JPRS ID: 9156 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9001
26 March 1980 ~
Sub-Saharan Africa Re or~#
p
FOUO No. 669
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JPR5 L/9001
26 March 1980
SUB-SAiIARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 669
CONTENTS PAGE
INTII~-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
- Role of ACDA Aid Program Ex~anined ~
(Sophie Bessis; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 Jan 80) l
Briefs 4
Guinea Se~ks UDEAC Membership
ANG OLA
DrieFs
Oil Production 5 .
Export Statistics 5
Education Minister to GDR 5
CAMEROON
Briefs 6
Paddy Rice Production 6
French Aid for Kribi Port 6 _
Population Prediction
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
~Bokassa Overthrow, Libyan Relations, Dacko Policies Noted
(Henri Maidou Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 Jan 80).. 7
French Cooperation Minister's December Visit Reported
( MARCHES TROPICAUX ET NI~'DIT~tRANE.ENS, 14 De c 79 18
CHAD
Two Gr.oups Withdraw From FACP
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI^lERRANEENS, 14 Dec 79).... 20
_ a_ [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) ~'ge _
GUNT Exists Only on Paper; Petroleum Prospects Noted 22
(Jos-Blaise-Alima; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 Jan 80)......
_ CONGO
' French A~reement on Movement of Individuals
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI`I'E~RANEENS, 14 Dec 79~ . 25
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Briefs
Cooperation Agreements With Spain 27
GABON
Agricultural, Other Resources' Data Analyzed
~
(Francois Ga.ulme; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET 28
MEDITERRANEENS, 25 Jan 80)
Briefs
Alleged Mercenary Camps 32
GUINEA
Bri efs
Rc,lations With Brazil Strengthened 33
Cereal Deficit 34
Railroad Delegation to USSR 3
National Assembly Constitution 3~
PRC Visit for Toure 3
Japanese Truck Donation 35
Technical, Cultural Agreement With DPRK 35 _
Agropastoral Cooperation With FRG 35
IVORY COAST
~
Details Given on Operational Budget
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Jan 80).. 36
LIBERIA
Pol~tical Situation After Attempted Assassination of
Opposition Member
( MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITF~iRANEENS, 14 Dec 79 ~2
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CONTENTS (Continued) ~ge
MALI ~
lir~ Lr: ('t,
I'u c~~l Dc 1.' i. c I l.
" CCCF Loaris ~14
Cooperai;:ion With Brazil 44
MOZANIDIQUE -
Briefs
Development of Agricultural Cooperative ~+5
Butane Availability ~+5
Cashew Nut Production Down 46
Steam Locomotives To Remain 46
" Budget for 1980 46
RHODESIA
F'uture of Whites in Independent Zimbabwe Pondered -
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 Jan 80)....... 47
;~f+~IVi~G/~L
;;~ci~;hor D:i .cu~;~es F.'arly Intellectua,l Influences,
Nonalinement
(Leopold Sedar Senghor Interview; LE NOWII,
OBSERVATEUR, 11-1j Feb 80) 51
French Financing Agreements Signed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITEEtRAN~'ENS, 8 Feb 80)..: 64
Data on Price Increases Reported
(MARCIiES TROPICAUX ET MEDI'.PERRANEENS, 8 Feb 80)... 65
Briefs
FIDA Rural Developrr,ent Loan 6?
SIERRA LEONE
Briefs
President Visits Kuwait, Qatar 68
Diamond Deposits Exploitable Profitably 68
International Fina,nc~al Aid 68
- c -
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CONTENTS (Continued) ~ ~'~e
TAN7~NIA
Briefs
Sisal Exports 7~
Danish Aid 7~ -
' Flower Mill Output Increase 7~
Data on Irrigation 7~
TOGO
?.gricultural, Mineral, Financial Statistics Published
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~NS, 15 Feb 80).... 72
- Briefs 4
Support for Eyadema 7
ZAIRE
Need for Political, Economic Reforms Outlineci
_ (Claude Jadoul; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
18 Jan 80) .......e 75
Briefs
PRC Agricultlzral Agreement _
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` INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ROLE OF ACDA AID PROGRAM EXAMINED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jan 80 pp 36-37
~Article by Sophie Bessis: "The Aid War Will Not Take Place"]
[Text] The ACDA: Under these initials, the new Concerted Action for
- Development in Africa has, since 28 December, joined the long list of =
associations that have flourished for the past several years to help
Africans emerge from underdevelopment. Unlike its elders, this newborn
organization is the off,:~rins~ of France.
Ulterior Motives
It was actually at the French-African conference that met in May 1976 in
Paris that President Valery Giscard d'Estaing launched the idea. It was
an ambitious project: The French chief of state proposed to persuade four
other ma~or Western countries (the United States, the Feder~l Republic of
Germany, Great Britain and Belgium) to participate in the creation of a
development fund endowed with a financial package of $1 billion to be ,
spent in 5 years in Africa, in the southe.rn Sahara. Since the initiative
was French, Valery Giscard d'Estaing undertook to spons~r the operation
from beginning to end and thereby make France appear to be.one of the main
instigators of African development.
After 3 years of negotiations, the mountain seems to have given birth to a
mouse: The ACDA does not have a penny to its name and is but a structure
for concertation between six of the main Western finan~ial backers, with
Canada having joined the initial team. Experts will therefore meet regu- _
larly to coordinate the aid awarded individually by the six new partners
and encourage the startup of projects to open up countries without access _
to the sea, fight natural disast~rs (drought and major endemic diseases)
and promote agricultural development. None of these things are new, 3nas-
, much as the cooperation organizations of the different states did not wait
for 1980 before ge~ting together regularly, even if each one does have its
own policy.
In order to understand this half failure suffered by France, one has to go
back to 1976 and even further, to the time of the launching of the little
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aid war whose origins are as one might have suspected much more poli-
tical than strictly economic. Beginning with the upheavals from 1970 to
1975 on the African continent and elsewhere: the oil crisis, the drought
in the Sahel and its consequences, the fall of the Ethiopian empire, Soviet-
Cuban penetration of southern Africa and the American withdrawal from South-
east Asia, Africa ceased being the reserved domain of the former colonial
powers. -
Suspicion and Distrust
� In the initial stage, it was a question of breaking down the de facto
economic monopoly of countries such as France and of enticing nations by
large amounts of financing. This is one of the reasons why for the past
several years, there has been an increasing "multilateralization" of
financia~ aid under tne aegis, among other organizations, of the World
Bank, and the establishment of development organizations such as the Club -
of the Sahel, sponsored by the OECD.[Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development], in which the United States and Canada have played an
overwhelming role, at least at the outset. At first, Frar~ce looked askance _
at all of this. It was all the more concerned since the stagnation of its
financial ai3 to development in real terms did not allow it to oppose
the reorientation effectively. iiowever, Giscard d'Estaing is not a man to
abdicate and he knows that prolonged brooding does not pay off. It was
therefore a matter of moving with the current, while giving France a pre-
ponderant role in the drafting of the policy of aid to development.
These seem to have been the objectives that presided over the idea's incep-
tion in 1976, ideas since renewed at every French-African summit conference.
However, the rival partners were not so easily convinced, reluctant to have
France shine thanlcs to their. dollars or marks!
How was the current compromise then achieved? First of all, on the politi-
cal level, President Carter was to accede at least partially to
France's desires, since the nation had become the principal defender of
Western positions in Africa. Moreover, it is significant that in this
~ matter, the State Department supported the creation of the ACDA, while
the U.S.-AID (the American organizaticn for aid to development) was hos-
tile to it. Because of their ideologically unbiased aid (the Congo and
- the Ivory Coast are on the payroll along with the European Develonment
Fund), the Europeans have many more trump cards than the United States for
"bringing around"�the~countries situated in the Soviet sphere and which -
receive many weapons from their great ally...but few machines or factories.
The possibility of detaching certain African countries from their alliance
- with the Eastern bloc seems to have won out.
Great Solemnity
On the economic level, finally, the experience of countries such as France
and Great Britain, fellow travelers in Africa, can be ~f great help in
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drafting projects important on a regional scale. Without a doubt, the French
pr.esident goes a little overboard when he declares: "The ACDA is one of the
most significant undertakings in international cooperation.'' Nevertheless,
he has managed to have the "permane~tt liaison group" of the new association
set up its headquarters in Paris. Diplomat Edouard Theysset has already
been named as France's representative, while the United States chose the
former representative of U.S.-AID in Dakar, Mr Schoonover. A meeting of
tiigh officials from the six cauntries will take place twice annually in order
to coordinate aid programs.
The enterprise was announced with great solemnity to the African countries
and the OAU. Was it in order to make them forget that it will not increase
the financial flow to their continent one cent? At most, the endertaking
will make it possible to speed up joint financing procedures for costly
programs and prevent rivalries between backers.
There is great hope in Paris that other major countries such as Japan wil~
soon join this "Club of the Six." But it is obvious that for the time
being, at least, the birth of the ACDA will not bring any major changes in
Africa's long march toward development.
r
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
r
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
GUINEA SEEKS UDEAC MEMBERSHIP--Equatorial Guinea would like to join the "
UDEAC (Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa), consisting of
Cameroon, Central Africa, the ~ongo, and Gabon. President Teodoro Obiang
Nguema Mbazogo confided this to his host, Mr Ahmadou Ahidjo, during his
official visit to Cameroon on 24-27 January. [Text] jParis JEUNE AFRIQUE
in French 6 Feb 80 p 55] 5058
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS "
OIL PRODUCTION--These are the statistics for Angola's oil production:
9,318,000 tons in 1973, 10,036,000 tons in 1974, 5,464,000 tons in 1975,
6,552,000 tons in 1976, 10,069,000 tons in 1977 and 8,198,000 tons in 19~8.
