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APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-R~P82-00850R000'100080020-0 ~ ~ M~L ~F ~ ?9 ~ C FOUO S179 ~ i OF i is AUGUST i9 . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 w'OR U~~ICIAL US~ UNLY ~ JP~S L/8619 15 August 1979 ~ast Euro e Re ort p p POLITICQL, SOCIOLOGIrAI AND? MILITARY AFFAIRS ~FOUO 5/79~ FBIS FORElGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICtAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 NOTE JPRS publicationa conCain informaCion primarily from foreign newapapers, periodicels and bo~ka, but also from newa agency transmiesions and brnadcasta. Materials from for~ign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are Cranacribed or reprinted, wiCh the original phrasing and ' other characCeriatics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and roaterial enclosed in brackeCa arP supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Textj or [ExcerpCJ in the firsC line of each item, or folloc~ing the lasC line of a brtef, indicaCe how the original information was processed. Where no processing tndicator is given, Che infor- mation was summarized or extracCed. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preced~d by a ques- tion mark and c.nclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in contexC. Other unaCtributed parenrhetical notes with in th~ body of an item originaCe with the source. Times within ~.tems are as given by'source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. For further information on report content call {7031 351-3060. C(?PYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIR,E THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/P619 , 15 August 1979 EAST EUROPE REPORT - POLIYICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILI'fARY AFFAIR~ (FOUO 5/79) CONTEN'fs PAGE por,arm Opposition Figures See Government as Weak - (Giovanni Russo; L'EZktOP~O, ~'8 Jun 79) 1 ROMAN7A Ceausescu Family Misadventures in Spain Reported (car~aio i6, i7 sun 79) 5 Advancee in Criminology Described by Head oP Institute (Ion Angelescu Interview; PENTRU PARTIE, May 79~.��� 10 YUGOSLAVIA Defense System Outlined for French Audience (Dusan Jankovic; ARMEES D'AUJOiktD'HUI, Jun 79) ~ _ a_ jIII - EE - 63 FOUO] FOR OFFICIAL L~~F 0'!ILY , � APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 FOR OPFICIAL U3L ONLY POLAND ~ ~ OPPOS~TION FIGURES SEE GOVERNI~II:NT AS WEAK Milan L'EUROPEO in Itali~n 28 Jun 79 pp 172-179 LD ~Giovaani Russo dispatch: "Acn Evening in Mickiewicz Street"] [Excerpts] Wareaw-='Wt?y does the governmenC tolerat~e the opposition's - activity?" Jacek Kuron had a k3nd of laughing~fit: "A ~ournaliet from ~ LE MONDE aeked me that 2 montha ago aud I told him that it ie not the ~ government that is tolerating the opposition, but the opposition thaC ie tolerating the government. It wae a paradox~ however, which the Journal- iat took literally. In fact there ie eome truth ~n my reply. The gover~- mant could eliminate the opposition, which here ie an organized aad large- ecale movement~ albett etill a vanguard ona, which manifeste itse].f in , very ramified legal and illegal forme~ but it aould have to arreet at least 4,000-5,000 of the moat famoue intellactuale aad artists, etudents and workere. It is simplq too weak to be able to permiC itself to do eo." "For several monthe," Kuron said, "I have been continuouslq followed by ~ two plainclothes policemea and every night, even now, two police cars are parked on eitiher aide of the road where I live, but only until the morning. The telephone suddealy developed a fault 3 daqs before the pope's arrival: somebody came and pulled out the wi:ee. Of couree it wae the police." Kuron showed me the latest isaue oE the KSS "KrOR" COIrII~iUNIQUE and the monthly NEWS BUI.LETIN, conaieting of some 40 duplicated pagee. It ie the paper which publishes information aad documents on the economic, social and pol{tical aituation and of which they print 6,000 copies, ~ut ah:tch haa a much greater circulation. "In Poland Che ecoaomic crisis ia profound (there is a$16 billioa deficit with the West), the plaa ie not working, agriculture ie ia a catastrophic state and there is a shcrCage of essential medicinea. Thie ie one of our worat moments. ~Ihi~ i,aa ai-.3~ rausEd a criais within the party, which cannot coatrol the pa~i:i~a1 aituution. There is a clear gap between the government and oocieCy." 