JPRS ID: 74593 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020030-4
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• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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i6 NOVEMBER i9T9 N0. 2045 i OF i
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~ ~
JPRS 74593
~ 16 November 1979
- / rth Afric~r Re ort
~~ar East No
p
No. 2045
_ FBIS F'OREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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sa~;z-,or `
REPORT DOCUMENi'ATION REPOR7 NO. 2. 3. Reciplent's ,~c~~=Y~o~ no
_ PncE ~ JpRS 74593 ;
i
4. Title end SuAlrtle 5. Report D3le i
i~EAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT, No. 2045 16 November 19'; ~ ~
6 _r.._----~-- ~
7. Auther(s) 8. Porformin~ QrQini7ation R-nt. 'i~~ '
~ u -
~ - i .
9. Perlorming Organizrtion Name and Addresi 10. i'rolect/Task/Work Unl! ftio. i
~ Joint Yublications Research Service -
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.~s above - ;
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_ 15. S~VPlcrnentary Notes i
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_ 16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words) ! -
This ser.i.al report contains information on socioeconomic, government, politir.al. `
aud technical developments in the countries of. the Near East and North Afr~.ca. j,-
~
~
~
~ ~
i
I_
17. Document Analycis a. Uescriptors ~ ^
_ Politi.cal Science Tnter-Arab Affairs x Libya Sultanate
Soci.ology North African x Mauritania of Oman
Lconom:i.c:; Affairs Morucco x Syria
Culture (Social Afghanistan People's Derno- Tunisia
. Sciences) Algeria cratic Republic United Arab -
I;thnology ~Bahrain of Yemen Emi.r.ates ~
. GeograpY?y Egypt Persian Gulf x k'ester.n 5ahara
T'echological ~ Iran Area Yemen Arab
Military Sciences Iraq Qatar ReFublic
x Israel Saudi Arabia
Jordan Spanish North ~
Kuwait Africa -
~ Lebanon X Sudan -
b. IAcntiliers/Open�Ended Terms ~
c. COSATI Ficld/Group SD ~ ,5C ~ 5K~ ~.5
16. Availab~lily Statament 19. Security Class (This Report) 21� No. o( Pay,cs
Uiil:i~nttHd AvailaUility UNCLASSIFIED ~
-....--J----~ 6__._--------__i
' ~iO~.Cj by T~~rjJ 2p, Sewrity Class (This Pagey ~ 22. Price
Spr:ingfi.c:lc1, Virginia 22161 UNCLASSIFIED
(~cc h~1S!-Z;9.19) See Insfruttion~ on Reverse OP710HAL ~O~M 272 (4-%"
(Furmerly NTIS--35)
OepaAmunt of Gcmn~e~ce
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' JPRS 74593
16 November 1979
NEAR E~ST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
No. 2045
CONTENTS PAGE ,
IRAN
- Revolution Puts Social Justice Above Individual Freedom
(Mohammad Javad Kermani Interview; ENRII~AB-E ESLAMI,
5 Sep 79) ..........oo......a.o .................o... 1
Iran National Fa.rty To Follow Revolutioriary Orders
(BAbIDAD, 6 SeP 79) o.....o.o..........o 3 -
Liberal Government a~ Variance With Islamic Leadership ~
(BANflDAD, 1 SeP 79) ...o 5 =
Influx, Drain of Citizens Following Revolution Revie*aed _
( ET`I'EI~4' AT, 6 oct 79 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g
Role of Ba,nks in Revolutionary Society Analyzed, Scrutinized
(ErTELA'AT, 9 oct 79) .............o...o...........< 1~+
~rfidy, Treachery of International Dru~ Firins Ba,red
( E'1'TEI,A' AT, ~o oct 79 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a o . . lg
Current Situation in Kurdish Areas Discussed
( NANiEH-E RiJZ, 1.1 oct 79 ) . ~ . . a . . . . o ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 -
Low~Cost $ousing Projects Discussed
- (NAMEH-E RUZ, 6 oct 79) ..~..........a.........a.... 26
Driefs.
Flight From Revolution 28
ISRAEL
Real Estate Administration Accused of Discrimination in
Rent ing I,a.nd
- (Shlomoh Giv~on; MA~ARIV, 26 Sep 79) 2g
- a - [III - NE & A - 121]
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CON.CIIVTS (C~~rrtinuc~d) ~`''k~`,
LIBYA -
Libyan Leader Afflicted With Eye Disease
(Maria Luisa Luca de Tena; BLANCO Y NEGRO,
lo-i6 o~t 79) 33
- MAiJRITANIA -
SN~I Director Discusses SNIM Deficit, Guelbs Project -
- (Ely 0. Allaf Interview; Cf:AAB, various dates) 37
~ Nation Searches for New Fishin g Policy
(Mireille Duteil; DEMAIlV L'AFRIQUE, 24 Sep 79) ~+6
Briefs -
Operational Prospects of Refinery 49
Large-Scale Contraband ~9
Hostility to New Government ~9
SUDAN
Refugee Influx Aggravates Problems in Sudan
(AL-SAFIR, 30 Sep 79) 50 .
SYRIA
Internal Instability Said To Be Threat to Regime
(AIgiIR SA'AH, lg Sep 7~) 53
WESTERN SAHARA
Moroccan-POLISARIO Clashes Expected To Intensif`y
- (I,E MONDE, 11 oct 79) 58
- PCE, PCF, PCI Decide on Joint Actions To Support POLISARIO
, (L'HUMANITE, 21 Sep 79) 60
yEMEN ARAB REPUBZIC
Official Interviewed on Water Crisis in Capital
(AL-THAwRAH, 22 Jul 79) 62 ~
- b -
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z~rr
- REVOLUTION PUTS SOCIAL JUSTICE ABOVE INDIVIDL'AL FREEDOM
_ Tehran ENQELAB-E ESLAriI in Persian 5 Sep 79 p 6
~Interview with Mohammad Javad KermaniT
/ Text / In ~he exchange of opinions and vtews of the three experts, which
was printed in the newspaper ENQELAB-E ESLAMI on Sunday, 11 Shahrivar
/ 2 September 7, His Eminence Mohammad Java~l Kermani's view regarding
ownership and class differences unfortunately w~.s not prinCed. The answer
to the appropriate questicn follows:
Question: Among the causes of Iran's Islamic Revolution were the existence -
- of severe class differences a.nd the concentration of enormous wealth in the
hands of a limited number of people. In your opinion, how should the econflmic
principles pertaining to ownership be formulated in the Constitution to elim-
inate these differences and to prevent them from reappearing?
Answer: I, myself, am not qualified to respond fully to this q~estion because
an economist knowledgeable concerning economic affairs should respond, but, '
- I can state in general terms that some action must be taken so that economists
and economic experts might resolve this problem i.n accordance with the Koranic
principle which states "La yakon dowlatan beyn-ol-eghniya alminkam," i.e., �
property and wealth must not be rotated among the wealthy. Any system and
method of economic management that causes property to be circulated only -
among ttie wealthy and in which the rich control and command the wealth and
under which the economy ~nd public wealth are in f~ct cor.trolled by a limited
number of people must be eliminated, and the economist must restructure it.
~ I am speaking as I fee~ and as I understand. I have reached a conclusion about -
economic questions, which I have occasionally studied, and now I am telling
you this conclusion so that it might be made available to the authorities on
this subject for their consideration and so that, if there is some error, it
might be corrected. In describing the general principles of Islamic economic
justice, two points have occurred to me. The first is that the Islamic economy
is based on two main pillars, and those two pillars are social ~ustice and
personal freedom, with this reminder that, whenever social justice and personal
- freedom clash, personal freedom must be sacrificed. This principle of social
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justice-personal freedom prevails throughout the Islamic economy. As lang as
social justice is guaranteed, we are not rorced to limit personal freedom; but,
if. we see that personal freedom is intruding upon social justice, we will re-
strict personal freedom. This is the standard: the individual will be
restricted to the extent that social justice is being damaged. This is absolute
and final. Tne second point regarding [he Islar,?ic economy is that the Islamic
- econo:ny is a. flexible economy. Because of 4Tt'1St I said in the first point, I
have term.^_d it a flexible economy an economy without shape. In past times,
many people have asked, "Is this form of economy a capitalist economy, a
comrunist economy, or a socialist economy? What structure does th2 Islamic
.:conomy have"?
I thought that tt~e best response fron my standpoint would be to say that it
is an unstructured economy because it is ar~ economy whose foundations were
- laid in the year 1400 or were molded generally in the schools of our ancestors.
Therefore, zae can not give a particular shape to the Islamic economy. Any
shape that can guarantee tnese two prinr_iples social justice and persor.al
freedom and, in the judgment of the economist,is in accordance with a
judicial decree of the time is fine. I am not governed very much by structure.
_ In prison, when I was conversing with one of those so-called youths who had
leftist leanings, he said, "This economy of which you speak has a lot in
common with socialism." We do not deny that our school of thought might have
a lot in co?mnon with another school. We should never be afraid to take an
~ action, the form of which is somewhat similar to the form of their action,
because we, too, might be accused. Now, this nationalization of the industries
and the nationalization of the banks are steps regarding which, had they been
carried out 20 or 30 years ago, our thinking would not hav~ been so mature.
We thought that such actions were the province of ozher schools of thought.
We should not fail to carry out any so-called action which is possible in the
- direction of adjusting the so-called wealth and which can provide justice _
~ tor the Just because it might be similar to some action taken in such and such
- a country or in such and such a school of thought, and we should not bind
ourselves to a particular structure. You must exert yourselves to the utmost _
and make every effort to combine social justice with personal freedom in any
way you can and, if ~ccasionally, and I am repeating rhis, personal freedom
clashes with social justice, personal freedom must be restricted; social
justice will not be sacrificed to personal freedom. t
8514
cso: 4906
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IRAN
IRAN NATIONAL P~RTY TO FOLLOW REVOLUTIONARY ORDERS
Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 6 Sep 79 p 2
[Text] On the anniversary of its founding, the Iran National Party issued a
statement in which, after referring to the historic struggles of the Iranian
nation and the founding of the party in Aban 1331 (23 October-21 November
1952), it states:
By following the wise leadership oF the great Mosaddeq during the difficult
era of Iran's national movement, the party has always stood in the ranks of
the strugglers against dictatorship alined with foreigners. After the coup
of 28 Mordad 1332 [30 July 1953] the party made special efforts in Iran's
National Resistance Movement and Iran's National Front and continued its
struggles, together with other political organizations seeking freedom and
= independence.
During the years that repression increased ann the imperialists dominated
_ our country more and more, although the organiaation sustained gr~at damage,
including damage to its manpower, it never left the battlefield to fight
the people's enemy. By broadening the religious elements in the liberation
movements of the Iranian nation and include the help of some parties, it first
established a unity of forces in the "Iran NationaZ Front" and then the new
"National Front of Iran" organization to establish national sovereignty.
In the solid efforts of Iranians under the leadership of "Imam Khomeyni" to
overthrow the "monarchic regime," and achieve victory in the Islamic revolution
of the Iranian nation, it participated sincerely. With the firm belief that
"an Islamic republic" is a government which can meet the historic demands of -
Iranians and has the capability of providing full independence for the country
with individual and social freedoms, and can completely change the economic
relations of the society and put an end to colonialist methods, on the
referendum which was he:ld on 11 Farvardin 1358 [31 March 1979], it voted for _
an Islamic republic and now it has risen to defend the revolutionary
- achievements with all its strength.
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The affiliates of the Iran National Party promise b~~fore God and the free _
people of this territory, on this anniversary of its f.oundation that ttiey
honor, and that so long as they are alive, they wY~l protect the values of
the revolution and strive for Iran's development and .freedom.
9044
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IRAN
_ LIBERAL GOVERNMENT AT VARIANCE WITH ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP
Tehran BANIDAD in Persian 1 Sep 79 p 2
[TeYt] Of all the active political and ideologies that exist in Iran's
revolution, there are two political ideologies which permeate the atmosphere:
one is Islamic internationalism wh.ose supporters consist of clergy and true _
" Moslems who are sincerely active for Imam Khomeyni's revolutionary leadership
without expecting any personal gain from the results of the revolution.
- Religious schools, mosques, the Guards Corps, and the revolutionary committees
can be included in this group. The other is western liberal bourgeois policy,
which, whether we like it or not, is a policy toward which the government
is inclined. It is observed that by main;.aining the same Uureaucratic
framework as that which existed prior to the revolution the government is
once again going to allow capitalism to dominate the economic and political
destiny of this country only by slight changes of an Islamic color. One
of the characteristics of Islamic internationalism whose xange of action
goes beyond the borders of Iran is that by spreading Islamic revolutionary
' ideas and creating or establishing unity among the Moslems in the world
and the poor nations it stands as a third power against the capitalist
imperialism of the West and the social imperialism of the East, as well as
= world Zianism, and is preparing the third world by relying on Islamic justice
and reviving the rights of the poor. Without being conservative even disre-
garding the problems that they would definitely face, and with zhe sincerity
- and clarity of their goal as stated in the Koran, the supporters of this
- ideology have risen to save the poor nations, for the salvation of societiQs
from financial corruption. They want to replace matter by humanity and
virtue. Disregarding the hypocrisy and the ideas of politicians of govern-
ments, they have focused their hopes on supporting the poor and are looking
for a light in the darkness.
Here, by complicating matters and failing to give the freedom that the poor
deserve, the government is pursuing its own ~aay and with procedures which
demonstrate its inclination for the continuation and stability of capitalism
very shortly the poor who are hoping for IElamic ~ustice and a monotheisic
society will lose the:Lr hope and if that happens the grounds wi11 be prepared
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~
, I
for turning away from Islamic principles and the weakening of beliefs. This
will give an opportunity for the non-Islamic groups ::nd propagandists of
materialistic beliefs to extend their range of activities. If so, the
policy of the leadership and the government instead of moving in parallel
and in one direction would practically he separated and move in contradictory
lines. This would not only sacrifice the revoluti~nary achievements, it
would also endanger both the school (Islamic ideology) and the country.
- One of the most important factors that has separated the policy of the
leadership and the government is the difference between the expectations of
the supporters of these policies. In the leadership policy there is nothing
but serving the people, God's satisfactions and otherworl:~'ly expectations.
Whereas, in government policy you can see the seeking of popularity. The
supporters of capitalism have penetrate3 into the government's policy and
separated it from the leadership's policy. By comparing prices before and
after the revolution, the inclination toward the bourgeoisie and the
strengthening of the interests of the arrogant is quite readily observed.
The same capitalist of the bazaar who struck a blow for Islam and an Islamic
_ republic before the revolution is practically stabbing the Islamic goals
with a dagger from behind and has not given up a tiny portion of his interests
and inhumane prof its. Apparently they talk more of being Islamic than other
classes of society. However, their way of living is a good criterion that _
they are non-Islamic and that if they spend money in God's way or spend their
property for Islam, in reality they have not given away anything from their
own property but rather from the pockets of the people to God's account. They
want both to eat their cake and still have it. (The cannot have both
alternatives.) They will not ride a car if it is aot a Mercedez Benz 280.
They do not want to give up their palace in the north of the city, their
- suburban gardens around 7ehran and their round-the-world trips and their
children cannot live on less than $1,OOQ a month abroad. How can they follow
the policy of the leadership? Obviously they are looking for another
alternative. -
Even against tYie will of the government, they wili push it toward ~apitalism. _
- How do they allow themselves to defend the Islamic republic. They are the
enemies of Islam. They damage the control of the leadership and they do
not have the right to consider themselves Islamic and supparters of Is1am.