The statistics for 1979 have not y~t been specified; according to the
PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, production wi11 hover around 9,000,000 tons. In 1978,
Angolan refinery capacity was as follows: fuel-oil, 445,318 tons (of which
431,917 tons were exported); gas-oil, 201,271 tons (with 6,804 tons exported);
kerosene, 93,000 tons; gasoline 68,629 tons (3,788 tons exported); crude
oil, 27,912 tons; butane, 7,659 tons; asphalt, 3,810 tons. [Text] [~aris
MARCHES TROP ICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Feb 80 p 399]
EXPORT STATISTICS--The commercial section of the French Embassy in Luanda
has estimated that the total amount of Angolan exports for 1978 rose to
$1,100 million. This total is apportioned as follows: oil, $800 million
(72.7 percent); diamonds, $85 million (7.7 percent); coffee, $145 million
(13.18 percent); other products, $70 million (6.36 percent). [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROP ICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Feb 80 p 399~
EDUCATION MINISTER TO GDR--Mr Ambrosio Lukoki, a member of the Politburo
of the MPLA-Labor Party and education miaister of the People's Republic
~ of Angola, has been touring Eurone since early January. In the GDR, he
was received by Mr Hermann Axen, a member of the Politburo of the Socialist
Unity Party. Mr Axen assured Mr Lukoki of the GDR's support for the action
which Angola is taking "to defend itself against South African aggression,"
the ADN [General East German News Agency] reported. With Mr Oskar Fischer,
GDR minister of foreign affairs, on 14 January Mr Luk~ki signed a 2-year
operational agreement providing among other things for expansiun of bilateral
cooperation in education and culture. Mr Lukoki t.hen went to Yugoslavia,
where he arrived on 17 January, for a"working visit." After. landing in -
Belgrade, the Ang;nlan minister said that he intended to talk wit.h his Yugoslav
hosts about coope:ratinn between the twa countries in education and training
of cadres. [Tex~C] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
25 Jan 80 p 215] 11915
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CAMEROON
BRIEFS
Pr1DDY RICE PRODUCTION--In Northern Cameroon, thanks to the efforts made
during 1978-79, paddy rice production rose to a total of 30,000 tons, of
which 18,600 tons were obtained in the rainy season. Paddy production
has been on the increase since 1974. In fact, for the period 1974-1975,
6,602 tons were har~-ested; 1975-1976 saw a gain to 17,000 tons and 1976-
1977 to 23,000 tons. In 1977-1978, the improvement was smaller: only
24,300 tons, but in 1978-1979 the figure rose to 30,000 tons. However,
the situation insofar as marketing is concerned is quite alarming. There
are 11,000 tons of paddy stocks, of which approximately 1,500 tons are
not under cover of any kind owing to the lacl~ of space in the warehouses,
a stoppage at the processing plant and congestion in the final products
warehouses. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French -
11 Jan 80 p 86] 7129
FRENCH AID FOR KRIBI PORT--Mr Youssoufa Daouda, Cameroon's minister for
economy and the plan, on 22 December (I979) signed a financing agreement
whereby France will grant the Cameroon 250 million CFA francs for the con-
struction of the port of Kribi. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 p 871 7129
POPULATION PREDICTION--In the year 2000, the Cameroon expects to have 14
million inhabitants, as compared with the 8 million at present. It is
estimated that the gainfully employed population will exceed 7 million,
according to a statement made on 7 January, last, at Yaounde by the
Cameroon's deputy minister for economy and the plan, Mr Pierre-Desire
Engo. As chairman of the meeting of the Cameroon's Commission for Produc-
tion, entrusted with ~.he task of examining the country`s development pros-
pects, Mr Engo stressed that it was importar?t to consider the means of
providing employment for everyone. At the same time, it was necessary to
offer educational facilities to some 3 million children between the ages
of 6 and 14, who will be attending school by the e~d of the 20th century.
Afcer indicating that some 48.5 percent of the population would live in
urban areas by the year 2000, the deputy mi.nister emphasized the need for
the country's growth in order to be able to meet all the demands of its
population. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
11 Jan 80 p 87] 7129
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
' BOKASSA OVERTHROW, LIBYAN RELATIONS, DACKO POLICIES NOTED
- Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in Frenr_h 30 Jan 80 pp 50-56
[Interv iew with Henr: Maidou, CAR vice president by Senn ~ Andriamirado et al.]
[Text] An interview with Henri Maidou, vice president of
the Central African Republic, le~ by Sennen Andriamirada,
with the participation of Jos-Blaise Alima, Sophie Bessis,
Abdelaziz Dahman i, Siradiou Dia11o and Jean-Pierre N'Piaye.
They called him "Mr Contradiction" during the last months _
of Bokassa. Under David Dacko, he is suspected of being
the real wielder of power. Former pri.me minister of the
' empire, now vice president of the republic, Henri Maidou
knew that when he came to JEUNE AFRIQUE no punch~s would
be p~illed. Why had he supporred Bokassa to the end?
Why had he called on France to dethrone the emperor in
- a half hour? Why had he yielded first place to David
Dacko? He told us everything.
"Bokassa had no reality otrer than tha.t ~~hich he himself had created." This
- incisive judgment is a testimony which has historical value. It comes f rom
Henri Maidou, current vice president of the CAR, but especially the close
collaborator of the fallen emperor during nearly 10 years.
Former prime minister of "His Majesty," he is one of the str~king f igures
- of that period of terror and humiliation which the Central Africans would
like to forget forever. Under these conditions, it is understandable that
the person of Henri Maidou would be debated for the role that he had p1�ayed
in the recent past.
Why hadn't he resigned if, as he claims, he had already long been in
disagreement with Bokassa`s methods? The reply is instantaneous: "Nobody
willingly quit his position during the 14 years tnat the monarch's
dictatorship lasted." And he continues: "I had to be extremely careful, _
~ because tf Bokassa had had the slightest evidence of my plan, I would hav e
been liquidated immediately, and his removal would have been postponed until
a snowy day in Ju1y..."
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Henri Maidou is not stingy with conf idences. He willir_gly states that despite
the banning of JEUNE AFRIQUE under Bokassa, he read it regularly thanks to
the collusion of friends coming back from trips who carried the newspapers
under their coats. He still remembers, with a smile on his lips, the
grotesqu~ decision of Bokassa to forbid h~.s subjects from lisCening to Radio
- France's international broadcasts. So many facts which demon::trate the
state of mind of a tyrant who did not ~shy away from ridicule, and whom Henri
Maidou descr~bes as a man who "did not hesitate to use all methods for
pursuing hj.s ascension to eternity."
Keystone of the core of conspirators who had resolved to undermine the regime
from inside, this gZeasant man, well-built and with graying hair, set off by
a shock of white at the f orehead, has an elegance which is rather rare among
Af rican politicians. From ~iis training as a teacher, he has retained a
certain taste for instructing. This tendency clearly wins out over the
subtlety and sensitivity of the politician, as shown by his little inclination
to dodge even the most embarrassing af questions. The man has a real mastery _
of ~vords and ideas. Without searching for the striking expression, he goes
right to the point.
The point? "Bokassa had to be gotten rid of, no matter what the means used,"
he replied to a question concerning the role of France. And he added, "The
people were inhibited. The army had naither amsunition nor weapons. We
were all waiting for Bokassa to die in bed."
The complete understanding which he has of his countrymen and of his country
comes from long experience gained in the field. On-the-~job-trained as a
teacher, Henri Maidou left his country in 1960 to go to Brazzaville, Congo,
where for a year he attended courses at the Institute of Higher Studies.
Next, he went to Rennes, in France, where after three years he became a
CEG (general studies high school) teacher. After returning to Bangui in
1964, he left again immediately for France and enrolled in the Nancy Faculty
of Letters. With a license degree in geography, he tried to pass his
certification exams, which he took one time. Without success. Even today,
he regrets not having had the time to start over again....
When he went back to his country in 1969, Henri Maidou, who was a member of
the Central Af rican Students Association, a subsidiary of the restless FEANF
(Federation of Students of French-Speaking Black Africa), knew that the
holder of the presidency of the Republic had changed. David Dacko had, in
fact, been replaced four years earlier by Jean-Bedel Bokassa. The Central
~frican students had, at the time, condemned the coup d'etat. But for Maidou, -
it was a new lif e that was starting because Bokassa called him to his eide.
In rhythan with the ministerial musical chairs which "Papa Bok" liked to
play, he became, starting in 1970, in turn minister of national education, of
health, and of territorial economic organization. In 1947, he was again back
in the department of national education, before being named vice prime
ministPr in 1977 and then prime minist er in July 1978.
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This is to say that the current vice president of the CAR knows perf ectly we11
how the wheels of administration of his country turn. It is understandable
that today he passes for the pillar of new regime. He is none the less at
ease when he recalls the policies of the old regime, which he summarizes in _
a conr.ise phrase: Bokassa had raised terror to a systen: of government."
