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APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000'1 0008003'1 -8 2i ~ ~ i 0F i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 FUIt 0~'riC1AG US~: UNLY ' JPRS -L/8630 21 August 1979 Ja an Re ort p p (FOUO 24/79) FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SER~/ICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 NOTE JPRS publicnCions contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals gnd books, but also from news agency trangmissions and broadcasCs. Materials from foreign-l~nguage sources are Cranslated; those from English-language sources _ are trattscribed or reprinCed, with the original phrasing and other characterisrics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets (j are supplied by JF'RS. Processing indicaeors such as [TexC) or [Excerpt) in ehe �irst line of each item, or following the lasC line of a brief, indicare how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicaCor is given, tihe infor- maCion was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclused in pareneheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but h~ve been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate wiCh the source. Timea within items are as given by source. The contenCs of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views nr aetitudes of the U.S. Government. For further information on report content call (703) 351-3067 (Japan, Korea, Mongolia); 351-2760 (Vietnam, South and East Asia). COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DIS5EMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 FOR 0~'FICZAL U5E ONLY JPR5 L/8630 21, Augus~ 1.979 JAPAN REPORT (~'OUO 24/79) CONTENTS PAGE POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL 'AKAHATA' Comments on Possible U.S.-Japan Straina (JPS, 27 Jul 79) 1 Journal Reporta 'Minak' Is No Threat to Japan (Toshi Suzuki; SHUKAN ASAHI, 29 Jun 791......�.����~�� Z Businesa Leader InCerviews Uahiba, Discussea Japanese Foreign Relationa (NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBiTN, 10 Jun 79) 8 Expert Urges Government To Shelve Northern Territory Isaue (CHUO KORON, Jul 79) 13 ECONOMIC Briefs _ Fu~ itsu Computer Sales 27 Heat Pipe Industry 2~ SCIFJ.~?~E AND TECHNOLOGY Briefs Opt.:lectronics Large Pro~ect 28 Turbaprop Aircraft Reexamined 2a Megawatt Pow~r Storage 2a Hhavy Crude Cracking 28 Coal-Oil kowerplant 29 Hydrogen ~Cgr 29 Laser Mold Making 29 Paranormal Research 29 _ a _ [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO] FOR OFFICIAL US~' ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 FOR OFFICYAL U5E ONLY POLITICAL AND SOCYOLOGICAL ~AKAHATA~ COI~IENTS ON POSSIBLE U.S.-JAPAN STRAINS Tokyo JPS in English 0907 GMT 27 Jul 79 OW [TextJ Tokyo, Jul 27, JPS--AKAHATA reported on July 27 Chat precaution is rising within the Japaneae Government that the economic relatione between Japan and the U.S. will be atrained again. One of the reasons for this ie that the receaeion has begun in the U.S. It ia cerCain now that the U.S~ will go into a period of etagflation, in- flation and receseion going at the same time. In thie eituation, Che Foreign Mini~try sources eay, "there is a poaeibility that the strong dis- satiafaction againat the (Carter adminisCration's) domestic economic policy in the industrial and political ciralea in the U.S. will be changed into a temper that will blow up against abroad, especially Japan." As the presidential election will be held next year, the Carter adminiatra- tion may also conclude that taking tough attitude toward Japan will be beneficial to his campaign. Under this circumstance, eome Foreign Ministry officiale eay, "Japan must ask the U.S. to carry out an effective policy to cope with the problems of energy and inflation," although they are doubtful of the effect of the energy saving policy released rec~:itly by the Carter administrat{.on. AnoCher government eource, on the other hand, eaid that it is important for Japan to carry out what ahould be done in the light of the international diviaion of labor, demanding that an ad~ustment with the U.S. be made promptly, which requires sacrifices of the people. CSO: 4120 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 rOlt 0~'~ICIAL USE ONLY PQLITICAL ANb SOCIOLOGICAL . JOURNAL REPORTS 'MTNSK' IS NO THREAT TC1 JAPAN Tokyo SHUKAN ASAHI in .1'apanese 29 Jun 79 pp 24-27 [Article by {Toshi) Suzuki: "Soviet Aircraft Carrier 'Minsk' Is 'To Be Used to Land on Hokkaido'1; But Actual Situation Is a'Paper Tiger'; Assignment - Co VladivosCok Is Confirmed"] [Text) It was confirmed on 18 June that the Soviet aircraft carrier "Minsk," reportedly assigned to the Soviet Union's Pacific fleet, had passed Chrough the Strait of Malacca and it is now a reliable fact that it will stay a stone's throw away from Japan at Vladivostok. In Che present day when tensions be- Cween Japan and the USSR are increasing, what meaning does the "Minsk" hold ~ for the safety of Japa:1? Let us assay calmly the new aims of Soviet straCegy in Asia. There is a fable called "The Boy Who Cried Wolf." This series of uprosrs over the "riinsk" is not unlike that fable. At first in th~ middle of the China-Vietnam dispute this March we heard, "The 'Minsk' has appeared in the Mediterraneanl" The uproar continued when it was sighted off the coasts of Angola, Mozambique and Mauritius: "It's the 'Minek'!", "Heading for the Pacific!", and "Poses a Terrible Threat!". Then on 18 June, it was finally confirmed that it had passed through the Strait of Malacca. In due course, it is certain to be assigs~ed to the Soviet Pacific Fleet which is based at Vladivostok, a mere stone's throw away from the Japanese archipelago. However, the reaction of the Defense Agency and of military experts towards this has been surprisingly cool. "Of course, while it concerns only a limited area, it broadens thei`r command of tae air and sea and alters their power relationship with the U.S. 7th Fleet. Speaking frankly, if the area around Japan is unsettled, it will after all dis- turb us, but it is more or less a political presence one finds in peaceCime, in other words, s kind of gunboat diplomacy, and it's not being taken as such a serious threat." (A member of the Defense Agency high command.) ~ 2 FOR OFFICIE.I. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 I~'OIt U1~F'ICIAL U5L ONLY "Ie r,nn be suid there is absolueely no direcC threae to Japan's de~nns~." (Kyuett Mineo, mi~itdry commenCator.) "With the presencQ of the U.S. 7eh I~'l~er, said to be the moat powerful in the world~ the ~Minsk' poses no problem at a11." (~iideo Sekino, milieary commenCator) We11 tihen, is the "Minsk" which has caused this much commorion simply norhing more than a sheep in wolf's clothing? The answer is "No." On this poinr, Mr Mineo, quoting ~:~viet Navy commander Gorshkov, "Naval power will be used gs a political eoo1," expli~ins: ' "PuCCing aside the pure military strength of the "Minsk," the passage of the "Minsk" through the Strait of Malacca signifies thae Gorshkov-style world strategy has finally begun in the Pacific. We can perhaps say thaC the battle lin~s have been drawn up with the American navy, which until now has en~oyed an overwhelming strength in the Western'Pacific. It is said that the waves in ' these rough ~eas can be felt all the way from Malacca to the Philippines." In a greater sense, beneath that sheep's skin, the "Minsk" has another, un- adorned, face, more powerful than that of the wo1f, that of the ferocious , polar bear "world straCegy." ~ How is the area around Japan drawn in the Soviet blueprints based upon this strategy? Before [we answ~r this question], let us briefly look at the true nature of the "Minsk." ~ The USSR did not have a real aircraft carrier until 1967. The .firsc was the helicopter carrier "Moskva," with a capacity of 18 anti-submarine helicopters. The "Kiev" was the next development, and was commissioned at the Nikolayev naval station on the north coast of the Black Sea in 1976. The "Minsk" is the second ship of this "Kiev" class,and according to "Jane's Fighting Ships," a third, the (Harikofu), is under construction, with ultimately six ships of this class likely to be built. Fully loaded, it h,as a displacement of 43,000 tons, an overall length of 282 meters, a speed of 30 knots. It has ~ust one f~.ight deck, 180 m~ters long, and compared to the backbone of the U.S. 7th Fleet, the carrier "Midway" (full load displacement 62,000 tons), is half the size. By Mr Sekino's es- ~ timate, her cr~w alone is roughly 1500 persons. Adding to this the necessary - personnel for the aircraft, [the total] must be around 2000. Effective Only Within Airspace Controlled by Land-Based Air Forces What must be taken note of are the aircraft she carries, which, ~udging from ~ Western photographs, amount to 20 or "s0 craft, taking together th~: YaK 36 : "Forger," the Soviet Union's first vertical short takeoff and landing craft ; ~ (V/STOL), and the KA 25 "H~rmone," its antisubmarine helicopter. ; Furthermore, it is equipped with eight SS-N-12~cruise missiles with a reported range of 400 miles, which with guidance by the V/STOL would seem to permit Che launching of a rather effective atCack. . 