JPRS ID: 8702 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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S OCT06ER 1979 CFOUQ SS/79) i OF i

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~ ,,BPRS L/8~'02 ~
5 October 1979 ~
West E u ro e R e o rt
p p
. ~FOUO 55/79)
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~ JPR5 L/8702
5 October 1979
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO: .55/79 ) ~
COKTENTS PAGE
THEATER NUCLEAR FORC~S
FRANCE ,
'Euroshima': Proposal for a Strategic European Nuclear Force ~
(Various sources, various dates) 1 ;
New Strategic Balance
. Main Tenets of Proposal
Communist Reaction, by Yves Moreau
Unanswered Questions, Problems, by Jacques Isnard
ITALY
NATO's European Strategy Termed Uncertain
(Sergio A. Rossi; IL SOLE-24 ORE, 31 Aug 79) 15
COUNTRY SECTION
.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
SPD Problems With Anti-Strauss Election Strategy Described
. (Werner Heilemann, Uwe Zimmer; STERN, 16 Aug 79) 18
Institute Polls Youth on Politics, 198G Election Issues
(Michael Juergs; STERN, 13 Sep 79) 20
,
Controversy on Naming New Bundesbank President ~
(Peter K. PErnutz; STERN, 6 SeF 79) 26
Soviet Comments on [dest Gerinan Psychological Warfare School
(D. Bel'stciy; ZARUBEZHNOYE VO~ENNOYE OBOZRENIYE,
rlay 79) 29
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
F?ANCE
Developments in Corsican Dissension Discussed
(CAMBIO 16, 2 Sep 79) 33
~
Corsicans Called 'France's ETA'
` FLNC Leaders Interviewed ~
ITALY
, Castro Position in Wake of Nonalined Summit Viewed
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 11 Sep 79) 42
Implications of Neto's Death, Nonalined Infighting
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 12 Sep 79) 45
Soviet Comments on Italian Troop Indoctrination
(V. Valentinov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE,
May 79) 48
~
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THFATER NUCLEAR FORCES �
FRANCE
'EURG~SHIr~~ii~ : PROPOSAL FOR A STRATEGIC EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE
New Strategic Balance
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 16 Jul 79 pp 12-14
[Text] France against the challenge of the "terrible years":
Soviet supremacy runs the risk of becoming linked to American
indecisian. The strategic choices are being made right now.
All last week the American strategic nuclear forces were in a state of war.
Six hundred and fifty B-52 bombardiers with their weapons and supply planes
took off from the 18 SAC [Strategic Air Command] bases. All of the inter-
continental missile crews were p]:aced on the alert, the communications system
and that of controlTed firing actually set. From 9 to 14 July it was really
the most important exercise of this type in 20 years. At t:he same time Carter
was studying the energy dossier at Camp David.
Lucidity is a duty, the President of the French Republic said. The energy '
crisis, the instability of the Near Eastern countries can at any time be sources
of conflict. He himself let that be understood on 19 June. Chancellor Schmidt
said so explictly: There is a risk of "wars." And the Am~:rican secretary ~
of defense, Harold Brown, spelled it out~
"If our vital interests were threatened, we would take the appropriate safety
measures to protect ourselves, including ~he use of military force."
The Penta~on announced the setting up of field force composed of 110,000 men.
On 2 July, Joseph Luns, NATO's secretary general, defined to his audiencc~ from
tYie rrench Institute for International Relations actuated by Thierry de
Montbrial, defined the world situa.tion as follows: "politic.:ally unstable,
economically fragile, psycfiologically disturbed,~' He~added this sentence:
"Everywhere signals that are perhaps tracing out the course of disaster are
_ being turned on and off." ~
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This was on~ o.f those signals. It was directed at France ,3nd came from the
Near East. VALEURS ACTUELLES can reveal it: Last March the Saudi and North
Yemeni Governments appealed i:o France. They requested its military aid to
contain the attack by.pro-Soviet South Yemen. Riyadh and Sana wanted war
materiel and bfficers on an urgent basis. With France intervening on.the very
edgec of the Persian Gulf so as to guarantee the area's stability, its politi-
cal impact on the international scene could be tenfold by comparison with its
Kolwezi operation.
~
" Paris had to give up. The French Army lacked means. Limited and inadequate
as to materiel, it did not have the men. Arabic is spoken in Yemen: The .
French Government could not ask its army to train cadres for this type of
_ mission. In the end arms and officers were supplied to the North Yemeni and
the Saudi by thP Americans. .
France does not commit its prestige by having its best units and its latest
missiles paraded on 14 July, but by being capable to responding to si:tuations
such as that of Yemen.
That Yemeni battle seems secondary. It was nevertheless a more serious signal
than people think. ~
Here was apparently a remote country, one underdeveloped and witti no oi1. It
was nonetheless very much a.matter of a strategic stake. The circumstances
of the outbreak of the conflict between the two Yemens praves it.