A government which cannot wash out these ant nests and take their money out
of their throat cannot claim to be an Islamic revolutionary government and
sooner or later with the help of a few million other government personnel,
- the government will have to feed on what is left from the poor and inevitably
a country which wants to move t~ward a monotheistic, classless society will
remain with the same non-Islamic classes. _
The imperialist, Zionists, capitalists, position seekers, monopolists,
and supporters of the former regime as well as those reactionaries who
pretend to be Moslems are not inactive and from every side they are conspiring
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to make the leadership ;,olicy move the guvernment in the dj.rection r_he} want
and to separate tne polic} of the go~~ernment from the yolicy cf ttie leadersi:ip
an~ to discredit ar,d cc~rrupt exisr.ing values. On the othez hanc:, lack of
uniLy among the c~ergy, the Pasdaran Corps (Guards Corps) ~tid the co~7unitte?s _
who are part of the Tmam's nolicv and the penetration oE ambitions and
monopolistic persons who pretend to be clergy as well as elements who are
far from the true values of the Islamic revolution such as pi:oFessional
criminals, those affiliated to the former regime and supporters of the
reactionary oppc.;it~on, capita.lists and leftist grou~s .in the coumi:ittees
make procrastin~.iuas arid obsrructioc:s in the revolutionary movement in the
policy of the ].eadership. Wc~ should also mention ttie groups affiliated to
imperialism anci zionism an~ unfortunatel~ even the national and pro~ressive
- groups have helped weaken rhe leac.~ers:~ip line by making mi.stakes and creating
involvements in the c~~untry and inflaming ideological disturbances. They
have made the governmi~nt mo panicky and perhaps the governmer_t _is incl.ined -
toward a direction that it did uot w~nt and the opportunity o~as ~ivzn to
those with bourgeois ir~r_linations.
i.f the struggl.ing and thc re~iolutionary groups had not so much cover.~d -
themselves in their id~,~lo~,ical beliefs in the name of the people and the
people's interest and h~d placed tY~emselves in the revolutionary atmosphere
of Iran and in th:: arms of tile n3tion with since.rity and had realized the
revolutionary positioti inscead of keeping at a distance from the people anci
making cr.iticism, tiie leadership power would ha~e been strengthened and
perhaps most of the existing problems and inadequacies would not have been
created. Of course, the forces supporting the leadership did not have a
sufficient understandi~lg of these groups and thus accepted tliem reglydless =
of their ideological differences.
The merce:~ary policy of Zi.onism ~nd imperialism helped cause sp]_its amon.g
political groups. The~ want to weaken the leadership and f~r this purpose
they have used all of their economic and political forces and mass media
even by creating grounds of uncertainty toward the revolution genuinene~s,
they prevented the peop].e f rom accepting and believing in tt~e revolution
and they wlll never remain calm. With the help of domestic r_eactionaries
and the negligence of nat~.onal political groups of relative undprstanding
- of the revolutionary time, they take political and ideolo~ical activities
underground. The intellectuals who should be in the front line of the people
have been placzd at such an iinsuitable distance because of lack of understanding
that the people consider the intellectuals as enemies. The imperialists and
Zionists want to split forces and they are hoping for the staY�t of under-
ground activities. They encourage repression and terrorism in every way and
want to prevent the development of our country by any trick or conspiracy.
No matter what ideology we have, we are all responsible to the revolution
_ and if it is in danger. If we believe in God we will be reprimanded before
God and if we do not believ~ in God we will be reprimar.ded by the peopJ.e and
history.
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So all groups and classes of society are responsible for prot~cting this -
genuine lslamic revolution and they are bound to purge themselves of beliefs
and understandir.gs unsuitable to the revolution and not to allow suspicious
elements who are not worthy of the revolution to act ahead of all the
progressive and struggling clergy. They should follow such examples as Imam
Khomeyni and AyatoZlah Taleqani. The intellectuals and university students
- should think of the path that the martyred teacher, Dr Shari' ati was following. ~
All the groups should focus their nonactive group role in producing activity
- at this time for strengthening the leadership and revolutionary slogans, that
- is, independence, freedom and the Islamic republic. Instead of theoretical
propaganda, the groups should b e active in Jehad (holy war), f or construction
- considering the revolutionary position and necessity in the country. The
supporters of the policy of the leadership should also accept that merely
having nonreligious beliefs does not mean opposition to the revolution. The
true enemies of the revolution who are supported by the imper ialists and
Zionists are usually in the clothes of supporters who strike their blow
- internally. The goverr.ment should avoid any program that wou ld lead to the
growth of capitalism, rather it should approach and conform ~vith the policy -
of the leadership. By maintaining the chain of command, to accept the system
of having council as a need for the revolution. Considering the disguised
_ unemployment in offices, the government can at least mobilize one-third of
its employees for the Construction Jehad. At least until the time that the
- hand of imperialism and Zionism is cut off, all groups should make peace
with one another and unite. Instead of confronting each other and making the
front weak, they should strive to strengthen a single front. Because it is
only by maintaining unity and strengthening the leadership that the anti- _
_ imperialist position is strengthened in all countries and victory is achieved
_ for the poor. ~
9044
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IRAN
INFLUX, DRAIN OF CITIZENS FOLLOWING REVOLUTION REVIEWED '
Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 6 Oct 79 p 5
/Article: "ThP Iranian Revolution and the Brain Drain:"/
_ /Text/ The brain drain, which is an inevitable symptom of industrial ex-
pansion, technical development and the sciences of the era, is like the
other poli.cies of the devastating imperialism which for a long time has
- had as its objective the world's intellectuals and specialists, especially
those of the countries of the third world--a worldwide problem and a com-
mon misery of all the countries which have risen up to deliver themselves
from the cultural and economic imper~alism of world imperialism. The ae-
duct~on of world capitalism, which enjoys abundant material resourcea and
resources for prosperity, has a record as old as that of neoi.mperialism's
existence in the world in attracting intellectual anci experienced minds
and people, and, God knows America is the master of the countries of the _
world in this intellectual and cultural exploitation and imperialism.
In the past 20 years America has had a pressing need for medical personnel
and has acted with such generosity in attracting trained doctors and nurses
that for the past 2 or 3 years practically all its needs have been met in -
this area. Since then it has exerted considerable rigorous efforts to
bring in doctors. Now a large group of educated Iran~ans, and above all
doctors, who, it is stated, total 5,000 persona, have been drawn to the _
American job market. In other fields of scisnce such as physics and math-
ematics, numerous stars like Professor Ghaffari enjoy a lofty status and
position in that country's scientific circles as well. Many countries of
the third world, besides Iran, and even European countries as well are
suffering from the symptoms of the brain drain.
The Brain Drain--and the Brain Draw
Following Che triumph of the revolution of Iran, when the bases of Che -
regime of oppression, tyranny and repression were crushed, numberous groups _
- of educated, specialized young people with revolutionary zeal and yearning
came ho*ne. Fortunately, in spite of numerous obstacles an.d problems, a
large portion of them still are staying in Iran, with the objective of
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serving the revolution, in hopes of finding appropriate work. In the
_ words of a Tehran University official at a television round table, about
' 70 Iranians who have studied abroad have been employed to teach at uni-
- versities. On the other hand, some unpleasant events of past months have
led to the emigration of large groups of educated Iranians and the medical .
cormnunity has been the most afflicted in this area.
In the f ace of this group fleeing from the inevitable events of the revo-
lution, many Iranian intellectuals and thinkers who lived for many long
years for political or other reasons as expatriares in the West returned
to the country with unparalleled zeal and enthusiasm and sincerely took a -
stand in service of the revolution.
In the rotten regime of the past, where the ruling power's pressure and
repression wrested the right to any kind of expression of ideas or freedom
to work from the people, most of the country's valuable educated and speci-
alized people headed abroad and resided in foreign countries. -
Hoveyda's fascistic government, which was happy and pleased with this sit~
uation, appeared on the surface to criticize the intellectuals and speci-
alists and organized fraudulent seminars and round tables for avoiding the
brain drain. However, when honest patriotic specialists did return to the
country, it consigned them in cowardly fashion to Savak's torture chambers
on the accusation of political activities or put them under such surveil- _
lance from one buresu to another, or one organization to another company,
- that they became exhausted and left the country after a while.
The Brain Drain
In a conversation with ETTELA'AT on Thursday 27 September, Sadeq Tabataba'i,
spokesman of the temporary revolutionary government, declared that more -
than $40 billion of the nation's wealth was taken abroad last year.
There are still no accurate statistics on the country's income for 1978-79, _
but nonetheless, if we cast a glance at the country's total income for the
year 1977-78, which totalled 203 billion tomans, and compare this figure
with the abovementioned $40 billion, we will arrive at a truly sorrowful
conclusion: the amount taken out of Iran just last year was 30 billion
tomans more than the country's entire revenue for 1977-78: Without a
doubt this loss was the result of the system ruling the country, that is,
subservient capitalism within its neoimperialist context.
" Then again, this 40-billion figure is just the material side of the ques-
tion; if we include the material value of the brains which have been
drained off in this calculation, the figures on the nation's losses from
the satanic regime will be staggering.
There is no doubt that a great group of scholars, men of ideas and speci-
alists have left the country. However, the motives of the matter need
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comprehensi~~e evaLt.:ati ~ri and analyais. ~ne can break t_his ciral.n ciown into
twa groups: one, special.iR~s who left Iran i~i order to escape trir~.l for.
some sorC ox conner_tiott wi th t:he regime which was ovPr[hrown, and two,
s~ecieliats who h~ive simp~.y lert the couritry on the stren~;lh of. bad ~ub-
licity and fear oI sociol changes.
This g~oup con~,ists mostl~~ of peopl.e who ev~tluate events not as L-k~ey are
but as r_h~y them~e~ves wi.sh them to be, In this respect, thN propap,anda
of capitalist cou~itr9.es ~s undoubtedly not withvut ~nfluenre, Inrpexialisn,
wiiich beca,-ne nysterical over the Iranian revoiution, has conatantly been
tryinfi to porti-ay our country~`s overall picture in such a fearsome way
tha~ ever}= ?um.inary ~s dr;ven ta leave his country by fear'. Their reason-
ing is tha*_ fasci~rn, wztli its "iron heel," ia on the way, and t~ev are -
whining ~bout the ? ack of freedom and t~e blar_kness of repreasion w,.chout
present~.T~c~ s rleur p; c!.~~}-~ of what they ~re sayzng, or adopting any reme-
dies for solv~ng this ;~roblem. Nstura~l,~ thi+ 11'I~.:t?RSI.f1P_t3 the ~XOb1_ems
of the brain dra(n .
The Returr? of Qualif~.ec? PLople
In the course of tne Iranian revolution, and a_~so fallowii~.g the t~r.iurrph
- oi th,~ r~vcl,~tic,n, a large group also returned to Ir~tn alongsid~ th~ graup~
which Left thE: country. This group returned tiome soJ.ely tc.� ad.vance the
goals of t:~e Levolu~~on, serve the people and he of t~r_ili,*y L�;ir_r~.~ ,.heir -
o~~~n lin~itati~~ns.
Nu?nerous s tudenta even left without completing their st~idies and e~~d~e their
way to ti~~ ct~u~~~ry alon~side exilea, enforced emigre~, ar~d m~;nbe~�s of or-
~;anizat'an~, n~lltical par.t~.es and so on and sn forr.h--sulely t~+ sez�v~ t:he _
- revolution. Ae H result the m~jority af tod~y's ler~ders~ip grcup in Irat~
consists ~f people iaho orere away from r_hei.r hom~larid. for 15 to 25 y~~rs. -
Habib Asg~z-i, a youth who left his socialogy studies half cumplQted and
came to ~ran, atates, witt-~ regard to his motives foz� ~eturning, "Today
more than any ttme I can say we have reached the e~-a c~F constr.uction; de-
struction is easier than ~=onstruction and for this r.eason mos[ of tt?e
people who were present during the destruction have naTa stayed on for the
reconstruction. A true revolutionary is a person who is aware c~f the arts
of construction nnd destrucCion, together, and one m~st say that these
periods have been very complex and complicated. Under such conditions, it
often happens Chat a number of people collapse under the weighC of problema
and leave the country diecontent since they are not able to diacover and
comprehend the laws b~aring on the class struggle.
"Now, in view of combativP circumstances of the struggle, one musr remain
- in the cocztr~, work and br.tiig awareness and understanding to the toiling
people and ~he masses. (?ne can also show dissatisfaction w~th a particular ~
developmenc in other. ways. Wh~t must be taken as granterl is that here our
country is, xnd we are par[ners and participants in its good and bad aspects.
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i
' "Now one must work with all one`s being, struggle and eliminate the ugly
features and inadequacies. This is the only existing reality."
Special Traders
Eng Bazargan, the prime minister of the temporary revolutionary government,
in raising a complaint about certain doctors, referred intelligently a _
short time ago in his television interview to the other classes of society
which preferred their personal welfare to the intereats of society and
stated "In the current conditions of the country it is the duty of every _
individual and every g:-oup to pursue activity and work without financial
- designs or inordinate rnaterial expectations."
Although he did not clace direct emphasis on the matter of the emigration
of numerous specialists and thinkers in this interview, one may fully de-
- duce from the prime minister's words that as a revoluCionary who is de-
voted to the revolution he is dissatisf~ed and worried about this emigra-
tion and brain drain. Unfortunately the number of doctors who left Iran
after the revolution is not small and one cannot easily sidestep it, con-
- sidering the shortage of doctors in Iran and the society's need for the
important issue of public health and treatment. -
Other specialists and educated people besides doctors have left the country
on various pretexts.
Hoseyn Radpanahi, a student at Tehran University, stated in a brief inter-
view with our reporter "The flight of people with capital and the prosper-
- ous classes of society in general was natural and predictable because the
- class character of this group makes it mandatory that they live in a gaudy _
_ atmosphere devoid of turmoil. However, the departure of a number of in-
tellectuals and specialists abroad is not justifiable in any way.
He added, "There is no doubt that some special class dependencies also ex-
ist among educated specialized people which assuredly will be of influence
in their life style. For example, a doctor who received a house call fee
of 200 tomans for a few minutes' examination of a patient under the previ-
ous regime, engaged in trade alongside medicine, enjoyed material prosper--
ity and abundant ease will, like others of his kind, find the current con-
ditions of society~in no way tolerable. In reality they are traders who
_ go anywhere their interests may be better provided for."
Last week also a doctor said in a radio interview,
"Our people and the toiling masses sincerely gave up their beloved lives
in the course of the revolution without any ulterior motives in order to
overthrow the filthy corru~t Pahlavi regime. _
. "They consummated the revolution at this exorbitant price. How can a
doctor allow himself to abandon a country in which he was raised for a
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~reater income when the masses of the people sincerely an~i loyally give up
, their lives for a sacred objective'? In my opinion this is the greatest
act of treason against the massea of the people. In a placz where people
are offering up their lives with no concern, what importance or value can
- ?naterial benefits have'? It is tt~erefore the duty of us doctora to engage
- in service with all the gower and sCrength we have, night and day, and
perhaps thereby pay our real debt to the revolution and the people." _
. 118~7
CSO: 4906
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- IRAN
ROLE OF BANKS IN REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY ANALYZED, SCRUTINIZED
Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 9 Oct 79 p 5
/Article: "Are the Banks Destroyers or Builders?"/
/Text/ Last week the Revolutionary Council of Iran ratified the bill to
- nationalize banks and ended the commercial power of the private sector ~
over this branch of industry. '
In accordance with this ratified legislationr the Supreme Council of Banks,
which is being formed in place of the Joint Council of Banks, is being
charged with carrying out the necessary studies to bring banking transac-
tions in Line with Islamic criteria and have the studies ratified by the
general assembly.
Thus the issue of nationalization of banks which, for the last several
- months, has been considered one of the most controversial programs of the
government, has come close to the stage of implementation.
From now on all the country's banks--specialized and com~nercial alike--
will be managed in accordance with particular provisions compatible with
Islamic commandments.
In the previous regxme, the bank management system was based on max~mizing `
profit and exploiting the low-income and needy cla~ses of society, since
- this sector was mostly managed with joint foreign capital, more than half
its enormous revenues flowed into the pockets of the big �oreign companies.
Economic subservience in bank management delivered terrible blows to the
resources and economy of our society and intensified our dependence on
Western capitalism in other areas of industry and commerce. It was for
this reason that the revolutionary government assigned special priority
to the nationalization of banks and insurance companies and economic and
financial experts pursued it with exceptional speed and seriousness.