3 FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 I~dlt OFi~'ZCIAL USE ONLY Howevcr, and here ChaC sheep-like facet emerges, for a fighC~r plane, the YaK 36 verCical takeoFf ~ngine is large, a burden on its performance, ies top speed [being] mach 0.85, and its range ~75 It 3s no match for Che F4J/N cnrried by U.S. aircraft carriers.with a speed of mach 2.2 and ~ run~e of 5Q0 miles. Moreover, there is a report from a WesCern source thaC during tgkeofti and landing ~ests aboard the "Kiev" coith rhe YaK 36, the heat from tlic 3rt exhausts melCed the flighC deck, which (they then] repaired wirh a spECial rosin. And yet on top of Chis, the fl3ght deck is eoo shore for non-VSTOL attack planes, and it lacks any complex equipment such as launching caCapults or arresCing wires for landings. In addiCion, because patrol planes cannot be carried, its early warning capability is poor. And since it musC reduce its speed Co the level of 10 knots in order for the V/STOL to take off or 1and, its mobility as an aircraft carrier is assessed as considerably limited. Based on these facts, Mr Sekino says that in case the U.S. and SovieC fleets should clash at sea, "The U.S. Navy, making the most of its range, would spot the Soviet's movements without delay. First, the electronic warfare plane - EA-6B wauld gather informaCion; on the Soviet surface-Co-air missile, (SAM) effective range and cause ~amming. Soon aftier, attack planes and fighter- bombers would arrive and suppress the SAMs and electronic countermeasure system (ECM) with anti-radar missiles and the like; F4 or F14 fighter planes ~ would rout the YaK 36's. It is certain that it would end in a lopsided vic- Cory for the United StaCes, no matter which [factor] is considered, attack range, attack strength, or electronic warfare power." In short, this means that ~he "Minsk" is not an attack-type, wolf-type aircraft carrier like the "Midway," "Constellation," and others. It is said that unlike American and the other Western countries, who when they dev~elop arms, first take into consideration possible multiple uses, the USSR ` ordinarily develops arms that satisfy single purposes, one by one. For ex~ ample, compared to the F4 which is used by the Navy and Air Force for ground support and air control, the MiG 25 [was built] exclusively to int.ercept the planned American B-1 supersonic bomber. For what operational purpose then was the "Minsk" built? Mr Sekino and Mr ~ Mineo conclude, "for antisubmarine and/or for landing operations." One of i the bases for this [conclusion] lies in the helicopters she carries. In the i Far East region, the USSR attaches such importance to helicopters as a means of transport that a helicopter force is deployed which can transport 16 ~ battalions simultaneously. "In a landing operation, the "Minsk" would first approach a landing spot and the YaK 36's would make a ground attack. After launching repeated attracks, they would effect an air-ground landing, with landing craft from the sea and helicopters from the air. If one might say so, there is a strong sense of [resemblance to] the American navy landing oper- ation:, assault craft." 4 FOR OFFICIl+,'.. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 1~'0[t OFFICIAL U5C ONLY PoinCtng out Chat the "Minsk" c~me intio the Far ~~se Chiy rime in ehe compuny of the assaulr crafe "Ivanov," made ~specialYy for landing operations, Defense A~ency of�icera staCe: "Ir may be described as for localized ground invasion operat~.ons. This com- bination of boeh land and s~a fighting strength is highl.y significant." Aside from Che aforementioned 5S-N, she also carries he~vy equipment which can be considered as support to a landing operation, such as n 5UW anti- submarine missile, Cwo rtBU 12-barrel antisubmar3ne launchers, and fourteen ' 57mm twin-barrel guns. 'Cl~e view of Mr Keitaro Hasegawa, a commene~tor whose "Will Japan 5urvive?" was serialized in this magazine', is unequivocal: "The 'Minsk' is purely and simply an aircraft carrier for landing operations. Its antisubmarine helicopters are for the purpose of escorting the couvoys at sea to landing points, and the V/STUL aircraft are not for air control but at~ack planes for bombing points on 1and. To put it another ~oay, the 'Minsk' can be used effectively only wiChin the air spaCe controlled by land-based triendly air forces. In which case, in view of Che present dramatic buildup of air forces in the [Siberian] ~Iaritime Provinces and in the Kuril Islands, the bringing of the 'Minsk' inCo Che Far East can be for no other purpose than for conducting a landing operaCion on Hokkaido." What in fact is the purpose behind posring the "Minsk" Co the Soviet Pacific Fleet? Of course, the Soviet authoriCies remained silent, indifferent to the anxious Western countries as well as Japan, and the RED STAR newspaper of the Soviet Armed Forces only briefly noted, "A large number of naval of'ficer ca- dets are aboard the "Minsk." This time, to be sure, the pur~ose may well have been the Craining of nava~ cadets, a test voyage, or practice maneuvers in the tropics. But when it cotnes to making Vladivostok Che "Minsk" 's home port, something suddenly begins to smell fishy. In 1969, the United States leased Diego Garcia lsland in the Indian Ocean from England and began to build a straeegic outpost. In opposition, the Soviet Union directed its Baltic and Black Sea fleets toward the Indian Ocean and began to move its pieces to the are nf the Red Sea, the Arab c~untries, and Sri Lanka. This strategy, including an increase in the number of buoys and nuclear submarines seems to have nearly reached completion by last year. On this, Mr Mineo observes, "At last, starting this year, they have advanced east of Malacca, with the aim of wresting strategic control of the seas in the Pacific from Che United States," and he pointed aut: InterInterdiction of Sea Routes to China or Landing operations "The United States holds control of the sea along the strategic waterway strethcing form Thailand to Malacca, which might be called the first inter- diction line, by means of nuclear submarines. With this as a trump card, while professing to protect military and economic interests in the countries 5 FOR OFFICIr,:. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 I~'OIt nN'FTCtAL US[: ONI,Y of Che region, it's ~im is ro sCrengChen its military power. Against this, Che 5~viet Union has ~or several years here had submarines coming and going, nnd has been conCriving to break American control of. the seas. We can say rh~t the 'Minsk' is an ~xtension oF this sch~me. The Americ~nq have already positioned a second interdiction line along rhe Bash3 Channel which connects rhe Yhilippines ~nd Taiwan, but Soviet strategy-center~d on Che "Minsk," h~s also broken through here, in an atrempt to secure free ocean passage to Che I'acific Ocean. Accordingly, the good natural harbors of Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang, Vietnam's ~ miliCary ~SorCs, assume Sreat importance. If the Soviee Union were Co woo VieC- nam and succeed in turning Cam Ranh Bay into a base for the "Minsk," ehat would be the exace cotinterpart of the "Midway" Yokosuka relationship. For one thing, Mr Mineo says that with Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang as bases, the 5oveit itnion's immediate goal would be to atCack the Bashi Channel interdiction line, weakened by the withdrawal of the U.S. 2nd Army D~,vision from Ta3.wan. [These bases] would provide mulCiple bases for the purpose of attacking Che peak of the triangle, the Bashi Channel. For another Ching, it means that by Curning Vietnam into a Soviet milttary base, the Soviet fleet could travel the seas freely, from the Black Sea, through the Indian Ocean, as far as Alaska, wiCh no need to take alon~ an oil tanker. To go even further, if at Che same time, bases in Vietnam are built for the 50 reportedly newest and most powerful Tu 26 "Backfire" fighter-bombers (Cop speed mach 2.5, range 5500 miles) that have been stationed in the b'ar East since last year, [Che area] almost up to Guam will truly lie entirely within their radius of attack. Vietnam once permitted a Soviet navy curiser to enter one of her porCs near the end of the China-Vietnam clash. What attitude will she assume towards the "Minsk"? As long as the situation does not change, there is the convinc- ~ ing viewpoint that she wi11 permit no more than refuelling or at most repairs, and that a complete military base is highly unlikely. However, even though the West is only speculatin~ now, when the Soviet Union does accomplish its strategic intent, there is no doubt that the world's military map will change totally. Mr Sekino and Mr Mineo forecast first a _ Soviet attack on China. "In peacetime, they may use [naval power] as a political or diplomatic inter- vention force, but when occasiQn demands, they would probably completely in- terdict the import of material goods by sea into China. Depending on the situation, it is possible that there could be a landing made in coastal areas such as Lushun [Port Arthur] and Talien. Further, it is also very possible that as the international situation becomes tenser, should North Korea and the Soviet Union link up, utilizing the "Minsk" they could secure a sea route for a landing in North Korea and continue on to ir~vade China. 6 FOR OFFICIti:. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 I~'O~t OFI~'ICZAL USE ONLY Depending on International SituaCion, a Direct Menace to Japan It is not imposaible Chat China could be completely surrounded by Soviet ground and ai.r �orcea from the north and by the SovieC navy from the south nnd easC. Defenae Agency officials also say that thia kind of encircling strategy ia very probably ehe Soviet ineent. �In the aense o� shooting fish in a bgrrel, Che Sea of Japan is in the same [situaCion]. There is the viewpoinC Chat it is only a matter of time before this inland sea which during the Pacific War was dubbed "the Emperor's bathtub" by the American forces, wi11 be called "the Sea." Mr Sekino, consider- ing the facC that the Soviet Union already has 3000 fighter-bombera stationed in the F'ar East, analyzes [the situation] very severely thus: , "xhe Soviet Pacific Fleet is no problem if one [is speaking] only of a clash between'fleets, but it becomes a completely different story if it has air sup- port from ground bases, because the U.S.~aircraft carriers' early warning planes, antisubmarine paCrol planes, etc., which could be termed Cheir life- line, are tempting bait for Soviet fighters. Even should a second Korean war should break out, it is unthinkable that the U.S. 7th Fleet would plunge into the Sea of Japan knowing it would become~fish in a barrel." What is even more shocking is Keitaro Hasegawa's opinion that "the 'Minsk' fs to be used to land un Hokkaido." Undergirding this view is the recent sudden increase in Croops stationed on the islands of Kunashini and Etorofu. The Defense Agency has 3ust confirmed that starting this month, 130mm cannons, 76mm howitzers, 23mm multi-barrel self-propelled anti-sircraft guns, and such were brought in on three occasions. The ob~ective situation is that already, equipment amounting to almost a whole regiment of Soviet motorized rifle units ahs been brought in. Further, two divisions of marines, that may be called a landing spearhead, have been posted on the farther-out Sakhalin, and still more, there is the fully equip- ped 6th Airborne Division in Khabarovsk. Of course, this viewpoint is based on the premise that "the American forces, includi,ng the U.S. 7th Fleet, will not take a hand," and is such a rather frightening prospect likely? However, "It is very possible that if by some chance something happened in Europe, part of the J.S. 7th Fleet would head there, or else its strength would be cut as it moved to the south to [provide] a standby supply line to Europe viu Hawaii, Australia, and Lombok. If that should happen, the area around Japan would be left with a great gap [in her defenses]. (Mr Mineo) When we hear this kind of talk, we realize,with a shock that it is not an account of same fantastic dream but is tinged with the touch of reality. Even if we double and triple the possible ramificationa of our "Supposing...," an extreme situation will blow them a11 away, ae the history of war up until now has proven. Right now, perhaps we muat ~ust say that the stormy waves of the Pacific are rising higher than.they ever have before. COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shir.