JPRS ID: 8758 WEST EUROPE REPORT
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F'nR O'f~'FIC'IrV, tlSl? ONLI'
- JPRS L/8758
9 November 1979
_ W est E u ro e R e o rt
p p
(FOU(J 61 /79~
FBI$ F~REIGN BROP.DCAST INFORMATIO~J SERVICE
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~ JPRS L/8758
9 November 1979
WEST EUROPE REPORT
_ (FOUO 61/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
ITALY ~
Political Aspect of Brezh~lev~ Tactic Poses 'Toughest
_ Problem'
~ (Vittorio Zucconi; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 18 Oct 79)....... 1 -
Milan Paper Hails FRG Stance on Euromissiles Tssue
(Davide Lajolo; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 20 Oct 79).......... 4
Impact of Expected ~Yes~ to EuromissiZes Examined
(Gaetano Scardocchia; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 23 Oct 79).... 6
COUNTRY SECTION
rEllERAL R~PUBLIC OF GERMANY
-
Bahr Comments on Nuclear Debate, Other Campaign Issues
(Egon Bahr Interview; STERN, 27 Sep 79) 9
Relations Improve Between CDU, Trade Unions
(Werner P. D'hein; STERN, 27 Sep 79) 14
F RANCE
Importar.ce of Air-Grcund Cooperatior. Reviewed
(Jacques Marc; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Sep 79) 16 -
New Marine Diesel Engines Described
(Pierre Vialatte; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Sep 79)....,.,.,. Z1
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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FUft 0~ FIC CAL USG ~NLY
, CONTENTS (Continued) Page
- ITALY
PCI's Pajetta Attacks 'Dogmatist' Ponomarev on Euro-
communism
~ (Gian Carlo Pajetta Interview; CORRIERE D~LLA
SERA, 23 Oct 79) 27
%accagni.ni I~action in llC Favors Government Involving PCI
(Antonio Padellaro; CORRIERE DELLA SERA,
15 ~ct 79) 28
4Tarship Deal With PRC Stopped Due to Soviet Pressure
~ (Pietro Ostellino; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 15 Oct 79).. 3i
UIL's Benvenuto Favors Worker Participation
(Giorgio Benvenuto Interview; L~EUROPEU,
_ 20 Sep 79) 34
USSR's Bold Strategy Versus Weaknesses of Democracies
~ (Vittorio Zucconi; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 22 Sep 79).. 37
- b -
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HOR OFFICIAL (JSE ONLY
- '1'H~ATER NUCLrAR FORCES ITALY -
POLITICAL ASPECT OF BREZHNEV TACTIC POSES 'TOUGHEST PROBLEM'
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 18 Oct 79 p 5 LD
[Dispatch by Vittorio Zucconi: "Why Brezhnev Is Saying: We Will Negotiate
on Missiles Right Away"]
[Text] Moscow--With the letters sent to a1Z the NATO heads of governmept-- '
but not revealed to the Soviet public, who still know nothing about them--
the USSR's iiiitiative to prevent the deployment of new U.S. missiles in
Europe has reached its political culmination. From 6 October, when Brezhnev
delivered his "speech from the Berlin wall," through 2 days ago, when the
Soviet ambassadors in the Western capitals delivered the CPSU secretary's
message, the operation to saturate the Western public and their leadership
classes with political propaganda was developed and perfected.
The tactic is not new: Indeed, it can be described as a"classic move" in
the recurrent overtures of the anti-NATO struggle. It was adopted in similar
_ terms, though in a very different international climate, by Stalin in Decem-
ber 1950, when he tried to prevent the formation of the joint military com-
mand, the future operational center of NATO. It was repeated by Khrushs~Zev
in 1957 when he tried to prevent the installation of U.S. Jupiter missiles in
Europe, and the similarity with the present case is striking; he went as
far as to announce the "unilateral withdrawal, as an example of good will,"
of 4,000 troops. Khrushchev was therefore more generous than Brezhnev~.
But however "deja vu," the Soviet tactic resurrected by Brezhnev cannot fail
to impress on account of the consistency, insi~tence and subtlety with which -
it is being implemented. On the psychological plane it puts its counterpart
NATO on the defensive by "revealing" to the cuntinent's peaceful peoples the =
evil imperialist plan to install 572 new missiles (Pershings and Cruise)
on their territory. Diplomatically, it shifts the international debate to -
the opposite camp and puts the NATO governments in the increasingly deli-
cate position of having to say "no" to the foremost Eurasian power and deal
with the leftwing for.ces still sensitive to appeal from Moscow. Militarily,
- 1 ~
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it shi.fts attention to NATO's rearmament plan and away from the rearmament
which is already underway or which has already taken place in the Eastern
B1oc. Brezhnev I~as revealed that a new missile, the SS-20, with three inde-
pendent warheards "becomes operation" every 6 days in the USSR. where 100 -
~>F tliem arc app~rently already targeted on Europe. This a5sertion h~s not
_ yct bren dentecl.
Now tl~e "letters to NATO governments" have brought the problem home to each
. of the Atlantic nations, removing it from the realm of indirect exchanges
and messages via the press. In these notes Brezhnev neither threatens nor
thunders openly. He asks and offers to negotiate, but--this is the point--
before and not after the installation of the Pershing and Cruise missiles.
Because this is the essenti.al issue for the Kremlin: to negotiate on the
basis of the existing military situation, in which there has already taken
place on the other side of the East-West border the q~salitative technological
leap forward, (if not the quantitative one, perhaps: This is the r~isunder-
- standing being manipulated by Moscow) with the multiwarhead SS-20 missiles,
the backfire bombers, clearly superior to the *~otorious and very old B-52,
and the high-penetration T-72 battle tank.
One can understand Brezhnev's aru~iety and the insistence with which his of-
Fer to negotiate before the deployment of new NATO weapons is being promoted.
If it were to be accepted unchanged, it cosld alter the prospects for mili-
tary, and therefore political, balances in Europe. ~nd this despite the
~ visits made by Hua, who is .forced to ask for help, and is not able to dic-
tate conditions, precisely because of his obvious military weakness. And
yesterday in Moscow saw the opening of the "negotiations with China," which
marlcs no real progress but prompted many attacks in the press.
L
The intrinsic weakness of the entire operation lies, therefore, in portray-
ing as a negotiation something.which is not a negotiation, since it proceeds
from the prior acceptance of the Soviets' central demand: the rejection
or indefinite freezing of the NATO modernization program. What, then, would
tliere be left to negotiate with NATO? Perhaps its obsolete missiles, like
the Pershing-I, already left behind by the new Soviet missiles? Herein
lies the element which has prompted the confusion and hostility of the ma-
jority of European reactions, and which also prompted Schmidt to make it
quite clear that the deployment of the missiles must be negotiated at the
same time.
But, leaving the labyrinth of military problems in which it is frightingly
easy to lose oneself (for instanc^, how can one establish what "parity"
= means, when the minimum requirements for compl~~te mutual destruction have
been exceeded many times over?), there remains the toughest and most pro-
found problem of the political aspect of the initiative. Even without re-
sorting to big words or the overused formulas of "~'inlandiz3tion," it is
- difficult not tc see how the Soviets' attempts to influence the Atlantic
Alliance's strategic decisions are now becoming inereasingly frequent.
2
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Last year the neutron bomb was a dress rehearsal for this year's much more
important action, and then came, the order to ~urope not to sell weapons
- to the Chin~se.
And yet nobody has ever tried to tell the USSR where to install and to wliom
- to sell its nuclear and convention3l weapons.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriala del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
CSO: 3104
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}~Olt OFI'ICIAL [IS}: ON1.Y
THEATER NUCLEAR FORC~;S ITALY
~
MILAN PAPER HAILS FRG STANCE ON EUROMISSILES ISSUE r
_ , Q
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 20 Oct 79 p 2 LD
[Article by Davide.Lajolo: "Europe Must Not Be Battlefield or Field for
Blackmail"]
' [Text] Before asking whether the United States is right to ask Europe to
install in various states over 300 missiles targeted on the USSR or whether ~
Brezhnev is right to say that he regards this operation as an act of pro~o-
cation against his country, one must bear in mind (and this has not been
done even in some headlines and articles on the subject published by this
_ paper) that the basis for the discussion is the defense of peace and our
security.
Having formulated and borne in mind this premise, we must reason with our
own minds, as Italians, exclusively with a view to safeguarding our own vital -
interests, and this coincides with the desire not to prompt provocations--
even just verbal ones--which would freeze the detente process. What does
reasoning as Italians mean? It means simply reasoning with the same cool-
headedness as the Germans, as their Chancellor Schmidt has stressed on sev-
eral occasions following the American and Soviet requests. This~ must be
~ done with the courage to make our own people's voice heard and with the aware-
ness that we are defending our own country by defending the cause of world
peace.