Last 17 February, China attacked along the Vietnamese border. The world
trembled: What would the Soviet reaction be to defend their Vietnamese ally?
Moscow did nothing in Asia. Its sole goal was to isolate ~~hina's action' and ~
to prevent its Washington or Tokyo friends from assisting it. How? By
~ applying a little pressure on the Free World's most sensitive and most deli-
cate point: pztroleum.
Four days following the launching of the Chinese attack, the South Yemeni
sorces, officered and armed by the Soviet Union, bore down on North Yemen, _
trat is, on Saudi Arabia's allied country and its galcis. It was a direct
threat to the petroleum wells. Part of the people working in Arabia and in
the emirates are Yemeni. The destabilizarion of North Yemen, the reactivation
of the guerrilla war in the Omani sultanate are two pieces of one and the
same game. The Kremlin reminded the West that the petroleum princes and emirs
were at the mercy of a revolution.
~)n the chessboard of Soviet strategy, the Palestinian organizat:;.ons wh.ich
~.ence forth are based on both banks of the Persian Gulf ha~~e a role which goes ~
far beyond their activities against.the state of Israel.
Speaking plainly and playing at becoming frightened, Sheikri Yamani, the
Saudi monarchy's minister of energy, finally commented that one or,two
supertankers sunk in the Strait of Ormuz would suffice to cut the petroleum .
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route. The detonator for a conflagration: something like the criminal -
attempt at Sarajevo.
United States-USSR
~ The Balance Is Finished~
1979 1982. . 1985
United States USSR United States USSR United States USSR
~
Launchers 2,100 2,500 2,200 2,250 2,130 2,520
Megatonnage 3,700 7,000 3,200 9,000 3,270 11,800
The above table takes into account the Salt II Treaty of Vienna (1979-1985).
It freezes the number of launchers and forces even the Soviets to reduce their
arsenal. But the nuclear power of the charges themselves (megatonnage) con-
tinues to be increased to the advantage of the Soviets. (Source; National
Strategy Information Center of New York.)
Up to now "the balance of terror" has made a conflagration unlik~ly. During
the night of 25 October 1973 when President Nixon placed his missiles and his :
European and Mediterranean troops on red alert, Brezhnev renouncsd parachuting
= into the Sinai the divisions he had massed together to rescue his then ally,
Egypt, which had been pushed back by Israel. Will other Soviet leaders give
up under similar circumstances? The balance is in the process of disruption.
The one who actually sent the red alert order, General Haig, chief of the -
, allied forces in Europe, has just said so publicly. On leaving his SHAPE
general headquarters [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers (Europe)] on
29 June, he gave his successor, General Rogers, an extremely harsh analysis:
"For nearly 30 years," he wrote in his final report, "because of their stra-
tegic nuclear superiority, the United States has been the final arbiter in
. every local or regional crisis in which it directly or hypothetically con-
fronted the Soviet Union. But the emerging of a new strategic equation at the
being of the 1960's put an end to this final arbitration and regional ratios
of forces now take on a far greater significance."
This new "strategic equation" is summed up in a small numbPr of figures. The
Soviet SS 18 missile carries in its warhead 10 thermonucle~3r 1 m~gaton (50
Hiroshimas each) salvos. The total of the three charges o~ the most powerful
American rockets, the Minuteman 3, just barely comes to 1 rnegaton. Over-all
ratio: 1 to 10. By adding up the power of all the devices in each arsenal,
the American "megatonnage" amounts to half that of the Soviets (3,700 as op-
posed to 7,000). In 5 years this ratio will be 1 to 4.
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What is the "balance" frozen by the Sa1t.II Treaty signed in Vienna by Carter
and Bre2hnev?
Francois de Rose, former French ambassador to NATO, stated: ,
"The Salt II Treaty is based on a fallacious balance. Up to now the American
systems were more accurate and had higher charges than those of the Itussians. '
We are heading towards a reversed situation."
Why did the~Americans allow that to come about? Technically, they did not be-
lieve the Soviet military.engineers were capable of filling that gap with
respect to the MIRV's (those nuclear charge slavos launched from the same
rocket toward different targets). Then they attribute to the atom an "equal-
izing power": A small bomb is as much to be feared as a large one. Finally,
their system is based on dissuasion: Nuclear power needs only to be strong
enough ta deter the adversary from attempting an attack. .
_ But this doctrine is not taught in the Soviet Union. The Russians talk neither
of no battles nor of no war. They atick to Clausewitz: Concentrating all of
one's means to strike the enemy in the head; "from the strong to the stron~." ~
Denis Delbourg, a graduate of the Ecole Norma]e Superieure [Advanced Teacher
Training SchoolJ and a diplomat, an expert in matters of strategy, brought
this back to mind in the last issue of the review DEFENSE NATIONALE; for the
SoviE:ts, "nuclear war can only be total, the rise to extremes is inevitable.