But he is far from being merely a man from the past. In some circles, .
they're betting that he'll some day take over the reins of the Central
African state. Does he want it? For once, Henri Maidou dodges a question,
- that of whether he considers himself "as a back-up for the republic." He
states that he wi11 support David Dacko in the coming presidential elections.
Since at 43 years of age he feels he has his future i:1 front of him, he can
still be cuntent to play second fiddle. But can one pick one's o an time 3n
politics?
For the mament, the economic revival of the CAR appears to be f aremost in
" the eyes of the leaders in Bangui. An interim 2 year plan has been prepared.
It involves thre~ essential sectors: transportation, agriculture, and
mining. At the time of reckoning, one must indeed judge the tree by its
fruit. Can the team which Henri Maidou is leading successfully pass this
difficult hurdle? More than ever, the old student recalls with bitterness ,
' having been f lunked once in the geography certi.fication exams. That didn't
stop him from pt~rsuing a long political career and fram surviving Bokassa.
But he is no longer allowed the smallest failure. Because the Central
Africans are waiting for him at the turning point.
"By January 1979, I Had Perfected My Plan With the French"
[Question] Henri Maidou, you were No 2 under Bokassa, you have remain ed No
2 under David Dacko. Do you have any trouble saying "Central African _
_ Republic" after so often saying "Central Af rican Empire?"
[Answer] No, I don't have any trouble. And we have become very quickly
� reaccustomed to saying Central Af rican Republic. In the adminis~ration, _
some secretaries had even saved the envelopes of the first Republic. We �
took them out to use! , ~
[Question] You worked a long time with the emperor. Minister during eight
years, you made a major jump in July 1978. Named prime minister, you had
to collaborate very closely in developing the imperial policies.
[Answer] Should I have refused? No statesman, no Central African leader
ever refused or willingly left a post during all that period. We all lived
in terror. Nobody was any longer in a position to react intelligently. The
instinct for survival reigned supreme. That will give you some idea of the
risk. we took in staging the coup d'etat.
(Question] At the beginning, what did you thj.nk of Bokassa? And more
precisely in 1969 when, having finished your studies in France, you returned
to Bangui?
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~Answer] Bokassa had then been in power fou~ years. But things didn't really
go bad until after 1975. When I returned to Central Africa, what struck me
was the artificial side of things. One day, Bokassa called together a11
the government officials. He started by telling us: "I have ~ust completed
5 years. I don't intend to continue. What do you think?" Certain ones
spoke up to ask him not tr leave power. After five or six speakers, he
declared that, in order to comply with the requests presented, he had
decided to stay on. Then, having f inished the meeting, he invited us to
his palace for cocktails. To celebrate the event. Actually, the festivities
had been prepared even before the consultations!
[Quest ion] All that did not prevent you from working with Bokassa.
[Answer] When I was appointed minister in 1970, things were more or less
going well. Or. the economic level, we were well off. Even at the time of
the coronation we were we11 off because the coffee market was at the highest
level ever. Even so, the coronation cost five billion CFA francs.
[question] Then you lived under what you call the terror. And you worked with
Bokassa? How did ~?e govern? ~ou consulted beforeehis coronation?~' ~ a
member of his government, were y
[Answer] The decision to have himself crowned emperor was, for Bokassa, the
culmination of a long road. He became marshal, president for life, then
emperor. At each stage, he convened a congress of the party. Each time,
the congress served to provide approval for his ascension to the eternity of
power.
[Question] But did you never, as prime minister, have anything to say about it?
[Answer] When I was appointed prime minister, the dream was already accomplished.
Bokassa was emperor.
[Question] After that, one had the impres~~on~t~t~~ denyetheomassacres of
example in May 1979, you knew what was g g
the children?
"Nobody Would Have Had the Courage to Kill Bokassa"
[Answer] Everyone knows that there would not have been that French inter- _
vention if the prime minister, which was me, had n~e ared the dlanswhich I
called in the French government, and we together p p P
culminated in the coup of 20 Sep 79. It is therefore easy to explain what F
you are criticizing me for: if B~kassa had had the slightest doubt about
me, I would have been neutralized. .
[Question] You mean eliminated?
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[Answer] At the very least, I would not have remained prime minister. It ~
was necessary to lull Bokassa. Something which I clearly su~ceeded in do~.n;g.
And that fact alone was what would zahabilitate me. Becuuse I state that :L
took the resp~onsibility for callin~; in France, all the while staying at _
the side of. Bokassa.
_ [QuestionJ When did you ca11 on the French for help?
[Answer] In January 1979, at the time of the first incidents--for wh3.ch
Bokassa later claimed I was responsible whereas I was not there. I was in
Belgium at the time. I went back through Paris before returning to Bangui.
At that time, I began to alert the responsible Fretich officials and to put
together a plan with them. On my return to Central Africa, I spoke again
- with Dacko.
[Question] You always say "I" and not "we." Does that mean that from the
start you were the only heart of ~he "plot."
[Answer] There was a small core of us taking the responsibility. But I say
"I," because as prime minister, I was tt~e 1ega1 authority who had to approve
the decision.
[Question] Why get David Dacko into the coup?
[Answer] I have known Dacko a long time, and I a].ways discussed the problem
with him.
- [Question] Did you consult with General Sylvestre Bangui who was then the
ambassador to France, or with Ange Patasse?
- [Answer] Never.
[Question] So who was in your core group? The present prime minister Bernard
, Ayandho, vice prime minister Alphonse Koyamba?
[AnswerJ Ayandho was not part of the structure. On the other hand,I Dacko
and Koyamba were. -
[Question] Why did Dacko become No 1 and not you?
[Answer] Our goal was not that one or the other become president, but that
the CAR not sink lower than it already had. It was essential to get rid of
Bokassa. Tt?e choice of a president would come later. It was not said that
_ this would be me. Besides, T was not all that interested in it. Since David
Dacko had been in France at that time, since hE~ had already been president of
the Republic, since he was older than I, I accepted it quite normally.
[Question] Who picked David Dacko?
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[Answer] It was not a somebody that picked him. Together, we were at the
source of the action; it was only a matter of knowing who, he or I, would
~ become president. -
[Question] Aiterwards, the die was cast. In your opinion, is David Dacko
~ going to be president for a long ~ime?
[AnswerJ That wouldn't bother me. I'm young.
[Question] Wasn't France involved in the selection of president?
[AnswerJ France was the arm. ~
[Question] Do you think that France is satisf ied with it or will be satisf ied?
Was it only in the name of friendship or human rights tt~at it helped you?
[Answer] I don't think that in today's world there are any philanthropists
who would only act for humanitarian reasons. Ourselves, we profit from what
has happened. There is no reason why, if there must be any profit, France
would not also benefit on its side. If we had called on the United States
or the Soviet Union, the situation would have been the same. Provided, of
course, that there be no blatant despoiling of Central African interests.
[Question] Under what conditions was French assistance given to you?
[Answer] None, We didn't bargain, and France didn't haggle either over its
intervention.
[Question] And you claim that the Central Africans by themselves could do
nothing?
[Answer] The Central Africans were paralyzed, I tell you! I'll give you an
example: on 20 April, there were massacres. On the 21st, Bangui was back
to lif e. The Central Af ricans were reduced to waiting for Bokassa to die
from natural causes, from an illness or from an accident. But nobody would
have had the courage to go try to kil.l him. Once again, that gives you an
- idea of what it took for us to deeide to act, while staying next to him.
Because once the plan was decided, we were exchanging messages with the
French authorities.
[Quest ionJ And yet France waited a long time. Contacts were started in
January, and action took place only in September. Meanwhile,.there were
other massacres in April.
[Answer] France waited because such an operation could not be done in one
or two months. In a country where spying had reached such proportions that
one distrusted his own wif a, it was diff icult to mount~a plan of operation.
Having spent his military service in counter-espionage, Bokassa knew all the
tricks of the trade!
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[QueStion] If France had decided to keep him on his throne, would you have _
been able to get ~id of Bokassa?
[AnswerJ It would certainly have been harder. But other countries would
perhaps have helped us.
[Question] So Bokassa's fate was sealed. Was his departure for Libya on
17 Sep 1979 part of the plan? Did you encourag2 him to leave so you could
- spring the trap on him?
[Answer] No, it wasn't a trap. The treason was empty, and Bokassa needed
money to paythe government workers. In addition, he had come to realize
that his men were ineff ective because they had no training. He wanted to
ask the Libyans to contribute. -
[Question] What did he off er the Libyans in exchange?
[Answer) He wanted to cede the north-eastern tip of Central Africa to
Qadhdhafi. But in September events had him by tha throat. He had to have
mon ey .
[Question] We thought that France was still picking up the tab.
[Answer] The report of the commission of African magistrates on the events
in Bangui had been published. Franca drew its conclusions.
[Question] If he hadn't gone to Tripoli, would he have kept his throne?
[Answer] No. At any rate, 48 or 72 hoLrs later, the oueration ;aould have
been under way. I knew that.he wouldn't make it past 9eptember.
[Question] That night of 20 September you were calmly at home. Without having
taken the basic precautions to protect yourself. Didn't you know that the
I coup d'etat was going to take place that night?
[Answer] That wasn`t the question. A single false move would have put my
life in danger. Moreover, that same day around 1800 hours I saw Bokassa's
plane flying over Bangui. I got sick, thinking that he had returned. Then
I realized that it was thE Corvette making a training flight. Bokassa had
taken th~ other plane. ,
"Libya Does Not Hold Us Dear"
[Question] Everyone knows that you subsequently took refuge in the French
embassy. Everyone also knows that David Dacko arrived that night. Where
did you get together?