1 Y~OR OFFICIAL IISE ONLY ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Adam Michnik and Barbara C., who io editor of the litierary magazine - ZAPIS, to which tha best known wriCere (Woroszyleki~ Bocheneki, Kazimierz Brandys and Baranczak) contribute, confirmed these a~sessmenCa. "Ie is g mietake on the Weet's parC~" Michnik eaid~ "to confuee Che albeiC imporCant phenomena of dissidence in ~he USSR and the other Eastern bloc countries with what happens in Poland. Here it is now an opposiCion movement cenCered on the Workers' Defense Committiee. And it en~oys grer~C suppore among the population." "Kuron is ri~he," Michnik observed. "The government could eliminate the opposition onl~ by meana of many arresCs; but thP need to maintain good - relations with the United ~tatea and the fear of a acandal in Che Weet prevents iC from moving on Co repreeeion--aparC from the fear of an explosion, which the USSR wante to avoid at all coate in Poland. The exieCence of an opposition linked to such a etrong church explains why the party was unable to ban the pope's visiC. But everything can be explained by the weakness of the leadership group within the party and the government. The leaderahip group is experieacing ita graveat criais eince 5talin's era: it cannot carry out repression, but neither can it carry out the reforms which would be the only way to prevent economic dieasrer. The tragedy for those in power is that the price of reforms is a drop in living standards, a price which, in polit:ical terms, Chey are not in a poaition to pay." One person who does rule out any changes in the leaderahip, howaver, ia an inte].lectual, an influential partiy member. His opinion is shared, moreover, by the Catholic opposition, if that is the right name for Che intellectuals aad groups centered on the ~ournals ZNAR (THE MARK) and WIEZ (THE LINK), albeit for different motivea. He spoke to me with a disconcerting aincerity, which revealed both the identity criais being experienced by many co~nuaista and the ehock caused by Karol Wo~tyla's 8 days in Poland. "Gierek will etay," he s~id. "Before Brezhnev dies, noChing can change in the party, becauae we have to wait and aee what happene in Moscow. Even with Brezhnev as ill as he is, nothing can change in the Soviet party, because they do not know how to replace him without upeetting - their internal balances. Our leaderahip group is very weak and isolated~ and partly corrupt as well. Power vithout control (here it ie Che party which directly governe the'etate) i.s more damaging than power ov~er which there is some f.orm of conCrol. But we have no alternative. Wyszyaski knowe that Gierek is the beat poesible thing for the Polieh church and the pope knowe thia too (he is a stubborn raan, but also a great diplomat). He has goae, but we remain herewith a population dieaatiefied above all with the economic coaditiona. Not all Poles are rational when it comes to the USSR ~ad John Paul YI did well to eay a few good worda about them [presumably the Sovieta] too at Auachwitz. The pope has left, but we ~ remain here to safeguard our cultural and geographical entity. We must 2 FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE 4NLY - accept the reality: We mueti keep the Soviat so~.di.ere, and anoCher Czechoelovakia would be a dieaeter Chat noC even the US3R wante~ and - indeed greatly fegre." In a eurge of confidence~ my interlocutor con- tinued: "In trie eocialiet countri4e there ie a profound ecanomic and ~ social crieie~ but Pol.and ie the moet seriouely ill because the con- tradictione are more grave and eeneatiional between the indusCrigl developmenC which hao been the greaCest in the Eastern bloc and the traneformationa in economic and social life. The ecoaomic mAChinery has becoma very? complex and the old po].i~ical and adminietrative etruc- tures do not s~and up. Tha level of production ie low and we cannot manage to make the workers work. We do noC know how to find a way out ~ of thie. Then there is a ma~or ideological crisis. Tt is a wheal which turna in a vacuum, with rules belied by everyday life. 'War coummuniem,' ' which could have suited Lenin's or Sta11n's timea, ie atill being imple- mented. Fine-sounding expresaions are merely repeated, without people , believing in them." "People are dissatiafied," my interlocutor continued, "because they have to sCand iii lines for hours, sometimea from 0400 hours, to buy a 1itCle meat. But if we incsease prices there wi11 be a general etrike a~d Che governmenr will collapse. We have already seen thie in 1956 and 1970." - And indeed when the pope was in Poland~ the following ~oke was current: "Now th'e Poles will find more msat, because tihe Ruseians do not eat meat rhat has been bleased." xut let us return to the communist intellectual's confeseions: "Now there will be calm for a few months~ nobody will con- cern themselves with prices and the growing inflation. Everyone will have to absorb the effects of the pope's vieit. But the problem haa ~ become more s~rious. Now the government is ev~an weaker toward the church and the people. The working class already knew that it was atrong after the auccesa of its strikea. Now the others have alao realized that they are a force, that they are the majoriCy, and they will