What in fact does the German Government say about this problem? Let us veri-
fy whether the USSR has reinforced its missile strength and is threatening
Europe and, while seriously carrying out this verification, let us begin
negotiations to reduce both weapons and dangers. If we become certain that
- ehe USSR has altered the balances in its own favor, then let us proceed
with installing the missile bases to restore an equilibrium to the balance
of forces.
This is a responsible, virile, cautious and at the same time courageous form
of. argument. Especially since it implies looking at the situation as it
really is and not vying to shout wolf the loudest, pointing at one side, to
please the other side or submit to its internal or international maneuvers.
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roi~ c~rr rcr~~!1 usi: o~vi,Y
Tn fact tlie Italian Government has not yet made any official 1~ronouncemc~nC. =
Not even when Cossiga visited Schmidt did he make the admissions some peo- �
ple have at~tributed to him.
However, a large section of the press is shouting for our country to install
the missiles tomarrow. Many of the people concerned are the very ones who
oppose nuclear power stations. But the examples of great dangers deriving
Erom nuclear bombs carried by missiles are no less terrible than accidents
at nt~clear power stations. Moreover, we are talking liere about deadly wea-
pons of warfare, not the production of energy, whi^h should at least facil-
- itate progress.
But it is worth returning to the basic issue. It is a matter not of nurtur-
. ing a cold war atmosphere but of fighting instead to restore vigor to de- -
tente. Especially as Europeans, so that the USSR, the United S tates and
China will not exploit Europe as a battlefield, still less as an area for
issuing their mutual blackmail threats. It certainly seems strange that the
Chinese prime minister, who claims and tries to be a pacifist, should come to
Europe to issue a call to arms. But what statement by any Chinese leader
since Mao's time is not strange?
States cannot act like certain viscerally anticommunist roving political `
observers immediately ready to espouse communist Hua Guofeng's appeals. It
is we Europeans and nobody else who must decide about the guarantees of our
own safety. I do not believe anyone would want to fight to make people take
the USSR at its word or could advocate its supremacy. The PCI has respons-
ibly refrained from doing so and has advocated negotiations precisely to
- restore equilibrium to the balance of forces and urged that the meeting be-
tween the two military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, lead :o the limita-
tion of every kind of weapon. At the same time it has advocated, as has
Social Democrat Schmidt, that the ratification of SALT II be. finalized in -
order to proceed to SALT III. Had it not a~:ted thus, what kind of a na-
tional party wculd it have proved to be?
Europe's responsibility at present must also extend to indicating to the
two major powers that they are no longer omnipotent. That war implies
- extermination particularly for those who have fewer weapons; but if whoever
has f~wer weapons has more brains and civil courage, he can influence who-
ever has too many weapons not to cause the massacre of his own people.
; COPYRIGFIT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
CSO: 3104
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TIIEAT~R NUCL~AR FORCES ITALY -
INIPACT OF EXPECTED 'YES' TO EUROMISSILES EXAMINED
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 23 Oct 79 p 1 LD
[Article by Gaetano Scardocchia: "New NATO Missiles, Kremlin and Reper-
cussions on Italian Scenario"]
_ [TextJ Rome--In a week's time, with Foreign Minister_ Malfatti's reply to _
parliamentary questions on the problems of the East-West military balance,
the government will announce its favorable attitude toward the NATO missile
modernization in Europe. Though a decision in principle has already been
taken--as Brzezinski's deputy David Aaron, who has been visiting Rome over
the past few days, wi11 have been able to verifS�--it will only be adopted -
and confirmed at the mid-December NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels. The
intention of the government, the foreign ministry and the defense r~inistry
is to make th e deliberations primarily technical in nature, in terms of
simply bringing the Atlantic military arsenal into line with the new offen-
sive weapons deployed by the USSR. In adopting this approach, the aim is
to avoid, or at least to reduce to a minimum, the splits and clashes which
the decision could cause on the Italian domestic scene.
The government believes that a gap has appeared in NATO's military strength
in Europe. With the SS-20 missiles, which I~ave a range of 4,400 km and
carry 3 nuclear warheads, and with the backfire bombers, with their combat
range of 4,200 lan, the Soviet Union is now in a position to directly hit
- any point 3n Western Europe. To counterbalance this disequilibrium, Italy
= is accepting the plan to deploy new and more powerful missile (108 Persh-
ing-II and 464 Cruise) in some NATO countries and is prepared to have some
of them (there is talk of about 80 missiles) on its own territory to re-
place the technically obsolete mi~.siles and to keep the number of nuclear
warheads unchanged. This modernization makes it possible to maintain the �
credibility of the so-called flexible response doctrine--namely, that for
every foreseeable kind of attack NATO has a range of alternatives permitting
a measured and calibrated response.
~ In the same context as and parallel to the military decisions, the Italian
Government believes that NATO must offer the Soviets serious and rapid
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negotiations for a controlled reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe. Since ,
_ the deployment of Pershing-IIs (all bound for the FRG) can only begin in
1983 and the Cruise missiles (some of which will be sent to Italy) will
- become operative in 1984-5, there is a sufficient time 1ag to verify the
Soviets' real intentions: It is even possible that a pro~upt concluaion of
the negotia tions might prompt NATO to trim its missile program. It is true
that in the meantime Pershing and Cruise missiles will be constructed, but =
for military purpeses the decisive moment will come when they are deployed
in Europe: As long as they remain in the United States these weapons are
harmless, since their range means that they can be used only in Europe.
On the basis uf reliable information which we have gathered, the Italian
- Government's position seems very similar to the Bonn government's. There
is an attempt among the Germai~ Social Democrats--mainly thanka to party
administration secretary Bahr--to create an interval between the decision
to construct ~~1e new missiles and the decision to deploy them: that is, Bahr `
proposed discussions in Brussel�s this December orriy on their construction,
postponing the decision on actually deploying the weapons until later, de-
pending on progress in negotiations with the USSR. But eventually Schmidt
opted for a single decision including the deployment while ke~ping open the
- possibility of rectifying decisions already taken if negotiations with the
Soviets prove fruitful. This is essentially the attitude of the Italian
Govern~ent also, while a few ranks of the Italian Socialist Party [PSI],
which is, however, also largely in favor of the missile program. =
Examining the possible repercussions that the ~overnment's decision might
cause in domestic politics, one can observe that the parties seem to be
split into two groups, more clearly than was the case ~ver the issue of
membership of the European monetary system: on the one hand, the five par-
ties directly or indirectly supporting the government (The Christian Demo-
_ cratic Party, the Italian Socialist Democratic Party,~the Italian Liberal
Party, the Italian Republican Party and the PSI) and, on the other hand, the
PCI, the radicals and the far left, The former are in favor of accepting -
the missiles, while the lattet- are against. The problem is to decide whether
the split should be attenuated and diluted oe whether it would be better to
emphasize it spectacularly and ratify it with a vote. This is an unresolved
dilemma which is lacerating almost all the parties. The government seems -
unwilling to exacerbate the conflicts and indeed is stressing the technical
nature of the decisions, precisely to avoid a parliamentary debate ending in
- a vote. Even the communists--iF what some of them are confiding is true--
would be very pleased to avoid spectacular parliamentary isolation on an
issue in which the very legitimacy of their stance as a government force ia
at stake.
The PCI's predicament lies in the difficulty of adopting a position which
will safeguard both its relations with the USSR and its strategy of coopera-
tion with the other Italian parties--the DC and PSI in particular. Balancing ~
acts a:e possible on ideological issues. Where conflicts ~f strategic and
military interests are involved there is less scope for ambiguity. The PCI
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re,jects the new NATO misailes, or rather it says that first we muat negotiate
with the i1SSR and then decide what to do; in any case this proposal is
- favorable to the Soviets, who have eve=g~interest in freezing the pr�esent
- balance of power in Europe.
Nevertheless, the PCI (cxn be deduced from Romano Ledda's report to the
directorate [actually Central Committee Commission on foreign policy issues]
published in part in Sunday's L'UNITA) has made a considerable cultural ef- `
- fort to illustrate its theses with documentati.on based entirely on Western
sources, restrained and unemphatic; and the PCI paper has admitted that the
USSR has a"considerable advantage" and a"functional superiority" in the
field of nuclear vectors usable in Europe, while maintaining that these news
- elements do not alter the overall strategic balance between the two blocs.