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+ [AnswerJ In the radio building. As for my presence at the French embassy,
I'm not hiding anything. Every one ox" us had his own execution squad
assigned to kill us at the slightest alert. The people of his guard, whom -
Bokassa had put around us, had been given the mission of killing us ~ven
if he himself was probably already dead.
_ [Question] Is it true that David Dacko hesitated at the last moment?
[AnswerJ I don't know.
_ [Question] Once the coup had succeeded, you appeared before the people and
the press. It seems that President Dacko made some gaffes. He declared,
for example, that he intended to establish diplamatic rela.tions with South
Africa, before saying that this was a"joke." One of us was there at the
scene and saw you on several occasions whisper more proper responses to him.
[Answer] You have to understand our state of physical and menFal fatigue.
We were in the second day of what I would call "the assault of the press."
We had not slept the night before. It was a real marathon. For the second
time in the same day, President Dacko was bei.ng interviewed. His answers
were a little hasty.
[Question] If tomorrow there were to be a public election, would David Dacko
be elected president of the Republic?
[Answer] By a wide margin.
- [Question] And yourself, would you not be a candidate?
(Answer] We are not there yet. The party convention is to take place in
March. If a consensus favors me, I will be the candidate. If it favors
David Dacko--and that will be the case--I will support him with all my power.
[Question] Some say that you are on reserve, to pick up the relay. _
[Answer] I don't know if I'm worthy of it!
[Question] You have set up a single party, the Central African Detnocratic
Union. And this party is to designate a candidate which the peQple will
have to ratify. Aren't you justifying the caricature of elections won by
99.99 percent of the votes?
[Answer] That caricature is exaggerated, especially by the Westerners. We
have a single party, but after all in the United States there are only two
parties. In Great Britain, the same. In France, for 53 million inhabitants
there are never more than three big parties.
[QuestionJ But even so there are at least four!
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[Answer] Yes, but there are three big currents: the socialists, the `
communists, and the right which is split into factions. In Central Africa,
where the state of mind is still burdened with tribal differences, it is
dangerous to let a multitude of parties flower wha would do nothing except
dividethe people and lead thein into an unhealthy parlamentar~anism. Something
w~;tch we in fact did for a month after Bokassa's overthrow.
"I Thought Bokassa Had Come Back. I Go= Sick"
E
[Question] In October, all the Centr.al African forces in fact organized a
round table. Why did you fail?
[Answer] Because of Patasse and his friends! Instead o= coming to talk of
general policies, they came to insult everybody. This is how they missed
the boat. And we were on the road to adopting a multiparty structure!
[QuestionJ After that, things got worse again. Foreign powers have even
been implicated. The ambassador of Libya and his associates were asked at
the beginning of January 1980 to pack their bags.
[Answer] I was not there when that decision was made. But Libya does not
hold us dear. Some Libyans no doubt wanted to ~~se certain persons to carry
out subversive activities.
[Question] In what way?
[Answer] Those who were against Bokassa came back to Bangui. T~Te should have
worked together. Certain ones tried to split the country along ehtnic lines.
That would have led us into a fratricidal fight. They thought tY~at they
should necessarily and i~ediately come to power. Like we had made the
coup d'etat just to step aside for them!
[Question] What are or what were your relations with Ange Patasse, with whom
you worked for a long time under Bokassa?
_ [Answer) I was a friend of Patasse even before we each became statesmen.
Within the government, we had friendly relation s. Right up to the time he
resigned as prime minister. He has even claimed that it was he that had
suggested to Bokassa to appoint me his successor.
[Question] Is it true?
[Answer] I don't know whether Bokassa was one to accept suggestions!
[Question] Afterwards, Patasse is your political adversary.
[Answer] He has made himself the political opponent of the men who are now
in power!
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[Question] What do you really disagree about? -
[Answer] Patasse has never clearly expressed what it is that he wants.
Concerning the nature or form of the government, for example. _
[Question] Is there a place today for an Abel Goumba in Central Africa?
- [Answer] I don't even know if he exists on the national level!
[Question] You have now set yourself the task of rebuilding the country. And
~ to do so, you are again calling on France which has already helped yos gain
power. In the f inal analysis, is the Central African state independent?
~ [Answer] We are sovereign and independent.
[Question] Isn't the Central African Republic a state under trust, not to
say a protectorate?
[Answer] It is not because France helps us that our country is under trust!
[Question] What would you say are Central Africa's trump cards?
[Answer] First of all, on the geographic level we have very interesting
possibilities. We are in the heart of Africa. The Central African Republic,
if it is well equipped, can play the role of a crossroads between all parts
of Africa, from the point of view of rai1, highway and air transport.
~Central Africa will be a veritable roundhouse the day when the African nations,
and the other nations who are inclined to help us, become aware of it.
[Question] All the same, it is strange to note how, whenever the question of
development is approached, African leaders always talk about the future!
Rarely about the present. And Africa has been independent for 20 years. '
~rt,y? -
[Answer] The reason is simple. Up till now, by virtue of the politics of
cooperation--multilateral or bilateral--nobody has yet found the appropriate
formula for the aid to be given to the underdeveloped nations.
[Questian] You talk of foreign aid. What about the internal dynamics of the
- countries?
[Answer] Do you think that, at the present level of technology, one can start
anything serious without foreign involvement? What we're dealing with is
determining the most effective means for aiding the nations which have
, decided to undertake real development themselves. The Central African
Republic is potentially very rich. But we have perhaps not yet found the
best means of exploiting our riches. And underdevelopment, what is it? It
is f irst and foremost a human underdevelopment. In a nation where out of a
hundred persons on~y two or three are high level staff, that's what the probl2m
~ is.
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"Anything Can Still Happen" _
[Question] Thus, you have uranium but nct the means to exploit it.
[ M swerJ Uranlum we have a lot of. And with our partners we are currently
seeing how we can ensure a good start-up. We have to get the country going
again. We have to build the major axes of communication. Including to
the Atlantic, i.e. to Douala, in Camaroon. To do this, we already have the
support of France, West Germany, the EEC and Japan. Besides these ma~or
axes, we must also open up the hinterlands to serve the coffee or cotton
areas. In agriculture per se, we must revive the agricultural research
stations for improving seed, distributing the f ertilizers, the insecticides,
the equipment, and popularizing cultivation techniques.
[Question] Where does the production o~ diamonds stand?
[Answer] It is barely a third of what production was in 1968, but its value
has exceeded that of 1968. If it could get back to its level of ten years
ago, the income would go a long way to relieving our budget. But we have to
get organized again to block the frauds and the loss of our diamonds.
[QuestionJ Speaking of the loss of diamonds, Bokassa's crown which was
encrusted with gems has disappeared. Do you know where it is?
[Answer] Unfortunately, no! It's too bad, because that crown is extremely
valuable!
[Question] And Bokassa himself? They say that you have dropped your request
for his extradition from the Ivory Coast.
[AnswerJ No way! We have demanded his extradition and will continue to do
so.
[QuestionJ President Dacko has said: "As long as Bokassa is alive, we are
all in danger of death." Da you, Henri Maidou:~; consider qourself in mortal
danger?
[Answer] It is not beyond possibility that Bokassa sti11 has friends and
money. If we don't have any fears on the level af national security, on
the individual level, anything can happen. We can be afraid of everything.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Af rique GRUPJIA 1980
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
FRENCH COOPERATION MINISTER'S DECII~ER VISIT REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3464
[Text] Robert Galley, French Minister of Cooperation, was in the Central
African Republic [CAR] from 4 to 10 December on an official visit. _
He was received by President Dacko as soon as he arrived. His talks with
some Central African ministers were completed by a visit to Banbari, 300
km northwest of Bangui, where the National Instittite for Textile and Foods
Research [INRTV] is located.
The French minister also visited the fish-farming station in La Bengue.
Two financing agreements, one dealing with budgetary aid of 19.25 million
F'rench francs, the other with financial assistance of 749,000 French
francs, were signed during Galley's visit.
Jean-Pierre Lebouder, the Central African minister for cooperation, signed
with his French counterpart a report on the talks that Galley held with the
Bangui authorities. The document contains a pledge on France's part to
contribute to the resolution of the most serious economic problems which
the CAR is experiencing.
Under the terms of this report, it was decided to provide a speedy solu-
tion to supplying the country with hydrocarbons. France proposed to sup-
port Central African requests to the Congo and Zaire, as wel~. as to the
petroleum companies.
As far as the road infrastructures are concerned, France has pledged to
continue the operations begun on the Berberati-Carnot-Baoro main road (in
the western part of the country). Some 180 tnillion CFA jAfrican Financial
Community] francs wi11 be requested early in 1980 from the management com-
- mittee of the French Aid and Cooperation Fund jFAC] and a new installment
of 160 million CFA francs will be considered :Ln 1981.
France and the CAR have agreed to intervene with the European Development
Fund [EDF] so that the proj~cts financed.by the EDF on the Bossemble-
Garoua-Boulai main highway may soon be started up again. The French and
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the Central African governments have thus deci,ded to ask for bids for the
~ repair of the roads in the cotton-growing region in the central part of
the country.
The two delegations spoke in favor of a reform of the Central African
Agency for River Transportation [ACCF], which could be partially put into
private hands. The financing of a certain amount of equipment of the
Bangui Airport will be considered.