try to exert prassure to take every opportunity to wrest aomething more from the state. The party can make few concesaiona, however, and muat stay in power, otherwise there will be a C2echot~lc~vakia-type disaster." WIEZ sel?.e 7,000 copies and, if there were no reetrictions on paper, it could sell at least four timea as many. Ita:editor, Tadeusz Macowiecki~ is the Polish Nicola Chiaromonte, with the s~me moral inteneity, the same cultural and civil rigor. It ia ~ spiri~ual aimilarity which strikes me. His face looks pained snd severe. "For Europe," he said, "Poland is like the far aide of the moon." [Quotation marks here and at end of next graf as published] Since John Paul II's visit something has profoundly changed, so that our nresent destiny, together with our historical destiny, has become part a� the shared destiny of mankind. Do not expect everything to change politically here. That is an irresponaible furecast. It is true, however, that thQ political leader- ship knows thaC the result Af this visit will strengthen society and not the leaderahip. Society's energy has be~x? ~normously re~rived. _ 3 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY A hopeless apaehy has 'been broken. I~ is noC a mattar of mak3ng Che oppoaition groupa more radical, but of increasing social pressure: only Chue will there be any xeal changes. People have become aware of their own moral srrength. We do noC want to provoke a Soviet intervenCion, neither do we want Chings to stay as Chey are. Only by meane of preseure from society car~ we change the siCuaCion without provoking a dis~ater. Following the pope's visit, every Pole reallzes that he can epeak ouC ~ ~nd speak out without fear. The inviCation to the pope was not a vic- tory for a].iberal seance wiChin Che government, but for the etrengCh of socisty. It was an event which wi11 influen~e the enCire social3st camp. BuC the chs~rch is serong because it is itself an elem~nt in thie social presaure. It fs a very long and very difficult process and there will be a long march. So believe us, we are a r~sponaible, mature nation~ not etupid, which has had many tragic ex~eriencea but will never abandon Che testimony of iCs own hope." COPYRIGHT: 1974 Rizzoli Editiore CSO: 31n4 ~ s ~F FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 FOR OF~ICIAL US~ ONLY ROMANIA ~ CEAUSESCU FAMILY MISADVENTURES IN SPAIN REPORTED Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 17 Jun 79 pp 31-41 [Text] MUNDO OBRERO, the official organ of the Spanish Communist Party~ ' has accused the Spanish press of insulting Nicolae Ceausescu, Romanian chief of state: ~ Ceauseacu, who was the official gueat of Spain for five interminable days deapiCe the continuoua rudenese he diaplayed, is ona of the protectora of Santiago Carrillo, secretary general of the PCE, to whom the r~cently - legalized party gave a 1940 Cadillac which he had to abandon becauee of the old vehicle's constant breakdowns. According to the official organ of the Communist Party, "i.n Madrid, the fawning newamen who talk like fiahwives davoted themselvea to ineult- ing a foreign chief~of state because neither he nor hia wife sub~ected them- selves to,the hypocrisy and abaurditiea of the anachronistic Suarea ~l'nlo- macy or the medieval customs of diplotaatic protocol." , CAMBIO 16, which followed in detail the dazzling vi~it of Nicolae Ceausescu Dada Ceausescu, according to certain foxeign miniatriea has been able - to reconstruct what was the firet visit to Spain by a leader from the East. The first "sCation of the cross began long before the arrival of comrade Ceauaescu, when a number of officials from the Romanian security aervicea requested entry visas, atating that they were engineers and not membera of the police force. Howev~~r, they were engineers who gradually wor::ed their way into the entourage and made it a habit to ask for anything they wanted because otherwise, the comrade president might grow angry and when a leader from the East grows angry.... The second "station" c~n the long path of the cross was the eve of hia arrival ~rirh the~outright order that several suites at the Ritz Hotel had Co be reserved in case the official residence the Vereaillea-like Aranjuez Palace that had been requested by the president himaelf should not be to the liking of Ceauaescu and his enCourage. 