The enormous profit which the balance sheets of banks showed in the
- satanic era show the depradation by the banks of oux ordinary, needy
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people more than anything else. The majori[y of these people--laborexs,
white collar workers and merchants--were burdt~ned do~an by heflvy ho~~eing
_ loana at weighty interest rate8 of from 14 [0 1.~ percent.
~ The exploitation and extortion by banks in our country, which had bec;ome
prey to the devil, was so extensive that a banlc established ~vit.h the aid
of foreign capitalists in Tehran managed to return all its capital to its _
= owners' pockets in the first 5 years. ,As an expert iz? money anci banlcin~;
has written, close to 60 foreign banks started operating in various sec-
- tions of Tehran just in the past few years. F ollowing the nationaliz.~--
tion of banks, an important issue was their consolidation, the creati.en o�
specialized banks, and the determination of the conditi.ons oF bank etripioy-
ees who are under various employment umbrellas and are subject to spec.igl
employment and retirement regulations and classi�ications in which discrim-
= ination among employees has been conspicuous. At the presenr time, tl~~
matter of the payment of a special profit which is the natural sight r,i -
_ bank employees has in itself added one more problem to thase of the b...rilcs. _
Whereas some banks, including the Bank Mel~.i, have made payments to their
employees on various terms and conditions, this problem still remains in
other banks. The matter of formation of counc ils, the appointment of man-
agin~ boards and the liquidation of elements connected with the previous
regime and the disbanded Savak are in themselves other issuea which a;.p to _
be observed in the banks as in other government organizations and depart-
ments. In any case it is hoped that with the merger and consolidation of
banks, the functions of about 62,000 banlc employees will be claxi:Ei~d and
they will ali enjoy equal privileges and benef its. -
The bill regulating the nationalization of banks ~nd insurance comp~nies
which became the subject of the attention ofc the government and the Aevo-
lutionary Council some months ago was ratified by the Revolutionaxy Council
1 week ago.
In accordance with this law, the banks are t4 have five main el.ementa:
one, the General Assembly of Banks; two, the Supreme Council of Banks;
three, the managing board of each bank; four, the managing director of
each bank; five the legal examiners of each bank. The General AssembZy af
Banks consists of the minister of economic and fin~ncial affairs, the min-
ister of industry and mines, the minister of c ommerce, the miniseer of
_ agriculture and rural development, the minister of houaing and urban devel-
opment, and the minister of state for the plan and budget organization.
Chairmanship of the General Assembly is the xe sponsibility of the minister
of economic and financial affairs.
In accordance with the law which has been ratif ied, any change in the
articles of any bank's charter, increases or d ecreases in any bank'~ cap-
ital, ancl the ~stablishment, dissolution or mex~gez of banks will ].ie ex-
clusively in the pawer of the ea~ceptional General Assembly of Banks<
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Regarding the new law on banks, our reporters got in touci~ with some man- _
_n abti~g directors and employees of banks and prepared and drew up the follow~~ -
ing report in the light of their recommendations and reform views. The
report is as follows:
The Banks' New nuties
Arabzadeh, managing director of the Credit Bank, stated, with respect to
_ the new law on banks, "The ~erger of banks has been raised in general form.
Details have not been presented in this law, but the managing director of
- the Central Bank had previously made clarifications on the details of the
regulating bill which to some extent define banking policy. It goes with-
out saying that this merger must take place because it will benefit the
banking system of the country, the economy and the society from every
standpoint. One good feature of the nationalization of banks is the cen-
tralization of bank management and administration and this will be accom�-
panied by considerable savings in cost. On the other hand, the sole aim
of the banks in the past was to make a profit and acquire interest; how-
ever, following the nationalization, the principle of profit will no long-
er be the object of attention and bank capital will be used to expand in-
dustries and build and develop the country.
"Thereby the banks will depart from their profit-making condition and will
take the form of a useful center for economic and industrial growth."
He added, "It is possible, in the light of the plan to consolidate banks,
that a number of bank employees will be surplus to requirements. There-
fore it will be necessary to create new positions for that group of em-
ployees and use them in different sections in accordance with their fields
of specialfzation. _
"To this end it is necessary that new duties be assigned to the banks.
This will be easy, since bank employees are well-informed on commercial,
industrial and agricultural affairs; that is, the government can consign
the administration of certain agricultural and industrial units to banks
so that the banks can make use of their specialists in managing and con-
sulting with these units. ~
"In this event, the problem of unemployment will not threaten bank employ- ~
ees and appropriate jobs will be created for surplus bank employees."
The managing director of the Credit Bank added, "Another government objec-
- tive in merging and nationalizing the banks is to help people and allevi-
ate their financial problems; the banks paralyzed the people's economic
power by receiving onernus and spectacular interest from them in the gast.
Now, though, the idea is for the bank.s to proceed to alleviate people's
financial problems for a reasonable commission. With the implementation
of the merger plan, the interest rate and commissions throughout all banks
will also become uniform and all kinds of overcharging and imposed condi-
tions will be avoided."
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Elimination of Interest
_ Regarding the elimination of interest, Arabzadeh said "This issue is re-
lated to the general policy of the government and the Revolutionary Council.
In any event the interest, along with the commission determined for loans
disbursed, will be equita~le, and the income from this will. be spent on
~ expanding the country's industries and agriculture.
"In my opinion, however, the interest which the banks rec~ive from ttie in-
dustrial sector at the present time is great. The interest which r.ow ap-
plies to industrial loar~s differs according to the size of th e loan and =
- even reaches 13 percent on some occasions; this is exceptiona lly high con-
sidering current conditions and the need the industries have for money with
which to operate."
Concerning the nationalization of banks, Askarian, member of the baard of
directors of the Iran Insurance Bank, told our reporter, "I am ir~ agreement
~oith the merger of banks but one must see what regulations have been pro-
vided for the merger. In order to merge banks it is necessary to consoli-
date an.: unify the employment regulations of banks before anything else so
that there will be no differences among bank employees. In addition, in .
order to avoid mistakes and duplication, a new system must be created so
that the banks will have mutual information exchanges and their credit and
legal management will be interconnected. Otherwise, numerous problems will
be created which it will not be easy to solve." Gorjestani, managing
director of the Merchants' Bank, told our reporter:
"My information regarding the bill which has been ratified by the Revolu-
tionary Council is restricted to the news I read in the papers; until the _
official letter concerning the bill reaches me, I will have to excuse my-
self from expressing an opinion on this matter." -
Employment Situation in the Banks
The plan to merge banks has drawn the attention of bank employees as well
as the nation's framers of banking policy, and the bank ernployees express
different views on the bill ratified by the Revolutionary Council. We will
content ourselves here with two examples of the points of vi ew expressed.
- Seyyed Morad Hoseyni, employee of the Export Bank, told our reporter con�-
cerning this matrer:
"If this plan is carried out properly and with the necessary care, it will
- be the best of bills because it will both ensuxe the people's interesta
and be beneficial to bank employees.
"When this plan is carried out, people's banking activities will be carried ~
out more easily and bank customers will no longer have to refer to differ��
ent bank branches. On the other hand the employment condition of bank
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empLoyees will also be clarified, all bank employees will enjoy simiZar -
rights and benefits and the extra privileges which some bank employees
possess relative to employees of other banks at the present time will be
eliminated. Most important of all, the interest or commissions which banks _
receive from borrowers will be equalized in all banks and thus there will
_ be no overcharging of customers. On the basis of ~hese facts, I am 100
percent in agreement with the law to nationalize and consolidate banks and
hope that this mission will be consummated as soon as possible."
Vahedf, chief of an Export Bank branch, told our reporter "I hope that the
pressure of work in banks will be reduced with the implementation of the
- new law on banks, or at least that the amount of work will not go beyond
= what it already is, and new duties will not weigh down bank employees."
He added, "The employment situation of bank workers has not yet been de-
� termined; in fact, employees who had jobs in private banks were faced with -
an t~nknown situation following the nationalization of the banks. Now we -
are neither government nor private sector employees. When we request the
- government to investigate the problems of matters related to us they tell
us 'You have not yet become governmental' and these evasive answers have
increased our bewilderment even more than before."
He added, "The nationalization and consolidation of the banks will be to
the benefit of all the people because all banking activities which used to
be scattered about will be cor.nbined in several banks and people will be
- able to carry out their banking activities easily. Most important of all, ,
with the nationalization of the banks some of our economic dependence will
be eliminated and this will be to the benefit of the country's economy."
11887
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- IRAN
PERFIDY, TRF.,ACHERY OF INTERNATIONAL DRiJ(: FIRMS BARED
Tehran ET'TELA'AT in Persian LO Oct 79 p 5
/Article: "Forei~n Pharmaceutical Firms Sell Drugs to Iran for Cash Only:
The Drug ShortaQe Is a~;~nk in the Counterrevolutionary Zionist Conspiracy'."/
/Text/ Some categoriea of vital, life-giving drugs have l~ecomFe unavailable
in Iran. Big rharma~eutical cat~ anies have laid out ver} stiff terms for
the sale of drugs to Iran and exp~rt druga to Iran only in exchange for
cash, wher.ese faxeign drug manufacturing firms previousl.y recelved 10 per- ~
~ cent of [he price of their orders as a dawn payment an~ receiv~d the rest
in instr~lmenta cver 6 months or more'
This custamary conduct was obr?erved with respect to ali caamne~cial agr~e-
ments and was not restricted to the sale and purchase of drugs. Now, how-
ever, some foreign pharmaceutical companiea anci othNr producers who are
linked with internationat Zionism and imperialism and are d~ss~:tisfi.ed with
the Iranian revolution ~re looking for excuses in order not to sel~ the~.r
goods to our country, and they even ignore intc~rnational co~nercial agree-
roents .
However, this deliberate creation of obstacles and sabotage, which is be-
ing carried out cuumlerely with the orders of Zionis~ policymakers, will
not leave the slightest infl.uence on Iran's current policy; ~t will even
increase our peopLe's anger toward the Zionist despoilers of the worXd.
~ The pharmaceutical ~~~anuFacturing companies, which rose up i~ competiti.on
in the past tn sell their drugs to Iran, anc~ yielded to every r~ecommenda-
- tion by the government of Iran, are not prepared to seil drugs tc~ Tran now
that their abundant resources have been blocked off.
More than 10 types of needed, frequently-consumed drugs have become scarce
- in Ixan and drug importing firms are in fin~ancial difficulties regarding
the purchase and acquisition of drugs from abroad.
The importation of drugs fran abroad takes two forma, one, that of manu-
factured and prepared drugs, and the other, that af psimary materials �or
the manufacture of drugs.
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At the present time, foreign coitrpanies are proposing difficult conditions
to importing firms ror the sale of each of these two types of commodity,
and most importing firms are not able to accept their proposals.
Dr IIarkhordari, director of the Bazarganan Hospital, stated in this regard:
"At the present time, the shortage of drugs is being felt throughout the
_ country and the sole reason for this may be eummarized as the foreign com-
panies' search for excuses not to sell drugs to Iran. _
- "In the past, drug importing companies obtained the credit to import drugs
from abroad at any volume they wanted by paying one tenth the price of
their orders. Now, however, the forezgn companies do not hand over drugs
- until they have received the entire price of their order in advance. These
problems also exist with regard to pharmaceutical primary materials, and
pharmaceutical blending companies have also met with difficulties in terms
of procuring primary materials.
~ "Recently the i~iinistry of Health also called upon Japanese pharmaceutical
companies to obtain drugs and apparently gave orders for a large amount of
syringes and other drugs. Scme foreign companies, for example the English _
company Organon, basically do not export drugs to Iran, so the drugs which
those companies used to export to Iran have become exceedingly rare."
He added, "In addition to the private companies which have the duty of
purchasing and obtaining drugs from foreign manufacturers, two government
organizations also import drugs into Iran; one is the National Drug Com-
pany Incorporated and the other is the Lion and Sun Preparations Organi- ,
zation.
"The advantage the Lion and Sun Preparations Organization has over other
private companies is that it can import drugs into the country without
paying duty, because the Lion and Sun Preparation Organization is connected
with the International Red Cross Organization; it is for this reason that
it has been given this advantage."
He listed the names of the following 11 types of drugs which are scarce in
the market: Ampicillin 500 capsules; P avolon capsules; Coraton tablets;
all drugs used for the treatment of asthma,such as Vantolin syrup,
Jantolin spray, and Phenergan cream; Bisolvan tablets; Costanin drops;
Cofitol drops; plain Selston and Coronodoz capsules; and Ampicolex.
Classification of Drugs
In this regard Dr Akhavan, head of the Sales and Distribution Unit of Che
_ National Drug Company Incorporated, told our reporter:
"The drugs which are rare at present on the market may be divided into
three groups.
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"One broup is drugs for wnich similar drugs exist in the market and in
whose place one can use the similar drugs, for example Panpartine, which
is actually rare in the market but in whose place one can use the similar
drugs Ampicine and Binotal. ~
"The second group is drugs which have primarily a placebo effect and whose
use, or nonuse, leaves no effect on the body. Among the capsules which
may be taken orally in the third group are drugs for which similar types
do not exist in the market and whose consumption is vital and necessary
- for a sick person, such as drugs like Izordil used for heart ailments.
The Drug Company Incorporated has imported this group ot drugs and placed
them at the disposal of pharmacies which have agreements with the company.
All in all the Drug Company Incorporated is procuring about 22 types of
rare drugs and selling them to pharmacies. Meanwhile pharmacies are being
advised to seLl drugs equivalent to a sick person's consumption for 5 or -
6 days in order to avert probable shortages." -
He added, "Some doctors write up to a patient's consumption for 6 months _
in one drug prescription, without taking account of current drug shortages.
For example, the University of Tehran, Emam Khomeyni Medical Faculty, on
2 October 1979 prescribed 200 Diceral S00 milligram capsules f~r a girl
named Ma'sumeh Moradmand, one capsule to be injected intermuscularly each ~
day .
- "liowever, this amount should be prescribed over five or six prescriptions,
_ meeting the patient's consumption for a month or 40 days each time.
- "Of course this classification is not possible in the case of certain
drugs. For example, the minimum consumption of antibiotics is 3 days, and
less than that should not be put in a prescription. However, one can put
a time restriction on the consumption of many drugs prescribed for long
_ periods and make the drug available to the patient in several instalments."
Companies Connected with Zionism
The owners and managers of certain drug importing firms which had special
connections with the previous regime fled Iran after the revolution and
pharmaceuticals which had been imported into Iran by these companies are
not coming into Iran now. These pharmaceuticals have also become scarce
in the market.
~ In this regard, Dr Akhavan said "At the present time foreign companies are
asking the full price of orders in advance before transferring ptiarmaceut-
icals to Iran. Now the value of an order must be paid to the account of a
foreign bank which they themselves determine. Of course some foreign com-
panies, because of their Zionist connections, are not prepared to be party
to transactions with the Iranian government and so to speak intend to put
our people in difficulties as regards drugs.
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"Some companies also refrain from selling drugs on credit, on the assump-
_ tion that the Iranian nation has gone through a cataclysm and cannot act
on its financial commitments. The fallacious, prejudiced propaganda which -
the foreign press, radio and television have started against Iran is also
fuelling this lack of confidence and inhibiting manufacturing companies
from commercial relations with Iran."
118�7
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IRAN -
CURRENT SITUATION IN KURDISH AREAS DISCUSSED
Paris NAMEH-E RUZ in Persian 11 Oct 79 pp 10, 11 ~
/Article: "File of the Day: A, Trip Report!'/
/Text/ KHABARNAMEH-E KORDESTAN is a newsletter, published by Kurdish
fighting men. Recently, issue 7 of this publication, which was reproduced
- by the Organizations of Guerrilla Irregulars of the Iranian People, was
- sent to NAMEH-E RUZ. We herewith publish part of a report by a Kurdish
worker from the town of Saqqez which was printed in this publication.
