JPRS ID: 8579 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8579
23 July 1979
Sub-Saharan, Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 642
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFOaMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/8579
23 Ju1.y 1979
~ SUB-SAIIARAN AFRICA REPORT
! FOUO No. 642
i
' CONTENI'S PAGE
' INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS ~
Signif icance of UNCTAD Meeting Examined by Habib
~ Boularea
(JEtiNE AFRIQUE, 30 May 79) 1
,
' Benguela RR Woes Discuased, Doubts on Reopening
Expresaed
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 13 Jun 79)......... 4 ~
; Briefs
Cabral's Attempt at Reconciliation 6
ANGOLA
I~'LEC Official: Cabinda Oil Funds Uaed for Subyeraion
; (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEFNS, 8 Jun 79)..... 7
FNLA Official's Sabotage Claims Denied
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 11 Jun 79) 9
UNITA Preaence in Paris May Mar Relations With France
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 11 Jun 79) 10
BENIN
Comments on Fr~:nch-Beninese Relations
(Ginet*..e ~ot; AFRtQUFrASIE, 11-24 Jun 79)........... 11
BOTSWANA
Brief s
Railroad Pro~ect 5tudie~ 14
E - a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) P86e
BURUNDI
President Baga~za Givee Interview Co Paris Magazine
(Jean-Baptiete Bagaza Interview; JEUNE AFR.IQUE,
27 Jun 79) 15
CAPE ~VERbE
Cape Verde Prime Miniater GranCs Interview
(Pedro Pires Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE,
' 11-24 Jun 79) 22
~
CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE
France Seeking AlternaCive Solution Regarding
Bokassa
(Elie Ramaro; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 11-24 Jun 79)......... 25
Sylvestre Bangui Said To Support Constitutional Monarchy
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 6 Jun 79) 30
_ Foreign Real Estate Owned by Bokassa Noted
(Abdelaziz Dahmani.; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 6 Jun 79)...... 32
ETHIOPIA
Report on Economic and Monetary Situation in 1977 and
Early 1978
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET 1~DITERRANEENS, 15 Jun 79).. 33
Economic and Monetary Situation Reporte~ for 1977 and
Early 1978
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 22 Jun 79).. 41
GUINEA
Briefs
. Plastics Factory Loan d5
MAURITIUS
Divisions Observed Within Main Partiea
(Herve Masson; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 28 May 79)............ 46
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~ CONT~IT5 (Continued)
Pfl(y?C'
~ MozArtc~zQuE
;
~ ariefs
~ New [t~ad Near Completion ~Fy
CU(Z 'Cextile FACtory Assistance 49
GI~lZ Elcc:tricity Assistance 49
` Cooperative Villages 50
NIGCIt
Niger's 3-Yearr 5-1'ear Plans Detailed; Budgee. Given
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRADIEENS, 1 Jun 79).... 51
Niger's GNP, Trade Balance Discussed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 1 Jun 79)..., 7g
Gross National Product
Favorable Trade Balance
NIGERIA
~ ~
- French Industry Sees Country as ImportanC Market
~ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 May 79).~. gq
~ Four More Sugar Factories Planned ~
(MARCHES TFOPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 29 Jun 79)... gl
Briefs
On Trade WiCh Brazil 92
French Bank Loan 92 -
Japanese Metallurgical P1ant 93
SEYCHELLES
i
'AFRIQUE-ASIE' Interviews SPychelles President on
~ Nonalinement
(Albert Rene Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, -
~ 11-24 Jun 79) 94
! SOiJTH AFRICA
Briefs
French Attitude to Independent Homelands 101
; 'Airbus' Arder 101
'
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CONTL'NTS (Continued) Page
TANZANIA
Iteporter Notes Economic, Politir_al, Military
Situation 103
(Francoia Soudan; JEUNE AFEtIQUE, 13, 20 Jun 79)...
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INTCR-AFRICAN ArFAIRS
l
SIGNIFYrANCE OF UNCTAD ME~TING EXAMINED BY HAB~B BOULARES
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 May 79 pp '13-24
[TexC] The international economic community resembles a school alass in
which one is not permitted to flunk rich people's children. Thus one ia
obliged to wait unCil all the parCners have attained the same degree of
comprehension of the problems so that the entire class can go on to the
nex~ grade.
During ttie 1960's, when it had become obvious Chat the international mone-
tary system was out of ad~ustment, Che Third World did not aucceed in mak-
ing international opinion admit thaC the entire economic order was invalved.
It required the gaping hole wrought in WesCern defenses by the Arab oil
~ embargo to make them agree to link problems to~ether. Further, it must be
recalled that the United States wait~d until September 1975 to accept the
principle of a dialog. But, at the same time, the developing nations
(DN's), who did not have any alternative structure to propose, were satis-
fied with proclaiming the necessity of establishing a new international
economic order (NIEO), which they made the catch-all for their grievances,
- both old and new.
Since this time, the North (W~stern, industrialized nations) and the South
(populous, diversified but united, nations) have met around several nego-
tiating tab'les in order Co set up--thus far in vain--a~equate ways and
means of establishing the famous NIEO.
From the viewpoint of the Third World, that amounted to saying: regularize ~
the staples market (by an integrated program of which the Common Fund for
Einancing buffer stocks represented the pivot); throw open world markets
to the manufactured products of the DN's; stahilize export earnings of
these same DN's; increase the volume of transfer of resources to the South;
reform access-to-technology procedures; and one will have established an
NIEO!
From the viewpoint of the industrialized West, that resembles a poker
game between a rich man and a poor man, the poor man saying to the rich
man: "You lend me some money an~? I will play with you; if I win, I keep
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the winninga; if I 1.ose, you c~r?c~l my debt." This wae, of course, ttot
true, but it is how the T.hird Wor1d's proposal was perceived~ It wns
obvious Chat a new order could not be erecCed solely on the basis oL the
sat~afaction of grievances, no matter how legitimate Cheee might be, with-
out taking into acnount the 3nterdependence of a11 the political and eco-
nomic problems ouCatanding, and, especially, w3thout Che partner who is
aummoned to give ground knowing exactly where thaC might lead him. Aaton-
ishing as this may seem, the international comm?un:tty Cook 5 yeara to reach
Chis conclusionl The interdependence and the refor~ta of world economic
atructurea are ehe key words of the fifth seeaion o� UNCTAD (United Na-
tions Confereace on Trade and Development) which w~.1~ be held in Manilla
from 7 May to 1 June 1979 (see JEUN~ AFRIQUE Nos 958 and 959). Not only
is a special point (point 8) given over to appropriate plans and measures
Co facilitate structural transformations in the international economy,
but the ma~ority of Che other points refer to it. There are many reasone
for this. From one neg~tiation to the other, it has been perceived that
it was noC possible to aolve any problem without taking into account the
influence it had on all the other sectora. If different formulas wer~ put
forward for each question under debate, no overall plan offered a coherent
picture of the desired international economy. Everything tranapired as
though one wanted to change all the parCs of a defective motor without
knowing whether the spare parCs could be ~oined together to produce a new
moCor which would work.
As a gross simplification of the packed agenda of the Manilla meeting,
it may be said that this new proposal providea a degree of intereat in
the present session. It is, indeed, the only thing of interest in the
debate. The enthusiasm and combativeness the Third Wurld formerly ahowed
have in fact given way to disappointment, to a general feeling of weari-
ness engendered by the inanity of the efforts they have heretofore put
forth.
This was clearly visible in Arusha (Tanzania) when the Group of 77 met
from 6-16 February 1979 to coordinate a common poaition of the Third
World with regard to the problems inacribed on the agenda of the current
- session of UNCTAD. Only 80 countries out of the 118-odd members that make
up the group got around to sending delegates. And, if one excludes the
part relating to the Common Fund for the sCabilization of staplet~, which _
no longer has any purpose since the conclusion~ last March, of negotia-
tions concerning it, the "Aruaha Program" seems to be wading in a mass of
technical details concerning trade, finance, and transport. Thence the
~ impression of a lack of mobility one gets from the Arusha meeting. The
goal of the striggle is not as clear and forth:ight as in the past. And,
when the DN's write into their plan of action the necessity, for example,
of creating multinational companies on their own behalf, that is enough
to baffle the layman, who has been bombarded, into the bargain, by leaks
concerning cracks--which exist--in the presumedly united DN front.
However, the picture is not as bleak as it seems at first glance. First,
we have recorded an impressive evolution of ideas on essential points:
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interdependence oE problems, the globgl aspect of the economy or geographic
interdependence; the naed the industrialized countries have of the DN''s
markets; Che existen~e of solutions for true cooperaCion beCween the�~DN's
and the industrialized nations, as Che Lome Convention, in epite of its
shurtcomings, lllustxatea; and, finglly, the utility nnd poesibility of
developing economic, financial, and scientific exchange among the DN's.
This is conatderable progrese when one thinke of the groping which has
gone on during the last 10 year~.
Secondly, a seri~~ss and in-depth examination is going to begin, perhape,
after rhe Manilla meeti~g, into what form a new world economic order might
take. For it is uaelesa to continue to pl.ead the interdependence of eco-
nomic problems (~:rod~cti.on, industrialization, commercializaCion, finance
and currency) and the interdependence of regions (the needs both aidea have
of markets, the solidarity of interests and the complexities of multi-
lateral relations), while at the same time continuing to reason wiChin the
narrow framework of the national economic units. Europe has made progress
on this road. But Africa too has b~~aun, aince the first of this year, to
be interested in a worldwide--albeit eplintered--view of the problems of
development. In thia respect, the contribution of the "Arusha Program"
is very important, especially with regard to cooperation among the DN's.
Under these circumstances, the stakes are much higher than during the 1974
proclamation of a new international economic order. For if 1974 wae the
year of fist-pounding on tables, it is now time for the Third World to con-
tribute effectively to the definition and the establishment of a true new
~ world order.
This is, when all is said and done, the fundamental theme of the Manilla
Conference, as Gamani Corea, UNCTAD secretary general, emphasized: "The
conference should strive to assure: recognition, by the international
community, of the vital need to operate transformations in the present
structures (of the world economy)...the evolution of rules and principles
governing international economic relations and the creation of an appro-
priate framework of negot~ations with a view toward carrying out deci-
sions made in common agreement."
If this triple goal were not reached in Manilla, one would then effectively
enter upon a period of lack of mobility in the Third World, a period of
the accentuation of divergences within it and an aggravation of the world
crisis.
COPYRIGIiT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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INTER-AFRZCAN AFFAIRS
BE~iGUELA RR WOES DISCUSSED, DOUBTS ON REOPENING EXPRESSED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 Jun 79 pP 61, 63
, [Article by Francois Soudan: "The Drama of Benguela"J
[Excerpts] Dilolo, Zaire-Angola t~arder, Saturdqy 11 November i978--Decorated
with Zambie~n, Angolan and Zairian flags, a heavy train loaded with copper
ore started out taward the southwest. Some applause, e deafening noise of
squeaking metal: the Benguela railroad was reopened, after more than 3 years '
of paralysis. Officielly at least, for though it seemed obvious that this
time the decrepit little train would reach the Angolan port of Lobito with-
out too much mishap, nothing proved that another one could travel this 1,300
kilome~ers of rail tomorrow.
The three ministers of transport present for the event were doubtlessly not
unaware of this: rarely can an inauguration have been so discreet. It is a
fact that 6 months later, despite denial.s and technical meetinga, the Benccuela
railroad is stil~ not operating.
It is a vital artery, but one that has been unuseable 'since August 1975 and
the troubled times of Angolan independence. There is a twofold reason for
this. The 90-percent awner of the Benguela railroad, the British company
Tanganyika Concessions, which today has become Tanks Consolidated Investment
(controlled by a consortium of London banks: Barcley's Rothschild, Baring and
Midland Bank), withdrew almost all of its technicians from the line starting
in July 1975, and since then he,s made no dividend distributions to its stock-
holders. In view of the nonpayment of the company's debts, the Angolan gov-
ernment has refuse to nationalize it.
Acts of Sabotage
~
But there is something more serious: the Benguela railroad traverses, for al-
most its entire length, provinces (especially Bie and Huembo) which were con-
trolled by UNITA (Union for the Tota1 Independence oF Angola, hostile to
Agostinho Neto's MPLA) during the civil war of 1975 end where Jonas Savimbi's
movement still has sympathizers. From their bases in northern Namibia to ~
which they have withdrawn, the men of UNITA, strong with South African logis- -
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i tical suppor~, are tod~,}r carr,ying out acts of sabotage against the Denguela
railroad~s 3nstalla~ione by sma,ll commando groups~ 7'he railroad for them ia
a strategic target of the first, importance: so 1.ong as it remains paralyzed,
there wi.ll be proof of the3.r existence in the field,
' Imminent Reopening?
;
; On the real reopening of the Benguela railroad depends the existence c;f a real
fron~ line in the face ~f ~che white regimea of southern Africa. After ~e-
claring f'or a long time that the re,ilroad was operating normally, and then ad-
~ mitting ~hat it was doing only local traffic, the Luanda authorit3es are today _
aware of ttis necessity. The big military offensive of August-September i978,
which reduced most of the pockets of UNITA resistance inside Angolan terri-
tory, was intended mainly to "clean out" the provinces crossed by the Benguela
railroad. And in Luanda 3t is hoped that settlement of the Namibi~r~ problem -
will cut UNITA off f~om its last support: South Africa. ~
I
For 4 months, Cuban assistants have been busy repairing the bridges sabotaged
and establishing a surveillance system along the railroad, even if it is im-
~ ~ossible to keep ~,check on the entire 1,300~kilometers of way. Agreements
have been made with Belgium and Portugal for trQining of Angolan railway tech-
nicians and with the European Community for the granting of a loan .for mod-
~ ernizing the equipment.
On 9 Maxch, at the conclusion of an Angola-Zaire-Zambia tripartite meeting
held in Luanda, an "imminent resumption of international traffic" was offic-
~ i.ally announced. Is this "resumption" really to be believed? The imminent
reopening of i:he Benguela railroad has been announced so many times for 4
years. It depends on many external factors which in fact cover all of the
' political situation in southern Africa. It will doubtlessly be necessary to
� wait for more than a little flag-bedecked train before believing that this
"Benguela story" has come to an end.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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~ BRIEFS
' CABRAL~S ATTENII'T AT RECONCILIATION--It is reported that Luis Cabra]. is try-
ing to reconcile the two poet-preaidents, Leopold Sedar Senghor and Agostinho
Neto. The main thing that the chief of state of Guinea-Bissau ~nust do is per-
suade hfs Senegalese couterpart, who reflxses to recognize the Luanda regime,
which in his eyes is guilty of coming to power by means of the Cubans and of _
having reflised to come to an understanding with UNITA and the FNLA [An6olan
National Liberation Front]. Neto, for his part, is said to be willing to
_ forget the support given by Senghor to his enemies. Luis Cabral is counting
on the good relations which he maintains with both in order to succeed with
this difficult reconciliation. jText] jParis JEUNE,AFRIQUE in French
13 Jun 79 p 28] 11267 ~
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ANaOLA
P'L~C OFFICIAL: CABINllA OIL F'UriD3 U3ED ~'OIi SUBVEA3ZON
Paris MARCHES TRO~'ICAUX ET N~DI~~RRANEENS in French 8 Jun 79 p 15~5
(Article: "Ths Cabinda OpposSti~rt I~ Trying Harcl to Arouse Pub13c Opinion"~
(~ext~ Frsnciaco Xavier Lubota, who preeenta himself Qs the n~W president
of the Front for Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (~'LEC), whicla is op-
poged to Preaident Neto's regime, and aho declares he wes elected to thia
poat (after numberous reaigna~ions within the movement) at a~enera]. congresa
last March, is presently strivin~ to "shake the indifference of the Western
_ and African countriea~" After going to the Unitea States in 1978, Lubota
held a press conference in Parie on 30 May. He kae then to go to Belgium
and Switzerland.
!{e gave the following details at his presa conference in Paris. Of the ap-
praximately 300,000 inhabitants of Cabinda~ encleved between Zaire snd the
Congo, attached administrative~yr to Mgola, nnd considered the "African Ku-
wait," there are 150,000 refugees livfng in Zaire, 50,000 in the Congo and
50,000 in the buah, including--according to him-~-7,000 fighters. On the
other hend, there are 8,000 Cuban soldiers in the enclave to protect the in-
stallatfons of ti~e American company Qulf Oil and "perpetuate the Angolan
grip" on this oil-rich territory.
"The Qulf Oil Company continuea to pa~y the communist governmpnt of Mgola
more than ~l million per day for exploitation righta to the oil that it ex-
tracta from the Cabindan re~erves," Lubota added. "This money," he said,
is used not only to sustain the regime swemped by the Soviet-Cubane, but
also to finance the Marxist terrorist activities in a1.1 of central and south-
' ern Africa. It is a stupid and short-sighted policy."
The president of the FLEC also declared that his movement occupies a third
of Cebindar? territory (out of a total of 10,000 square kilaneters and that
80 percent of the population is French-speaking and 20 percent is Portuguese-
speaking. "The Cabindan people have been anti-Angolan for a long time," he
_ said. "We W~nt our independence and ke ~ar~t to exercise our right to self-
determination."
Lubota was accompanied by his chief of staff, Colonel da Costa, Who for his
pa.rt considers that "Without the Cubans," Cabfnda xould have been independent
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. ~o~ o~~icint. us~ oxi.Y
~'or ~ong tim~, "~ven within 15 ~~ys." 7.'he colon~l al.~o dec~eu~ed that tihe
u
~'L~C obtiQins information from certain CubE.n militiary pereonnel Who do not
W~nt to ~t~y in G~?bind~," and that "eome de~ertiere are eaid tio h~?ve been
ex~ruted."
COPYRIdfi'~: Rene Moreux et Cie p~rie i979
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ANaOLN
~?lLA OFF'ICIAL~ S 3ABOTAO~; CLAIM3 DFNI~D
~'aris AFYtIQUE-ASIE ir? French No 189 11 Jun 79 p 3?
["Article by AC: "More Provocationel"J ~ -
~Excerpts~ Nearly four years ago, under the leadership of the MPL11 1ed by
Br AgoatinFio Neto, Ar~gola seized ita independenae. Neither attaake by
South African and Zairian forces, nor provoaation and aabotage by organi~e-
t~ons tele~uided, armed, end financed by internstional imperisli~n (~ii~A,
UNITA, FLEC ~Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda IIiclaveJ) hnd euc-
ceeded 3n breaking the liberating momentwn of the patriotic revolutiionary
- forces.
But uhile the Mgolan regime was Consolidating ite toundation~, developing
national reconetruction, and divereif~ring its international relatione,
~estabilization attempts continued, though never eeriously threatening it.
~ South African armed incursions and assanlta~ air bombardmenta of the eouth-
ern border regions, assassination attempta, preas campaigna by certain
western and African newspapers in the psy of neocolonial regimess nothing
~~as spared the yroung Angolsn republic.
Thus, too~ puppet groupa, the identity of rrhoae protectore ~a very well
known, move around a11 over xestern capital8, here holding preea conPerencea
(Liabon, Paris, Waahington, etcetera), and ~here intervieua, lrith the aim of
,:oving the effectivenees cla3med for their terroriat a~tiona*. Witneea the
assertions oF an FNLA m~nber, Vaal Neto, according to xhom hie organi~ation
is supposed to havg attacked oil inetallatione at 3oyo, in the provin~e ot
Zaire (in Angola), gnd killed five Cuban oYficers. Ncw, not only t+ere the
- i:~stallations never attacked, but there i~ not a aingle mamber af the inter-
~~etionalist Cuban forces in that provin~e nor in the entire northern terr~-
tory of the countr~.
~ r m ng ese atatements, Vaal Neto xea e,zpelled from Portugueee terri-
tory.
COP~'ftIRHTs 1979 Afrique-Asie
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UNITA PRE3fl~1Cf~ IN PARIS MAY 1~AR RELATIONS WITH FRANCB :
i
,
Paris A~ttIQUF~A32~ in French No 189 11 Jun 79 pp 41, l~2 ;
1
~UnatEributed artiole: "Parie-Luandss Clouded Atmoephere"~ ~
~Text Deepite repeated aeewranaee by Franch dip~omatia circlea~ in p4rti- ~
cular ~y Miniater of Fbreign Affaire ~cancois-Ponaet, to the Mgo~an a~nbae-
eador in Paris, Luis d~Almeida, and desp~t~ the genuine improva~ent in ~
r~lationa betwean the ttiro oountri~e, the caee of ths UNITA rapreeentativa ~
in ~an~e, John Narquee 1Cakumba, tlareatana to give rise to freah di!lieult.iee . ;
Indesd, becauae of hia dubioua caonercial activitiee in &irope, Kak~mba h~d
heen expelled Prom Orl,y airporti upon arrival in Plranea a fex aant?ha ago. '
Hub he ~ame back recently, armed thia time xith a diplaaatia pasaport~ deeig-
nating hi~n ae t~norary Senegaleae consul to Liaht~at~stein, with rsaidenae in '
Paris. !
When questioned, French authoritiee aaaerted that they knev nothittg about
the matter. But John Marquee Kakumba ~noet carta~n],y had arrived in Paris,
end had telephoned aeveral friends and acqualntancea. aia aabivit~ee continue ;
to be conducted Pran hia "office," 15 avenue Yictor Rngo, Mhers a ltill ti~ ;
secretary is working. j
The repreaentative of the pugpet organisation led by Jonas 3avl~bi is tlwre-
fore continuing hia aativitiea trom Paris, wbsnae he aetxlS coa~uniquea to ~
varioue newapapers ar~d prese agenaies abont the ~o-called "viatories~ o! hie `
movement, xhich ga everyoae knowa ia finaaced and arasd by ths racist South '
African authoritiee~ ~rith the aupport of aertala ~f'riaan and ~ropsan gotern-
mente. Thia situation ~nstitiab7~r irritates olticial ~ngolari ciroles, rbo
are wondering if Preaideat aiacard d!Bstaing~a o!liaial polia~r ia not baing
th~arted by ea~e of hia aecret aerricee.
� OOPYRIONTs 1979~-Alrique-Asie ~
t 211~9 .
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BENIN
COI~ITS ON FR~IVCH-BII~IINFSE RELATION3
Paris AfiR~QU~-ASIE in French 11~24 Jun 79 pp 27-28
~Articl~ by Oinette Cots "Time to be ftealistic: Benin ie Noti the ~I~atin
QuQrter~ or the ~Sick Child~ Ar~y More~,T
_ ~~ext~ Thg official vie3~ of French Miniater of Cooperation Roberb Oalley
' to ~he Peopl~~a Republic of Benin 1a~t ? to 9 May a vieit rounded off by
the firsb meeting of the ~`reneh-Henineae grand commieeion, inetituted by the
gen~ral agrEement on cooperation on 27 February 1975 aertainly marke a
turnin~ point in the relabiona between the two countriea.
ri~lations, ae ie common knowledge, had aeriouely deteriorated~ eepsalally on
the political level, after th@ imperialieti armed aeeault on 3und~y~
1~ January 1977, under the leaderehip of Colonel Howrgeaud, alias Colonel
l~~urin, elias gob Denard, ~n whieh nwnerous other Freneh mereenarie~ took
part. It ia also ranembered hox Paris shilly.ahallied over~agreeing to
replace the then ambaaeador of France to Cotonou, Mr Meadmore, who xae in-
volved in or~aniaing the aseault that took place, xith the complicity of
certain statee that are vaeeala of the Slyeee.
~ren though cooperetion betxeen the two etates was not broken off, it never-
Lhelesa suffered some notexortl~y blockagea. Now that the People~e Republic
of 9enin is serious~y and pereeveringly involved in building a aolid eaonomic
base, and noa that proofs abour~d that the regime inatalled on 26 October 19?2
is deeply rooted among the iqasses oY the people, it eeeme that the need for
a more realistic poliay is starting to be underetood in Paris.
For, though two years after the mercenaries~ landing, 8rprthing eeems pceaible
once more, it is on one coaditions that everything take place ~rith l1~11 re-
spect for the road ahosen by the People~s Republia of Benin and the ob~eetives
on vhich it has decided. Also on condition that the conaequences of the
16 Jenuary 19?? attack be efPaced aria reparation made Por them, and that Paria
have fully learned its lesson fraa the tailure of ita gunboat policy and ita
vain atternpts at recoloni~ation.
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Though the Peopl~~e Republic of genin concretely confirma ite 3ntention of
irietituting honest, 1oya1, mutually beneficial cooperation, it is definitely
not about to g~t down on ite kneea. From the star~, in gny ca~a, Pr~~id~nt
Ker~kou has made a poinb of setting th~ E~ne. And to remove~ if ~ndeed any
still exiated, a11 ambiguity~
As he received Rob~rE aalley on 8 M~y, the genineae head of state was to
state, specifioallys "There 3s no question that the relatione o~ friendahip ~
and cooperation existing between our two peoplem and our trro states are very
o1d and are even eometimea tinged rrl,th paternsliem, Which ie inadmieeible
betrreen tao sovereign, independent peoples. It ie the exietence of thia
paterne118m, and ita incorrect interpret.ation Which have created among us,
in ~enin, since our country~s aooessian to�nominal independence on 1 Auqu~t
1960, a situation of political inatabili~cy, econom3~ stagng~lon, and eoaio-
cultural ali~nation.~~
Md it is precieely to put ar~ end to ~his neocolonial eituation, whiah earned
Henin the ironical nicknemea of Africa~a nLatin Quartern or "aick ohild,n
that the naticnal armed forces intervened on 16 Ootober 1972.
After r~calling the attack on 16 January 1977 and the public statements by
iiob Denard, xho by hia oxn account is preparing to make a freah strike at
the People~s Republic of Benin, on the instrv;stiona of hia masters, Preeidenti
Kerekou emphaai~ads "In viex of the silenc~ of the F~ench authoritiea con-
cerned, after such statementa by a F~eneh citizen internationally knoxn aa
mercenary, w~ Benineee r+onder iP this armed aseault for colonial recon-
queat of our country did not have the moral and material eupport of certain
high ranking authorities in the hierarc~r of the French state." It is a18o
noted, President Kerekou recalled, that "a11 the official atepa undertaken
by ~he Beninese government w3,th the FSrench government~ tirith a view to extra- `
ditio� of the French mercenariea~ so as to have them tried by the Benineae
courts concerned, have not received aqy favorable response to date." -
~conomic F'ro~e~ts
Has this apeech been heeded?
In any case, the visit by Mr Qalley and hia delegation hae given rise to
some meaningful comments. Md the First meeting of the "grand comaiiaaion"
hae produced some important results. For example, the ~ench intervention
program (of xhich the suhstantial increase in volume for 1979 and 1980 hea
been nated) has been.atopped, and the prineiple of pluriannual planning,
taking inLo account future years, has been accepted.
In the domain of economics, several pro~ecta have been diacusaeds eztenaion
of the Cotonou-Perakou railroad aa fer as Niarney, in Niger; euteraaion of
the autonomous port of Cotonou, on vhich vork atartad in May, xith 90 per-
c.ent participation by F~ancej inatallation, etarting in 1979, of a
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~ox nr~YC1nL usL nrtLY -
Lel~aommunications g.rnund etation that wi11 enable television to oover the
wholc of~th~ national terr~.tory. ,
In th~ doma~ns of cultur~ and scientific reseArch, the quegtion of trgining
i.nstructor~s and r~searChers Henin~s priority goal and the pr~spect
of inte,rupivers~.ty ~~:aen~ents have been debated, as we11 a~ a11 the issues
Connected~w3th or~.entatinn ot the new sohool. In add3tion, the m~ana to
b~ implemented �or th~ promotion o~ t?uman exchan~es betWeen the two cotin-
tries have been speci~�ied. The two partiea, deecribing the results achieved
~~an imp~ortgnt step ~ow~rd a fresh impetua in the multiform relationa
wov~n by history betwee~~ the two countriea," agr~ed to meet again next year.