In short, to come to the crux of the matter, the tone and reasoning of the
communist polemic do not seem to be paving the way for massive mobiliza-
tion against the NATO missiles. The PCI promises to express cautious and
flexible dissent, unless a further Soviet political offensive upsets the
forecasts; but it must also be said that possible initiatives by the Radical
Party could also increase the Botteghe Oscure's [PCI headquarters] embar-
rassment. -
There remaj.ns the problem of a possible parliamentary vote. As far as we
know, neither the goverrunent nor the DC or PSI secretariats has any inten-
tion of asking for one. Sin~e it is a matter of communications on a tech-
nical modernization of NATO, thA governme~t apparently intends to address
parliament--following Malfatti's brief adciress on 31 October--only after the
� end of the Atlantic 6ouncil meeting in December--in other words, when every-
thing has already been settled. At this stage the debate does not require
a vote, unless a particular political group explicitly demands it. The
Social Democrats, for instance, might do so. Deputy Pietro Longo told us
yesterday evening that "parliament must pronounce on such a delicate issue;
it is right that the Italian people know what the attitude of the various
political .forces is. We do not want a lacerating vote but a clarifying
VOtfl~~~
= COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s. ~
CSO: 3104
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COUNTRY S~CT]:ON FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF s~,:
MANY .
BAHR COMMENTS ON NUCLEAR DEBATE, OTHER CA1~iPAIGN ISSUES
Hamburg STERN in German 27 Sep 79 pp 250-254
[Interview with ~PD Executive Director Egon Bahr by STERN editors Heiner
Bremer and Peter Pragal: "With Albrecht It Would Be More Difficult;" date
_ and place not given]
[Text] SPD Executive Director Egon Bahr comments on the
Schmidt-Strauss duel, on internal dissension regarding _
� nuclear energy and on friction within the socialist-
liberal coalition. -
[QuestionJ In the 1980 Bundestag elections, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt will
- have to vanquish his challenger, Franz Josef Strauss. To win this duel, -
the SPD wants to prove that the CSU chief is az unpredictable politician.
Has the struggle become less difficult as a result of the riots involving
Strauss and his uncontrolled outbursts?
[Answer] As much as we Social Democrats are against brawls, we must never-
theless call attention to the fact that Strauss has demonstrated once again .
how easily he loses his self-control. Everyone must understand how dangerous
' it would be for our country if this man were to become chancellor.
[Question] Strauss will certainly not find the kind of antagonism everywhere
else that he did in the Ruhr area and will therefore once again emerge as a -
serious statesman....
[Answer] ...there is no need for us to prove the tenuoiisness of the CSU
chief's self-control. We want to emphasize primarily that he must not
r
become Bonn s head of government because of his own political contradictions.
[Question] To what contradictions are you referring?
[Answer] Strauss tries to evade controversial subjects by agreeing in turn
- with vario~is people. Example: He is in favor of moxe nuclear power plants
but against storage depots in Bavaria. He is against treaties with the East -
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but wants to abide by them. But he fails t~, state how he intends to instill
life in these treaties. He rails against n3tional debts but demands rapid
tax reductions. He is against children spending too muc~e time in front of
television sets, but at the same time he advocates more programs for com-
, mercial television. All this misleads the voter, and we will not let,him
get away with it.
[Questi~n] In November the SPD's Godesberg Program will have its 20th
- anniversary--a concept with which the members ceased being the party of one
class and established themselves as a party of al.l the people. How valid
_ is the Godesberg declaration today?
[Answer] Godesberg is 20 qears young. The SPD has changed our society. ~We
are no longer a workers' party; we are a p3rty which represents the interests
of all employees.
[Question] We are of the opinion that the SPD has primarily become a
chancellor's party.... .
[Answer] ...thank the Lord, we have realized that power and governmental
responsibility are necessary to implement political goals. After all, it
is terribly simple for the opposition to make fantastic demands which fail
to be realized. Since Godesberg we have come much closer to the Y�eal world
without having forgotten how to plan for the future.
[QuestionJ Do you quarrel with the statement that the next Bundestag elections
can hardly be won by the SPD, but instead by its guiding light, Helmut
Schmidt?
_ [Answer] I consider this a distortion of the truth. Obviously, a party can
be helped or be damaged by its leader; that is why we are glad to have an
outstanding man for our chancellor. But even if your statement were true,
we would have won the elections even today, perhaps with a two-thirds
majority. But I would rather not depend on that.
[Question] We still believe that the next elections will be decided by the
amount of conf idence with which the citizens view the individuals concerned--
Schmidt or Strauss. The programs are of secondary importance.
[AnswerJ If Schmidt should win for that reason, I consider this entirely
legitimate....
[Question] ...if one person plays such a dominant role, there is an increasing
danger that the party will waste away....
[Answer] ...your thesis is contradicted by, for example, our intense internal
discussions about the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The SPD is not a
ceremonial organization which is no longer capable of developing its own mind.
1C~
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[QueSt-ionJ Iiut, as a matter of fact, with the nuclear power debates one can
~3en~e the le~der9hip's behind-the-scenea activity to ensure that during the
forthcoming December party convention in Berlin no decisions will be reached
which will entirely contradict the chancellor's conditianal apnroval of -
nuclear energy.
[Answer] The SPD's governing body would get along without a leader if he did ~
not openly speak his mind.
[Question] Might the delegates not consider themselves duped if they realize
, that all decisions had already been made prior to the party convention?
[Answer] I dare to predict that the debate about nuclear er.ergy will not be
influenced by any recommendations on the part of the party leadership, but
rather by the convictions of every Social Democrat.... -
_ [Question] ...and by the necessity of providing the chancellor with decisive
majorities. ~
[Answer] No one can guarantee anything tnese days.
[Question] Might it not be necessary for Helmut Schmidt to at least hint at
a hidden threat of his resignation, as did his deputy Hans-Dietrich Genscher
during the FDP party convention, in order to make the delegates hew to his
policy on atomic questions?
[Ansiaer],We will see about that. I respect those who in this matter do not -
think about the chancellor and the government but who say: Our sense of
responsibility dictates care in the use of nuclear energy and, if necessary,
a vote against it. There will also be advocates of accelera~ted development. ~
In the end, the chancellor must be able to determine his course of action
based on his overall responsibility.
- [Question] Will Eundestag delegate Egon Bahr grit his teeth and vote for
increased use of nuclear energy? _
[Answerj Along with Eppler, I am of the opinion that during the next few
years we cannot dispense with nuclear energy. This applies not only to those
nuclear plants which are currently in operation, but also to those under
construction.
[QuestionJ Will the party convention come out in favor of governmental
intervention f or energy conservation and, for instance, demand a speed limit ~
on the autobahn?
[Answer] Personally, I like to drive fast. But I admit that in. the long run
we cannot afford to be the only country in the world which does not enfor'ce
speed limits~
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_ [Quest~.ton] Economics Mi*~ister Graf Lambsdorff is of the opposite opinion. -
Would yau risk going on a collision course with ~-he FDP? F
[Answer] We are not looking for conflicts but neither do we seek to hide
� any disagreements with the Free Democrats.
[~uestton] The SPD and the FDP disagree on other matters as well as on
nuclear policies. Differences exist as well on problems concerning social
security for ~he aged and taxation policies. How much stability remains in
social-liberal pol{r~_cs?
[Answer] Lots of people wonder about that. If the electorate chooses us,
the SPD and the FDP will again make common cause during the next 4 years.
The pension and tax problems can be resolved. After all, even joint economic
policies with the liberals were possible, even though many had thought this
could only happen in a Grand Coalition.
[Question] Shortly prior to any election there is increasing pressure on
each coalition partner to clearly identify himself before the public. The
FDP seeks primarily to gain votes in its capacity as a guarantor of a state
based on justice; that is why it is demanding a liberalization of the
Contact Prohibition Law during the current legislative session. Will the
SPD join in.this? ~ ~ ~
[Answer) It would not be wise to try this during the hectic pre-election
campaign.
[QuestionJ As the federal executive director, you are responsible for the
SPD's election campaign. In the future, Hans-Juergen Wischnewski, who has
organized past successful election campaigns, will be your party deputy.
Will you operate as a team in 1980, or will there be conflicts?
[AnswerJ I am certain that we w:.ll complement one another in an excellent
manner.
[QuestionJ Will the coalition partners have a~oint election campaign strategy
- during the coming year, or is each proceeding on its own?
[Answer] Each party will seek votes independently....
[QuestionJ ...and will there be a recommendation to the social-liberal voters
to vote primarily for the SPD and secondarily for the FDP?
[Answer] We are not giving anything away and will the-refore fight for every
single vote.
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[Quest.ion] Are you not afraid that without vote-splitting the FDP could
slip be.'.ow the 5-percent hurdle?
[Answer] I do not see this danger. Based on recent polls, Che FDP will
give a good account of itself.
- [Question] What is your estimate of Franz Josef Strauss's chances of winning
the election? Could he profit from an economic crisis?
[Answer] I cannot imagine that Strauss can, within 1 year, polish up the
image that the citizen has gained of him in the last 20 years. Strauss has
remained the same man who in times of stress tends to lose his cool. With
Ernst Albrecht as the CDU/CSU candidate for chancellor, this would have
been more difficult. He can use the word "liberal" and almost get away
with it, even though he is no liberal at all.