5 FOR OrFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY P~?lure Layout ~ The third eCatinn inv~~lved Che Spanish Security Se:vices when ehey realized ChaC the greatest in~erest of the Roman3ans 1ay in photographing everything, probably as a service to a third country whoae identity it was not difficult to guees. In Cheir obseseion wiCh obtaining information, they even asked for details on Che security syeCem of Zarzuela Palace, the residence of the King, saying that they wou18 like Co have a ema11 drawing of the layout. At Moncloa Palace, they wanted,to know who tasted the food of the head of Che governmenr. With more irritaCion than wit, Adolfo Suarez replied thaC it was the King. " The answer musC not have been very convincing, for aC lunch the next day, Ceausescu did not eat a biCe. However, he made up for iC when he arrived - at Aranjuez Palace, ordering that he be served a complete lunch even though it was after 4:30 in the afternoon. The Romanians brought their own telephone centra2 and operator but they still Cried to stick their nosea into communicationa at the Bara~as airport. At any rate, the warnings and clarifications of Spaniah security officials and dip- lomats from the Minietry of Foreign Affaira went unheeded, Quite attentive, they would tell everyone that they underetood, but as soon as they could, re- turned to what they were doing. For the white-tie dinner, they absolutely ref uaed to wear formal evening dress and blatanCly forgetting the customa of all international diplomacy, _ refused to give a diriner in return. Naturally, Manuel Fraga took advantage of the Romanian move and also�wore a dark suit to the Palace. The spectacle at the Royal Palace was a aight to behold: Half of the gueste were in tails and bedecked with medals, while the other half were wearing plain atreet clothes. That night or rather, in the Wee houra of the morning the Romanian gueats at Aran~uez Palace gave the cook the fright of her life when the president's security guards went to ask for meat and ham and cheeee sand- wiches. A whole squad of agents with radioa closely followed the gastronomic undertaking while keeping one another up to the minute on work in the kikchen. Service for Everything The Palace administrator could not get over his aatonishment, but the aston- ishment soon turned into terror. Hours after he thought that the nightmare had ended, he was calmly walking down the corridor of the presidential suites in order to aee that everything waa in order when, as he recalls, he was suddenly thrown to the floor with an expert'~udo move. Thereafter, not even the servants dared to walk through the halls. The Romanians them- selves took care of the rooms. ~ ' 6 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 FOR !~FFICIAL USE ONLY Fiowever, nne of the most dramatic moments of the "Calvary-like" was during the scheduled trip Co the Prado Muaeum. The 111ustrious gueat, bored with tihe E1 Grecos and Goyas, dec~.ded after 20 minutes thati he had had enough paintinge and that he had to go Co Moncloa. UnAwara of ~he preaident's haete and with 40 minute~ of the tour yee Co ga, the director of the museum tried in vain to expl~in hues and meaning. Ceausescu did not even stop befa~e Che canvases. The Romanian was in such a hurry that when he arrived at Moncloa Palace, iC atill looked like a deaert. Since there was uo one aC the daor to receive him, an usher had to take him into the reception room. In view of the ueher's concern, no one even we:.ced to sit down and the atmosphere was not relieved of iCs tension unCil a smiling and canciliating Suarez appeared. ~ Mystery at Moncloa And yet, incredible thinga were hr~ppening at Moncloa Palace. WhiXe in the - Council of Ministers' chambers comrade Ceausescu droned on and on about national independence and the equality of nations, the oCher Romanians fi11- ing the other rooma of the palace shut themselvee up two by two and went at iC tooth and nail. At the same time, two security officials, dauntlese of. face and carrying their own black equare bags, were seated on a bench right aC the very door of the roor.ti where the official talks were going on. When Che officials~refused Co give up their privileged place, Spanieh security officers decided to counter the atCempts of the Eastern officials. , In the end, it would appear tihat they decided tc: "comb" the area in order to ascertain whether anyone had "forgorten" anything. That night, everyChing was nearly norma]. at Aranjuez except for the fact that Santiago Carrillo and Duran Farrel were summoned at Che same time (the ~one who waited was Santiago Carrillo, naturally) and there were proteata ' over the noise that a train whistle made as it went from the atation to the Spanish capital. ~ Valencia was a tragicomedy. To begin with, the band played~the old Romanian national anr.hem. Moving right along, after the visit to the city hall and in view of an obvious desire to go shopping, Che mayor inaisted that the president's wife should go to the Corte Ingles and practically did not allow - her to get into the presidential car. In the midst of the greateat confusion, it was finally realized that the Corte Ingles visit had only been planned a half hour previously and thaC at the lasC minute, the president's wife had decided to accompany him. ~t the Lois Faecory where blue~eans are made; the guesCs were ocfered a glas~ of orange juic:e, but Ceausescu waved his hand and a~faithful servant ~cting as both a lackey and bootblack brought out his own lemonade. ~The ~entle- man guesC had his drink and there was none for anyone else. 