The development of agricultural production was also the sub~ect of exten-
sive talks at the conclusion of which the French delegation stated that
it was prepared to examine supplementary financing as part of specific
projects. A mission of French experts will go to the CAR to dafine ways
to implement training and education in the fields of agriculture, stock
raising, waters and fo:.ests and hunting. -
The French delegation agreed to ask the FAC for supplementary credits
amounting to 160 million CFA francs for the development of forest and -
cynegetic resources and 90 million CFA francs for pro~ects for the manage-
ment and protection of fauna in the national park of Manovo-Gouda-Saint- -
Floris (northwestern part of the country).
Lastly, the d elegation headed by Galley suggested that foreign aid be re-
- quested for p rojects which have not been the subject of a French-Central
African agreement. It stated that it was ready to provide aid for the
preparation of the files to be presented to the financial backers and to
use its influence to obtain the necessary financing.
Commenting on the French-Central African talks, Lebouder said that they
- were meant to "strengthen co~peration between the two countries in the
fields where it already exists and, in view of the disastrous results left
by 14 years of dictatorship, to see what can be done to straighten out
rapidly the s ituation."
For his part, Galley was of the opinion that the "CAR ought to make an
immense effor�t to get out of the present stagnation" and asserted that
French aid "within the limits of its meang" will not be spared.
' COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
~ 12116 ~
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CHAD
TWO GROUPS WITHDRAW FROM FACP ~
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 pp 3468-3469
[Text] The Fundamental FROLINAT and the Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Chad [MPLTJ announced on 4 December that they were withdrawing
from the Provisional Front for Joint Action [FACP], established last May
and grouping six of~the 11 political movemants which make up the Trans3-
~ tional National Union Government [GUNT] of Chad.
The withdrawal of those two movements, led respectively by Had~aro Senoussi,
minister of reconstruction and territorial development, and Aboubakar
Mahamal Abderahmane, took place after the withdrawal of Dr Abba Siddick's
original FROLINAT last 16 November.
The fundamental FROLINAT and the MPLT a.ccused El Had~ Mahamat Abba Said,
state minister for the interior and security and president of the FACP and
Ahmat Alkabacne Acy1, state minister for foreign and cooperation affairs
and president of the Revolutionary Democratic Council of "tribalistic in-
triques" with the purpose of orienting the FACP toward objectives ~ sopar-
dizing the Lagos agreements on national reconciliation. Those agreements
were signed last August by all the CY:a~ian political movements. They also
reproached the two ministers for having divided the important ministerial
posts between then~elves.
In Nd~amena a strike of teaching personnel (who must face long delays in
the payment of their salaries) has been going on since early in December
and there have been wage demands in several sectors.
France will grant Chad priority aid for the purpose of getting on its feet
again the administration of that country. This was announced on 5 December
in Nd~amena by Jean Sriber, directeur de cabinet of the French minister of ~
cooperation.
Drawing his conclusions from the work of the mission of experts of the
Ministry of Cooperation, which stayed 10 days in Chad for the purpose of ~
estimating the needs of that country to get its economy going again. _
Sriber pointed out that the mast important thing for the moment was to
help the Chadian administration to function normally once more.
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~ He stated in this regard that k'rance would provide "priority technical
assistance in the field of the reconstruction of the tax services" so that
the state may once again find the resources which it has lacked so griev-
ously since its administration was upset after the fighting in February,
March and June between northerners and the southerners.
Fte also stated that France would ensure "a very significant part of the
salaries of the civil servants" for the next 4 months. France`s effort,
Srib er furthei� emphasized, will in particular have to do w~.*h the material
equipment that the ministries neEd, as some ministries were pi.~.laged dur-
ing tY?e clashes early in the year.. In the same way, the civil servants
caho have taken refuge in the south will receive help if they return to
the capital.
Lastly Sriber pointed out that he was taking away "a very comforting im-
pression" from the talks that he had with the Chadian leaders and that he
hoped that after that 4-month period of cooperation reorganization on a
level comparable to that of past years could be established betweeri France
and Chad.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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CHAD
GUNT EXISTS ONLY ON PAPER; PETROLEUM PROSPECTS NOTED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jan 80 pp 25, 26
[Article by Jos-Blaise-Alima: "Only the Bodyguards Govern"--passages in
slantlines published in italics]
[TextJ The National Union Government could not do anything
- in 3 months. And the ministers have turned into heroes of
a bad Western.
The first Congolese soldiers of the Neutral African Force, which must act as
a buffer between rival Chadian brothers, arrived in Ndjamena on 18 January.
But the bloody incidents that broke out near Amy-Dam, in the eastern province
of Ouaddai, on 8 January, are a reminder that Chad lives continually on tep
of a powder keg that can explode at any time. For several days in fact,
vio~ent encounters leaving over 50 dead pitted the Northern Armed Forces
(FAN) of Hissein Habre (minister of defens~) against those of the Joint
Action Front (FAC), which include three political factions represented in
the government: the Popular Liberation Forces of Mahamat Abba Said (minister
of the interior), the Volcan A~ny of Adoum Dana (public works), and the
Democratic Revolutionary Council of Ahmat Acyl (foreign affairs).
On Paper
It was to be expected that the agreement signed in Lagos last August by ali
the brothers who are political foes would not solve the Chadian problem. If
it is true that a Transitional National Union Government was set up on
10 November, after 3 months of equivocations, it is equally true that it
l exists only on paper. The different factions coexist, neutralize each other,
and paralyze a goeernment that cannot claim to have done anything at all
since it was formed. Each faction has the power of veto, and uses it when
it wants to. The meetings of the ministers, run by President Goukouni
~ Oueddei, unfold like a bad Western. Of course, the representatives of each
group sit side by side around the same table. But behind each minister
stands his personal guard of five or six bodyguards armed to the teeth.
Should a member of the government get up because of physiological reasons,
he is immediately surrounded by his guardian angels who escort him to the
lavatory and return with him to the council room.
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Split Power
This "close protection" remains just as impressive in the streets of the
capital, Ndjamena. No minister would take the wheel without having a
Kalishnikov or a gun with him. An excess is a must: rifles, guns, and
heads of guards stick out from the windows of the cars. Michel Nganbet,
- minister of the economy and of the plan,�confided that, like his colleagues,
he has a radio which, at all times, enabl2s him to be in contact with the
headquarters of Colonel Wadal Kamougue (the leader of his faction), who is
staying at 25 km from Ndjamena. /"In case of danger,"/he says, /"I
immediately send a distress signal."/
Besides, the ministers of the National Union Government do not have lodgings,
they camp out. Those f rom the South are in two villas used as dormitories.
It is true that most of the old administrative lodgings in Nd~amena were
sacked or destroyed. The rest are occupied by those who control the area
around the Chadian capital. As for private houses, they were confiscated
by those who were armed best. ~
Each ministry has become a"stronghold." Each minister has called for a
squad from his faction, most often from his native region. /"The atrocities -
committed during the civil war have left deep wounds which have not yet
healed,"/ said Michel Nganbet.
In the meantime, insecurity reigns everywhere, and no one is truly in power
~ in Nd~amena. Each faction is set up in a zone over which the government
has no control whatever.
Unly a neutral military force could put an end to such anarchy. Though
~ th_,Congolese soldiers are here because of the Lagos agreement, those of _
Benin and Guinea have not yet arrived. And those of France remain in Chad.
This does not please the southerners who have not forgiven France for -
choosing to play the Habre card at the time of the February 1979 incidents,
and since then to have chosen him as its "protege."
In fact, for Paris, the nationalism of the former jailer of Francoise
C~.austre was a shield against the expansionist designs of the neighboring
Libyan head of state, Colonel Qadhdhafi. And it is true that French-Libyan
confrontation in Africa is best illustrated in Chad.
- The unexpected alliance of Colonel Kamougue--having become since then
presidenr of the Chadian Government--and of Colonel Qadhdhafi can be
explained for similar reasons. Under the pretext of fighting French
influeuce, Libya does not intend to be excluded from the Chadian problem.
The only nuisance: France follows the same line of reasoning, and feels _
it should not stay out of the internal struggles in Chad. Obviously, this
means going around in circles, while the end of the tunnel recedes.... Yet
this chaos does not stop the World Bank from being interested in Chad.
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During his stay in Washington (from 6 to 9 January), Michel Nganbet met with
several managers of the bank. The discussions centered around petroleum.
Latent Miracle -
The outlook is so rosy that a mission is supposed to go to Chad at the end
of this month of January. In the beginning it will be a question of building,
- in Ndjamena, a refinery that will handle the petroleum earmarked for local
consump*_ion. With time, they plan to build a pipeline linking Moundou with
the Cameroonian port of Douala. According to the estimates of the Chadian
minister of the economy, Cameroon will get a righC of way costing about 500
- million CFA [African Financial Community] francs per month. As for Chad, the _
reserves discovered so far will bring in a mere 750 billion CFA francs a year.
For this "miracle" to take place, the political situation has to be stabil-
ized.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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CONGO
- FRENCH AGREEMENT ON MOVEMENT OF INDIVIDUALS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3469
[Text~ The French JOURNAL OFFICIEL of 5 December 1979 published Law No 79-
1032 of 4 December 1979 authorizing approval of the agreement between the
Government of the French Republic and the Government of the People~s Repub-
lic of the Congo on the movement of individuals, signed in Brazzaville on
1 January 1974, the general codicile was signed in Brazzaville on 17 June
1978 (These texts will be published later in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL).