The Western idea of a limited nuclear conflict is an illusion." He added
these words: For the Americans, strategic parity is equality as to the
certa.inty of losing; for the Soviets,.it is equality with the hope of sur-~
vival.."
From all that General Haig dr~aw the inference in his report by calmly observing:
"We are living in a strategic environment in which the Soviet capacity for
intervention has assumed a greater value at the political level. At the same
~ t~me Moscow's increasing tendency to intervene has become more difficult to
ii dissuade and its actual intervention more difficult to counter."
~
Can one be more outspoken? Sovi~t power has become such that dissuasion is
going to have the wrong effect. Now there is talk of a new "syndrome":
that of the inevitability of. Soviet. victory.
7'hat may be true for the Near East. But also for Europe.
:n Helsinki in 1975 I~oscow got the Western. powers to recognize definitively
the borders of its European empire. Today, Rremlin diplomacy is seeking to
bring to an end the strategic solidarity between Europe~and the United States
(an end to the "nuclear umbrella").
The specialists give that the term "uncoupling." The American "central system"
would be detached f rom the European security system. The difference between ,
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the Salt II negotiations on the two great powers' arsenals and the coming '
Salt III negotiations on the European theatre indicates the direetion.
An American expert was recently heard to say during a meeting of specialists
held in Berlin: ~ ~
"For 30 years we have been carrying Europe like a monkey on our shoulders. .
Things are becoming unstable."
In a book with the evocative title "Euroshima" (Media publishers), Lt Col Guy
Doly observed: "One cannot help placing within this framework the American
decision taken in March 1978 to defer manufacturing the neutron bomb which
could considerably improve the effectiveness of a flexible response from the
[NATO] alliance in Europe." ' ~
That came after an effective Soviet campaign against this neutron bomb.
Officially, however, nothing'has changed in the American attitude towards
Europe. Only the climate is grac?ually altering. Last week the weekly
NEWSWEEK asked General Haig: "Isn..'t there a tendency in Europe to recognize
~ the inevitability of Soviet suprem~cy in order to avoid tension with Moscow?" ~
"There are in fact many signs of that," General Haig replind.
~ t
Of whom was he speaking? Of Federal Germany in particular. Located in the
center of the European battlefield, Germany believes only .in Americar, pro-
~ tection, not in any other. If this protection were to decrease, it would reach
an understanding with Russia. Hence the emphasis Bonn places on refusing to
shelter modernized nuclear missiles (under American control) on its soil, if
Germany were to be the only NATO country to do so: "no unnecessary tension"
with Moscow.
French military power only makes sense if it dissuades Germany from turning
toward Moscow and from.thezeby precipitating the "Finlandization" of Western
Europe. A strong and resolute France would restrain Germany from following ~
a policy of humiliation with respect to Eastern Europe. ~
Now, French power is still less than our means. A law on planning was approved
in 1976: It was a law for readjusting military appropriations. In the fall,
an evaluation of what has been accomplished in its first phase will be made.
New delays have been incurred with respect to materiel: combat planes, nuclear
attack submarines. Ori the contrary, this equipment and investments in nuclear
weapons must be speeded up.
1
In 5 years our strategic forces will be composed of five nuclear rocket-
launcher submarines, to which will be ad,ded a sixth, the submarine named ~
"Chirac-Debre" (because without ttie action taken by the RPR [Rally for the ~
Republic], it would have been delayed, of 18 Albion plateau missiles and
36 Mirage 4 planes to be brought up to date. With these arms systems, tacti-
cal nuclear devices for tanks, planes or even attack submarines. But over
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. all, accord:ing to Lt Col Doly, "the numerical ratio to the enemy threat will
be on the order of 1 to 100..."
In audition, no decision has yet been taken for the years that will follow the
end of the "planning." That is, after 1982. In other words,_for thE "black
years" whiclz the Soviet-American ratio will experienc~e froin 1980 to 1985.
(Beyond thae, the coming of the MX missiles, numerous Trident submarines and
new weapons should greatly improve the American position.)
France's p~oblem is that of not remaining "inhibited" by the Soviet threat.
The alleged good will of Brezhnev or of his successor in no way changes the
ratio of forces. Seeking to ignore this would be fatal.
At the end of 1914, former;serman chancellor von Bulow questioned his suc- ~
cessor, Bethmann-Hollweg, as to the causes of ~~he outbreak of the conflict.
Bethmann-Hollweg replied in these words:
"I do not know,�I.do not know."
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "Valeur.s actuelles" .
Main Tenets of Proposal
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 27 Aug 79 pp 14-14 ~
[Article by M. Cd.: "Europe~s Scouts"] '
[Text] All-round dissuasion or European defense. France's
military doctrine depends on the outcome of this debate.