A ~~Most Sar: ous Partner~~
~t ahould also b~ noted that the �inal communique closing Mr (3a11ey~A offi-
~ia1 visit ~ondemns a11 ~rmed assault~ on A�r3can countries and the acti-
v3ties of inercenaries. In addit3on, after three years~ abaence from Benin,
Michel Van (3revenyn~he (form~r French amabassedor to Cotonou, where his
attitude had b~en appreciated) who directed the Work of the ~~grand commis-
sion~~ for the FSrench party, stated that he was atruck by the changea that
have come about in the country. "FYrstly,~~ he said, at a press conferenoe,
"the geriousness with which public a�fairs are conducted is b~ginning to be
noticed. The same concern is noted in the way buainess is conducted. We
consider Benin one o� our most aerioua partners in thia respect, and ae are
very appreciative of this aspect of our relations, knowing that the decisions
made by the Beninese authorities are followed by results. We have also noted
that the people has set to xork, in accordance aith the government~a wish,
along tt~e lines laid dos~m."
This is something that should prompt people yearning for colonial reconqueet
to be more prudent. ~ut though realism seems to be prevailin~ in Paris,
- duplicity in F~ench politics and the dissensions rife ir. high circles are
too well known for people to be sxept away by exceeaive optimis:n. Md,
though everyone here r4~oices in the nex course of things, vigilat~ce ~s etill
indispensable. And it is by the evidence of facts and the ansxers to the
questions asked hy presid,ent P?erekou that people will ~udge the sincerity of
the si~ns of goodKill exhibited by Paris.
COPYRIaHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
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BCTSWANA
BRIEFS
RAILROAD PROJECT,9TUDIID--BotsWana is seeking a maritime opening on the Nem-
- ibian coast. A proposal is presently under atuc'~y for building a rai~ line
betaeen enclaved Botswana and the Atlant3c, ecroes the Kalahari desert. Up
ta now, international. traffic has been hand].ed by the South African ports.
The Co~onwealth fund for teehnical cooperation uould ps~r~ticipQte in the
financing of the pro~ect. [Text] [Parie JEUNE AFRIRUE in French 13 Jun 79
p 27] ii267
cso: 4400 '
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BURUNDI
PRE5IDENT BAGAZA GTVES TNTERVT~W TO PARTS MAGAZTNE
, Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE 3n French 27 Jun 79 pp 45 -47 LD -
' [InCerview wiCh Burundi Preaidenti Jean-BapCisCe Bagaza by Siradiou Diallo:
"Priority to NaCional Unity"--date and place not apecified]
~ [TexC] JEUNE AFRIQUE: At the age of 33 you are Che youngesC African head
of sC~te. You may even be the youngest head of atate in the world. Is
, that an advaneage or a handicap?
' Jean-Baptiate Bagaza: It all depends on the way you look at it. Given
; the burdens oP Che ~ob, youth can be an advantage in that when you are
young you have more energy for working, traveling in ordez Co atay in con-
tact with your people and underatanding young people. However, there are
disadvantages tno, if only because you do not have the experience which
older~heads of staCe have. There are aituations which you do not fully
, anticipate. Most current problems are the result of former actions or
dec3.sions which older heads of state know more intimately than young men
like me.
JEUNE AFRTQUE: Are yc~u not rather intimidated when you meet heads of
state some of ~hom are twice your age? _
Jean~-Baptiste Bagaza: Zntim3dated? Not exactly. I am more impressed by
people like Houphouet -Boigny, Senghor, Giscard d'Estaing.... However,
more imporCant than that, I would say that it ~s not always easy to reach
an undersCanding wfth older leaders. We do not apeak the same language.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: What language do they apeak?
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: They are still speaking the language of the cold
war with all the ulterior matives, calculations and distrust which that
implies. Some behave as if Chey were at open or veilPd war with the
communist world. The others behave in the same way toward the capitalist
world. Perhaps they are rfghC. However, it so happens that my generaCion
does not really believe in confrontatfon between the communist and capitalist
worlds. It seems to me that the United States and the Soviet Union cooperate
more than con~ront each other now.
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JEUNE AFRIQUE: You do not diatrusC eieher communigm or capitialiem?
Jean-BapCiaea Bagaza: I regard thia view o� the world as rather old~
fash~oned. The Soviet Union and Che UniCed SCatea no ~ongar confront eech
other in order to domingte the world. They prefer to diacues with each
other and dietribute apheres of influence amicably r,zther than with gune.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Suraly one of the reasons for your lack of dietruat ia that
you cannot cheriah any supremist ambitions?
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Of course. A sma11 country like ours could not try
and dominate anybody. We cannot even try to become leader of a grou~: of
A�rican countries, atill less of ~he Third Wor1d. We are completely
neutral. Thie is obviously not the case with other countries which
cherish, secreely or noC, ambitions at regional~ African Qr Third World
level. It ia understandable that auch countriea ahould act as if the cold
war were still going on and fight or defend themaelvea against others.
However, since that ia noC the case with us we will refuse to allow our-
selves Co be drawn into battles which are not ours. We are and will remain _
neutral.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: One of the problems facing you is that of naCional unity.
. During its 17 years of independence Burundi has experienced a seriea of
tribal-Cype tragedies. Do you think you have overcome this problem once
and for all?
' Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: If Z were to say yes you would ~ot believe me, would
you? To be honesC, this problem has not been solved. We are still a long
way from overcoming the scourge of tribalism. We have to have the courage
to admit that. These are problems Which have lasted for generations and
we are ~rying to solve them gradually. However, you know that with under-
development at all levels, including the mental level, the problem is
growing worse and more~ complicated. Therefore it is impossible to be
protected from new disturbances.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Nonetheless tribal antagonism aeems to have been overcome -
at the level of cadres and intellectuals.
Jean~Baptiste Bagaza: Not completely. Cadres and intellectuals who do
not have the means of voicing their opinions or who do not dare to say what
they think resort to their ethnic group and hide behind tribal antagonism
to satisfy their ambitions or assert their vieWpoints. Moreover, T think
this phenomenon is common to all African countries.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: How can Africa overcome this terrible scourge~ which is a
serious handicap to nat3onal unfty and economic development?
~ Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: It is extremely diff tcult. Intellectually this
problem may seem to be solved or easy to overcome but in practice it is
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not sn ensy. We need t3me~ I ehink Ch~r n~Cinnnl un1Cy c~n only be forged
in rhe melCing pot of a naCional p~rCy. At al]. events that is what we nre
trying to do in Burundi, We think the parry ~.s the only adequate framework
in which,all ethnic groups cxn merge nnd educ~te each oeher Co build
national uniCy. Our belief is strengehened by Che face that our party, Che
Union for Nntional Progress (UPRONA) hxs si~rvived a11 our counCry's
uphenvals.
~ JEUN~ A~'RY~1UE: UPRONA is due tn hold a congress soon. IC will be the
first Cime that such a congress has been held during your presidency. How
_ much importance do you attach to iC?
Jenn-Baptiiste Bagaza: This congress W3ii he crucially importanC. Tndeed
since we came Co power the countiry has lieen ruled by a tranai~ional
government, the only program being the elemenCs contained in Che
20_ November 1976 declaration. ThaC shows you the imporCance we atCach
~ to this congress since it will enable the members to express the3r views
on the instiCutions and thp party program and Co choose tt~eir~leaders.
JEUNE ArRIQUE: Why are you consulting ehe members now when you did not
do so when you took power? -
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: UnforCuna~ely, it was impossible before. However,
we think the time hss now come to consult them, to find out what they want
and to change Chings taking their wishes and aspirations into accounC.
After the congress we will emerge from the transitional period with a
stronger basis and starC following a program and a line defined and accept-
ed by the whole country,
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Burundi suffers from a seiious handicap: it is landlocked.
How are you dealing with this?
Jean~Baptiste Bagaza: There is no solut3on to this problem unless we
extend our country to the sea! We have neither the means nor the desire
to conquer our neighbors! All We can do, and are doing~ is to negotiate
with them to obtain easier passage for our merchandise across their
territories. To this end we are in constant contact not only with our
immediate neighbors Rwanda, Zaire and Tanzania but also with Kenya,
Uganda and even Ang~la. We need to cooperate with all these countries , -
because we must diversify our routes~
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Are you satisfied with the way in which Burundian goods
pass through the ports of Mombasa and Dar es~Salaam?
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Far from it! We suffer enormous losses due to the
fact that the goods which we import sometimes stay fn these ports �or
months and are damaged and sometimes even vanish. The ~ruCh is that our
Kenyan and Tanzanian neighbors have still not mastered the techniques
of storage and management required for running a bfg merchant port.
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JEUN~ AFRIQtI~: What was your posiL�ion during Che armed conflict beCween
Ugandg and Tanzania?
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Naturally we could not remain inactive. If only
becauae we knew ehaC the war was bound to hava repercuseiona on us.
Therefore, we sent emissariea to Uganda to Cry and perauade Preaident
Idi Amin ~:o abandon the war and settle his conflict with Preaident Nyerere
by negoeiation. He did not heed us. When the fortunes of war changed
camp we tried the same mr~diation with Presidenti Nyerere. We did not meet
wiClt~any more success on that occasion. I muet say thaC our economy
suffered a great deal from this conflict.
JEUN~ AFRTQU~: ForCunately it did not last long~
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: You think noC? Tha conflicC is not yet over for us~
The Tanzanian Crains which usually transport our goods aouth are still
requisitioned by the Tanzanian army. They are all going north toward
the front. We hava reason to believe that this will be the case for
several more months.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: During the K3gali summit in May Burundi moved from mere
observer status to full membership of tha Franco-African conference; Why?
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: We Cook this decision as soon as we received the
assurance that we could work informally within the conference and that it
had no rigid character. Tndeed we do not share President Senghor's view
Chat this type of summit should be.structured. However we thought it
was extremely useful to be able to meet other African leaders on this
occasion and exchange ideas and experiences with them, provided the
conference did not take the form of a new organization with rigid and
constraining rules. This point was cottceded to us. That meant that we
no longer had any reason to remain an observer. We became a full member
of the Franco-African summit. You have to be consistent. It is a question
of honesty.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: After years of suspicion and quarrels Belgian-Burundi
relations seem to have 3mproved.
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: That is correct. Our relations with Belgium are
developing well. Before there were suspicions, as is usually the case
between ex-colonies and ex~colonisers.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: How do you explain this development?
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: You know, in time everything is settled. Perhaps
the improvement in our relations can be partly explained by the fact
that the old Belgian and Burundi leaders who always saw things in a
colonial spirit have vanished from the political scene. I think that the
present leaders in both countries are less marked by memories of the
colonial period. They have fewer complexes and are less traumatized.
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' The Belgian leadere no longer Cry ~o impoae their way of thinking on us.
~ And we~~~re less sensitive. We now diacuas al~. queaCions relaCins tio
cooperatiion in a direct and honest way and in a calm and relaxed frame of
mind.
~ JEUN~''AFRIQUE: Is ~rance trying to supplant Belgian influence in your -
' counGry?
~ -
' Jean-B~ptiiste Bag~za: T do not think so. We cooperate loyally with both
~ counCri~s. But we have never felt tha~ France was Crying to aeize the
~ lion's share. Moreover~ T think France has a loC to do in the countries
formerly under irs ~uriadiction. Tt is too much in demand in these
' countries and in Zaire to show much interest in a little country like ours.
; In France's domination strategy, aupposing it has one, Burundi muat count
for almost nothing.
~
i ~~~~..:JEUN~ AFRIQUE: OAU Secretary General Edem Kod~o recently demanded that
~ the organizaCion should have an armed force in or.der to be able Co inter-
' vene more effectively in case of armed conflicC between two African states�
i What do you think of the idea?
i
i Jean-Baptiste Baga2a: As you know the African states have so far refuaed
~ to place their arms at Che d~sposal of liberation movements in order to
, liberate countries still under domfnation. Sfmilarly nobody is very
enthusiastic abouti the inCervention force. I would like the OAU to have
i one. I t~ink it is useful that our organizatlon shuuld be able to inter-
; vene at times. Tt would be the only way in which 3t could take effective
' acCion in certain stupid conflicts bet~een fraternal states.
~
, JEUNE AFRIQUE: Zt will not be easy to set up such an army.
I Jean~Baptiste Bagazat Of courss, the means of organfzation and financing,
; the conditions governing intervention, command and so forth will have Co
~ be discussed. However, I thfnk the OAU has an increasing need for a tool
i of this type. I think that such an army should exisC and be based in
~ a country recognized as neutral and recogn~.zed as neutral by everybody
so as noC to alarm anybody~
i JEUNE AFRIQUE: Do you th~nk such an azzny would have prevented thz conflict
~ between Uganda and Tanzanfa? .
i
i
! Jean-Baptiste Bagaza; In view of the nature o� th e conflict 3t would have
been difficult to use such a force~ Do not forget that Marshal Amin Dada's
' regime was special and Chere were few people who dared defend it openly.
i
i JEUNE AFRIQUE; The S~.xth OAU Summit which fs to be held 3n Monrovia in
~ a few weeks' time is likely to be the scene of serious clashes if only
~ because of the Cha:i conElict and the Egyptian-israel peace treaty.
i
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r~~
,
FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
Jeun~-Bapeiste Bagaza: The government inst~lled in N'D~amena could euffer
' rhe eame fatie in Monrovia as it suffered at the Franco�~African aummit
~ in Kigali. Unlese it expands Co i~clude Che other poliCical e~.ements iti
is not likely to be accepCed.
JEUNE ArRIQUE: 'Is Egypt facing Che same fateZ
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: I d'o not think so~ Tf problems exist Egypti is
- encounCering them in the Arab league but not at African level. Do not
forget Chat rhe OAU has always supportied Egypt. Why should we condemn iC
now and m~reover expel it?
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Some states could ask the OAU to expel Egypt for having
signed a separate peace treaty with Tsrael.
Jean~Bapt3ste 13agaza: No, the Arabs cannot ask thaC of us~ They know
how far Chey c~n go with us. At most they can ask us not to support Egypt
any longer but they cannot ask us ta condemn it still lesa to expel it
from the OAU. It is unthinkable.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Will you hand power back to civilians one day?
Jean-BaptisCe Bagaza: That ia a class~.c questiion! Al1oW me to tell you
. thaC power is indeed in cfvilian handa. Tn a government with some
20 members only three are soldiers including ~+yself~ The UPRONA party~-
our country's leadership body~~is almost entirely in civilian handa.
However, when the time comes we wfll give them complete power. HoWever,
the idea of an army is not quitie the same fn Europe as in APrfca.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: What distinction do you draW beCween African and European
armies? ~
Jean~Baptiste Bagaza: These two types of army ahould not be confused. ~
do not think there are any real armfes tn Africa, The army as it exists
in Europe has a folklore, trad3,tions~ a mentality and a behavior which are
totally different from civilfan life~ That is not Che case in African
armies. There is not and cannot be any real ~nilftary power in Africa
because the Africans do not like military dfse~pline as such. African
soldiers cannot form a different class f~rom civflfans. T.hat is why any
soldier who tries to govern as a solider Frlthout taking account of the
civilians or even going against them ia doomed to fail~ Just look aC what
happened in Uganda.
JEUI3E AFRIQUE; Do you ever intend to organize parliamentary and pxesidential
elecCions aimed at giv~,ng Burund~. constitutional leadership bodies4
20.
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~'OR nFFICtAL US~ ONLY
,1~~~n-13npCi.i~e t3c~~~an; Af~er th~ perCy ~~ngr~~~ which wE inr~nd Co hold
bc?twepn now ~nd C11~ rnd of Chi~ year eherp wiii ~~rCt~inly b~ ~i~etion~,
t ehink ChttC rhh Burundi p~opi~ will b~ a~k~d to choo~~ ehpir preeid~nt
nnd d~puCi~g fr~~1y by n~xC year, Ther~fnr~, Che country will hnv~
normal d~mnCraeic inseiCuCions~ B~lieve me w~ ~ra seriouely contemplaCing
an c~l~~rion. iC will b~ cgrried oue wiChduC dQ1~y ~nd withouC trickery~
COpYRiGH'C: J~UN~ AFRTQUE~-PAA
CSO; 442U
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~ ~i~~
~
FAR ~FFiCIAL U98 ONL4
CAi'8 YgRDB ~
CAPE V~RD~ PRiML~ MYNISTER CRANTS tNTBRYIEW
Parie AF~tIQU~-ASi~ in French 11-24 Jun 79 pp 38~39t.D
[Auguetn Conchiglia interviea ~rieh CAPBg~ueacedrb 8ehe~Tt?cught@of OurrParry'e
"Our PoliCicel Action Wiil Alvaye Sa In Y
Founder Amiicar Cabral"--date and place not specifiad~
[Excerpt] What ste8e h~e tha procgae of unifica~iofl aieh GuinQa-8iesau
reeched?
Pedro Pires: At the Secofld Intergovernmentai Conferenca ~+hich vae hald at
the beg~nniag of the yeer ~ took a numb~at of decisions ai~ed a~ trorkitsg
together to plan our future. These decieione relatad in particu~ar to con-
ctete aspects auch as the deveiopment pian of aach countty ahich .houid
promote a ~ro~ring economic comrp,lementarityot ~s~~~i~e~productiottiis~lo~+
sea linke, trade is still difficult. in b to over-
and there is a lac"~c of commercial activity. wQ �~a t~~ At
come theee problema becaou~sfr~
Cuineaeaad~e~cport~ salt~aaadgbananae to~it.
the moment we i.mport ito
At a government and partq level, hovever, ncchangee hava dsveloped--sll
minietries have permanent joint commiseiona and ve ars~ furthCer~o~gQ f~~ro
eidering the posaibility of ~oietiy recruiting tact~nicia~~ regpective mae�
have been viaiting Cape Yarde to mcchange infas~a~i~�
- organizations and our institutions, including our nationtl asga~blias~ ~~ut
ie touch. 4te must coasider the process of the formatiaa of such uni~~ raCe
we must neither progre~a too fast nor proceed inordinatelY slowly.
aad form of progrese in t~ntYiesctec nomic develbop~ent~be date~r~iaed by the
coordination di the tao c _
jQuestion] tiave relati~e8c ncrete~than~in the paat?e8a coloni~s nov been
eatablished on basea mo
Pedro Peres: We believe that is in the inte~e8t of all concerned to maia-
tain a apecial relationship amon8 all of us. Obvi�ugly, there ate ~any
affinities between us which are a Yesuit of our joint ttistory a~~~~~8bove
colonies--especially the adoption of the same official 1~8~~ t~ia saoe tiae.
all, of the fact that we heve foug,ht againet a ca~oon es?m~?
22
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N.
h,,. ~a~ ~~~~c~nt. v~~ or~,~r ~
Fureh~rino~r~, t':1a~@ ~@~~~fl~~ r~l~tion~ ~ci~t ~oag mi~i~~nt~ and 1~~d~r~ af
our eo~intri~~ whieh ~a b~ck eo th~ b~ginning~ of th~ ~neicoiaeiaii~e ~~~ug- ~
gi~ m~v~tn~n~ ~ .
Th~ ie~d~r~ of for~n~r Pareugu@oe colonie~ aili eoon meee to di~cu~a Wha~her
ie waulci b~ ~dvi~~bi~ eo cr~ge~ ~ joinE ergenizeeton. ~te d~ nbt ~u~~a~e
ehi~ id~a, b~~~u~~ ~ p~~~~a~11y b~li~ve that ~ven th~ugh it i~ tn tha intar=
e~t of aii of ur~ eo uait~ perman~ae eoordin~eion organiaaeion of thie
kiad vauid nae b~ vi~b1~. Ev~e though ie ie qu3t~ obvioua Chat ehould
d~v~~op eur ~conomic ~nd poi~eie~?i r~~aeioee, ie i~ mor~ obvioue the~ ae
~houid a~i r~tein ind~p~nd~ne ~?~~a~. N~ believe thgt these relAtions 8te
@v~n mor~,fundam~ntai beceu~e th~y ~hould b~ ~een ~n rhe pretent context
vhi~h ie marked by ~~Q~?rch for ~ n~+~rorld economic order~ We beliave
Rhat in thi8 cont~x~ a~ muet aCart by iesuring cooparetion among Third Worid
Countri~~. ~e i~ ai~h ~hi~ Qad in mind ehat a8 maietnin good ralatione With
our n~ighborg--Q~mbi~, San~g~i, M~ii, Nig~r and eo forth.
H~ d~v~loping countrie~ ~uff~r from ~ cotnpi~xx--ae g~ry to obt~in ev8rything
t~ n~~d f~rom d~v~lop~d countrie~. ~u~ it ~~em~ obvious to me thae ve could
fuifil~ ~ny of our n~~ds by d~v~ioping cooperation among oureelva~. Let
th~r~ be no mietak~ aboue thi~ and 1et no one aegume tha~ We do not aant to
take eavantage of mankind'~ achievement~ aherever ~hey have taken pigce. On
th~ contrary, ae are Q~pecially aoneciou~ o~ ~h~ fact that in~ernat~onai co-
op8ratio~ ig of great importence for our deveiopment. Thie has beea dm?on-
,~trated by the fact that ~?e maintain relatione ~rith ~ost countriea in tha `
t+orld.
(Queationj tt is tru~ eh~t your foraign pol3cy ie very dynemic and that
you have developed cooperation linice aith masr c~ua~rins....
Pedro pires: It ie the intereational preatige echieved by the RA2GC during
the liberation aar vhich ha8 facilitated our task. Furtlu~rmore~ we have
received coneiderable aid because we have been able to conviace our iater-
locutor8 of our fufldamental lack of re8ources ahich has been aggravated by
~ the long period of drought ,from which our canntry hae suffered. We have
tried to further increaee o~r party's prestige ~y utilising retionaliy and
honestlq means piaced at our dispoeal. Pinaliq, ve ale~o belitve thet there
is no reaeon vhy ve ehould Ye~ect any aid fr~ aey govermaeat pxos?ided no
political conditions are attac~d to it.
~Queation] Are you nonthe.less not afraid that neocolonialism could be e~c-
tended under the cover o# international cooperat~oa. At leaat by meane of
dependence in the technological sph~re?
Pedro Pirea: Such ~ danger ai11 undoubtediy mciat until ve become economi-
ca11y independeat. Progress tovard the stage o~ comopl~t~ i~depeadence bas
not yet reacfued the point of no retnrn. bowever, ~te are t+aS~nB 8 etruB8le
23
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~~r
FOt~ ~~FICfAI, U~~ OPfLY
~ar eh~ ~~uflE~y'~ ii~~r~eian, ~ad a~ fuiiy reaiige hov div~ir~~ th~ me~h~ni~m~
of for~i~n damin~r.c~n ~~n b~. ~urth~rmor~, a+~ m~~~~ in~ur~ ~hae ehe couetry
do~~ nne ~uf~~r a r~~ule df euiturai lnfiu~nce~ e~t~rt~d by ~conom3e eys-
t~ incon~i~t~~t Wieh eh~ int~t~~~t~ rf ~h@ p~opi~. And ~he liberetion
~ti~u~gip mu~t b~ wgged ~rieh ~rp ti~ ~~ied~~ tt~~t ~.~E~~d~~~fld~ae~ ~ng dif~
fer~nt cauneri~~ i~ i~erp~~in~ d~iiy. ttor~v~r~ v~ ~uA~ kn~ horr Eo con-
etioi i~ and in~ur~ eh~e it do~e noE 8ff~ce th~ per~oeali~y aed opeion~ oE
~ii c~nc~rn~d~
~Qu~~tion~ Frdm uhi~h eountri~~ do mo~t of the cooperant~ come?
Pedro Pir~~: b@fini~~iy from Portugai, with whom ae mainta~n very good re-
iationg tn many ~~ctor~, principaily eh~ econamic, commerc~ai and cu~~ural
fi~lde; th~ ~am~ i~ tru~ for t~chn~cal aeeistence,
[Qu~~eidnJ An dAU cda~i~~ic~n wiii aoon be rev~aving th~ eiCuetion deriving
from eh~ i~nding ~f S~uth African pianee at ehe Sai internatinnal Airport.~~
Pedro Pir~~: Th~ ~AU commi~~ion is aup~oeed ~o pr~pose to us aome roiutione
Which eon~eitut~ ~n alteragtive t~ the pre~eet sieuation. I~ ie vidniy kno~m
~hat th~ airpore is prgctieally th~ only eourca o! revenue for the Island
and that it ig vital to it in preaent circumo~atancaa. if the OAU ~rould be
abi~ to compen~aee us for ~he financiai lossa8 raeulting from our breaking
the existing contract vith the South African Airlina. ve are ready to re-
nounce theae ~gr~~ments, vhich, at any rate. have beee inherited from ~he
time of the Porruguesa. colonization.
Our country is very poor, we are not aehamed eo admit iC~ buC it is thie
pove~c~y vhich mandateg our policy. Ne have even diecueeed thie iseua aith
a repres~ntative of the South African Libera~tion ~tovement~ ~he ANC (Afr~can
National Congreag] aith vhich~ needleee to ,~ey, ve maintain good re~atiore.
And he underatood our reaeone....
Howeve~, we make it 8 poir,t ot procleiming tt~ae Yretoria vill never impoee
its conditions on Cape Yerde~ no matter vhat their t~arura.
COPYRIG}iT: 1979 AFRIQUE-ASIS
CSO: 4400
24
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' Fak tl~t~iCiAL U3~ ONLY
c~Nmr~L a~icart ~t~
Ffi~ANC~ B~~KINC} ALTf~;RNAT~1i~ 30LU'1'ION ft~aARUINa ~OKA33A
,
paris AI~ItIptJ~-ASI~ in ~'ranah 11-24 Jun 79 pp 25-26
~r~Eio1~ by ~1i~ Ramaros "Th~ ~ankraptay of the Bloody
~mperor,"a'
~ex~] "Pspa nok" the Amin Dada o4 the
r8n~h speakers ie aoou8ad by Africa and
r?ith him a11 hi,s supportere and proteo~ora...
Nin~11y �xpoeed in broad dsylight~ s4ter ~Ehe revelatio~cu of
Arnnesty It~~tertia~ion~l ~baut the "bloody night" oP April snd
the resignstion o~ 3ylveetre BAngui, ambaseador of the Centrsl
African Empire BoksseQ~a reoord sppesra o~errrhelming . Th�
rssdera of AFIifQ1J~-A3I~ rrfll be the laet to be surprised*s
Since its foundatfon, their publicstion has raported~--~wi~h
mix~d feelings o~ shsme and anger--the comio or bloody ~aaaspsdes
oP a diatator rrho ia lollowing in the lootatepa ot Ami~n Dsda
and vbo a11ov8 the Me$tern medfa to cultivste s aimplistic
imsge of Alrics~ hallwsy be~xeen the ridiculou$ snd the unai~i-
lizea.
