ha comm~ands for tihe eake of train~.ng and
molding Che young recruite, and framee and supgorts ~he un.~tis. He guarantees
both rigorous executiion and cohes3on. '
I
Broadly open Co the changes in the current world, he knowa how to adapC: he
is responaible for a very larga port3on of the succeas of the ~ffort under-
taken by the army to change i.~e life and cotiunand style and train+.ng methods:
his role in tihe implementation of the current educational reform~ :e
fundamental.
Commandera Who Serve ;
To command has a meaning only within the framework of a~oint undertaking.
Aa pointed rut by the minister of defense to Che atudents of the Saint-
Maixent ENSOA (National Army NCO School], the hub of the corpa, the asaignment
entrusted to the NCO's, which they ahare with the officera, "is the noblest
and the gravest of all: Co maintain and support the arms of France, obeying
the lawa of the republic and acting in accordance with the rules of military
honor." This is what assigna them their duties and gives them their rights.
The duty of assuming full responaibility by virtue of both specific functions
and his position in the general military hierarchy demands of the NCO two
apecial qualities: competence and availability. In fact, it is clear that,
being in direct and constant touch with the men, he cannot conceal any of his
insufficiencies or eventual weaknesses. Furthermore, he must be ready to
meet, specifically during periods normally used for relaxation and rest, the
exigencies impoaed by daily activities and operational requirements.
Modern man can and wants to undersCand the meaning and extent of what is asked
of him. The NCO is not exempt from thia social phenomenon. Therefore, very
epecific efforts have been made in recent years to supply him with the
necessary information for commanding and to guide his individual efforts.
The role of the NCO president which, in each formation, provides in this area -
a great deal of help to his comrades and tio the corps chief has been
_ extensively developed in particular.
Unquestionably, maintaining permanent and direct contacts with their men,
more than anyone elae, the army NCO's are both model executants and competent
and available commanders.
The importance of their role and the increasing complexity o~ their tasks
justify the interest displayed by the command in this personnel category.
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~ Their willingnesa to g3,ve to ~he entire corpe its value and cohes~.on wh~.ch
make ite etrength has been epecifically ~ranelated, ever sinae the
promu~.gation of general directive number three, in 1975, in the decieione
taken to enhance the profeseiona~ standard of ~he corpa, and promo~e within
and without it the proper coneidaration owed the NCO'8, encourage ~he beat
among them to aerve longer terma for the sake of ~he good of our army~ and
promote the retraining of thoae who ~.eave ~he aervice rela~ively young.
FOOTNOTES
1. General directive number three, daCed 1 October 1975, on the actione to
be implemented to the benefit of the NCO corpe. _
2. The average length of service of ~he NCO's is about 11 yeara.
3. The NCO corps numbers close to 6,000 women.
4. One-third of the NCO's come directly from self-contained units; two-thirda
are trained in the followin~ schools: Inter-Army School of Female
Military Peraonnel, National Schcol for NCO's of ~ha Active Army,
National Technical School for NCO's of the Active Army, and 10 achools
for NCO's of the active army.
5. Thus, sergeant ma~ors, regimental aergeant ma~ors, and ad~utants who -
obtain a commission are given directly the rank of lieutenant.
6. As of Chis point over 120 certificatea have been endorsed.
7. The purpoae is to promote an educational reform which would radically
improve training results through the effective particigation of contact -
cadrea and the ranks in training for and implementation of their
activities. -
COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Revue des forces armees francaises
"Armees d'Au~ourd'hui"
5157
CSO: 3100
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~
~UIt O~~ICIAL US~ nNLY
COUNTRY 5LCTION
RESPONSIBII.ITIES OF AIR FORCE NCO'S OUTI.INLb
Parie ARMEES D'AUJOUItD'HUI in ~rench May 79 pp 56-57
[Article by Col Jean~Paul Faraud:* "Another Im~ge of the Pighter: NCO'~ in
the Air I'orce" ]
[Text) With a total manpower of about 100,000 men, ehe air force hag
elightly over 45,000 NCO's, all apecialiata. Thia high proportion o�
apecialista is the congequence of the high technical level required in
running the air force.
Their functions and qualitiee are, h~wever, ineufficiently known outside the
aervice~ for few among them openly participate in missiona and demonstrations
o� the air force. The relative desaretion of their ro].e, their unusual level
~f specialization, and the high percentage of such cadres, unuaual in armed
forces, reault in the fact that they are quite frequently coneidered ae -
simple technicians in uniform, aupporting a small number of operations for
fighting personnel.