`~unsha 1979 9010 ~ CsO: 4105 FOR OFFICIE~L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 POLIT~CAL AND SOC~OLOGICAL _ BUSINESS LEADER INTERVIEWS USHISA, DISCUSSES JAPANESE FOREIGN RELATIONS Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japaneae 10 Jun 79 p 7 /Sunday Special Seriea: "Interview with Japan's Chief Negotiator in the Mul- tilateral Trade Negotiations with Yoehiya Ariyoahi, President of Nippon Yusen Kabuahiki-gaisha and Chairman of BIAC (Buainess and Industry Advieory Council~ ~ex~ Nobuhiko Ushiba: graduate of Tokyo Univeraity Law School, 1932; entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was Director of the Economic Affaira Bureau, ambassador to Canada, vice-minister, and ambaseador to the U.S.; from 1977, ininister in charge of foreign economy; from 1978, government representative in charge of Tokyo Round (Multilateral Trade Negotiations); born in Tokyo in 1908. Yoshiya Ariyoahi: graduare of Tokyo Univeraity Law School, 1925; after 3oin- ing Nippon Yusen, served at the branch offices in England and Germany; Presi- dent of Nippon Yusen, then Chairman, and, since June 1979, consultant; in March 1979, became the first Japanese Chairman of BIAC (Buainese and Industry Advisory Council); born in Tokyo in 1900. LAriyoshJ Of course, for Mr. Ushiba, there is no difficulty coming to an understanding with foreigners. Rather, on the contrary, you are sure to throw 90 percent of your energy into persuading the Japanese of the foreignera' thinking. (laughter) ~shib] Well, well, it seems you understand me. _ LAriyosh] In my experience, for example, when I attend at ahipping alliance ~ conference, it is like fighting with real awords because I am representing - the company and am to obtain navigation rights. At those times, it is en- ~ tirely futile if I don't proceed with full authority. It is a miserable thing to attend such a conference without the authority to yield much now and ob- tain the future in its stead, or, to yield the left and take with the right. One can't do anything if one ie depending on instructiona by telegram for everything from the home office. But in Japan, full authority is usually not given to the person out in the field. ~ $ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 P'UH Uk'!~'.L(:.Lw., USE ONLY ~ ~UshibJ 'I'h~t's right. To be suxe, it is noC readily ~iven in ,iapan. (laugh- Cer) ~ LAriyoshJ Not giving ir throws a wee blanker on the siCunCian, So, I Chink it is difficult to act. LUshib~ In my case, I generally disregard direcC3ves. In the past, rel~tively reasonable directives came, but because today's directives poke around 3n all directions, the person receiving them cannoC understand what Che person send- ing them is thinking. (laughCer) Z'he results are betCer if they are disre- garded. (laughter) Though, one will be at a loss if not enough understanding is arrived at with Che home country. LAriyosh~ Wt;at kinds of difficulties do you undergo with Che problems of - the partner country in the negotiaCions? LUshib~ There is the feeling that recently, no matter where, each minisCry is lined up side by side. The U.S. is so; in the past, if one was talking only with the State Department, afCerwards it (the State DepartmenC) generally controlled (others). When you go to Congress, there are the congressional leaders. And if you speak with then, generaLly is was settled. Nowadays, all are lined up side by side. The other party in the negotiations is not the government, but sometimes Che White House, sometimes the Congress. Even in Japan, there are complaints when something is not readily passed even though the prime minisCer says fine. And nowadays, such countries as the U.S. are ~ust so. ~~riyoshJ That is something the Japanese cannot understand. In the U.S. ~ongress, each congressman acts as his own spokesman on many things. Such as, oranges and cherries. Each for himself speaks with a loud voice. ~shiba 7 Each congressman proposes bills for passage. So there are many bills that are shelved. Even though there are many bills on import limita- tions proposed, most are shelved. Lut, in Japan, it is reported simply that the U.S. government proposed the bill. Even a person who thinks he knows a great deal about the U.S. errs in that area. L~Criyosh ~ That is one thing the ordinary Japanese does not understand. ~shibaJ I think one more great difference is that there is neither a com- munist party nor a socialist party in the U.S. Therefore, there are almost no party disputes that move Congress. And, the 3cope of movement is con- servative---it is conservative from left to right. Consequently, there is always the coloring of protective trade within that conservative coloring. Different from the past, this is an era where there is much interest in what comes in from a foreign country. And then, there is difficulty by reason of the fact that exports have become an exceedingly grave concern for the U.S. LArlyosh~ My feeling about Japanese foreign relations is that Japan's negotiators with foreign countries change too much. For example, the Japanese 9 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 � V~~ V~ a~ ~Y~+y~ YI~stI ~I~Ir1~ ' egrri~~ ~~g1,ling G~rd wiCh th~ tiiel~ a~ bur~egu dir~etor dr vic~-mini~e~r. B~~nug~ Ch~y ~11 g~n~rglly prpp~r~ ~~11ing c~xd~ lik~ relgtiv~~ nE Che prime : minigter, no on~ erugC~ th~ir eglly card~~ (1~ughCer) Abrdgd, Ch~y negoCiaC~ - wiCh Mr. U~hibg or Mr. Itock~�ell~r. TC i~ noC goad Co chgng~ Ch~ person - thduglitl~s~Ly, ~g do~~ Jgp~n. ~ff~hib~~ 7'hae ia r'or eure~ I� poseible, ~,t i~ betC~r to hgv~ Ch~ ~~m~ p~reon tcr a fa~.r].y long Cim~ in �or~ign ct~goC3gC~.ons. LAriyn~hJ Un~ morp ehing i~ ehge Coo many peop.l~ go slong. 7'h~ idea of ~ ~ummie i~ thae, wh~n nece~eary, the top people will oppn their hegrCs gnd do gome back-slapping. However, when Jrapan i~ invlted, very n~,any peopl~ Come ~long. Ign't that the regson why Japgn was not invited to the four nation head~ of governmenG conference at Guadelo~~pe laet Janu~ry? (laughter) ~UshibJ Thati point i~ g pnesibiliCy. When the Japanese are Ch~re, tranalator~ ~re ne~ded, and an gCmospher~ where ghort-s].~eved ~hirts ar~ worn attd ahoulders ~re hugged ~ust doesn'C happen. After all, Japan i~ somewhat heterogeneous. LAriyoshiT AC any raC~, we become tense in matCers of imporCance to the �taCe. ~~laughter) We do not open our hearCe freely as do foreigners. The Japanese have a atrong feeling that w~ cannot be careless even with one word or phrase. One more Ching, Japan ia a country with a strong gs~oup cotteciousness. Moreover, it is one race and one nation. Al1 are in the group, and a fellow- ghip consciousneas as Japan is etrong. Therefore, when we go to a foreign country, there is "he feeling of "water and oil." ~shiba7 There is almost no other place in the world where 110 million people are ga[~ered togeeher is auch a amall counCry as this and are all one race. 1 It is an Extremely unique existence. ~A'riyosh] What is thought to be natural in Japan because feelings on values are the same, is often apt not to be natural abroad. Americans say that Japan is not open at all. So if Japan says, "we are open,'' they will say, "how many American directors are there in your company?" Japanese wouldn't even think such a thing. When such things are looked at from abroad, it is said Chat Japanese get together only wiCh comrades. The National Railways family and the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation family have a con- sciousness of being relatives. ~ ~Ushib] ThaC group consciousness reflects a closedness. It is not said only by foriegn countries thaC National Railways or Nippon Telegraph and Tele- phone ~ublic Corporation are closed. It is said ev~n at home. (laughter) The area where they are hardest put to open the doors is in national relations. There is no one who things that foreign goods will come in that suddenly. ~riyosh] After all, the contention of the U.S. is that the basis is the principie of reciprocity. ; 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 T'OR O~IC~AA:L U~~ 01V~Y ~tl~hib~ 'I'h~ principle~ a~ r~~iprnciey ~nd equ~liCy gre J~p~n'~ w~~kegt pdinCg~ 'The U.S~, We~e~r7 ~urope ~nd Jnp~tt ~r~ th~ ~hre~ pillgxa a~ ehe wdrld eCanamy, ' uue Che prnbl~mg eh~e nCCUr ~re ~lw~yg prab].~m~ beCween J~p~n gnd ehe U.S., ~nd beew~en J~pgn ~nd W~~e~rn ~urup~. prnbl~m~ dd nne occur mueh b~ew~en eh~ U~S. gnd W~s~~rn ~urop~~ Such g siCuaCion ig ~xer~m~ly diger~~~ing. �Thge i~, of edur~~, b~c~ug~ Jap~n i~ unusual. Ag �or J~p~n b~ing unu~u~l~ iC would be ~1ri~he i� iC w~r~ unu~u~i by r~ggon o� b~ing npen, bue it ig unu~ugl by r~~gnn af bein~ gen~r~lly cloged~ (l~ughe~r) `Ariyogh~ ~v~n Chnugh Jgpgn iegelf thinkg ie ig np~n, when ~~~n from gbra~d, ~ ~ontrnry Cd ~xpenCgCinng, iC ig ofCen gaid noC Co b~ ~o. ~Ughib~ p~rhapg the grdup ~nnsaiousnegs nf ehe ~nmhanies m~ntidn~d here is pregent. ~e ig noe gn eo ~he exeenC of being ~ government policy, buC ig the rule or the nnrm. '1'hig is we11 underatood by th~ Jap~nese, but for~ignerg don'C und~r~C~nd. IC c~n be ~~id tih~C Jgpan'~ openn~s~ :t~ progr~~~ing Co a ` nere~in d~gr~~, ~nd only minor problemg rem~in~ 7'ho~e mindr probleme gre rhe mngC diffiCU1C, gren'C eh~y7 LAriyoghi If ehere ig ehat kind of talk, can't one ~use ggy, "oh yes," gll of ~~ud ~n. (lgughter) Aftiprw~rdg, we gre free to buy nr not buy. ~shib~ WesC G~rmgny is doing go. They ob~ect Co ehe fu1fi11mene prdcedur~g. ey say Chey wi11 buy anytime, and, in fact, they do buy variou~ thing~. - ~Ariyogh~ In euch a background, there are complainta about Japan's black figures, and yet there are no complgints abouC West Germ~ny's black figures. 