It is se old storys Jesn Bedel Bokases, enlfsted a~ 18 yesra
of age in the coloninl srmy, holder o! 15 Fronoh deaorations
after the 1939-1945 war and fi~?ttles in Indo-China, rose in the
ranks in the C@ntral Africsn ~~apublia, wstil he became chiot
o! ataff~ then--by mean~ of a Qoup d'etnt ifl 1965--preafd~nt
of a small country, to be sure, landlooked and poor, but r+hioh
aeemed deatined for a batter fate, it it had not been asd~ lad
rrf~h auoh a drendtul leader.
Previously, tben ss today Paris xss behind Bolcaasa ~ued "Psps
Bok" repays it xell. Ds t~sulle is his lather and he mourna
*~ee raore psrticul~rly AFBY~UE~ASI~ Noa ?9~ 125~ 135, 145 and 183
25
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M~
~n?~ h~~tClAl. U~N. dNLY
h~g d~~~,p~~o?rnnae; Pom~idou wi1l~~be hia "~riQnd": aiso,,rd ie
noW hig oousin or hia 'rele?tive. Je~n gedel Bolcaesa remained
a Frenah "P~triot" aa they no longer exie~E toaay in ~Ehe mother _
aountry: he 1~ep~E hi~ ~r~noh natianality= he bought for himeelf ~
~Ehanks ~Eo aums ~ppropriated from the etate budg~t s ~ha~Eosu
a~E YillemorAnt~ in Sologne~ ~ villa on the Cote ge~Ztrivisl~
cofe restaur~nt in Loir-et-Cher. In epit� of a
misundere~Eandinge, he 8oes not conceive of snother ms~or slly
for hfg oountry ~han the old coloni~l poaer promoted all st
onae to adviser~ milit~ry overs~er ana pthe~'mon~Eh.r Finaily~r~i
African budge~E~B dif4iou1~E last dnys of
when ~the former Quarterme?ster aergeant--aho becnme "msrsh~?11"
me~nWhile--got the iclea of being crowned "emperor~" it ie in
~re?n~e aga~n this oal~?ahest his ~ourt=etiquetten'�..hia eaglea,
hi~ uni~orms~ ~
I~ran~e'a patienoe aith ite Central A4rican protege hae never
flaggeds it h~s ignorod a11 the ac~ndalgs trom the "bloody ba~ll
of Bangui" in August 19T2, to the Jsnusry and April 1979 ma~as-
cres; from the gucaessive failureg of sn economy and a budget
drained by the unbridled excegaQa of the emperor or his aourt
(who are ~11 good buaineasmen) to the @xtra�iieatthePQOUntryeS
of the coronation. Paris r+hich alresby ~sPPof officie?1 Qoop-
with 12 billion CFA Pranca annuslly, Y y ifta
eration has never fafled to distribute~ in sddition, g
~Eo msin~afn friendship--lor example, s Super-~sruvMlle" in
1976 immediately christene8 "the Bsraka o~ 13 April i or 100
vehicles and 35 horges brought by plsne in 197? fthetdeb~arst
nstion; and especially Frenc~ never fafls to psY aters
the rig~ebel a~ainsththeir~master,~who ialslowyinrpsying thefr
do not 8
asle?rfes. ~
President ~tacard d'~stsin8, "honorary citizen of the Cl?R"
moreover hsd selected Ba~ngui to orgsnize there hia first trip
He took sdvaatsge of ft--~a he
to Africa ss chief of state. s~e or
did before for 10 days in August 1978--to hunt big g
elephants on the Ndele Reserve, pretending he does not uader-
atand the many gibes~ rrhich theae repeated sataria of another
age brinp, him in Frsnce. And vhen the French nevepspera spoke
out in Dacember 1977 to criticize the pomp snd sbgurd expenae
oY the c;oronntion~ s cooperation miniater appeared to tell N
them th~at "criticizing this cere~ony xss prsaticing rscfsm.
26
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~ ~Ok lll~'rrCl'At. US ~ f~NLY
,
53.lenc~ e?nd n~scret3on
~ut tltere ie something eleAS The Central A~rioan ~mp3re~ hoN-
ever ridiaulou~ i~ m~y be, h~n d~poei~t~ n~ dinmendg and ee~pe-
~aial~y uraniwn. I~ also hag a~ ~rontier with coneta~n~ly unetab,le
coun rieas Chsd, Za,3re. Yt is quite uee~ul to Franae that tha
emperox ha,s approved~ in reoent yesrs~Prom the reaee8eg of his
Napoleon3o p~1a~e, all the Frenah government's belligeren~t ~
aaropa~3gns in APr3ca, beg~.nning with the KolWex~, "clennup"
opQration.
It ia aff3rmed 3n dfplomatic and m3litary aircles that Be?ngu3--
whioh waa, like the ~ormer Fort Lamy~ one oP ~the ba$ee o~ the
I~'renoh Army under ~olonization--eould reaume thia rule of a
stop on the royal highway o~ intervention~, whiah run~ ~rom
Europe to southern ?Prica, passing through Zaire.
All the$e reagon~s are enough to explain ~thst ae~ide ~rom s Yew
isolsted publiaationa like ours, it was ponsible to en3oin
s3lenee. The emperor;s escspades Nere the price to pay,in the '
beat oP cases,for maintaining a preaenees it Wae suggeated to
the 4oreigners on the spot tha,t they sttribute ft to a congeni-
te,l madnesa of the Africane, all a li~i;tle bit extravsgsnt, is it
not so? As for the reat~ it enough to control communfastione
channels: watch the telex; incresse the surve3118nae o4 coopera-
~ tion workera, studenta and ofPicials; regularly purge looa~l
reporters; expel possible press correapondents...All that ia
one of the esaiest assignments for speoislfst~.
Thus after the imposing pa~gesntry of the eoronation in December
1977, a veil of modesty agnin covered the ~ormer Centrel sfricgn _
Republic. One wanted to forget how Jesn Hedel had ~logged some
thieveg himself in August 1972,before forcing the croad to Pile
past their corpses, or hov he treated Kurt Waldheim, UN 3ecretary
aeneral--aho xas astonished at these manners--" of a pimp, ~srmer
' snd imperislist." For Marshall Bokasss~ future emperor~ lfke
Arain Dada, was adept at smbiguous lsngusge, when it guited him:
He a:lso condemned ' the ~estern exploiters," When the~~opportuni,ty
appeared, even having the French Embsssy in Be,ngui stoned one
dsy, and tnking his part in s rether unexpected csmpaign of
insults against Jacques Foccsrt, Pormer chie~ of the asulliat
"unotficial secret agents." Nevertheless he took cover under
the European umbrella. He sent commercial misaions to 3outh
Africa and sucked t'he blood of his people as ~ex xicked ~oreign
cspitslists knor~ how to do:
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, ~
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One wnntod to ~orqet ~the guccegsion oP governments~ aong~Eantly
modi~iedf ~the anarchy in aseignin~ port~ol3,og~ whAre Bokaeea
had gone q~~ �e~r as ~to te~1~e upon him~elf six departmentsy fn
Qddition to hie supreme regpong3bilities= the appoin~ment as
pr~me minister of the celebrated Mr~ E13zabeth Dom~tien (~50
kilograms, numerous plantstions after her marriage to a Europee~n
settler) and her departure~~a~ter ghe had adviaed "Papa" agafnat
~ becoming emperor, ~s he began to aonceive the ~dea in 1976.
One had to handle adroitly financial di$a~ter~ of sll type~s
embe~zlements~ comm3.tments for fantastia expendi~turea~ corrup-
tion etc.--to the point where Boke~ssa hsd gone so far ss to
publish big notices in the Europesn preas with his gignsture~
warninq the public that Central A~ricen diplomats should not
be believed on their word, when they mentioned money snd the?t
he himaelf had dec3ded to personally e3.gn all checka involving
the stnte or a nstionalfzed compsny. rt wss neceggsry to vink
a,t the president's choatic tamily situations at the true and
~alse "Ma,rtine" from Yietnam; "Prince aeorge," hie grsnd~on
expelled from the country,only s week s~ter being sppointed
minYSter of state; or at his thirtieth legitimate child~ im~ne-
diately baptised "Prinae Se,int-Jean de Bokasae? de Berengo de
Bobsngui of Central APriaa~" e~t the sa,me tfine thst a holidsy
was decreed in his honor:
The Bloody Weekend
It was sdvisable to cover up the attempted ssae?seinations (in-
cluding the one organized by the be,tte,l3on chie~~ Okrou~ his
own son-in-leW in February 1976) end the imprisonment of minis-
ters. It wes also better to forget the~t~ Qonverted oatenta-
tiously to Islam at the end nf 1976 e.nd taking on that occa~sion
the neme of Salah Eddine (fighter ~or the fsith), he ha~d given
up this name the Pollowing year~ for resson$ of imperial ex-
pediency--"Salah I" not being Na,poleonic enough--and how he
afteraards got involved in the shady dealings oP e~ lormer
Israeli generel who became sll-powerYul in Bsngui.
It was even suggested to Porget the coronation itselP, whoae
retrosctive splendor compsred xith the agonies of the daily
lives of his imperial majesty's subjects, had seemed all the
same outrageous to most observers. And it vrss sdvised to
8 ~
overlook rrith it, the etiquette oP the court o~ Beren o the
series of imperial decrees~ the "dual government" (Which indi-
cated a dif~icult arrangemeat betr?een the "emperor's "adviaera"
and the remaining ministers in~Bangui).
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;
~ ' i~'Ok dl~'1~'ICIAL USL ONLY
But the seoonde~ry achool ~tudents~ whose Preedom of expre~sion
wa,~ ~aa,red as well ~.e that o~ the common peoplo, and whom ~their
empQror alwnye considored a paolc of sooundrels, kindly remem-
~ bered themselv~s to the dietator and managed to g~t ~ome pub-
lioit~y a,broad.
L~,gt.J~,nuary was a weekend o~ riots. The reg3me ~ound itael~
openly de~iQd, Por ~he first time, in 3,ts "imperia,l ca~pital,'~
becau~e it had forced the aecondary student~ to wear a uniform
which would distinguish them from the nonstudents--that is,
from the street loafera. "Le Paysan" Supermarket and the tex-
tile products aompeny--belonging to Bokassa or "B mpresa
C~,therine"-Wwere attQCked, as well as several Frenah establiah-
ments. To restorQ order, Bokassa requested the intervention
af Mobutu~ his Zairian a11y, who sent to B~,ngui a company of
the 301st Paratroop Regiment with 3ts codre of Frenoh ndvisers.
When the emperor's troopa were confined to barracks beeause
they had run out of ammunition, the Za,irian paratroopera cleared
the city with mortar fire~ producing who knows how many victima
and who will ever lcnow? Mobutu, "brother" oP the emperor came
to repQy him Por his favor of the previous years had no~
Bokassa sent a contingent to Sha.ba, ce,lled the Inter-A~ric~n
Neocolonial Force to support Zaire...
During this period,silence or almost silence reigned in Pe,ris.
It would be the same in April aPter the "bloody night": at
least 30 children ar students were stoned to death; 20 were
sufPocated.
Several weeks were necessary ~or clear evidence to surPace:
""the young people Were arrested at random; Bokassa went to the
Ngaraba, central prison~ etc. Questioned closely during the
Franco-African Conference in Kigali~ the emperor denied every-
things "I am e great Christien, baptised at Frejus, confirmed
in Lourdes...Moreover, my people raised me to the high rank oP
marshall, then emperor...Marxism-Leninism vants to degtroy my
empire..."
But the regime was elready splitting dangorously. France, the
Ivory Coast and Senegal--leaders o~ the moderates h~d to alloW
an investigative committee in Bangui. The Paris government
promised to temporarily fr~eze military sid to the empire to
appease French public opinion. And Ambassador Sylvestre Bangui~
whose resignation created an uproar, travels all over A~rica
to expla,in why he decided, in his turn--and although bela,tedly--
to join the opposition. Meanwhile~ a possible alternetive
solution is being studied in the quiet of the Elysee offices.
One is never too discreet...
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
29
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r~oR or~iCia~, us~ ntnY
CENTRAL AFRTCAN E1~IRL
SYLVESTRE BANGUT SAID TO SUPPORT CONSTTTUTTONAI, MONARCHX
parig JELiNE AF'RIQUE in ~rench 6 Jun 79 p 16
[Article by J.M.Z.: Sylvestre Bangui: Wh~t Now
,~Text/ "Mon general, bravol" cried all the Central Africans living abroad.
Finally! a representative of his ma~eaty, Sylveatre Bangui, said no. The
Zola-style "I accuae" fell like a bomb ~ust when agreement had been reached
Co say that the Bokassa a~fair had dominated the French-African summit ati
Kigali. ~
The stage was undoubtedly set. Shortly after the coup d'etat in 1966, the ~
Central African monarch, then a colonel, lese and lesa tolerated the presence
~ of his companion in arms, then quartermaeter of the armed �orces. Unable to
place his Quartermaster under arrest, Bokaesa opened an embassy for him in
OtCawa. Later Sylveatre Bangui, promoted to the rank of general, would learn
what "diplomatic exile" was, fiar from public or private affaira. Although
sidelined, the ambaesador remained loyal to the Bokaesa regime.
What is it today that is driving the man who is ~ust a former Central
African ambassador and the new leader of the Ubangi Liberation Front which
he himself founded? Is the former diplomat getting ready to go underground?
While many have applauded the initiative of Sylvestre Bangui, it ia also
true that there ia aurprise in some Central African circles over his T~nia
the whole moderate, even contradictory" intentiona vis-a-vis crown.
true that whereas the ambassador has sharply condemned the repeated murder
oS chidren, he has still not called upon the emperor to step down. "I favor
a constitutional monarchy," he has said. But the empire already has a
constitution under which Bokassa should be a constitutional monarch. Ien't
- the ambassador merely demanding that the constitution, heretofore ignored,
be enforced, or are there other tnotives involved? According to some
Central Africari oppositionists, Mr Bangui.~s poei.tton u~ight give Bokassa .
the chance to make overtures--whi.ch would still not mean much of a retreat--
enable the ambassador to reap the benefits. _
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! . .
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~ One might nlso considex another theory under which Che rearorat3on of Che
conseitueional monarchy would sancCion seCt~.ng the emperor g~nCly aside and
bringing to a conclus~on ehe abol~.Cion o~ the emp~.re. France would not
be hoatile eo the latter soluC~,on, wh~,ch would preserve ~.tis interests in
Central Afr3ca and might satisfy 3rs other allies on the continent.
~ 5ylvesCre'Bangui plana to visit the African heads of atate. W111 he receive
encouragement? There is little likelihood that Che wiaemen of Africa will
give him'their endorsemenr. Tn Che African tradition, the preference ie for
Chinge ro be handled in ehe family, Too viaible an e~for~ abroad in Africa -
' would be regarded with dis~avor.
In the midst of all this confuaion, what has become of the men whose namea
circulate'as poasible candidate?: Yangango Maidou (prime miniater), Malendoma
(member of the board of directors of ~?ir Afrique), Ange Patasse (former
prime minister)? Will they accept Mr Bangui's leadership? For the moment,
none of them has said. BuC perhaps other initiatives will occur to eclipae
Che "bomb" dropped by Bokaesa~a former ambassador.
~ COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1979
9268
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, ,.f,
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~ CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE
FOREIGN REAL ESTATE OWNED BY BOKASSA NOTED
Yaris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Jun 79 p 14
[Article by Abdelaz iz Dahmani: "Retresta ~or an Emperor~']
,~Text/ In 1968, 2 years after hia coup d'etat, when J~an-Bedel Bokaeea
met General de Gaulle, he aeked for two things: the Legion of Honor and
a biatro on the Riviera. De Gaulle refuaed him both deapite their modeaty.
Thia has not prevented Bokaesa, after appropriating almost everything in
Central AErica, from making his forCune in France. -
He has four homes there: E1 Patio, a luxurious villa on the Riveria; the
Bel Air, a huge home near Romarantin; a villa in Yvelines; and last but
not least the Villemorant chateau in Sologne, a veritable muaeum p~~ce
surrounded by hunting grounds. Bokassa alwpy.s goes there wiCh great pomp
and at timea is surprised not to find a French Government minister on hand
when he geta off his plane to go to Tours. It is near there in the village
of Neung-sur-Beuvron that�Bokassa has decided to live and in early 1979
bought a cafe-bar-restaurant, the Montangue.
He also has several properties in Switzerland in the region of Berne where
he owns the embasay itaelf, plus a large building in Khartoum in Sudan.
These properties enable him to lead an extravagant life.
The 5uper Caravelle bearing his name (he also has a Corvette decorated by
Hermes and a Mystere 20) often flies between Bangui and Paris. Bokassa's
chef comes regularly to shop in the Rungis marketa (caviar and salmon by
dozens of kilos, champa~ne by hundreds of cases). To recover his expenses,
the emperor offers travelers half-price fares on the imperial line. Departure
dates are announced over the imperial radio.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Atrique. GRtJ~JTA 1979
9268
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I
~ CT}{IOPIA
~
i ,
~ ,
I
i
I
I
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I
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~
i RCPORT ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY SITUATION IN 1977 AND EARLY 1978
I Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Jun 79 pp 1615-1617
;
i
[Text] The recent quarterly bulletins of the Naeional Bank of Ethiopia yield
, basic elements in the siruation of the counCry in 1977 and, for certain
i ' sectors, during the Eirst few months of 1978.
i The population of Ethiopia was estimated at 30 million inhabitants for 1977,
; a year which was difficult on rhe political level and was characrerized
i economically by a deficit in the balance of payments which, for the three
~ preceding years, had showed.a surplus.
i
' U~~spicc~ a favorable export situation, thanks to the high price levels reached
by coffee on the world market, this deficit is the result of the state of
war which led to a drop in production, disruption of the main foreign trans-
~ portation routes, a reduction in investments and finally, increased financial
I needs which could not be met except through recourse to bank credit, the
~ source of the rise in prices and the increase in the monetary mass.
; On these two points, the situation did not yet seem to have been improved in
; the first quarter of 1978, while it was too early to estimate the trend in
' the balance of payments.
I
i ~ In addition, the damage ~aused by the war was estimated at the beginning of
i 1978 at one billion birr for the Harrar region alone.
j The most recent economic accounts for Ethiopia are those for the 1975-1976
I fiscal year (1 July 1975-30 June 1976). They show negative growth for the
domestic products at current prices in 1974-1975 and a slight resumption of
' growth in 1975-1976.
~
I
~ * On December 31, 1977, an SDR [Special Drawing Righr] was equivalent to 2.533
~ birr or 5.715 French francs, and that 1 birr was equivalent to about 2.25 francs.
I
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Grosa Narional Product at Current Prices '
(In millions of birr)
1973-1974 1974-1975 1975-1976
At E~ctor Costs.......... 5150.8 5103.5 5588.1 ~
Annuril grnweh rate + 11 - 0.7 + 9.5
Ae m~rket prices......... 5514.8 5997.7 60GO.a
At constant prices, using 1960-1961 as a base, the situation is comparable,
bue the per capita gross national product is far from the maximum reached in
1972-1973: 150.1 birr.
Gross National ProducC at Constant Prices (1960-1961) ~
(In millions of birr)
1973-1974 1974-1975 1975-1976 '
At factor costs........... 3936 3939.5 � 4047.6
By category: ,
Agriculture, forestry,
fishing 1940.1 1905.6 . 1964.1
Other productions...... 633.7 624.3 605.8
Distribution........... 612.7 611.6 630.5 �
Other services......... 749.5 801 845.9
At factor costs per capita 148.7 145.4 145.6
Farm Production
~ Farm production accounted for 48.5 percent of this last gross national product ,
figure. On the whole it has failed to increase because of circumstances;
after several years, want continues to prevail in the Wollo (Dessie) following
the 1977 droughC, affecting a half-million peasants. The insufficiency of
food production and the precarious nature of transport facilities have been
among the causes of the cosr of living increase. �
Coffee production, after reaching a maximum of 109,000 tons in 1975 (coffee
inspected by the Coffee and Tea Development and Marketing Author~ty) suffered
its most serious drop in 1977. There was recovery in 1977-1978, with the
considerable increase in prices during the first half of 1971 being followed
by a drop which became even more notable at the beginning of 1978, as the
table below shows.
* The assessment of exportable production by the International Coffee Organi- ~
aation showed 62,900 tons �or 1976-1977, 79,900 tons for 1977-1978, with an
estimate of 75,900 tons for 1978-1979.
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~ ~ Cnff~Q Subj~et Av~reg~ Price
td I~i~p~rtion Expore~ per K~logr~m
(in tons) (1n tony) (th birr)
1974..:~ 80,324 55,666
1975~..~..~ 73,674 S5 363 2.a8
r
19~6 80,123 71,425 5~56
1977 71,589 49,960 10.81
lat Quarter 1977........ 39~878 30,121 10.8 (See
ist Quart~r 1978......~. 58~891 40,432 8.6 Note)
NOTE: Averag~ price for flrst quarter.
Sugar productfon remain~d more st~ble than coffee production, but exports
were considerably reduced in 1977, while importa remained v~ry weak as beEore.
Production
Sacked Exports
(in thouaands oE tons)
1974 120.5 9.7 F
1975 124.9 23.9
1976 124.8 15.8
1977 124.7 4.7
lst Quarter 1977........ 46.3 1.6
lst Quarter 1978........ 51.2
An agreement was signed with Havana calling for the building of new sugar
miils and the training of Ethiopian ~ersonnel in Cuba.
Cotton production on the state farms was considered good in 1977-1978~ and
the produc:tion estimate was 62~400 tons, a figure in excess of the needs oE
the local plants, assessed at 21~OOQ tons of cotton fiber.
There is no indication given as to other types of production, but the
reEerence to exports of certain farm products shows the decline seen since
1974, except for oil cake for cattle, as the result of the increase in
domestic grinding activity.
Exports of Ethiopian Parm Products
(In tons)
1973-1974 1976-1977
Sesame Seed 84,174 18,558
Leguminous Crops (lentils, beans)........ 143,886 75~465
Cotton Fiber 6,364 2,791
Oil CAke for Cattle 68,743 94,733
Nides and Leather 11,801 8~114 -
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Th~ M~nuf~eeuring Indu~try
Uthhr pruciu~~lnn ~atpgnri~e~ ~~~nunt~d Ear 15 p~er~~n~ o~ ~h~ gr~s8 naeidnat "
prndu~t in 1975-19~6. Amon~ ~h~a~ c~t~gari~s, m~nuf~cturing producttoh
~e~eount~d for ~nly 4.2 p~rc~nt, ~r~ft prddu~tion ~nd thp gmall and m~dium-
~iz@d ~'flt@CpC~S@9 fnr 4.~ p~r~~nt, COf19tCUG~~Gfl ~nd pubtie aork~ Eor 4.9
p~rr~tit, ~nd wat~r ~nd ~l~eericity For 1.2 pprc~ne. Thp c~ner~l steeiseicat
d~Eir~ nE thp Ethiapi~n g~v~rnmpne ~st~blishpd ~n index of ma~nufacturing pro-
duction ~ctivity, with th~ b~~~ y~ae 1~69-19~0 ~qu~l to ~00. Its devQlopm~nt
~nd ~h~t of c~reein cat~gories w~~ a~ folloas~
1974-1975 1975-1976 1976-1977
' Ind~x df m~nuE~cturing
prnduction a~ ~ who1~........ 127.4 ~24.4 124.4
tneludingt
Food Industri~s 144.6 126.8 129.9
'['exttl~ Industries........... ~20.7 126.S 118.2
Chemicai Industri~s.......... 125.0 11~.9 120.5
ConatruCti~n Matprials....... 104.8 66.7 88
Met~ls 93.9 76.5 86.6
`Che majrrrity of thp industries, ~~~ording to the June 1977 index, held steady
(textitps) or show~d a dectine (above all, chemical induatries)~ except Eor
leather ~nd beveragps. A number of industrial projpcts, in particuter in
the textil~e, oil and soap, flour milling and food pastes and paper pulp
sectors, were in the process of completion.
Eleccricity produceion increased gradually, above all thgt from water sources
(in militons of kilowatt hours)s
Total From
Production Water Sources
1975 391.0 311.7
1976 408.9 363.0
1977 427.6 374.8
lst Querter 1977.......... 104.4 91.9
lst Quarter 1978.......... 108.8 95.0
Consumer Prices
The index of retail consumer prices in Addis Ababa increased substantially
beginning in 1975, but shoWed a relatively limited rate of groath in 1977.
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, . . . . . . y . . . / . . . ` . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
1~`~ ~ ~!1?'tC ~AL U9~ ~NLY
R~tail Pri~~ 1nd~x in Addi~ Ab~b~ (i963 = 100)
Av~r~g~ V~rt~eion
Ann~~1 ind~x Cx)
l974........~ iS9.7
1975..........~...~..~......... 170.1 ~ 6.9
19~~..........~~..~...~........ 218.7 +28.S
1977..........~~ 254~9 +16.6
'Ch~ cd~t of E~ud prnduetg wes thp m~in cauge oE rhis incr~~s~, ag eh~ ind~x
f~r th~ mon~h oE Decemb~r for eh~ thre~ last y~ars ehoas.
. G~n~r~l
index Food Housing Clorhing
December 1975..~.......... ~8518 19y.2 191.9 197.0
D~t~:ember 1976 236.b 270.9 233.0 207.4
Decembpr 1977 270.8 303.8 293.2 230.6
June 291.9 338.7 287.7 241.3
Percentage variation between .
December 1977 and June 1978 + 7.8 - 12.4 - 2.1 + 4.6
Thp difficulties in transportation, particutarly Where the D,~ib~ouei reilroad
was concernpd, aggravated the capital's supply problema. Hoaever~ intervention
by the cooperatives and the state, as aell as strengthened price control~
rontriL~.~.ed to reducing the increase at the end of ?977.
Poreign trade
According to the customs sratistics, the foreign trade b~lance beginning in
1975 was no~ favorable, but an improvement occurred in 1977 thanks to coffee
prtces. -
Ethiopia's Foreign Trade
(In milliona of birr)
Imports Exports Balance
CIF FOB
1974 590.2 547.3 - 42.9
t975 64~.9 648.4 - 179.5
1976 729.5 572.8 - 156.7
1977 727.8 (excluding 688.6 - 39.2
ist five months oE 19i7... 322.8 crude oil 311.2 - 11.6
lst five months of 1978... 273.0 imports) 248.7 - 24.3
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lmpure~ by m~i~ ~~ce~r~ W~r@ aa Eollowa, taking into accoune ~hat oii produc~s
muse b~ ~ubj@ceed ~o ~n ad~us~mQne b~ginning in i9~7s
i975 19~6. l977
(in millions of birr)
� Oil produc~s 141.g 110.9 40.3
Textil~g and ~loehing 46.5 7~.2 119.1
Aueamoeive vehict~s 75.3 90.1 96.2
MachlnQg (inctuding ~ireeafe)........... 76.8 127~7 80.3
El~c~.ricei equipmene . 30.5 3S~0 53.9
Metals ~nd meeel products.......�.��.��. 44.9 3S.8 50.8
Ch~mical produces 96.3 ~8.6 54.6.
