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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000'100090047-0 ~ ~ ~ i1f a ~7 ~E~T�i!~�R i979 t FOUO ~ i~i"~9 $ i 0~ i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - - JPRS L/8688 27 Septemb~r 1979 USSR Re ort - p POIITIC~,I AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS CFOUO 12/79) ~BIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are tr~nscribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. ~ Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original informa.tion was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- - - tion mark and enciosed in parentheses were not clear in the - original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government. . For further information on report content - call (703) 351-2938 (economic); 3468 (political, sociological, military); 2726 (life sciences); 2725 (physical sciences). - COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULA.TIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION ` OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE OiVLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 . FOR OF~'ICTAL USE ONLY . JPRS L/8~88 _ 27 September 1979 - - USSR R~n0~2T POLITICAL A(~D SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS (FOUO 12/79) CONTENTS PAGE . INTERNATIONAL - Shakhnazarov `~Jrites on Peaceful Coexistence (G. Kh. Sakhnazarov; VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 6, 1979) 1 NATIONAL Review of Book by Grishin, Smirnov, and Others on Ideology - (I. L. Vartanov; OBSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI, SERIYA 1, PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA, No 3, 1979) 21 REGIONAL ~ssassination Attempts on Estonian First Secretary ' (POSEV, Jul 79) 30 1 - - a - [III - U55R - 35 FOUO) - FOR C~FFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ INTERNATIONAL ~ ~ SHAKH~AZAROV WRITES~ON PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE Moscow VOPROSY FILOSOFII ~.n Russian No 6, 1979 pp 20-34 , [Article by G. Kh. Sakhn~zarov: "The Problem of Peace: An Analyais of the Basic Concepts"] ~ [Text] Every attempt to into the complex3ties of contemporary inter- _ nationa.l life, especially in respect to such a very complicated problem as ~ the problem of war and peace, requires first of all an intei-pr~tation of the basic con ~pts which providE the means for a more or less adequate ex- _ plana.tion of the essence of the processes,predominating~in the world arena. Today this connotes primarily pea.ceful coexistence, the "cold warr" and the relaxation, of interntional tension. Peaceful coexistence is sometimes interpreted as one of the conven~iona.l principles of international relations and at best as a collectfve concept _ embracing a number of accepted norms which should guide the states in their relations. This kind of approval fails to take account of _ both the historical and the theoretical significance of the idea of pe ace- ful coexistence. We know that the idea itself, which was advanced by V. I. Lenin right after . ~ the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, was inspired by the need to determine the ob~ective principles governing the development of in- ternational relations in the era of revolutionary transition from capital- ism to socialism. In other words, we are dea.ling with a phenomenon~ the ~ history of which is still unknawn, and with the inevitable coexistence in the world arena. for a more or less pr~longed period of states with diverse economic configuration, social structure and political system. It may be said that there have also been periods like this in the past, as for exa.mple, in the tra.nsition from feudalism to capitalism. This is true. - Another researcher is able to ~ietect a number of similarities iz~ the para11e1 international situa.tion of the period from the end of the 18th _ to the b eginning of the 19 th century on the one hand and our era on the ather. However, we ca.n only talk about partial paralleliams and superficial - ana.logies b ecause the class nature of the states of various complexiona which supplanted each other in the past was in principle identica.l. 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In the 20th century we are encountering a phenomenon of an essentially dif- ~ ferent nature in relations b etween states with opposing class character. ~ This is why Che previous concepts proved to be inadequate and V. I. Lenin ;;provide d a precise description of the essential character of the new era ~which is witnessing the inception of the development of international re~.a- - tions: states with diverse social systems have been compelled to coexiat in the world arena because there is only one possible alternative to this-- war. _ Thus, it is wrong to view peaceful c oexistence as one of the traditional - principles of international law, simila.r to respect for sovereignty and independence and equality and non-interferei2ce in internal affairs. These democratic principles, of