Yet, this image of the air force, totally ignoring the overall aspect of ita
miesion, is quite remote from reality. The specific target of thia missian
ie, in fact, indivisible from a number of specialized compeCitiong which makes
ite implementation poasible, demanding in all sectore and in all staEea
identical military qualities.
Enrolled in tche Air Force School in 1961, "CommandanC Jeandet" class, a
licensed fighter pilot in the United States in 1954, Col Jean-Paul Faraud has
_ aerved in North Africa, flying Mistrals and T6's until 1960 and, subsequently,
as an all-weather fighter pilot on Vautours until 1965. Subsequently he
commanded the Aulnat Navigation Personnel Training School, held a number of
staff positions and, of late, has com~anded the air force in the southern zone
of the Indian Ocean. He has a superior military teaching certificate (29th
ESGA [Army War Collegej class), he is currently head of the bureau of general
studies of the DPMAA [Main Air Force Munitiona Depot].
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~d~ n~~t~i~, us~ ocrvY
Th~r~~ore, on~ c~u1d not ~~pgr~e~ in eh~ gir forc~ th~ miliCgry fr~m eh~
teehniciane bue couid only di~tingui~h ~mong Che various military ~peci~ligte~
mo~e af them NG~'8.
Who ~re, Gheref~r~, Ch~~e m~n and womenl who meke the corps o� th~ ~ir torc~
NCO'e?
A Crpge Vgriety of Ski11~--A Uaiqu~ Mi~~ion
niv~ded between the tw~ corpe of "flying per~onnel"2 ~nd~ in the ca~e of Che
big ma~ori~y, "non-flying personnel," the gir force NCO's are a relatively
young population~ whoee aver~ge age ig about 30.
R~crutted mo~ely at a 1eva1 eimilar to thee of th~ eenior high echool clase,
the NCO candidatee of the non-flying personnel are directed eoward one of th~
1.~ grnupe of exietin$ ekille b~~ed on thetr levei of ~cholarehip, apritudeg,
inclinations~ and requiremenCs of the ~ir force. The r~ng~ of choicae is
quite broad, ~ince one-half of it covere technicel areas (electronics~ air-
craft mechanica, aeroepace ~quipment, air weaponry 15~ deal with
operaCions (control of aircraft in Che air, eecurity, communicatione
about 30X deal ~rith support akill~ (~dministratio~~ managameat, infot~oatica,
secretarial work . .
For about one to ane and a half years they undergo school training combining
vocaCiQnal training, quite frequently on a high level yet alvgys practical
in term~ of overall military training, along With civic and moral training.
After their graduation and promotion as NCO's~ they are aseigned to an air
force base where, guided and inatructed by their eldera, they aeaume the
multiple functione which constitute the fowndations of a modern cambat air
force. In addition to the pilots,3 navigatore, and flying mechanice, there
are:
Cround mechanica or armorers who maintain and check the condition of the air-
planes, aupervise their refueling or supply with other ingredients, replace-
ment of aa~unition and control of armaments guaranteeing directly the
execution, effecCiveness, and security of the missiona;
Radar controllers Who inform the pilots, control interceptions, and assure
landings in all weather, and are equally reaponaible for the auccess and
direct security of the flights Which they frequently guide or, at least~
observe;
The air canmando fusiliers who insure the safety and defense of our air forc~
materiel and our installations against all threa:s from the ground or the air
play a prime role in the preaervation of the size and credibility of our
forcea;
_ Maintenance unit specialists who periodically check and replace deficient or
worn out parta of air c,r specific materials and who maintain the operational
readinesa of the air force;
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~ ~Oft (~~'~ICtAL US~ dNLY
Txangmi~~ian ~p~cieiiges whn in~ur~ gpecifiCaily nir-ground cdmmunic~Cinn~, ~
fire eecuYiCy per~onn~i who ptioCecti the airplan~ and, gbov~ all~ the ltfe
of ehQ cr~we in the ~ase of an ~ccidene gnd participate directly in the
efforte to gaf~guard our poe~ntial;
. Finglly, thos~ who make Che life of tihis community poseibie by ~upporeing and
adminigtraeing it play gn equ~~ly very imporCanC role.
Skilled Professionals and Reaponsible Members of Che Milieary Forcee
These few examples make it clear thaC all air force NCO's directly partici-
paCe, from their very firet years o� service, in the implemenCgtion of the
fl3ght miegion~ of the air force. _
These mi~~ions whose pareicular featiure is thgt they can be auccesaful only
within very narrow time and prenision margins, demand, in fact, a high level .
reliability of a11 the componenta of the weaponry sysCem and of even the
leaeC bit of equipment, alnng with all human cooperation without exception.