[Question] Would you dare make a prediction for 1980?
[AnswerJ Strauss will get even fewer votes than Kohl did in 1976.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner +,7ahr AG & Co.
9273
CSO: 3103
(
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COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
RELATIONS IMPROVE BETWEEN CDU, TRADE UNIONS
Hamburg STERN in German 27 Sep 79 p 248
[ArticZe by Werner P. D'hein: "The Good Fairy and the Evil Witch"]
[Text] DGB chief Heinz-Oskar Vetter offered an alliance to the CDU Presidium:
"If we want to prevent leftist dogmatists and those who want to change the
present system from gaining the upper hand, we will also need your help."
CDD Chairman Helmut Kohl responded happily: "We are on your side."
~ Monday of last week the leadership of the DGB and the DCU endeavored to
bring about a change through reapproachment. The unions, it was agreed, -
will, through "various statements" (Vetter) make clear they are "by nc, '
means an electioneering force for the SPD" (DGB deputy Maria Weber). i;The
CDU/CSU, on the other hand, will not repeat in this election period ~he
anti-union campaign which had been conducted by Kurt Biedenkopf in ':he Ruhr
district in 1976. CDU General Secretary Heiner ueissler said: ";hat was
clearly a mistake." -
Vetter had cleared the way for an understanding as early as mid-September
at the Federal Congress of the CDU Committees on Social Affairs in Krefeld.
"To make this perfectly clear: The unity of the unions has its strongest
source of power in the Christian-social values on the oz~e.hand, and democratic
socialism on the other." And: "We have the same comp~~s, even if we have
_ differing views in the fields of politics and economic:s. ~
In return, the DGB chief "gratefully" acknowledged what the CDU leadership
had to report from Munich. The CDU's chancellor candidate, Franz Josef �
Strauss, by no means approved of the threat by Edmund~Stoiber, the CSU's ~ -
general secretary, to create a conservatively orientE:d union as competition
for an SPD-oriented DGB. Strauss has in fact stoppei~ Stoiber, after not only -
his own representative in Bonn, Friedrich Zimmermann`("sheer nonsense") but
also the Bavarian Association of Employees had immediately protested against
"such little games."
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It is due to the efforts of Geissler, the CDU's general secretary, that the
DGB and the CDU/CSU are again able to talk with each other. Since he has
been in office in Bonn, the social policy expert has preached in favor of `
a"matter-of-fact approach to the relationship." Geissler: "A policy which
is t-~ostile to the unions would be a foolish policy for the CDU." _
In a 66-page paper which was written in preparation for the leadership
conference with the DGB, Geissler listed *_hose points in which the CDU/CSU -
and the unions act in concert, and those points where they do not. Norbert
Bluem, of the CDU Committees on Social Affairs says: "Of course not every- -
thing is sunshine and roses between us and the DGB. But the myth that 'the
SPD is the good fairy and the CDU is the bad witch' can no lor;er frighten
_ anyone but political infants."
The chairman of the CDU Association of Employees, however, fully understands
what the party has to do, if a true change in climate is to be achieved.
Union leader Bluem, who has been referred to mockingly as a"Sacred Heart
- Marxist" by Strauss, the Bavarian leader, has said: "We do not demand that
Franz Josef Strauss join the DGB. But DGB members~ip must not lead within
the CDU/CSU to a suspicion of socialism. The accusation of aocialism is
not made any more acceptable by the use of the term `Sacred Heart."'
~ COPYRIGHT: Gruner + Jahr AG & Co., 1979
9410
CSO: 3103
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE ~
IMPORTANCE OF AIR-GROUND COOPERATION REVIEWED
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Sep 79 pp 42-43
[Article bq Colonel Jacques Marc, French Air Force: "Air Ground Coopera- -
tion")
[Text] The author, Colonel Jacques Marc, entered the Air
Academy in 1951 and was awarded his fighter pilot "wings".
in the United States in 1954. From 1954 to 1961, he served
in Tunisia and Algeria, flying Mistral, T-6, P47, and
Skyraider aircraft, and later in the FRG as an F-100 pilot.
He graduated from the Ai,r.War College in 1968, and was chief
~ ~ of staff of the 2d CATAC [Tactical Air Command] from 1973
to 1976. He is currently assigned as personal representa-
tive of the Commanding General FATAC [Tactical Air Force]
to the Commanding General lst Army. -
Is it sti11 necessary these days to ar~ue for air-ground cooperation?
Without wishing to hark back to World War II with its well-known and
successful employment of the tank and Stuka in tandem, the history of
these past few years does offer an extremely wide variety of conflicts
for us to study.~ But we shall limit ourselves here to mentioning only
a few significant examples.
During the Yom Kippur War, the initial attack by Syrian armor in the
Golan Heights was stopped in great part by the Israeli Air Force (with
heavy losses, however). A short time later, Israeli armor crossed to
the west bank of the Suez Canal, taking the SAM-6 [surface-to-air
~ missile] defense belt from the rear, thereby allowing Israeli aircraft
to penetrate over Egyptian territory.
Alongside this type of modern blitzkrieg, successful from a strictly
military standpoint, how many more or less latent conflicts, wars of
"liberation," throughout the world, have dragged on for years on end
without ever coming to any real military conclusion? The fact is that
air-ground cooperation was. never fully practiced during these conflicts,
either becaus'e combat aircraft were only employed very infrequently, or
because thej.r employment was greatly restricted for political reasons.
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All these examples ~how that while air-ground cooperation is definitely
one of the keys to successful military operations, it must be conducted
in compliance with strict principles. Such cooperation is no place for _
_ rivalry. Neither the army nor the air force has the capability of deciding
the issue by itself. It is the judicious combination of each service's -
complementary capabilities in convergent actions that assures successful _
accomplishment of the mission.
Joint Scheme of Maneuver Is Essential
Tactical air forces are equipped and trained to operate in conjunction ~
with land forces. They must naturally support the latter with all their
firepower massively concentrated where and when desired. This fire support
does not simply complement artillery fire. It is a major element of the
land battle. ~ven though the modern fighter bomber is more often tllan
not a single seater, it carries 10 times more ordnance than its World
War II elder. For example, a Jaguar squadron is capable of firing some
2,000 rockets onto its target in the space of a few seconds. Reconnais-
sance a~rcraft have also made.considerable progress both in their all-
weather information gathering capability and in the volume and quality
- of the inf~rmation they obtain. The products of conventional cameras with
amazing optical elements, and of infrared and radar detectors, are pro-
cessed, interpreted and evaluated on-the ground by means of automatic
data processing equipment. This intelligence, along with the products of
- electronic reconnaissance are an irreplaceable element in the preparation
of the land force's scheme of maneuver. Reconnaissance aircraft are -
the pre-eminent instrument which enables the armed forces to see in the
distance, and thus see someone coming.
= Lastly, tactical air forces provide cover to land forces, protecting them
against attacks by enemy air forces. Nor is such air cover their least
important role. Indeed, it is not the easiest mission, considering
the delivery systems and penetration altitudes of present-day combat
aircraft. Hence tactical air force support of land forces--whether i.t
_ be fire support, reconnaissance, or cover--takes the form of veritable
- tactical air operations closely linked to the execution and outcome of
~ the land force's scheme of maneuver.
For their part, the land forces must do their utmost to facilitate the
conduct of these tactical air operations by taking action to suppress
enemy antiaircraft defenses, either systematically, during friendly air
support missions, with their electronic countermeasures equipment and
organic fire power (particularly artillery and ALAT [Army Light Aviation]),
or possibly by their maneuver, as Israeli tanks did in Suez. Land forces
- also participate~in the battle against enemy aircraft by employing their
_ increasingly sophisticated antiaircraft artillery, a situation that imper-
_ atively demands coordinated management o� the lower airspace in the battle
area.
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The integration of air and graund operations must, therefore, be studied
Prom the sciieme-of-maneuver conception stage and be the subject of ~oint
- ~lanning. This integration must naturally continue through all implement-
in~~stages c~f the operation, and this implies existence of joint operations
centers. Lastly, at all levels of execution, procedures must be fully
assimilated, personnel must be well-trained and perfectly familiar with
their duties through lengthy practice o~ working together. Only such
� practice will make it possible to learn how to derive maximum benefit
; from the complementary capabilities of each of the two services.
Special Ties
What part do FATAC and the lst Army play in all this?
It is out of the question for us to go over all of the air support rules
- in this article. Moreover, the principles thereof are well-known. What
we shall do is see how these rules function in everyday practice.