course, obtained general acceptance and began to - exercise a more or less decisive inf luence on international relations under the impact of socialist foreign policy and as a result of the new alinement of forces in the world. But they are not excluaively a phenomenon of the new era; this period only created the ob~ective posaibility for transform- - ing them f rom an abstract conceptian to acCual reality. As far as the principle of peaceful coexistence is concerned, it does not repres ent an ~ exceptional phenomenon of our time and not even simply a norm for the ~ relations b etw e~n s tates with a diff erent social system;.it is preciee reference rather to the socialist and ca.pitaliat states. ~ ~ Another important factor relates to the scope of the concept of peaceful coexistence. Some people believe that this concept should connote Any state of peace, or more precisely, absence of war (the widespread exprea- sion is "the worst peace is better than war"). Others, on the other hand, emphasize a considerably greater scope for peaceful coeadstence and inter- pret it to mean not only the absence of military operations but also the existence of a wide-ranging international cooperatian and a definite trust in the relations b~.tween states with different systems. - This is undoubtedly the ideal of peaceful coexistence in its full scope, so to speak. But is hardly correct to consider that a low level of inter- national cooperation indicates the lack of peaceful coexistence. This con- cept would seem to encompass a broad scope: one form of it is the e1e- - r^.entary state of peace, which is comparable to the "cold war'~; the othar is _ a well-developed interna.tional cooperation. And the transitian from the first to the second entails precisely the process which evolved in the 1970's and has been given the name of relaxatian of international tension.~' _ At lea,st this is the way it looks historically.2 Replying to a question from a TIME correspondent, L. I. Brezhnev said: 'GJhen we talk about 'relaxation of tension' or, in its abbreviated form, simply 'detente~ we have in mind intern~tional relations and a regimen which is the antithesis of the posture of the so-called 'cold war'~; it is one characterized by constant tensian and it threatens to erupt into open conflict at, anq moment. In other words, detente means primarily sur- mounting the 'cold war' and going over to norma~l, equitable relations between s tates. Detente entails a readiness to resolve differencea and ~ 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY disputes, nr~t by force and not by fihreate and rattling of arms, but by ' peaceful means behind the negotiating table. Detente means a certain amount of trust and an ability to take one another's lawful inzereste into - account. Such, in brief, ia our understanding of detente. In thia connection, an important clarification suggests itself. While acknowledging th at th e simple absence of military operations and the "worst peace" can be interpreted as the init~:al state of peaceful coexistence, it should be added that this is the case if it does not ~ust atnount to the - usual breather between two war~. After the defeat of the imperialist intervention, Soviet Russia gained exactly such a breather but this kind of state of peace can hardly be termed peaceful coexistence ~+ecause the ruling circles of the capitalist countries did not abandon the hope of ~ s~..: ~hing the young socialist republic by military meana and they did not even take any great pains to conceal their design:~. They talked only about gathering their forces for an immediate "crusade" against communism and the astonishing blindness which characterized the bourgeois democratic government's attempts at '~appeasement" of the Fascist aggressors is ex- - plained by the fact that they saw in th~m a key detachment of imperialist - crusaders. In other words, for the state of peace to "deserve" to be ,called peaceful coexistence both systems must more or less officially renounce attempts to resolve their historical anaganism in their favor by force of arms. In - this lies the quintessence ~f peaceful coexistence. Of course, its in- - tensiveness and completeness are to a great extent dependent on whether the economic ties flau~tsh or survive, whether there ex.lsts at least a - minimum atmoaphere cf trust,`etc. But with a11 that, re~ection of resort to war to resolve. the "capitalism--socialism" conflict is the sine qua non of peaceful coexistence; without such re~ection we canno~ talk about it ev~en if we cover up the cannons at a pa~ticular time. As far as socialism is concerned, a war stance is grossly contrary to ita nature and if this stance nonetheless eventuates, this fact in itself is proof of the immaturity of the socialist social relatior~s and con- _ sciousness, resulting in a definite distortion and deformation of the - foreigr~ policy p rinciples. This is precis aly the situation with Chines e militarism, whose sources are rooted not in the least in socialism but rath er in