The debate on the defense of Europe has begun~again. Ztaenty-five years after
the failure o� Jean Monnet's plan for a European defense community, the idea
is again becoming popular among French political and military circles. .
l3efore the end of the year the UDF [French Democratic Union] intends to publish
a detailed report on France's defense: Its conelusions could move in the
direction of reinforcing European military cooperation. At the expense of the
doctrine established by General de Gaulle and maintained up to now by his
successors: A national army organized ar~und a nuclear weapon for d~ssuasion,
aimed in al~ directions. .
~ves Laulan, a member of Jean Lecanuet's CDS [Center of Social Democrats]
~nd former NATO director of economic affiars, in LE FIGARO of 7 August re-
gretted that the process of building Europe had neglected t:he security factor.
Some Gaullists themselves do not hesitate to bring back int-o question some as-
pects of th? doctrine of the Fifth Republic's founder. In LE MONDE of 14 July,
Jacques Chaumont, RPR senator for the Sarttie [department], declared the ne-
cessity of European military cooperation. And Alexandre Sanguinetti, former ,
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UDR chairman of the Chamber of Deputies Committee for National Defense, made
i~entical statements in LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR of 20 August:
"We must not repeat "independence, independence" in the wa;y others say "Europe.
Europe."
According to Sanguin~tti, France does not have an adequate budget available
to ensure~its def~nse on its own. Hence the "necessity of a European defense
which can only come into being through a teaming up of French nuclear power
with German industry." A thesis completely contrary to that of Michel Debre,
hostile to the militarization of Germany, who was one of tlze mov:ing forces
behind the anti-EDC [European Defense Community] campaign in 1952.
Among the items in the dossier: "Euroshima" (Media publishers), a book by a
young field officer, Lt Col Doly. VALEURS ACTUELLES (our 16 July issue) called
attention to this work which adovcates a European defense community including
Germany and directed against a potential Soviet aggr~ssor. On 16 August,
Yves Moreau, editurialist for L'HUMANITE, denounced its author and "the pro�-
tagonists of a European army who harbor bellicose anti-Sov:iet designs."
The communists obviously want to profit from the affair to launch a campaign.
They were alerted by dispatches from the TASS agency and an arti~le in IZVESTIA
published a few months ago which denounced earlier.works b~y Lt Col Doly.
"Euroshima'' underscores the danger.of the "rising Soviet tide," which possesses
the highest capacity in the world for military intervention. Faced witn that,
France can with great difficulty only maintain a defense withdrawn unto itself.
_ Hence the necessity of a European defense community endowed with a nuclear
weapon common.to all of its members, including Germany.
Lt Col Doly pursued his logic to the end: The utilization of a common weapon
implies a supreme authority for decision-making. "A presidency of the European
Council," for example.
"A natural attribute and manifestation of political union, European defense
can also be its driving force," he wrote.
A graduate of the War College, a 41 year old,artilleryman, Lt Col Doly was not
making his first ,*..rial shot. ~ao years ago in "Strategic France-Europe" (Media),
- he was already adv:~cating a revision of the Gaullist strategic doctrine in a
European sense: "The doctrine corresponded to the ambitions of a France
which was animated by tr;e imperial spirit. Can that of 1917, reduced to
the dimensions and resources of territorial France, have a.ll its doctrine's
means? An analysis, which corresponds to that of Giscard r.i'Estaing when he
spoke of France as a"average power."
At the beginning of the year, under the pseudonym of "Francois," Lt Col Doly
published a"novel without fiction" entitled "The Sixth Column, If the Russians
Attacked"; a strong criticism of the "nuclear all or nothing" and of France's
!R
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military isolation. With the discreet endorsement of the Ministry of Defense
(our 26 February issue).
Lt Col Doly's arguments represent a strong return to the arguments of Jean
Monnet and of the partisans of Atlantic Integration. It was douhtless not
by chance that one of the signatories to "Euroshima" was Pascal Fontaine, a
30-year old member of the teaching profession, son of the editor of the Paris '
office of the European Communities, a member of Lecanuet's CDS, a former col-
league of Jean Monnet whom he assisted in writing his memo:irs. The other
signatory, Capt Rene Cagnat, 36 years old, a specialist in Soviet affairs and
a gra.duate of the School of Political Science, is a former NATO niilitary ob-
server. And a member of the Secretariat General of Defense whicti confers
upon "Euroshima" additional authority.
In his book, to which he gave the subtitle "Buildizg the Defense of Europe,"
Lt Col Doly exposes some "personal thoughts." They could express the concerns
of Gi~card d'Estaing in this sphere. This book was ~ublished with the endorse-
ment of the Ministry of Defense as is the custom for officers on active duty.
That is to say it falls in with a guideline which is not systematically ex-
cluded by the government.