'fhey are thoroughtly open, aren't Chey? ~Ushib~ Acrually, Erhart (former chancellor, 1963-66) was wonderful. The fact Chat in his time Crede and capital transgctinns were entirely ppen is very forCunate for today's West Germany. Japan was as closed as possible to foreign investment. That is the biggest cause for Japan's b~d reputation. Finally, since the 19~0's, we have opened up little by little. ~Ariyoeh~ Also, West Germany is helping the European Common Market. ~shib~ West G~rn?any has had an excess of exports wiCh the U.S., but from the U.S. perapective, Che balance with the EC is looked aC rather than the balgnce with West Germany~ The U.S. has a slight excess of exports, and so, for sure, the West German black figures are hidden. ~Ariyosh] The exchange control has finally been eased to some degree, but this is also a problem that is difficult to explain to foreigners. As for the actual problem, even though it is said that Japan's export exchange con- trol is formalized, it is counterattacked with " your law is so strong that even the prime minister could be arrested." tJshib] In fact, Japan's capital transactions are still far from open. ecently, Europe and the U.S. have made demands concerning Japan's financial 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 run ui~~r,~~.~w us~; uivLr ~yge~m. ~n Ch~e, ~V~n i~ ~ b~nk ~~i.1g in ies bu~in~~~ in g forei~n - Gnuntry, no dn~ geCg tdgeeh~x tio n~~er reli~�~ ~Iowever, in Jnpan, ~inn~ n poli~y, wher~by ~inanci~l inetieuCion~ abgolueely do noC go bankrupe, ig carried out, government interventi~n ia indiacriminately great. Jgpan's - bank~ gre eaeisfi~d with thgt, but �oreign bank~ thae hav~ come intio Jap~n gr~ di~egCis�ied ehgt there hg~ tio be such rigid control~ Still, rhey don't think about b~ing help~d by the J~paneee gov~rnmene and ehe Jgp~nege govern- menr haen'C thought gbnue helping �oreign bgnkg. LAriyneh] Jnpgn ig re~Lly gn ov~rproC~ct~d counCry, i~n'e it? The $ov~rn- menC'~ posiCion is to help ouC ~to matt~r what. ~U~hib] Itgeher, Ch~ government is officiou~ly meddling. As a result of the governmenC's incre~~ed inCerv~ntiion, Che number of people who cn~k~ their living d~bbling 3n ehi~ gceivity incregges the way a enowman does~ 7'hat makes perm~n~ne plgce~ of emplaym~nC; sd it can'e be stopped easily. The difficuley in gdminigCrative refnrm has its cause in triis. LAriynsh] But, when gnoCher look is not taken ae Che way Cha ndministration ghould be, noC only will foreign discord increase little by 1iCtle, but Japan iCself will become unable to endure a"big government." Our country's most influential authorities on internaCional affairs and friends meC together. As soon as Mr. Uahiba arrived, Mr. Ariyoshi, who was eagerly waiting, started questioning, and the talk quickly went to key issues. These ~ two diagnosed the origin of economic friction between 3apan and the U.S.-Europe to be the "fellowship consciousnesa" of the Japanese. It is said that the adverse tariff barriera are more in our hearts than in our system. If so, it will not be easy to diasolve the friction. They met far the first time in 1937, when Mr. Ariyoshi was residing in Berlin and Mr. Ushiba was in service at the embassy in Germany. Indeed, it is said that they both knew each other's name because their grandmothers were close friends. According to Mr. Ushiba, there are many people who atCend the BIAC conference to hear Mr. Ar3yoahi's richly witty talk. At the time Mr. Ushiba was ambassa- dor Co Che U.5., it was written in a leading U.S. ~ournal that he himself was a"five star of the Washington diplomatic cirale." Next week's guest will be Chairman Oki of the Japan Economic Research Center. COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1979 9400 CSO: 4105 12 FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 ~OEt d~~TCIAL US~ ONLY pOLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL EXPERT U1tGES GOV~RNM~NT TO SHELVE NORTHERN TERRITORY ISSUE Tokyo CHUO KORON in Japanese Jul 79 pp 277-286 lText/ Last year during the procea~ of negotiating the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship Creaty fears of Soviet reealiaCion were voiced in some quareers. Fnr instance, the vi~w wgs expreased that the Soviet Union might withdraw its ambassador from Japan or tighCen up in Che fishing negotiationa. Ae the most extreme there was even apeculation that the Soviet Union might occupy Hokkaido. r In fact, these feara were groundlesa. Indeed, the Soviet Union has recently displayed new interest in improving Soviet-Japaneae relations. The direct expression of thie was the opening of the Soviet-Japanese administrative level conference on 14 and 15 May. The administrative level conference was a plan put forward by Japan at the timi. of F'oreign Minister Sonoda's visit to the Soviet Union in January of laF~t year. In the past the acheduled yearly Soviet-Japanese foreign tniniatera cnnference was often apt to be postponed, and even when held it resulCed in nothing but fruitless confronta- tion over the northern territory issue. The plan was aimed at trying a different approach through a frank exchange of opinion and deepening of mutual underatanding at the administrative level. For a time the Soviets ahowed no reaction to this. However, on 9 May they suddenly indicated their acceptance. Thua it came about that Foreign Ministry Vice Minister Firyubin and other officials came to Japan, and administrative level talks were held with Foreign Ministry Councilor Takashima and Japaneae officials. Of cour~e there was no progress on the northern territory issue. However, at the talks, in responae to the Japanese state- ment that "our fundamental policy with respec~ to the Soviet Union is that we wish to develop friendly relations with the nation which is our most important neighbor," the Soviets responded, "We are in agreement with Japan's basic attitude concerning Japanese-Soviet relations, and there is a possibility of relations between the two countries developing to a new stage." There was also ready agreement to "meet next in Moscow." Prior to this, the necessity of developing friendly relations toward the Soviet Union was mentioned in the U.S.-Japanese ~oint statement of 2 May released following the Ohira-Carter summit. And 9 May, the day on which 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 FOR O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY the Soviets indicated their a~cept~nce of the l~vel tglkg, was also the day on Which U.5.~5oviet ag~eemene ~~n SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation '~alke) aas announced. It eeem~ like.~.y ~hat the Soviet Unio~n ~aw thie ae a good time to approach Japan. If we look at the ~rea of fiehing, prior ta Che ogening of this year'~ ~almon gnd trout negotiatione the Jepanese worried coneiderably over "how thing~ will go." However, when negoCiations at laeC begin in April the SovieC~ dieplsyed an unexpectedly pllant attitucie, recognizing trout and salmon fiet~ing on the open seae again this year, even ~hrough the condition~ gre mor,e difficult Chan laet year. _ In the area of Soviet-Japaneee economic cooperation there wae thF appearance that "the 33no-Japanese Creaty wae a matter of no concern." The coagCal trade Calka of September of laet year, the annual Soviet-Japanese trade talks in OcCober, and the Soviet-Japanese Joint Lconomi.c Committee etaff meeting in F~bruary of thie year were each carried out extremely emoothly and in a friendly atmoophere. However, if we wonder if conclueion of Che Sino-Japanese treaty has had abeolute].y no negative i.mpact upon the Soviet attitude CoWard Japan, of course that is not the case. The Soviet Union has taken the Sino-Japaneee treaty and the no:malization of U.S.-China relations with followed it as the conclusion of a quaei-military anti-Soviet alliance, and has increased ite vigilance and tightened up its guard. The concrete expreesion of this ie the poeting of an eatire brigade of ground forces, several thoueand men, to Kunashiri and Etorofu~ and the conetruction of baees there. Defenae Agency officials are eaying that "it can be cencludtd that Chis ie not an offenaive operation but ie for the defense of the islands" (for instance, the briefing given by Defense Agency Chief Yamashita at the LDP gathering on 9 February). If thia ia true, it ia not proper to call it a "retaliation mesaure." However, iC is certain that it ia a concrete Soviet "countermeasure" to the Sino-Japanese treaty. An additional, more fundamental countermeasure Which muat be pointed out is that the Soviet Union has taken thie opportunity to dieplay the reaction of re~ecting even more deciaively the Japaneee demand for return of the northern territories. For inataace, according to New Liberal Club repreaentative Kono who visited M~oecow at the end of November last year aad talked with Prime Miniater Kosygin and other Soviet leaders, Chairman of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet Shitikov told him at that time, "By the conclusion of the Sino- Japanese treaty, Japan has backed itaelf into a situation in which there is abeolutely no hope tirith reepect r.o the northern territory isaue." At the eame period as Kono's visit to the Soviet Union, Soviet Ambassador to Japan Polianeky aeid in an interview with MAIIdICHI SKII~IDUN, "There is no Soviet-Japaneee territorial ieaue. The Soviet Union has no intention of handing over a aingl~ etone, not to mention an ieland, to anyone" (MAINICt~I SHI1rIDUN, nwrning edition, 24 November 1978). The northern territory iesues hae reached the etate of there being literally no island of which to take poeeesaion. 