a great-power. ~ingoism and, viewed from a broader political perspective, in bourgeoi.s nationalism. _ The CPSU program postulates as one of th e paramount communist principles _ the "repudiation of war as a means of resolving questions in dispute among the states and it advocates resolving these disputes by negotiations." This principle was embodied in all the documents of the CPSU and the Soviet - gavernment beginning with the celebrated Leninist peace decree and ending with th e peaca programs adopted at the 24th and 25th Party Congresses. Finally, the 1977 USSR Constitution declares: "The USSR is unawervingly 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY pursuing th e Leninist policy of peace and it stands for strengthening of the aecurity of peoples and broa.d international cooperation.rr4 Similar principles are enunciated in the party and state documents of all the countries of socialist concord. If one wishes to define their gen- - eral position, then it also invariably comes dawn to a defense of pegce and a repudiation of the use of force or threats involving its use. The - relevant proposals have been reiterated in the declarations of the politi- ' cal advisory committee of the states which participated in the Warsaw - Pact, which declarations were adopted at the Bucharest (1976) and Moscaw (1978) conferences. In all the important documents a decisive role has been played by histor- ical experience. The most convincing evidence of the fact that the Soviet Union has adhered ancl is adhering faithfully to the principles of socialisC - foreign policy is the fact that throughout the recent period it did uot once make war against other states. Thus, on its part, socialiszn has always manifested a readiness for peaceful coexistence. This is not true of imperialism. The best proof of this is ~ to be found in the evolution of the foreign policy doctrines of the United States. We know that the short-lived nuclear monopoly of tae U.S. in- spired the strategy of sa-c`lled containment of communism and "massive retaliation." The strategy was frankly designed for the use of nuclear blackmail against the USSR and the other socialist countries and ultimately for affirmation of American world dominance. R. Niebr~ir, one of the founders of Che school of theoreticians which was - given the designation of political realism, asserted in 1950 that the - earth will for a long time continue to be an arean of war which will re- turn it to the camp of ca~italism. Neither much or little stemming from this could be construed as the "moral right" of the U.S, to be the first to assault the USSR and the camp of socialism. "The idea of the inevit- . a.bility of war is still one of the logical steps to the cancept of pre- ventive war because if it is inevitable for us to have war with the ?:ussians, then why should we not choose the time to begin this undertaking that is most advantageous for us."5 In the 1960's the changed alinement of forces prompted the ruling circles ~ of the U.S. to shift from a policy of "massive retaliation" to a strategy of "flexible reaction." But in this instance "flexibility" was a very ~ relative concept: in essence the only boundary for this has become the policy of avoiding direct ronflict with the Soviet Union, a course which would henceforth be considered suicidal for the U.S. In everything else = the use of m3litary force, as before, is regarded as a wholly proper method of 3chieving political ends. Finally, still another reappraisal was made in the 1970�s: the recognition of the parity of the military po~wer of the USSR and the U.S. forced the 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY American atrategiate to devise a new foreign policy doctrine which was _ called "realistic hesitancy." It entails, first, an increase of atrength - and, s econd, the threaC of its us e ahort of war.6 However, thia doctrine too is slated for review and it is aignificant that the diacuasions p ertaining to the new atrategy are inspired by a striving to maximiz e the conditions for coexiatence. Tt~ey s eek not so much a means of strengthening peace as the maxl.mum belligerence which would preclude only total nuclear slaughter. 'Thus, there b egan to come into vogue the concept of "limited nuclear war," as formulated in 1974 by the U.S. Mi.nister jsic] of Defense J. - Schlessinger. It represenCs a complicated and rather cumbersame structure whose component parts are badly fitted one to the oth er and it can ba interpreted in various ways. This was apparently also the author's in- tention: to "feed" the hawks and still satisfy the doves. If we 1ay bare the subsequent ingenious masterpiece of American military thinking, we discover it comprises in essence an attempt to 11legalize" the use of nuclear weapons, which is equivalent to a step backward toward the infamous policy of "retaliation." True, th e American experts anphasize the point that what we have now is - only "limited nuclear option"8 and they even under~aka to prove that such a method could