Food praduces (including animal products
end bevprages) 27.2 42.6 39.9
~ther produces 112.8 13f.6 f93
' Despite the aituation in agriculture, fmportg of food products remain~d
retatively minar. In 1977, on the other hend, ae see a gubatantial increase
in texeile import~ eo meet thQ urgent needs of the population. There was .
also an increase in electricat equipment, metals (bacauge of the rssump~ion
of construction), and vehicies, and a decrease where machinea (~he airplane
purchases having been made in 1976) and chemical products aere concerned.
The trend for the first five months of 19~8 was comparable, but shw+ed a
recovery in imports of machiriery.
The countries of origin of the imported goods aere videly diversified, aith
- Japan, Italy and the United States in the leading positions.
Va1ue of Imports by Ethiopia by Country of Origin
(In millions oE birr)
1975 1976 1977 '
Japan 75.9 91.3 128.6
italy ~ 69.0 64.5 81.1 '
United States 47.3 76.3 73.5
FRC 63.1 64.8 65.6
United Kingdom 48.8 46.9 46.7
South Korea 2.1 2.6 33.5
Rest of the aorld 341.7 387�1 298�2
Totat 647.9 729.5 727.8
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~~~~@rn Asi~, in~ludi~~ ~tong Kong, Chih~, 'C~iw~n ~nd 3ing~pnre, w~11
~ ~h~ ~wd COUtIECLl6 1i~t~d a~~oune~d ~or 27.9 p@r~~n~ af th~ imports in 1971.
Th~ ~ontrlbutidn nf 5~udi Ar~bi~ i~ not ~hawn !n this t~b1p, bee~us@ whl1~ it
Alregdy e~m~ tn ~9.5 mlilion birr in 1~77, it will dnubtl~ss hev~ ~a be
ifl~r~~sed Wh~n th~ ~d,~ust~n~n~ an thp v~lu~ ~E ~i1 products h~e be@n ce1~ul~t@d.
~r~neh ~~IpB ~o Eeiiiapi~ ~~m~ to 1G~5 million birr fn 1977, compar~d ta
27~6 i~ i975 ~nd 16 in 19~6. Frane~ r~nked nineh, ~Ee~r Holl~nd.
'the CEMA enunerip~ incrpa~~d th~ir ~gle in 1977 (2G.8 million birr as
comp~red.to 24.2 in 1976), th~ US3R ~nd Czechoslov~kia b~ing the mein
suppli~r~.
CafEe~ h~s for ~ long tim~ b~~~ th~ l~~ding expore in t~rm~ of vA1u~,
~ecounting ~or 75.4 p~rc~nt of th~ total pxports in 197~. All of thp
pr~duets exported wpre f~rm prnduct~, the main dn~~ being as Eollowgt
1975 1976 1977
; (In million~ of birr)
Cr~en eaEf~~ iS2.3 324.6 519.3
Hides and leether........... 34.4 55.4 47.4
Leguminous products......... 64.8 55.8 43.4
Oleaginous grains........... 84.9 31.2 17.5
_ Oral ceke Eor cattle........ 5.6 10.8 9.4
Fruits and vegptabl~s...~... 7.5 7.~ 7.5
Sugar, live animals and grains practically ceased to be exported in 1977.
In the Eirse five months of 1978, the situation Was similar, with an increase
in th~ exports of hides and leather, but a very substantial reduction in
. exports of fruit and vegetables, because of the interruption of railroad
transportation.
The countries to which these exports aere consigned are very numerous,
because oE the very Wide range of nations which are consumers of Ethiopian
Arabiea cofEee. The CDR thus moved up to the poaition oE Ethiopia's second
most important cuatomer, after the United States, in 1977, but it no tonger
appeared on the list of consignees Eor the first quarter of 1978.
France purchased goods Worth 21.2 million birr from Ethiopia in 1977 (11.7 in
, 1975 and 2b.5 in 1976), including coffee worth 1~.7 million and hides and
leather Worth 2.7 million.
Exports to the CEMA countries totated 104.8 million birr. Excluding the CDR
and its exceptional purchase of coffee, these countries, led by Poland, Were
mainiy interested in hid~s and leather.
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~o~ or~icrni, us~ cna~~r :
V~tue of Ethlapi~n Exporeg by Counery oE Deetinaeion
Cin mlllluns oE bfrr)
1975 1976 197~
Uni~td S~st.~~ 93.2 189.4 177.5
CDR 99.8
~RG 57.0 35.1 59.4
S~udi Arab~a 63.6 43.0 59.5
Japan 4A.3 40.2 47.9
iealy 20.8 40.0 33.2 ~
D~ibouti..........�.�.����� 53.5 49.4 33
R~st of tha World.......... f40.0 175.7 178.3
Toeal 468.4 572.8 688.6
Ethiopia's trad~ with other African nations 8ccounred for only 2.3 percent of
the impore total in 1977 and 7.2 percent of th~ export total. The situation
can be asaessed from the folloWing tabl~. ~
~thiopian Trade aith Other African Nations _
(Main countries involved~ in milliona of birr)
'fotel Djibouti Kenya Egypt Mauritius Malawi
1975
Imports........... 14.2 0.9 8.$ 0.1 1�5
Expores........... 108.6 53.5 8.9 41.9 0.4
1976
Imports........... 10.5 1.4 8.3 0.3
Exports........... 78.5 49.4 0.3 29.6 2.3
~ 1977 1.2
Importa........... 16.9 1.3 11.8 0.3
Exports........... 49.5 33.0 1.3 10 0.9
Thus we can see an increase in the weak flow of imports from Kenya and
difficulty in maintaining a profitable export floa to the Republic of Djibouti
and Egypt. This situation seems to have deteriorated further in the course
of the first quarter of 1978, particLlarly with regard to trade with Djibouti.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
5157 .
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' ECdNOMIC AND MONETARY SITUATION REPORTED FOR L977 AND LARLY 1978
~
! Paris MARCNB5 TROPICAUX B~' hf~nIT~RRANgBNS in French 22 Jun 79 pp 1681, 1682
?
! [TexC] Continued from preceding isaue.
I
~ 'I'he Balance of Paymenea
i
; In 1977, after three years o� surplus, Ethiopia faced a sign~.Ficant deficit
' in the balance of foreign payments. This is shown in the following table: ~
;
~
' Ethiopia's Balance of Foreign Payments
~
~ (In Millions of Birr)
i
1975 1976 1977
f
Goods and services -178.8 -199.7 -287.7
~ Merchandise - 88.7 -132.9 -173.7
~ Services (transportation, lending,
travel, etc.) -106.8 -104.3 -135.1
~ :nvestment income - 24.1 - 3.2 - 6.g
I Governmental transactions...... + 40.8 + 40.7 + 20.6
~ Net transfers + 82.7 +131.0 +114.0
~
Movements of capital +129.7 +111.8 + 68.1
~ Long term +148.3 +138.3 + 71.5
~ Shoxt term - 18.6 - 26.5 7.4
~ , -
i ~rrors and Omissions (net)....... - 26.2 - 13.1 - 28.2
~
; Balance + 7.4' +.30.0 -133.8 ~
~
;
i Despite the favorable situation of coffee, expc~rts of which were not suf- .
ficient to compensate for increased imports, the deficit in the balance of
' 41
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_ tr~d~ increased, ~t a tiime Wh~~r~nsfersu�romg~broadreign capital were apprec-
iably diminishing, w~il as
~~~~w g~nural :~Ituutlun wus nbvinusly ~ggravnted, which disrupted tr~nsportation
gnd decreased production. in 1978 an effort was made to increase coffee ex-
ports and diversi�y its destina~henbalance~oftvisibiertransactionsrwaseto~be
essential imports; 3n that w~y
improved.
In 1977 the situation brought a decreas1977_1978~the~decreaseiwas~largerhoid-
ings (-20.6 percent). For fiscai year .
332,800,000 Birr (42.3 percent).
The Monetary Situation
Available information makes it possibae ~As forYthetotherntrcpicaltAfxicanfor
the period 1 July 1977 to ~0 June 197
countries of the Northern Hemio accounthasfit~doesa herharvestscand purchases
is the most active, taking ~int
by producers.
Fiscal year 1977-1978 was characterized, in relation to thechieflyedueeto the
a significant increase in actual currency ~(+19.2 percent),
circulation of paper money (2~.1 percegtincreasedabye14e6 percentt~and hisde
posits. The total monetary assets thu erations carried out
situation is due to the fact that following monetary op
from September 1976 to January 1977 an appreciable shrinking of those assets
occurred. The situation in December 1976 caused these data to appear:
By virtue of duplicate currency, domestic credit substantially increased in
1977-1978, by 49�9 percent, whereas foreign reserves, for the National Bank
as well as for commercial banks, decreased.
Growth of Monetary Assets From June 1976 to June 1978
(In Millions of Birr
Paper Money Demand Total Quasi Monetary
Circulation Deposits Currency Currency Assets
End of June 1976.... 810.2 282.b 1,092.8 329.0 1,421.8
~nd December 1976... ~47.7 235.0 809.7 449.9 1,259.6
~ End of June 1977.... 696 299.7 996�3 471.6 1,467.9
End December 1977... 769�3 329:9 1,187.2 495.0 1,682.2
knd of June 1978���� 857�
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Duplicate Currency
Crcditc 1. 'Cn Gov~rnm~nt; 2. prfvato; 3. Totei; 4. Nnt I~ornign Iloid3ngs)
;
~ (In Millions of ~irr)
~ 1 2 3
' ~nd of June 1976.... 407.5 487,8 895.3 736.2
Lnd December 1976... 445.1 A94.7 942.1 649.3
~nd o� June 1977,... 443.1 525.0 968.1 786.6
~ Lnd Uecember 1977... 605.6 572.0 1,17~.6 515.6
~nd of June 1978.... 766.3 685.2 1,451,5 453.8
Thus there is a strang expansion of credit to the government, 731,300,000 of
_ which was granted by the National 9ank on 30 June 1978, to make up 78.7 per-
cent of the total.
~ The credit operations of the c~mmercial banks, excluding those dealing with
government documents, were clistributed as follows, according to economic sec-
tors, on 30 June 197~: domestic trade, 99,900,000 Birr; industry, 78,100,000
~irr; agriculture, 54,400,000 Birr; building and public works, 77,100,000
Birr; personal loans, 8,800,000 Birr; foreign trade, 232,600,000 Birr (includ-
~ ing exports, 109,SOO,OQO; imports, 123,100,000); total, 550,900,000.
i .
~ 6thiopia's net foreign holdings were distributed as follows over a two-year
~ period (in millions of Birr):
Foreign Holdings of Foreign Holdings of
National Bank Commerciai Banks
31 December 1976........ 615.3 34.0
30 June 1977............ 648.6 138.0
31 December 1977........ 447.5 68.1
i 30 June 1978............ 360.1 93.7
The favorable situation of 30 June 1977 was due to the rise in the price of
; coffee~exports.
i
Finances of the State
~ Statistical information makes it possible to establish the state finances sit-
~ uation over the first nine months of fiscal year 1977-1978, that is, from
i
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July 1977 to March 1978, ~nd to compare it with the seme period of the pre- ,
c~ding year,
Budget ary d~ficits brought about recourse by the Public Treasury to the bank-
ing credits pointed out above,
'fhe government's domestic clebt to the National Bank and other banks h~d in-
cre~sed as follows: December 1976, 655,0OO,OAO ~irr; June 1977, 648,000,000
Birr; December 1977, 837,000,OOO.Birr; June 1~)78, 1,019,000,000 Birr. On xhe
latter date the debt was divided between the National Bank~(731,300,000), the
commercial banks (199,000,000) and various organizations (88,800,000).
Situation of Ethiopia's State Finances
(Millions of ~irr)
Income Indirect Taxes on Taxes on *
Total Tax Tax~s Hydroelectric Comm., ext.
Revenues: Power
July 1976/March 1977.... 557.0 81.7 105.5 18.4 351:5
July 1977/March 1978.... 588.1 94.7 109.9 19.1~ 364.4
Expenditures: Total .Ordinary Capital
July 1976/March 1977.... 627.4 495.0 132.4 �
July 1977/March 1978..�.. 787.1. 639.0 148.1
*[expansion unknown]
The foreign public debt was the subject of an analysis which concluded that it
increased by 8.2 percent as of June 1978, in relation to th9 preceding 30 June;
48 percent of this debt had to do with the IBRD [International Bank for Recon-
struction.and Uevelopmant].and.its.subsidiaries, and.24..6 percent with t}ie
United States. It was estimated as follows (in millions of Birr):
.Called in Outstanding
1974-1975 134.7 767.9 '
1975~1976 140.5 843.1
1976-1977 127.5 949.4
1977-1978 97.7 1,027.6
Debts called in reached their highest level in 1975-1976 and then fell off,
which curtailed the increase of Ethiopia's public debt.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
8946 44
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i GUINEA
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I
! PLASTICS FACTORY LOAN--The Iraqi Fund for Foreign Development hae granted
! a 6.5 million loan to Guinea for the conaCruction of a plastice factory.
; 'i'his 1oan, which carriea a 3 percene intereat raCe, ia reimbursable in
~ 12 years with a 3-year grace period. T'hia amount was granted following a
~ v isit to Guinea by the director general of the Fund. During this viait,
; he had studied witli Guinean officials the various meana to finance the
i construction of the facCory, whose total coat ia apprc,ximately $1G million.
~ (Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Jun 79 p 1728)
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MAURITIU5
DIVISIONS OBSERVED WITHIN MAIN PARTIES
Paria AFRIQUE-ASIC� in~'Franch 28 May 79 pp 18-19
[Article by Herve Masson: "A Double Diviaion"] ~
[Text~ The Ma~ority in Power, While the Oppoeition is
Torn by Conflicting Groupe.
- Will it or won't it fall? The government of Sir Seewooeagur Ram~oolam hae
not fallen yeC. It has atood up againat winda and tidea for 30 yeare.
From "deputy miniater" to "chief miniater" in the days when Mauritius was
still a British colony with grPat autonomy, Sir S. Ramgoolam, SSR, as
tie is called, has been prime minister since independence, during March 1968.
Trained by the British, introduced to parliamentary life, the Mauritian
prime minister.achieved the miracle nf maintaining power while generally
keeping parliamentary democracy in hia country intact. With the exception -
of the difficult years of repreasion from 1971-1973, when.democratic guar-
anCees (freedom of the presa, the right to assemblc3, the right to express
opinions publicly) and certain unions were "sub~~nded" and militants from
I~A4f [Militant Mauritian Movement] were imprisoned without trial, Mauritius
remains a free country where chaaging the government remains poeaible
through the democratic, parliamentary and electoral process, without
recourse to violence, where the multiparty aystem is not an idle word, nor
is freedom of thought a~oke. In this, the Mauritian regime is a remark-
able example ~mong the former coloniea which have obtained independence
over the last 20 yeara. SSR, then, was able to reaiat the easy temptation
of personal power, based on a dictatorahip and armed force. For thia per- �
formance, hommage is due him. Does that mean it is a model regime? Far
- from it. The Mauritian Government is probably the moet corrupt in the world;
in domestic affairs it has betrayed all the promises made during demogogical
election campaigns; the country is ruined and the people are angry. To stay
in power after the elections of December, 1976, SSR's Labor Party had to
once again form a coalition with the Mauritian Social Democrat Party (PMSD),
of Mr Gaetan Duval, the former minister of foreign affaira until 1973,
whose extreme~right reputation could not be greater. The regime ia ashamed
of it, but, solidl~ attached to the democratic forms iriherited from the
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' Wn~t, the'Muurieiau~ w111 not do t~nyChing to overthrow ir by force. They
will paCienely waie for Che general elecCions in 1981, unlese~ becauae tie
is forC~d tu, Itamgoolam reaigns and ca11s for early elections, which is far
fr~~m likely in spite of much presaure. The pr~me miniater is certainly
under ~~rong pressure noC only from the opposition IrII~i, but ~ven and
egpecially from its ally, the pMSD (which Chinka ie hns plain eailing)
and ~~l~o from a.very violent diasident group within the Labor Parey itself.
'Cl~is disaidenC ~roup, which had many membera ~t ehe beginning c~f the,cur-
r~nt pnrliamentary aession, now has only three: Mr Boodhoo, Mr Gungooeing
and Mr geedassy. Since the I~I iCseLf has 32 deputies out of 70, it would
be enougt~ for Che three dissident membera Co vote with rhe opposieion, if
' two or three members of the ma~ority were abaent, to bring down the govern-
menC. Last month, rhat could have happ~ned, since the aupplementary budget
' presenred by the government had received only 35 votes, to 34 "no" votea,
~ one deputy from the Mt~t (who was consequently expelled from the parCy)
Jean-Claude Augustine, being out of the country because of illness. And
' Chis is Che situation which explains ttie abaence, which has been noticed,
; of Mauritian miniaCers in recent internaCional meetinga: the prime minister
, wanted to keep them at home ao as to not lose their vote in Parliament. But
the session is over and the miniaCers will be able Co take their flighta
around the world. They are not needed in Mauritius any more,
IC has been said thaC public finances are in very bad shape. Debt has
reached one fourth of the GNP and the government has great difficulty finding
, lenders abroad; it is now turning to the progressive counCriea, particularly
; Libya, wtiich explains the strange change of direction in its foreign policy,
which was only recently still unconditionally alined with the West. The
: budget will reach 2 billion rupees thia year and the government does not
have enough revenue: they talk of a deficit of 500 million!
The social situation is hardly more encouraging. Strikes follow one after
the other, in the port and in public transportation (which is not running
well). Since it is a hotbed of protest, the university has been closed and
has remained occupied by the Riot Unit (local riot police). Elementary
; school teachers are threatening to stop work. Obliged to yield all down the
~ line, the government is running up against more and more oppoaition from
employers and from big business; the sugar oligarchy, only recently the
strongest supporter of the regime, is angry and making threats. In this
~ difficult context, dangerous, some say, Ramgoolam is said to have, they say,
tried to negotiate a"national unity" government, with the 1~II~M.
, .
~ Is such a coalition imaginable? The secretary general of the MhII~[, Paul
Beranger, has mvre than once denied the rumors. "There could be no question
~ of a coalition with the PMSD, nor even with the Labor Party alone, after
what that party has become," he affirmed. That�seems in the eyes of some,
to leave the door open to the Labor Party "which could change." Some observere
think then that actually the secretary general and the leadership of the I~4M
; are hoping for access to power in a coalition with the Labor Party alone.
~ But they know that it would be a very difficult pill to make anyone swallow.
~
' 4~ ~
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What will the leaderahip of the I~f do tihen? No one can say. All that ie
cerrain is th~C in the preaent staCe of Che party~ in which the leadership
is being aCrongly attacked, the rueh forward mig'ht aeem a lesaer evi]. to
the leadera. They might be tempeed to believe that their presence in ~he
government and the holding of key posts would give them the mean~a Co regain
control of the middle ranks of the parCy. "H'inding posta" for all of theae
current protesrors mi~ht, in the eyes of Che leaderehip of the 1~4I, lead
Cl~em to stop their criticism. But the base, that popular base so violently
hostile to the,very idea of coalition, what would it do? klow can it be
convinced? Thae is the main difficulty that neither Mr Paul Beranger, nor'
his court seem capable of resolving for~the momenC.
Far from diminishing, the crisie within Che A4lM has undergone new der?elop-
ments. Resignations follow expulsiona, each of~them provoked by the severe
criticism directed'against the leadership of the party. Mr Paul BerBnger,
Aneerood Jugnauth, Kader Bhayat and Jean-Claude de 1'Estrac, who are in fact
the masters.of the party (the other members of the Political Bureau and
the Central Committee are only there for appearances ('showcase' Chey say
in Creole) tolerate no criticism and do noC hesitate.to exercise the de~peaC
vengence on thoae who contradict them. They are hated more and more and main-
tain their position only through pressure and'political blackmail. Through ,
rumors and gossip, also, say those who have been victims of thefr machina-
tions. The scandal is now public, causing those who have traditionally
supported the�party~to have second thoughts. The Ml~i as a result lost a
special election ~'or a replacement on the municipal council of Beau-Bassin-
Rose Hi~l, its stronghold until now. The defection of several Ml~i councillors
resulted in tHe loss of that city, the second largest in the country. The
M[~Ai now controls only two large cities (Port Louis and Vacoas) where it has
however shown some signs of increasing strength. What happened at Beau-
Bassin-RosQ Hill? The dissenting councillors said it clearly: they had
enou~h of Che De 1'Estrac clique. In the case of Coon~an, who was threatened
with Qxpulsion; the leadership had to back down and send a delegation of
comrades to.the deputy to explain Co him that there was no longer any
question of expulsion, but that simply the "case would be studied."
The MMM, the progressive party in 1971-73, having become the social-democrat ~
party in 1977-1979 is falling rapidly. How would iC do if elections were
held soon? They say it would lose about 50 seats. Faced with a majority
and an opposition divided among themselves, the riauritians don't know which
way to turn. What will happen to that glorious Mauritian democracy in this -
context? Hasn't� the time come for all the Mauritian progressives to become
reorganized in order to breathe new life into the revolutionary struggle?
COPYRIGHTi 1979 Afrique-Asie ~ ~
8956
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MOZAI~ZQU~
BRIEF4
NEW ROAV NEAR COM'PLETI~N--A road 1y0 kilanetera long Will link t~he rich agri-
cultural district of Angonia W3th the rest of Moxambique's aephalted road
syetem by ~he end of next year. Angoni~ ia loc~ted near the border xith
Malaai, in th~ northWegt province of Tete. It is the principal producer of
potatoeg and other egrictil.tural producta, but distr3bubion of them to bhe
rest of the country ia very aeriously impeded by the absence of a permanent
road connection. During the rainy aeaeon, the trgck ie frequently impaeeable.
The new road, ahich repregents an investment of $6 million, goea from Bra-
ganca, on the Malawi border in the north, to ~he Zobue-Tete road. The north-
ern part of the road ia asphalted up to the town of Ulongue. The conetruction
work, begun in 1973, was to have been completed in 1975, but Wae paralyzed by
the departure, at the time of Mozembique's accession to independence, of the
foreign supervisory personnel and techniciane of the firm responsible for the
pro~ect. Mozambican korkera hQVe aince received intensive training to eneble
them to resume the work. Other factors have also contributed to the delqy of
the pro~ect--in particular, the aupply difficulties with conatruction mater-
ials and the high cost of new equipment to replece the old equipment, Which
had totally deteriorated. (Text~ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET t~DITERRANEEN3
in French 8 Jun 79 p 1565] 11267 ~
GDR TEXTILE FACTORY ASSISTANCPr-A Cextile factory equipped t~iCh 51,000
apindles and approximately 800 automatic looma will be bui1C in Mozambiquel
within the next few yeara with GDR assistance. It will be the largeat end
most modern textile factory in the counCry. Initial deliveries have al-
ready been made by the VEB Textima-Proj ekt Karl-Marx-Stadt company in
regard to a weaving-achool. Moreover, the company will undertake the
training of qualified pereonnel for this factory. [Text] jParia MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Jun 79 p 1689]
GDR ELEC?RICITY ASSISTANCE--Three transforming plants, as well as an aerial
line of 110 kilovolts measuring 200 kma in length have been built by
specialists of the VEB ~nergiebau Radebeul and VEB Otto Buchwitz Stark-
strom-Anlagenbau Dresden companiea in the People's REpu6lic of Mezambique.
[Textj [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ~:T MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Jun 79 -
p 1689)
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~dl~ tl~'~ICtAi. U~~ dNLY
COOPERATIV~ VILLAQ~S--Approximately 800 cooper~tive villageA have been
e~tablished ~n Mozambique eince independence in ].975. Thia announcemenC
w3s made by Job Chambei~ director of Che national committee for cooperetive
villagee. H~wever~ he ~dd~d ~h~ti eh~ greatiar parti of these villagee were
eti11 not organi~ed on e co~l~ceiva life and productian baeie. The main
taek to ba accomplished from now on ig to eseablieh the neceesary c~nditiona
for the development of production in thoee villageg already in exiqtence
~nd to sub~ect living conditions eo rigoroug review before eeCabliehi.ng
other villages. Chambal added thar the largeat concentratiion of~cooperative
v311gges i~ in rhe Cabo Delgado province in the northern part of Che
country, while the ama].leet in the province of Inhambane in rhe eouth.
Cooperative villagea are conaidered the backbone of developmenC in Mozambique'e
rural zonae~ On the one hand, the goal ie to 3ntroduce collective modes of
life and production in rural regione and on the other hand, to make poesible -
effective government a8sistance in such fielde ag education and healCh~ an
undertaking which would be imposaible in eparsely populated area~. (Text]
~Parie MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANE~NS in French 22 Jun 79 p 1689~
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NI(3ER
NIG~R'S 3-Y~Att, 5-Y~Att PLAN3 D~TAILED; BUDGETS GIVEN
` Paris MA1tCHES TItOPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRANEENS in French 1 Jun 79 pp 1387-1.391,
1395-1398
~Textj No modern nation can allow iteelf the luxury of maktng short ehrift
of its regular bueinase and living from day to day. In the beet of caees,
the few counCries which, out of negligence or incompetency, follow ~euch a
po~icy for any length of time are doomed to etagnation and in moet caees,
~ Co regression and collapse. It is indeed difficult Co keep nntional enter-
prises running or ro achieve progreas, .when they dfl not know whaC ~upplies
ehey need or are capable of handling or if they are not aware of their obli-
gationa or the needs they will have to cover more than only a few weeke
ahead. Induatry, like commerce, dependa on reliable predictione, both with
resp~ct ro suppliea and marketing. S~~ch predictions are posaible only
' within the framework of a planned economy.
! Moreover, it is difficult to obtain eubstantial financing from foreign
; investora, whether private or public, if backers do not know what auch
financing is to be used for.
Niger is now in an interim period. The latest 3-year program came to a close
in December 1978 and the new 5-year economic and social development plan for
1979-1983 has not yet gone into effect (with respect to execution). Never-
~ theless, as early as June 1978, an order from the chief of state (78-52/PCMS/i~)
concerned the eatablishmenC and makeup of the committeea in charge of drawing
it up and theae co~umittees are wor~Cing ceaselesaly, despite difficultiea to
be diacussed laCer, to plan a solid, balanced developmenC base within the
short~st possible time.
Three-Year Program for 1976-1978: 65-Percent Completior~ Likely �
; ~
. The last 3-year program covered the years 1916, 1977 and 1978. By 30 June
1978 that is, 6 months after its completion a few details can be ,
given about its completion. The percentagea used are based on official
' estimates, taking "credits used and the performance of the aector" into
' account. However, some of the groupings were put together by our staff.
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~rr
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Tha ob~eetivee tu ba echieved were dividad by ehe plann3ng departments ~nto
four m~~or seceora to wh3ch one could aseign a rate of participation (or
importance) te~,~e~ng Co the Whole, particuigrly coeaidaring Che credita
provieionally allocated Co eaeh oee. �
gy 30 June 19~8, th~ proportion of cover of eectoriai ob~ac~ivee initially
planned makes it poes3ble to figure the rate o~ completion of the overall
progrnm on ehae data 8imply by adding.
in thc table below, Column A repreeents the initiai importance eteributed
to the sector; Column 8, the percentage eruly covered by rhe end of June
1918; and Column C, the rat~ of completion.
p 8 C
1 tturai production . 33.6 .15.45 (46)
'l Infraetructure, public worke,
hydraulica 46.8 32.78 (70.04)
3-- Numan reaourcea 15.3 11.44 (74.8)
4-- Induetry, mining, commerce 4.3 2.06 (47.9)
100 61.73 (61.73)
By the end of June 1978, the 3-year program apparently had a completion
rate of 61.73 percent. It is logical to admi~ that at the time of its con-
clueion, the overall rate of completion with reepect to ob~ectives planned
will be t~o-thirds.