14 FOR OFFIC:.:L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 ~tllt ~~'~ICZAL US~ ONLY Sovi~C~ S~~k N~~.ghborly Coop~r~eion TregCy Well ~hen, exgcCly wh~ti hgs been the history to ehe presen~ eime of n~gotiations for return of the northern territory einne the ~oi.nC Soviee- Jgpaneae d~claratiion resuming diplom~tic relatiane and ending the et~te of war? I will try to present a survey in the fnlYowing paragrephe. The Soviet-Japaneae ~o~.nC d~cl~rat~.on w~~ cottcluded und~r th~ Hatoygma CabineC in OcCober 1956 and became effective in December. Concering Che t~rriCori~l ig~u~, ~t provided rhat "the Soviet Union will transfer Hgbomai gnd Shikoran eo Japan. However, these islanda wi11 actually be transferred following conclueion o� a SovieC-Japar,eae peace Creaty." Originally Che peace rreaCy wae eupposed to have been concluded at thia time. However, ehe Japaneae said, "not only Habomai and Shikotan~ If ynu don't al~o r~turn Kuniehiri ~nd Etorufu..," d~manding ehe return of all four islands at once, and no agreement was reached. Thus, as provided in the ~oint declaration diplomatic relations were re-established and the state of war was ended, while concluaion of the peace treaty including the territorial isaue was left to further negoCiations. In June of 1957 there was a starement by ~ generously minded Khruschev that, "if Comorrow the Americans returned Okinawa to Japan, I would probably take to our government a proposal that Habomai and Shikotan ehould be tranaferred Co Japan prior to conclusion of the peace treaty," Then party first secretary, he uttered thia statement in an interview with ASAHI SHII~UN Editorial Bureau Chief Hirooku. However, with the conclusion of the new Japan-United States Security Treaty with the United States Government by the Kishi Cabinet in Januarq 1960, the Soviet Government sent a memorandum to the Japanese Government giving as "conditions for the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan," besides the "conclu- aion of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty" as agreed in the ~oint declaration, the newly added atatement that "all foreign troopa be withdrawn from Japanese territory." Trying to alter Che conditione for carrying out the agreement they had undertaken in the ~uint declaration with a single notification was altogether like the Soviet Union's heavy handed methods. However, in January of 1972 during the time of the Sato Cabinet when Foreign Minister Gromyko came to Japan for the regularly scheduled Soviet- Japan foreign minister's conference, the Soviet Union agreed for the first time to the opening of negotiations for the ccnc?uding of a peace treaty. This was interpreted as a switch to a softer policy toward Japan by th~e Soviets in Che face of President Nixon's viait to China in February. In July of the same year the Tanaka Cabinet was formed, replacing the Sato Cabinet, and in September Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira visited China, and the Sino-Japanese joi.nt atatement concerning the normali- zation of relations was issued. However, in October For~ign Minister Ohira visited the Soviet Union and he and Foreign Miniater Gromyka carried out the firat round of negotiatione for conclusion of a peace treaty. 1.5 FOR OFFICIAL 1JSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 ~(~It d~~ICIAL U5~ ONLY The following y~ar~ in 4cCOber 1973, Prime MinieCer T~n~ke visiCed tih~ Soviee Union ~nd iaeued a~oint seatem~ne wirh Secreeary Brezhn~v agreein~ to "continue negotiaCione for a peace tre~ty." Concerning Che evente of Chati conferena~, in r~spon~e ro the Cwice repeated ineistAnce of the Japanese that - "Prime Miniet~r T~naka 'wishes to af�irm thar the ieaue o� ehe four islands is included among the unresolved iasue~ to be reeolved by Che concluaion of the peace treaty,' the firat secretary replied '~ast so,' 'ehat is fine."' However, the Sovieta denied thie, saying, "First Secretary Brezhnev made abaolutely no etatement that territorial iseues remain unresolved." ~ollowing Chis, un~er Che Miki Cabinet, which took over in December 1974 after the Tanaka resigned, Foreign Minister Miyazawa Cwice carried out peace treaty negotiationa with Foreign Miniet~r Gromyko, in January 1975 and January 1976. I� the Tanaka-Brezhnev tglks are included, there have been four rounds of negotiations aince the Ohira-Gromyko ealks in 19~2. However, in no inatance was any concrete progreas whatsoever toward resolution of the Cerritorial ieaue to be aeen. During this t3me the Japanese demands for the northern territories were placed in an awkward situation in connection with terriCorial fishing waters. That is, in December 1976 the Soviet Union estgblished a 200-mile limit for iCa territorial fishing waters, and in February 1977 released the gist of the actual linea drawn. This was based on the premiae that the four northern islands were Soviet territory and the aurrounding water.s were included in the waCera to which thia applied. In our country, the Fukuda Cabinet was formed in February 1976 replacing the Miki CabineC, and was placed in the predicament of dealing with this difficult problem immediately after it was launched. Ultimately, at the end of negotiations for the Soviet-Japanese proviaional fishing agreement, which lasted 3 full months, from February to May 1977, an understanding was reached by inaerting into the agreement a"shining" reserve clause stating that, "no provision whatsoever of this agreement may be viewed as impairing the standpoint or opinion of either government with respect to the several problems concerning their mutual relations." The Japaneae had narrowly escaped a defeat. Following this, in January of last year Fornign Minister Sonoda visited the Soviet Union and talked with Foreign Miaiater Gromyko. Mr Gromyko stated that, "the Soviet Union also wiahea to conclude a peace treaty, but it cannot recognize the Japaneae territorial demand for the return of all four islands at once. At this time we woubd like to proceed with negotiations for a neighborly cooper~tion treaty parallel Co negotiationa for conclusion of a peace treaty." and presented the draft of such a treaty. In response to this Foreign Minieter Sonoda said that, "conclusion of a peace treaty based upon reaolution of the territorial ieaue has precedence," and handed Gromyko a draft peace treaty providing for return of all four islands at once. Then each took the other's draft with the statement that, "we will not study it, but we will take it for now as a matter of etiquette." 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 ~Olt 0~'F'ICIAL US~ dNLY In July 1967 during rhe Sato Cabinet when Minist~r Miki vis~.Ced Che Soviet Union and tglked with Prime Minister Kosyg~.n, Mr Kosygin propnsed - Co Mr Miki ~hat, "we ahould each coneider some interim measure unCi1 a peace Creatv in concluded. The neighborly cooperation treaty is interpreted gg ehe connr~te Soviet fur this "inCerim measure." The Soviets had probably been care�ully the of ie~ presenCation ever s~.nce. The month ~ollowing ite presentation, thae ie, in February of lasC year, ehe - Sovieta unilaterally made the drafC treaty publ~.c. Since thaC time Chey have been pressuring the Japanese, saying, "This CreaCy is ehe hand of friendship - extended to Japan by Che Soviet people. This Cime it is the Japanese who should make the next move." On the other hand, the Japanese Government hnd diaplayed a plianC aetitude, sCating that, "simultaneous discussion of the drafts of both the peace treaCy attd the neighborly coopPration treaty ~nd the consolidaeion of both treaties may be possible" (reply of Foreign Minister Sonoda in the House of Councilora Budget Committee 21 December 1978). But with reapect to territory, the government has noC changed its attitude of "demanding the return of a11 four islands at once." Kunashiri, Etorofu Renounced Looking back on the history of negotiations for return of Che northern territories to the present time I cannot refrain from having strong doubCs concerning the ultimate propriety of the negotiating stance of the "demand for the return of all four islands at once" adopted by the Japanese. Mr Munenori Akagi expressed the eame thoughts in Chis magazine two issues prior to this one (Munenori Akagi, "A Way of Associating With the Soviets"). As I will explain later, the reasons for my doubts are not necessarily the same, but in any case there seems to be a considerable tendency in Japan to look askance at the present government negotiating line. The government has come to assert that "the 'Kurile Islands' renounced by Japan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty do not include Kunashiri and Etorofu" as Che basis �or its demand for the return of all four islands at once. While it is clear that Habomai and Shikotan, which are a part of Hokkaido, are not included in the "Kurile Islands" renounced in the treaty, the government has said that "the situation is the same wiCh Kunashiri and Etorofu," and based upon this interpretation has demanded the return of all four islands at once. However, in reality, Che administration of Yoshida's Liberal Party at that time accepted the treaty on the basis of the interpretation that "Kunashiri and Etorofu, which ar~~ the Southern Kuriles, are included in the 'Kurile Islands' which have been renounced," and the Diet at that time accepted ratification of the treaty with this knowledge. Therefore it must be said that the government interpretation that "Kunashiri and Etorofu have not been renounced" is contrary to the facts. 17 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 I~'OR Ol~'F'TCIAL U5~ QNLY The San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded in SepCember 1951 at the San Fr~ncigco Peace Conference and became ef� 28 April 1952 glong with Che U.5.-Japan Se~:uriCy Treaty. However, aC Clie Peace Cnnfer~nce the Japanese plenipoeentiary Prim~ Minister Yoshida spoke as follows concerning the northern territories isaue in his speech accepting the treaty. "We cannot yield Co Che esaertion of the 5oviet Union's plenipotentiary thae Japan seized the Cerritory of the Kurile Island Chain and Southern Sakhalin by aggression. AC the Cime of the opening of Japan the Imperial Russian Governmenr entered no ob~e~riort whatsoever to the fact ehat the tw~ islands of the Souehern Kuriles, Etotofu and Ku~nashiri, were Japanese territory. However, aC the time tne islands of the Northern Kuriles north of Urup were territory inhabited by both Russians and Japanese...Moreover, Habomai and Shikotan, part of Hokkaido, which belongs to Japan proper, have been occupied by the forces of the Soviet Union becauae at the time of the end of Che war there happened to be Japanese military barracka on these islands." This speech by Yoshida clearly sCates ehe facC thae Habomai and Shikotan were not included in the "kurile Islands" which had been determined as renounced according to the peace treaty. However, this was noe stated wiCh respect Co Kunashiri and ECorofu. With the renunciation of the "Kurile Islands," Kunashiri and Etorofu, which are the "Southern Kuriles," would also be renounced. ThaC we had been placed in such a desperate situation - ~ that we had to renounce even these Cwo islands, which were an integral part of our nation's terriCory, was the greatest of misfortunes, but that is Che interpretation of the purporC of the Yoshida speech of that time. Why did the Japanese adopt the interpretation that "Kunashiri and Etorofu are renounced"? ~t was because the faCher of Chis treaty, John Foster Dulles, then SCate Department advisor to the Truman administration (later secretary of state under Eisenhower), adopted this interpretation. Even at that time when the U.S.