Can one conclude for all that, as L'HUMANITE does, that "Euroshima" bears the
"official s'tamp of Giscard's government"?~ Can an official evolution toward the
measures advocated by Ly Col Doly be envisaged on a short-term basis?
Formerly a member of Jean Monnet's Committee for the United States of Europe,
the chief of state is not hostile a priori to such theories. There is another
convinced European at the Quai d'Orsay, Jean Francois Poncet, a former col-
league of Maurice Faure, a signatory to the treaties of Rome.
The UDF's report, drawii up by a committee composed of parliamentarians and
military experts, should take into account concerns close to those of the
Elysee. The chairman of that committee, Jean Marie Daillet, CDS deputy from
S4int Lo, resisted giving any indication before the publication of the text
"so as not to hinder the president of the Republic's action in such an import-
ant sphere."
He did, however, point out:
"The Americans themselves want a re-equilibration of the At:lantic alliance to
tae advantage of the Europeans. The latter hope for it fox� reasons of dig-
nity arid a concern for ~ffectiveness. Everyone deplores the dispersion of
fforts and the inadequate harmonizing of European armamenrs,
~ The Ri?R's defeat i_n the European elections on 10 June incit:ed the Elysee to
~ make a"Hobson's choice" in the European sphere. ~tilme Simone Veil~s speech
of investiture ori 18 July is one sign of this: By insisting on the powers of
the European Parliament, the new president of this institution deliberately
provoked the Gaullists and announced an irreversible evolution of the EuropPan .
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organization. Now, the Elysee has very closely followed "Operation Veil"
and Giscard d'Estaing's advisers have worked in liaison with those of the
former minister oE I~ealth.
- "The decision to elect the dFputies to the European Parliament by direct uni-
vers~.l suffr.age is likely to accelerate a collective aware~zess by Europeans
as ta the common destiny that they can organize," L~ Col D~1y wrote. He added:
"In the years to come the European Council and the elected European Parliament ~
will doubtless be the two poles of a prefederal sCructure which may see un-
. suspected developments. ~ . '
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "Valeurs actuelles"
Communist Reaction
Paris L`ITUMANITE in French 16 Aug 79 pp 1,9
[Article by Yves Moreau: "'Euroshima' Against National Defense"]
[Text] The campaign for the European elections was orchestrated by the Gis-
I card government with reassuring themes, democracy,peace, such were the claimed
objectives. The supra-national aims were soft-pedaled. As for the possible
; military consequences of European integration, the watchword was total silence.
The elections over, such precautions have been shrugged off. Mme Veil aban-
doned the good-natured smile on her posters to use the language of supranation-
ality bluntly beginning with her first address to the European Assembly. And
now i.n mid-summer a whole campaign on behalf of the European army and mili- '
~ tary integration is beginnir.g.
Thus, the REVUE DES DEUX MONDES this August turned over its pages to Gaston
I Thorn who proclaimed the Common Market "inadequate" and "nonoperational"; he
defined it as "a European mercantile ensemble..., a mere framewock of inter-
~ state cooperation governed by the rule of unanimity." To stop there, he
stated, would amount to resigning oneself to "marking time." And he went on
~ to attack "the idea of national independence... utilized without rhyme or
I reasc~n by the defenders of a nation state inherited from the 19th century."
In LE FIGARO of 7 August, the former director of NATO's economic affairs, Yves
Laulan, also complained that "the process of building Europe has neglected
security to the advantage of the economic sphere." To be sure, he did write
"two knocks have already been given on the European stage"*: The creation
of a monetary system and the Assembly elections, "but for Europe actually
to enter upon the international stage, it is essential to have the third
~ knock resound... The problem of European defense is now posed."
Analugous ideas are developed at length in a book issued by Media Publishers
which Guy Doly, Rene Cagnat and Pascal Fontaine have just published. The
~ third named was for 4 years one of Jean Monnet's assistants. The othPr two
*A reference to the three knocks given in French theatres b~efore the curtain
rises
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authars are of.ficers on active duty and ther~fore could not sign the work
without official permission: Lt'Col Guy Doly is on a command assignment at
Belfort; Capt Rene Cagnat is a member of the Secretariat General of Defense,
a bo~.y coming under the prim~: minister, Ray~mond Barre.
When one knows the sanctions incurred by a.soldier signing a pet:ition merely
requesting free transportation for men going on leave, the significance of
autharization given military men with the responsibilities Lt Col Doly and '
CapC Cagnat have is quite clear: that of the Giscard government's seal of
approval.
A Gaullist Concept Challenged (Impugned?)
Now their work which they entitled with a taste that to say the least is dubious,
"Euroshima", is wholly marked by open hostility to national defense. Thus
they wrote that "the national idea... can no longer inspire defense" and
that "the term 'defense' no longer corresponds to 'reality'~"
They submit that in principle an end must be put to the dual Gaullist concept
of dissuasion in the military sphere and of national independence.in foreign
polic.y.