Better Reaults in Human Advancement
First of all, one Will noCe that the greatest a~fort anticipated by the
planners involved the aector of infrastructure and hydraulice, to'which
nearly half of the.proviaional credita were allocated. Next came rural
production, human reaources and all the secondary and tertiary sectora.
Second~ one will note that within the aecCorial frameworks thue defined, -
it is human advancement that beaefited from the higheat rate of achievement
(74.8 percent, meaning that three-fourths of the ob~ectives had been at-
tained 6 montha before the cloae of the program). Next come infraetructure
operations, public works and hydraulica and the eecondary~ and tertiary
sectors. The rural sector cloaes out the group, with the rate of completion
reaching 46 percent of initial estimatea.
These overall percentagea are of some interest, but they are only average~
resulting from combining the completion ratea of branches that are often
very different. It is therefore neceasary to go further inta detail.
52
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!
{
~ FOtt 0~'FICIAI: t~9~ ONLY
i
i
~ NSN _ q PROQRAMME i) ~
' tAIENNAI - 1916-19~1-19~8
~ lxdcution t~I au 30 /6119~8
IN~RAS tRUCTlJRE
i In+po~~anc~ e?t~~~ueo ~ rP, _HYDRAULIQUE~ Q In~porf~nt~ i~~~~buie
1--yi (Taux d~ ~u~ s~tl~u~~ po~ I~ pl~n 8~
2) w s~chu~ ~ Q 7) eea~ls~~~on ~~~~~49'.) �
! 3) ~.."~ec~lor~e~l~! ~ touve~lu~e
! 46 8 ~ti~~~~~~~~~ r+n ju~n 1911 9)
~
4~40r PRURA~EiN _
~0 t � � 1 tau R d~ A , .
,5~ rlalis~lion :~f~ ~e~....~.,.,.,.,~,~,~,~,.,~,.,.,~,.,~,~,~,
8~~- :~c::'~;~i'i~:~:';~;~: ~i';~; _ '
:~;~:~;~a:~:~:~:~:�:�
33,6 ~''~'~'~~i~i~::~'s~:~;~:i~;~,~:~c'
Zp~, i�:�:~ ;i . . . . . .
' RESSOURCES
; :~:;;:32,18 lo)
Z~~- HUMAINES i
~t~~~ a~ :~4,8 ~1
:::::i~::c:::i::~~:~:~:~:~:~~;::: ~N~~:onon
INDUStRIE,
10~. i i?:;:;;~; :;i;:~;: MINES, 12)
~Q - - COMMERCE~
;:15~45::
(T~uM d~
:;:~i'aa;:~:=:::: ?~~~~~~~~0~:419x~ ~3
~ )
::~ti':::::::::::~:.:::::::.:~, ~ _
;
~ Key: ~ _
; 1. Three-Year Program, 1976-1977-1978, Execution (X) by 30 June 1978
2. �Importance attributed to the sector
~ 3. Sectorial�cover
4. Rural production
5. Rate df completion
6. Infrastructure, public worka, hydraulics .
7. Rate of completion ,
8. Importance attributed to sectors by the plan
9. Cover by end of June 1978
10. Human resourcea
: 11. Rate of completion
12. Industry, mining, commerce
~ 13. Rate of completion
' Rural Production: Under 50 Percent
, In principle, "rural production" covers four branches with different coef-
ficients of importance (base figure of 100):
;
~ 53
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~
l;~y
FOR O~F~CIAL U8E ONLY
Agri.culture 64
Liveseock raieing Z~
Rur~l angineering 4.5
Wooda and �oresCe 4.5
_ ~n the ~iald of agriculture, the two ma~or ob~ecrives were: an increaae in
market gerd~n producCion and an ipcrease in productivity of income cropa.
The reaulta obtained (45 percent of eatimatee) are inadequate except with
reapect tn niebe. Local grain naede ere not covered and export crops are
atngnant. Certain "produceivity" pro~ects have experienced long delays.
It is quite likely that the little vigor noted in the field of rural engineer-
ing (only 25-percent rate of completion) had an unfavorable effect on agYi-
culeural development. ~
With reApect to livestock raising, whose essnntial ob~ectivea were to re-
build 1lvestock herds and improve yield, resulCs are eomewhat better (55 per-
cent rate of execution) ber_ause the growth in herds aometimes exceeded
expectations. On the other hand, operatione involving graziag ranchee,
fattening lots, breeding centers and livestock feed planta had varying
resulta.
The regults for woode and foresta were poor (25 percent), which must be
~ coneidered a very aerious matter. A country that ia very rapidly turning
into a deaert cannot neglect reforestation. _
Infrastructure, Public Works, Hydraulics: Roade Very Satisfactory '
In the very important aector of infrastructure, public worka and hydraulics,
the (initial) importance attributed to the different branches was as follows
(in percent):
Roads and bridges . 41.9
Post office and telecommunications 13.2
Village and rural water pro~ects (hydraulica) 8�s
Adminiatrative infrastructures
Energy 6
Housing, city planning 4�9
Sanitation, sewer syatems 4.5
Aeronautics, meteorology 4
- Urban hydraulics 3.4
Secondary roads 3
River transport 2�1
Road trangport 0.5
Rail transport ~ pM*
Maritime transport PM
*PM s for the sake of the record
.�54
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,
' . _
- ~Ot~ O~~ICIAL USC ONLY
~
! Wi~h r.e~pe"ct tn rdud~ ~nd bridgee, reeulta gre v~ry e~tief~actory (85-percent
C~mpleCinn).
'
On NsCinnal Rnad 1, Che Niamey-Doago and Doseo-Madaou~ aecCione ware widenad
and work on the '~ahadoua~Takeita secCion i.s being completed~ `
On N~rional Itoad 9, the riarad3-Nigerian bordeti section ia completed.
On National Road 11, work on the Agadez-North-Zinder secCion w~s compleCed
end the Soutih-Zinder-Magaria secCion is being repaired.
The M~intenance or the refilling of paved aCripa, financed by the FNI [Na-
tional InveatmenL� Fund] or the IBRD [InCernational Bank for ReconeCruction
and UevelopmentJ ia r~gularly done~ On the oCher hand, work hes not even -
begun on rhe road aerving ae an exit from the Marad~. bridge from Goulbi
de Maradi.
The aecondary road program (2,000 kilometers) has not been begun. The main
portion of Che financing from the IBRD was not acquired in time.
Waterworks
Concerning village and rural water systems (55 percent completed), the
sysCems for Goure, Dakoro, Tanout and Mayahi have been completed. Some
wells have been dritled but the 80 we11s in Damergou and the 619 wella in
the so-called "human investment" pro~ecC, the IH, were not drilled.
With a 95-percent rate of completion, the urban waterworke aector ahowed the
i moat progress (expansion and reinforcement of the Niamey and Zinder water
supply systems).
Concerning houaing and city planning (75-percent rate of execution), propoaed
studies on housing legislation and policy were not completed, but 150 houaing
units financed by Saudi Arabia were built in the Faycal compound and the city
of Akokan was provided with an administraCive infrastructure. Concerning
the latter, one should mention the construction, during the 3-year period,
of buildings to house the ministriea of Rural Development, Civil Service
and Public Works. ~
Work on sanitation systems (35-percent completion) mainly involved Maradi.
~ Work planned for Niamey turned out to be more costly than planned and its
completion was delayed.
Satisfactory Results for Post Office and Telecommunications
The postal and telecommunications program shows a satisfactory raCe of cover
(70 percent) corresponding to the completion of the Panaftel Project, micro-
~ wave relay equipment and telephone connections between Maradi and Dakoro,
' Zinder and Tanout, Niamey and Banibangou. However, there was a slow start
55
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~Olt OFFICIAL USE ONLY
on the equipping of tihe intir~urban eystem ~nd a fgilure t~, complaCe ehe
telex ceneral (600 lines) in N3amey, alChough financed by the BOAD [WesC
African Development Bank]~ and the additional Celaphone programe planned
for Niamey, M~radi, Zinder, Dosao and Tahoua.
In the area of el.ecericity (65-per~centi execution), ehe firet phaea of the
study for tihe Kandad~i Dam is complaCed and six citing have been electri-
fiad (aquipmenti or impYOVement)s Zinder, Birni. N'Konni,.Dogondoutichi,
~ilingue, Tess~oua and Tillabery.
The ~eronautica and meteorology pro~ects Werment forcA adez~and~Tehouaur-
facing of the Agade~ runway, technical equip 8
a gtudy for expaneion of the Maradi airport and the conatruction of an agro-
m~Ceorology center. ,
The.river traneport program (20 percet~t completed) was yetiy poorly carried
out. While sCudies for the~N~~gnd$theGpurchase~ofebargespandetugehforiger
River was not mgrked with b y
the Niger River Transport Company was poetponed.
The road trangnk8ttorthe~co pletionBOf~Che~Niameyf technical superviei n out
90 percent th
center. ~
Rail and maritime tranaport are included in the list of projects of Che
~ Progress in
3-year program only for the sake of serving as a reminder.
this area can only confirm or fallow the opening up of the territory.
Various projects are being .looked at: Kano-Maradi exteneion, Parakou-
Dosaou-Niamey exCension, Niamey-Tambao conn~ction. Choices have not yet
been definitely made. Maritime pro~ecta will in principle be initiated
only when the access way to the ocean has been choaen and establiahed.
Human Resources Sector and Education
The human resources aector was distributed as followa (base figure of 100):
54.3
Education 29~4
Health g.g
Information 4.6
Youth, sports, culture � 2~6
Population census 0.3
Community development
The record rates of achievement in primary and secondary education (95 and
98 percent) demonstrate the determtnation of the Niger authorities to develop
to the maximum extent and without delay those atructures involving the
spread of education and basic training. Anticipated rates of'school atten-
dance were exceeded by 2 points (13/15 percent expected; 13/17 percent
obtained according to official figures. Some 950 classrooms were to be
. 56 ~
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~ ~
FOE~ O~~ICIAL USL ONLY
j ,
~
~ buil~ but ~,050 were in fnce CnnsCructed~ The only gap s~ems to lie in the
delny concerning th~ congtruceion o� Chre~ regional inepeceorahipa (wesC,
' centr~l region and easti).
~ In ~econdary education, ChF I1].ela, Guid~n ftoum~i, Bouaa and Aguie CEG's
[Genei�~1`Secondary ~duc~~ion School~ were built, along wiCh the Tahoua
~ lycee and the Tchin-Tabgraden C~G (noe planned but built in p1ac~ of the
Tahoua-II`C~G). Other establishments noe included in the 3-year program
(Arlie, Kolo, Loga, Mad~rounfa~ zinder IT, Doutchi II) were op~ned to eCu-
dents in OcCober ~nd November of 1978.
The "NigeYizgCion" of Ceaching pereonnel and the equipping of ehe Univereity
of Niamey conCinued. Two buildinga were complated~ Buildings to houae
liberal arCs, healCh, educatinn and agronomy have nor been completed buC
they are nearly financed. On ehe oCher hand, there are not yet any sources
of fin~ncing for law and economics~ On the whole, Che higher ~ducation
program was 40 percent compleCed~
' Literac; Craining (75 percenC) is well underway. A training center for
liCeracy tegchera has been aet up gnd by the end of 1978, 1,000 literacy
centers were to be ready.
~
InveaCmenCa in Health
There was a low rate of completion for information (20 percent). One
achievement that might be mentioned is Che departmental searion in Agadez,
~ while Che one in Maradi operaCes in temporary facilities. Proposals to build
a radio and ehort- and medium-wave radiobroadcasting cenCer are being financed
; but they have noC been completed. The training center for technical person-
nel in the field of information is operating but does not yet have any build-
ing. The proposal to build a national publishing housg has been abandoned.
There has been a rather saCisfactory execution of the health program (70 per-
cent), made up of numerous amall or medium-aize inveatments (clinics, medi-
~ cal centers, PMI [expansion unknown], and so on).
In the field of youCh, sports and culture (50 percent), one should mention
construction of the Tahoua and Maradi sCadiums and the electrification of
the Niamey etadium, but the construction of the International Youth Center
in Niamey and the Niamey Cultural Complex has not come about.
Ob~ectives in Mining
~ ':he industry, mining and commerce sector is distributed as follows (in per-
cent) :
Mining 53.6
Industry 23�2
' '.ourism 23.2
. 57
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With respece tn Che mining aector, in which the program wus SO percenC
completed, one shouLd mention that certain operaCiona in which the private
ser.Cor ia very acCively involved currently escape full examination. Yn Che
rnlntnK secror, rhe problem o� financing research doee noe exiet in the
urnnium area, where the SOMAI~ [Air Region Mining Company], Imouraren,
D~gdo nnd Akouta pro~ects have continued~ Of the three ob~ectives planned:
con~inuation o� acCion aimed at developing known mining resourcea; continua-
tion of research; and updating mining and oil regulationa, oniy the laet
was not achieved~
The industry (nonmining) and tourism sectore, where 10 percent of Che pro-
~~cta planned were completed, were Khe moaC neglected branchea of the program.
- For induatry (not including mining), the aituation ia fairly understandable,
since Che country's landlocked nature doea not allow the establiahment of
a substitution industry, the marketing of whose producCs would be hindered,
moreover, by the inadequate meana of the population and distribution diffi-
~ culties.
In the area of tourism, the problem is more aerious and will be dealt with
in detail 1aCer. If Che pro~ects are not carried out, it is becauae the
Nigeriens are not yet sufficiently motivaCed by thia type of activity and
do not have the leaders or qualified personnel to promote it and operate it.
Activity of Chamber of Commerce
In the field of commerce (40-percent completion), there were no overall,
concrete actions between 1976 and 1978 aimed at overaeeing the profession,
regulating it or reorganizing trade circuits. On the other hand, one might
note various specific actions whose results were varied.
Because of the drought, SONARA [Niger Peanut Marketing Company] could not ~
achieve the expected results in the area of peanut marketing and had to
expand its intervention to the niebe sector.
COPRO-NIGER [National Commerce and Production Company] was to become a
national company, but 6.9 percent of the stock still belongs to private
parties.
The Chamber of Commerce, headed with great competency and dynamism by
President Souna, undertook specific action aimed at reorganization and the
modification of statutes, structures and circuits and is getting ready to
establish the structures needed to train Niger manufacturers and merchants.
The Development Bank of the Republic of Niger (BDRN) achieved its ob~ectives
with a rate of 90 percent and the government now holds 55 percent of its
capital. The National Savings Bank and the National Agricultural Credit-
Bank (CNCA) both fulfilled their ob~ectives well. The eatablishment of a
company Co monopolize ineurance services did not come about, but the Niger
Insurance and Reinsurance Company (Leyma) opened its doore. ~
. 58 .
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~
i.
~ ~OIt OrFICIAL USE ONLY
~ ,
~ Among the gchiovemenxs nf Che 3-year plan, nne muet also menCion ehe toeal
_I
~ elimination of ehe miniroum lump tax (IMF) and the resrrucruration of the
~ schedule tax and Che gener~?1 3ncom~ tax~
~
The NaCional InveaCmenC Fund (FNI) was not restructured ae planned, nor wae
; the budgetary year mnde Co coincide with ~he calendar year.
I Concernin bud etar
8 g y provisions of Che 3-year program, ehey were greatly
~ exceeded (Cab1e in mi~lione of CFA francs).
;
" Estiimate Eatimate Difference
~ 1976 24,310.6 24,310.6 _
-I 19~7 " 25,998 34,175.6 + 31.45~
1978 2~~~25 44,504 + 60~52
Five-Year P1an 1979-1983, Work Underway
~ �
Work to draw up the Five-Year Economic and Social Development P1an for 1979-
, 1983 is underway. On 22 June 1978, decree 78-52/P CMS/MP concerned the
; establiahment and makeup of the commitCeea apecially appointed Co complete
~ this task. These committees are seven in number. They are technical and
advisory in nature and are under the direct authority of the minister of
~ planning:
~
1) the Orientation, Coherence and Inatitution Committee, headed by the
i minister of planning (8 members plus the aecretariea general of the minie-
I Cries, plus the chairmen and deputy chairmen of the six other eectorial
! committees, totaling 30 to 32 persons, including the secretary general at
~ the preaident and the permanent secretary of the National Development
~ Council;
{
i
; 2) the Rural Production and Waterworka Committee, headed by the secretary
; ~f state for rural development (21 members, including the deput~ chairman
i and the reporter);
I
_ 3) the Mining, Energy and Industry Committee, headed by the secretary gen-
eral of the Ministry of Mines and Hydrology (10 members);
4) the Infrastructures Cocnmittee, headed by the director of publ3c worka
~ (16 members);
i
~ 5) the Human Resources and Health Committee, headed by Che secretaxy of
~ state for national education (24 members);
' 6) the Commerce and Services Committee, headed by the secretary general of
~ the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Commerce and Industry (20 membera); and
~ 7) the Financial Resources and Cooperation Committee, headed by the
_ , secretary genersl of the Ministry of Finance (14 members).
i
; �59~
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FOR n~FICIAL US~ ONLY
(EdiCor'8 NoCe: The above numbers include tha deputy chairman and reporter
of each commititee.)
'l'he Trnde Union of Work~rs of Niger (USTN) is repr~sented on all committeee
exr.epti Committee 7(Finr~ncial Reeources and Cooperation).
The Aseaciation of Niger Women (AFN) participates on committees 2(Rural
Produceion and WaCerworks) and 5(Human Resourc~e and Health).
The Chamb~:r of Commerce is repreaented on five committeea (1, 2, 3, 4 and
6); the Development Bank of the Republic of Niger on committees 3, 6 and 7;
NIG~LEC [Nig~r Electric Power Company] on committees 3 and 6; and tha
Niger Foodstu�fe Office on committees 2 and 6.
On the regional level, Che atructures in charge of drawing up the plen and
organized and set up by the prefect of each department.
Difficult Work
These operations are particularly difficult due to the inadequate statiaCi-
cal data making it possible to f.~llow up and measure the country's evolution
over the last 8 to 9 years. The latest national accounta published acCually
date from 1969. Reasonable estimates were drawn up for the interim periad.
They constitute precious atepping stones for officials tn charge of drawing
up the developmenC progrnnas for the current 5-year period and who muat take
into uccount Che lessons and experience of the paet. International experts
are giving their aid to the Niger GovernmenC so as to esti~lishobvious8that
beginning in 1976, base figurestoafloatin edata andtthat it is impossible to
rates of progress cannot apply 8
know where one is headed if one does not know where one is beginning.
Given the current state of work on the 1979-1983 Five-Year Plan, it would -
be imprudent to claim to aupply details on the ob~ectives envieaged or even
to try to define definite orientations. The final deciaione depend on the
~ p~litical choices of the government and the propo8als made by the committeea,
proposals that are conaCantly sub~fficiallYeputibefore~theeplannersaforetheir
- a number of reliable hypotheses Y
consideration.
Past Evolution of Niger
,Niger's pasC evolution (production, foreign aid, consumption and inveatmenta)
can be shown in the following S~atesimfor years~1963pandd1969tandBtheoMinis-
tral Bank of the West African ~
try of Planning for 1975 (in billions of CFA francs):
1963 1969 1975
66.02 97.91 159.30
Production ~.32 6,Sg 24.10
Foreign aid 65.70 104.40 183.40
Total
60
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. FOIt OF~II;ZAL US~ ONLY
Coneumprion 54.66 98.11 158.30
Investm~nts 11.04 6.29 25.10
~ An examination of the above Cable enables one to make ehe following observa-
; Cions;
~
~ On the wt~Q1e, if one expresaea the figures in indexes (1963, baee figure of
; 100), on~,obtaina ehe following:
~ ~ 1963 1969 1975
~
ProducCion 100 148 241
; Foreign'Aid 100 66t 2,418
i ToCal 100 159 279
~ Consumption 100 179 290
InvestmenCs 100 75 227
~ The increase in production, in constanC franca, averaged 7.6 percent annually. -
,
~ Foreign aid, which was somewhat negative in 1963, exceeded the figure of
! 24 billion CFA francs in 1975. However, 3ti is not stricCly accuraCe, from
~ the accounting point of view, to group a11 auch aid under the heading of
foreign deficit, given the considerable importance occupied by tranafers
' wiCh no counterparC since 1968 or 1969.
~
Consumption increased between 1963 and 1969 much more rapidly than production
(8.05 percent compared with 6.75 percent on an average per year). On the
other hand, between 1969 and 1975, the situation was reveraed (8.25 percent
~ compared with 8.45 percent per year).
~ ~
Investments, which clearly declined between 1963 and 1969 (7.94 percent of ~
domestic producCion plus foreign aid in 1969, compared with 16.8 percent
' in 1963) are up aubstantially and in 1975, represented 13.7 percent of an
i overall mass 2.8 times greater than that of 1963.
; Based on the preceding considerations, one must remember that at the beginning
i of 1976, the situation showed a substantial improvement with reapect to
production and that Niger had ~izable outside aid (much without any counter-
part). Consumption, which was very high during the first 6 years, exc~eding
, domestic produeCion in 1969, settled down and left a slight aurplus in 1975.
This domestic savings and increased foreign aid are channeled toward invest-
ments. The proportion of total resources invested (13.7 percent) ia still
~ too low, but the trend is encouraging.
~
Prospects for 1985: More Outside Aid
In an official document from the planning departments, one finds a continua-
tion of the tables given above although the authors emphasize the hypo-
thetical nature of the data and the conclusions. The continuation is for
1985. Here are the figures (in billions of current CFA francs):
61 '
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1975 1985
Production 159.3 29~'2
Foreign aid 24'~ ~
183.4 290.2
'rorai , 158.3 ~ 226.6
Cnnaumption 25~~ 63.6
InvearmenCs
The most obvious figure is the 0 included under foreign aid. Such a hypo-
thesis is neither pretentious nor illogical. Already, when the Nige~r balanc~
of payments was atudied, it was mentioned. Naturally, the 0 is only indica-
tive because it would be abnormal for Niger to cold-bloodedly refuse unre-
stricted free aid or limited~o~al~�inancialaindependencelvisyaavisnforeign�
The 0 merely signifiea Chat
countries i.s perfectly poasible by 1985.
An examination of tha other agregate figures shows thaC during the decade '
between 1975 and 1985, production (according to the hypothesis expreased)
would increase in current,value by 82 percent (an av~rage of 6.18 percent
per year), total reeYCents(uy 3866 percyear)uand~investmentspby 153r4~percent
sumption by 43.15 p P
(up 9.9 percent per year).
Such figures and such percentages are reasonable given the current daCa and ,
medium- and longer-term prospects. The average increase in production of
6.2 percent, given a starting base (1975) already aubstantially increased
by the contribution of urani~im, will imply quite a aubsCantial contribution
of the primary'sector, while awaiting the more delayed participation of the
still weak industry and productive services.
The portion left to cone~~mption is rather amall and such a low percentage -
will be aCtained and liedtwithd rowingfuse of~localsproducts aubatitutedinst
waste apending are al 8
for imported products.
The average annual rate of 9.9 percent is but a composite of percentages ~
that increase regularly as resources�are utilized. It should be n?Sepercent
Che positio21:9~in~~centnin 1985g which inSthecNigerlcontext~conatitutes a
in 1975 to p '
remarkable performance.
Reservations �
One must nevertheless view the above absolute figures and percentages with
reservations. They constitute only an overall approach to the specific ~ ~
problems posed by Niger's development. It is highly, unlikely that they will ,
On the whole then, the
not be modified in the final documents of the plan.
data on domestic Prbelowi~butnitvremainsigorbe determinedl~inlsetting le
those in the table , .
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estim~re~, Co whne exCenC the vari.ous eecenre nf rhe ecnnnmy wi11 help
to GonetiCuCe ehem ~nd ae a reeult, whgC ~nnual r~ee of groweh it would
he rennon~ble tn ~eRi~n Co Chem.
s ri _ ~o NYP~th~se 1)
de ~~veloppement
, du Niger I 1915 ~ 1985 l _
2) RESSOURCES ~"'~~~~~ds cFA t 4~ UYIIISATION
~ kessourtes RQSSO~rtes
lolalcs (65,~1 lolales (65,71
~ 211.! ?90,?
Producfion 2~~ Consonmalion
5) ~ ~nleneurt (ii,021 ) ~ (5,~i6)
p ~ .
6~ ~ eRf~riQUrs Q InvastissQmenfs
22 ,i
..a::
~:::s::�r�~~~'~~
:~::::;:.:~:~s,~:
:s i:~:i :;i:::.: : >r
~ _
_ ~
( Mrlliords CFA couron~s ) g~ r
a:
~
( -
- ~
~ 11 '~11 ~
+~p ~1.2~ 411 ~ 1
~ -
i " 2~1
_ 1.)! ~ )
~
I
~ I~~; ~I., ~~~~7� Ir.~~~. ~,,g,,:v;�~ . ~ , ~ ( ~ ~ .
I , , ~ ~ ~1l~I 18t~ 1511
. ~w:~~~.~..Y?~....' v.~. 1~7N~....v.....A~.M..iL.J.j911~Wi'.l:'~~~:IAV?~~H�v~'..1s..~b~.LUH~11.r1W y~�u,i~~~ r
~
Key:
. 1. Customs receipts
2. I)illions of CFA franca �
3. Billions of current CFA francs �
I Niger's Customa Receipts (in millions of current CFA franca)
' 1961 1,786.6
1962 1,698.3
1963 � 2,456.7
1964 2,923.9
~ 1965 3,462.6
~ 1966 4,047.9
~ 1967 4,226
, 1968 4,176.2
i 1969 4,106.9
I ~ 1970 4,675.3 '
~ � 1971 4,773.9
i 1972 5,066.6
i 1973 5,529.6
~ 1974 5,806.2
I
1975 8,206.6
' 1976 9,849.6
1977 13,170.2
;
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I� ong goea inCo deCail, bgaed nn Che 1978-1979 Budget, one will nore CheC
the income Cax conetitutes tihe esaenCial portion of anticipatad resources.
The follnwing lisr givea tihe percentiege poeirinn (fnllowing Che elimin~rion
of the IMF, ~he minimum lump tax) of the varioue diract taxes:
Induerrial and commercial profiC~ (BIC) 88.28 -
Wages and salaries 6.07
Other income Caxea 3.'1
Properey, rea~. estate tax 1.26
Patent and 1lcense tax 0.19
Apprenticeahip Cax 0.37
Joint venture control tax 0.13
The gap between resourcea stemming from the BIC and thoae from wages and
salgries is enormous.
Every year, indirect taxes bring in more money because Chey are based on
value and because the yield from taxes is all the greater when the cosC of
producCs or services tio which they apply ia ha.gher. Two essential sourcea
should be noted: turnover and uranium.
1978-1919 Budget: Indirect Taxes (in percent)
Turnover tax 49.68
Mining-uranium royRltiea 37.11
Tobacco, cigarette tax 4.82
_ 011 products tax 4.82
Tax on alcoholic beverages 3.38
Tax on matches 0.19
The excellent perfarmance noted with respect to regiatration fees ia linked
to the favorable orientation of Niger's general situaeion. Some 56.5 per-
cent of the anticipated resources under Chis heading are linked to income
from dividends and interest (IRVM).