-Soviet cold war was erupting in bursts of flame, it would not do for the Americans to reduce the secret Yalta agreements which had "given the ~ntire Kurile Island chain to the Soviet Union as one of its compensations for the sought-for Soviet participation in the war against Japan" to a mere scrap of paper. As a matter of fact, in his introductory remarks to the debate on the substance of the treaty at the peace conference, Dulles, who was explaining the treaty proposals as representative of the United States, said in his address, "There is some question whether the Habomai Islands are included in the geographical term Kurile Island Chain in the second clause (which conCains the provisi.on concerning renunciation of the Kurile Island Chain). It is the view of the American Government that Habomai is not included." This can be interpreted as practically meaning that "Habomai (and Shikotan) are not included in the Kuriles renounced under the Treaty, but Kunashiri and Etorofu are included." The Soviet plenipotentiary who attended and spoke at this conference was First Vice Foreign Minister Gromyko, that is, the present day Foreign Minister Gromyko. Of course the Soviet Union, which was dissatisfied with 18 FOF OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 ~'Oit 0~'~ICIAL US~ ONLY ~ rh~ c:nnCents nf the rreaCy, did noti participatie in ~igning iC, bue the �oreign minister, as a witnesa to history, has exhaustive knowledge of all Che detiails of events. On re�lection, the Japanese assertion thaC "Kunashiri and Etorofu have not been renounced" made Co such g person ~s Gromyko is enough to make vne break out in a cold ewe~t. At tihe 5pecial Session of the Diet for conaideration of boeh Che peace Creaty and the aecuriCy Creaey, held in October of ~haC year as g follow-up , to the p~ace conference, ehe governmenC again took the positinn that "Kunashiri and ECorofu are renounced." ~'or instance, Kumao Nishimura, than chief of the Foreign Miniatry Treaty Bureau, gave the following stgtement in his reply in the Special CommitCee for Peace and Security of the House of Representatives on 19 October of that year. "W~ think that both Che NorChern Kuriles and Southern Kuriles are included in Che bounds of the Kurile Island Cha3.n in the treaty." However, the fact that, viewed historically, the position of the Northern Kuriles and Che Southern Kuriles is completely different in exacCly as was made clear in our plenipotentiary's (Prim~ MinisCer Yoshida) address at Che San Francisco Conference. It is Che intention o� Che Japanese Government to hold fast to thaC view in the future." Tlius the Diet of that day agreed to raCification of the treaty with approval of an overwhelming ma~ority (the Left Socialist Party, the Labor-Farmer Party, and the Communist Party were opposed) with knowledge of the interpretation "the 'Southern Kuriles,' Kunashiri and Etorofu, were includpd along with the 'Northern Kuriles' in the 'Kurile Island Chain' which had been determined as renounced according to the treaty. Successful American Aim The changeover of the Japanese, who had at one point given up Kunashiri and ECorofu, to demanding their return along with Habomai and Shikotan came after the opening of negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union for resumption of diplomatic relations by the Hatomama Cabinet in June 1955. The events surrounding this are related in detail in Shuichi Matsumoto's book, "Rainbow Over Moscow" (Asahi Shimbunsha 1966). Matsumoto had been vice foreign minister during the war, and even though only just elected to the House of Representatives for. the first time, became plenipotentiary from the first in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations, serving in the front _ lines at the negotiations from the beginning to his signing of the ~oint declaration resuming diplomatic relations along with Prime Minister Hatoyama in Moscow the following year in October 1956. According to this book, Japan at first went into the negotiations with the following intent. While we would continue to insist that Habomai, Shikotan, the Kurile Island Chain, and Southern Sakhalin were historically Japanese territory, we did not have the idea of obtaining the retur~t of all of them, but would sub~ect them to negotiation with flexibility." Thus, that 19 FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 FOR 0~'FICIAL US~ ONLY negoei~Cions were launched by asking for everything poseible did noe mean thaC the wiCness to Chem, and naCural~y ehe Japaneae te~m at rhe time, was cunfidenC of success. When, after having several meeCings, at the �i.rst meeting in Auguse 1955 the Soviets hinted ~hat "tranaf~r of Habomai and 5hikotan would bE a11. right" Matisumoto wriees that, "a~ first w~ could noC - belleve our own eara~" On Che Jap~nese side, ehos,~ directly connected with the negotiations hoped for "agreement and concluai?~n of a peace treaty along the lines of the reCurn of Habomai and Shikotnn." Huwever, the preasure from hard liners within the conservative party who held that "there ahould be no agreement unlesa rhe four islandg, including Kunashiri and ECorofu, are returned at once, was strong. The American Government gave powerful support to Chis hard - line insiatence from the sidelines. Thus the HaCoyama Cabinet gave up concluaion of a peace Creaty and decided for the presenC to aeCtle for Che ~oint declaration, and the peace treaty negotiations, includ~ng the territorial issue, were made matters for continuing negotiations. Due to Che lack of space I will omit a detailed explanation of events during Chis interval, bue the preparation of the theoretical grounds for the demand for the return of the four islands at once, and the formal manifestaCion in the Diet of the new interpretation that Kunashiri and Etorofu are not included in the renounced "Kurile Island" by Foreign Ministry officials, was in the House of RepresenCatives CommitCee for Foreign Affairs on 11 February 1956. This was immediately after the Soviet Union had presented its proposal to "transfer 3ust Habomai and Shikotan" in the form of a text given to the Japanese. Foreign Ministry ofFicials aC Che time supposed that this alteration of interpretation had naturally been carried out with the support of the American Government, but afterwards in the final stages of the negotiations in response to a request by the Japanese for the opinion of the American - Government concerning the Kunashiri-Etorofu issue, the Americans gave the following reply in September of that year. "The United StaCes, as a result of careful study of historical circumstances, has arrived at Che conclusion that Kunashiri and Etorofu, along with the Habomai Islands which are part of the Hokkaido, have been an integral part of Japaneae territory and should be recognized as coming under the legitimate sovereignty of Japan. If the Soviet Union agrees to this iC will be a positive contribuCion to the relaxation of tensions in the Far East." In short, it adopted the new interpretation that "Kunashiri and Etorofu should be returned to Japan" and gave a stamp of approval "supporting" the - Japanese demand for the return of all four islands aC once. At the time, Dulles, the father of the peace treaty with Japan, was secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration. If he had thought that "Kunashiri and Etorofu should be returned to Japan" he should have made iC clear in the peace treaty or at the peace conference. Instead, while taking the position at that time that "Kunashiri and Etorofu are included in the 'Kurile Islands' which have been renounced," he changed his attitude at this stage. 20 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 ~o~ or~sczAt, us~ nrrLY ~ At the Che United St~~es did not w~,gh for the resumpe~.on of SovieC- Japanese diplomgtic rel~tions, xn the mid~ti oF Che Soviet-U.S. cold w~r iC probably was his esCima~e ehati it w~s in ehe naCiongl inCeresC of tihe - UniCdd 5taCes ChaC Japan conC~.nue ite atCiCude of re].ying goi~iy on th~ Unit~d Stut~d rather than eetabli~hirig $ pi,peline to th~ Soviet Union~ rrom Chie standpoi.nt, his ace~.on was qu~tie natural. If ehe new interpret~- tion thaC "Kunashiri and Etorofu sho~~.d be reCurned to Japan" were adopted, noC only would it ehow good w~.l~. toward Japan, it would serve the purpoee of prevenCing the ~.mprovementi of Sov~,et~Japanese relations. It is 13kely that the United SCaees took ~ta acCion with this politinal aim in mind. The hard liners with respect to the Sov~et Union witihin eh~a country's conservative party at ChaC time gained sCrengCh from this stamp of approval from ehe Amerioan Government, and Che preasure on Che Hatoyama Cabinet calling for the demand for return of a11 four ielande aC once developed ro violent proportiiona. The same was true for a 1$rge portion of the press. I~'or Chis reason the Hatoyama Cabinet was dr~,~en into the position of havittg ~o give up conclusion of a peace treaCy solely on the basis of Habomai and Shikotan. Thus, today after 23 years have paesed ~here atill are no definite prospecta for conclusion of a peace trea~y. IF one principal aim of rhe new American interpretation wae to "prevent the improvement of Soviet-Japaneae relations," it has been a splendid succeas even up to the present time. When Foreign Minieter Sonoda visited Che United States in early April to pr2pare for the visit of Prime Minister Ohira in May he conferred with American Go~ernment leaders, and aC that time Secretary of State Vance, touching upon Che northern territory issue, was reported to have clearly expressed the intention that "if there is anything it can do, the United States would like to lend a hand" (at talks held aC the secretary's retreat in Williamsburg on 7 April). In responge to Chis Foreign Minister Sonoda was said to have replied, "At the presenti time there is no need for the United States to lend a hand. We wish to Choroughly resolve problems between Japan and the Soviet Union as problems between Japan and the Soviet Union." Since the Japanese have adopted this attitude, a situation in which the United States would step in is not to be imagined, at least for the present, - But even so, Secretary Vance's offer of cooperation merits attention. Japanese-American relations, SovieC-American relations, and the general state of international affairs of 23 years ago and Chose of today are quite different. The difference between the world view of Mr Dulles and that of Mr Vance is also probably very great. I wonder what sort of "cooperation" American Government leaders believe is desirable at this time? Withdrawal of 'Four Island Demand' I believe that perhaps the government should at this time withdraw its demand for