The military integration they advoc2te is limitless. They recal'1 with relish
that Lord Carrington, the present British foreign secretary, had hoped for a
"European niiclear �orce" in 1972 when he was minister of defense, and accord-
ingly they demand the or.ganization, to begin with,.of a Franco-British strik-
ing force. At the same time they demand that a classic European field force
be established. Of course, according to them, the standardizing of weapons
is an urgent task. ~
"Preventive War"
If the word "defense" is to be given up and the concept of dissuasion repudi-
ated,~it is, they explain, because the strategy they favor "may involve pre-
ventative operations of an offensive character."
~ The European army, such as they envisage it, "could not be conceived indepen-
dently of the American alliance... On the contrary, it aims to reinforce the
Atlantic alliance." But they deplore the fact that the Atlantic pact is not
even worse than it is; they reproach it of unduly favoring the sovereignty
of states" and of not~"covering" Africa and the near East.
1s a fine example of the "preventive" wars they are prepared to encourage,
they foresee in Africa and in the Mediterranean "far more :Lmportant expeditions
than those of Shaba or Lebanon."
To justify renouncing a national army and repudiating the very idea of defense,
the entire argumentation o~f "Euroshima's" authors consists in invoking the
alleged disparity which they declare exists between the Soviet forces and those
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of the Western bloc. The same old story which served to justify the cold war
and which still adds fresh fuel to continuing the arms race. But this false '
propaganda is always unable to explain why, if the USSR is so inordinately
powe~-fu1 and aggressive, instead of attacking without further delay, it is on
the contrary multiplying initiatives favorable to measures of military detenCe
and arms reduction.
In reality, as emerges from several of the quotations given above, it is the '
protagonists of the European army who are harboring bellicose anti-Soviet de-
s igns .
An Atomic Bundeswehr
And, in this respect going back to the Versailles and Munich tr~3dition,
"Euroshima's" authors base their hopes in large measure on Germat~ imperialism's
military potential. Almost overtly they argue in favor of giving the FRG
[Federal Republ~~c of GermanyJ nuclear arms.
Thus, with manifest regret, they noted that "Germany, deprived by the 1954
Paris Accords of the possibility of setting up for itself a force of nuclear
dissuasion within the national framework, has never received a proposal from
France or Great Britain for a gradual change that would bring it to share ~
atomic power with one of its European partners." And they immediately added
that in the European army, at last "Germany will find the place it deserves."
A prospect which will not fail to enthuse those who on the other side of the -
Rhine are extremely eager to accede to nuclear power and ~oho feel, like
Franz Josef Strauss, a Christian Democratic candidate for the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, that "a Bundeswehr without atomic weapons makes one think of
a Roman legion equipped only with bucklers against firearms" (statement made
to the weekly QUICK).
Weapon Standardization
The similarity between some of the projects recommended by "Euroshima" and
those which not only Strauss but also the government of Social Democrat
Helmut Schmidt cherish, is furthermore obvious. Thus one reads in the 1975-
1976 "White Book" of the FRG Government that on arms matters "national pres-
tige and egoism will have to take a back seat."
And the "White Book" went on: ."It is not always possible to spare ourselves .
or our partners the temporary disadvantages which cooperation may involve,
for example, giving up natit~nal development or limiting nat:ional production
for the sake'of some arma~nent projects. But, in view of t11e advantages
offered in the long run by standardization, all member countries of the
alliance (Atlantic) must be prepared to endure such temporary disadvantages."
It is on that path, alas!, that the Giscard government has set out. Hence
the initial and serious mesaures for dismantling French state arsenals and
establishments. Hence also France's official participation since the be- i
ginning of 1976 in GIEP [Independent European Planning Group] and in CNAD
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[Conference of National Armament (Plants) DirectorsJ, bodi.es which arF~ in fact
closely tied iT.i with NATO. .
A WEU [Western European Union] conference is to be held next 15 to l7 October
in Br.ussels to speed up new national renunciations for the benefit of a
"European armament policy." It is to bring together NATO and EEC [European
Econamic Community], as well as executives of ~he nine nations' armament
industries. It has officially set as its goal "standardizing the various
types of European weapons, in particular at the time of their replacement."
As one sees, "Euroshima" is not a work of pure imagination. Some of the ideas '
set forth in it are already being implemented by governments. On the issue ~
of standardizing armaments, it is furthermore the application of the principle
stated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, adviser.to President Carter, in an interview
granted in April io DIE WELT, LA STAriPA and LE MONDE, and in which he called
upon the European allies of the United States "to decide jointly on controlling
armaaients or on deploying new weapons."