In the town of Saqqez, an apparent tranquility is to be observed. The
shops are open and one can sense traffic in the streets. Young revolution- "
ary forces are nat to be seen in the town. The faces of guards are to be
observed everywhere and most evenings after midnight they raid so-called
suspicious houses. At 0100 hours in the morning Maj Me'marzadeh was ar-
rested in bed and sentenced to 3 y~ars in prison on the charge of cooper-
ating with the Democratic Party.
The spiri t of the people is very good and the slogans on the doors and
walls of the houses and the alleys off the streets display a revolutionary,
defiant spirit. The people are indifferent toward the guards, and most re-
bel against the meetings and demonstrations they hold. The guards view
this attitude with a weak, despairing spirit and sometimes try to draw
people's attention to themselves by such theatrical acts as the distribu-
tion of oil, rice and Tide. However, the people of Saqqez, who have put
_ the experience of 5 days' fighting against the guards behind themselves,
_ in spite of the shortage of these materials and relative financial poverty,
- will not resort to having these materials handed over to them under any
pretext and procure most of their oil and rice via Baneh. The hireling
guards, who also are failing in this area, have no choice but to attract
simple-hearted rural people through local reactionariea, show them off in
thc: main street in a long line`before an army of guards and, as armed per-
_ sons watch over them, in order to compensate for their difficulties, say
"All right, now do you want oil, or autonomy?" upon handing over a very
small amount of the commodity to them. Then they laugh and make fun of
the helpless people. In this situation, people who complain are sub~ected
23
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to the insults and blows of the hirelings (hired of course in the manner
of the Islamic Republic). This has caused rural people to come to town
less ~ften. An old peasant man named Sufi Mahmud who has seen this situ-
ation stated, with utmost discomfort and simplicity, "Would that our
- children died of hunger and that I had not done this. I swore upon my
- honor that after this if my children die before my eyes I will not refer
= to them for anything."
The uninformed guards have resorted to another trick. Trying to attract
people's attention by so-called humane means and good conduct, they gr.eet
young and old people in the streets and alleyways and pretend to be big
brothers. When this trick does not work they either attack like Mongol
troops or work out their problem by firing guns, *.error and arrests. In
many places women spit on them. Most guards are unhappy with conditions
and are very discouraged with their work. One may easily observe fear,
_ regret, distress and remorse on their faces. People in the police are al-
so dissatisfied with them and are not prepared to cooperate with them.
t+Then the guards visited the Saqqe~z police and requested that they go on
guard and on watch in cooperation with one another, they met with great
opp osition on the part of police personnel.
In the afternoon of Tuesday 18 September 1979 around 2,000 young people
and members of the toiling classes set out from the belt road toward Aqab
Square with siogans for Sheykh Ezzoddin, autonomy and the expulsion of the
- ~;uards. The parade concluded at Aqab Square with the Kurdish national
anthem ('Emri Qeyb). A few hours after this occurrence the confused
guards entered Aqab Square with a Simorgh freight van and began to fire
guns in fear. A number of young people who were reading proclamations and
newspapers on the walls were dispersed and the guards arrested four of
them. Aqab Square was emptied out. The guards, finding no one else to -
- arrest, started arresting uninformed, uninvolved passersby. At that time
one guard went into the Zamiran coffee house in the square and addressed
some people seated there, asking "Why don't you cooperate with us and turn
the counterrevolutionaries and troublemakers over to us, we have come here
to preserve security?" Someone answered "This talk doesn't go down with _
us, you yourselves are causing the disturbance and destroying the calm of
the city by shooting guns and committing terror. If you expected coopera-
~ tion you shouldn't have troubled yourself to preserve our safety and calm.
We haven't seen any troublemakers, nor are we the sort of people to betray
our fellow townspeople." Gradually it got dark and every place became
empty; except for a few workers in coffee shops on the outskirts, nobody
was to be seen. Thus the comedy of the anti-Islamic guards ended with the
arrest of eight people.
The morning of the following day the constant sound of gunshots around the
garrison broke the people's sweet early morning sleep and dawn tranquility.
A few hours later the people resumed their lives with a good but apprehen-
sive spirit. When they asked one another about the morning's gunshots,
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they told one another cooly and sometimea with a mockin~ lau~;h "It's
- ~iothtn~;~-tl~ey must~ve ~:een Kurdiah Piehmergas early in the morninR."
Hasan Qiasi, a photographer, was arrested on the baseless charge of photo-
~raphii~g Saqqez demonstration festivities and is in prison. Aziz Fallahi
was detained on the charge of carrying around a typewriter which was iised
for making and printing Islamic proclamations; although Mas'ud Alu'i, head
of the Koran office, observed that this typewriter was used for publishing
_ Islamic announcements, he was still sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment and
is now in Evin. Eight nurses in the hospital and the public health depart-
ment of Saqqez Shahrestan were banished, all being charged with cooperat-
ing with the Democratic Party. Observed among the banished were the Ka'bis
(two sisters), Mrs Gilani, Mrs Afra, and Balluri.
Twenty-four sincere revolutionary teachers who served the Shahrestan of
Saqqez were banished in absentia; their names are as follows: Fayeq -
Dabbaghi, Faruq Keykhosravi, Ata Ahmad Panah, Tareq Dabbaghi, Aziz Reza'i,
Habibollah Balluri, Ahmad Mortezabu /sic/, Mostafa Rahmanian, Hoseyn
Taqizadeh, Ebrahim Qaderi, Naser Ahmadi, Khadijeh Naderi, Mofideh Motahhar,
Ahmad Abdi, Hasan Me'marzadeh, Faruq Naqshi, Taher Adami, Mahmud Keyvan,
Abdolqader Ghazi, Mohammad Rahim Amini, Mohammad Salehi, Hamid Dabbaghi
and Moha~nad Reza Qassab Azad.
11387
CSO: 4906 .
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IRAN
LOtd-COST HOUSING PROJECTS DISCUSSED
Paris NAMEH-E RUZ in Persian 6 Oct 79 pl (Annex)
/Article� "Construction of 6,700 Low Cost Houses in Iran"/
/Text/ An English company has signed a contract to send machinery and
equipment valued at $8 million for low-cost housing construction in Iran.
- In accordance with this project, 6,700 houses are to be built in a satel-
lite city in the vicinity of Tehran, which indicates that the government
of Iran has given the construction of low-cost housing top priority in its
~ lans .
A South Korean company signed the contract to build the first 1,000 houses,
but the greater portion of the work on this $400 million project will be
- carried out by the Iranian company PDM. _
The South Korean Ministry of Construction has announced that the govern- _
ment of Iran requested South Korean companies to carry on with their work
on 14 construction projects suspended during the February revolution.
Total figures for the contracts on these projects is $105 million.
The projects under discussion consist of the construction of a chemical
plant in Shiraz and cargo storehouses in Bandar Khomeyni (the foi-mer Bandar
Shaihpur). Prior to the revolution, South Korea held first place in the
construction field in Iran. -
An important portion of the materials imported to Iran for the staellite
- town near Tehran will probably be imported from England. A spokesman for
the Mideast Consultant Company which is responsible for construction of ,
this ~own stated, "It is still early to announce the price of the required
- materials, but this figure will be very important and will include the pur-
chase of electric and sanitary materials as well. The export of these
materials from England will help the condition of the British pound." ~
At the beginning of the month, Mideast Consultant Company, which had pre-
viously performed contracts in Iran as an intermediary in the importation ,
~ 26 , ~
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of primary indus~rial equipment, announced tl~at it had been chosen to
select and order all Corei~;n services, materials and equipment for the
satellite town. This is the first construction agreement to be made with
an English company since the revolution. According to the Mideast Con-
- sultant statement, the Iranian government is trying to accelerate this and
similar projects by releasing its controls on building materials.
The client which is ordering this project, which comprises the construction
ot 6,000 one-story houses and all the necessary infrastructure, is the -
Iranian Government Railway Workers' Cooperative Company. Meanwhile, the
contracting company, PDM of Iran, will construct another 700-house project
in an area for the Iranian government near this one.
118~7
CSO: 4906
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IRAN
BRIEFS
FLIGHT FROM REVOLUTION--By the time the Iranian revolution triumphed, tens
_ of thousands of people, most of whom had either acted with overweening
greed or collaborated with the previous regime, had left the country. Of
these, the majority were people who had either gone abroad because some
economic and social activities had been suspended or feared that the revo-~
lutic~n would take a Communist turn. The departure of these people was con-
sidered temporary, and everyone hoped they would return to Iran after the
revolution. A number were also collaborators of Savak or partners in cor-
ruption who knew their trip would be a long one and therefore piled up pro
visions for the journey and filled their bank accounts abroad. It was
hoped that most of those who had left would return to the country after
the triumph of the revolution but now hardly a few months have passed since
the revolution and people who did not want to or could not leave Iran, as -
well as people who went abroad, have realized that there is no place foz~
educated or progressive people in the fanciful "Islamic" society of the
leaders of the revolution, while many old Savak collaborators are employed
in the new Savama. The true lovers of freedom, who brought the revolution
to fruition, and people without whose aid Iranian industry and economy ,
could not progress, were "liquidated" one after another; the reason for
this liquidation was not cooperation with the previous regime but their _
political tendencies and their professional knowledge. Now, in the past
6 months, close to 1 million Iranians have left the beloved homeland for
a long time, and it is expected that by the end of winter the number of
Iranian refugees will total 2 million. For this regime to establish its
triumph or failure, it is not enough for people to say how many hundred
thousand people they have placed behind a few Friday-prayer clerics; rath-
er, it would be better for them to declare how many pelple have remained
in Iran out of the hundreds of thousands of people who throughout the de-
cades mastered arts and sciences through the country's money and their
own hard work. /Text/ /Paris NAMEA-E RUZ in Persian 8 Oct 79 p 1/ 11387
CSO~ 4906
,
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ISRAEL
[ZEAL f~5'lATL' ADMINISTRATION ACCUSED OF DISCRIMINATION IN RENTING LA~ID
Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 26 Sep 79 p 19
[Article by Shlomoh Giv'on)
- [Text] .Ari'el Sharon, Minister of Agriculture, raised his eyebrows in
surprise, and it was clear that even if he had been informed of the problem
previously, it had never been presented to him so plainly, unequivocally,
and explicitly: "Mr Minister, it appears to me that you don't know what's
happening to public land in the Negev. The people of the national land
administration are not taking care of what they are actually supposed to
take care of. Instead of guarding public land and preventing unceasinb in-
cursions and increasing domination of public lands all over the Negev,
particularly by Bedouins, they are busy raising the price of land, and col- -
- lecting the biennial rents, the approval fees, and all the other payments
- that are levied on Jewish land. This leads to some absurd situations.."
The speaker was Betsal'el Gever, chairman of the Local Council of 'Omer, the
agricultural settlement near B'er Sheva. The words were spoken directly
to 'Ariel Sharon, Minister of Agriculture, during his last visit to the
Negev, which was devoted essentially to learning the problems of the national
. land administration.
One of the "Shlomtsiyon" Veterans
'Ariel Sharon and Betsal'el Gever know each other from the days of the last
Kneset election campaign. Gever was then Negev district coordinator for
the "Shlomtsiyon" election list, on which he held third place. Since the
elections, relations between the two have cooled a little, and this was a
good opportunity for Gever to renew the old ties with the head of his list,
who has meantime become Minister of Agriculture and also head of the national
land administration.
In the course of his Negev tour, Sharon was invited to a flying visit to the
'Omer local council; there, in the council meeting room, Betsal'el Gever
"let him have it" and in a direct assault explained one of the important
problems that is troubling him these days. "It is impossible," he continued
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directly to Sharon, "that such serious discrimination between Jews and
Bedouin should prevail in everything that pertains to land for construction.
It is impossible that a dunam in 'Omer should be evaluated by the government
appraiser at a record high of IL 1.2 million, without development expenses
(which today add up to about half a million lira per dunan). In contrast,
- the government delivers land to Bedouins for the same purpose, a few kilo- ~
meters away from us, at IL 20,000 per dunam. Did you ever hear anything
like it? If someone has set this policy with a clear mind, that's very
bad. Because it mak�s construction in the Jewish sector expensive, and is
definitely in contradiction to the policy of population dispersal."
Ariq Sharon says that the words sound justified. He nods his head in agree-
nent. He glances at the land administration people who have accompanied him,
and it is clear that he has passed the ball to them.
The land administrators were not enthusiastic about hearing Gever's criticisms,
and even reacted angrily to them. They were in sharp opposition, and in
particular expressed two contrary charges:
_ Neither Free Idor Cheap -
1) The government is not obligated to provide land at a reduced price, or
- half price, since this land will be an object of speculation and will make
people rich, while the government will gain nothing.
2) The price oF the land is established by the government appraiser for
each separate instance. The appraisal is a function that belongs to the
riinistry of Justice, which is independent of the national land administration
and any other factor.
But Btsal'el Gever was not satisfied with the frontal attack he had just
conducted against the land adr~inistration policy. He proposed that the
administration meet with the Jewish tenant, to see whether something prac-
tical could be done to change the present procedure.
Gever recommended that from now on the adninistration should collect only
40 percent of the land price (i.e., half the amount that has been collected
hitherto), and that after 5 years of occupancy the matter should be considered -
as though 80 percent had been collected from the tenant.
The minister of agriculture, who as we have said showed a tendency to agree
with Gever, concluded by saying that the subject shouTd'be brought up for ~ _
consideration before the Council of the national land administration.
This would not be the first time that Negev land for private construction
will be considered by the land administration. Over a short time the price
of the land has gone up severalfold, and no one feels that an individual
tenant is still ready and able to pay the prices that are being asked.
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According to Gever, a situation is now being created where the expansion of _
_ 'Omer's population is being endangered by the high land prices. As an example
he points out that only 5 years ago (in 1974) one could obtain a lot in 'Omer
for private construction for IL 20,000. Three years ago (in 1976) the price
" l~acl risen to IL 80,000. Today the price for one dunam for private construction
is over IL 1,000,000. -
Tlie land administrators, who in official conversations hidP behind the broad
back of the official appraiser, have admitted lately that the new prices seem
- too high to them also. They admit that last year land prices in the Negev
climbed sharply, and apparently the trend is continuing.
Even in 'Arad (which is not in the coastal plain, which is thickly populated
and subject to fluctuating land prices) in less than a year there were sharp
increases in land prices for private construction in the "Bne Veitkha" (Build
Your Own Home) program, which is sponsored jointly by the land administration
and the local authorities.
"Updating" the Price -
Only 9 months ago the government appraiser set a price of IL 55,000 per ~
dunam in 'Arad. Some months later the price was "updated" Co IL 270,000 per
dunam, and today according to the appraisers valuation it costs IL 400,000
for a dunam. n
Some people at the top level of the national land administration think that
these appraisals reflect the general market situation. But in contrast others
think that i~ncreases of 100 percent within a few years (in 'Arad, less than
- a year) are unjustified for land for construction, especially before the
first stone has been laid. `
Temporary Relief for Tenants
Not long after the ninister of agriculture's last visit to the Negev we re- _
ceived the news that the land administration co~.incil had passed a resolution
saying that even though it was not announcing any change in policy, the present
policy permitted temporary relief for land renters in the Negev district, for
dwelling needs. -
In 'Arad a new collection system will be put into effect, according to which -
the renter will pay only half the sum determined by the appraiser. The
balance will be considered a loan over the 5 years after construction is
finished, and after that time will be written off. In return the tenant caill
pay a biennial rent of 1 percent of the value of the lut.
Just recently Btsal'el Gev~er also received the news that the land administra- _
tion was ready to accept his proposal to reduce the cost of the lots for pri-
vate construction, with one change: instead of 80 percent of the lot value -
the administration would collect a 60 percent down payment when the rental
contract was signed, and a bier.aial rent cf 40 percent of the remainder.
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The administrators in the Negev district have tried lately to change the
appraiser's valuation, and instead of IL1200 per square meter they have pro-
posed that the value be set at IL900 per square meter.
hfatters have not yet reached their final stage, for even if this proposed
change is accepted, the price of a 600 square meter lot would be IL540,000,
plus IL300,000 development expenses; i.e., IL840,000 for a lot for one-family
dwelling.