First of all, it must be remembered that FATAC and lst Army already
exchange liaison officers in peacetime, and that the staffs of these
_ two commands work in close partnership on all matters of joint interest,
ranging from planning to the conduct of training. In addition, each
army corps has a permanently attached air support element. Each division
has an air force liaison officer (OLFA), and each FATAC wing a permanently
attached army liaison officer (OLAT). Forward air controllers, responsidle
for guiding aircraft, are present in the wings and regiments. FATAC's
- mobile tactical air control system systematically participates in all
joint exercises.
But the system's originality comes from two special aspects related
to "routine" everyday training.
The first aspect is "pairing." Each division in the lst Army is paired
with a FATAC air base. Special ties also exist between FATAC wings
and ALAT units. The purpose of this pairing is to increase exchanges
so as to become better acquainted and thus work efficiently together.
Exchanges of orientation visits, of course, but primarily exchanges of
air and ground tactical experience during exercises. Pilots familiarize
themselves with tanks while their army buddies get a taste of fighter
squadron life, and may even fly in the rear seat during a support missi~n.
During divisional and regimental exercises, the paired squadron usually
furnishes the support and a forward air controller. The OLFA and OLAT
are the two indispensable pillars of this pairing arrangement.
The second aspect has to do with the execution of support missions.
Piecemeal air support against fragmentary targets is obsolete, even though
it may possibly still be suitable in some settings, overseas particularly.
r
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( ~ ) : 4-~~L .y.1~`~if~"F , . : lY~n ~l W~ ! . Y ~ ~ ~ i'~['~' - ~ 't ~ ( / ~ l _
~ M 17 17 s ~ v 4~ ~ `
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M C OOI/(AtAC-I iu/ruirn . ~ . . ~:::y . . , ~ ~ ' ~ ie1 '~.e
(6)
KEY: 1. Army-air force coordination detachment
2. Army corps-air force liaison officer
3. Division-air force liaison officer
4. Army liaison officer-Tactical Air Force and lst RA [Air Region]
5. Army liaison officer-wings-air bases
6. Pairing
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While the learning of basic techniques does actually require training
in ~his type of support, the number of such training exercises is limited
to what is strictly necessary. The rule is to focus everyday training
~n exercises provi~ding ~3 more reali9tic setting and situation, warranting -
mc~re 9i~nl.fir~~nt ~ir si,pp~rt missionr~. These exercises inv~lve. therefore,
huc�~�~~v~ t~~n ~~I~ f~ur-r~i tcrrift ptitrol 5. Whc~never the level c~f th~~ Gxc~r- -
t;~e~ :i I Lc+w;: ~~~~lier a~ej~~,c[y ~re ~~dded ~c~ thls exerc Ise~ scenario, yucl? ns
employment of electronic warfare equipment--evaluation and exploitation
of information obtained by listening posts may trigger immediate air
attacks on the indiscreet stations--or employment of antiaircraft defense -
weapons in conjunction with close-in air cover missions in support of
ground units.
Everyday support has thus become a continuous series of joint exercises
providing valuable experience.
It should also be noted that, in addition to this everyday training,
FATAC also participates in all important exercises conducted by lst
Army, its corps, and their divisions: command post exercises or field
exercises with t'roops. Such exercises are conducted practically every
month, thus giving air- ground cooperation an additional opportuni.ty to
become more effective. `
Lastly, FATAC flies a large number of support missions for other national
military commands.
Admittedly everything is not perfect. In matters of air support, one -
must be extremely modest, beware of any academicism, and stick to cau-
tious empiricism. Modern combat conditions are evolving rapidly, and
J both the army and the air force have to be flexible enough to adjust to ~
these changes. This is one more vital reason, however, for ensuring
ti~at air-ground cooperation remains a vivid and dynamic concept at all
echelons of command.
COPYRIGHT: 1979-Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
8041
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
NEW MARINE DIESEL ENGINES DESCRIBED
Paris ARMEES D'AiJJOURD'HUI in French Sep 79 pp 58-59
[Article by Chief Ordnance Engineer Pierre Vialatte: "New Diesel Engines and
Marine Propulsici.n"]
[Text] Upon graduation from the Marine Engineering School
, in 1~~68, the author, Chief Ordnance Engineer Pierre
Vialatte, was assigned to tne Indret Marine Engineering
~ and Naval Weapons Facility as test engineer and later as
head of the marine engine department. In 1975, he was . -
ass igned to the Marine Engineering and Naval Weapons
Technical Service where he is currently chief of the
"machinery" section.
An important techrical evolution has occurred in the field of marine pro-
pi~lsion thes e past few years. Th~ use of diesel engines to power merchant
ships has expanded progressively at the expense of reciprocating steam
engines and steam turbines because of the numerous advantages of the diesel
engine from the standpoint of production costs, fuel consumption, ease
of operation, and also thanks to the continuous improvement of diesel.
engine perfo rmance which has made such engines capable of attaining power
levels heretofore obtai.iable solely by~steam turbines. At the present time,
steam propul sion units are no longer used except for very high-powered
vessels (very large tankers). For example, steam engines accounted for
only l0 percent of the power capacity of ail ships built in 1978 while
diesel engin es represented 90 percent.
A similar evoJ.ution has taken place in powerplants for warships, with, in
addition, the.intraduction of two new types of propulsidn:. nuclear pro-
pulsion by means of a pressurized water reactor plant and steam turbines,
and propulsion by gas turbines derived from aircraft engines.
Nuclear prop ulsion has gained acceptance for use on submarines. It gives
the latter a decisive advantage from a secrecy standpoint: Its use on
certain large surface sh ips is also advantageous:
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'19u~ ~;~i:~ turh(.i~~~ [y lighter th~n [hc~ dirvel c~ngine bul- definit~~ly cc~ngumes
m~re Euel. It is especially suitable for very fast ships with limited -
cruising range, such as nonconventional vessels. On the otl~er hand, for
those ships wh ich constitute the main part of surface fleets, there is
still wide-open competition among three types bf propulsion systems: the -
all. ~;ay turbinc~ system, the all diesel system, and the combined diese.l and
_ y;r~~~ tiirhtn~~ :Zy~;tr~m.
Far its corvette program, the French Navy initially chose the combined
system because it offered the advantage of combining the diesel engine's
low fuel consumption for cruising speeds with the gas turbine's light
weight for peak speeds. The Georges Leygues class of antisubmarine warfare
corvettes now under construction is being fitted with this type of propulsion
system.
Important Advantages of All Diesel System
But for its antiaircraft defense corvettes, the French I3avy has decided ~
to use an all diesel propulsion system for the following reasons: French
manufacturers of high-speed diesel engines--in excess of 1,000 rpm--have
considerably increased the power of these engines (SO percent at constant
w~igh~): the cumulative advantages of all the diesel propulsion system
include: smaller air intake and gas exhaust ducts; replacement of. adjust-
able-blade propellers by fixed-blade propellers because of the reversibility
of the diesel engine and not of the gas turbine; and simplification of
operation and maintenance derived from the use of only one type of engine.
With these new engines, it is also possible to develop exceptional ~high-
performance propulsion systems for fast patrol boats. This was recently
demonstrated by the re-engining of the patrol boat La Combattante whose _
propelling power was increased 20 percent while weight and bulk were
reduced approximately 30 percent.
However, such developments in the diesel propulsion system do demand a
few words of explanation about the technical methods and processes used.
Improved Performance
Schematically, the diesel propulsion system consists of the engine proper
and a supercharger that compresses the air fed into the engine at a
pressure higher than the air pressure. Supercharging is normally produced
by a single turboblower driven by the engine exhaust, as depicted in ~
Diagram l.
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~11 CZ~ AHI AS?WATION
QAt
- ~ TUR80�60UFi~ANT!( ,
RfFPIGERANT ~
~r
MOTEUI~ ~ I
~
Diagram 1: Normal supercharging
KEY: 1. Gas
2. Air intake
3. Turbo-blower
~ 4. CooZand
5. Engine
The objective of recent development studies is to increase the power
= supplied by a given engine without thereby altering the strain placed _
on that engine, mainly the maximum temperatures and maximum pressures
reached.
The increase in power is obtained by augmenting the volume of fuel and the
volume of air introduced into the cylinder during each cycle. To do this,
it is necessary to modify the fuel injection pump which regulates the amount
of fuel injected, and also the supercharger which, by increasing the super-
charging pressure, allows the air flow to be increased.
A rise in maximum temperatures is avoided by increasing the extra air
fed into the cylinders. This increase is achieved by a supercharging
pressure sharply higher than strictly r~ecessary for good combustion. From
a technological standpoint, to attain the required supercharging pressure,
it becomes necessary to connect two turboblowers in series with inter-
mediate cooling as shown in Diagram 2.