That is also what French Socialist deputy Formi hoped for as early as November
1977 in a report presented to the WEU and which declared: "We must not adjust
ourselves to France's absence from NATO, but envisage the ways of new coope*--
ation with NATO." Giscard's policy, we know, contributed only too actively
to it.
The "Right to Intervene" ~
Finally, the military integration demanded by Lt Col Doly and his friends is
a.imed at very significant internal political objectives. One of them was set
forth by Guy Doly in a pr.eceding work published in April 1977 when its author
still held the rank of major. Entitled "France-Europe Strategy," this book.
specifically demanded the pure and simple banning of the French Communist
Party denoun~.~d as being the "internal adversary."
"t~uroshima" sets its sights on even more. This new work does not solely
attack French communists, but also any state that might possibly be guilty -
of "drawing away" from "the European ideology." "Euroshima's" authors announce
that not only should such a state be excluded from the Western European bloa,
but in addition that one would have to resort to "intervention, first of all
economic, then perhaps military" against ~c. They insist that "the right~to
economic or armed intervention" be recog;iized. .
^o there you have what the European ar;ny required: The abandonment of all
~ationa.l defense, of all nat~;,riai independence, total subor.dination to NATO,
the nuclear arming of th~ FRG, the adoption of the so-called strategy of
aggression, possible war against a France, an Italy or a SF~ain should it reject
the European ideological yoke.
~
Hair-brained proposals? They are nevertheless revealing for the very fact
that their features are of'ten excessive and unrealistic.
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Europe's future will ce~rtainly not be that envisaged in "Euroshima." But it ~
would be very wror.g not to take into account the fact that such dreams, however
utterly mad they may be, correspond to Che political intentions of the Giscard
government. In certain respects the latter has already begun to take France ,
onto the "Euroshima" road.
Unan.swered Questions, Problems
Paris LE MONDE in French 17 Aug 79 p 6
[Article by Jacques Isnard: "'Euroshima' by Rene Cagnat, Guy Do'ly and Pascal
Fontaine"]
[Text] It is hard to know what one must most appreciate about the book
"Euroshima,"* which its authors: two officers, Guy Doly and Rene Cagnat, and
a member of the teaching profession, Pascal Fontaine, devote to European se-
curity: The often severe but argumented judgment as to the incapacitq of
liberal states to take up the military challenge of Soviet power or the naivete
of the solutions proposed--barely outlined and not always original--in order
to organize a real European defense which would remain faithful to the Atlantic ,
alliance.
At the beginning of their reflecting, a profession of faith which leads the
three authors of this book, convin~ed of the necessity to resist the
"Finlandization" or the "subversion" of Europe by the Red Army, to declare:
_ "The European defense organization could not be conceived independently of
the American alliance and even less against it without playing into the hands
of the strategic adversary."
This strategic adversary, one of the three signatories to "Euroshima" believes
he knows very well who it is since Lt Col Guy Doly, under the pseudonym of
Francois, had at the beginning of this year, devoted to it a strategy-fiction
novel, "The Sixth Column, If the Russians Were to Attack" (LE MONDE of 26
January 1979), in a somewhat hasty style. The same young field officer, about
2 years ago, had already written a work on European defense entitled "France-
Europe Strategy" which has much in common with "Euroshima." This means that
the reader will find himself on familiar ground in this new book and have a
feeling of having read it before, of something already hacked to death despite
the contribution, hard to discern, of the other two co-authors.
Guy Doly, Rene Cagnat and Pascal Fontaine assert that the true security.of
the French Henceforth depends;on European union. And if risks do exist that
nuclear dissuasion reinforces the nation state, then~the credibility of classic
_ means and putting it in the service of a~European defense community, a new
formula, must be developed. It is an argument to which young Fr~nch army
officers are sensitive because they have no effective or determining role in
the use of the nuclear weapu~i.
*"Euroshima," by Rene Cagnat, Guy Doly and Pascal Fontaine, 176 pages, Media
publishers.
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The difficulties begin for the authors when it is a matter of building this
Eur~pean securi~y under the egis of an executive power which would be the
European Council in the absence of there being some day a president of
Europe elected by universal su�frage.
How does one reconcile the existence of a British nuclear dissuasion force with
that o� the French strategic fdree? How does one devise a joint organization
of classic forces in the other European countries which shnuld accept the
nuclear "umbrell~'of London and Paris? How would the United States and this
integrated military Europe coexist: What delegations--whic:h would not amount
to abandoning national sovereignty--would each of the European countries agree
upon for communal defense? �
So many questions which the authors of "Euroshima," followi_ng many other
theoreticians of European institutions, attempt to answer 3.n the final quarter
of their book~without always succeeding in avoiding the tr~ips inherent to any
construction of the mind.