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 ~Olt OFFICZAL U5~ ONLY The Firar Lady (who is tl~e second xanking official in Che hierarchy af Clie Romanian Communisti Party) soon decided that she wanted Co go to the beach. IC Cook a great deal of paCience and convince her ~hat the: ~ beachea of Valencia were very far away and that it was not worth the troub~.e. Upon leaving the helicopter ehat Cook Chem to Sagunto, the f aiChful aervnnt: playing the double role of valet and bootblack eaw with horror that hie master's shoes were dusty, and to Che astonishment of Che A.dmini~traCi~re Council, which was moving towurd Che plane to extend a smiling greeting to Che visitors, he kne1C down at the president's feet. Whipping a handker- chief ou.t of his bre~st pocket, he cleaned them 11ke a profeeaional. To put a finishing touch on Che swel tering day, at a luncheon given at a hotel on Che ouCskirts of the ciCy~ the security forces wuuld not a11ow air conditioning to be used. No one ahould have been surprised that the presi- denC availed himaelf of the opporruniCy to leave suddenly, postponing Che coffee, after-dinner drink and cigar for another time. Toledo was a complete disasrer. The Cour of the city began aC the cathedral. The president seemed Co be in another world when suddenly, upnn getCing out of his car, he found himself face to �ace wiCh two actual medievril churchmen in red robes and white lace, their caps on their heads, who greeted him ef- fusively, despitie his sleepy look. To give him to compose himself, ~ they introduced him into the sacristy. But Roman vengeance was noC long in coming. On].y a few minutea later, the Romanian president decided to cut the viait ahort when Che bewildered guide was explaining Che delicious nuances of "The Burial of Count Orgaz," which is a marvel of.... It was a little after seven. In a quick conspiratorial meeting between the civilian governor, Che mayor and other Spanish officials, it was decided that they would have to fi11 up time until nine, the hour appointed for the official dinner at Fuensalida. ' - There then began a frantic mobilization of Spanish imagination in order to mark time. The president was taken to a handicrafts workshop in Toledo, two stops were made at the synagogue, he was taken aro~nd the city, the monumente were praised. Finally, the party went up to the room where the president carefully washed his hands, but in a few seconds, he was already at the reception. In a moment of supreme inspiraCion, someone showed him how to put together and take apart the Cetme of one of the civilian guard escorts. The civilian governor then took the bull by the horns and told him that they could not leave there before 8:45. But what a'miracle! Ceausescu smiled, tamed down and to the great horror of some and the surprise of others, asked for two - beers and a piece of freshly fried sauaage. At one minute before nine, they arrived at Fuensalida. Manuel Clavero, minister of culture, arrived 3ust in time, managing to save a presidential table which would have had to be changed if he had arrived seconds later. 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 }~Olt OFFICIAL U5L ONLX It was now evening and on the dark ~nd ~.on~ly~rond runnin~ from Toledo Co Aran~uez, Che vehicles foll.owing the preAidenCial. car last sight of the cortege at an intersection. Worriedly beaCing a hasty, they d:ts- covered the cause: The pre~identiial car bu~ none o~ ehe Cwenty odcl oxher vehicles was starting to shooe off aparks. Zhera waa a loud nnlse ancl Che engine died, The whole caravan came to an abrupt halt and the securlty oEficers raced ~ madly to the scene, ~ne of Chem running inCo a ditch. 'The officidle in Ghe last car ran to ehe auComobile with their little b~ack bags in their hands but it was a false ~l.arm. The exhauat pipe had aimply come ~.onse ~tnd the driver put out the flames, nearly skinning himself alive. In the midst of the lugubrious scene, the Ceausescu couple appeAred to under- aCand nothing of what ~vas on and watched in wondermenC tlie sCrnnge ' cnmmotion and confusion. 'I'hey finally arrived aC Aran~uez, where the night still reserved the strong tension of a possible meeeing between Suarez and Ce~usescu, which Che Romanians held to be a question of honor, quite unlike the Moncloa affair. No one knew anyttiing and the Romanians began to issue threate: If there was no meeCi~g, there would be no press conference. The telephone c~lls and Cension continued un~il the next day at 9:30 in Che morning. Aixplanes On the following day, as if it were the finishing Gouch, a phone cfl 11 during the visit ro the Aeronautical Construction Company announced Chat there wae a bomb in Che plant. 