The aame appliea to flight safety which could be compromiged by the failure
= of even a eingle apecialieC along thie chain.
Therefore, whereas the actiona of the non-flying NCO's are generally Chose of
ekilled profeeaionals, their motivations musC be, from Che very beginning,
thoae of responsible military personnel. 3'hey must be fully aware of their
participation in the mission and of their essential role in ita succesa and
safety which demand of them a great degree of readinesa, an acute aense of
reaponsibility, and high 1eve1 initiative and team spirit; those are~
precisely, qualities typical of military cadres rather than of simple
operational technicians.
They muat display these qualities at all times, in predawn take-offa and
nighttime repairs, during watch hours of the numerous units in a atate of
permanent alert and, frequently, under extreme working or weather conditions.
In such times it is their sense of duty alone that enables them to exercise
their competence always with the same coafidence and efficiency.
Their sense of discipline is also manifested not only in the traditional
aspects of military discipline but also by virtue of the exactingness th~y
must alweys display in the implementation of their assignments, an exacting-
nese characteristic of the air force by virtue of its stresses and risks.
Once they have proved their profeasional experieace by earning their superior
certificate (after some 10 years of service), the NCO's are assigned the
reaponaibilities of runway chief, control watch chief, or maintenance crew or
security chief instrucCing and training their ~uniors and the ranks.
They advance on a parallel basis in the hierarchy, their promotions being
based more on their dynamism, competence, and suthority than on length of
aervice. �
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~ox n~~tciAr. us~ orn.Y
Becoming~ subaequently, "master cgdree" (aftier about 15 yegrg of gervice),
they may be entru~ted with the comimnd o~ a,~ii units (technical workehop~,
eecurity~ guard, or commun3cation~ platoon~ or e1Be important
funcCione involving control, and Craining under the comm~nd pe~eonnel.
At ~uch higher i~~~ig which ara the equivalent~ in te~ of eubeC~ntial
profes~ional experience, to ~nterpri~e fnremen, they musC imperaCively prove
_ that they poeeeee ~11 the human and military qualitieg indiepeneable 3n
exercieing guch importane comm~nd reeponaibili.ties in eerme of the air force
miaeion. At rhgt point they represent the contact cadres, tha link between
, the command pereonnel and those who execute the miseion which ie the
guarantee for auccess of any armed force.
T'he large number of air force officers coming from the ranks ehrough varioue
recruitmenC methode (Air Force School, Rang, and ORSA [lteserve Officers on
Active Uuty under Contract]) conetitutes, in fact, yet anoCher prQOf of all
of their military qu~litiea.
Professional competence~ dedication, a, feeling of reapoasibility and
diecipline are the essential characterigtics of the air force NCO's.
Ae military specialiets, virtually all of them directly participate in the
execution and safety of aerial miasions, even though in ways and means
different from those of the traditional fighter. It ie thus~ far more than
through their occasional participation in military activitiea or more
orthodox exercisea, that they deaonstrate their military qualitiee. This is,
- in fact, the main reason for the eateem and the truat in them felt by combat
crewa and pilots.
FOOTNOTES
� 1. There are about 4,000 women NCO's.
_ 2. There are about 1,300 flying NCO'e.
3. Pilots trained as of this year will be promoted to officer rank after '
their graduation as is the case with other Weatern air forcea.
COPYRICHT: 1979 - Revue des forcea armees francaises
"Armees d'Au~ourd'hui''
\
5157 -
CSO: 3100
40
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~
~Uit 0~'~~CYAL US~ bNLY
COUNrftY 8~C1'rON ~'ttANCE
i
~
MILITAItY, G~NDAI2M~RIE NCO SCHOOLS CHARTEU
paria ARM~~S D'AUJOUEtD'HUI in ~'rench Mgy 79 pp 68-69 ;
_ (Text~ I. Army ~
Technicgl Training 5pecialization Length Obaervations ~
School Diploma Sciiool Diploma Training
~
NaCional Active CM11 Interservice CT12 12-18 Mos. CI: Center of
NCO School SchQOls, CI, ' InatrucCion
(ENSOA) ESALAT, EIS ESALAT: Special
(Saint-Maixent) , Army Light Avia- ,
tion School
EIS: Interaervice
Sports School
Infantry Training CM1 EAI CT1 12 mos.