more ePfectively control the cours e of nuclear conflicta. According to them, a"carefully considered" nuclear strike frightens the enemy and .thereby preventa the development of the hand-to-hand struggle ' of a general conflict. In short, it is samething like us ing a sma11 dose of poison in order to keep from poisoning the whole organism. The question, h owever, is how do the doctors from th e Pentagan intend to measure a"beneficial dose." Various opinions are voiced in respect to this. They a.rgue as to whether it is enough to destroy 3,000 Soviet people or whether it is necessary to kill 30 million, not forgetting also a retaliatory attack on the Americans. Is, it enough, for gurposes of "intimidation" to attack some missile base or is it better to destroy Lenin- grad and sacrifice Chicago in exchange? And so on in the same vein. One does not need to be a in military-politlcal strategy to con- cl~ide that the only possible result of th~.s kind of cannibalistic disputes w ill b e a less responsible and more frivolous attitude toward th e threat of nuclear war. This is also sought by Schlessinger and his sympathizers. Taking exception to th eir position, their countryman G. Scoville Jr. em- phasized the point that the opening of nuclear war on any level would be a catastroph e and that this would probably happen "if th e national leaders themselves perpetrate the hoax of having checked the possibility of keeping the war small and then energing from it as a victor."9 The attempts to make even wors e the already bad aggressive military-polit- ical U.S. strategy show how weak and inconcistent is imperialiam's readiness 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 . FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY for peaceful coexiatence. The explanation is aimple: the peace policy is not dictated by the nature of the old society; the changa in the alinement of forces demaande it. And every fluctuation in the currently establiahed balance of pawer (equilibrium and parity), any illusion or self-suggeation along these lines entails a reexamination of the military-political doctriz~es. R. Barnet, director of the Washington Institute of Political Research, thus explains the sharpening of the U.S. positions after the coming to power of the new administration: the director of the CIA sub- mitted to the president a new evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the USSR and it was concluded on the basis of this that the U.S. had "no need to make relaxa.tion [of tension] the cornerstone of its foreign p oli cy . "10 In short, the American denial of its strategic orientation taward nuclear weapons bears a very shaky character. Consequently, peaceful ccexistence in its current stage ~an be likened to a river bridge with one of its supports immersed in shifting sandy soil. But nothing else has as yet been offered. Let us naw make aure we are aware of the way in which peaceful coexistence and relaxation of tension are in general construed by the inte.rnational re�- lations theor3sts in the West. We do not have to prove that in qu~stions of international life the clash between the different partiea in ragard to the basic concepts has more than sporadic significance. Commanding attention, first of all, are the attempts of some reaearchers to find an analogy for the relaxation process in the past. American Profesaor R. Rosencrance recalls the situation in the 1880's when treaties were concluded between Germany and Russia against Austria and between Germany and Austria against Russia. Although these alliances were not very stable - they enabled Bismarck to (according to Rosencrance) "maintain good rela- ~ tions with two forces opposed to each other and to keep than from going to war. "11 C.r course, ont~ can attach the label oF relaxation to any international rela- tior.s irnprovement knawn to history. But this is really ~ust a pedantic dis- play. The artificial analogies do not halp us to gain a better understand- ing of the thinking behind the unique process which is truly relevant to the 1970's; on the contrary, it 'complicates this task.12 This is wli+at is happening to some very definite political thinking. Thus, :t. Eubank (U.S.) searches for a parallel between the current relaxation and the rtolicy of "appeasement" of Germany as practiced by England and Franca - in the 1920's and 30's. The "Dawes Plan," the encouragement of Nazi ag- - gression in Spain and Austria, the Munich Pact, the betrayal of Czecho- slovakia--a11 this he describes as the then variant of "relaxation of ten- ` sion in the interests of maintaining peace." The reader is thus sub~ected to the shopworn anticommunist thesis of the "parallelism" betwaen the foreign policy of Hitler Germany and the Soviet Ur.ion. 6 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY a There is another point of vieur. In the opinion of R. Pipes, director of the Rus sian Pe s earch Center at Harvard lJniversity, there were s everal ina tances of detente in the post-October period and one