return of the four islands at once which is based on an interpre- tation which is conCrary to the facts. Then a new negotiating policy should 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 I~'Oit d~'~ICIAL US~ ONLY perhnps b~ puti together based upon ~ retiurn Co the original st~rCing pointi gt th~ time of the conclusion of Ch~ San ~'rancisco Peace 'Tre~Cy and ~ frank recognition of the fact ehat "~his country hae renour,.ced Kunashiri and Etorofu." Thia belief is based on the following two reasons. - The fireC reason is that it i~ to be imagined that the demand for the rerurn nf the islands at once based upon an inCerpretation which i~ contrary to Che facCs 3.s unlikely to have any more power tio persuade the other party in the fueure than it has had in Che past. Then gs long ns the Japanese stubbornly cling tio ehis demand formula, to hope for ehe reeurn of the islands must be imagined to be like waiting for the rivers eo run upstream, noC only in the case of Kunashiri and Etorofu, buC also for Habomai and ' ShikoCan. The second reason is that the present political posture o� the government in putCing out propaganda for domestic consumption cl~iming as "an inter- preCntion faithful to the facts" an interpretaCion which is contrary to the facCs must be supposed Co involve great problems from the standpoinC of democratic politics. There is a pamphlet titled "Our Northern Territory" put out as material for , the government's domestic public relations campaign concerning the northern territory by the CulCural Information Buresu of the Foreign MinisCry. It makes free use of every soxC of maCerial to stress the legitimacy of Che demand for return of the four islands at once, but the reply of Treaty Bureau Chief Nishimura in the Peace and Security Special DieC Session and the Dulles speech at the San Franciaco Peace Conference (both previously mentioned) are not presented, The formal interpretation of a treaty ought to be that of the time of the conclusion of the treaty, but this argument is formed out of materials lacking t~e most essential parts. This seems to be not telling the truth to the people. Of the various political parties, the Socialist and the Communist Parties have from the first pointed out that "the government interpretation of the Kunashiri and Etorofii issue is contrary to the facts." But the ma~ority of the people probably think that the government explanation, rather than the Socialist-Communist assertions, is correct. If this is true, they have been misled by the government. This is a lamentable political condition for a democratic nation. The polieical stance of the government of a democratic nation must be to rely on the formation of public opinion based upon accurate information and telling the truth to the people, who are the sovereign rulers. Of course, telling the people of the true circumstances surrounding events at the time of the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty has no connection whatsoever to the leaking of national secrets. For the policy officials of the various related countries, including our negotiating partner, the Soviet Union, these are self-evident historical facts. 22 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 ~OR Ob'FICTAL US~ ONLY A similnr ~hing c~n be sgid cottcerningChe dr~fr pegae erenCy providing for reeurn d� Che four islands ati ottce, which was pres~nC~d by ehe J~pane~e ae the Sonoda-Gromyko ealks in January of lase year. As alre~dy m~ntioned, ehe Soviets have made public Che draft neighbor].y conperaC~.on treuty pre~eneed by the Soviet Union ae Cha~ time. However, Che Japanese dra�t peace tre~Cy has not been made publlc, and even today the people are being kept in the dark. Why are our owtt peopln not eold the coneents of some~hing which hgg ~een told to our negotiating partner? Thia is something which strgin~ nur understnnding. Moreover, in both cases it ia probably miadirected Co criticize ~nreign Minisery officials who are directly involved. In the cage o� ~ poLitical issue of such a high level, it is not the administrative officials who should bear responsibility, but the politicians. _ Seriously SCudy Hirasawa Proposal If the government withdrew its demand for return of ~he four iglands at ~ oncQ and returned Co the original sCarting point o� the San Fruncisco Treaty, openly admitting the fact that "thia nation has renounced Kunashiri and Etorofu," what new negotiating line sb,ould be adopted instead? I don't believe it would be a wise solution "to give up on Kunashiri and ECorofu and, drowning in our tears, conclude a treaty on Che basis of Habomai and Shikotan." With this, 23 years of Japanese efforC si.nce the time of the Soviet-Japanese 3oint declaration would come to nothing. Even if renounced, since Kunashiri and Etorofu were wiChout doubt originally purely and simply an integral part of our national terriCory, to close the~ curtain in such a fashion "in tearful full retreat" by the Japanese would leave a stiffness difficult to relax in the future course of Soviet-Japanese relations. If this is the case, might not the two stage demancl argument for "first Habomai and Shikotan, and followinR this not only Kunashiri and Etorofu, but also all the Kuriles" as put forCh by the Socialist and Communist Parties be a line which could be adopted by a conservative party government? Even though they are the same two stage demand theory, the plans advocated by the Socialist and the Communist Parties are not the same. The Socialist Party plan is to "first conclude a peace treaty on the basis of the reCurn of Habomai and Shikotan, leaving the remaining Kurile Islands for continuing negotiations. Then, with the dissolving of the U.S.-Japan Sec~irity Treaty in the future, bring about the return of all of the Kuriles." The Communist Party plan is "first, to ask for the return of Habomai and Shikotan right away, even before the conclusion of a peace treaty. Then, based upon prepartion of ob3ective conditions leading to their return through abrogating the clause in the San Francisco Peace Treaty renouncing the Kuriles and dissolving the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, bring about the return of all the Kuriles." The Soviet and Japanese Communist Parties on 14 April made public the text of an agreement ending a period of reptL~red relations stretching back 15 years, and as follow-up to this Chairman Miyamoto will visit the Soviet Union 23 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 ~OK t~~~'ICtAL U5~ ONLY gnd hold form~l e~~.k~ ~im~d ~e r~eon~il~gtinn with ehe Snvieeg "g~ ~~nn gg grrung~m~ne~ h~v~ be~n m~d~." ~or the Sovi~t Union, ehig m~y be ~~id to b~ dn~ "~ounC~rmeg~ure" Co th~ Sino-J~pgn~~~ tr~gCy. BuC in ~ny a~~~, tihe Japane~e Communi~C ParCy i~ eager to make the northern Cerritory is~ue on~ ' th~m~ of th~ e~lke and tn ge~k the agr~~ment of th~ oth~~ ~ide to it~ ewd- ~e~$e reeurn ~r~um~nt. Th~ Sc~uth~rn Kuri1~~, Kunaghiri ~nd ~tnrofu, ~r~ purely gnd ~imply gn inCegrgl pgre of our nneion~l C~rrieory, bue th~ Noreh~rn Kurileg north nf Urup I~1gnd were c~ded t~ th~.~ country p~~c~fully in 1875 in Che er~~Cy ~xch~nging eh~ Kuril~g fnr K~r~futo, and in the g~nge of n~e h~ving been seized by militiary force, ehey algn are an int~grgl pare nf our eerr~.tnry. ~'or the 5oviee Union eo make them its territory is contr~ry tn the principle of non-agrandizement of terriCory which wae ehe grand cause pur forw~rd by the A11ied naeiong 3n Wor1d War II. Thu~ it m~y b~ gaid that Chere i~ g rgtional~ for the insistgncp of Uoeh Che Sncigli~C and Communist pariCes on Che realizaeion of Che reeurn nnC only of Kunaghiri and ~torofu, but all of the Kuriles including th~ Northern Kuriles. Further, if a Socialist-Connnuniat coalition government were established and a revolutionary turnaround of our former fnreign policy were la~~nched in an atmoephere of "peaceful revoluCion" based upon the ~upport of the ma~ority of the people, that in iCself might hav~ persuasive power intez~nationally. However, this cannot be sought by a conservative party government. If a government which heretofore had not dema:~ded Che return of the Northern Kuriles suddenly sought them, even in a two-eCage formula, it would be taken - as "madness" in the international communiCy, and would only uselessly invite migtrusC. As a breakChrough policy for the northern territory issue to replace the demand for Che return of all four islands at once, I believe that the so- called "Hirasawa Proposal" might be one which the government should seriously consider adopting. This proposal was advocated by the late foreign affairs expert Kazushige Hirasawa in an article titled, "Japan's New Foreign Policy," which he contributed to the October 1975 issue of the authoritative inter- national affairs quarterly, FOREIGN AFFAIRS"publiahed in the United States. The portion related to Che northern territoriee and relations with the Soviet Union is as follows. "I believe that Japan should freeze the issue of Kunashiri and Etorofu until the end of this century and conclude a treaty of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union. This proposal is conditional upon the opening of Che fishing grounds surrounding both islands to Japanese fishermen. In the next 25 years if the atmosphere steadily improves and a relationship of mutual trust is built up, in the first part of the 21st century Japan and the Soviet Union can probably sit down together at discussions for the purpose of friendly and constructive handling of the territorial issue. If this does not happen, the prospects for cooperation in relation to the even more important issues of food and energy resources will be quite dim." - ~ 24 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 ~Ott O~~ICIA~, U5~ ONLY - `~hig ~rCic1~ w~~ publi~h~d Ch~ p~ri~d of tih~ Miki C~binet~ Sin~~e Mr Hirg~gw~ w~~ known ~g Mr Miki'~ f~reign pnli,cy br~in, it w~g given ~dme ~CC~nCion "coming from som~on~ who i~ a~pok~~m~n for Mr's inC~nti~n~," but this wa~ d~n3~d by Mr Miki. Th~n, tihi~ plgn w~~ ~h~1v~d in ~h~ midgC nf fi~re~ att~ck~ from public opinidn gupporting ~h~ ~rgum~tte for ~he return ~f all four ielanda at once. Howev~r, ~ bel3eve Ch~e eh~.~ "grgum~nt for the r~turn of tigbomai and ~hikntan and the freezing (~he~.ving) nf Kuna~hiri and ~eorofu" might be Che right idee. Moreover, once w~ gcknowledge Che r~nunci~Cion of Kun~~hiri gnd ~torofu in th~ S~n F'r~nci.