To avoid a rise in maximum pressure, it is necessary to either lower the
compression ratio by modifying the piston in such a way as to increase
the clearance of the piston head, or provide a precombustion chamber. But
these different modifications create new difficulties:
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~A= / AIR AlPIIIATqN~2~
runeo.souF?uuure a~. 3~
RFfRIGEHANT \ ~
\ J
~
TURBp.{OUFfIANTi N,/ S
RQiRIGEqM1T (41 .
? i
~E~ ~ 6 ~
f
Diagram 2: Dual supercharging
KEY: 1. Gas
2. Air intake
3. Low-pressure turboblower
4. Coolant
. 5. High-pressure turboblower
- 6. Engine
a. Difficulty in starting the engine due to the lower compression ratio
. which is unfavorable to ignition of the air-fuel mixture, thus necessi- _
tating preheating of the engine and the use of auxiliary starter units
in the start-up phase;.
b. Diff iculty in adjusting the turboblowers which have to furnish proper
supercharging over the entire power range used.
As a result of development trials and endurance tests conducted by both
the manufacturers and the Indret Marine Engineering Facility, these -
difficulties were corrected and the engines were qualified for shipboard -
use at 50 percent higher power than the normal engine. Engines of Chis =
type currently power the fast patrol boat~La Combattante. They will soon
be installed on th~ gunboat ("aviso") Commandant L'Herminier. Tt is planned
~ to have them power the future antiaircraft defense corvettes. T'hey
have also been proposed as the propulsion systems for ships built for
export.
'r'uture Development Prospects
Development studies in the near future will be an extension of the r.urrent
development effort:, '
24
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~.L s ~_~a,--_ ,r~ r,:� , _
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Engine on test stand at Indret Marine Engineering Facility (Photo by author)
25 ~
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a. Improving the supercharger by developing turboblowers with a better
~ compression ratio~ and high eEficiency over a wider ,power range, thereby
red~~cing the space required for the supercharger inszallation and enhancing
specifi.c fuel consumption;
b. Curther lc~wering oC the compression r,itio, thereby necessitating
development of special equipment for starting the engine and running it
at low speeds. A highly promising arrangement consists in using an addi-
tional combustion chamber. But to be entirely satisfactory, this process
-
must not appreciably increase specific fuel consumption.
These efforts to increase the power-to-weight ratio, and thus reduce the
advantage the gas turbine has over the diesel engine, will be accompanied
by continued efforts to improve specific fuel consumption, notably by
obtaining better knowledge of the phenomenon of combustion, and also to
improve the possible use of low-grade fuels. These are two areas in
~:~hich the diesel engine is unquestionably superior. Their importance can
but increase in the next few years. -
In concluding this rapid survey of the evolution in marine propulsion
systems, and more particularly of current and foreseeable developments in
diesel engines, it must be emphasized that although marine propulsion is
no longer as important as it was in those days when speed was a prime
fact~r, it has, nevertheless, made noteworthy advances and the overall
quality of a ship still greatly depends on the performance of its pro-
pulsion system.
COPYRIGHT: 1979, Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
8041 -
CSO: 3100
E
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
PCI'S PAJETTA ATTACKS 'DOGMATIST' PONOMAREV ON EUROCOMMUNISM
Mi1an CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 23 Oct 79 pp 1-2 LD
[Interview in Rome with PCI Directorate member Gian Carlo Pajetta by Antonio
Padellaro: "Christian Democratic Party Must Pay the Price to the Country"]
[Excerpt] Rome--[Question] Does Soviet [aide] Ponomarev's attack on Euro-
communism na} facilitate a return to cooperation with the other parties?
- [Answer] Ponomarev? There are some dogmatists who reveal in their irrita-
tion with Eurocommunism their inability to understand the need for renewal,
the need to eliminate crystallizations and accretions, while hiding this
behind a formal loyalty to an alleged ideological purity. As far as I am
concerned I have never properly understood the meaning of this latter term. _
[Que~tion] Then there is the pr.oblem of the NATO mis~iles. Your position
is different from that of the other parties. Don't you fear isolation?
[Answer] We fear the danger of making a mistake, of encouraging an in- _
exorable and most dangerous rearmament race. When those who proclaim a -
Soviet threat say that there are 3 years for negotiations, they are proceed-
ing from two assumptions. First, that there will be no change of the other
side during these 3 years and, second, that their own statements contain
- no offer of a dangerous temgtation which would entail the very threats being
discussed. I would like to know what guarantees there can be unless we
negotiate immediately or if we reply in cold-war terms to an overture which
can be discussed and which raises expectations. Let this be quite clear:
we want disarmament because we want detente.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
CSO: 3104
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CUl1N'1'RY SF.CT I ON zTAI.X
~ ZACCAGNINI FACTION IN DC FAVORS GOVERNMENT INVOLVING PCI
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 15 Oct 79 pp 1-2 LD
[Report by Antonio Padellaro: "Zaccagnini Current Does Not Rule Out Possi-
bility of Government With PCI"J
[Text] Rome--There is movement on the political front again. While the .
Cossiga government is manifeating its first uncertainities and encountering
continual difficulties in its struggle with the problems of the moment--
strikes, tensions in the labor world, the NATO missiles issue--within the
Christian Democratic party [DCJ the debate is resuming on the formula for
the next inajority. The DC left wing imparted a major thrust to the hypothesis
of an understanding with the PCI. Some people are talking in terms of an -
outright political turning point.
At the convention of the Zaccagnini current, the majority of the current -
- spoke out for a government with the communists as the outcome of the "only
possible policy"--national solidarity. And to dispel any doubta, the final
d.ocument contains a commitment "to involve in the government all the poli-
tical forces which could help extricate the country from the crisis."
While in Rome Galloni, De riita and Bodrato were launching their congress
challenge, Zaccagnini was flying to Ravenna to commemorate Aldo Moro--afl
- opportunity to further bridge the gap between the DC and the PCI. "To seek
the bases for broad social and political solidarity in terms of a converg-
ence of shared desires which take precedence over the various positions~--
this was one of the most significant remarks made by the DC secretary in a
speech full of appeals for cooperation, for "a collective effort against the
closed and self-centered attitudes which fray the social fabric."
Zaccagnini repeated this: "If the new situation requires new forms of
- association it could be useful and desirable to try and revise certain
aspects of the.institutional order to rediscover the spirit which inspired
the constituent assembly after the war."
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,r�
}~OR OT~f~'ICIAI, [fSf: ONLY
That is to say, he i,s proposing once again the path of agreements on in-
stitutional reforms as a kind of shortcut to democratically legitimizing
the PCI before accepting it into the country's government. Having decided
not to stand for reelection as party secretar~, Zaccagnini, no longer re-
strained by the various state considerations linked to his mediating role,
seems to want to fully revive the issues of renewal ("We are ready to opt
deliberately not for what is moribund, btit for what is new, what is emerging
and must be helped to emerge") and the "moral iseue" ("The DC is not the
party of the arrogant use and domination of power").
But let us return to "national solidarity": at the Domus Pacis convention
a large proportion of the DC (some estimate 25-30 percent) adopted this as
the watchword for the congress. But within the Zaccagnini current various
interpretations of it are prevalent. The ,~nost widespread is that summed
' up by grassroots representative Mastella ("a government comprising a11 the
constitutional parties at once") while former Justice Minister Bonifacio
proposes something less--namely, the DC and PCI together in local governments.
But differences were noted even among the "big shots"--and these differences
were not always limited to simple political details. First [DC deputy sec-
retary] De Mita attacked [Italian Socialist Party secretary] Craxi ("How can
one.believe in the strategy of someone who invents a new proposal every week")
and then suggested proceeding with the political dialog with the PCI "not to
bring it into the government, but to prepare blueprints for renewal with
its assistance." This was a more cautious approach than the one suggested
by Bodrato, who is determined to test right away "The communists' willing-
ness" among other things to demonstrate "contradictions and resistance."
Zaccagnini's right-hand man Pisanu wondered perplexedly: "The DC and the
PCI are agreed on their diagnosis. Will they manage to find the same agree-
ment on what remedies to adopt"? -
But there was no lack of emphatically "rr~ductive" interpretations of the
formula of solidarity, especially from the Moro current. According to Luigi
Gui "A policy of alliance with the Communist Party is impossible" and Mor-
lino, after going so far as to state in an interview that "for the time being
national solidarity camzotbe automatically reintroduced," is concerned not to
- lose contact with the other sectors of the party. But the Domus Pacis
- convention failed to provide concordant answers on other issues as well.
For instance, some people are more worried than Zaccagnini and Galloni about
institutional reforms (Bodrato) and some, like Martinazzoli, regard it as
a"frivolous and at the same time dangerous" issue. Then there is the prob- -
lem of the lists for the peripher.al assemblies. Should there be joint lists
with all the leftwing currents or separate lists to be ~oined later in Rome?
And how wi11 Bodrato respond to Donat Cattin's call to restore unity to the
Forze Nuove current?