occurred precisely when "military weakness or economic difficulties had forced the Soviet Union to seelc he?p from the cavitalist countries."13 According to this concept, even the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was a manifestation of � detente. , S~milar to this point of view also is the treatise of W. Laquer (U.S.), director of the Institute of Modern History. He believes that in the post- w~r period the relations between the East and the West on four occasions ent ered th e sphere of de tente : th e death of S talin, th a talks at Camp David in 1959, the period follawing the Cuban crisis, which led to the banning of nuclear teats, and the Geneva Conference of 1965 and the current most significant of the problems as far as scope is concerned.14 It is true that, unlike his colleague, Laqueur does not descend to the point of int erpreting every p eriod of p eace as a cons equence of tk~ e insidious in- tent of the communists ti+ gather their forces for the next aggression. But his interpretation is, a:1a.s, not very far from this level. The only thing is he associates the shift to detente not with various "fits of weaknesa" but with the Soviet lea,dership's realization after aJ.l of thP need for peaceful coexistence because allegedly it has become convinced of the - futility of its attempts to adapt its way of life to peace. Laqueur adds that the sh'ift ~vas only half a change because the Soviet formula for relax- ation of tension not only does not exclude ideological struggle but provides for. tta exascerbation. J The idea that relaxation of tensian must include a weakening or even a _ cessation of ideological struggle finds its most widespread pr.oliferation in the West; indeed these positions are taken not only by~ the thaorists - but also by the political officials. Perhaps the most vivid presentation of these positions was made by American ~S~ator Moynihan, who is considered an outstanding authority in the'field of international relations. In his opinion the policy of detente ma_y at best lead to a"redistri- bution of tension moving it from the technological to the ideological - sector. Reduction of the outlays for military technology will lead to an increase in expenditures for ideological sCruggle, which the communists regard as so important and which requires no less attention. Reduction of - tenaion in one sphere wi11 lead more or less automatically to an exascer- bation of the conflict in another sphere. "15 It is strange that Moynihan regards as such a"redistribution" of pcxaer the November 1975 adoption of the UN resolution which proclaims Zionism a form of ra~ism. Strange logic, ~s it not? Perhaps the thinking is that if there were no relaxa.tion of tension, such a resolu~.ion would not have a ~:hance to eome up and Zionism would not come to br~ recognized as what it really is. 7 FOR OFFT.CIAL USE ODtI.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ ~ - Moynihan's dissertations bring to light the tendency of the bourgeois - theorists to ignore the ~sential.differences between the political and the ideological means of struggle. Canadian Professor N. Naida writes di- rectly thus: "While ideological differences exist, we cannot talk about the end of the `cold war.' It is simply shifting from one phase to another - , and changing its forms, methods and means.i16 If we internaCional - relations in this fashion, then it is simply impussible to explain why in - some instances a lengthy and stable peace is possible in the face of ser- ious ideological differences and in others, with no ideological differences whatsoever and a completely idyllic world situation, so to speak, endless bitter wars may be waged. ` With rare exceptions the western political ex-~~erts' version of peaceful coexistence amounts to the following: (a) peace plays havoc with the struggle of the superpawers (blocks, centers of peace) ;(b) the aggressive side is commrmism, i. e. , the 'Sovlet Union, and the side maintaining de- fense is the West, i.e., the U.S. Any action of the socialist states which falls within this criterion acquires the character of an attempted "encroachtnent" on peace while any action of the imperialist st3tes must automatically be regarded as a defense of peace and the values of civil- ization, most of all, freedom. Even when it is the U.S. aggressive action against Vietnam or the CIA-organized overturn in Chile. The American Soviet expert S. Gibert, determined, by way of classification, that there are three "schools of detentp" in the U.S. There are the " "orthodox" group (R. Nixon, H. Kissinger and others) , who maintain that the USSR has changed from a revolutionary force to "a pcxaer which saf~ guards the status quo"; the "revisionists," who believe that on the whole relaxat3.on of tension entails repudiation by tha U.S. of the former aggres- sive policy; the "realists" (H. Jackon, J. Schlessinger and other "hawka"), who f.eel that in general detente does not exist and that it represents nothing more than a grandiose political bluff.17 ~ Without attempting to 3udge how accurately this classification sets forth the views of these or other American officials, it should be said that rhose categorized by Gibert as revisionists are undoubtedly right, This with a qualifying statement to the effect that the U.S. repudiation of ag- gres~ivP policy unfortunately bears a"selective" character and an additional statement to the effect that the reason for the reappraisal was the sub- stantive change in the alinement of forces in the world arena. Rela:cation of tension and peaceful coexistence insure what is most important for all peoples and for all mankind--removing the threat of global nuclear _ conflict. As far as social progress is concerned, those who are dissatisfied - - can refer their complaint to their own history because this was precisely � what pre3etermined the inevitability of the collapse of the capitalist sys- tems and confirmed the viabiliry of the socialist systems, The fact is the _ movement in this direcrion would continue even under more complicated cir- cumstances and without detente. 8 ~ FOR OFFICI~II. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100094447-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ Relaxation of international. tension by no means leads automatically to social progress. It only creates the preconditions for a freer deve];op- ment of the class struggle. It was not in Moscaw that a decision way taken concerning the revolutions in Portugal or Greece, Ethiopia or Afghanistan. '1'hey were in accordance with the will of the progressive forces among the peoples of the respective countries and by their handa. It's a different matter that the c�ommunists, like all democrats, are in sympathy with these processes ~nd have a feeling of solidarity with respect to them. When th e workers of the "Reno" plants go on strike, it is not a conse- - quence of relaxation of tension but of dissatisfaction with the wages and other aspects of their social status. When the blacks in the U.S. speak out regularly, it is not the result of detente b ut of their indignation at _ the ma,nifestation cf racism. When Iran nationalizes its oil extraction industry, the fault lies not with detente but with the wish of the people - of this country to control their awn na.tural resources. In other words, nob ody, even if he wanted to, can give capital a guaranteed _ pledge of retention of its dominance. In answer to those who seek such guarantees L. I. Brezhnev emphatically sta.ted at the World Con~resa of Peace-Loving Forces: "Revolution;~ are not made by order or agreement. We may add that neith er can revulution, the class struggle or the liberation movement be abolished by order or agreement. There is no power an earth - that can raverse the ~nexorable process of regeneration of social life. Where colonialism exists there will be struggle for national liberation. . - Where there is exploitation there will be struggle for liberation of 1ab or. Where there is aggressian there wi11 be resistance to it."~$ The mea.ns employed to wage such a ~struggle ~e in ma.ny respects dependent on what further changes transpire in the alinement of forces in the world. However, it is naw already clear that the struggle will take on the char- acter of military conflict, usually political and nearly always i~eological. Peaceful coe~dstence also differs from the' slmple conoept of peace in that it is accompanied by ideological struggle. Cansequently the task of pre- serving peace in the era of transition from one social form to another is complicated by the nee~3 to find additional res~erves of strength which _ would negate the undesirab le consequences o~ ideological disputes. Such reserves are available. They are to be found p rimarily in the ob~ective - need for integration and the grawing need for the cooperation of all countries in the intPrests of resolving glob al p roblems. 1t can be said . that whereas in the past there was no acute manifestation of the factors of ideological struggle, the peace endeavors were also not affected by s~ch . powerful compensatory factors as the "narr~wing" of political distance, - the intensificat:ion of interdependence and the urowing need for cooper- ation, But it would have been irresponsib le to rely on only "compensation." No agreements and treaties, no form of interr.ational 1aw and order is capable 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ; ~r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100094447-0 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ , ~ of obliterating the c:tash between the poliCical views and positions which - e~dst in the modern world with its complex and contradictory social struc- ture, nor can it keep people from expressing their views on the course of events or stop their discuesion of idegs, Moreover, even if such a pos- - sibility existed it would deserve to be re~ected in the most decisive fashion b eca use it would mean putiting an end to all thE spiritual. progreas of mankind and ultimately to its social