- Into the complex of prices and the lack of a clear and uniform policy by the -
- land adminsitration, Gever has now thrown another propusal that is extremely
far reaching.
Gever informed the minister of agriculture that he was ready to head another
agricultural settlement ('Omer B), to be called "Nahal Hevron," in the "Green
Line" area. He proposed that for this purpose the state should allocate land
at no cost, with a grant of the rights of 80 percent of the land, and pro-
- hibiting transfer of the property for 5 to 7 years from the signing of the
contract. _
A Historic Opportunity
Gever's detailed proposal, as presented to the minister of agriculture, speaks
of allocating about 2000 dunams for establishing a settlement of about 2,500
families. He proposes that any Jew should be able to enroll in this program,
by means of a subsidy for the first tenants based on the size of the mortgage, _
such as is given to Beduins in the Negev who are ready to settle in one of
the established villages.
As Gever submits his proposal to the minister of agriculture, he ~mphasizes
that this is a historic opportunity to establish additional agricultural
- settlements like 'Omer in the Idegev. He says that the initiative and the
possibility are there, but what is needed now is a decision to implement
the proposal.
9045
CSO: 4805
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LIBYA
- LIBYAN LEADER AFFZICTED WITH EYE DISEASE
Madrid BLANCO Y NEGRO in Spanish 10-16 Oct 79 pp 14-16
/Article by Maria Luisa Luca de Tena: "Qadhdhafi's Eyes, Dependent on a
Spanish Opthamologist"/
/Text/ It has been announced in official circle that Colonel
Qadhdhafi, the leader and president of the Revolutionary
Junta of Libya will soon visit Spain. This event leads us
to publish an extremely curious story, which was completely -
unknown until now, in which two totalitarian regimes, Libya
and Spain--since our story goes back to 1974--made an agree- _
- ment to "kidnap" a Spanish opthamologist and take him "blind-
ly to Tripoli to attend a mysterious celebrity, with the
whole operation classified "top secret." An American journ-
alist living in Libya was the only one who managed to get
hold of the story. When threatened with losing her creden-
tials, she gave up the idea of using her information, which,
af~er all, was of interest in Spain, where it could not have
been published thanks to censorship.
Our little story takes place in April 1974, coinciding with the offi~ial
visit to Madrid of the prime minister of Libya, "Abd al-Sala'm Jallud.
This takes place at a politically difficult moment for Spain and for Libya.
- The official visit had been postponed, first by the assassination of Carrero -
Blanco, and a second time by the trip of Cortina Ma.uri, then Ministea~ of
Foreign Affairs, who was accompanying the Princes of Spain to Saudi Arabia,
the Philippines and India.
A year before the assassination of Carrero, important changes had also taken
place in. Libya. Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, until then head of the Libyan Revolu-
tionary Council and prime minister, had been replaced in the latter post by
Jallud, who also took over the political control of Libya, leaving to
Qadhdhafi the task of being, above all, the popular idol and representative
of the revolution which had overthrown the aged King Idris in 1969.
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Another piece oE background information to keep in mind in our story is the
eye disease of Qadhdhafi. A man of the desert, a bedouin by birth, the _
Libyan colonel received from his past not only his deeply rooted religious
fanaticism, but also--it is speculated--the widespread disease of desert
_ Africa, ocular trachoma. This contagious disease, of viral origin, can even .
produce blindness if neglected. With regard to this, in October 1971 the
Cairo newspaper AL-AHRAM published the report that Qadhdhafi had entered a
military hospital in Cairo to undergo an examination and tests; that the
initial diagnosis had been sinusitis; that he had remained a total of 25 days
. in the Cairo military hospital and that the results of those tests had not
be~n made public. As can be seen, the disease of the then 29 year old colonel
and leader of the Libyan revolution still was secret. -
Search for an Opthamologist
The delayed visit of Jallud finally was set for 23-27 April 1974, and only a
few days before on 7 April, foreign embassies in Tripoli received the follow-
ing communication: "From now on Colonel Qadhdhafi will devote himself to -
ideological questions, and is relieved of administrative and representational
functions." According to this, Jallud was taking another step toward real
power, and his political role was strengthened, with a view to his impending
trip to Madrid. At that time, the free European press comments that "Qadhdhafi
is the emotion, and Jallud the brains" in the context of the Libyan revolution.
Jallud was accompanied on his journey by the Libyan director of Public Health.
6dhile Jallud was occupied with the official business of his trip--the exchange
of oil for technology--the latter devoted himself, in consultatiQn with the
Spanish health director, Doctor Bravo, to looking for a Spanish opthamologist _
who could be taken to Tripoli on a secret mission. But who? -
They had to find a specialist familiar with the desert disease, trachoma.
There are some in Spain, in fact, since this distressing disease was brought
to our southeastern and Andalusian coasts in the 19th century by soldiers of .
Napoleon iaho were returning from campaigns in Africa. In 1929, health teams
had been organized under the auspices of Alfonso XIII in a wide-ranging cam-
paign to combat this disease, which had become endemic. The director of one
of these teams, which had worked in areas of Murcia and Alicante, had been
the eminent opthamologist Dr Tena Ibarra, who in 1974 was the head of the
National Opthalmic Institute. These two circumstances determined the choice.
This would be the man.
According to our information, Carlos Robles Piquer, then Spanish ambassador in _
Libya, was in charge of the first contacts with Doctor Tena. Also, ~,ccording
to our sources, Doctor Tena resisted in principle. The identity of the patient
had not been disclosed to him,~and that was not to his liking. They had only
told him that he must go to Libya in Jallud's official plane to have a pro-
fessional consultation with an important person. In official circles the re-
sistance of the Spanish doctor was opposed, since the results of Jallud's
visit had not been completely satisfactory, and they wanted by all possible
means to satisfy the minister in this other objective. The matter definitely
3~+ n
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required mediation, and thus the president of the government himself, Arias
Navarro, put his weight behind the affair, personally calling on Tena to -
agree to the journey. Little time remained. He had to report to the
Villamagna Hotel in Madrid to go with Jallud's official entourage to Bara~as,
and fly with them to Tripoli.
In Qadhdhafi's Fortress -
Even during the flight they would not reveal to Doctor Tena the exact mis-
sion that had been assigned to him. He was put up in a large hotel and was
in permanent contact with the Spanish Embassy, where the wife of Robles Piquer,
Irene Fraga, wen+t out ~f her way to personally look after the well-being of
our distinguished doctor.
The morning after his arrival in the Libyan capital they at last explained to
Doctor Tena the specific purpose of his journey. He was to examine President
Qadhdhafi, as well as other members of his family and of his entourage. He
was brought in an official car to the outskirts of Tripoli, to the imposing
fortress where the Libyan leader lives surrounded by extraordinary security
measures. After numerous check-points and several lines of barbed wire, they
reached a spacious and massive dwelling which housed about a iiundred persons, _
including aides, family members and personal guards. In the palace fortress -
there are also clinics, installed so that the eye examinations of Qadhdhafi
and his family took place in absolute secrecy. Doctor Tena's diagnosis did
not leak out, and we do not know it.
One thing is certain. Trachoma, a very serious disease in the past because
of its persistence and difficulty of eradication, as well as its contagious
nature, was first effectively battled after the discovery of the sulfamides,
and antibiotics have fortunately finished it off. Iri the Spanish territories
which have suffered from this plague endemically, it ~as been totally eradi-
cated. Qadhdhafi, as we have indicated, has undergone serious treatment for
many years, and it can be assumed that at this point he has overcome his for-
mer affliction.
When Doctor Tena was taken to Tripoli in the atmosphere of secrecy which we
_ have tried to describe, they wanted to disguise the reason for his trip with
a series of scheduled visits to the hospital installations of Tripoli, which _
in those years were beginning to be equipped, and whose doctors were almost _
all of foreign origin. A great number were natives, and many others from
countries of the East.
As always when there is an attempt to surround with ~ecrecy something as
simple and normal as a chief of state consulting a specialist, many false
rumors went around in those days in Tripoli's diplomatic and journalistic
circles. There was talk of an operation, of an ailment much more serious
than the real one. The pure and simple truth, according to what we have
been able to discover, is that the Egyptian family physician who attends
Qadhdhafi wanted to confirm the correctness of his diagnosis and treatment
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with another qualified professional. But since Qadhdhafi cultivates for his
primitive people the image of the protected of Allah, he could not appear be-
fore them as a simple mortal, who because of his bedouin past had contracted
such a common disease as ocular trachoma.
After all, democracies have their advantages. They can tell the truth. _
- 8131
CSO: 4410
~
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NiAURITAIV IA
SNIM DIRECTOR DIS~IISSES SNIM DEFICIT, GUELBS PROJECT
- Nouakchott CI-IaAB in F`rench 26, 27, 28 Sep 79
~Three-part interview with SNIM Director General Ely 0. Alla,f]
[26 Sep 79 PP l, 3)
[Text] In an exclusive interview which he granted us, Mr Ely 0. Allaf,
director general of the SNIM [National Industrial and Mining Company] ~
revealed that the loan agreements for the financing of the Guelbs project-- '
_ which in 1983 will assume the statement of account of the Kedia of Idjil--
are practical].y completed with the group of lenders and some have already
- signed. The others, said Mr Al1af, will do so immediately. Nevertheless
he had to point out that certain legal difficulties remain, especiall,y at
the level of the guarantee agreements demanded by the lenders of the funds.
~~mong othe~ things these agreements include an agreement, called a trust
agreement, which causes a bit of a problem. It concerns a system respected
by the English moneymen, which consists of entrusting to one man--the
trustee--who will pay the amounts due on the desired dates, the management
of the funds destined to repay debts. He must preserve these funds as
though they were his own property... The problem of this trust agreement
is being discussed at the present time with the lenders and when all the
- details of information have been collected at the company level, the busi-
ness can be settled quickly.
Touching on the present situation of the company, Mr A11af, without giving
way to excessive optimism, said that the prospects are not very gloomy.
One cannot yet see light at the end of the tunnel, but a slight recovery
which is beginning in the iron market--a recovery the extent of which can- .
_ not of course be yet measured--augurs a good year for the company.
Still more significantly, for the first time in 4 years the profit and loss
statement of the company showed a slight improvement for the first quarter
of 1979. That is something to arouse the satisfaction of the officers of
the company, which has been showing a heavy deficit since 1975.
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In the course of this interview Mr Allaf also mentioned the prospects
opened by the return of peace in Mauritania and the abandonment of the
policy of austerity.
L,iith r�egard to i;he haltir~~; of +,he war, Mr ~llai' said that thez�e havc beccl
- l~enel:'icial r~~:>uli,s .i'or the compally.
But he had to add that it was only now, after the hostilities had ceased,
that we have been able really to measure the damage caused by the war.
[Interview with Mr Ely 0. Allaf]
The National Industrial and Mining Company, SNIM, which
took over, after the departure of MLFERMA, the affairs of
the sector of industry and mines, a sector which comprises
the heart and lungs of our national economy, sti11 has not
come up to the anticipated results. -
Nevertheless one recalls the commitment undertaken in the -
euphoria of nationalization by its leaders and all of its
workers to improve production and to take Ltp the challenge
hurled to us by history.
The deficit of 700 million ouguiya which the company now
suffers can only be due to external factors, and therefore
independent of the desires of the leaders and of the
devotion of the workers of the SNIM.
In the following conversation Mr Ely 0. Allaf, director
general of the National Industrial and Mining Company SNIM-
SEM gives us the reasons for this deficit
[Questionj Since 1975 SNIM has had a large deficit. Why does this deficit
- exist and what measures are er~visaged for absorbing it?
(Answerj The deficit of the company has several important causes, among
which must be included the fact that the company was charged with operating
the copper mines of Akjoujt which, after the drop in the price of copper to
- a very low level, in effect became a charge on the company. The new company,
as you know, no longer includes this activity. It has therefore been sep- -
arated from SNIM along with the refinery project. One of the causes of the
deficit has consequently been eliminated. The second cause is the effect of
the war.
This effect was very important, firstly because of the destruction of mater-
iel caused, the slowdown of production, and the slowdown of the transportation
of production. Therefore a complex of phenomena caused by insecurity which
considerably reduced the activities of the company during the period of
insecurity. The third cause was obviously the drop in the price of iron in
3$
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~
_ recent years. If, for example, one compares the 1974 price with those of
~97g in current dollars, the 1979 price is about half the 1974 price, and
in constant dollars that is really low.
Therefore there was tnis drop in the quotations for iron which was one of
t~e main causes of the loss in receipts, and all this means that the new
_ 51VIM, after separating out copper, has started out with a rather lar~e
deficit of 700 million UM which it must recover simultaneously by tighten-
ing up measures internally to lower its costs, consolidate more closely
its break-even point, organi7e itself better, and likewise by an effort
in the market in collab~ration with all the ore producers to try to ensure -
tha+ tile price of iron moves upward rather than downward.
[Question] In its last issue S1VIM-INF"ORMATIONS reported an improvement in
the financial situation on the company level. What is this exactly? -
[Answer] As you know, the company in effect reports its operating results
quarterly, that is to say it balances the total of its expenses and its
income by guarter.
This profit and loss statement has been in deficit for a certain number of
years, and for the two preceding.quarters the operating results have been "
slightly profitable. This augurs an improvement of the financial situation
for the ,year or the result for the year, but not enough to cut the deficit
seriously. _
We cannot know the significant results until the end of the year. Essentially
therefore the information reported the results of operations for the first
quarter, which are positive.
[Questionj There is talk of a recovery in the market levels for iron. Is
this only a small movement in the market level or a trend which may accel-
erate or even be maintained?
[Answerj According to the forecasts of the producers, normally, it is an
upward trend expected for next year and the following years. But the problem -
is to know if this rise is going to be regular on the one hand and large, on
the other.
And, as you know, the price of iron is in effect set annually. During the
course of a single year one cannot get a clear idea of the size of an in-
crease in the following year from the prices in effect. At the end of each _
_ year there is an overall negotiation between the producers and the users of -
iron are which takes into account the possibilities of world production,
which also takes into account economic recovery from the point of view of
iron and steel producers, and it is at the end of the year that the nego-
tiations end in a result.
At the present time we think that this result is going to be an increase in
the price of iron ore. Several signs point to it, and in particular the
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~
R
j
~
bids offered cutside c~ntract, what are called spot orders, made during ~
the course of the year indicate a stronger demand.
_ As a result there is a possibility of an increase in the price of iron
ore for next year, but all this is only an indication. We cannot fore-
cast the amount of the increase before the end of the year. '
[27 SeP 79 P 31
� [Text] In the first part of the interview which he gave us,
~ Mr Ely 0. Allaf, director general of the SNIM, explained at _
length the reasons for the large deficit of the company at
the present time. Among the reasons for this deficit the
director general particularly cited the operation of the
copper mines of Akjoujt which, after the drop in the price r
of this metal, constituted a charge on SNIM, the effects of
the war and the drop in the price of iron.
- Relieved of the charges of the SONffMA [Mi.ning Company of
Mauritaniaj and the climate of insecurity which prevailed
in the region, the SNIM is in the process of resuming its
normal pace.
Actually the operating results of the company, which had
been in deficit for several years, has just shown a positive
increase. This augurs an improvement of the financial sit-
uation of the SNIM-SEM.
Nevertheless the extent of the damages caused by the war
constitutes a serious handicap for a normal recovery of
the operations of the company.
But with the start-up of the Guelbs project, financing for
which has been obtained entirely, optimism is permissible.
[Question) For almost 2 years the company has not had to suffer the blows
of the POLISARIO. Can you give us a short assessment of these 2 years of ~
~ pea,ce?
:
[Answer] These years of peace, that is, from the end of the year 1978 and ;
~;he year 1979, have been extremely beneficial for the company in the sense
that it has been able to work in calm, although for reasons of security, ; _
peace was not complete; there were still some complications due to ttie '
necessity of ensuring security to the workers, particularly on exposed
routns.