~ The report made by Charles Ehrmann on the proposed law, on behalf of the _
Foreign Affairs Committee, recalled to mind the fact that French coopera-
tion continues to play "a significant and appreciated role" in the Congo.
However, this aid has had a tendency to level off. After naving reached
its maximum in 1976 with 239 million francs, it fell to 136 million in
1977; then it climbed up again to 209 million in 1978.
Technical assistance in personnel is slowing down temporarily due to the
spectacular increase in cost, the manpower decreasing sl3ghtly: 1974:
37 million francs; 1975: 49 million; 1976: 75 million; 1977: 79 million.
It must be noted however that the Congo is no longer paying its contribu-
tion to the maintenance of those technical assistants either and that the
cumulative debt has reached thus nearly 30 million francs. In 1979 the
number of technical assistance personnel was 485 officials, of whom 302
were employed in education. It must be recalled to mind that there were
more than 500 officials in 1976.
French military assistance is almost nonexistent both in personnel and in
material aid. However it must be noted that the Congo has requested that
a larger number of military scholarships be granted to Congolese military
personnel in training in oruer for them to travel to France.
Before the coming into force of the agreement on the movement of individ-
ua1s, (which has just been passed by the French Parliament) the migratory
flow from the Congo had not been subject to any restriction: indeed, the
Congo is a signer with France of the multilateral agreement on the basic
rights of the nationals of the states of the ~rencF? Community, which in
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its Article 2 provides for complete freedom of movement among nationals =
of the member countries.
The Congolese had not used that freedom to any great extent up to a recent
date, since, according to the statistics of the Ministry of the Interior,
only 3,398 of them were living in France on 1 January 1976. The migratory I-
- flow seems to have speeded up somewhat since then: on 1 January 1978 they
numbered 5,118.
Article 1 of the new agreement introduces the obligation to be the holder
of a valid passport for the Congolese who travel to France and reciprocally
for the French who travel in Congo, as well as the international compulsory
vaccination certificates, as is customary.
~ Article 2 provides for the institution of an entry visa whenever the dura-
7 tion of the planned stay is greater than 3 months. This provision is new
since the principle remained that of free movement.
Articles 3 and 4 provide for the obligation of guaranteeing repatriation.
These are provisions which are found in all agreements of this type and
which, as is customary, are applicable neither to politiciana nor di.plo-
- matic and consular officials, nor in a general way applicable to civil
servants and to a certain extent to students and sailors.
Article 5 is the one which most restricts the conditions under which the
Congolese may stay in France. It institutes the obligation of a labor
contract for those who want to come to France and work there. Chiefly,
Article 5 provides for the obligation of being in possession of a resi-
dence card for the Congolese in France as well as for Frenchmen who live
in the Congo. This residence card should, furthermore, for those who want
to engage in any paid activity, carry a special clause and be renewed under
conditions provided by the legislation of the state of residence. This
indeed permits France to refuse a French ~ob to a Congolese national ~ust
as it may to any foreign national. As for nonwage earners, they must give
proof of their means of existence.
Article 5 quinquies makes applicable to Congolese students the provisions
until now applicable to a11 foreign students. In practice this amounts
to provi_ding for preregistration of persons concerned before they travel
to France. Article 5 sexto concerns family groups.
Article 6, extending to Congo the benefits hitherto applicable to several
African nations including Niger, permits sailors of that country, of what-
- ever rank, to board French ships. Up to now that possibility was open
only to officers. In practice it will be noted that this provision is
rather balanced, since at present k'xench sailors are employed as officers
on Congolese fishing boats in the Gulf of Guinea.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
12116
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
BRIEFS
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH SPAIN--A technical c~operation agreement be-
tween Equatorial Guinea and Spain was signed on 5 December in Malabo at
the conclusion of a meeting of the joint commission. This announcement
was made by Sanchez Teran, minister of transport, who headed the Spanish
clelegation to Equatorial Guinea. The minister added that a fishing agree-
ment, granting $4 million in credits to Equatorial Guinea, was also signed,
as well as several cooperation agreements on air and sea transport.,.and the
sending of Spanish experts to Malabo. Lastly, the joint commission deter-
mined the priority sectors where all of the credits granted by Madrid will
be allocated, or a total of $23 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Dec 79 p 3469] 12116
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GABON
~ AGRICULTURAL, OTHER RESOURCES' DATA ANALYZED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 pp 171-181
[Article by Francois Gaulme: "Ambitions and Realism"]
[Excerpts] President Bongo was reelected for % years on 30 December. A new
National Assembly is to be formed for 5 years on 10 February in Libreville.
The national scene thus continues to be dominated, as it has been since
1968, by the same man, Mr Omar Bongo, who directs policy according to how -
he considers it to be best suited to the country's interest. Some observers,
who also express satisfaction with Gabonese stability, have come to believe
that there is more government management in Libreville than true political
life, with its debates, confrontations and choices that have hardly anything
to do with the economy.
Beginning in 1980, the government is expected to put into practice the congres-
sional resolutions passed to combat various abuses. T11e governmen~ has
pledged to do so on several occasions and it is therefore believed that
partial replacement of Gabonese political personnel, in t~e sense of a reju-
venation, is on the verge of taking place.
Improvement and Pri~rities
This expected improvement of moral standards and rejuvenation shoul.d not
occur in an atmosphere of crisis: it is said that the climate will instead
be optimistic in the Gabonese capital in the early ~80s.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Banque Lazard (acting as official _
financial adviser to the government) are satisfied with the results of the
austerity policy started in 1977. The Ministry of Finance has since regained
control, which it had lost during the years of euphoria, over government
expenditures and operations. This oolicy will be continued in coming years
through the 1980-82 Three-Yea.r Plan prepared with IMF assistance . The Third I'ive-
Ycar� Plan, extravagant and unrealistlc, has in fact been abandoned.
When the 1980 budget was submitted (314 billion CFA francs as opposed to
328 billion in 1979), Finance Mini~ter Jerome Okinda said that he was
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determined to ].imit foreign borrowing as much as possible. If Gabon's indebt-
edness, which reached 570 billion CFA francs in 1977 (1977 gross domestic
product: 636 billion CFA francs) has since been reduced, de~t servicing
still remains quite sizable: 143 billion CFA francs in 1979. Thus despite
the government's intention to maintain an adequate level of public spending
to stabilize the economy, the long period of convalescence, which Gabonese
f[nances will still have to undergo, calls for moderation. Ma;jor pro~ects
will be l.imited to those whose continuation is an absolute priority: con-
struction of the transgabonese railroad and the development of agricultural
potential.
Work on the transgabonese railroad was slowed beginning in 1979 for financial
reasons as well as technical considerations. Parfi of its layout actually
had to be resurveyed. Operations are nevertheless continuing at a regular
pace. The government, which had turned to a European consortium named
Eurotrag (with SPIE-Batignolles as coordinator) for construction of the
railroad, today seems to be considering applying to American and Romanian
companies for completion of certain sections.
A New Place for Agriculture
Everything remains to be done in the agricultural sector. The Gabonese
climate, with a rainy season lasting practically 9 months.of the year, is
a major obstacle. The slightest penetration into the forest does not make
it possible for the layer of humus thus cleared to withstand very rapid
furrowing. Gabonese women are well aware of this and their manioc fields
do nor }~ave the regular, well-kept appearance that you would naturally expect
to find on plantations. But the stumps left behind after trees are cut down
stabilize the soil and make it possible to produce tuberous plants (preferable
to corn, which exhausts the land) in accordance with a fallow-land system.
Truck-farm projects in Gabon have not produced the expected results. Growing
~ vegetables outside the dry season is quite a feat. A system of growing
hydroponic cr~ps under glass has been tested in Port-Gentil in the last
few years. But its technical level is such that it cannot be considered
on a large scale, nor can it be left to the initiative of rural Gabonese.
These projects originated with the amazement of foreign experts, who saw
the most ordinary produce on European tables being imported to Gabon at
great expense. The most realistic way of considering Gabon's food problems
(15 billion CFA francs of fresh produce imported each year) is probably
not by encouraging European eating habits. Gabonese farmers know how to
grow certain vegetables on favorable land, which thej~ can locate due to
~ their familiarity with the region. But they must not be expected to one
day become producers of carrots, potatoes and beans in the French style.
In ccntrast, rice growing has produced encouraging results in the southeastern
part of the country. Started by Taiwanese experts in the '60s, it was given
a new impetus by the People's Republic of China a few years ago. With un-
deniable success among well-equipped farmers, this crop is a definite hope,
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but its production has not yet reached 1,000 tons per year. The Japanese
company Nippon Koei is supposed to implement a program in Ndende, making =
it possible to produce 4,000 tons of rice annually in two harvests, as well =
as ~ processing plant.
Rice (12,000 tons are consumed in Gabon annually), plantain bananas and
manioc have every reason for remaining the basis of Gabonese agriculture.
It is on this sound principle that Gabon's most recent food crop projects
are based, either in the Franceville area, where moderate rainfall favors
~ agriculture as it does throughout the south, or in Ntoum, where a banana
plantation is currently being laid out. The plantation should produce 5,700
tons of fruit in 1981 and thus supply Libreville markets, which are only
40 kilometers away and are acc~ssible by railroad.