School (EAI)
(Montpellier)
Armored-Cavalry CM1 EAABC CT1 12 mos.
Training 5chool
(EAABC) (Saumur)
Artillery Training CM1 EAA CT1 12 mos.
5chool (EAA)
(Draguignan)
Surface-to-Air CM1 EAASA CT1 12 mos.
Artillery Training
School (EAASA)
(Nimes;
Engineering Train- CM1 EAG & CT1 14 mos.
ing School (EAG) CIG3
(Angers)
Transport Train- CM1 EAT CT1 12 mos. .
ing School (EAT)
(Tours)
41
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~OR O~~YCTAL U5~ ONLY -
Aceive NCO CM1 a) ~SOAT CT1 16 to 18 mos~ ~SEA7': Advgnced
Transmittere and/or Army ~lecrronice '
Schnnl (~SOAT) ESEAT School
~ASeri) b) ~SEAT and CLE~M: I~'oreign
CLEEM Langu~ge and
M1litary S,:udiea
_ Center
Special CM1 a) ESMAT CT1 12 to 15 mos. E5AM: Advanced
- MaCeriel School b) ESMAT and Mgteriel Train-
(ESMAT) ESAM ing School
(Chateauroux) c) ESEAT and
' . ESAM
NaCional Army CM1 ENSOSSAT CT1 12 mos. ~
- NCO Hea1Ch School
(ENSOSSAT)
(Orleans)
Military MounCain CM1 EMHM and CT1 16 mos.
Troope School EAI
~EMHM)
(Chamonix)
National Active CM1 ENTSOA (BEP)4 3 yeara
NCO Technical CT1
- School (ENTSOA)
(Iasoire et Tulle)
1. [expansion unknown)
2. [expansion unknown]
3. [expansion unknown)
4. [expansion"unknown)
Interservice Schools
School Location Requiremenxs Specialization
Interservice Sports Fontainebleau a) Active NCO NCO physical
School (EIS) from Saint-Maixent training and
b) Naval officer military
c) Air Force sports instruc-
officer tor
School Location I.ength Training Specialization
_ Women's Military Personnel Caen 3 months CM1
Interservice School
~ 42
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II. N~vy
Schnnl Locaeion Period Specinlizntinn
Midehipmen'e 5chool Breat 1 ye~r
~ngine Room Apprer~tice 5chool Saint-Mandrier 1 year Mechanic
_ Petty Officers Deck School BresC 1 year Deck
Petty Officers Navigation School Saint-Raphael 1-2 years NaviggCion
PetCy Officers Engineering School Saine-Mandrier 1-2 years Engineering
III. Air Force
Ground Peraonnel -
School . SpecializaCion No. Weeka Diploma
Rochefort ETAA Radio-radar 46-52 Basic Special-
(Air Force Technical Airplane mechanica 23-35 ist's Diploma
School) Photo equipment 37-39 [All ground
Electronic equipment 46-52 peraonnel]
. General technical 40-54
Conatruction 38
Hotel trade (cook) 18
Chambery Electronics counter- 28-52
Metz measurea
Rochefort
Chambery Transmitting 28-37
Chambery Control and sur- 12-35
Toulouae (National Civil veillance of air
Aviation School) activities ,
Training at air basea
Nimea Air fusilier 121
Evreux Secretariat 14
Administration 17 to 19
Saint Cyr Meteorology 24
Photo deaigner 15
Cazaux Security, fire � 19
Bordeaux Health 20
Bretigny Data processing 25
Nimes - Apt Dog trainer 12 + 10
~3
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~ox n~~YCiaL us~ o~n.Y /
_ ~light Per~anne].
School Tr~ining Weeks Diplom~
_ JeC pilot
Clermont-Ferrand Initial trgining 29 Pilot's
Au1ngC Parachute Craining ati Pau 2 licen~e
Cognac Bgaic flighC training 34 "
Avord Propeller aircraft 36 "
TranepnrC Pilot
Clermont-Ferrand Tnitial training 29 Pilot's
Aulnat ParachuCe training at Pau 2 licenae
Cognac Basic flight training 34 "
Avord Propeller aircraft 36 "
Helicopter Pilot
Clermont-Ferrand Initial training 29 Pilot's
Aulnat Parachute training at Pau 2 license
Cognac Basic flighC training 34 "
Chambery Helicopter training 30 "
1. Includes 2 weeks at Pau (parachute training). For apecialista lst class,
an 8-week training period in Nimes only.