Miscellaneous Proceeds
Income from miscellaneous taxes is negligible. Three departmenta are pro-
ductive: the supervision of dang~rous, troubleaome and unhealthy eatabliah-
ments; control of precious metals; and control of insurance organizations.
With respect to miscellaneous proceeds (16.3 percent of the resources in
the 1978-1979 Budget), the receipts anticipated make up some 45 percent
of the revenue from national lands, 40.5 percent of fines and proceeds or ~
~ transfers ~f services, and 14.5 percent of allocated receipts.
The most important items (in percent based on the toCal category) are as
follows:
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~ ~ r,;k ~ox nrFZCr~ us~ orn,Y
'
~
I Domain
Income~'~rom dividends and interest 42~~
~ ~inea ~nd penalties 5~2~
~ SpeciAl resources 30~94
, A1located rec~ipts (taxea on operationa of Che
~ IDA '['~nt~rnational Development Associ.ationj,
~ tihe KfW [Reconsrrucrion Credit Bankj, and
~ Che ADB (African Developmene Bank] 14~45
i
~ In estimaeea concerning fines and penalties, one notea 350 million CFA
francs in cueCoros confiscatione. '
,
~
' Reaourcea anticipated under apecial resources are negligible. The main
items, which are very modeat, come under taxes from collectivea and public
eatablishmenrs and aid funds (the KfW, the IDA, the ADB, the CCCE [Central
i Fund for Economic Cooperation]). Nothing ia expected in 1978-1979 from
loan reaourcea. For a very long time, Chis poasible line of receipta has
remained untouched by Niger.
i Diatribution of General Budget 5pending (in billiona of CFA frAnca)
~
~ 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1915 1976 1977 1978 1979
~
~ Pub.Debt 0.6 0.62 0.4 0.44 0.38 0.66 1.64 1.86 2.30 2.75
~ 5.56X 5.67Y 3.36~ 3.36;~ 2.66X 4.31X 6.75X 5.44X 5.3 ~ 4.85X
Op. Exp. 8.08 8.55 9.05 9.65 10.64 11.11 14.8 17.87 19.55 23.96
I 74.81X 78.15% 76.12X 73.61X 74.62X 72.52~ 60.881; 52.3 X 45.05X 42.22X
~ Pub. Int. 2.12 1.77 2.44 3.02 3.24 3.55 1.81 14.44 21.54 30.04
I 19.63X 16.18X 20.529; 23.03X 22.72X 23.17~ 32.37X 42.26X 49.65~ 52.93X
i
Total 10.8 10.94 11.89 13.11 14.26 15.32 24.31 34.11 43.49 56.75
~ General Budget Spending
! The distribution of spending in the general budget between 1970 and 1979
~ is shown~in the preceding table.
i
j For the three main categories, one will note a very different evolution.
i With respect to the general budget as a whole, the public debt occupies a
i very stable position (average of 4.96 percent for the 10 years used in ~he
table). This is a paiticularly low rate, far lower than what one finds in
' most other African countries. The increase in service on the debt in current
~ value between 1970 and 1979 is 348 percent. It is higher than that of
( ~ operating expenditures (up 197 percent), but far'beyind that of public
I intervention (up 1,317 percent). -
� 71
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~
�
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NSN_ u ~8 "fonctionnement" L) ~ ~
~ le~ "intervention: publiquet"
~u :ein du Budget ginbr~l ~ ~
dn NI~ER
.
%~�h''~; F0N[T10NNEMENT 2~ ~ ~
!,f
~~s : i< < s
'I}'}~ EtEEi~ I N T E R V E N T I 0 N S 3) :i {~,~E~
, ~ s~~ ':i~i~~i ;si;E~~
14,1 pM !!;ll~ '~1;4s.
: ~
;
1t,1t ~ i~~ji~: iiil}:
( ~.SS ~~i~i~; ��ii!3i
~~i :~:V. ~ , t.:~1i: '7{~ll
:y 3'; :~'iS.
, '~/1 ,~77 tt ~i '
..i~ , ~ i~~ :,i i!:
~:v ~ . ~ k ;l'~ , i,~,~i
:r~. . 4 ~1. ;Ej~`;E: k,l~;,
~~S ~i~~{ ~ i j~t~ ik}4?3~ ~f
: r:::
~=�i ~~i.~~ :E~~:~: ;'I~~f
` 212 t ~ ' 'i;�r ' ~~1~! ~;it~} :,~t;~, .i,:il
~ ~ ~ ~ j ,
i i' '::f~! ~~ii~ ili~~i u r;; .d3ii
~ } ~iiii!
� s.:.~
ii~r~ fi .ii =t!: i!i!i! i: 3i~ i~?f?{ ,~~y,~.
. . .
Ill:yl/ ~ ~ ~ Iql/ll ~ ~ 1/11/11 �
i~, ~ Lo! d~ Finone~i
Key:
~ 1. Operating Expenditures and Public Intervention in Niger's General
Budget ~
2. Operating
3. Intervention
Since 1975-1976, two very different types of evolution have been evident in
operating expenditurea and public intervention. While previous to that
time, the latter made up only 72 to 78 percent of Che former, there has
~ been a spectacular reversal in the situation, depicted graphically in the
chart above. Since 1978, interventions have exceeded operating expenditures
in value and such interventians are for the most part made up of investment
spending.
Between 1974 and 1979, the proportion of investments among public interven-
tions seems to be as fcllows (in billions of CFA francs):
Pub. Int. Invest. Percent
1974 3.24 0.77 23.77
1975 ~ 3.55 0.85 23.94
1976 7.87 3.8 48.28
1977 14.58 A.42 57.75
1978 21.55 14.11 65.48
1979 30.04 22.21 73.94
~ �72�
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Conaequ~t~tly, beCween 1975 and 1979, the position of inveatmenes compared
I with t~o~a1 public inCerven~ions went from under 25 parcent to nearly 75
~ percent, - IC is a phenomenon to be emphas~.~ed because it has never before
been noeed (wirh such inCenairy) in any African country.
.
Operat`~~g ~xpenditurea
The so-called operating expenditurea are normally divided between two.:
categoriea: government and d~partmental means. Here they wi11 be placed
rogethe~,under~a single heading~ but div~ded into four aections: pereonnel,
i equipment, tranaport and houaing (1979: budgeC):
7 (Bi111ons of CFA franes) 1976 1977 1978 1979
i Personnel 8.03 9.26 10. 2
' 9 1 .53
~ Equipment 4.4 5.66 5.57 7.97
i Transport 1.9 2.18 2.52 2.82
~ Housing 0.47 0.55 0.56 0.63
Total , 14.8 17.65 19.55 23.95
' Growth in current values between 1976 and 1979 is as followa: personnel,
i up 56 percent; equipment, up 81 percent; transport, up 48.4 percent; and
I housing, up 34 percent.
f
~ Considering the monetary devaluaCion, tranaport and housing expenditures
~ were substantially reduced and those for personnel were barely mainCained.
I Personnel spending (12.53 billion CFA in 1978-1979) mainly involves: Na-
tional EducaCion, 32.3,percent; Interior, 13.25 percent; National Defenae,
~ 10.4 percent; Health, 9.62 percent; Rural Development, 8.09 percent. This
I spending makes up nearly three-fourths (73.91 percent) of the total.
~ The main consumers of equipment are: National Education, 20.98 percent;
I Health, 15.39 percent,; National Defense, 9.35 percent; Foreign Affaira,
~ 6.8 percent; InCerior, 6.45 percent, but 22.8 percent of the equipment
expenditures come under common charges.
Transport is broken down as follows: common charges, 20.49 percent; Na-
tional Defense, 19.43 percent; Rural Development, 9.91 percent; Health,
9.37 percent; Interior, i3.43 percent; Foreign Affairs, fi.46 percent;
National Education, 4.89 percent; and Finance, 4.15 perceat.
Housing expenditures, which are relatively low, are almost exclusively
' common charges. .
i
j Public Interventions
i
~ Public interventions are broken down into~seven categories depending on
; their purpose. Their distribution between 1914 and 1979 (budget) is shown in
I the table below.
' � . 73�
i
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Yf one deducts from the overall budgee tha 21 biliion CFA franca allocaCed
to the FNI, one notes ehat for 1979, the m~.nistriea with the moat fueda are
the following (~n b~.111ons of CFA francs):
Minietry of Finance 6.76
Narional Education (not including higher educatiion) 5.79
Civi1. Service, Labor and Public Worke 2.97
Health and Social Aff aire 2.67
National Defense 2.61
Interior 2.46
Rural Development 1.64
Foreign Affaira and Cooperation , 1.43
Planning ~�13
Public Interventions (in billiona of CFA franca)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
International interventions 0~3 0.45 0.54 0.56 0.78 1.14
Political interventiona 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.1 0.12 0.13
Administrative interventions 0.61 0.54 1.8 2.26 2.78 3.24
Social interventions 0.31 0.39 0.68 0.89 0.92 0.43
Infrastructures 0.87 0.96 0.92 2.29 2.79 2.35 -
Inveatments 0.77 0.85 3.8 8.42 14.11 22.2
Economic interventions 0.3 0.3 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05
Total 3.24 3.55 1.87 14.58 21.55 30.04
These figurea give only a rough idea becauae 3.55 billion CFA franca in
common charges are not broken dawn and the 21 billion CFA franca in FNI
investmenCs are not taken into consideration. However, they do ntake it
possible to see the excel~lent position of National Education and Health,
which is consCantly improving.
National Inveatment Fund
The National Investment Fund (FNI), whose increase in allocations has al-
ready been mentioned, mainly receivea ita resources from allocated receipts,
patrimonial resources, loans, contributions and various typ~s of financial
aid. Actually, the FNI is funded by the general budget: 21 billion for 1978-79.
The FNI expenditures can~be broken down between: direct interventiona,
14,936,700,700 CFA frart~~t; participation or other typea of ~interventions,
6,063,300,000 francs, or a(rounded) total of 21 billion CFA francs (be-
fore the order of 8 March 1979).
Direct interventions include a very large number of sectors, but they can '
be classified in the following manner (for 1978-1979, in millions of
CFA francs and percent):
. .74.
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I Natural resourcea davelopm~nC 1,377.6 9,22
~ Roads nnd bridges 1,459.6 9.71
; Other marerial infr~etrucCures 853~6 5,72 ,
Human infrastructure oper.atione 5,331.3 35.7 .
j Adm~niatrAtive infraetrucCure operaCiona 5,527.3 37
~ producti.ve equipmenC . 234.6 1.57
Miscell~neous 152.~ 1.02
;
14,936.7 100
In opexations to develop natural reaourcea, it is the hydraulics aector
, (858.6,mi11ion CFA franca) thaC is tihe beat endowed. It ia followed by
rural ~ngineering (377 million CFA francs). Other allocations are lo~v,
~ mainly Ehose for woods and forests (35 million C~A francs).
t
Work concerning roads and bridges is varied but mainly involves four ma~or
pro~ecta: the Zinder-Birni-Kazoe-Kelle-Goure road, 350 million; the Doaso-
~ 5abongari road, 350 million; National Road 24, 166 million; and the North
! 2inder-TanouC road, 100 million.
i �
~ Other infrastrucCure operations are dominated by the improvement of the
, runways at the Tahoua and Agadez airports (400 million) and sanitation
' pro~ects for ~he facilitiea of the Republican Guard (190 million).
~
~ Investments for Human Infrastructure
~ � Among pro~ects to be carried out under this heading, a very large proportion
~ is reserved for education (3,250.300,000 out of 5,331,300,000, or about 61
I percent). Such work mainly includes: high school bnd professional education,
i 1,576,000,000; primary education, 1,515,000,000.; higher euucation, 105.3 cail-
? lion. Literacy training received 50 million francs in credits and televi-
' sion for education, only 4 million.
~
~ Health received 973 million,.mainly allocated for the construction of hospi-
tals. The Dosso Youth Festival absorbed 300 million out of the 630 million
allocated to the Youth, Sports and Culture aector. Another 100 million
are to finance the construction of an auditorium in Niamey. ,
Information received 478 million, including 140 million for the N'Gufgmi
retransmitting station.
Administrative infrastructures drain off a large percentage of the invest-
ments, distributed as follows (in millions of CFA francs):
Office of President, National Court, CND
[National Development Council], Planning ~ 958.6
Rural Development ' 914
I National Defense ggg
Interior 735.6
I
~ �75
~
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~
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_
Pubt~lc W~rks, Mining 703�~ ~ ,
Ln~~nce, Clvil 5ervice, Economic Affaire , 580.5
roreign Affaiza and CooperaCion 421
Justice . 316
Total 5,52~.4
Most of Che above creditia are to cover construction or property.
NSN_ 15 ~8= � ~
investissements 1) ' ~
d u F N 1 I 1918 / 1919 Z 1 milli~rd= CP~
. . . . . r
6)
( en millions CFA ) Intrai~rudure Infroshucfu~
humaine adminisMa~ive
552~~3 ~
5 331,3 . ,
2 . . . -
Mis~ ~ ~ ~
vateur 3) �
des Roures 4) . . . �
ressources et Aufres
- nawreUes ponts mfrash~uctures , .
mat~rieUes Equipemeots p~p~~ses
- produclifs diverses
1459~6 + 15Z,1
1317,6 `:;853,6~::: 234 6
. , ~
_
- NB. - Les 6 063,3 millions de ~ participetions et autres interventions ne sont pas reprls
dans le graphique cT-dessvs. .
Key:
1. FNI Investments: 21 billion CFA francs 5. Humrin infrastructure
2. Development of natural resources 6. Administrative infrastruc.
3. Roads and bridges 7. Productive equipment
4. Other material infrastructures 8. Miscellaneous
~tote: The 6,063,300,000 francs in participations and others interventions
are not ahown in the above chart.
, 76,
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hrnduc:ttve equipmenC invnlves the purcha~e nf agriCUlturnl mnchinery Cnet-
tnK 23G~h milli~n C~A f'ranc~~
I'nreiCipneiona gnd other interventions o� thP FNI ere clae~ifi@d gs followg
(in mi111ons nf C~A francs): . -
~quipm~nt subsidies 783
~ Startup or balancing subeidies 330
Local financ~.al parCicipation 2,711.8
ParCicipatton in inCergovernmene or inrernatinnnl
operg~iona 2,~38.5
Total
6~063.3
Among the moat imporC~nt operaCions, one should note Che following (in mil-
lions of CFA francs):
~okker purchase 22~
Agricultural training operaCfon 27A
Live~tock feed plant 170
New brickworks consCrucCion 200
participation in conatruction of an internaCional-
class hnCel 800
Tillabery sugar pro~ect 600 -
Crain silos and SONICHAR 511.8
50NITEXTIL [Niger Textile CompanyJ 500
Boeing hangar 300
Konni agricultural waterworks development participation 700
Pareicipation in IBRD-IDA telecommunicationa pro~ecC 368
_ Saudi loan counterpart 300
~ COPY~jGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paria 1979
11,464
CSO: 4400
~
:a7
.
, 77. ,
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~ NIOER .
NIGER'5 GNP, TItADE BALANCE DISCUSSED
Grnag National Product .
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Jun 79 pp 1376-77
[Text] While the concepts of grosa national production, of grose
national product, of national revenue are difficult to deCermine in the
countriea of the Third World where statiatics ,are sometimee acarce, thay
oftien constitute the mo.at valid eource to whic.t one may resort in order to
trace the development of thoae countries or tio determine the "standing" of
t,t~eir inhabitants.
Difficulty i. Determining the Groae National Product [GNP] ~
As for Niger, the matter ie more delicate. The moat recent complete and
publiahed national reports regarding this country date back to 1969, and j
' reconstitution of the seriea linking the end of the laet decade to the
preaent period is practically imposgible. However, aome reliable eatimates
are available--but difficult to confirm--from international financial
organizations that have sent experta on several miasions tn Niger.
According to departmenta of the International Monetary Fund (IM!~) and of
the World Bank, the market price Af Niger's grosa national product went from
101.7 billion CFA in 1970 to 163.5 billion CFA in 1976, that is, an overall
progreaeion of 60.8 percent, countered by a marked regression in 1972 and
1973 as a reault of the effecCe of the drought.
~
World Bank estimatea for I'~77 are on the order of $770 million (about 190
billioa CFA), but they must be accepted with reservatioa.
For 1978, unofficial data from financial circles in Niamey in December 1978
reported some much higher figures. It did not seem prudent to include them
78
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I
~ ,
in the ptiesent seudy~ It may nevertihelesa be emphasized ~hat if thoee
figures were to be conf~.rmed, the qross nationgl product For 1978 would be
50 percent high~r than that of 1977. Well, in spite of the energetic sCi-
mulation provided by ~he exploiCetion of uranium to the Nigarian economy~
such an~enormoua progresaion ie very difficult to accepC~ ~nd especially eo
explain,`4t the 1eve1 of the diseribution of basic aggregatea.
, Thanks eo~the IMF, there are aome reasonable estimatea concerning thie
distribution from 1970 Co 1976. It is noted thati the produc~ion of the
rural sector (including sel�-consumption) during that period oc~upiee first
place by far (average proport~on~ 49.2 percent, the result of compeneation
for annual participation ranging berween 44.4 and 55.9 percent. The trend
of primary production during those seven yeara remained s~~ady and even
relatively improved.
, The minin~ aector from which there had been no appreciable parCicipation in
Che GNP in 1970, furniahed 3.7 billion CFA (2.3 percent) in 1976.
The other aectors--except trade--are generally regrouped, which manifests
difficulties encountered by the experts in very precisely defining the
competition with regard to contribution by the manufacturing induatries,
conatruction, transports, noncommercial servicea, and even of the adminie-
trative aector.
With prudence, one may offer the following average participaCiona (with =
reaervation), with mention of the apparent 1970-1976 development:
- Agriculture, cattle breeding, fishirg, forestry: 49.2 percent (very
slight progreas).
- Mining: 1.4 percent (net progress).
- Manufacturing industries: 9.8 percenC (small progress).
- Construction: 3.7 percent (small progress).
- Transports: 5.8 percent (sppreciable progress).
- Commercial servicea: 8.8 percent (small progreas).
- Administration: 5.5 percent (stagnation).
- Trade: 15.8 percent (small progress). -
i
79
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Progrees of the Mining Sector
Yt is important Co specify ~hat the above deecxiption and the gr~phica that
concretely depict the e~aCi~~ica do noti represent the preeent eituation aC
a11. For example, ~.t is obvious that rhe mi.ning sector has developed
considerably between 1975 and 1979. We11, the participaeion thaC hae ~uat
been furniehed correeponda ~o the 1970-1976 average and includes two years
of negligible competition (100 million CFA 3n 1970, 200 million in 1971).
The average established for the five-year period cannot help but reflect
the effects of the first two years.
The conetruction and transport industries are in fu11 development because
uranium ia �ar from being a stranger.
The siCuation regarding services, most likely with the inclusion of the
diatribuCion of energy and of water, and perhape the production of elec-
tsicity, is certainly progresaing appreciably, taking into account the evolu-
tion of a demand oriented towards comfort and modern facili~ies.
Agriculture has long remainad in firat place in the economy, without loaing
its relative poaition in Che leset. If one regroupe the ~roduction of th~e
1970-1972 yielde on the one hand~ and of the 1974-1976 on the other, one
obtains the following annual yields: 53.4 billion CFA/69, 1 billion CFA. ~
In relatior.. to the average annual GNP calculated for the eame two periods,
these figurea represent respectively 49.3 aad 50.1 percent participation~
which makes it possible to nota (see table) "very elight progress."
The contribution of the mining sector and the increase in certain other
- aggregatea (traneporta, construction, aervices, and perhaps trade) have
probably occasioned in 1977, and especially in 1978, an appreciable regrea-
sive movement in the relative participation of agriculture. The peanut ~
crisis has also precipitated this procesa.
The Changing Economy
This phenomenon is normal and even encouraging, because it seeme to teatify
- to the change that Niger ia experiencing. Thia country, in effect, thanks ~
in particular to uraniwn, no longer has an econamy that ia 8olely based on
the primary sector--usual sign of underdevelopment--and is progreesively
heading toward a more balanced situation in which the three traditional
pillars (primar.y, secondary, tertiary) will compete to asaure it a basis
that is at the aame time more solid and more comfortable.
It is customary to state the groas national product (GNP) by inhabitants.
The Il~' calculates it each year, beginnin~ with the GNP (Gross National
Prod~ict), determinAd through its research and demographic data that are very
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~
close (�orlNiger) tio Che official esti.mgties. According tio ehie organiza-
rion, one may cnnclude that in 1970 the Nigerian per cap~.ea GN1' was about
25,680 ~ CFA. Yn ~.9~3~ it was very clearly be].ow that �igure (2G,050 F CFA).
In 1.974: ~.t repreaented 26,800 ~ CFA; in 1975: 28,815 F CFA; in 1976:
34.590 F.C~A and; in 1977:(perhape) 39,010 F CFA.
49,000 I~' CFA per capita GNP in 1980?
Theae figures are furniahed with reservation (especially the las~), but seem
to correapond to the remarkable evolution of the overall economy of Che
' counCry. Most o� the unofficial reportera encountered this past December in
the Nigerian capiCal have stated that they were convinced of rapid progresa
in the overall GNP and in th~ per capita GNP during the forthcomi.ng yeara,
and thie in apite of climactic and parasitological hazarde. An annual average
increase of about 12 percent had been envisaged for the five-year period
~ for the overall GNP. This progreas would be between 9.3 and 9.4 percent of
; the per capita GNP, which in 1980, when the population would approach the
~ 5,500,000 inhabitants mark, would provide a per capita income of about
49,000 F CFA, that is, two times ~hat of 1973.
Niger will no longer, then, as in this period, be one of the 10 pooreaC
countriea in Afr~ca. In 1973, it wae in 46Ch place in regresaive importance
' in the list of 53 African countries for which the World Bank furnished the ,
; per capita GNP. In 1982, in all probability it will occupy 28th or 29Ch
~ place and, toward 1985, could be among the firat half of the ranked coun-
tries. It is true that, among the countries indexed by the World Bank,
some of them, auch as Ceuta and Melilla, Che Seychelles, Sao Tome, or the
, Cape Verde Islands, have fewer inhabitants than Niamey or Zinder or have an
~ area smaller than that of an arrondissement, which removea fram their per
capita GNP, too flexible and too senaitive, a great part of their aignificance.
, In fact, the per capita GNP, which may serve as an elemeat of comparison for
developed countries having a homogeneous structure, ~.s not aignificant in
~ any of the Third World countries. Disparities in Africa and, in particular,
in Niger, are often enormous. The above mentioned 1973 ministerial report
furniahes a striking exmaple:
- r~verage annual wages of a Nigerian laborer: 106?602 F CFA.
- Annual average salary of a Nigerian employee, level of engineer:
1,397,8~3 F CFA.
, - Annual average salary of a European upper level employee: 2,935,982 F CFA.
Between the salary of a basic Nigerian worker and that of a Nigerian
' engineer the relationship was fzom 1 to 13. It went from 1 to 27.5 in the
, European upper level staff. Well, a salaried employee in Niger is a privi-
leged person in the work world, even when he is paid th~ SMIG [Interoccupa-
tional Guaranteed Minimum Wsges]. In fact, if all Nigerians of active work .
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age in 1976 had received a salary equal to the inCeroccupational guaranteed -
minimum wage, the per capita GNP would hgve reflected~ at leaeti tihie year:
99,820 x 218,000 . 46,A35 F CFA
4,727,000
Since per capita income did not reach 34,600 F CFA, one must infer that many
Nigeriana lived in very modese c~.rcumRtances, between almosti total deeti-
tueion and the famed minimum interprofessional guaranteed wage. ,
Moat Incomea Are Very Low
The cases of individuals living campletely outaide the economic circuit
(aelf-consumption only) are very rare, not to say nonexistant but, in the
rural areas, it often happena that the money resources of peasante are
limited to a few thousand francs (CFA) per year--long set aside for the -
moat part for the payment of taxes. Even if the aup.presei.on iri 1978 of
th~ minimum tax sum :(II~IF) already raduc~d by half. in 1977, had eome
untoward repercuasions at the production level (by no longer obliging a
farmer to increase production in order to satiafy tax requirementa) it has
constituted, on the part of the CMS [Supreme Military Cauncil] a humanita-
rian act and a wise measure. The peasants from now on will have to pay only
350 F CFA each year for an arrondiasement tax for uses that concern them
directly. It is certain that, having pasaed a period of initial paesivity,
imputable to relief, the rural people will again find reasons to produce, if
only to become integrated into the evolutionary process to whi~,h they had
been barred up to now.
The indirect, but quite considerable, advantage that an examination of the
per capita GNP represents reaides in the fact that, in a country in which the
demographic progression is known, the rate of increase in reaources which in
theory each inhabitant could have makes it possible to measure the degree of
progressive enriciunent of the nation as a whole. Even if the mational
~ wealth is, in the immediate present, poorly distributed among the persons
who create it, its increase ~:onstitutes, at leasC in countries with geod
management and where waste ia prohibited, an improvement factor which each
member of the community, within a short term period,or a longer term
period, will derive a benefit. This is especially the case with Niger, eince ,
international observers are unanimous in acknowledging the gaod management of
the present Nigerian govenament, its keen awareness of national prioritiea,
its desire for efficiency, and its determfnatic�R to devote all of the coun-
try's resources to the improvement of man and country.
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I '
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; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' N N
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83
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Favorable Trade Balance
Paris MARCHLS TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Jun 79 pp 1378-79
[Text] An examination of tihe trade ba~ance and of the balance of paymentie
ahows that for several yearg these r~sources have been very appreciably ,
increasing. An exami.nat3on of budgeta showa that the dieCr3bution of
credita ,qllocated Co operation, as well as ~o investments, is sound and cor-
responda--witihin the limita of posaibilitiea--to the true needs of the coun-
try.
- Without infringing on a more detailed atudy regarding trade exchanges, a
study in which a special chapter will be devoted to that topic, it ie useful
to emphasize that, according to multicopy reports on foreign trade in 1976,
published officially and gathered through our effortia in the Directorate
of Statistiics in Niamey in December 1978, the year 1976, with 31,979 million
CFA in exportations compared with 30,383 milliYeaentsia p
sitiveitradefor
t
h e f i r s t time in the history of the country p
balance (105.25 percent), whereas during the first 5 years of the deca de
the rates of imports covexed by exports were regularly negative: 1979,
68.06 percent; 1971, 88.52 percent; 1972, 85.24 percent; 1973~ 95.28
percent; 1974~ 62.42 percent; 1975~ 76.55 percent.
Other figures (called "provisional estimatea") were furnished for 1976 and ~
1977 in the middle of 1978. They are a'~:hematic and surpriaing: in 1976,
FOB exportaCions, 36.9 billion CFA; CAF importations, 48.3 billion CFA;
cover rates, 76.4 percent; 1977, FOB expc:tatione, 46.9 billion CFA; CAF
importatione, 60 billion CFA; cover rates, 78.8 percent.
Favorat~le Balance in 1976
Although the figures cuntained in the multicopy reporta also are temporary
and sub~ect to later correction, because of their detailed presentationEven
chapters and topics we considered them as preferable to overall data.
though they are not offered with positive guarantees of exactness, we have
chosen them and they alone will be used in this present study.