Cash crops must also remain an economic priority: this involves reviving
cacao growing in Woleu-Ntem. It had reached 6,000 tons prior to dropping
below 4,000 tons since 1976. Paralleling the drop in tonnage, production
quality has also declined. To stimulate cacao growing, the producer's price
has again been raised and the four quality categories reestablished. Planta-
tions must still be reconditioned and cacao trails restored. A similar
program is to be carried out in the case of coffee in the Makokou region:
- Gabonese production has been less than 500 tons since 1973.
Sugar production by SOSUHO (Haut-Ogooue Sugar Company), with 6,000 hectares
of sugar cane plantations and highly mechanized operations, is in its initial
stages. With 8,000 tons in 1978, it alr.eady satisfies national consumption.
Production of 20,000 tons was scheduled for 1981, but the cost price of
Gabonese sugar is far above world levels. As long as the transgabonese
railroad is unfinished, shipment of produce from Franceville is difficult
and the company's deficit already exceeded 5 billion CFA francs at the end
of 1978. The government appears determined to savz it. It is today consider-
ing converting part of its production into alcohol.
The success of a policy that is primarily agriculturally oriented does not
depend only on th?se major projects of an agroindustrial type. The Gabonese
Government has shown that it wanted to establish a rural cooperative movement
in the country. With the appearance since 1977 of a phenomenon practically
unknown in Gabon, unemployment, it is becoming necessary to stem the rur_al
exodus and, in terms of employment, to take measures other than swelling
the ranks of public office (28,500 civil servants in 1979 as opposed to
25,700 in 1977 and 19,600 in 1975, whereas private employees declined from
124,500 in 1977 to 90,000 in 1979).
Returning to that former agricultural prosperity in Woleu-Ntem, based on
cash crops, would be a model success that could change the direction of
future action. Unfortunately, such goals depend just as much on the restora-
tion or improvement of road infrastructures throughout the country as on
the attention given to agricultural problems. .
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The Nation's Real Wealth
Agriculture's recognized primary importance must not mislead us: if its
social function is of prime importance, its economic role, today almost
nil, will not be able to develop to the point of one day representing a
share of the GDP (gross domestic product) comparable to that of petroleum:
with an officially~ estimated total of 508.6 billion CFA francs in 1978
(down 20.1 percent from the previous year), agriculture's share is 42.2
billion (including 15.7 billion for timber) in comparison to 208.4 billion
for extractive industries. There has been tl~e same disproportion every
year since 1974 due to the increase in oil prices. Although crude oil pro-
duction, which has again dropped to less than 10 million tons annually,
should decline in coming years, the current rise of prices will make it
possible for this situation to continue: the barrel price of Gabonese crude
oil has doubled in 1 year and its value today exceeds $30.
Thus regardless of the improvement in the economic situation for timber
(in 1979, even small yards of zone "A," reserved for Gabonese, resumed their
operations), for manganese (1978 was an exceptionally poor year), and the
good prospects for uranium, petroleum remains the principal source of national
wealth: customs statistics show that if hydrocarbons bring in more than
200 billion CFA francs annually, manganese and timber only account for barely
30.billion in good years and uranium for about 20 billion.
_ Gabon thus possesses a revenue situation that is independent of its citizens'
labor: ac~ording to the World Bank (based on an estimate of�540,000 residents),
petroleum provided Gabon with a per capita GNP of $3,580 in 1978, the second
highest in Africa after Libya and far above that of its neighbors (Cameroon,
$460; Central African Republic, $250; Congo, $540; or even ivory Coast, $840).
This exceptional advantage should produce the greatest expectations. Yet
we are familiar with the debilitating effect of the overabundance of oil
revenues. Gabon has managed to return to its budgetary wisdom, but in the
future it must no doubt beware of the taste for great projects, even when
they appear justified. It is this taste, in fact, which almost caused its
downfall and we shudder at seeing a study being made of a tuna fishing project
estimated at more than 8 billion CFA francs, huge road works in Port-Gentil
and other investments that do not appear to be essential for the future.
*Source: General Department of Statistics, Libreville
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1980
- 11915 `
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GABON
BRIEFS
ALLEGED MERCENARY CAMPS--The Gabonese government has approved the
establishment of new training camps for Angolan mercenaries whose goal
is to organize destabilization operations agaxnst the People's Republic
of Angola. In another development, it has been learned that Col Rabert,
the new French ambassador in Libreville, whose activities include the
organization of secret agent and mercenary commandos, has reopenec~ the
"Benin File." Under his direction, mercenary Bob Denard had attempted
to overthrow the Beninese regime through the assassination of its
principal leaders. Reportedl,y, his smarting defeat did not discourage
~ him. [Text~ IParis AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 298, 3-6 Mar 80 p 21]
c:50 : 4400
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GUINEA
BRIEFS .
RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL STRENGTHENED--President Ahmed Sekou Toure headed
an important delegation of the Guinean government on an official visit to
Brazil, from 4 to 10 February. In the southern part of Brazil, the chief
of the Guinean government in particular visited the giant Itaipu dam
(under construction) and the agronomic institute of Londrina. According
to the joint co~nunique, Brazil is going to purchase some alumina from
Guinea and grant it some credits. Moreover, the two countries have agreed _
to intensify their cooperation in all domains: small industry, trade,
- construction, extraction of minerals, agriculture, livestock, transports,
culture, and technical cooperation. Brazil and Guinea believe that there
are great possibilities for the development of trade. One notes j;�:this
connection that economic relations between Guinea and Brazil are not very -
considerable. In fact, from January to Sept~mber 1979, Guinea imported
$14,000 worth of inerchandise from Brazil and exported to that country
$21,000 worth. During the 4 preceding years, the Guineans had not exported
~ anything to Brazil. On the other hand, the Brazilians nad exported ~
$114,000 worth to Conakry in 1977 and $130,000 worth in 1975. Sekou Toure
on 6 February had contacts in Sao Paulo with Brazilian businessmen. Finally,
both countries agreed to open embassies in their respective capitals.
General Figueiredo a~~epted the principle of an official visit to Guinea,
the date to be determined later. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 15 Feb 80 p 378J 8255
CEREAL DEFICIT--Appeal to friendly countries. A big deficit has been
ascertained in the co~nercialization of cereals in Guinea. According to '
a report of the minister of commerce, this "deficit is due to the appear-
ance in middle and upper Guinea of caterpillars tlxat destroyed the young _
shoots in rice fields at the beginning of the agricultural season, and
, thus impaired the harvests." It was decided to appeal to friendly coun- -
tries for help in providing food. [TextJ (Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Feb 80 p 378J 8255
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1tAILROAll DCL~CATION TU USSR--The "very disturbing frequency" of accidents
_ on the Behele-Conakry railroad, built by the Soviets, has caused Guinea
to entrust its minister of foreign affairs with an "urgent m3.ssion" to the
USSR. In 5 years, 4 accidents that occurred on this track that connects
the bauxite mines of Kindia (1J0 km from Conakry, exploited by a.~oint
Guinean-Soviet company) with the port of Conakry, have resulted in 4
deaths, the loss of 147 cars, of 5 locomotives, of 54,307 tons vf bauxite,
and of S00 meters of railway track. The most recent and most serious
accident occurred this past 26 December, when a 3,600-ton convoy, advancing
_ at 100 km per hour, collided violently in the city with a locomotive
transporting workers. The cause of this accident, which resulted in four
deaths (three Guineans and one Sovie4), was "failure of the brake system _
of the convoy cars, the failure being due to the concept of the system."
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Feb 80
p 378] 8255 ~
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONSTITUTION On 27 January, the Guinean voters elected
a new Pdational Assembly. The new parliament includes 210 members~ as against
150 in the former, 56 of whom are women, as against 30 previously. In a
message to the nation, President Sekou Toure indicated that the legislative
sector in Guinea could not digress from the line of the "Party-Sta.te" (de-
cided on in November 1978) which establishes the primacy of the Democratic
Party of Guinea over the state. He added that the new Assembly "will ha.ve
the responsibility of freely taking a position on a11 bills, on a11 budgets,
on all the accounts of the nation and finally on a11 the actions which could
have a direct or indirect influence on the collective future of the people
of Guinea." The new Guinean Assembly, whose members were selected at the
close of the meetings of the regional revolut~ionary councils (regional au-
thorities of the single Guinean part~ in charge of control over the manage- '
ment of the Guinean production units , includes notably: 27 professors, 5 ~
doctors and physicians, 2 magistrates, 8 engineers, 20 administrators and
economists, 17 officers and non-commissioned officers, 16 nurses and mid-
wives, 65 teachers, 2 skilled laborers, 10 farmers and craftsmen and 30
office workers. [Text] [Paxis MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 'i
1 Feb 80 p 256] 84-63
PRC VISIT FOR TOURE In 1980, the Guinean president, Mr Sekou Toure, will
make an official visit to the People's Republic of China. This was announced
on 22 January by the Chinese prime minis~cer, Mr Hua Guofeng~ while enter-
taining Mr Daouda Kourouma, the ambassador of Guinea to Peking. On the
political level, the Chinese prime minister underscored Peking's desire to
take advantage of the growing reservations in Conakry with regard to the
Soviet Union. On the bilateral level, this visit by the Guinean president
should mark the actual launching of cooperation between the two countries
which, beginnin~' with a visit to Conakry in 1978 by a high level Chinese
official, Mr Geng Biao, ha,s been rather modest up to now. r~eXt] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX L MIDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 25b~ 8~~b3
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JAPANESE TRUCK DONATION The Japanese government donated 35 trucks to the
government of Guinea. The donation was mad,e on 21 Januaxy to the Guinean
minister of transportation, by the Japanese amba,ssador to Guinea. Text]
~ Par�i^~ MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Fren~h 1 Feb 80 p 256~ g4-63
'I'i:CIINTCAI,, CULTURAI. AGRCEM~NT WITH DPRK--Radio Conakry reported on 19 January
Cliat (~uinea and the Democratic P~ople's Republic of Korea have concluded
an agreement for technical and cultural coopeation. Among other things,
' this agreement concerns agriculture, sports, plastic and decorative arts
and will take effect in April with the arrival in Guinea of North Korean
military serving in a civilian capacity. The cooperative agreement, signed
_ by the Guinean secretary of ~rate for international coop~ration and the
~ North Korean deputy minister of cooperation, follows the official visit
which Mr Sekou Toure, president oi the People's Revolutionary Republic -
of Guinea, made to the DPRK in Nov~ember. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
FT MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 195] 11915
AGROPASTORAL COOPEt;ATION WITH FKG--A semipublic corporation, SAPAL (Agro--
pastoral and Vegetables Company), has just been established between the '
Guinean Government and an FRG company for developing and financing agro- ~
industrial projects in Africa. An agreement to this effect was signed
in Conakry between the Guinean minister of agriculture and the president
- of the German company. SAPAL, which will be set up in Faranah in central
Cuinea, will farm 20,000 hectares of land before 1984 and raise 5,000 heads
- of cattle and 1 million broiler chickens. The company will also provide
for training Guinean ~;ersonnel in agriculture and livestock breeding. [Text]
- [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 195] 11915
CSO: 4400
,
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TVORY COt1S7'
llETAILS GIVEN ON OPERATIONAL BUDGET
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 11 Jan 80 pp 79, 80, 81
- [Text] Afrer the accelerated economic development of the Ivory Coast over
the years 1575 to 1977, there was a slowdown in 1978 and 1979. This trend,
associated with the evol.ution of world prices for primary exports, was to
some extent atteauated by an active policy of mobilization of external finan-
cial resources.