7'he Spanish security agents went into a cold sweat trying to deceive Ceausescu. However, the president had Caken a liking Co the planes and was en3oying himself more here than while taking in the paintings at the Prado. He calmly said that there was no hurry. When he was finally sneaked aboard a helicopter for Zarzuela Palace, everyone heaved a eigh of relief. A separate chapter shou.ld be devoted to Nicolae Ceausescu, Jr., the third- individual on tt~e proCocol list and Che top man with respect to a lack of up'.,ringing and manners. Su~fice it Co say that at the Palace dinner, while seaCed between Amparo Illana, wife of Prime Minister Suarez, arid Silvia Arburua, wife of Marcelino Ore~a, he refused Co converse with them and spent his time looking at Che ceiling and whisCling. A serious incident nearly took place when rhe young Ceausescu, head of the Communist Youth in his country, began to make jocular, disagreeable remarks abouC Spaniah pro- tocol in the presence of several Spanish officials. In short, when comrade Ceausescu finally took off for lovely Bucharest, the entire country could relax at last, except for the MUNDO OBRERO staff, which appears to be enchanted by the coarse manners of the East. COPYRIGHT: (1979] Informacion y Publicaciones, S. A. 11,464 9 CSO: .i110 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 , FOR O~1~ICIAL USL ONLY 1tflMANiA ADVANC~S IN C1tIMINOLOGY DESCRIBED BY HEAD OF INSTITUTE BuchgresC PLNTRU PARTI~ in Itomanian Mey 79 p 17 [Interview with Col Ion Angelescu, hped of ~nstituee of Criminology in General Ynepectorate o� MiliCia, date and rlgce not given) (Excerpts] We are in the office of Col Dr Ion Angelescu, head of the Institute of Criminology in the General Inspecrorate of thc: Militie, for a ahorr xnrervt~ew. [QueetionJ: Comrade colonel, ~ahat ie the place and role of criminological science and technology in determining the truth in rhe moet difficult casee? [Answer]: Placing werk in the reelm of criminology on a ecientific beeie-- es Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, eecretary general of the Rananian Commnuniat Party, our supreice commander,required of ue-�presuppoeee the inteneive utilization of the methods and means offered by criminological science, which is undergoing constane development ao a reau3t of the influence exercised by the contemporary scientific and technical revolution. [Questioconcerns of science in theefieldeof criminfllogyinnovarions and the current (Answer]: Mobile crime labs, installed on ~nodarn means of tzanaportation, which belong to the couaty miliCias and the militia of Bucharest Muaici- . pality, permit the rapid dispatchiug to the crime aite of equipmenC, devicee, kits, insti~uments, and eubsCances which are necessary for making investi- gatioas un Che spoC, for re-enacting the crime and for other penal proae- cution activities. Also, during recent years, we have been ~itneesing the more use by milieia cadres of inethods of ex8mination ficienc binctheiidentificaCion science, a fact which has increased their ef y of the perpetratora of the crimea. In addition to classic criminological methods, other methods have fully proven their uaefulness in the activity of the ~udicial organs. Tt~eee include spectrography, infrared and ultraviolet apectophoCometry and atomic 10 FOR OPFICIAL USE 01TLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 FOR OF~ICIAL US~ ONLY gb~orptiion, th~ chrom~tographie m~ehod, th~ eechnique of dl.frac~ion ~nd flaor~ecence in X-rey~, eha t~chnique of eleceronic microscopy and holography, ulrramodern m~ehod~ which ~re anCering tnto tihe ar~a o~ con- cern ef ~ur in~Citutie~ which inieia~e e new etage in tih~ exami.nati.on of microtr~c~~, anChropologicai and biological proceeeee, in Che Snreneive uriliz~tion of elecrrontc computere, in the ure of a vaat range of poesi.biliCiee of�~red by Romanian phonocriniinological methode and by successf~l arCempC~ eo apply peychology tn deCerming the truth. [Queation~: Can you summ~rize rhe mose importanC resulea n� ehe Institute ~f Criminology? [Anawer~: Since it i.e an interdisciplinary ecience, criminology should be viewed in cloae agsociaei.on wirh prngress achieved Sn all other eciences. This does noC mean ehae we, the Criminologiste, should noC carry on bagic and applied acieneific research en work ouC our own m~thodg. In Chc~ 1976- 1979 period, ehe cadres of our in~tiCuee gnd those of the couney criminol- ogy laba devised some 131 criminological devicea and methods, 25 of which were paCenC~d as inventione. Some 45 of Chese received prizes aC the firat national "Hymn to Romania " feseival and more than 20 were preaented at Che , Becond ediCion of this presCigious manifeetation. The specialized works compiled by the InaCitute of Criminology are very uaeful