8094
CSO: 3100 ~
`
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES ITALY ~
NATO'S EUROPEAN STRATEGY TERMED UNCERTAIN
Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 31 Aug '79 p 9
[Article by Sergio A. Rossi]
[Text~ In the shadow of the-SALT II agreements on limitation
of American and Soviet strategic missiles, a debate is surf ac-
ing in Europe over our continent's atomic secura.ty.for the
Eighties. Once again, the issue emerges from the political and
military heart of Europe: from France, Great Britain, and Ger-
many, the first two nuclear powers in their own right, the ~hird
still only a conventional power, but one endowed with a prestige
and a traditional role in defense questions which has swiftly
sprung up again~ mutatis mutandis, inside the NATO ambience as
well.
Italy~ as usual, is still hanging about on the fringes, so to
speak, save for sporadic reports in a press which is generally
apathetic or only superficially informed on strategic matters.
Just what is the issue? ~ ~
Substantially this: on the one hand; the SALT II agreements ~
between the U.S. and the USSR are beginning to include several
limitations interim limitations for the moment and the
development of some theater nuclear weapons, such as the ground-
based cruise missile~s, which are of course American, but; since
they are based in Europe, are of direct concern to the security
of the allies, and to Germany, in particula~.
On the o~her hand; the. Soviets are developing rE:gional superio-
rit,y in Europe in the crucial area of theater nuclear weapons,
sometimes known as Euro-strategic weapons. Thi,; is a matter of ~
growing concern to the European allies in NATO x+ecause this
already existing local superiority now consi~ierably improved
from the qualitative point of view (accuracy and range of the
Soviet intermediate-range SS-20 missiles) is no longer offset
by the once overwhelming American strategic superiority.
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~tlhat is worse, tha�t same global strategic balan~re th~t prevails
tod.ay between the two superpowers provides solid grounds to f ear
that; should there be an acute crisis, the Amer.icans would he-
sitate to intervene in Europe with their nuclea�.r weapons in the
face of a possib~e direct Soviet threat to extend the: conflict
to strategic attack on U.S. territory.
Of course this scenario is still mere theorizing, and that is
as it should be; but it has its own specific political k~eight ~
in that it weakens the deterrent impact of diplomatic action on
Soviet pressure on the Western European countries~ easier prey
to an unspoken but already creeping process of Finlandization.
To put it briefly, the East-West nuclear equilibrium in Europe
should be adjusted on the.basis of the complicated argument that ~
too even a balance of forces would enhance the hypothetical op-
portunity for the U.S.A. and the USSR to fight a nuclear war
confined to Western Europe, keeping their own home territories
as "sanctuaries": this would be one way to unlink U.S. territo-
rial defense from thafi of Europe. And yet too uneven a balance, `
like the one now existing, would ipso facto paralyze any poten- -
tial American nuclear intervention in clefense of Europe. ~
Meanwhile, the Soviets are push~ng hard to get Britain and France
included as participants in the next SALT rounds, since their
nuclear missiles have the range to strike into Soviet territory,
so that those missiles can be explicit~.y counted in the overall
East-West strategic equation. And here we can clearly see or~e
readily understandable source of Soviet concern lest the nuclear
balance in Europe should ~erode in the Eighties into close
bilateral nuclear controll of the two superpowers and a crisis
of nuclear co.nfidence between Americans and Eurupeans within
NATO should lead to either of two possible kinds of development.
The first is a marked upgrading, already in the planning stages,
in the British and even more certainly in the French nuclear
~ieterrent, the latter of which will reportedly double or triple
its current destructive potential within the next few years. along
with the mobility and invulnerability of its own missiles, parti-
cularly its submarine-launched contingents. The second is tha~
the Europeans might agree unilaterally on some sort of nuclear
cooperation; perhaps within an EEC structure, but more probably
on a bilateral or trilateral basis.
And right here the.alternatives become so inter~stin~, and also
such a source of controversy in East-West relat:ions themselves.
In fact, while there is again talk about military nuc;lear cooper-
ation between France and Britain and there have already been
rumors and statements indicating such a trend only recently
there has been talk from such French politicos as Sanguinetti
and from military spokesmen such as Gen Buis, of possible Franco-
~ German military cooperation.
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The fact that these are mere "trial balloons; " or. more or less
welcome public opinion polls, confirms Europe's uneasiness as
it watches the steady growth of its own independence from the -
~Uni.ted States (partly because of a degrPe of per.ceived weakness
in the current Car~er administration) in the po:litical, commer-
cia.l, and monetary areas, but without consequen~~~ly being either
able or willing to make up its mind to deal con~:lusively with
its a11 but absolute dependence in the p~~.i~ico�-mil.itary field.
Thus on the one hand the European NATO allies, c~f whom Ita1y is
not the least, are hesitant about plans to beef up t~zeater nu-
clear weapons as proposed by the Americans themselve~; in response
to German concerns, aware that, even should this be necessary,
merely to do so would once more legitimize Wash.ingtoil's remote
control over European security. Yet on the oth