For the year 1979, the development of GNP, although not as noteworthy as the
average trend for the period 1976-1978 (+9.5 percent annital.ly) did neverthe-
_ less hover around 5 percent.
As in the 3 preceeding years, the operational budget for 1980 reflects three
_ major requirements: rigorous maintenance of budgetary balance by strictly
limiting any increase of expenditure against available resources; a limitation
on any expansion for the operation of the administration, in order to be able
to devote the maximum possible to f inancing investments which are essential
to the country's development; and, lastly, intensification of capital formation
efforts.
In 1979, the balance of trade showed a small surplus, although the deficit of
current transactions weighted it down.
The moiblization of foreign aid and capital has al~ays provided the economy
oE the Ivory Coast with the necessary additional financial resources for its
developrnent. After the 1978 pause, which had enabled the country to hold down
the level of foreign loans, a number of new commitments were undertaken in *he
course of 1979. These obligations will raise the debt total, current and
committed, to approximately 1,200 billion CFA francs in 1979. `
The budget for the fiscal year of 1980 also includes a number of fiscal mea-
sures designed to provide the Autonomous Fund for Amortization with resources
necessary to guarantee servicing of the public debt.
~xpenditures and Receipts
The operaeional budget for fiscal year 1980 was cut off at 338.4 billion CrA
francs, insofar as receipts and expenditure ire concerned, as compared caith
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304.6 billions ot CFA francs for the corrected 1979 budget, the initial fore-
cast oF which (277.4 billion CFA francs) was established in the course of the
year. The rate of increase of the indebtedness in the 1980 budget, as compared
with 1979, thus comes to 11.1 percent, a figure which stands approximately ~
midwzy between rlle data for 1979 (up +9.4 percent) and 1978 (12.6 percent
higher).
Rc~c~~ ipts
T~ible No 1 affords a comparison of the resources shown in the budgets for 1978, ,
1979, and 1980:
Table 1- Resources of the Operational Budget
(Billions of CFA francs)
1978 1979 1979 1980
Corrected Forecast Corrected
Direct taxes 51.5 5;.8 71.2 80.1 '
Property Tax 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.6 _
Patents & Licenses 1.5 2.0 2.2 2.8
Tcnclirect llomestic Taxes 36.7 38.2 42.9 46.6
Import duties & taxes 116.8 1'32.0 138.4 156.8
L'xport duties & taxes 36.6 33.7 36.4 35.7
5t~iinp & IZegistration tax 5.6 6.5 8.2 10.8
Nation~~l rcceirts 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9
Rc~ceLpl-5 from services 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.1
M:isc.cl..Lancous receipts 1.1 l.l 1.0 1.0
- 'C 0 T A L 253.6 277.4 304.6 338.4 '
In dealing with direct taxes, it should be noted that the revenue from the
profits tax for 1980 was esti_mated to be 34.9 billion CFA francs (11.2 per- -
cent higher than the corresponcling 1979 figure). This increase was justified
Uy substantial activity in the private sec~tor. The ordinary Income Tax re-
- turns were computed at 21.4 billion CFA francs (up 10.7 percent) while em-
- ployers' contributions, based on wages paid, should provide 13.5 billion CFA
francs (an improvement of 20 percent). Finally, it is anticipated that the
tax on wages and salaries will bring in 5.7 billion CFA francs (or 17.1 per-
cent more than in 1979).
' Domestic indirect taxes, basically, consist o.f. the value added tax, calculated
- to produce 29.1 billion CFA �rancs (or 7.8 percent over 1979), and the tax on
the rendering of services which should raise 15.1 billion CFA francs (9.6 per-
cent above the figure for the preceding year).
Duties and taxes on imports are expected to account for 56.9 percent of total
budgetary resources for 1980, as compared with 57.4 percent thereof in 1979
and 60.5 percent the year before that. At 156.8 billion CFA francs, the
increase over 1979 will amount to 13.3 percent.
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l1 sma11 downward corr.ection (of -2.0 percent)'was made in the forecase of
- recc~ipts from expc~rt cluties and taxes, given the estimated decline of cof.Eee
and cncac~ expurLs Ecr. 1980, resulting from climatic conditions, and of sales
oP undr.e:;secl (rou~l~?) timber. The tax on exports (with the exception oP tim-
. I~ur) tiliuulcl ~~r~~v(clc~ 27.5 bt..ll.tnn Cr~ Lr~?ncs (~i dro~~ of 5.5 pc~r~~cnt) w1rLl~~ llic~
rucc~[1~~~: frc~m llmbcr ~~x~~c~rCS :~liou].cl rcach 7.5 bil:lton CI?~ I'r.niics.
~xpenditure
The bulk oC the expenditure in the 1978, 1979 and 1980 budgets (in billions
of CFA Francs) can be shown as follows:
1978 ~ 1979 1979 1980
Expenditure Corrected Forecast Corrected
Personnel 127.5 146.1 154.3 182.7
Material 5.8 6.0 6.4 7.8
Development 67.6 65.1 76.7 70.2
Contractual debts 1.4 1.4 2.2 2.3
_ TransFer.s & claims 51.3 58.8 65.0 75.4
T 0 T A L 253.6 277.4 304.6 338.4
[n 1980, the Figures for perscnnel expenditure cover the cost of new activities _
in the L-ields of training, technical instruction, health and social welfare;
in shorL-, those which call Lor an increase in the number uf civil servants,
their total being 68,535 on 31 December 1979, as compared with 51,537 as oF
30 September 1978. -
The division oI budget expenditure by government service was as follows:
(shown i.n billions of CFA francs)
1978 1979 1979 1980
Corrected Forecast Corrected
General services 45.8 51.9 53.4 61.9
Social services 89.2 102.4 110.8 133.8
~conomic services 117.0 121.4 138.0 140.1
- Miscellaneous 1.8 1.7 2.4 2.6
T 0 T A L 253.6 277.4 304.6 338.4 ~
As compared wieh 1979, the increase is the expenditure for general services
represents an expansion of 16 percent (as compared with 16.4 percent for 19?9
in relation to the preceding year), while the expenditure on social services
rose by 20.8 percent (as against 24.2 percent in 1979 over 1978). -
The expansion observed in the item "Transfers and claims" (up 15.9 percent)
srems from higher allocations (ordinary; the Agency for Air Navigation Safety
in Africa and Madagascar - ASECNA; the Transit & Storage Company - SOTRA;
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~ cooperatives and education), that is, a total of 29 billion CFA franes (9.6
billion francs more), as well as subsidies to divers public agencies and
private institutions.
The division of the operational budget by ministry, including the major al-
locations, is indicated in Table 2, below:
'1';ible 2- Spr~ad of Operational Lxpencliture
(Billions of CFA francs)
- 1978 1979 1980
Corrected Corrected
Ecor.omy, rinance & ihe Plan 73.9 87.9 80.6
Llementary L'ducation 33.2 44.0 52.6
National Educar.ion 25.2 30.6 39.4
Public Works_,..Transport, Urbanism 27.0 31.7 38.3
National DQfense 19.8 21.9 24.9
Public Health 18.4 21.1 23.9
Interior 8.5 11.4 13.0
Technical Instruction 5.4 6.9 8.2
Internal Security 5.4 5.7 8.0
Agricu~ture 4.9 5.3 6.2
Foreign Aff,zirs 3.8 5.4 6.2
Commerce 2.2 3.6 3.8
InE