Furthermore, how will the problem of electing a new secretary be reaolved?
De Mita favors restoring this function to the party leadership, but some of
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- of his group think differently. "These are inevitable problems in a new group
but they will be resolved;" the DC's.new leftwingers calmly reply. Their
attention is now directed toward the outside: How wi11 the other groups
at the Domus Pacis convention react? What will the communists say?
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere dell~ Sera" s.a.s.
CSO: 3104
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_ COUNTRY SI?CTION ITALY
WARSHIP DEAL WITH PRC STOPPED DUE TO SOVIET PRESSURE
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 15 Oct 79 pp 1-2 LD
[Commentary by Pietro Ostellino: "We Go to China To Sell Ships, Then Change
Our Minds (Afraid of Moscow?)"]
[Text] Shang~~i--This is the story of a traveling salesman who, by dint of
great sacrifices, travelled the world to demonstrate and sell his wares but
who, when he finally reached the home of the emperor who wanted to buy large
quantities of them, showed his wares and then, in fright, refused to sell
them. It sounds like a story from a bygone age, for small children of a
bygone age. Unfortunately for us, it is also an Italian story. Let us
see what it is about.
_ On Tuesday 18 June the destroyer "Ardito" and the frigate "Lupo" left Livorno
for a 7-month circumnavigation of the world. This is the 24th such voyage
carried out by the Italian warships since the birth of our navy. One stop
on the itinerary was Shanghai. This was the first visit by Italian naval
ships to the PRC. The last visit.to China was in 1921-22. By some strange
coincidence on the first voyage in 1866 by the ship "Magenta," the command-
ing officer Capt Vittorio Arminion was carrying letters of credence as
minister plenipotentiary with the aim of establishing diplomatic relations
with China.
We are not a great naval power, nor do we aspire to be one. The journey
was a great financial burden and exhausting for both crews. The purpose,
therefore, was neither a training exercise nor a par~de. It was promotional:
We rove the world (yesterday we arrived in Yokohama in Japan) to show our
ships to whoever might be 3:nterested in buying them. In this field our
shipbuilding and military industry lead the world. We have already sold
six "Lupo" class ships to Venezuela and four to Peru and have also signed -
a contract to supply two to Egypt.
ide could have sold another six to Argentina. Some top Argentine officials
visited the La Spezia shipyards to order the ships to be built at a cost of
about 700 billion lire. But the workers went on strike and organized pro-
test demonstrations against the "Ar~es~t~ne fascists." The officials were
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obliged to leave the shipyard through one of the back entrances, like re-
ferees after the match. The result was that nothing more came o~ it and
the Argentines had their ships built by the Germans, who were evidently much
more easily satisfied.
Incidentally, it might be as well to remember that the Soviet Unio~1, the
foremost and most powerful socialist country in the world, is one of Argen-
tina's major trading (and politica])~artners and that the Soviet workers have
never demonstrated against this cooperation, partly because they obviously
consider it useful to their own country and also because in the USSR strikes
are banned by law. Still by the way, it might also be worth remembering
that our shipbuilding industry has one of the largest deficits of all the
state's losing industries.
So the "Ardito" and the "Lupo" left Italy on their promotional voyage and the
technicians of the companies which produced the ships' armaments and fit-
tings followed on in aircraft, stopping off at ports where they thought they
could find a buyer to whom they could demonstrate their products. When they
_ arrived in Manila, however, they mysteriously stopped and did not continu~
to Shanghai. And yet China had submitted a formal request to purchase a
number of "Lupo" class ships. The customer was keen to complete as soon as
possible, inspected the ships enthusiastically ~d welcomed their crews with
the warmth of ancient Chinese hospitality. But the Ttalian experts were
nowhere to be aeen.
What happened? Why did they not come? Nobody mentioned them, though some
_ people failed to hide their embarrassment over the extraordinary situation.
Then, as always happens, the rumor spread that our experts did not come to
Shanghai because they received orders from their own comganies not to. The
companies in turn were apparently acting on specific orders of a political
nature: For the time being it is better not to talk about selling ships to
the Chinese; it is be~ter, in fact not even to broach the subject.
In other words, we came thus far, costing the taxpayer a fortune, showed
the Chinese our goods, whetted their appetites and then drew back.
The impression is that, as usual, we are trying to be too clever, to have
it both ways, talking to the Chinese about Marco Polo, giving them great
slaps on the back, and at the same time winking conspiratorially at those
who do not want us to do business with China and especially not business of
this kind. The Chinese, who are men of the world, pretend they have not
noticed and, undeterred, continue asking how soon a deal can be made.
This is what we are wondering too, asking ourselves--and others--a series of
, questions. First: Would our shipyard workers, who opposed the sale of ~
ships to Argentina (because it was fascist), now be prepared to demonstrate
against losing this order from China, which is not fascist and which is in ~
fact a socialist country? Second: What lies behind such an apparently
contradictory form of ~ehavior on the part of our public industry?
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One Italian politician on his way through Beijing told me that "If we
sold arms to China, we would alter the existing strategic balance, thua
_ forcing the Soviets in turn toward the arms race." This is obviously non-
~ sense, at best, or pure bad faith, at worst. Whatever ships or weapons
we are in a position to sell to China would not alter the strategic balances
one iota, for the simple reason that they are not strategic weapons. The
Chinese would use th e"Lupo" class ships to patrol their coastlines and _
nothing else, because they could nnt use them for other purposes, given the
nature of the ships. It is ridiculous to state that the sale of a few -
[quattro] ships to China could accelerate the arms race on the Soviet Union's
part at a time when the Soviets are so committed to building warships that
the satellite countries have to see to building merchant ships.
So what is the answer: It is impossible to find one here in Shanghai. Some
people say that the answer must be sought in Rome, at the Soviet Embassy, and
that it is also known to the foreign ministry. We are waiting for this ans-
wer.
_ COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
CSO: 3~04
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
UIL'S BENVENUTO FAVORS WORKER PARTICIPATION _
Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 20 Sep 79 p 14
/Interview with Giorgio Benvenuto/
/Text/ "Over the last 3 years, we have been going
about things in completely the wro~ way," says
the secretary general of the UIL Lltalian Union
of Labor/; "it is time for the union to take
on more concrete responsibilities within industry."
/Question/ While fall seems to have brought into the factories a climate
of deep tension, beginning at Fiat, in many quarters it is being said
that the country cannot get out of the economic crisis if the working class
does not take on the burden, does not assume direct responsibility for
production. What does this mean for the union?
- LAnswer/ "It means," answers the secretary ge:neral of the UIL, Giorgio
Benvenuto, "a,cting more coherently and precisely with respect to the choices
which the uni~~ has made over the last 3 years. It is right to pay homage
_ to the line of Lhe EUR because it has been the sumbol of a union which
- not only promoted wage demands but took on strategic objectives, established
coherences, priorities. But this line has had its ambiguities regarding
implementation, and especially it lacked instrumentation. We have spoken
of mobility, of a youth policy, of industrial reconversion, of planning but
then our position has not had much influence in the head offices, in the
factories or throughout the country, where the union's strategic choice
would find its realization. I must say outright: within our union there
are many complexes, there is the fear of the integration of the union move-
ment, there is the concern over taking on the ultimate responsibilities."
/Question/ And thus, thus the ec~nomy, to save itself, has gone underground,
employment has been saved by Saint Brambilla and not by the union, as they
said at the EUR?
LAnswer/ "Paradoxically, this is exactly what happened: black labor [unre-
- ported work], an underground economy and large companies in crisis. It is a pic-
ture which must make us think. Becaase when the union must,be concerned wiCh the
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survival o� the company, and i,t is absent from the great world of the
underground economy, it transforms itself into a union which preaches
but has no power, does not bargain and does not administer. Instead, we
must immediately make our presence felt in the head offices where we must
intervene and assume the relative responsibilities."
/Question/ In short, if the public or private manager calls together the
factory council and tells them, as they did at Alfasud: pay attention,
this company is losing 100 billion a year, the factory council and the
workers must continue to answer that it is not their business, as long
as the state pays, or else the r_ollectivity? ~ -
- ;Answer/ "I am profoundly convinced tnat we must not wait to be convened
by the company management. Today, we aretrying to ignore the bad news and
we do not utilize what we learn in the factory to build our strategy. Alfa
Romeo, for instance, is a company in crisis and the union must take the `
responsibility for this, must intervene, show it a plan to remedy the
situation. Otherwise, what happens? In the background there is disaster.
As at SIR."
/Question/ This, Benvenuto, is called codetermination, something which
the union has always rejected with contempt.
/Answer/ "Yes. But now I believe that the union's approach must be different.
We must give un our smug attitude about the experiments made in other
~:uropean countries. If what Berlinguer wrote in his last article in RINASCITA
about the responsibility of the working class means this, then it is all
- right."