~co Peaee Treaty, the Japanege cannot mak~ "d~mands" of th~ other parey conc~rning th~ dispogiCion of th~ Cwo i~l~nds, ~v~n for the "freexing unCi1 the end of rhig c~ntury." BuC iC i~ prob~bly pogsibl~ to make ~"claim." Also, conc~rning Che immediaCe return gought for Hgbomai and ShikoC~n, considering Che giet of Ch~ Soviet memor~ndum to Jgpan gC the tim~ of Ch~ aonc~usion of the new U.S.-Japan Security TrenCy, it ig prnbably necesgary ro d~vi~e m~g~ure~ eo exclude th~m from ~ov~rgg~ und~r th~ Securiey Tr~~aCy. 'There grp probably gddiCional technicgl diplum~eic problemg. However, in its fundamentgl thinking the Hirasawa propogal mighC be the proper line. Deng Xiaoping SaCement Merits Att~ntion . As previously mentioned, the Japaneee Government has taken the sCance that "There may be simultaneous diacussion of boCh the Japanese peace treaty draft � and the Soviet neighborly cooperaCion treaty draft and consolidation of both treaties." As an acCual negotiating formula the Japanese probably ought to aim first for this type of discuesion. Then they ehould plan for con- version from the four island at once formula to the Hirasawa formula during these discuasions. The contents of the draft treaty of neighborly cooperation presented by the Soviets has many points in common with the treaty concluded last year in November with Ethiopia and with the treaties the Soviets have already concluded with India and Iraq. That is, it is based upon a pattern of treaties with non-aligned nations. This is something which our country cannot swallow in its preaent form. However, the Soviets have concluded arrangements of friendly cooperation with BriCain, �'rance, Canada, Denmark, and other Western nations. Thus it will be best if our country aims at conversion to this Western pattern. As the fierce criticism at the time of the publication of the Hirasawa proposal will teatify, the negative reaction domeatically to the "argument ~ for the tabling of Kunashiri and Etorofu" is strong. However, the thing which comes to mind in this connection is the statement concerning the Senkaku Island issue made by Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping at a news conference in Tokyo on 25 October last year. Mr Deng spoke as follows. "It does not bother us if this issue is shelved for the present. It does not even bother us if it is shelved for 10 years. The wisdom of our genera- tion of inen is insufficient to reach agreement on this issue. The next generation of inen ia certain to be wiser than we and will probably be able to discover a mQans necesearily acceptable to all at that ti~e." This is an opinion which merits attention. 25 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 ~Oit dI~'~~CIAL US~ ONLY The ~n~ who gCeuglly ~x~r~i~~~ conCrnl nv~r th~ Senk~ku r~l~nd~ is nne Chin~, but J~pgn~ Viewed from eha geandpnine of thig country, eh~ ~ituneion ig exactly eh~ rever~e nf eh~ northern t~rrieor~.~~ c~~~. If Chin~ h~d dppo~~d Jnpan'~ ~ff~ctive conCrol ~nd refueed ehelving of ehe iesue, th~ Sino-Japene~e rreaty would not have been connlud~d and progr~gg 3n 5ino-Japgne~e relations would prnbably ndt h~v~ oceurred. WiCh reapect ro rh~ northern terriCury ieeue, China, as is w~11 known, supporte th~: argumene for return of g11 fnur ~.~1gnd~ aC once. Howev~r, b~ Ch~ti ie r.:ey, rh~ grown-up gCCiCud~ di~pl~y~d by th~ Chine~~ ennc~erning ehe Senk~ku iseue ~.g ~uggeseive wieh respece tn Ch~ gC~te o� our n~tinn's gtititiude tioward the norehern eerrienry iseue. Ji~i Tgushin chief cdmmeneatior Kikuo SaCo arguea as followe concerning Chi~ poinr. "The norehern eerritory isaue ig incomparably more imporCane th~n the Senk~ku igsue. However, ie would be we11 to recongider the stubborn gtrirude which completely closes off imitating the wisdom of Vic~ Premier Ueng~ Ought we not to decide wisely so as not Co be laughed at by wise generaCions of the future?" (S~KAI SHUHO, Naw Yearg Issue 1979). I agree witih hig commentg. COPYRIGHT: Chuo Koronsha 1919 9407 CSO: 4105 26 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 ro~ o~FicinL crs~ oNLY ~CONOMIC BRIEFS � FUJYTSU COI~4'U'rER SAL~S--As of 30 June 19'79, Fu~itsu had received ordere for 15 M-160F, 15 M-150F, 80 M-140F, aud 95 M-130F com~uters. Ordere for emall compueere since 17 Apri1 tallied 160 V830 and 130 Sygtem 80 computera. Delivery hae been made on the firet M-130~ and firsti M-140F. Buoyed by unexpecCedly good order receipCs~ l~u~itsu is eetting ite fireti year order targee for the new machines at 1,000 machinee and expects ordera for over 2,500 machines in tihe following year. [Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 24 Jul 79 p 8~ HEAT PIPE INDUSTRY--The heat pipe induatry in Japan, presently composed of Furukawa Denko, Showa Aluminum (tie-up with a U.S. manufacturer), and Suzuki Metala (U.S. Government liceneee), is rated ae at the take-off atage. All three companies are expandiag production, and insidere at Furukawa expect entrance of perhape anoCher 10 firma into the field in the next few yeara. Heat pipes have application in heaC recovery in indugtrial proceeaes, aerospace, elecCronics, electric power and trans- miseion, automobiles, solar water heaCing syeCems, air conditioning, and ' other areas. [Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN :Ln Japaneae 25 Jul 79 p 7] CSO: 4105 27 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 , ~OR O~~ICIAL USE ONLY 3CILNCE AND TLCHNOLO(3Y BRIEFS OPTELECTRONICS LARGE PROJL~CT--The Agency of Induetrial Scienc~ and Tech- nology, to move ahead w3th an 8-yea~t program to coet 20 b1111on yen for development o� optical applicatione in8erumantation and control syetem~, has establiehed a working gruup subcommitt~e in the large eachnology developmeat subcommittee of Che Ynduetrial Technology Council. Th~ pro- gram, to start in JPY 197g as a new "large pro~ect," ie ratied as the government's firse serioue ~ub~idy program for fosCering tihe optelec- tronice induetry, which ie expected to become a core knowledge-inten~ive industry of the 1980'e, in addition to being ae effort to eolve current problems euch as in plant energy resource and energy conservation~ po11u- tioa~ and eafety. (Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japaneee 26 Jul 79 p 2~ TURBOPROP AIRCRAFr Iu:EXAMINL~D--The Japan Aeroepace Industry Association has aet up an "8nergy-conserving tiigh-epeed Turboprop Re~earch Promotion Temporary Subcommittee" to survey leading aircraft technology develapment focusing on proepecte for turboprop aircraft which offer fuel economy 20 to 30 perce~nt better than do fan~et aircraft plus lower noiee levels and on compoeite materials which are expected to aeeume a much greater role in new aircraft etructuree. ~Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO 5HIMBUN in Japanese 26 Jul 79 p 9) t~GAWATT POWER STORAGE--The Ageacy of Industrial Science aad Technology intenda to start a"large pro~ect" on a large-capacity electricity etorage eecondarq batterq eyatem in JFY 1980 and is now aoliciting the views of elecCric power companies and battery manufacturers on the eub- ~ect. The echedule eavieioned is to conduct de~netL~ation testa on a megawatt-hour class syetem in 1987 or 1988 and atart commercialization in 1991. The AIST ie actively promoCing this program aad the fuel cell program ae "two large projects for energy conservation." (Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIIrIDUN in Japaneae 25 Jul 79 p 1~ HEAVY CRUDE CRACKIr1G--Miteui Mining and Miteui Cokc~ Industry have com- pleted a 2.4 ton/daq heavy crude pilot cracking plant in Fulcuoka Prefec- ture at a cost of 200 millioa yen. The proceee uses delayed thermal cracking technologq from the Solvolqeie method coal liquefaction procesa to obtain 60 to 70 percent yields of gaeoline, keroaene, light oi1s, and 28 FOR OPPICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8 ~ ~OR OF~ICIAL U9E ONLY oeh~r produef:a. Ifl ~~~~ne~, r~~3du~i oil r~mm~ining ~�eer r~~ining tih~ erud~ i~ Crgn~f~rr~d eo tih~ h~gvy era~king p1~nC, h~~e~d eo 400 d~~ree~ ~nd ~ireul~t~d, yielding ehe lighr fr~nei.on~ gnd pirch. The Mi~~ui group~ whil~ continuing experimentie at the pi1oC plgnti, 3nC~nd~ ~o build g 150,000 Co 200,000 bbl/day r8finary uging tihie technology over 2 or 3 y~8r~ and commerciali~~ the proc~~e. ~Tokyn NIKKAN KO(;YO 3HIMBUN 3n Jap~n~e~ 29 Jui ~9 p 2] COAL-O~L POtJ~RPLAN~--7'he ~1ecCric pow~r ~~velopm~ne Corp ha~ ~nnounc~d it~ pl~ne ~o build ~ 100-200 ton/day COM (coal oi1 mixCur~) flemon~era- tion pl~nt ae th~ Tgk~h~r~ thermgl power p1anC in Hiro~him~ and conduce fu11-~c~1~ boiler firing t~ge~ ueing 2 of tihe 20 mak~h~rg No 1 bniler~. Con~truct3on of the COM plant and conver~ion of th~ two boilerg is tn bg completed dur3ng JFY 1980. ~Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Jgpaneee 18 Ju1 79 p 9) HYD~OG~N CAit--Profeegor ~uruham~ of th8 Mueaehino In~titut~ o� Technology w311 be etarCing on developm~nt of g frontwheel driv~ car ueing a 1,000-cc engin~ fueled with liquid hydrogen. Profeaeor ~uruhama earlier built a 2-cylinder 550-cc hydrogen engine auto, and now ia intent on gcaling up and demonetrating the safeCy and practicality of Che hydrogen- fualed car. In th~ new pro~ect, he will have the fu11 cooperation of Suzuki Motor. [Tokyo NIKIt~I SANGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 27 Jul 79 p 16~ LASER MOLD MAKING--Profesaor Nakagawa and asaietant Suzuki of Tokyo Univereity Industrial Technology Lab, with aeaistance from Tokyo Computer Control and a subeidy from tha Japan Technology De~relopment Corporation, have developed a metal mold manufacturieg meChod uCilizing lgaer machin- ing. Costs are cut to one-half or leea that of conventional methoda for die~ and such. (Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 26 Jul 79 p 11~ PARANORMAL RESFARCH--Shuji Inomata is working full time on paranormal research at the Electrotechnical Laboratory, Agency of Industrial Science and Technology. Building on Einstein's mass-energy convertability, Mr Inomata poetulatea mass-energy-conaciouaness convertability and envisione telepathy, "annihilation" of radioactive wastes, cure of cancer, control over gravity, and other capabilitiea to be poaeible. Mr Inomata ia 45, holds a BS in radio engineering, was a visiting researcher at MIT and holda a PhD in engineering from rokyo Inetitute of Technology, and at the Electrotechnical Lab worked in acoustics, audio, and bionics reeearch until the furor over paranormal phenomena in Japan 5 yeare ago. Hie auccesa in bending a epoon aC that time made him a convert, and he now heada the Japan Conaciousneas Engineering Research Society. [Tokyo IIIKKEI SANGYO S~iIMBUN in Japanese 19 Jul 79 p 13) - CSO: 4105 END 29 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8