It seems, then, that in 1976 Nigeria's foreign trade balance was alightly
favorable (with a aurplus of +1.6 billi.on CFA). This surplus ahould be
maintained, and even increased, during 1977 s~d 1978~ for which definitive
figures are not yet avaiY.able and for which the provtsional data are uacer-
ta~n or suapect.
~
. ~ 84
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~
' Proportion of Certain Exportations to the Totial Value o� Expor~s (perc~nt)
, 1970 1972 1974 1976
; Grods produces nf the 79.87 64.77 32.81 26.74
~ primary sector
~ Mining~productg 0.10 13.29 32.22 64.30
i �
O~her ' 20.03 21.94 34.97 8.96
It is wa11 known that uranium ia the basic reason for the above mentioned
change. It ia not only the chief reason, but the assential cauae, ae
manifested by the following figurea:
The PreponderanC Position of Uranium
- If one accepta the above percentages, calculated from official documents,
one notes that, progreasively, beginning with 1972, uranate exporta from
year to year have acquired a preponderant position. In 1~15 they repre-
sented 47.2 percent of total exportations. The ratio of 64.3 percent in
, 1976 doubtless constitutes only a atep toward greater participation in the
' years to come.
The recovery of the peanut industry and the rational exploitation of a
~ restored livestock situation could occasion a reduction of those percentages,
but that would appear improbable in the immediate future. _
;
The positiLe nature of the trade balance cannot help but have a beneficial
; influence on the balance of payments. Well, the latter ia already satis-
~ factory ("too much so," even say some malicious financiers, accuetomed to
~ v~ry f� iuent negative imbalances in Africa).
Between 1973 and 1975 Niger, which did not make uae of ite rights to special
' funds during t:~at period, recorded negative amounte for "goods and aerviceap"
but "transfers without counterpart" and "movements of capital" were generally
~ favorable to it (in billions CFA):
; Balance of Payments
~ Source: BCEAO [Central Bank of the West African States]
~
1973 1974 1975
j Goods and services - 9.74 -28.07 -15.48
; Transfers and c~unterparts +15.25 +24.85 +13.66
j Balance of current payments + 5.51 - 3.22 - 1.82
~ Capital of nonmonetary* sectors - 0.6 + 8.15 + 7.29
i
! Net errors and omissions - 4.03 - 3.97 - 5.21
~ Total Balance + 0.88 - 1.04 + 0.26
* On this line the + sign represents a decrease of assets or increase in
liabilities. 85
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The balance of payments for ~976, as presented in aome publicationa, has not
been considered here becauae it has been eatablished at the level of "goode
and aervicea" on tiotally different bases from those that we have choaen.
The "balance of inerchandiae" in this document shows a deficit balance of
7 billion CFA, largely countered by the poaitive balance of tranafers with-
out counterpart (+18 billion). The movementa of capital show~ without
details, a little more than 11 billion in liabilitiea or reduction of asaete,
which resulte in a quasi-balance of the overall balance. Well, if one
utilizes the figures of the "mil~ticopy reporta," in which the Crade balance
~ is positive, the balance of payanenta muet show a poaitive balance of more
than 8.5 billion CPA.
A Very Favorab].e Balance of Payments
If auch a result, preaented with reservation, corresponds to reality, it
is absolutely exceptional and has not many equivalenCa in Africa. It is,
however, the logical refleation of solid management through which uaeleas
expenditurea are reduced, of an appreciable improvement in foreign trade~
of the increased confidence manifested by foreign investers (on the public
and private plane).
~ It must be mentioned that during this past decade the balance of paymenta in
~ Niger has been greatly burdened, easentially by a conatantly deficient
balance of goods (even after an allowance for food assistance, enormous in
1974) and, Co a lesser degree, remuneration for assistance services.
The transfers without coun~erpart are always very poeitive. In fact, Ck~e
transfera for expatriatea who worked in Niger between 1973 and 1975, with a
c;~duction n?ade for the return of the funds of Nigerians who worked abroad,
reflected an annual negative balance of only 3.5 billion, whereas the average
nonreimbursable aid made to the government has been 20.1 billion CFA.
Liabilities are increasing, but at a reasonable rate. The combination of
these aggregatea assures Niger the continuance of a pos:ttive supply of
resources and of reserves: 392 million CFA in 1968; 1,~15 M CFA in 1969;
3,:i30 M CFA in 1970; 3,392 M CFA in 1971; 1,984 M CFA in 1972; 1,111 M CFA
in 1973; 1,225 M CFA in 1975...In 1974, by way of excepfiion, because of the
effects of the drought, Nigerian assets were negative (1,539 M CFA).
If in thP future the trade balance regularly ehows a surplus, which seems
probable, iliger, already not very handicapped by foreign liabilities, will be
progressively an3 rapidly in a position to finsnce from its own resources the
integral development of its economy.
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! A ratihe~�~Sma11 Foreign Debt
' On 1 January 1978, the to~al foreign debt was about 70 bi~.l~on CFA--a e~atie
' debt of 63 billion and an endorsed debt of 7 billion.
, These figurea are very modera~e and do not impose any very appreciable annual `
; ~ reimburaement problema on the Nigerian budgeC. In tha 1976-1977 budget
~ service for the debt (operational phase) represen~ed only 5.6 percent of total
i expPnditures, whereas in some neighboring countriea the rate is 4 to 5 timea
higher. In.the.197.7-1978 budget (estimates), the "public debt"/"tiotal budge~"
proportion is even reduced to 5.35 percent and, according to the 1979
~ financial law, to 4.85 percent.
It is to be noted that the Nigerian government hae aot yet borrowed in
; Euro-dollars. During the 1973 to 1976 period, the debt has had the following
average structure (in percentages) with respect Co iCa outseL:
' Asaistance from governments 74.5
~ Assistance from international institutions 15.85
~ 9.58
~ Assistance from various establishments
! Suppli~~rs' Credit 0.04
1
i Financial organizati:.ns 0.03
-i
~ Ample details will be furnished in a apecial chapter on foreign bi- or multi-
~ lai:Aral assistance and on Niger's cooperation with a great number of foreign
I
i countries. It is enough to observe here that this assistance and th s
' cooperation are particularly important, and that this manifests the excep-
~ tional credit that th.is country en~oys in the world.
~ Considerable Increase in Public Invest~rents
' A thoraugh examination of the budget will also allow us to trace the dis-
~ tribution and the allotment of Nigeria's resources. Without going into
~ detail for the moment, it is interesting to note that priority is given to
~ investments. Proof of this is furniehed by the index development of the
! three key positions of the budget beginning with 1970 (index 100):
I . -
1970 1973 1976 1978
~ Pu~~lic debt 100 73.5 275 435
~
j Operation ~ 100 119.5 183 242
i
~ 100 136 354.5 970.5
, Participation
~ 8~ 100 121 225 404
Total
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This table showa ~hat the service for the debC has appreciably kep~ pace
with the deve~.opmenti of the total budget, whereas operational credite have
experienced a very slow progression owing perhapa to a too great compression
of expenditurea for adminiatrative personnel. In contrast to ~hie, "etate
pro~ecta" have multipl3ed practically b;, 10 in a total budget Chat had been
eatiafied to merely quadruple. Well, atb:te participation represents a
ma~or part of the investmente (conCributions ~o the National Inveatment
Fund, profit aharing, credita for economic infrastructures, varioue
economic appropriations, etc. In 1974 and 1975 investments repreeented
59.6 to 59.7 percent of total particigation. In 1976, the proportion ruae
to 60.45 percent; in 1977, to 73.8 percent; and in 1918, Ca 78.2 percenr.
The National InvesCment Fund, which ia the chief source of public investments,
with resourcea that in principle conaist of specially appropriated receipta,
of contributfona from the General Budget, o� foreign financial aid, and
occasionally receipts from loans, has experienced the following evolution
_ during the course of recent years: 1971: 1,558 million CFA:
1972: 2,176.3 M CFA; 1973: 2,671.6 M CFA;
1974: 3,164.2 M CFA; 1975: 2,523.7 M CFA;
1976: 5,532.6 M CFA; 1977: 18,423 M CFA; .
1978: 13,996 M CFA. Article 11 of the 1979 financial law stipulates for
this fiacal year: "The allotment from the general budget to Che National
Inveatment Fund is fixed at 21 billion francs" (21,925 M CFA siace the
9 March 1975 edict, bringing the Nigerian budget from 56,747 to 59,314
million CFA). One has come a long way, it must be acknowledged, fxom the
several hundred million at the beginning of the decade. ~
It goes without saying that the allotment of such significant credits for
investments can take place only if, on the one hand, there are available
resourcea and if, on the other hand, they are not used for excessive opera-
tional expenditures or for prestigious and luxury accomplishments that do
not result in any revenue.
The continuation of this work will furnish ample proof that Nigerian public
savings (because private savings are small, if not neg].igible) are used for
purpoaes that have to do with the two main concerns of the CMS: the dzvel-
opment of the country and, as a consequence, the progresaive and rapid .
improvement of the standard of living of the Nigerian people.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979
82 55
CSO: 4400
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~ NI(~ERIA
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~
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,
FRENCH INDUSTRY SEES COUNTRY AS IMPORTANT MARKET
I
~ Paris MARCHES TROPSCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 pp 1313-1314
[Article: "The Firms Present at the Franco-N3gerian Days in Lagoa (21-25
; May~~~~~
~
[Excerpt] The sizeable participation in the Franco-Nigerian Days in Lagos
testifies to the fact that there is no doubting the constantly growing in-
' terest that Nigeria is arousing in France, and this despite ~he imminent
chatiges which the country is ~o3ng to experience on the political level wich
; the establishment of the civilian regime. Furthermore, as has been empha-
~ sized by Claude Maurisset of the FIMTM [F~deration of Mechanical and Metal-
Transformation Industries], who was the real instigator of the event, this
' change of regime should not cause too much uneasineas. Nigeria, he said, is
presently in the trough of a wave, and while the military authorities have
' in fact taken measures which brake the activities of investors and businesa-
men, these measures can only be temporary, because they present the risk of
~ suffocating the country. Their aim :Is only to leave to the civilians as
~ sound a situation as possible. General Obasan~o and his team are thus show-
i ing fair play toward the civilians; and perhaps they are also trying to avoid
' subsequent reproaches. In any case, their attitude appears to be understood
~ both domestically and ab road. Abroad, proof of this can be seen in the great
i increase of expressions of interest by a large number of countries in this
gi ant of Africa, of whose immense potential all countries from Great Brit ain -
' to the United States, from Western Europe to Eastern Europe, are perfectly
i
~ well aware .
I The officials of the FIMTM believe that Nigeria will rapidly constitute an
important market, and moreover or.~ which is well-situated in Africa and is a
I st rong promoter of technology transfer. Mechanical products presently re-
present 5 percent of th~ country's imports, with the public-works equipment.
They consider that such sales will grow noticeably (they have alreac~y in-
' creased 34 percent between 1977 a~d 1978), on condition that they be given
' a certain added value.� Moreover, it is from this point of view that countries
I such as Japan, the USSR, Poland and the FRG have begun to make sales.
` Thus, on the occasion of the FIMTM press conference in Paris ~n 15 May, its
i
j , generaZ manager, Georges Imbert, made this emphatic point: "If we do not do
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it, Nigeria w3.11 develop without us." The industrialists of the mechan3cal
industry see this as a 5-year challenge. "Tn the coming 5 years," Imbert
continued, "activity on Nigeria will have a thoroughly priority character.
It 3e an investmen~ area which is going to require a lot of effort, doubt-
lessly the most important efi'orts that we w311 have to make in Africa.'~
Imbert nated regarding transfers of technology--one of the ma~or ~hemes of
the L~,gos event--that while they are being carried out with good technical. ~
expertise as regards the big pro~ects, as represented by the Peugeot assem-
bly plant at Kaduna, the same is not true for the transformation industries
or, more generally, for the medium-size enterprises. 7.'00 often, as regards
the latter, the know-how is considered only as a subproduct of the equipment
delivered. And Imbert concluded: "In the coming 10 years, it is necessary
for some thinking to be done in this area, and we, the mechanical industriea,
must take part 3n it, and it is necessary for France to want t o be in the
first rank." In this direction, the big companies in interne,tional. trade
�that want to work more closely with the industrialists ahould be led to pley
an increasingly important part, so that the medium-size firms can truly be
capable of giving added value to the producte which they export.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie i979
~1267
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FOIt Ol~'FICYAL U5~ UNLY
NICEItIA
FOUR MORE SUGAtt FACTO~tIES PI,ANNED
Parig MARCKES TROPICAUX ~T MEDITERItANEENS in French 29 Jun 79 p 1~33
~Text) Nigeria's sugar producCion, now esttmated at some 72~000 tone, will be
incregged to 22~4~000 tons by 1984. To the presenti two factories will be
added four more~ including a~oinC venCure with Swaziland, and not counting
the Nigerian-~eninese pro~ ect of Save, in the Republic of Benin.
The two present factories are Bacita and Ilorin in Kwara State. The former~
the Nigerian Sugar Company, Ltd., farms 4,600 hectares of cane and plane to
expand, baeed on the Oshun river baein pro~ect~ to an annual production of
50,000 tons. A new production uaiL will be added. The second factory~ Tate
gnd Lyle Nigeria, Ltd., produces 38,000 tons per year (~ugar cubes end
syrups).
The three other national pro~ects will be Numan~ in Gongola State; Mokwa, in
Niger State, and Edu, in Kwara State. The Numan pro~ect, the Savanna Sugar
Factory, to cost 246 million aaira, is to go into p:oduction between now and
the end of the year, Lut its full capacity of 100,000 tons will not be reached
until 1984. The pro~ect involves the federal governmenC~ the govermmente
:+f Congola, Bauchi and Borno states, and the Commonwealth Development
Cot�poration. The Mokwa project, Sunti Sugar Factory, to cost 280 million
nai:a, will be inauguLated in 1981. Iaitial production will be 50,000 tone,
to be iacreased u].timately to 100~000 tone. Participating in the pro,~ect
are the it~erai government, the governaaents of Niger and Sokoto etatea~ the
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB), and Sugar Conaortium Pty~ Ltd
Austrialia, which recently reglaced Tate and Lyle as technical partner. The
Edu project. Lafiaji Sugar F.actory~ is still under feaeibility etudy, which
should be completed by th~ end of the year aad the factory could go iato
operation in 1980.
We have no details of the Nigerian-Swazi pro~ect except that the Nigerian
federal industry t~inistry has budgeted 2 million naira for 1979-1980.
Finally, the Nigerian-Beninese Save Project, to be constructed by the
Belgian company ARR Engineering, is to have an annual production of 40,000
tons, ~+hich the two countries will share.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et ~ie, Paris. 1979
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NIf}~RTA
~ BRIEFS
ON TRADE WI~H B~tAZI~-At the end of April, the Nigerien federal commieeioner
for mine~ end prn+er, Juatin Teeayo, xent tn Brazil to negotiate posgible co-
operation in the erea oP el~ctric po~rer. We note in thig regard that Niger-
ian production of electric poWer recently increased considerebl~r ~rith the
plecing in service of e nes~ unit in the thet~mal po~rer plent oP ~gurode. Thia
unit, s+i.th e poxer of 120,000 ka (kilvfratts~ (not 120 kilovolts, es erron-
eously printed), has raised this plant's poa+er 340,000 ka, and the other
three units xhich ere to be placed in eervice au!i which are reported to total
300,000 kw will rQfse it later to a level 260,000 kx higher the~n that of the
Kain~i t~ydroelectric panrer plant. The federal commissioner was e~].so to take
up in Brasilia the problem of increasing Nigerien oil sales to Brazil from
20,000 to 50,000 barrela per de~y. The director of the Nigerien National Pet-
roleum Corporation (NNPC)~ Esto Marinko, ~?as also expected in the Brazilian
capital a fes~ dqys leter to atuc~y this problem in greater detail with the
representatives of Petrobras. Brazil attaches great importance to develop-
ment of its links xith Nigeria, its No 1 trading pertner in black APrica.
This is also ~het had been atressed by the Nigerian federation's chief of
staff of supreme general headquarters, Gen Musa Yar' Adue, on~the occasion
of his visit to this country in January. Trade exchanges betaeen the tao
countries have increased quite aharply in recent years, especielly es re-
gards Brazilien exports to Nigerie, s+hich aent fro~n $57�2 million to ~233.5
million betWeen 1975 and 1978.' In the same time period. Nigeria's exporta
have stagnated and even decreased in 1g78, toteling ~67 million es egainst
$90 million in 19T7� The current imbalance could thus be corrected precisely
by increased sales of Nigerian oil to Brazil. ~Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
~T MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Me~y 79 p 1191t ] 1,126T
FRENCH B~ANK LOAN--The Nigerian Federal Government and the Par1s National
Bauk (BNP) signed aa algreeaeat on 5 June for a loan of 500 million French
francs. This first purchaee credit agreemeat signed bq Nigeria with a
- French bank reflects the curreat favorable atmoephere bet~+een Nigeria and
Fraace. It is intended in particular to promote French eaports of equipment
and technical assiatance. (ExcerptJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 15 Jun 79 p 1608J
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JAPANE5~ M~TALLURGICAL pLANT--A J~pane~~ source reportg that Che Nigerian
~ederal Gnvernmene's agr~ement wiCh Kobe Steel~ Ltd. Co cnnstruct et
Katisinn ~ meenllurgicnl fncrnry of 210,000 tone' cepgciCy is for the price
nf 27 millinn yen. [T~xt J (Paria MAItCH~5 TItOpICAUX ~T M~UIm~I2ItAN~~N5
in ~rcnrh 29 Jun 79 p 1732j
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SEYCNELLES
'AFRIQU~-A5IE' INTERVIEWS SEYCHELLES PRESIDENT ON NONALIN~MENT
Pari.s AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 11-24 Jun 79 pp IIY-VI Lb
[Interview with Preaident Albert Rene of Seychellea by Simon Malley--date
and place not epecifiedJ
~Excerpt] A few montha prior to the summiC o� nonalined csuntries in
Havana, all sorts of maneuvers have been etarted to further weaken a move-
ment which was created as a reault of Third World peoples' determination
not to become vassals of big powers, to make 3t abandon iCs real ob~ectives
and to deprive it of its content. Because tAe next sunimit ~rill take place
in Cuba in September aAd because Fidel Caetro is to becane its chairman
for the coming 3 years, certain ~Iestern po?~era, China and aome iniluential
members of the group o! nonalfned countriea are already trying to reduce
by any meana the influence and authority oP the chairman deaignate. They
would like to subject him to some kind of tutelage~ prevent him from
revitalizing the movement which has virtually been stricken With paral,ysie
since Houarf Boumediene`s chaira~anship came to an end and~ above all~
pre~ent any action aimed at reasserCing and coneolidating the anCi-imperial-
ist and anticolonialist nature of the movesnent of nonalined countries.
For inatance, certain people have proposed that the chairman (Fidel Castro)
be seconded (controlled) by three deputy chairmen, that Che number of
coordinaCion committee members be increased from 25 to 35, that anq other
nonalined country be allowed Co attend its meetinga as observer and that
an emergency organization be created wiCh a view to discussing and trying
to resolve any conflict that might arise among nonalined countries. In
short, it is a questi.on of depriving the office,of the movement's chairmnn
of the role entrust~~d to it since its creation which has enabled many
heads of state actively engaged in the anCi-imperialist atruggle to play
a crucial role in its consolidation.
Some other people have mentioned the possibility that people's China,
which has dared to propose that the Havana summit exclude Vietnam from ,
its ranks while pretending that it would be aupportied by North Itorea in
such a venture, might ~oin the movement.
,
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It ie an utCempC aC de~tiroying Che gubstanne of ehe movement o~ nonalined
countries during tl~e Havana gummiC, merely because the meeting wi11 take
pl.nae'in Cuba nnd b~cause Fidel Cnsero i~ to become its chnirm~n.
Uc?~r~ this m~an that n cridi~ hae arisen? A crieiA which migh~ ha~vc s~rious
rcpcrcussiong not nnly in 'Third World countrias but also for the balnnce
of inCernationAl forces.
; "This is''erue," President Albert Rene told us, "and we are profoundly
worried by it all. But firsC it shnuld be sCaeed tihaL the existing aitua-
tion is a result of the fnct ChaC many people have a mistaken idea about
what in,fact nonalinement is. They would like to make everybody believe
thaC to be nonalined means that you are neither on the eide of capitalist
~ counCries nor on the aide of aocialisC couneries.
"But iC is not so simple. In our viea and in the vieW of Third World
counCries which have been sub~ected Co the colonialisC and imperialisC
yoke, A capitalise country can be nonalined and a~ can a socialiaC one,
We believe thaC nonalinemenC meana refusal Co be member of a military pact
controlled by eiCher big power. Tt meana refusal to accept the imposition
~ of ~ny given policy, any precise strategy~
.
"Obviously, certain sCrategiea can sometimes link up wiCh one another if ~
interests coincide. But what distinguishea an 'alined' counCry from a
'nonalined' country is the latter's deCermination Co fiercely defend its
independence, its total freedom as far as its choice aP policy and action
is concerned, its cvmplete sovereignty.and ita refusal to allow any foreign
bases to be installed on its territory,
"Therefore, why should socialist countries like Cuba or Vietnam not be
accepted as nonalined countriesY The case of a capitalist country li,ke
the Ivory Coast is similar..~"
[Question] But what is the explanation o� a11~,these machinattons ~ust
before the Havana aummi.t in whi.ch~ we are told~ you W~.11 partic3pateY
[AnsWer] I will certainly be there. In my opinion, the crisis which you
have mentioned is due to certain external influences. Because we are
going to CubRs be~susp Fidel Castro will receive us and becausE according
to a traditiart respected by the nonalined movement the head of sCate of
the host country is el~cted chairman, certain big powers are afraid that
the movement m~ghe become someChing which. in any case, it shou].d have
always been, that is. a"diplomatic atrike force" able to resist maneuvers
and plots directed by them against Third World peoples. A"diplomatic
strike force" which c~u1d e~en become a strong and dynamic economic and
political strike forGQ wh~ch aould unite and mobilize all the forces of
our peoples ~rith a view to resisting any subversive maneuvers and
aggressive acts to Which ~re are constantly being sub~ected in Africa, the
Arab countrfes, Asia, Latin America and elseWhere....
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Some other countriea--memb~rs of our movement--are at variance w~.th Cuba
or disngree with it on certain international problema. They are now using
these disagreemenCs Co call into que~tion rhe fundamental concepC of
nonalinemenC or the way in which it has been implemenCed even though ehey
have noC done so hitherto. The aim of Chie is clear--ef.foxCe are being
' n;9de to divide the movement and create factions within it by arousing
di~strusC among cexCgin leadera and questioning some peoples' ~.nCenCions.~..
~Question~ Do you think that you will be able to prevenC these maneuvers
from succeeding and if so how?
[Answer] It is difficult to foreaee the courae of events now~ All what
can be sgid at present ie that all Chose who are united by a common desire
and deCermination to breathe new life into the movement of nonalined
~ countriea and launch a neW offeneive against the dangera threatening us
ahould intensify their efforts ~aith a view to warding off any attempte to
disrupC the movement or weaken iCs authority. Faced with Che challenges
daily presenCed to us by the forces af aggression--whether on the part of
South Africa, Iarael, Rhodesia or Cheir allies and~protectors-~-the movement ~
of nonalined countries has a decisive role to play. Let us insure that it
can fully assume iCa Yesponsibilities....
[Question] In your opinion, to WhaC extent is khe Sino-SovieC conflict
responaible for Chfa ~ituatfon? And how could the nonalined countriea
mitigate its effects on the development of your movement? Are certain
countries not afraid that it could be used to aupport onP of these t~ao
powers against the other?
[Answer] Obviously, this conflict affects us directly. When two countries
with which we maintain friendly relations and cooperate clash, it is only
natural that we should suffer as a result. Try to image what Che world
would be like if the USSR and People's China were united! Try to image
what immense benefits we Third World countries would reap from this. The -
present and potential aggressors againsC the African, Arab, Asian and
South American peoples would th3nk 1,000 times befare attacking us!
Having said this, any crises and conflicts anong nonalined countries or
between these countries and a socialist power make us naturally wonder who
is right and whom we should support.
The Sino-Vietnamese conflict can serve as an example of this. On the one
hand, Vietnam is member of the movement of nonalined countries and is
therefore entitled to support and sympathy on our part. And on the other
hand, PeCple's China is a friendly power and, furthermore, a socialist one.
This is why in many Third World countriea so~e people have defended China
and some other people Vietnam whereas the ma~ority has remained silent for
atate or short-term tactical reasons.
The role of the Soviet Union and that of China has been mentioned at one
time or another~ but few people have said: "Let us forget about the Sino-
' Soviet conflict. Let us first think about Vietnam, whose people have
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suffered so much, h~ve sacrificed so much during 40 yeare of n naCion~l
liber~rion war in which the worl~'s Uiggest powers--firet i~'r~nce nnd later
rh~ Uni:eed SC~tes--were engaged. Let us firAr think of rhe heroic gC~uRg1e
waged by the penple who helcl ouC AgainsC WesCern ~ggression nnd won. They
were bound Co merit nur sympathy and support..." ~
' [QuesCtop) Do you not find China's attiCude diaturbing on the internaCional
plane?'~Are you not afrnid that in alining iCself increasingly with the
. positions of Che United StaCes and Che moet reacCionary end feudal Third
World countries it mighC eventually conclude a semi-official alliance with
Wushington? AfCer all it attacked Vietnam, aupported Pinochet, the Shah
of Iran, Haile Selassie, Numayri, MobuCu and Che moat conservative Weat
Europe~n regimes. It was hostilQ to many liberation movements in Africa
and ehe Arnb world when they were formed: the African Independence Party of
Guinea and Cape Verde, the Popular Movement for the Liber~tion of Angol~
(MPLA) and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique..,.
Did iC not give financial and miliCary aid to the puppets in the National
Front for the LiberaCion of Angola and the National i:nion for the Total
Independence oP Angola and others?
[Answer) Of course I am worried. How~ver, thie feeling is mixed with some
confidence in the more distant future. I think China is in the thr~es of
what 7 would call convulsions. T visited Bei~ing and had long talks with the
Chinese leaders. I Cold them my worries on many problems. T told them I
did not understand their attiCude on certain siCuaCions in Africa, Asin and
LaCin America. For example~ T do not understand their behavior with regard
to the Polisario, Pinochet's Chi1e, Neto`s MPLA. the Shah of Iran, Cuban
internationalist aid to Angola and sd forth. '
When a problem arises China does noC examine Che root of the matter. Yt is
merely content Co take the opposite side to the Soviet Union even if that
harms the oppressed peoples of the Third World. The result is paradoxical.
Bei~ing's attitude is Chis: if you are anti-Soviet you become Beijing's
friend, if you have special relations witii Moscow it wi11 eventually regard
you as an enemy.
_ Nonetheless, I do not think that China will really form an alliance with
the UniCed States. I think its present attitude is determined by its fear
of the "great bear" and its desire to sCand up to it. For China that is
more importanC than anything else and hence iC n~egl.ects Africa. That is
also what led it to attack Vietnam--an aberrant ~peration which caused us
great concern. Moreover, I do not think that such an operation was the
best thing the Chinese leaders could have done if they wanted to prevent
- the USSR's alleged attempt to control the Indochinese Peninsula as they
, said they did.