development. Of cours e, there is a ccnsiderab le diff~rence between the struggle of ideas _ - on the one hand and ideological excesses, misinformation and slander on the other. It is now a struggle, not of ideas but, one may say, of fisticuffs. _ It can and must be brc~ught under control. It is a question also of norms of law regulating reciprocaL res traints on (a) actians that are directly inimical to peace (for example~, calls for war, propaganda for militarism, violence, racism, aggression, and various forms of natianal isolationisml, !,b) limiting the struggle to precisely the realm of ideology and by pre- text and cover banning ideological discussions of the shift to actual sub- vers~ve operations (dispatch of agents who pass around leaflets calling for overturning the existing government, financing antigovernment activity, indoctrinating the population in a hostile spirit, an example of which ts - the misinforma.tion and slander spread by the radio stations Freedom and Radio Free Europe). This is also entailed in th e essential diff~rence between ideological strug- gle and "psychological warfare": the former is waged with the idea of achieving its ends without war and the latter endeavors to prepare for itself the best possible positions in the forthcoming war. "Ideological struggle." said L. I. Brezhnev in this regard, "must not de- velop into 'psychological war' and it must not be used as a means of inter- ference in the internal afrairs of states and peoples nor must it lead to political and military confrontation. "Othexwise, this ideological dispute may turn into a catastrophe in which ,nillions of people and their ideas may perish, so to speak."19 Cuns equen t1y, it may be said that the law developed after World War II as a - result of a prolonged struggle and cooperative endeavor within the UN is, to a considerable degree, a law for peaceful coexistence. Many of its norms axe unique because they were designed only for the contemporary period and they are geared for the cooperation of states with diverse social sys- tems. They are thus transitory because the existing situation cannoC last forever. But they are slated to play their preservatian role--to be a shock abs orb er in mankind's shift from capitalism to socialism and to help mankind to overcome the unavoidable pits and hollows on this path with minimum damage. There can be no doubt that many of the present-day norms of international law will be ma.rvelous for our descendants. L~hen they are largely occupied 10 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 ~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY with carrying out constructive tasks, they will be amazed to learn that their ancesCors spent lots of time and exercised a great deal of cunning to regulate th e control of the air or to negotiate methods of dissemin- ating literature. But this makes up an important element of the present- day structure of international relations and such agreements and similar ones �or the mos t part retained the existing world order. It is not necessary to say that drawing a precise and fine line between "psychological warfare" and ideological struggle is an exceptionally com- plicated matter. Not only becau~e it is no simple matter to prepare norms of law--this is an entire original branch of knowledge and reflects the ` capability of the transitional era--but also because it must inspire maxi- mum respect for th ese norms and evolve and develop a definite tradition of political thinking. And under the difficult circumstances which accompany any general application of the norms of internationa.l law this means the absence of force capable of compelling fulfillment with. the accent on ' voluntary action~ of the sovereign st~tes entailing some only limited means of collective pressure (the UN, th e International Court, the role of public opinion, etc. j But as complicated as this task is, it needs to be resolved because there is no other path for mankind. Peaceful coe}dstence is only one of the al- ternatives to war; it is in fact the most total of all. Peaceful coexis- tence is not a matter of choice and it is not an ob~ect of bargaining. It is an ob~ective necessity. This thinking was expressed fairly well in the words of E. Bar, one of the leading officials of the SDPG [Social Democratic Party of Germa.ny]: "Do I proceed from national interests or f rom�European? Do T think about the tension in the relations between the North and the South or do I simply feel like a citizen of the world and a democrat--as a citizen who wants to project a prediction for 2000 years or as a democrat who believes in the - superiority of his own system when it operates in a peaceful milieu? In any case, I look upon relaxation of tension as an enduring task of the J` 1980's, one for which there is no reasonable alternative."20 - Unfortunately, in recent years the West has evolved a whole political trend _ which raises as its banner th e slogan "S~lling detente to the communists ~ is expensive." When it, this s logan became binding upon tlie com- mercial system--this inalienable attachment to the bourgeois mentality. One of its commandments is that when some agreement (deal) is proposed to you, it is advisable for a start to ask the maximum price for your com- modity and it will b e seen at that point. This was approximately th e rea- soning of the western political officials, who in the process of preparing for the Helsinki conference of the European states, U.S, and Cana.da, ad- vance the formula "one-third o� the basket ~or free flaw of information) in exchange for security,~~ In common speech this formula sounded approximately ~ like this: If you want peace, agree to 2 concession in the realm of ideology. 