IV. Gendarmerie
School Location Period Diploma
Gendarmerie Preparatory School Chaumont 6 months CAT1
(EPG) Chatellerault
Montlucon
Gendarmerie Training Center Maisons-Alfort 6 months CAT
Saint-Astier
Melun
Berlin
1. [expansion unknown)
COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Revue dea forces armeea f rancaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui" -
11,464 ~
CSO: 3100
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~OR O~~IC~AL US~ ONLY ~
COUN'~RY 9ECTION SW~D~N
BRIEFS
NLW SWEDI5H SUBMARINES--Sweden will have a flotilla of three aubmarines
specially conceived to operate in Ba1Cic waters. The firat of them, the ~
"Nncken", was launched last April and ia a very complex uniC built with
the help of computera. Smaller than iCa predeceasora, Chank$ to techno-
logical advancea introduced in this �ield, it will accomaoodate a crew of ~
19 men; it has a dieplacement of 960 tons, its length is 49.5 meCers, ita
beam 5.7 meters and its draft 5.5 ineters. The electric motors, diesel type, ,
allow high epeeda under ailent conditione, while the torpedoea, remote
control, are of two clasaes: for attack againat eurface boata and against
aubmarinea. In addition Co theae units, Sweden, who had not built sub-
marines for 10 years, is pro~ecting the replacement of its "Dracken" class
submarines in the mid-1980's by a new generation tentatively called the
"A17." They have also developed a aubmarine, the "Tipo 45," intended for
export and which differa from those made for the Swedish army in that it
is fitted out for longer underwater sCays. /Text/ /Madrid DEFENSA in
Spanish Mar 79 p 5/ 9341
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C(~UNTRY S~CTION 3WITZ~RLAND
N~W ANTIAI~tCRAFT V~NICLE ADOPTED
Madrid DEFENSA in Spgnieh Mar 79 p 59
lText/ On 11 AugusC, 1978, the Swise Government Arms Agency and the Swie~
enterprise Contraves AG of Zurich eigned an agreement for the development
of an antigircraft vehicle.
As is known, the federgl council decided on 31 May 1978 to include the
35 mm "Oerlikon-Contraves" antiaircraft vehicle in the processea of evalu-
ation tl~ anCiairc~aft defense material for pro~ecCing mechanized units.
Thia decision meane that the Swies induaCty, under Che direction of
Contraves AG, hae been charged with the contruction, eimultaneously with
- other materials, of a prototype for testing. ~
Thie aerial defense system will be equipped with two Oerlikon 35/90 mm
antiaircraft guns, a Contravea-type guidance and radar instrumentation built
either by Siemens or by Siemena-Albis, as well as other equipment, all of
it integrated into a apecially designed turret.
The main difference between the Swias veraion and the antiaircraft vehicle
~ in service in Germany, Belgium and Holland, concerna the chaseie, that is,
the carrying vehicle itaelf. While the antiaircraft vehicle of the 3 above-
mentioned NATO countriea use the Leopard-1 chasais, the Swias conception
has been designed so that the turret, including the antiaircraft syatem
itself, can be mounted without practically any changes on the modified
chassis of the Swisa combat vehicle "Pz-68."
Concerning the construction of the prototype ordered, the problema that have
come up due to the precision of the modifications, have already been solved,
most of the work having been done at the Federal Construction Araenal of
Thun.
The Swias antiaircraft vehicle offera possibilities and benefits which are
totally identical to those of the 35 nm (Gepard) antiaircraft vehicle now
in mass production in Germany u~ider Swias license as far as armamenta and
electronics are concerned.
46
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_
. ~Ott O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
The epeed in~erred~ ~,n view of the urgett~y, h~~ be~n po~gible due Cd Ch~
fect that in the eutarn~r of ~.977, Cnntr~v~a AG, ~taehine Tool Wark~ O~rlikon-
BuhrlB Ltd~ Siemeng-Alb~,s AG, Georg ~iecher G~~ 32G, ~e we11 as Ch~ ACeli~r
de Congeructiong d~ Vevey SA, decided to perform the work~ prepratory eo the
development of a SwiAe vereion of antiaircraft vehicle, und~r their own
reaponeiblliCy~ and thanke ~o thie prelimingry ~ctivities~ th~ ~rd~red
proCotype will be completed in March of rhi~ ye~r gnd dellvered tn th~ 5wi~e
GovernmenC Arma Agency with the end of ~ub~ecting it to exheustive tests.
COPYRIGHT: Edicionee befensa, S.A. Madrid 1978
9341
C30: 3110 ~
47
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