in Craining militia cadres, eapecially the "Practical Treatiee on Criminology," Che firaC two volumea of which have been made available Co the militia cadrea and other judicial organe. CSO: 2700 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 ~Ott tlF~tCIAL US~ GNLY _ . YUGO5LAVIA ~ DE~~NSE SYST~M OUTLIN~n F'OR )~R~NCH AUDIENCE Paris ARMEES D'AUJOUItD'HUI in French Jun 79 pp 43-45 [Article by Col Dusan Jgnkovic: "The Square of the 'Hedgehog' Circle--The Yugoslav Paople'~ Army"] , [Text] Col Gen StanofficialrvieiC~to Franceffromtl7 Cog201Apri1 19798 Army [YPAj, made an , Oc~ this occasion ARMEES D'AUHOURD'HUI is publiehing for its readers an article by Col Dusan Jankovic, who examiries the organization of the armed forces of Che Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY]. _ Aa the ~oint tactical exercise "Golija 76" was ending~ a group of foreign ~ military obaervers arrived at the positions located near the village of Orlovi. Just then one platoon of soldiere was preparing f~r combat againat the "blues" who were expected to appear aC any momenC� "Our plaCoan~ with 276 rifles. 5 machineguns and 20 antitank grenade launchers, from this slope has to stop the battalion of 'blues'," announced the commander quietly to his soldiers. When these words w~re translated, one foreign iailitary observer asked in ~ amazement: How can that be? ThirCy aoldiers and approximately 300 weapona. Is it a miatalce? An extra zero? People Armed Equals Triple Military~Strengti~ This "error" in~calculaCion was quickly explained. The platoon leader in estimating his forces did not use the classic formula. If he had~ he would ~ only have had 30 weapons~ which would hardly be likely to stop a battalion. However, he included all the forcea in the area, in other w~ords the 300 . armed villagers, in his combat force. This is what really happened. When the battle began, the soldiers of the regional units~ the partisana and the guards were in the trenches near the village, side by side with the soldiers of the etanding arc~y~ and they all defended the village of Orlovi. 12 FOR OFFICII+L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 ~OR 0~~'tCIAL U5E ONLY Thi~ unu~u~l cglculatiion ~rnug~d un~~reniney in mu~h wider circ~.e~. Lasr year during hie vigit Co the United States~ President Tito~ epeaking on U.S. r.elevieian~ reveal~d "tha miliCary secret:" In war tiroe, the Yugoelev armed f`orce~ could fieid ~pproximaCely 8 mil].ion eoldiere. Mil~rary experts and ~o~r.nalists were astonieh~d ~ti "thi~ incredtble �i.gur~," because according Co ehe u~~ual ~tandarda, Yugoslavia could field 4~5 mi].lion eo].diere et moet. 'Chi~ repr~sents 20 percene of ehe total population of 22 million inhabitan~s. `~he SFRY armed forces cannot be ~udged ?~y the criteria valid for convenrional armie~. In Yugoslavia, the predicxion of a great milirary cl~eaic ie coming true; it stgted that the counCry which could impiement rhe "armed paopie" concept would double its military forces. Thig opCimietic prediction has even today been gurpasged: the number o� people carrying weapone ie three time~ larger. A Modern Arnry 'The gC~nding army and the Cerritorial def~nsp comprise ehe Yugoslav armed forces. Their toCal strengCh in peace time has noCbeen a m1liCary secret for a long time: in and outside the barracks, there are approximately 2 million soldiers bearing arms. In gccordance with the principle "each citizen a goldier," approximately 1 million riflea have been dieCribuCed to the people in the last few yeara. This could only be done in a counCry whose political syetem enaures that the weapone in the hands of the citizens will be uaed only for the country's defense. Of the smaller complement of these armed forcea, let us eay approximately one man in eight is in the barracks. The soldiers in the operational unite Eorm the backbone and the permanent element in the general popular defenae. Although small in number in peace time~ the Yugoslav People's Army becauae of its tota~ striking force is classed as a modern European army. Currently, it is implementing an accelerated modernization plan, carried out on the basis of the 5-year plan (1975-1980). At the end of this period (in other words, next~year) the total fire power will be consid~rably in- creased and will be largely based on the country's armamenta and t~chnical means of production (80 percent of the total armamenC). Our military in- dustry can produce armaments and equip an infantry division from the semi- automaCic rifle to the 203mm howitzer. In addition, we also produce more complex technical equipment, such as the "Orao"-model plane, the "Oranj" multi-tube rocket launchers, submarines, rocket-launcher boats, armored vehicles, etc. Within the framework of modernizing the army, special effort is being made to improve the anti-aircraft defense system, antitank defense, and