/Question/ You do not, then, reject codetermination?
/Answer/ "We must study in depth what has been achieved in Germany, in
Great Britain and in Sweden. Of course we cannot transfer mechanically
to Italy foreign experiences, but we must finally discuss it. We will have
hard battles with Carli and the Italian management world, which is very
jealous of its own prerogatives."
/Question/ And do you think that the Italian union is ready for a debate
oE this type?
/Answer;~ "For a debate, yes. Certainly there are various opinions, we
will have heated conflicts. But we must open this debate. Our union cannot
remain a union which refuses to discuss some things, we must knock down
certain "tribal idols." I believe that the eighties are the years in which
the union movement must carry out concrete forms of participation, in search
of nonconflicting areas."
/Question/ Even you are the prisoner of taboos. You use the word
participation, the term codetermination bothers you.
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LAnswer/ "No, it does not bother me. Codetermination however is a word
which has been too much associated with the German model. I prefer the
Swedish one, even if the German one has its strength. The Ttalian union
can no longer struggle along on the information which it receives in the
factory, if things go badly, it must intervene. Even we have unfortunately
Eallen into t}ie habit of postponing problems and then reality places us
- before dramatic situations. Innocenti, Unidal, Sir, Liquichemica, Alpha
Romeo. Why wait for the crisis to overwhelm us?"
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Rizzoli Editore , .
8956
CSO: 3104
4
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COUNTRY SECTION IT~Y
USSR'S BOLD STRATEGY VERSUS WEAKNESSES OF DEMOCRACIES
. Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 22 Sep 79 p 1
/Article by Vittorio Zucconi: "The Kremlin Acrobats"/
- LText/ Moscow--While the tired Cuban ghost is coming back to flutter in [
front of the eyes of the American electorate and the strategic brains of
America and Europe are arguing about nuclear "umbrellas" and "windows,"
the Soviet Union, stubbornly impervious to difficulties and failures,
continues its foreign policy. The rhythm of its actions is not intierrupted
by electoral crises, but it keeps moving with a view toward vital bb~ectives.
From Ethiopia to South Yemen, which was visited by Kosygin (who will build
= a 100,000 ton superport in Aden to receive the new generation of Soviet
strategy is like its weapons, probably raw, certainly not brilliant, but -
capable of functioning when the moment arrives, by the simple inert strength
of quantity. It is enou^h to compare the global role of power which the
USSR is playing in the ~aorld today with the isolation of some decades ago,
to understand that in this change there is more than mere megatons and war-
' heads and it is not enough to spend more money on arms to combat ft.
Henry Kissinger, whc has become very brilliant in inverse proportion to the '
- slipping of Carter and Brzezinski, is once again looking like the "Super
K" of the Newsweek covers and quite the arms expert, which had never~~been
true before. And be is raising before the Europeans a series of dramatic
questions, but which smell stale. As if there were a projection into the
future of old scenarios, polished up and computerized Truman and Eisenhower, ~
rather than authentic innovative strategies for the West facing the eighties.
With cities, industries, nations now headed toward the twilight of programmed
"blackouts," with apparently strong economies dependent on the raw materials
of others, upset by mountains of dollars wandering and now out of control,
_ one has to wonder whether the problems of European "defense" mean a new
intermediate missile or a tank division. With what energy will they be
biiilt and launched? With what money will they be paid for? With what
morale will they be induced to fight?
The algebraic sum of the international data of the last few months, after
the sensationalism of the press has been removed, leads us to conclude
bitterly for those~who feel more secure in the West, that the United States -
37
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seems to have no longer a forei,gn policy while the Soviets have one. The
_ Carter administration, after the promises of "globa'ity and courage,"
disseminated during the electoxal campaign of 1476, has now settled into -
a line of conduct which (between China, the Middle East, SALT) seems a `
Kissingerism without Kissinger and now today, with the fuss over Cuba, a
Kennedyism without Kennedy. On the strictly military level, the revival
of initative in planning the dispostion and movement of troops, like the
"attack force" destined for the oilfields of Arabia, seems more due to the
natural overcoming of the Vietnamese shock ("American boys will nev~r again ~
die abroad") and to the stimulus created by fear over energy prospects,
- rather than to indications of coherent development from the top. The sum
of so many smail episodic decisions and of so many meetings on the "Soviet
- threat," does not yet make a foreign policy. "We would like to know if
anyone can say who speaks for the United States today," wrote with well-
founded irony, an influential Soviet authority on America, Genrikh Trofimenko.
Facing the inconsistent behavior of Carter leadership, is the persistence
of the Soviet strategy. While the Western strategists are concerned with
establishing whether the deterrent to an attack against Western Europe is
strong enough and flexible enough to dissuade the Soviets, as if the imminence
of a reverse "Barbarossa Operation" were obvious and real, the Kremlin
continues elbowing its way, by political, diplomatic and military means,
" into the friable areas of the world, from Africa to the Near East, from
Central Asia to the Far East, restrained by nothing, a.nd even stimulated
by the great flutter of the "Chinese map" which Washington is making. If
strategy is the art of losing the next war by applying the tactics which
served to win the previous one, Western strategic thought is one the right
track. Presumptuously and provincially blinded by a political and strategic
"centrality" of Europe which is less true year after year and which the
blackmail of oil could definitively destroy, it does not want to admit that
the real game over the future balance of power of the world is being played
elsewhere.
To attack Hambur, Bremen or Paris could cost the USSR "only" millions
of lives in Europe and "last least" 30 percent of its cities destroyed
in retaliation. To attack the soft and swollen bellies of the world's
riches, that is in substance the very roots of ttie economic and political
power of the 'processor' West, costs a few Cuban auxiliaries or some
"civilian" advisors and in time could give extraorindary results. Cobalt,
' an essential metal for today's aerospace technology, is imported by the
United States and 70 percent o~ it comes from the province of Kolwezi, in
Zaire. And the province has been the object of increasing attacks by
"rebels" armed and supported by Moscow. The Polisario guerrillas in the
former Spanish Sahara are ~upported by the Soviets and their training includes,
say the Western secret services, sabotage of the plants manufacturing
phosphates, which Morocco exports to the Western powers.
The Soviet navy is investing heavily in the construction of ships which are
to be used for total control of the seas, not the nuclear or subnuclear
- "lightning war" in the Atlantic. Four battleships (32,000 tons) of the
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"Soviet Soyuz" class have been placed on line and then three medium aircraft
_ carriers (.35,OQ0 tons) of the "Kiev" class, while it is now certain that
tne first Soviet nuclear super aircraft carrier of 50,000 tons is now under
construction. "None of these ships, which are too big and too vulnerable,
would be useful in a European war," said a naval specialist in NATO. But
_ they are all indispensable for a policy of great power on a gl,obal scale.
To "flex their muscles" around the world, as the United States has done
for 30 years and the Royal Navy for another 100 years before.
- The advantage of totalitarianisms over democracies in foreign policy, of ~
_ which history is full, can be odious, but it is certainly real. The America
which is in power (Carter and Brzezinski) like that in ther opposition
(Kissinger) must think in immediate political terms, sometimes absolutely
electoral ones . And this explains Young's expulsion and the resumption
of the specter of the "Soviet threat" in Europe (the Polish vote, the
Italian vote and tne vote of all those who in the United States still think
of the old continent as their "mother country"). Even the dusting off
of the "Cuban threat." The men of stone who sit in the Kremlin have at
_ most death to which to account, not hundreds of millions of touchy voters.
They do not often succeed, often they fail. But the ideologic~tl security
which the USSR still en~oys is ab].e to carry it beyond the worst defeats, "
In Cuba, it attempted to remove the last trace of ineaing to the word
"nonalinement." In Iran, after a long courtship of the Ayatollah, today
it secretly supports the Kurd guerrilla uprising because "one never knows."
- And in A�ghanistan, the Kremlin is propping up, constantly supplying more
arms and men, a regime born out of a coup and which is unpopular and anti-
national with a choice which should lead us, if we were really leftists, to
rekindle the flame of the extinguished and cold torches of Vie~nam. What
_ Western imperialist could allow itself such acrobatics so much open-
mindedness, without being called sooner or later to answer to the country?
And wl:ile Europe imagines, to reassure itself on its own geopolitical
- centrality and to remove the suspicion of its progressive provincialization
that the Russian "T 62's" are already en route toward the Rhine, the USSR
continues to try, even among defeats and reverses, to penetrate the tender
flesh of the Third and Fourth World, on which depends the future of ttte
industrialized center. And the impressive nuclear umbrella, which has
become ven stronger and more "invincible," is in danger of passing into
hi.story as the new, highly costly "nuclear Maginot line" of the 20th century.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale der "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
8956
CSO: 3104 END
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