[Question] Nonetheless, you mentionPd your conf idence in the future..~.
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(Answer] Yes, because we muat trust Che ~reaC Chinese people. Their hard-
working naCure, their acute sense of discipline, the enormous task Lhey
have accnmpllshed and the succesg they have nchioved since the triumph of
Chair revoluCion are arl factors which will eventually produce changes in
Beijing'e foreign policy.
[question] I.ike Madagascar, the Seychellea earnesely want the demilitariza-
tion of the 2ndian Ocean. This ia also the desire of all the progressive
r;irtLes on the other islands in the ocean. What is the atate of your
relsCions with the United States, the Soviet Union and France on this
po:tnt?
[Answer] When we came to power 5 June 1977 we made a serious atudy of the
siCuation. Of course, at that time we did not want any conflict with
the great powers bue we clearly told the Soviet Union and the United States
thgt we were determined to pursue our efforts to have all the great powers'
forces withdrawn from the IndiAn Ocean.
" LasC year we went furCher and warned them Chat we were about to t;ke atepe
to sCarC the region's demilitarization. For example, with regard to the
warship~ anchored in our ports. When we broached this sub~ect with
Washington we were told that the UniCed States must increase the size of
its f1eeC in the region because Che ~oviet Union is doing so. We then
suggested that the two powers should come here to the Seychelles to hold
the se~cret meetings which they generally hold in their countries or in
Europe so that ae could be involved in the3r discussions and know what wa~
decided. Of cour~e we cannot fight the USSR or the United States. However,
we can tell ti:~m what we accept and what we re~ect. For us the main thing
is to establish a system of cooperation so that these warships no longer
cruise round our islands but go away so as to avoid the risk of a world
- conflagration in which we would be the first victims.
[Question~ What aba~it Deigo Garcia?
[AnswerJ Diego Garcia is a different matter. It is much more serious and
. much more explosiv~. Diego Garcia is a naval air service military base
which is right next to us. On this question we are categorical: Chis
base absolutely must be removed. We are demanding much more than
Mauritius: we think Diego Garcia must be given back to that country.
I do not know whether that constitutea interfer~ence in Mauritius' internal
affairs but the fact is thaC this U.S. base is a permanent threat to our
security and indeptndence.
[Question] What about France? After ~11, there is also a French military
presence in the Indian Ocean....
[Answer] In my opinion the only peoples who have the right to be present
in the Indian Ocean are the peoples of this region. On a strictly legal -
level France regards itself as an Indian Ocean country because Reunion
- is a"French department." However, I will repeat what I said in Peris:
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;
; ? Chtnk rllFir tht~ (i'rench) prescnr.e i~ nn ~n~cl~roni~m whi.ch hiatory will
yc,unrr c?r l~lter reuic~vc~. Hc~wev~r, whll.~ the i'reneli pre,~enr.c~ COII~IC~CUCCH n
- cll~n~;er I c le~ ~i ~ rr~r~~rit fram the dnn~rer cauped Ly rhe presence of thu twc,
~uper pow~:r~ whose conErontation could lead to tt world conflict~ Nuving
said thar~ I c:nnnot s~y wheCher ~rance should or should not httve tt f~eeC
here. T do noC see wh~C it is doing in the Tndian Ocp~n and whom it ig
trying'~tn proCece. Tf France really w~nCs to help the Tndian Ocean
counCries it should give them ships, warships! However, I think thnt
sooner or later I"rance will be forced Co follow ~r~tain which considered
that ~.ts presence here was too expensive. Sooner or later it will withdra::
its fleet from our region. Tt would be in iCs in~eresCs to do so if it
wants to remain Africa's friend. A reA1 cooperation poltcy is not
compatible with an undesirable militAry presence.,~.
[QuesCion] What are your plans regarding the NASA satellite detection
station in the Seychelles?
[Answer] As you knoo~ the contract which was signed by Che previous govern-
menC binds us unCil 1985. ThAt does noC mean that we do not intend to raise
the problem when the time comea. All T can say is thnt Chis station will
not remain on our Cerritory for lon~.
' [Question] You mentic~ned the Middle East and North Africa.,.. What do you
Chink of the recent separate peace treaCy concluded between Cairo and
Tel Aviv? Whae all-embracing settlement of the PAlestinian problem do
, you envisage?
[Answer] During the recent OAU summit in Khartoum I spoke at length with
~ President A1-Sadat. I tried to understand the reasons for his policy. A11
he told me was that he was acCing "in the interest of peace." But what
peace? Why have there been all these wars between the Israelis and the
Arabs since 1948? Surely the fundamental reason for them was the fate of
the Palestinian people who had been robbed of Cheir land and their country?
How can any "peace" be possible without finding a soluCion to this funda-
; mental problem which is in keeping wiCh the PalesCinian people's aspira-
I tions? How could peac~ be insured by the resCoration of a little piece `
i of Egyptian territory while all Chose wars were fought to restore the
! Palestinian people's legiCimate rights?
That is why I lost all my respect for E.1-Sadat. It is true that from the
day he expelled the Soviet military advisers and asked for U.S. interven-
~ tion it was obvious that his policy with regard Co the Palestinians and
Israel was going to change, I must add that the separate peace Creaty
signed by A1-Sadat and Begin will noC last very 1ong~ either due to an
internal changa in Egypt or to Israel's expansionist policy. Just look at
what is now happening in the Middle East: constant and systemaCic Tsraeli
attacks on Lebanon, raids inside Lebanon territory, threats against Syria,
Jordan and so forth, i;;:~ long do you think the Egyptian people will
tolerate this sitciation? By signing this treaty A1-Sadat showed that he
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ht~cl b4cam~ n 11.5. H,1 ~~v~ . A~ far ne we ~zro concernrd ~ wc i~rN ~~rml y cnmmi ~tecl
ta dupporting the Palestinian people and wi11 maintain th~t unewerving
eupport. _
[Quci~tl~n] N~rtl~ Afrir.a h~s witneased serious dieturbanceR recently; the
lib~ratinn war waged by the Polisario, the death of Preaident Houari
Boumediene, the threata hc~nging over Libya....
[Answer] First, T would like to stress Ch~C Algeria is one of the few
countries with which we have always had a deep af�inity~ Long before
becoming independent wp followed and atudied i.ts fight against, and
victory over, the colonial forces. We have always felt we could learn
from the Algerian people's struggle, its successes and failures. During
my talks with President Boumediene we both felt that we ~thared Che same
ideology, the same convictions and the same fundamental optiona.
President Boumediene undersrood the specific problems of the Indian Ocean _
islands and never had any hesitation in helping us. His death affecCed
me deeply buC I know that the Algerian people and the leaders they have
appointed to run the state wi11 consolidate the Algerian revolution's
achievements.
I have noC yet had the opportuniCy of ineeCing the new Algerian 1Qaders but
I am convinced thae the ties of friendship, cooperation and solidarity
which link us will be maintained and strengthened in the coming yeara.
As for the Polisario, our position has been clear since liberation. W~ .
think the West Saharan people have the right to run their own country~.
_ The liberation war they ara fighting proves that they have a right to
independence. Aside from the Saharans, all those now in the Western
Sahara, whether Moroccan, French or Mauritanian are in fact invaders.
Immediately after our 5 June revolution we were due Co go to Lusaka to
give our clear support for the independence of the Western Sahara and the
recognition of the Saharan Democratic Arab Repubiic. When Che Lusaka
meeting was called off, following various machinaCions, the very day it
was'due to start we.recognized the Saharan Republic~
[Question] Do you think that a peaceful solution is possfble?
[Answer] Frankly, I do not think so. Tt is impossible to count on it as
long as the present Moroccan regime is in power~ That is why the Saharan
_ people must fight until it has chased out all fts aggressors. The supporC `
which Algeria has given to the Polisario is an act of great political
courage and should serve as an example to the other countries which could
help Che Saharan people.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
CSO: 4400 ,
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S~U'rH AFRTCA
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}3RT~FS
; FRT~I1Ci[ A'I'TITUD~ TO IND~PF~NDEI~T HOMELANDS---In reply to a written qu~stion
dated 24 Mr~rch from Pierre Bas, deputy (RPR [Ra11y for the Republic]), the
French minister of forei~n affairs, Jean firancois-Poncet, declares (JQ [~f-
~ ficial Journal] of Debates, Diational Assembly--11 Ma,y 1979) that "there is no
'contradiction between the atti~ude adopted by k'rance toward Ang~la [a coun-
~x'y whose, independer~ce it has recognized] ' and that which it has tal~:en toward
the South African ~Bantustans' of Transkei and Bophutatswana. The People~s -
Republic of Angola was admitted i,o the United Nations in November 1976. Fur-
thermore, France was one of the first Western states to xecognize its inde-
pendence, t~,nnd Franco~Angolan relations have recently been raised to ambassa-
; dorial level. The case of Transkei and Bophutatswana is totally different,
. and must be viewed with the framework of the South African s,ystem of apart-
` fieid, which France has eiways condemned. By practicing a so-called "separate
development" policy, the South African government is aiming, in effect, at
tyi.n~ 19 million blacks, who represent 70 percent of the population of the
; Republic of South i?frica, to 'national homes' Which represent scarcely 13 per-
i cent of the country's area. Z'hese ~national hames' or 'Bantustans' are broken =
~ up and scattered throughout all of South Africa's territor,y. In these con-
ditions, France has not wanted to appear to back the 'separate development'
policy of the South African government by reco~nizing the factitious indepen-
denc~ that it has granted to Transkei and Bophutatswana and that no state has
' recognized up to the present. It considers that the South African government
will not solve the problem of coexistence of the white and black communities
by mainta.ining the fiction of a territorial partition, which for that matter
~ is far from equitable. It will be able to do so only by promoting participa-
tion by black South Africans in the prosperity and political life of 'the en-
tire r.ountry. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
25 MaY 79 p 132~] 11267
'AIRBUS' ORDER--On 15 May, the South African national company South African
' ~ Airways (SAA) received authorization to purchase a fifth "Airbus" airplane,
the political correspondent of the South African newspaper chain ARGUS has
_ announced. We note that SAA has been using four "Airbuses," purchased in
1975-76, on its domestic system for the last 2 years. According to the ARGUS
group's correspondent, this decision was made by the minister cf transport,
Lourens Muller, on 15 May. A reliable source states that the South African
" 101
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compr~ny's fifth "Airbus" will be delivered in 1981. (hi 23 April last, Mr
Lourena Muller had announced an imminent "Airbus" order by South Africa.
[mext] ~Paris, MARCHES 2'ROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in F'rench 25 May 79
p ~.325 ] ii267 .
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TANZANIA
'
i
REPORT~R NOTES ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY SITUATION
~ Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13, 20 Jun 79
[Article by Francois Soudan]
[13 Jun 79 pp 20-21]
i [Text] Cost of Self-Sufficiency
Mwinyikunda Mwinyikandi is dead. He died this Friday afternoon 11 May, in
the middle of a popular quarter of Dar es Salaam. Mwinyikandi did not know
how old he was. He still remembered, merely, the time when the flags waving
on the �ront of public buildings bore the German eagle. When Tanzania was
; called Tanganyika and when it was a German colony before becoming British,
in 1918, and then independent 44 years later.
~ About 10 of his n~ar r~,lations mingle their sobs with the sputtering of rain
on th.e sheet metal roof, around immaculate linen, along the somber walls of
the h~use. A delegation from the party, their hands filled with armfuls of
. red flowers, is waiting in the shade, somewhat in the backgro~uid, to be able -
to approach the old man. "Ndugu" (comrade) Mwinyikandi was dean of the
members of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, the Rally of the Revolution. Before his
; election as an honorary member of the CCM [Rally of the Revolution] (which
resulted from the merger of the Tanganyika Afr~~an National Union and the
; Afro-Shirazy Party, in January 1977), the old Ndugu had participated in
every combat, in every hope: for independence, for socialism (a word whose
meaning he was often not sL..e that he understood well), always at the side
~ of the one whose yellowed chromo brightens the wall of his death chamber,
Julius Nyerere. D~es this Tanzania that M�.:inyikandi has just left, with
~ his face strangely calm, resemble his dreams? No, without doubt. And no
i one here will conceal from you that the long marcti of Arusha exists much
, more in the mind of the leaders than in the heart of the 17 million Tan-
zanians.
What concerns the little city dwellers in Da~ es Salaam, Dodoma, Moshi or
Kigoma at present is not the latest skirnu shes in the war with Uganda or
~
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I~OR 01~~'IC[AI. US13 ON1~Y
t}ie �everish debates agitating the bar es Salaam university students around
the topic o� "community authenticity," but ra~her supplies for the markets,
- the constant price rise, the dramatic lack of ineans of communica~ion. At the
end of May, the price of a liter of gasolina went from 3.85 to 5.05 shillings
(a Tanzanian shilling [Tsh] = 50 African Financial Community francs = 0.50
French francs), and Iran, the principal supplier, has not yet resumed its ~
deliveries of crude oil. The shops around Askari Square, the nerve center
of Dar es Salaam, are almost empty and they decorate their displays with a
few dusty cans of corned beef imported from Great Britain and Zambia, or
a few rare bottles of South African whisky. Nevertheless, retail trade,
which was nationalized at the beginning of the 1970's, has just been re-
turned to the private sector, because of "management inability." But the
rumor runs that the merchants most of them of Indian origin have
- recovered their petty bourgeois way of thinking by rPgaining possession
of their shops. "They stcck up to sell on the black market," a taxi driver
grumbled. Remarkably organized networks are also flouxishing in the black
market in a parallel exchange of the national currency. Foreigners pass-
ing through are discreetly offered rates five to ten times higher than the _
official rate.
The 1976-1981 5-year plan, aiming at industrial development and improvement _
of productivity, will moreover, result in putting the private sector, to
which it has granted very broad import authorizations, on its feet again.
The embryo of Tanzanian baurgeoisie will undoubtedly be regenerated by this.
Although a visible passion for business and ostentatious expenditures are
, not part of everyday living, there is a very definite feeling that the
bourgeoisie is raising its head. Its privileged meeting places are the
~ar es Salaam Tennis Club or the Simba Grill in the Kilimandjaro Hotei,
where a suit mus~ be worn for admission. Before the East Africa Community
was dissolved, 2 years ago and the frontier with Kenya was closed, the -
Tanzanian bourgeoisie had the habit of getting away, on weekends from
Dar es Salaam, the austere capital where they were bored, to relax and go
' shopping in Nairobi, the flashy show window of .r.apitalism in east Africa.
At present, they fly off to the capital of Mozambique, Maputo, who~e shops
sell South Afri~can products. More serious undoubtedly is the relatively
rec~nt establishment of prostitution networks still discreet that
draw on the rural exo~us for their source. It is whispered that certain
high-level ~arty officials are probably profiting extensively from it.
Cynically speakinq, the rates of the Tanzanian prostitutes are among the
lowest in Africa.
Rural exodus is; the most visible tie between the city, where 7 percent of
the population of Tanzania live, and the countryside, the primary objective -
of Julius Nyerere's socialism. Especially since the semifailure of the
"villagization" movement. The eriginal aim to group all the rural po-
oulat~on within community villages was quite o�ten diverted by excessxve
zeal on the par.t of the party's "mission heads." Instead of explaining,
~
all too often they preferred compulsion. Instead of encouraging voluntary,
more operational, grouping, they imposed mass grouping. As a result, the
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~ t~ok c~l~i~ICI~L U5L UN1.Y
1gy3 di~nught ended in a gener~liz~d ~hnrti~qe in the "ujamaa" (cnmmunity
villages), where the pc~pul~tinn was tioo l~rge in c~mp~~ri~on witih tihe pro-
duC~ion ~~p~citiy d~ tihe snil~ Ati pr~senti, ehe great majdritiy of th~ vi]- ~
, laq~~ have be~n "d~~ammunitiiz~d," witih ~~re ti~ken, ati tihe g~me eime, not
~o di~p~r~~ tih~ rural populatii~n again~ Vi11Age managers wer~ ~ppointed,
r~~pi~ngibl~ for tr~naging tihe "u~~m~~." 'I'h~ principle of collectiive ~e) f-
m~nt~gem~nt i~ growing f~inti~r. 1n the Kilimanjar~ r~gion, tih~ well-td-dC
caffQ~ p1~n~~r~, whn h~d n~ver r~ally aca~pti~d tih~ Arush~ t~ clar~tion and ~
tih~ 1970 "directives" and wh.~g~ entiire nctiivity w~~ directiQd tinw~rd mark~eg
' in K~ny~, are r~covering ~ bi~ of th~ir "spirit o~ enti~rprise." buring the
whn1~ Coll~ctivizatiinn p~riod b~tiwe~n 19~G and 1976 ~lmogt onQ quar- ~
ter nf tihe coffee harvegC in Moghf and Arusha went to the Kenyen port of
Mombasa by smugg]erg' tirails, _
'~he d~velopmhn~ of p~ttiy capiti~lism, the backward mc~vement nn tih~ rnad to
rur~i coll~ctiiviza~ion, th~ snm~tiimag brutai purging measure~ (like the dis-
m~gs~1 of g~000 rivil serv~ne~, dr z0 p~rcenti af the st~te's employees, in
1975) ~re nati ~lt~ring, nev~rttieless, the optimism of ehe manzanian lead-
ers. Str~ngtihened by snlid succegsful achi~vecn~nts in the fields of
liti~re~~y, health, nationalizatiion of th~ batiking sector or df nelf-
gufficiency in food~ confid~nt in the operatir~n c~f a sizable mininq field
tcoal, iron, phcr~phate~ and natural g~s e~ppcially), they explain their ~
Ghnic~ very cl~arly as �ollows: "We must provide ourselves with basic
industries," an nfficial in the Ministry of interior points out. "if not,
we shall never take off. We are well aware that, in order to achievc this~
we musti inrrease our dependence on foreiqn countries and allow the nation's
private sector to develop. mher~ wili be further inequalities. $ut we
' shall mas~er them. Self-relisnce will be ~t that price. in half a C~.ntury."
(20 Jun 79, pp 36-37J
(Text] War for YeaCe
Clicking of weapons fn the night. Between the ink-colored shapes of two
coconut palms swayed by the wind, a furtive, curfous shadow crept a hair-
breadth. The leading militiaman, barefoot, in battle dress, threadbare at
the elbows and knees, threw himself flat on hfs belly and was inftated by
his three companions. tie shouted harshly "Stopl." The shape stopped,
trembling. It wa~ violently illuminated by a flashlight. Bursts of
laughter. It was only Ndugu Peter, an old, half-crazy, stammerer. Every-
one here knows him.
We are far, very far from the Uganda kar and the moppinq-up operations in
the north of the for?ner "kingdom" of idi Amin. The coconut palms, the
militiamen in the "night security patrol" and old Peter live in Kunduchi,
20 kilometers ,~orth of Dar es Salaam. Once niqht has fallen, the presence
everywhere of paramilftary squads equipped with old rifles is the only
vfsible trace of an armed presence on Tanzanian soil. Offfcially, the
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~
~~nk n~'~ICIAL U5h: UNLY
CounCry i~ ~tiil a~ war, but nothing s~em~ rc~ have chang~d. Only public
tiran~portiatiion anfl trucke, r~quieitton~c~ a few mnnthe ago, h~ve b~com~ _
gcarcer. Odd qroups congregate along tihe bus stop~. No on~ protiests.
mar~x~nian~ ~r~ accugtiom~d to waitifnq.
Knowing how tio waiti has undoubt~dly been th~ critical eharacteristie of the
manzanian Army in its conflict wiCh 2di Amin's tiroops. As e~rly ag Noveun-
ber 1978, when tihe Ugandane occupied and d~vastatied the Kaqera salient,
manxania'g i~ad~r~ established the ob~ective of puttiing en ena to the mar-
shal. ~ue tih~ Tanzanian Army, in the imag~ of its comman8er in chi~f,
Julius Nyere, ie not an army in a hurry. ~very leap forward in ita march
on Kampala w~a preced~d by infiltirations of gabotieure and clandestiine "ex-
planation taams," responsible for preparinq the Ugandan population psycho-
logicaily. ~very tiime, 24 houra before the starti of a bombarda~ent, power-
fu1 lnudspeaker~ enjoined the peasante to evacuate tihe zone ain?ed at~
Without floubti, this patiient tactic of peopie'$ war in the Chineae fashion
explaing the slownegs of the Tanxanian counterattack over 6 months
much better tihan resistance by And.n's soldiers. Each day of those 6 montha _
~ogt, officially, $1 million. Tanzania never would have l~een able to
- etand thati e~cpenditure withouti tihe discreet assietance of the United States,
Creat Britain and undoubtedly Eqypt, buti it will weigh very heavily, never-
theless, on the domestic development program in the next 5 years.
ttave the people of Tanzania really understood what a high-level official
called befor~ me "the price of freedom of others"? No, undoubtedly not.
Once more, they will have to bet on the long term. On the beneficial ef-
fects that the proximity of a rich and frfendly Uganda and of a Kenya beti-
ter inciined toward them may have on Tanzania's economy. For the present,
this war that never mobilized the crowds is forgotten, erased by the dgily
concern to survive. Only the newspapers publish episodically a few let-
ters from readers suggestinq that "all the streets in our citfes bearing
the name of African traftors be chanqed" (an obvious allusian to the fa-
mous Libya Road in Dar es Salaam),oz that "a grandiose monument" be erected
near Kagera "to the qlory of our brave liberation Armed Forces."
Nevertheleas, the Tanzanians are ur~doutedly the only ones in Africa who
have really incorporated in depth the sense and the need for liberation
struggles. A nutnber of fighters for the continent's freedom have passed
throuqh Dar es Salaam, which has the headquarters of the OAU Liberatian
Committee in an old buildinq of the Azania Front. The authorities
Julius Nyerere is regarded as the leader of the five front-line states
have systematically explained to the people the full significance of the
attitude of solidarity. At the end of May, the only posters stuck on the
walls of Moshi, Arusha or Dar es Salaam represented the photograph of So-
lomon Mahlangu, a younq South African black, "assassinated by the Boer
doqs." In the few first-class tourist hotels, the organ of the Rhoclesian
Patriotfc Front, ZIMBABWE t~WS, occupies a good place in the middle of
Mozambican and local publications. Moreover, part of Robert Muqabe's
lOb
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t~Uit ~~!~i~IC;I,1L tiyi: r)NLY
guerrill~ figh~erg ~re training in ~he sc~u~hern parti nf L�he C~untry (Mord-
gn~e r~ginn), unfler thc ].ead~r~hip of m~n~~nian ir_seructivr~.
~ "We h~~v~ ~idec~ every rountiry ardund u~ ti~ win it~ ~recdom," Julius Nyerer~.+
g~~ti~d rer~ntily, "k~ut d~ily ~wo nf ~hem, zaml~i~ anc~ Mnz~mbique, have ~hdwed
us any gratitude." i~ shauld be pninted out, hdwever, th~t rela~inng wi~h
Z~mbi~ who~e cc~pp~r mine~ are conrecti~d with the port of bar ~H 5~l~am
by tihe mazar~ ~~ilydad h~ve ndt ~lways be~n idl~llic. Wh~ti I~resid~nt
Kenneth Kaunda decided, ~ti the etid of 1975, tio reopen his bnrder wfth Ithe~-
desia, Ny~rer~ blocked a].1 7,~7mbian Cop~~er exportis via T~~nzania fdr 2 monthg
as ~ retialiarory measure.
' ' "our friendship is ndt boughti, it is merited," a leader of the single partiy
conffdad. And when w~ observe lhe remarkable pnlititc~l ~C~ility of Tan-
zani~, wh~re no major ineident (with ~he ~xceptio.r, r~f the atit~mp~ at a
coup d'~tiat fn January 19G4) h~s nccurred to di~p~itie tihe legi~im~cy c~f
authnritiy, it mu~t be concluded that the rel~tiinn?~ m~intained by the gov-
ernment with its pec~ple are baged much mor~ c~n conseng~s than on force.
7'here is nne unmist~lcable sign: here there is no trace of n personalitiy
culti. bf course, no nne dedic:ates to Ny~rere a frenxfed flassion thaC he
does not seek morenver, but the president is integr.ated into the landscape
and life, like Kflfman3aro an9 the Indian Oce~n. I!~ is ~n integral part
of the 'I'anzanfan whnle. A practicing Catholic, even though he hardly likes
it to be said, Nyerere refruins intensely from any proselytism. When he was
: asked abouti the war with Uganda, he answer~d annoyed: "Mosti of the snl-
diers in my army are Mu~lims. Where do you see a war of rcliyion7" -
~pisodically, rumors run about on g imminent resignation of the chief of
state. gut, at 54 years, the "Mwalimu" seems dedicated to perpetuity.
Nevertheless, he has already provided for his succession in the person of
the vfce president, Aboud Jumbe, a plump Muslim who governs the associated
- state of Zanzibar with great moderation. Ur~tess Edward Sokoine, th- young
prime minister from the Masaf plateau, becomes "number 1-A," called on to
replace Nyerere.
5okoine's post was held, before 13 February 197?, by Ftashfdi Kawawa, who
does not appear always to have been above any suspicion. Rumor did noC
treat the "depraved and corrupt habits" of his associates qently. This
unfortunate experience, moreover, drove Nyerere to choose in Sokoine a
man from the country, preserved from urban temptations. In fact, the
~ "Mwalimu" has always mistrusted the city and what it represented. His
socialism tends constantly to set the rural masses, which are his support
~ strenqth, up against the uprooted persons in the cities, the uncultured
unemployed and the petty bourgeois labor unionists. ~-I
The exacrple of the Chinese cultural revolution, to which Nyerere has often
, referred, is obvious at this level. But the utopianism also very Chi-
nese underlying the Declaration of Arusha has now qiven way to a lucidi;;y
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i~c~k t~'ti:l AL U5L UNLY
rs~h~r rar~ fn Afri~~. mh~ npwspap~r~ ahdw tih~ir r~afl~r~ ~h~ m~ch~ni~mg of
dapend~nc~ involved by re~drttng tio forel.gn lnan~ and ~hey tiry ~o ma)c~ th~m ~
ur~dcr~tund why 'P~nz~nia is, in gpite nf ~11~ quitc oblig~d tio ~ccepti ~ic~
c;umi.n~~ Crom abroad. A daily evcn had the ~~?tirag~ to ex~l~in why WilliQmson
ui~m~nd~, ~ nakion~l ydmpany wnrking tihe Mwadui diemonc~ min~~ in th~ Aru~h
regien ~n8 whos~ offtc~~ ~r~ cstabli~:h~d in ~h~ nortihern suburb o~ Dar e~
S~1~am~ h~d to have a 1drg~ p~r~ of its proc~uc~ion marketi~d by ~h~ Sou~h
Afri~~n t~ ~3~~r~ company.
"it's f~ntagtiic wh~t mon~y can buy~" an ~dverti~ement for ~ brand o� luxury
manzanian cigaratt~~ procl~ims. Ju~ti 2 y~ar~ ago, this kind of ins~rt would
never have been publlsh~d. P~rh~pe tih~ ~enae of realism and lucic~ity inspir-
it~g tihe manzanian l~aderg ati preaent hag urg~d th~m to ~hut th~ir eyee.
nut everyone know~ h~r~ tihat diqnity ha~ no pric~.
C~pYftSGHm: ~~tu~~ Africa GRfJ1~JIA 1979
10,042
C50: 4400 ~
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