defense against air- or sea-borne units. Millions of Soldiers Without Barracks The territorial defense is several times larger than the standing army. It is calle~ "the army without barracks," and in its ranks are more than 1.3 FOEt OFFICItiL GSE UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 ~ }~OIt OH~LCIAL U5h: UNLY ~ ~ million we11-trgined goldierg equipp~d witih modern weapona. ALmogt ~11 gnldierg in rh~ Cerrieoriel defense have compleCed tiheir military service in eh~ ~rnry ~xc~pC tih~ young volunteerg who are being trained in apecial trainin~ ~enr~rs. Eanh commune, c~Cy, village or faceory ha~ its own . r~rrienrigl uniC~ which in recent yeara have made remgrk~bl~ stridea in thpir organization, Cheir w~npona gnd their equipment. The "depoe de- ra~hmentg" nf the past have been treneformed inCo mil~.eary units. Ag for CnmbxC readinese~ the territorial units are able Co C~ke up pngitione es quiCkly ns the unit~ n� the gCanding arnry einc~ the fornter have tihe . nec~~sbry wegpons and equipment in their homes. A11 Yugoslgvia is "covered" by echelons of thia civilian army. The Cerritorial uniCa are no longer "ord3nary infantry" equipped with riflee and light weapons, they also have artillery, boeCg, nnd even planes (it could be said Chat the aircrafC ChaC they have are not less in number than thoae of Che air forc~). The striking fnrce of rheee companieg and battalions ig cnnsiderable. For example, the antitank forces of the communes (500 in number) can sur.ceasfully oppose several thousand tanks. Another "element" mueC be added Co this appraisal: if each soldier in Cerritorial defense carried an antitank mine in his pack (and it takes 500 mines to destroy a tank), four armored divisions would be disabled. The armed forces are the backbone of the Yugoslav defensive strategy whose foundations were laid during the war of national liberation from 1941 to 1945. This concepC of general, popular defense, named "hedgehog atrategy" by iCs creator, Marshal Tito, means preparing the entire society for battle. In war time, the whole country would become a military camp, in which more than 13 million adult citizens, organized in military unita would oppose the aggressor by armed struggle and other means. For this reason, right now in peace time the entire population is in training according to plans Co be in a poaition to carry out war duties. For some years, in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, an exerciae called "Nothing Ca~ Surprise Us" has been held in which, for example, last year 3 million citizens between the ages of 10 and 70 participated. Whole regions, citiea and villages took part in Chis "battle" and each partici- pant contributed Co the defense effort--fighting, putting out �ires, trans- porting the wounded, repairing tanks, putCing up posters, digging trenches, etc. Similar exercises to determine the people's combat readiness are also ' being held in the other republics. The War Plan Is Not a Military Secret In recent years, armed forces traf:iing has gone beyond the conventional military games. Each autumn, when the army's combat readinesa is tested, various institutions participate in the joint exercise. In addition, to standing army and territorial units, the security orgar?izations, civil defense, communal assemblies, socio-political organizations and the economy also carry out various duties. The "Golija 76" ~oint tactical exercise in which about 10 communes took part demonstrated that the readiness of the "armed people" could be verified. It was an "image of war" in which all ~4 FOR OFFICIi~:. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084420-4 I~'UEt dl~r"I:CIAL I151~ ON1,Y nitix~ng, by every pos~ible meane, zver-regdy, dgy gnd night, uncegsingly defended every inch o� terrirory. A].1 mi~.itary formuY~~ become unworkable when there is an exhau~ting, long-C~rm preseure to counC~r e invaeion. ' 'To find the aquare o� the Yugosl~v "hedgehog" circle, we mugt begin with new m~thematical axioms. The cla~sificatiions used throughoue ehe world for "very confideneial" material h~s been removed from a11 Che war pl~ne. The clasaic rule about mil~.tary senrets no longer applies, because prep~ring rhe entire cnuntry for d~fense means thar millions of ciCizens have deCailed infnrmation not only about eheir duCies in the combat effort, but also about the YPA general staff's basic concept of Yugoslavia's etruggle in war time. Nonal.ined Yugoslavia is building its defensive rttmparCs to win the "de- ciaive baCtle" in peace Cime. By its "hedgehog seraCegy" it hopes eo dis- cour~ge any would-be aggressor who has drawn arrows en his operational maps pointing to iCa borders. COPYRICHT: Revue des forces armees francaises (ARI~IEES D'AUJOURD'HUI), Paris, 1979 9479 CSO: 3100 END ~ 15 FOR OFFICI6w USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080020-0