Nevertheless they permitted working in calm, and which is very important-- _
producing quantities greater than had been possible the previous year,
namely 1978. But it must be said that it was in the course of this period
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of peace that the company has been discovering the extent of the damages -
~ caused, and the difficulty of resuming its normal operations. This is
explained by the fact that during the period when it had serious financial
difficulties and serious security conditions, equipment could not be main-
tained normally.
It could not be overhauled as it should be. Consequently it was when we
_ needed to operate the equipment, both rail equipment and mine equipment,
when we needed to make it produce at its normal capacit;y, that we became
aware that it had suffered heavy damage, that it had not been overhauled,
and that it could not produce as expected.
_ Conseguently the lack of spare parts, the difficulty of getting the equip- -
ment in order, a difficulty due both to the lack of spare parts and suffi-
cient personnel; the personnel was adequate for a rate of normal maintenance
and overhaul. And from the moment that a toc~ large quantity of equipment '
could not be maintained, the capacity of our persor.nel to repair it was
insufficient. This is why we have great difficulties in restoring this
equipment to normal operation, and consequently, production. I must point
out that in the past few years, suppliers who had not been paid in a long
time had almost terminated supply of spare parts necessary for regular
maintenance of the eguipment, and the restructuring of the capital of the
company was imperative in order to cope with this accumulated debt toward
the suppliers, to regain their confidence, and to obtain from them the
_ spare parts orcered.
We hope to be able to restore the normal situation between now and the end
of the first guarter of next year. Meatlwhile the company obviously strug-
gles in this major difficulty--working with unusable equipment with all
the inconveniences which that involves: frequent stoppages, train derail-
ments, etc.
Despite everything, until now, production has been maintained at the
envisaged level. We contemplate, if there are no great difficulties,
- reaching at the end of the year the production which was forecast, which
is about 8.5 to 9 million tons. Our major difficulty is this equipment -
which was used beyond its capacity without maintenance and without over- ~
haul during the preceding years.
[Question] You have just made a trip to Abu Dhabi, where you have had to -
discuss a loan from the Abu Dhabi ~znd for the financing of the Guelbs
project. Can you give us the details of the advancing of this finr~ncing
and where it is now? -
[Answer] Actually the financing of the whole project has been obtained.
_ We are working to terminate the negotiations with the group of lenders at
the earliest possible time. I should say that, for the moment, the loan
agreements are practically complete with the group of lenders: some have
already signed, others should do so immediately. Now what remains to
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I
start up operations is mainly the legal formalities which sometimes take
time but whicti do not constitute a major difficulty.
We had important legal difficulties which have been removed, particularly
the effective realizaticn of the increase of capitalization which has just ~
been achieved with the participation of Iraq. Consequently the compariy is
r~ow a legally established company with a definite subscribed capital and _
the called-for installment deposited. , -
We had another difficulty--the convention of establishment between the
company and the state. At the present time this convention has been signed
and presented to the council of ministers, which has approved the draft
- ordinance to be presented to the CMSN [Military Committee of National Sa,l-
vation) for its approval.
_ This problem has therefore been resolved. Following these problems, the
decree granting the company the permit to exploit the Guelbs will also be
presented. From that side the complex of problems has been resolved.
Practically a11 the loan agreements have been negotiated and we think that
with the agreement of the sources of financing we will be able to begin
operations before completing the formalities of putting into effect the -
loans as a whole. Certain of them involve the possibility of repayment
to STTII~I if it has engaged in certain operations before the granting of
the loans.
There are some agreements for which we are encountering some difficulties.
These are not the financing agreements but the guarantee agreements re-
quested by the lenders. These guarantee agreements are of three types:
an agreexnent of domiciliation on which there are no problems and all the
partners are in agreement; a surety agreement on which the partners are
also agreed; but there is a trust agreement which presents some little
problems. It presents a problem in the sense that we must have some
information on the functioning of precisely this type of guarantee, of
this type of agreement, before arriving at a formula agreeable to the
sources of financing and to ourselves.
We are in the process of searching with the lenders for a final solution
which we hope to complete in a very short time. ;
[28 Sep 79 P 31 -
[Text] The policy of austerity decided by the Military
Committee of National Salvation and its application to
SNIM: this is the 3d subject covered by Mr Ely 0. Allaf,
- director general of this company in an exclusive interview
which he granted to us.- '
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Ilc mui~taoiicd 1'ii�:;i, oi' t11.1 tfiu i~ew policy ~u~ci~rtakr~ii l,y
the company witti regard to housing. He spoke also of a
reduction in general expenses as a whole.
Woulcl a reduction in force be envisaged? lVo, Mr Ely Ould
1111a1' told us again, except in the event of a reduction
in operations... In this latter part of his talk, the
- director general of the SIVIM stressed the necessity for
hi.; eriterprise to start up the "Guelbs" project in 1~~2
at the latest iri order to avoid a drop in productiori.
[~,ues~;ion] Of what does this trust guarantee which is causing a pz�oblem
~onsist?
[~answer] It is a system which entrusts the management of the funds destined
for repayment of tr~e debt to a trust, that is to say a man who manages them,
who pa}/s the installments on tne date due and who guards the funds as though
_ they were his own property. It is therefore linked to the debt service which
the leriders are paid on the desired deadlines and for which the SNIM pays in
advance the sum necessary for this debt service. Then there is a man called
the trustee who is responsible for that.
This system exists particularly in England, and it r2mains to obtain a cer-
tain riumber of details, in particular concerning the taxes which might have
to be paid in the name of SNIM, which must commit itself to reimbursing him.
It is this agreement which still entails certain difficulties, due essentially
- to ignorance.
~.e ~Lherefore have legal advisers arid we are discussing these problems with
- tt~e lenders in order to come up with a solution; these are agreements which
must be signed likewise with these lenders as a group and which constitute
the guarantee system for the repayment of the loans.
- [Question] Recently the government; in order to restore the economic situa- _
tion of the country, proclaimed the policy of austerity. How will this policy
concretel,y affect SNIM? ~
[Answerj As applied to SNIM it ~nust be confessed that before the austerity
policy, in the framework of the Guelbs project, SNIM had been asked to take
a certain number of steps designed to reduce its costs: general management,
general services, etc. 'I`here is therefore a program decreed for reducing
the aggregate of general expenses of the company, a program which will be ,
accomplished in a certain number of years.
This program breaks down into several eleu~ents. Firs~ly the external services
are to be regrouped into a single subsidiary, thereby eliminating certain
offices without distur.bing the operation perf~rmed, and transferring the
function to a single office, which will reduce operating costs. We contem-
plate transferring a part of the activities of our Zurich office to Paris,
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anct ultimai,el;; all thc aci.,ivities performed Ly the Zurich office would be
carried on from Mauritania. ~de are studying the implementation of these
measures, wh~ c~fl would permit the considei�able reduction of ~;he operatin~;
costs ~f o~zr ~urcha^in~ offices abroad. Witli regard to domestic matters,
you luiow t;kiai. we tiave a Iicadquari,cr�r; ic~ the c~ouc�:~e o(' r.omplel.i.on--iL wi:l.1.
aci;uaLl,y bc 1':ini~hec~ 2 ir~oci~;tis from iIOW--B,IIC~ 1:�~~;ainirig ol' ~,hi: rict~.clqual�tc~c�s
will greatly reduce a11 types of expenses, particularly rent costs, tele-
phone, cost of local travel, particularly gasoline, and will certainly
raise t he output of the agents.
Tlie reductiort of all the rentals for offices we have represents already a
cotisiderable reduction in expenses, and the existence of an internal system
of communication in the headquarters will also reduce costs. In other
aspects we are not neglecting any measure which tends to reduce expenses.
Thus guite recently we have opted to replace the system of housing for
Mauritanian employees, up to now provided by the company, with an allowance.
Actually the housing was very expensive and it was practically impossible ~
to limit the consumption of water and electricity. This allowance system
will be more economical for the company and will make the employees more
_ responsible in the management of their incomes and will perhaps make it
possible to find individual solutions for the acguisition of a personal
properzy. This is a measure which released 30 villas. But it cannot be
~xtende d to expatriates in the sense that the company must irisure for them
housing conditions in which they can work. It is in their contracts at the
outset, and they have no particular interest in owning housing and they
would also have difficulties obtaining housing if another system were adopted.
Ever,y time it appears to us that an action may reduce general costs, we will
study it. It is clear that we are a production company and because of this
we cannot eliminate any element unless we are convinced that there will be ,
rio serious negative effects on the company`s profit and the quality of its
operations. Therefore each case requires a special study. No step can be
arbitrary. Each time we must measure numerically to the extent possible
the advantages and disadvantages of internal steps we take to reduce t':ie
costs of the company.
[Question] Through reduction in force?
[Ansr~er] No, unless a reduction in operations--which is possible--occurs.
For example, if there is a separation of certain operations, and I am speak-
ing particularly of the separation of the distribution of petroleum products. _
It is obvious that if a unit leaves, it has its surety on the personnel
level and it will require a corresponding reduction of the cost of existing
personnel. For the moment we do not foresee a personnel reduction.
[Question] You recently mentioned the problem of SOMMI.MMA. Can one not
expect a resumption of the operations of that company? -
- ~+4
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- [Answer] The exploitation of copper mines is under the ministry of mines
at the present time . I am not well informed on the status of research in
- that field.
[Questionj You have spoken of the problem of poorly maintained equipment
which can no longer operate as required. Besides this problem, have you
any fundamental problem which is confronting you at present?
(Answer] At the present time our basic proble?n is to be able to start up "
the Guelbs project in time to enable us to guarantee the continuity of
production after 1g83. But you know that starting in that year the pro-
duction of the Kedya is going to begin to drop, and it is absolutel,y
necessary that we be able to get the exp loitation of the Guelbs project
going by the end of 1982 or the beginning 1983 so that production will
not drop and the exploitation of the Gue lbs take over the operation of
the Kedya at the appropriate time: this is our major concern and it
justifies the efforts every one of us, on the side of the government,
on the side of the company, on the side of the Lenders, makes to get
bids issued as soon as possible, so that the date of getting the project
under way will be held to and that there will be no decrease in opera-
tions which would cause an extremely difficult situation for the company
both financially and in human terms, because it will be necessary to cut '
jobs, and o~bviously throughout the whole country, because the resulting
drop in production could be very great. All this means thaL our efforts
are concentrated on the start-up of the project.
6108
cso: 4400
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, MAURITANIA
- NATION SEARCHES FOR NEW FISHING POLIGY _
Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 24 Sep 79 pp 64-65
[Article by Mireille Duteil, "Exploiting Gold From the Sea]
[Text] A few canoQs, fishing nets stretched out to dry on a white sand
beach oppressed by the hot sun. Out to sea a closely packed flight of
birds wheeling in the sun indicate the presence of a school of fish.
Back from the beach are 6 or 7 shaky huts where ebony skinned children,
heads shaved except for three tufts of hair in a triangle are running.
We are with the Imraguen, the only tribe of fishermen among Mauritania's -
Moorish population. At the lookout's signal the men waded into the sea
up to their waists. They emitted eerie cries and beat the water with
their hands. Soon~ as though hypnotized by this call, hundreds of mullet
hurled themselves into the nets.
This complicity between the sea and the Moors, sons of the desert, has
something fascinating about it, and hardly lets us guess the lack of taste
f or fishing of the Moors living on a coast considered one of the world's
richest sources of fish.
The trawlers, seiners, and factory ships swarming in Mauritanian waters
will be flying Spanish, Japanese, Russian or Korean flags. And the country's
economy, there can be no doubt, gets little profit from it. The statistics
are edifying. In 1977-78, of 1.2 milliori tons of fish taken off the coast
of Mauritania and Tiris E1-Gharbia, only 64,000 tons were processed at
Nouadhibou, the country's second city and only fishing port.
To be sure the Mauritanian budget does get royalties on fishing rights
which are granted in the form of licenses to foreign ships. For the current
year the equivalent of 4.5 million CFA francs will flow into the coffers
of the state. The provisional budget for 1979 records a projected 10 _
billion CFA francs (2 billion ouguya), about a third of the cou~ntry's total
receipts. "This projection will not be realized," a Maurit~nian leader
confided to us, "unless a lot of licenses are granted. But that will ~
encourage even more the pillage of our shores." ,
46 ~
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Bottom fishing, fishing for cephalopods (octopus, squid), in which the
Japanese and Koreans excel, is the most devastating. Their immense
trawlers, up to 1800 tons burden, destroy the ecological equilibrium of
_ the sea bottom, and it takes years to reestablish it. Surface fishing
(mackerel, bonita) is less dangerous, for the stocks are enormous. In
_ tf~is ~irea, the hit parade of the biggest catch falls to Interpeche, u
Dutch firm registered in the Bermudas. Its dozen ships, with a factory
ship transforming the fish into meal on the spot, can alone take away
up to 150,000 tons of fish in a year.'
The golden years of foreign ship owners are over, it is believed in
Nouakchott. Already in 1977, under President Mokhtar Ould Daddah, this
licensing system was under consideration for review. After the coup d'etat
of 10 July 1978, this policy became more definite. The minister of fisheries
then decided not to renew the licenses of factory ships who did not
deliver any fish *_o the land. From then on, it was indicated, �ish taken
along the Mauritanian coast must be commercialized on national territory.
In doing this Nouakchott hoped to bring the foreign ship owners to create,
alone or in association with private capital or public Mauritanian funds,
complexes for processing fish.
This policy of nonrenewal of licenses was applied rigorously during the
- first months of 1979. Soviets, Japanese and Koreans who did not accept
Mauritanian conditions were~asked to leave. The Portuguese, Romanians,
Swedish, Dutch and French whose licenses have not yet expired continue to
fish. On the other hand, after three rounds of intense negotiations
_ between Nouakchott and Madrid, the Spanish are keeping their licenses, -
but agreed to quadruple their fishing fees. They will pay $16 million for
fishing rights in 1979 for the 260 Spanish trawlers (the most numerous)
which have, by contract, the right to all be in Mauritanian waters at the
same time. But it is true that with Spain the old neighborly ties plus
fishing clauses appearing in the agreement with Madrid provide for, among
other things, that Spain can send 800 fishing boats without fee off
Western Sahara--explain this survival.
Nevertheless, Nouakchott confronts two obstacles in applying its new policy.
Mauritania has no means of stopping the "pirates" of the sea. It is
estimated that 25 percent of fish taken escape any control. It's said that
- from photographs taken from a Breguet deux ponts [translation unknown] it
_ was found that of 400 ships fishing, only four had licenses: The Koreans
h ave the reputation of specializing in this kind of "piracy." They always
navigate in squadrons and there are veritable naval battles taking place
between Mau~ritanian military patrols and the illegals. Yet the fine is high:
500 million CFA francs for a factory ship. In 1978 the Mauritanians took
91 ships fishing illegally.
The second obstacle is technical. "Processing plants on land are practically
nonexistent in comparison to the stock," a businessman told us. However, the
three cold storage facilities now at Nouadhibou are operating at far less
~+7
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I
than full capacit y, when they are not closed. During the 70's Mau~ritania
had granted licenses in order to keep the three cold storage facilities
and fish meal factory supplied. Responding to the request of the Mauritanian
government, the Japanese, the first, delivered a part of their catch to
Nouadhibou, followed by the Soviets. On the other hand, they obtained
licenses for dozens of ~reezer factory ships.
Today the Mauritanians are setting up projects to create joint companies
with the Swedes, the Libyans and the French. Some businessmen are looking
in new directions. Thus the Societe des Grandes Peches de Mauritanie
hopes to conclude a contract with a Fr'ench-Soviet firm which will outfit a
ship for them. On land it will process the octopus caught into meal. The
product will subs equently be exported to Zaire and the Congo. This formula
of chartering from foreign firms will allow Mauritania to train its own
seamen until it gets its own. However this may be, it is urgent to secure -
mastery of this fabulous treasure from the sea which should, just as iron
does, constitute an important revenue source for the national economy,
8860
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MAURITANIA
BRIEFS
OPERATIONAL PROSPECTS OF REFINERY--Getting the petroleum refinery at
Nouadhibou into operation could be the first effect on Mauritanian economy
of resumption of relations between Algeria and Mauritania. Constructed
at great cost ($66 million) under the presidency of Mokhtar Ould Daddah, -
it has a refining capacity of 1 million tons of crude per year, at full
operatior� It would be supplied by Algerian oil from Hassi Messaoud.