11 � - ~ ,FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ s ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY There is no need to say that the authors of these ulfimatums have no grounds whatsoever for the argumenCs they advance: capitalism has not WOI1 any victories over socialism, victories which would enable it to de- mand an indemnity. On the contrary, it is generally acknowledged that detente itself and such a development as the one now culminating in the Helsinki conference were the resul~ of the changed alinement of forces based, among other things, on Che military of pawer. A1so abt~urd is th e attempt to barter for s ecurity with a"commodity" whic;h both sides _ are eaually in need of. But in politics what is important above all is not motives and arguments but facts. The appropriate demanda, even though they were wholly un- Cc~unded~ were formulated; they began to defend them and, as frequent~ty happens in such cas~ea, many began to seriously believe that they have the right to "sell" detente to th e communists. Besides, this position was eventually taken by anoth er and, additionally, a very influential group of theorists and policy malcers of the imperialist states and they were pre- cis ely the ones who at firs t did not want to hear about such a detenCe. Recognizing that such frank obscurantism puts th em in danger of complete isolation, these people decided to change their tactics. They announced that they too were adherents of detente but th ey also imposed conditions which would inevitably lead the whole business into a blind alley and bring = the world back to ehe time of 'the "cold war." This is how Kissinger's biographers describe th e position of th e hawks: "Russia must be made to pay a higher price for American wheat and Western technology. It can b e forced to lib erate its society. Ir it refuses, th en there should b e no loans and no lifting of trade restructions and if this is necessary then there can be no detente."21 The absurdity of the arguments of the enemies of improvement of the inter- - national climate is ohvious. First of all, no one is saying to the United States that, after it signs an agreement with th e socialist countries to .vert the threat o� war, it must expand its trade and othar relations with th em. It is another matter that stimulation of econom~Ec, scientific- cechnical and cultural exchange has become a natural consequence of normal- ization of the international relations which are beneficial to both sides . Where there is trade there are also credits and these are by no means a ` ' gift b ut a customary method of financing deals in an international context. The bourgeois policy makers lmow perfectiy~~.~.well that trade is based on com- mercial s ettlement. American grain and Western technology are being paid for, not by detente, but by Soviet oil, industrial equipment and other out- n ut of th e socialist countries. Consequently, detente and liberation re- main as factors in direct "commodity exchange." But since relaxation of tension is the result of agreement and further intensification of it is also dependent on the good wi11 of all the principal participants in *_h e - world community, these people are trying to sell goods which do not be~long to them. 12 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090047-0 .!I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Carrying out this ldnd of operation is no simple matter in the market nor � is it simple in politice. To give their claims a more or less valid aspect in the eyes of the world community, th~ adherents of capitalism had Co pres ent them, not as in a class context, but as being in the genaral in- terests and they had to back the~n up with a certain amount of moral force. In the 1970's the efforts of the bourgeois ideology in this direction took on a feverish character. The inn er circles of the various cammissions preparing the positions of the capitalist states for the general European conference hatched a decision to link detente with so-called progress in - human rights. After the appropriate preparation and refinement, thj.s b e- came for the functionaries one of the basic principles of the modern foreign _ policy doctrine of imperialism. "The issue of the rights of man," declares American Soviet expert R. Conquest, "is