In fact it had never functioned. The possibility of importing Algerian
oil again has moved Mauritanian leaders to study the cost of putting the
refinery into operation through an English study group. But many problems
remain: new investment is necessary to replace old or deteriorate~ parts,
the cost of the production and the transportation of crude oil are too
high to allow the Mauritanian refinery to be competitive in the inter-
national market, at least not without the state adding heavily to�its
debt. [Text] [Paris DII~IAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 24 Sep 79 p 66~ 8860
LARGE-SCALE CONTRABAND--During the past few weeks, authorities at the port
of Nouakchott have seen objects arrive which, curiously, they have not been
in the habit of seeing unloaded on their docks, such as perfurme, transistors,
tape recorders. Nothing very mysterious, however, in this affair. These
products, quite common in Mauritania, by the way, up until now sneakily
arrived from Las Palmas via Dakhla and Tiris E1-Gharbia. Now that the
Mauritanians have withdrawn from Saharan territory, the network is no longer
functioning. With the merchandise leaving and arriving illicitly from
~ Senegal, it is estimated that close to 96 percent of Mauritanian commerce
is by contraband. [Ter.t] [Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 23 Sep 79 p 71J
8860
HOSTILITY TO NEW GOVERNMENT--Graffiti hostile to the new government have
- been appearing on many walls in Nouadhibou--the economic capital of Mauritania
in the north. Many arrests and challenges have been made among the pro-
Moroccans, suspected of starting the movement. The majority of those
arrested have been released. It seems that this agitation might be connected
with the influx of Saharan "refugees," mostly small storekeepers and business-
men who followed the Mauritanian troops out during the retreat from that part
of Western Sahara administered by Nouakchott. POLISARIO sympathizers are not
likely to fold their arms. Their reaction led the Moroccan Prime Minister
, Maati Boua~id to demand of his Mauritanian~:oounterpart the "protectio;~" of
10,000 Mor~ccan soldiers who are getting ready to leave the north. [Text]
[Paris DEMATN L'AFRIQUE in French 24 Sep 79 p 71] 8860
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SUDAN
REFUGEE iNFLUX AGGRAVATES PROBLEMS IN SUDAN
~ Beirut AL,-SAFIR in Arabic 30 Sep 79 p 12 ~
[Article: "~ao Million African Refugees In Sudan. At Fir~t a Matter Of
Security and Supplies, Their Problems Have Become a Part Of the Political
_ Crisis"]
[Text ] Khartoum AL-SAFIR special .
The Sudan covers a vast area--1 million square miles--and shares borders with
eight countries: Ethiopia, Zaire, Kenya, Uganda, Central Africa, Chad,
Libya, and Eg}~pt.
Owing to this geographical situation, the Sudan faces the problem o~ the
refugees in a manner rather different from other countries with similar
conditions . This is due to the large number of refugees, on the one hand,
and to the fact that the Sudan lacks the forces required to regulate the
- refugee influx within its own territories under ordinary conditions as well
as under exceptional conditions resulting from famine, escape from political
persecution, or flight from battle. The most recent operations involving
the crossing of the Sudanese borders involved many thousands of people from -
Uganda who were running away from the battles psrtaining to the war which
overthrew the previous president of Uganda, Marshal Idi Amin Dada. Before -
that, hundreds of thousands of people from Eritrea had preceded them, as a
result of the current war of lit~eration between the troeps of the Eritrean
revolution and the Ethiopian forces, in addition to many thousands of
~thiopians who crossed the Sudanese borders for the same reason.
The first exodus to the Sudan started more than a century ago, when the
Sudan was used as a passage for people from Nigeria and other countries in
West Africa, going to Hijaz on pilgrimage, who preferred--on their way back. -
to their native countries--to stay in the Sudan, where there w~re vast -
stretches of unused fertile land. Those people built thier own villages,
engaged in, farming and irrigation, and were subsequently followed by others
from Chad and elsewhere.
, 50
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k'olitical L:xodus
When political upheavals started to spread, the ST~dan had to deal with the
refugee problem. In the 1960's the events in the Congo marked the befiinning
c~f a massive Congolese influx into the southern part of the Sudan.
lluring ttie liLe and under the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia,
; during the persecution of the Eritrean people, the Sudan opened its doors
~ to many refugees. However, the human influx across the eastern borders of
the Sudan exceeded all predictions when military battles in Erit:~ea expanded
their scope, According to official statistics published in Khartoum, the
number of both Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees exceeds half a million.
The southern part of the Sudan recently has witnessed the arrival of many
- thousands of refugees f rom Uganda. Although statistics concerning them are
not accurate, owing to the fact that they are constantly pouring across the
borders, the figures currently available to the executives of the United
Nations office in Khartoum indicate about 300,000 refugees, while the
authorities in the southern area of the Sudan--who are in charge of relief
- and welfare matters--evaluate their numbers at 500,000 people, mostly
women and children. It was possible ro gather them into special camps after
assigning various school and other facilities to provide food and health
facilities, with the participation of the United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees' Affairs to provide the refugees with the required
assistance.
The Sudan lacks statistics about the number of refugees who have ~~~~rzd
across its borders for political, survival, or safety reasons. Statistics
currently available to the Sudanese authorities are merely estimates and
nothing more; according to them, the number of refugees may vary between
a maximum of 4 million and a mini*.num of 2 million. These were the figures .
- officially published in Khartoum before the events in Uganda.
Effects of the Exodus ~
The phenomenon which currently concerns the team of Sudanese investigators
at the National Research Council in Khartoum is the particular effect of '
the exodus to Sudan, which obviously has become a threat to the social and _
economic basics of life ever since the refugees started moving to the largest
cities close to the borders and subsequently to the Sudanese capital itself�--
which recently has started swelling with huge numbers of refugees of various ~
- nationalities in search of work.
The Sudanese authorities currently face many problems owing to the huge
foreign influx into the capital and surrounding areas, which are considered
the natural extensions of the capital itself, since it consists of a triad ;
that includes the cities of Khartoum, Um Durman and Khartoum Bahri. That
is why the Sudanese capital is usually called the triple capital.
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The cause of the authorities' concern goes back to two main factors.
One is the security aspect, followed by the economic aspect, since a rather
important portion of the supplies of food and merchandise specifically r
destined for the capital goes to the newcomers. The medical, sanitary, and
educational services are also concerned about the breakout of diseases which, -
according to the description given by the official health authorities in
Khartoum, are plagues requiring the attention of a large percentage of the
health services to treat the refugees. -
- The government of the Sudan is especially worried by this phenomenon, and
particularly with the security aspect thereof, because a large number of
refugees have crossed the borders with arms and ammunitions. The Sudanese
authorities have completely failed to keep the refugees away from the capital,
however, in spite of the large raids undertaken at the beginning of August1979.
Trying to keep them away, the Sudanese authorities intended to gather them
together ir already existing camps, such as the present camps for Ugandan _
refugees in the southern part of the Sudan. They intended to do so by �
moving the refugees from Ethiopia and Eritrea to special camps in the
eastern area of the Sudan, where farming lands were assigned to them, while
moving Chad nationals to the western part of the country, and so forth.
That was meant to achieve two political goals--ensuring their supervision,
and making it easier to provide basic living requirements. This in turn
would have facilitated the establishment of statistics concerning their
numbers.
Reverse E~:odus
- On the other hand, we find that the Sudan--which already provides a 1� ~ge -
number of African refugees with shelter and sustenance--has in turn star~~d
experiencing a reverse exodus, which has assumed a collective aspect since
the beginning of this decade. The Sudan has lost many thousands of its
nationals during these past S years, when they decided to settle and work
in a number of Arab countries, including Libya, the Gulf countries, Saudi
Arabia, and Oman. Those emigres include a large sector of the Sudanese
intelligentsia, such as college professors, engineers,doctors, technicians,
and skilled workers, who left their country to look for a more financially
rewarding position, or because of political persecution, or because they -
could hardly find any means of living in the Sudan owing to the unemploy-
ment which affects most workers, skilled and unskilled alike.
This exodus has deeply affected the gener.al life in the Sudan, owing to the
heavy shortage which has to be faced by many educatlonal institutions and
public services and facilities, such as Khartoum University, which has lost
a large number of its professors, such as the electric power and water de-
partment, more than half of whose engineers have lefr, and such as the -
_ telephone facility, with which less than a quarter of its staif of engineers
= and technicians has remained. This is a big problem currently faced by the
Sudan, which also has to confront the problem of 4 million Africans who have
willingly or unwillingly crossed the borders shared by their countries with
the Sudan.
2693
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SYRIA
- INTERNAL INSTABILITY SAID TO BE THREAT TO REGIME
Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 19 Sep 79 pp 10-11
[Article: "What Is Behind the Rejectionist ~dall?"]
_ [Excerpts] What is the tru*_h about the terrible struggle within the ranks
of the Alawite Ba'ath Party which rules Syria with an iron fist? What is
the extent of the internal divisions besetting its frightened leadership?
How extensive are the religious divisions within the Syrian armed forces?
The most obvious fact is that Hafi-; al-Assad's regime is beset by dissension
and threatened with collapse. The rifts are so serious that all attempts to
save the situation appear doomed to failure. The most ominous aspect of -
the deteriorating situation is that it has spread in octopus-like fashion
- to engulf the party, the government, and the army. All diplomatic reports
~ from Damascus confirm the turmoil. The bitter struggles within the al-Assad _
regime and among the leaders of the Alawite Ba'ath Party revolve about several
fundamental points:
1. Party Struggle
There are deep, fundamental differences between a large number of regional
leaders and Mr Rif'at al-Assad, the President's brother. These differences
came to the forefront during the unity talks between Syria and Iraq.
Mr Kif'at al-Assad opposed the unity moves and described them as a threat
' to the Alawite Ba'ath Party. He was openly criticized for his position by
Mr Jabir Bahbuh, the party`s regional secretary, and by Mr 'Abdallah al-Ahmar,
_ a member of the regional leadership and th~~ chairman of the party's student
office. Apparently, Rif`at al-Assad has L_ome the opposition champion
against the army and the party leaders.
He is also at odds with other national leaders, in~luding Syria's former air
force chief, P4ajor General Naji Jamil. It is reported that Mr al-Assad is
~ planning to use the coming elections to remove a majority of the party's
leaders from power. The elections, originally sche~�sled for last April,
have been postponed as a result of the deteriorating internal situation. ~
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There is also the old enmity between Rif'atal-Assad and the minister oE
interior, rtr 'Adnan ~abhagh. The feud d~tes back to the last re~;ion~l
electic~ns in 1.~)75. Mr al-Assad char~;ed at that time that Mr Dabbagh's .
el.ection to thr. party leadership was illegal. The dispute acquired added
significance in view of the fact that Mr Dabbagh was a Sunni Moslem. There
were rumors and some apprehension that Mr Dabbagh might use his position as
interior minister to split the Alawite sect and concentrate power in Sunni
hands. Even Hafiz al-Assad is said to harbor doubts about the intentions
oL his interior minister. It is now expected that the minister will be
eased out of his position during the coming party and government reorganiza-
tion. Mr Hafiz al-Assad apparently believes that Mr Dabbagh was behind the
bloody turmoil in Latakia, Damasccs, and Aleeppo. Rif'at al-Assad has
evidently succeeded in convincing his brother that Dabbagh's relaxation of
internal security was responsible for the internal eruptions.
' There is an ongoing struggle among the factinns of the National Progressive
Front, in whose name the Alawites rule. These factions include the Com-
munist Party, the Socialist Union, the Socialists for Unity, and the Arab
Socialist. These factions, however, are powerless. Real power is in the
hands of the ruling Alawite group. There is a grok�ing resentment over
Hafiz al-Assad's nearly exclusive reliance on the Alawite minority, a
development viewed as an attempt to put Syria under Alawite control. Hi.s
apparent reluctance to break away completely from disparate factions of
the National Progressive Front is seen as a ploy to maintain the support
of the Communist Party in order to please the Soviet Union and ensure a
continuing supply of Soviet military and economic aid. -
2. Dissension Within the Government
There is a persistent effort to reduce the power of Sunni government officials.
- In particular, the effort is directed against the defense minister, Major
General Plustafa Talas, and the interior minister, 'Adnan Dabbagh. The latent
religious dispute broke into the open with Rif'at al-Assad's public attack
againstthe ministers and the ministers' counrerattack. Hafiz al-Assad was
forced to intervene to resolve the dispute, but, as usual, in favor of the -
Alawites. The heretofore camouflaged enmity ultimately erupted into the open
with the removal in February 1979 of 'Ali al-Madani, the director of internal
security and a Sunni Moslem, and the ouster of 'Adnan Dabbagh, the interior
minister, from his position as director of the National Security Office,
which oversees internal security operations, and his replacement last August
_ by Ahmad Diab, almost exactly one month after the massacre at the Aleppo
Artillery School. The current policy in "Alawi" Damascus is to rid the
~ country gradually of Sunni ministers and leaders. Rumors thar. Hafiz al-Assad
is about to remove the defense minister, Major General Mustafa Talas, and
replace him with Major General Hikmat al-Shahabi, Syrian Army chief of staff,
appear to confirm this policy.
It is no longer possible to conceal the progressively worsening divisions
within the government. The rapid changes in the latter part of last February
testify to that. First to go was 'Ali al-riadani, director of internal security;
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_ nc:xt was Muh~immad al-Kholi, the air. force director ol security. Less than
seven months later, a new purge resulted in the removal of Brigadier General
Nazih Zarir as director of internal security, and his replacement by Brigadier
Genera.l 'Ali 'Abd al-Karim, the former chief of the Aleppo security ofFice.
It is also evident that the turmoil is spreading to the Foreign Ministry.
~Cf.icials of the ministry are lining up against [Fareign Minister] 'Abd
al-Halim Khaddan, who is being subjected to a bitter campaign by the
officials of the Foreign Ministry. Exploitative and opportunistic are
some of the epithets being hurled at him. Rif'at al-Assad is pressuring
his brother, President Hafiz al-Assad, to purge the Sunnis from leadership
- positions in the Foreign Ministry. The President has so far resisted the _
pressure, in a calculated effort to maintain the status quo and to avoid
antagonizing--and thus possibly staving off a revolution by--the Sunni
majority.
There are confirmed reports of strong disagreement between Hafiz al-Assad
and his brother Rif'at. The latter is attempting to acquire power by any
means, particularly since his position has improved as a result of having
~aon control of the armed militia, the so-called defense companies, which
are considered superi~r. to the regular Syrian Army. The dispute centers
on the best method to deal with the deteriorating internal situation. The
growing opposition, the collapse of internal s~curity, and the spread of
disorder to the larger cities, including Aleppo and Latakia, increase the
probability that Major General 'Abd al-Rahman Khlifawi will return to form
a new government in an attempt to control the situation.
There are also reports of dissention within the Alawite sect itself. The
- bloody confrontations between the "Tailors" branch, to which Hafiz al-Assad
belongs, and the "Ironsmiths" branch appear to confirm these reports. In
addition, there are rumors within the army that Rif'at al-Assad is intensi-
fying his effort to remove from command some of the Alawite officers who
may block his path to absolute control. These officers include 'Ali Doba
the chief of military security; 'Ali Haydar, commander of the Special Forces;
and 'Ali a].-Salih, commander of the Air Defense Force. The three officers
have appealed to President Hafiz al-Assad and asked him to restrain his
brother. This development is one of the causes of the growing depute between
the President and his brother.
3. Dissension Within the Army
The most ambitious outcome of the internal instability in Syria is the
_ possible collapse of Hafiz al-Assad's regime and the spread of the religious
Sunni-Alawite struggle to the armed forces. According to rumors, the Aleppo
massacre constituted an insurrection within the army, planned by junior
officers with the direction and support of senior retired officers. This
is in addition to the primary motive for the massacre, which was to elimiaate
the largest possible number of new party cadres, who were being nurtured
and prepared at the [artillery] school to take over control of the armed
forces, specifically the artillery and missile units. The goal of the in-
surrectionists was to overtax the ruling Alawites' resources by forcing them -
to resort to bloody solutions.
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There is growin~; jealousy over the roles assigned to the defense companies
- led by Rif'at al-Assad and the Special Forces commanded by 'Ali Haydar.
Simultaneousl~, dissention is increasing within the military commands over
Rif'at al-Assad's incessant attempts to shrink Major General Mustafa 'Talas'
influence in the army. One illustration of Rif'at al-Assad's determination
to undermine the defense minister's influence is his refusal to implement
the minister's orders to the defense companies.
Despite persistent efforts by Haliz al-Assad to maintain control oF the
army by traditional Ba'ath Party methods--i.~e., by appointing Alawites to
top army positions and strengthening the defense companies and the Sa'iqa
forces--an explosion appears imminent. The opposing Sunnis are consolidating
tlieir strength in an attempt to reduce Alawite control of the army and
government. Their effort is aided by the Alawites' jockeying for power
among themselves and by their preoccupation with material gains derived
from improper use of their military positions. There are reports of numerous
- scandals involving the Alawites in illegal drug trafficking from Lebanon via
tlie "special highway" authorized by Rif'at al-Assad in conjunction with a
group of Syrian and Lebanese traders.
A traveler recently arrived from Damascus related to me several incidents
represr.ntative of the dangerous developments within the Syrian Army. He
confirmec, that the religious conflict between the Alawite and Sunni officers,
~ on the one hand and the conflict over power among the Alawites themselves,
on the other, pose a real danger to al-Assad's regime. As one illustration,
we cite an episode, which ultimately turned bloody, involving Alawite and
Sunni officers in Latakia. According to reports from the scene, a group of
Alawite naval officers disarmed and imprisoned a group of Sunni officers in
a small room. A staff officer subsequently aided the captive officers to
escape. Following the escape, the officers got together to plan revenge,
and a bloody confrontation is reported to have ensued. Rif'at al-Assad
intervened by sending his defense companies to occupy the naval base and
to arrest a large number of Sunni officers and enlisted men. On the heels
- of this episode, a pamphlet demanding that Hafiz al-Assad resign and stop
his brother's massacres received wide circulation within the armed forces.
The pamphlet is reported to have been issued in the name of the Syrian Army.
Ubservers are convinced that public wrath is forthcoming, perhaps sooner
than later, particularly in view of the proliferating signs of division
within the ranks of the ruling Ba`ath Party and the nearly complete isola-
tion of the Alawites. The potential eruption is being speeded up by Syria's
disordered foreign policy, especially the collapse of its relatiuns with
Iraq and Lebanon.
Observers believe that the dangerous developments will lead to one of two
outcomes:
1. Hafiz al-Assad will make sweeping changes extending to those now close
to him, including 'Abd al.-Halim Khaddan, 'Adnan Dabbagh, and some party
leaders. Oral directives to the ministers ordering them to clear their
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I
deslcs by the end of September appear to signal that al-Assad is planning a
_ radical political and military reorganization to save his government.
2. kiC'at al-Assad may attempt to restore stabtlity and order by for~�e. -
The attempt may take the form of a coup d'etat supported by the Soviet
Union to oust Hafiz al-Assad himself. Ttie danger implicit in such a move
is that Rif`at al-Assad may plunge Syria into a religious civil war similar
to what happened in Lebanon. .
Based on these assessments, there is a strong likelihood that Hafiz al-Assad
- might resort to radical changes--at the Alawites' expense--and offer the
Sunnis a share of genuine government control. Should this happen, two
people now close to him will pay the price. They are Rif'at al-Assad, who
is the target of bitter criticism, and Mustafa Talas, for his failure to
preven~ the spread of religious turmoil to the army.
This is the reality of the situation behind the walls of the rejectionist
state. What a shame that Damascus, the capital of the Umayyad Dynasty, -
has become a den of the Alawite gang. Farewell to imprisoned Dama.scus and
Syria's sad hills. -
9063
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WESTERN SAHIIRA
MOROCCAIV-POLISARIO CLASHES E'~ECTED TO INTIIVSIF'Y
_ Paris LE MONDE in F~ench 11 Oct 79 p 1
[Text] Whatever the actual ratio of losses--1050 Saharan dead according to
Rabat, 1269 Moroccan killed according to the POLISARIO Front,--the battle -
which took place at Slnara, the holy city of the Western Sahara, seems far -
� and away the bloodiest of the conflict which broke out exactly 4 years ago.
It also marks a new level in the escalation of this war of the sands: for
the first time the royal forces used Mirage F-1's against an adversary who
has considerably modified his tactics, if not his strategy, since 1975; the
tattered guerrillas henceforth are wearing uniforms and have become dis-
ciplined soldiers of the ~~Saharan People's Liberation Army.~~ The latter is
said Lo contain some 10:,000 men equipped with increasingly heavy eguipment.
It does not hesitate to launch into battle large numbers of e~fectives, as
many as 200U to 5000 men.
Morocco, which had planned to invite the international press to visit the
site starting Tuesday to confirm the falseness of the Saharan claims, post-
poned the departure of the journalists by 48 hours, which leads one to -
believe that the situation is still confused.
The Moroccans justifiably stress that the recent attacks of the POLISARIO
Front were conducted for political ends as much as military, on the eve of
regional or international meetings such as the OAU sumarit at Monrovia and
_ that of the nonalined nations at Havana. The battle of Smara also precedes
= the debate on the Saharan conflict in the General Assembly of the United
Nations. Actually the Saharans have always chosen the most favorable moment
for their cause, but since the beginning of the year assaults against large
garrisons have been added to ambushes and surprise attacks which contribute
to the demoralization of the enemy, as was the case in Ma.uritania. The fact
that the Saharans have attacked one of the ma.in points of the "strategic
triangle" El Aioun-Slnara-Bou Craa--where the phosphates are located--illus-
- trates the gualitative change which has progressively developed.
On the diplomatic level the N14roccans have also ha3 to yield ground. Their
c~ase was, however, defensible: they have not ceased to repeat unanimously
tYiat their~country had been dismembered by colonization and that they have
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Lhe right to re~onst~tute their territorial unity by recovering "their" _
:;ahara. 'I`he lack of firmness in the prosecution of the war added to the
absence of follow-up and the blunders of Mc~roccan diplomacy have tieverthe-
less contributed to the growth of credibility of a"Saharan entity" su~-
ported by Algeria and Libya, as is proven by the recognition of the Saharan
arab Republic by 35 states.
The POLISARIO Front believes that the prosecution of the war could lead to
"destabiliza-cion" of the monarchy. If such an eventuality were to become
reality it would not fail to have repercussions throughout all of the Maghreb,
and it would run the strong risk of provoking a more noticeable intervention
by the great powers in favor of their respective allies. It is doubtless
because they were aware of these dangers that President Boumedienne and King
Iiassan II had made discreet contacts; the death of the Algerian chief of
state ended the hopes raised by the possibilities of a meeting which, if it
did not settle the whole thing, would at least have opened up the paths to
a negotiated settlement.
Since that time Algeria has discouraged mediation attempts of President
Bourguiba, Mr Yasser `Arafat, and King Khaled of Arabia. At the headquarters
of the Arab League at Tunis they nevertheless do not despair of seeing the
new Algerian team display greater flexibility once its power is consolidated,
whereas Morocco would likewise take a step in the direction of the POLISARIO
Front. Meanwllile they admit that there is no solution in sight and that the
- clashes can only be intensified.
hlo8
c so : 1E4oo
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WESTERN SAHARA
PCE, PCF, PCI DECIDE ON JOINT ACTIONS TO SUPPORT POLISARIO
Paris L'HUMANITE in French 21 Sep 79 p 11
[Text] "Soon new initiatives will be taken to intens:fy our solidarity,"
said Georges Marchais to the POLISARIO's general secretary, Abdelaziz,
_ when they met on 28 August 1979 in Algiers. The meeting of the French,
Italian and Spanish communist parties on Thursday in Madrid was devoted
to the study of the situation in the Western Sahara. This meeting was "
undoubtedly an important initiative prompted by the new situation created
by the POL~SARIO in that region of the Maghreb.
This new situation is increasing the POLISARIO's international audience
among large world organizations. In the meantime the Sahraoui armed for c es "
are taking initiatives on the battlefield and are inflicting heavy losses
on Morocco's army.
- It is not by chance that the three parties met in Madrid. It is there that
- the disastrous agreement was signed through which Hassan II allowed his _
troops to occupy the Western Sahara. His agreement is now worthless, sin ce
after their meeting in Algiers, Mauritania agreed with the POLISARIO to
leave the part of the Sahara which had been given to it.
It is not ~nough to acknowledge Nouakchott's disengagement, as the French
Government does, or to assert one's determination to guarantee Mauritania's
territorial integrity. The main threat against this integrity comes from
~ Rabat. It is thus necessary to stop supporting the aggressors politically,
econamical~y and militarily.
On the other hand, one cannot assert that Mauritania's borders inherited
fr~m colon~al powers must be respected and then keep quiet when the
application of these principles is demanded by Sahraouis.
Upon his return from Algiers, Georges Marchais had asked Giscard d'Esta3.ng
to recognize the POI.ISARIO as sole representative of the Sahraoui people,
in order to allow France to play its role in reestablishing peace in that .
region.
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,
. ~~f
E-
The three parties meeting in Madrid decided to prevail upon their respective
governments to recognize the POLISARIO as soon as possible.
1n orcier to support this request--which, if granted, would greatly facilit~te
opening of negotiations for recognition of rights to self-determination and
independence for the Sahraoui people--French, Italian and Spanish communists
will organize meetings in Paris, Rome and Madrid.
To demonstrate their solidarity on the field, a delegaticn will soon travel .
to the Western Sahara.
These decisions, demonstrating a new step toward international solidarity
for the fighting Sahraouis, were greatly appreciated by the POLISARIO. A
delegation of the POLISARIO was in Madrid today and received news of these _
decisions. "We enthusiastically welcome this expression of international
- solidarity from your three parties, which follows an already effective and
fruitful bilateral solidarity," said Ahmed Bokhari.
This meetin~ concluded with an interview with Santiago Carillo, general
secretary from Spain's communist party, who invited the three communist
party delegations and the POLISARIO's representative to lunch.
8924
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YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC
OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON WATER CRISIS IN CAPITAL
San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 22 Jul 79 p 3
_ [Article: "The Capacity of the Water Authority to Supply the Population
of the Capital With Pure i~ater" ]
[Excerpts] Talking about water has become a major concern of the people.
Th ey do not stop talking about the importance of water projects on the
city and the village level, about what they read in the newspapers or
- . listen to on the radio and television about making pure drinking water _
available, about what the Water Authority is doing, and about the coopera-
tion of the citizens in digging water wells and exploring for ground water.
The people of San'a' have a tale about the legends of the black elephant
or the water wells which wer~ found in most of the houses of old San'a'.
The story about that matter has become a legen3 told in gatherings accord- '
ing to ancestral custom. Looking for pure water these days has become
very important because a citizen cannot dig a well by himself in his house
as he used to do in the past. He could find water without c~ifficulty as
soon as he dug a few meters in the ground. Even the projects carried out
by some capitalists are floundering since the revolution broke out and un-
til the Water Authority was established to carry out this task. _
Nowadays the citizen in our country would like to get up in the morning
to witness a new day of the era of big pro3 ects, a day of happiness on
which he does not suffer the problem of searching for water.
A citizen told me that in spite of the successive stages of the water
project which is being carried out by the Water Authority there arQ many
districts in the center of the old capital which have no water as yet
such as: (al-Fulayhi) area, Mu'ammar, Su al-Baqar, al-Shahidayn (Handal), -
al-Sayyad, (al-'Almi), al-Maftun and other districts. Axiother citizen
in one of the districts which water has reached complained of the water
crisis by saying: "The water crisis has become in many cases one of the
most important problems of our everyday~ life."
The director general Muhammad (al-Fusayl) answered some of my questions
and authorized 'Ali al-Ansi to aiiswer some other questions because he was
busy and had problems to attend to.
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[Question] The first question was related to the ability of the Water -
Authority to supply the capital and its suburbs with purified water for
~ drinking.
[Answer] At the present time the ability of the Authority is ltmited.
It depends in the first place on the first stage of the water project
which will meet the needs of 6,000 homes, that is, 36,000 persons if we
consider the average number of family members to be six. This is in
addition to the 11,000 persons who benefit from the temporary project
and who are supplied with water daily or every other day according to
the circumstances of the district and the old network of pipes which was
constructed in a totally non-technical way. The reason for this was the
unavailability of the needed supplies in the Yemeni markets and the insuf-
ficient funds at that time.
Secondly: The second stage which will meet the needs of 18,000 houses.
Work has started on ciigging the wells needed to meet the needs of the
citizens. The company tenders for implementation of the civil and electro- -
mechanical works were opened on the 16th of this month. This second stage
will cover all the houses located on the circular line surrounding the
capital.
[Question] Can the Authority cover all the districts of the capital and
why?
[Answer] In spite of this we do not expect that the authority will be
able to extend water to all the districts of the city, because the devel-
� opment of the city is haphazard and no authority in the world is able to _
give precise estimates for the expansion. You know that emigration from
the country to the city is increasing daily and it has a dangerous effect
on the services in the city because the democracy which every citizen in ,
our proud republic enjoys entitles him to request from the state all the
necessary services such as water, electricity and medical care on an equal .
footing with every other citizen who has been living in the city for a
long time.
[Question] It is said that the first stage of the San'a' water pro3ect
cost about 90 million riyals. Is this correct? Does the Authority bene-
fit: from this?
[Answer] I have answered one of your questions by saying that the first
stage has not yet been finished and according to contracts with the
several companies we expect the project to cost 70 million riyals.
Concerning the second part of the question, that is, the benefits the
Authority will gain, I would say they are as follows:
l. Solving the present problem of making pure water available so that it ;
may meet the citizen's needs.
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2. The Authority will meet its obligations to the state because it is a
service organization and should take care of the citizen's living condi-
tions because the goal is not material as much as it is developmental. _
3. Completion of the Authority's proj ects will raise the health standard
of the citizen, because pure water helps to eliminate many common diseases. `
_ 4. If pure water becomes available the citizen will save the money he may
spend on combating illness and buying medicine. Pure water is an impor-
tant health and economic factor.
[Question] What are the costs of the new Authority building and how much
has the Authority saved over the monthly rents it was paying?
, [Answer] The cost of the building may reach 10 million riyals. The sav-
ings on the monthly rents for the Authority includes the rents paid for
storage areas, the rental of our branch which cost 6, 000 riyals per month,
the rental of the headquarters which saas 15, 000 riyals per month and the
rental of the consultation building which was 20, 000 riyals a month. The
Authority intends to require the consulting and operating firms to have
their offices in the same building; this will help the Authority to meet
its obligations by making the offices availz~le to the firms. Moreover ~
~ the closeness of the firms ~�r:ill facilitate communication with them and
help the decision-making process, something no one can ignore.
The director general said concerning the problems faced by the Authority:
"The Authority has established a special department to handle home hook- -
ups after a detailed technical and econom~c study which will help the
department to hook up as many ho:ises as possible. This study was conducted
with the interest of the citizen and the affected areas which were in-
cluded .i_n the first stage of the San`a' water project in mind. The Author-
ity carries out the digging, makes supplies available and transports them
_ to the point nearest his property [words omitted] or a public project.
_ The department has carried out 2,000 hookups so far and the work is still
going on . _
As for the second part of your question, the prob? zms which face the
Authority when hooking up the water to citizens' houses, I may mention
the following:
Firstly: The bene{iciary does not abide by the rules and regulations of ~
_ the Autharity, for example by not maintaining the water-meter.
Secondly : They do not prevent their children from playing near the water-
meter . _
Thirdly: Attaching the valve to the water-meter ixi a primitive way which
results in br~aking the water pipe.
9215 E~
CSO: 4802
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